A radio countermeasure jamming system applied to substation unmanned aerial vehicle security defense

Abstract

The application discloses a wireless radio countermeasure interference system applied to substation unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) security defense, and relates to the technical field of radio interference, and comprises the following steps: identifying an UAV communication frequency based on a substation electromagnetic characteristic to obtain a frequency distribution; identifying a communication link according to the frequency distribution to obtain a link structure; calculating interference power according to the link structure to obtain the interference power; generating an interference signal according to the interference power to obtain the interference signal; setting a pointing coverage according to the interference signal to obtain radiation direction control parameters; and performing interference emission according to the radiation direction control parameters to obtain an UAV interference result. The application can adjust the interference power according to the station area electromagnetic environment change and the UAV link structure, calculates the minimum interference power as the interference emission basis, improves the interference efficiency and stability, and improves the success rate of the UAV suppression.

Description

Technical Field

[0001] This invention relates to the field of radio interference technology, specifically to a radio counter-jamming system for the security defense of drones in substations. Background Technology

[0002] With the increasing intelligence of power systems, the perimeter security of substations, as key energy hubs, has become a crucial aspect of ensuring stable power grid operation. In recent years, small unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) equipped with high-magnification cameras, communication modules, and remote control systems have frequently approached power facilities. These UAVs may be used for illegal filming, target reconnaissance, fault interference, or even destructive attacks, posing a potential threat to the operational safety of substations. Therefore, utilizing radio countermeasures to disrupt the communication link between UAVs and ground-based remote control terminals has become an important technological direction for substation defense.

[0003] In existing technologies, there are shortcomings in the calculation of interference power: existing UAV jamming equipment generally uses fixed radiated power or coarse path estimation models for jamming, resulting in large deviations in interference power and posing potential risks to power grid security. Summary of the Invention

[0004] To address the shortcomings of existing technologies, this invention provides a radio counter-jamming system for the security defense of unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) in substations, thereby solving the problems mentioned in the background section.

[0005] To achieve the above objectives, the present invention provides the following technical solution: In a first aspect, the present invention provides a radio counter-jamming system for the security defense of unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) in substations, comprising the following steps: S1. Based on the electromagnetic characteristics of substations, UAV communication frequency identification is performed to obtain the frequency distribution; S2. Identify communication links based on frequency distribution to obtain the link structure; S3. Calculate the interference power based on the link structure to obtain the interference power; S4. Generate the interference signal based on the interference power to obtain the interference signal; S5. Based on the interference signal, set the pointing coverage to obtain the radiation direction control parameters; S6. Based on the radiation direction control parameters, perform jamming transmission to obtain the UAV jamming results.

[0006] To further optimize this technical solution, the communication frequency identification in step S1 includes: In the context of high noise and multiple reflections in substations, the UAV signal can be distinguished from the substation noise by multi-path reflection difference screening, thus obtaining the communication frequency distribution of the UAV.

[0007] To further optimize this technical solution, the multipath reflection difference screening includes: Multiple spectrum scans were conducted on the airspace of the substation area. Suspected frequency bands were identified by combining the background electromagnetic noise of the substation area. By utilizing the differences in signal strength received from different directions of the substation, the signal changes of the same suspected frequency band were compared at multiple monitoring points to confirm the UAV signal.

[0008] To further optimize this technical solution, the communication link identification in step S2 includes: Based on the obtained frequency distribution, frequency band information is extracted, the link type and communication method used by the UAV in the station area are identified, and the data encoding, frame structure and transmission direction in the link are determined to obtain the link structure.

[0009] To further optimize this technical solution, the interference power calculation in step S3 includes: Based on the obtained link structure, the interference power calculation model is used, combined with the characteristics of strong noise and metal reflection in the substation, to calculate the interference power corresponding to various link structures.

[0010] To further optimize this technical solution, the interference power calculation model includes:

[0011] in: Interference transmission power; : Effective signal power of the drone receiver; The minimum operating signal-to-interference ratio (SIR) threshold for the link; Propagation loss; : Background noise power in the station area.

[0012] To further optimize this technical solution, the interference signal generation in step S4 includes: Based on the obtained interference power, a propagable electromagnetic wave with specific spectral distribution and time characteristics corresponding to different link types is generated through the signal generation process, thus obtaining the interference signal.

[0013] To further optimize this technical solution, the pointing overlay setting in step S5 includes: Based on the obtained interference signal, the power is concentrated in the direction of the UAV by controlling the radiation coverage area, and the radiation direction control parameters are obtained.

[0014] To further optimize this technical solution, the interference transmission in step S6 includes: Based on the obtained radiation direction control parameters, the interference signal is precisely transmitted to disrupt the UAV's communication link and obtain the UAV interference result.

[0015] This technical solution has been further optimized, including the following functional modules: Frequency analysis module, link identification module, power calculation module, signal generation module, direction control module, and signal transmission module.

[0016] In a second aspect, the present invention provides a computer device, including a memory and a processor, wherein the memory stores a computer program, wherein: when the computer program instructions are executed by the processor, they implement the steps of a radio counter-jamming system for the security defense of unmanned aerial vehicles in substations as described in the first aspect of the present invention.

[0017] Thirdly, the present invention provides a computer-readable storage medium having a computer program stored thereon, wherein: when the computer program instructions are executed by a processor, they implement the steps of a radio counter-jamming system for the security defense of unmanned aerial vehicles in substations as described in the first aspect of the present invention.

[0018] Compared with the prior art, the present invention provides a radio counter-jamming system for the security defense of drones in substations, which has the following beneficial effects: This radio counter-jamming system, applied to the security defense of drones in substations, uses a jamming power calculation model to adjust the jamming power according to changes in the electromagnetic environment of the substation area and the drone link structure. It calculates the minimum jamming power as the basis for jamming transmission, thereby improving jamming efficiency and stability and increasing the success rate of drone suppression. Attached Figure Description

[0019] To more clearly illustrate the technical solutions of the embodiments of the present invention, the accompanying drawings used in the description of the embodiments will be briefly introduced below. Obviously, the accompanying drawings described below are only some embodiments of the present invention. For those skilled in the art, other drawings can be obtained based on these drawings without creative effort.

[0020] Figure 1 This is a schematic diagram of a radio counter-jamming system for the security defense of drones in substations, as proposed in this invention. Figure 2 This is a schematic diagram of a radio counter-jamming system for the security defense of drones in substations, as proposed in this invention. Detailed Implementation

[0021] To make the above-mentioned objects, features and advantages of the present invention more apparent and understandable, the specific embodiments of the present invention will be described in detail below with reference to the accompanying drawings.

[0022] Many specific details are set forth in the following description in order to provide a full understanding of the invention. However, the invention may also be practiced in other ways different from those described herein, and those skilled in the art can make similar extensions without departing from the spirit of the invention. Therefore, the invention is not limited to the specific embodiments disclosed below.

[0023] Secondly, the term "an embodiment" or "embodiment" as used herein refers to a specific feature, structure, or characteristic that may be included in at least one implementation of the present invention. The phrase "in one embodiment" appearing in different places in this specification does not necessarily refer to the same embodiment, nor is it a single embodiment or an embodiment selectively excluded from other embodiments.

[0024] Example 1: Reference Figure 1 This is the first embodiment of the present invention, which provides a radio counter-jamming system for the security defense of unmanned aerial vehicles in substations, comprising the following steps: S1. Based on the electromagnetic characteristics of the substation, the communication frequency of the UAV is identified, and the frequency distribution is obtained.

[0025] In this embodiment, the communication frequency identification includes: Substations are high-voltage, strong electromagnetic complex environments with multiple interference sources (power frequency electromagnetic radiation generated by conductors in high-voltage corridors, multipath reflections caused by large metal facilities, etc.). These interferences work together to increase the noise of background wireless signals in the substation area and make the propagation path unpredictable. The operating frequency of drones, which can be directly scanned under normal open conditions, is easily masked by background noise or spectral distortion in substations. Directly using traditional spectrum scanning methods to identify the drone control frequency band can easily lead to problems such as the inability to distinguish between drone signals and harmonic interference in the substation area, or the detection results may deviate from the actual operating frequency of the drone.

[0026] In the context of high noise and multiple reflections in substations, multi-path reflection difference screening is used to distinguish UAV signals from substation noise, obtain the communication frequency distribution of UAVs, and thus improve the accuracy of UAV signal recognition.

[0027] Furthermore, the multipath reflection difference screening includes: Multiple spectrum scans were performed on the airspace of the substation area. Suspected frequency bands were identified by combining the background electromagnetic noise of the substation area. By utilizing the differences in signal strength received from different directions of the substation, the signal changes of the same suspected frequency band were compared at multiple monitoring points to confirm the UAV signal. The specific implementation steps include: Background electromagnetic noise acquisition in the substation area: Multiple sampling points are deployed in different areas of the substation to continuously record background wireless signals, obtain the background noise intensity change curve and the frequency of harmonic peaks, identify which frequency bands are long-term, stable and related to equipment operation harmonic peaks, and clarify which frequency bands belong to the inherent noise of the substation, thereby providing a benchmark for UAV signal identification, reducing subsequent signal identification errors and improving identification accuracy. UAV signal scanning within the station area airspace: Within the set monitoring radius, multiple spectrum scans are performed on the communication frequency bands (remote control, image transmission, and navigation frequency bands) that UAVs may use to reduce misjudgments caused by occasional interference or short-term abnormal signals. The data is then superimposed and compared with the background noise data. If the signal strength of a certain frequency band increases periodically in a short period of time and the amplitude exceeds the fluctuation range of the background noise curve, it is marked as a preliminary suspected UAV signal frequency band. Screening using multipath differences: The metal structure of the substation causes differences in the received signal strength in different directions. Relying on the multipath propagation characteristics formed by the metal components and buildings of the substation, candidate frequency bands are further screened. The signal changes of multiple monitoring points for the same suspected frequency band are compared. If the signal strength of a certain frequency point has obvious directional dependence and the strength changes significantly with the direction, it indicates that the signal source is a relatively independent moving target (drone). Then it is judged to belong to drone signal, rather than station area harmonic noise. Background harmonics are usually evenly distributed in the direction of each monitoring point. Confirmation based on communication signal characteristics: Combine the carrier structure characteristics of the UAV remote control and image transmission protocols to check whether the suspected frequency band signal contains periodic modulation characteristics or frame structure characteristics. UAV communication signals usually have specific periodic modulation patterns and frame structures. For example, the remote control link may present a fixed-length command pulse, and the image transmission link may have video frame boundaries or compressed bitstream characteristics. If there are command pulses or data frame boundaries, it is confirmed as a valid operating frequency band, rather than occasional noise or background interference. Frequency band distribution results are generated by classifying and summarizing the selected frequency bands according to link type, forming the frequency ranges for remote control channels, image transmission channels, and satellite navigation signals. These three frequency distribution results serve as the final output parameters of this step and as the data basis for subsequent steps.

[0028] S2. Identify the communication links based on the frequency distribution to obtain the link structure.

[0029] In this embodiment, the communication link identification includes: The airspace above a substation may contain various types of drones, and these drones have significantly different communication protocols. Link modes may include one-way remote control, two-way image transmission, compressed video links, frequency hopping links, and so on. Different link types correspond to different interference strategies and power requirements. Differences in communication structure directly affect how interference signals are generated. Failure to identify the link structure may result in interference failing to disrupt communication or wasting power. Therefore, simply knowing the frequency range used by the drone is insufficient to guide subsequent interference design.

[0030] Based on the obtained frequency distribution, frequency band information is extracted, the link type and communication method used by the UAV in the station area are identified, the data encoding, frame structure and transmission direction in the link are determined, and the link structure is obtained. This ensures that the interference signal accurately covers the target link, avoids ineffective radiation, improves the success rate of the radio countermeasure system in suppressing complex UAVs, provides quantifiable parameters for subsequent interference power calculation and signal generation, and ensures the feasibility of the project.

[0031] The methods for implementing communication link identification include: Frequency band scanning and signal reception: The frequency distribution results obtained by S1, including the frequency range of the remote control channel, the frequency range of the image transmission channel, and the frequency range of the satellite navigation signal, are used as the scanning range. Frequency reception is performed one frequency at a time in each frequency band. The receiving device captures all available signals in the frequency band, realizes directional identification of known frequency bands, and eliminates other electromagnetic interference sources. Multi-band comparison and demodulation: The captured signal is demodulated using multi-band comparison and demodulation technology. This mature technology can parse the data packet structure, extract the communication protocol header, frame boundary and periodic control information, etc., and obtain demodulation results of multiple frequency bands. By comparing the demodulation results with the known UAV protocol template, it can be determined whether the frequency band is a remote control link, image transmission link or other type of link. Link function determination: After demodulation, if the signal contains command pulses of fixed length (such as direction, take-off and landing, attitude commands), it is determined to be a remote control link; if the signal contains compressed frames or periodic data packets, it is determined to be an image transmission link; if the signal corresponds to the satellite navigation band and the characteristic symbols conform to the navigation signal standard (such as satellite navigation pseudocode), it is determined to be a navigation link. Communication method identification: For remote control and image transmission links, further analyze their modulation type to determine whether the remote control link is digitally encoded or analog spread spectrum, and whether the image transmission link is compressed or real-time transmission mode. Digitally encoded remote control link signals usually present a fixed symbol rate and frame structure, while analog spread spectrum remote control links have continuous frequency spread characteristics. Whether the image transmission link is compressed or encoded can be identified by inter-frame differences or preamble loops, so that subsequent jamming can be designed to target the modulation and coding methods, improving the targeting of jamming techniques. Transmission direction confirmation: For frequency bands that may have bidirectional links, analyze the frame structure and control segment length, such as whether there are return confirmation packets, feedback data segments or video return segments, to determine whether the data is a one-way remote control feedback or a bidirectional return data link. By using frame period and directional characteristics, the control direction and data return mode of the link can be determined, thereby clarifying the communication directionality of the interference target and deciding whether the interference needs to cover the uplink, downlink or full-duplex link. Link structure summary: Organize the identification results of each frequency band according to the link type to generate UAV link structure information, and clarify the function (remote control, image transmission, navigation), modulation method (digital, analog, compression), and transmission direction (one-way, two-way) of each frequency band.

[0032] S3. Calculate the interference power based on the link structure to obtain the interference power.

[0033] In this embodiment, the interference power calculation includes: Substations possess a unique environment with strong electromagnetic background and metallic equipment reflections, causing wireless signal propagation to differ significantly from ordinary open environments. Directly applying open-field formulas typically yields inflated interference power, leading to excessive equipment energy consumption and potential impacts on power grid communications. Therefore, it is necessary to recalculate the interference power in conjunction with the substation's electromagnetic environment.

[0034] Based on the obtained link structure, an interference power calculation model is used, combined with the characteristics of strong noise and metal reflection within the substation, to calculate the interference power corresponding to various link structures. This enables the interference to have a clear link targeting, accurately control the transmission power, improve interference efficiency and stability, avoid unnecessary coverage of legitimate communication in the substation area, increase the success rate of UAV suppression, reduce equipment load and energy consumption, and improve the long-term operational capability and applicability of the countermeasure system.

[0035] Specific implementation methods include: Determine the minimum interference ratio of the link: Based on the S2 output link structure, determine the minimum signal-to-noise ratio threshold for different links. Different communication links have different requirements for signal-to-noise ratio, so the difficulty of interfering with them is also different. For example, remote control links usually require high reliability and have a higher threshold, while image transmission links can tolerate short-term image damage and have a lower threshold. Navigation links rely on satellite pseudocode structures for positioning calculations and have an interference tolerance between the two, so that subsequent interference power calculations have a physical index basis. Introducing station area background noise as an auxiliary interference quantity: In substations, the operation of high-voltage electrical equipment generates continuous broadband noise, which objectively exists in the electromagnetic spectrum and has a real impact on UAV communication. Therefore, station area noise can be regarded as an effective energy source that can replace part of the active interference signal, jointly interfering with UAVs and completing the suppression. Introducing propagation loss: Since the interference signal does not directly act on the UAV receiver in the substation, but is transmitted from the countermeasure device and then propagates through reflection, attenuation, and multipath superposition, it is necessary to introduce propagation loss into the power calculation. The relationship between the power of the interference receiver and the power of the transmitter must be established. Only by calculating the propagation loss can the effective interference intensity of the UAV communication receiver be obtained. This will prevent the transmission power from being blindly increased due to overestimation of propagation loss, which could lead to excessive energy consumption or even coverage of legitimate communication in the substation area. To determine the minimum interference power: combine the propagation relationship and signal-to-noise ratio requirements, unify the units of all parameters to decibels (dB), decibel milliwatts (dBm), or watts (W). In engineering, dBm or dB is usually used so that losses can be directly expressed by subtraction. Calculate the minimum power value of the interfering transmitter.

[0036] Furthermore, the interference power calculation model includes:

[0037] in: Interference transmission power refers to the actual transmission power output by the interference device at the antenna port. The minimum power required to meet the interference requirements must be greater than this power. In engineering, it is advisable to choose a power slightly higher than the calculated power for interference, but it should not be excessively amplified to avoid additional coverage and energy consumption. The effective signal power of the drone receiver represents the power of the effective communication signal received by the target drone receiver (usually the receiving antenna of the remote controller or flight controller). It serves as a benchmark for calculating interference intensity and determines the lower limit of interference power. The stronger the signal, the higher the required interference power. It can be obtained by sampling the drone signal strength at different locations in the station area and calculating the average received power. It is usually between -80dBm and -40dBm and can be converted to a unified unit using a formula. The minimum signal-to-interference ratio (SIR) threshold of the link represents the minimum SIR required for the UAV communication link to maintain stable communication. The higher the value, the stronger its anti-interference capability. The reliability requirements of different UAV links are different and can be obtained by referring to the UAV communication protocol specifications or through experience testing. For example, the remote control link is usually 6 to 12 dB, the image transmission link is usually 0 to 6 dB, and the navigation link value is usually 3 to 10 dB depending on the navigation system. It can be converted into a unified unit using a formula. Propagation loss describes the signal attenuation from the transmitter to the UAV receiver, including path attenuation and multipath reflection loss. It is estimated by station area structure modeling, ranging and empirical propagation model, combined with station area layout, metal structure and UAV flight altitude. It is usually tens to hundreds of dB, and 60 to 100 dB is common at a distance of tens of meters. It can be converted into power units by formula. Background noise power in the substation area reflects the electromagnetic noise of the substation itself. It can partially replace interference power, reduce external emission requirements, and achieve environmental auxiliary suppression. The intensity depends on the operating status of the substation and is usually between -120dBm and -80dBm. It can be converted into a unified unit through a formula.

[0038] This model describes how to calculate the transmit power required for UAV interference by taking into account the link structure, station background noise, propagation loss, and effective signal power at the receiver.

[0039] Traditional methods for calculating interference power often use open-field interference power formulas, failing to differentiate between different link reliability levels and neglecting electromagnetic environmental noise and station area reflections. They rely on empirical values ​​or maximum power outputs, resulting in excessively high power levels. In contrast, this model identifies links and binds interference power to link type, improving its targeting. It utilizes environmental noise as auxiliary interference and considers propagation loss, enhancing its adaptability. Furthermore, it calculates the minimum interference power, avoiding excessive power levels, thus improving accuracy, safety, and the success rate of interference.

[0040] S4. Generate the interference signal based on the interference power to obtain the interference signal.

[0041] In this embodiment, the generation of the interference signal includes: UAV communication links use specific frequencies, bandwidths, and modulation methods, such as OFDM data transmission links, FHSS frequency hopping remote control channels, and QPSK control links. Knowing only the interference power is not enough to disrupt communication. It is also necessary to determine the content, spectral characteristics, and modulation method of the interference signal and construct a wireless signal that disrupts the communication structure in order to effectively cause link failure.

[0042] Based on the obtained interference power, a propagable electromagnetic wave with specific spectral distribution and time characteristics corresponding to different link types is generated through the signal generation process, thus obtaining an interference signal. This allows the interference to cover the link bandwidth, suppress the link coding structure, and directly disrupt the data demodulation process, generating controllable, effective, and stable interference in the target frequency band, achieving higher suppression efficiency than traditional power suppression.

[0043] The steps involved in generating interference signals include: Interference signal modulation pattern determination: Based on the link type analyzed by S2, the corresponding interference modulation method is selected. If it is an OFDM-based image transmission link, broadband noise with random subcarrier modulation interference is generated. If it is a frequency-hopping remote control link, multi-carrier interference with synchronous frequency band hopping is generated. If it is a narrowband control link, a narrowband continuous wave suppression signal is generated, so that the interference signal is directly coupled with the UAV communication modulation method, reducing the effective anti-interference capability. Frequency band and bandwidth parameter embedding: The communication frequency distribution information of S1 is used as the center frequency point, and the bandwidth is expanded or covered according to the link bandwidth. For example, the entire working bandwidth of OFDM links is covered, and the center frequency point is dynamically changed according to the frequency point for frequency hopping links, so as to achieve complete overlap between the interference signal spectrum and the UAV channel, and ensure that the interference signal will not cause accidental damage to the original wireless services in the station area. Signal amplitude determination: Based on the interference transmission power obtained from S3, the amplitude of the interference signal is determined. By setting the amplitude of the generated signal, the actual transmission power is made slightly higher than this value, so as to meet the interference requirements and avoid unnecessary energy consumption or electromagnetic interference risks in the station area due to excessive power. Temporal perturbation construction: UAV communication modules usually have error correction and automatic retransmission functions. If the interference signal is stable and predictable, the UAV can readjust the receiving gain, modify the demodulation strategy, or adopt anti-interference frequency hopping to avoid the suppression signal. Therefore, randomized time segments, such as random amplitude perturbation, random pulse groups, and random modulation sequences, are added to the signal generation to make the interference signal unpredictable and unstable, thus hindering the UAV from performing adaptive anti-interference reconstruction. Wireless interference signal formation: The signal after modulation, spectrum coverage, power mapping and random injection is converted from digital to analog, filtered and amplified by the radio frequency front end to form an interference signal that meets the requirements of center frequency, bandwidth structure and power.

[0044] S5. Based on the interference signal, set the directional coverage to obtain the radiation direction control parameters.

[0045] In this embodiment, the pointing overlay setting includes: Drones have a high degree of freedom of movement within the substation space, and their communication link receivers may be located in different positions. Power and frequency coverage alone cannot guarantee continuous suppression of the link; spatial directional control must be used to concentrate energy in the areas where drones are likely to appear.

[0046] Based on the obtained interference signal, the power is concentrated in the direction of the UAV by controlling the radiation coverage area, and the transmission is made precisely. The radiation direction control parameters are obtained to ensure that the signal is strongest at the UAV's flight path, while reducing interference to other communication equipment, improving interference efficiency and reducing energy consumption.

[0047] The implementation methods for this step include: Determine the target coverage area: Based on the inspection path of the substation drone and the airspace layout of the substation area, determine the spatial range of interference coverage. For example, mainly cover the main control area, switch area and cable channel of the substation, and other areas where drones may fly. At the same time, exclude areas where there are no unattended personnel or important communication equipment. This provides a basic constraint for setting the radiation direction parameters and reduces the risk of non-target interference. Choose the appropriate transmitting antenna array type: Select the antenna type based on the size and shape of the coverage area, such as a phased array antenna or a multi-beam antenna. The antenna selection criteria include the size of the station area, the range of transmitting power, and the frequency band of interference signals. The antenna type determines the degree of freedom and accuracy of subsequent directional control parameters. Calculate the main lobe pointing and half-power angle: Based on the location and range of the target coverage area, calculate the main lobe direction of the interference signal to maximize the radiated energy at the possible location of the UAV. The half-power angle defines the width of the coverage area to ensure coverage of the target area while controlling side lobe leakage, ensuring that the transmitted signal is concentrated and effective and does not waste power. Sidelobe suppression and multi-beam superposition: For non-target areas within the station area, leakage power is controlled through sidelobe suppression technology to avoid affecting critical equipment. If the coverage area is wide, a single main lobe is insufficient to form continuous suppression. Multi-beam superposition can be used to combine multiple main lobes to form continuous coverage, making the spatial distribution of interference signals flexible. It can take into account both "concentrated strikes" and "full area coverage" without affecting the safety of existing equipment in the station area. Generate radiation direction control parameters: Based on the above, generate a set of parameters that can be directly input into the transmission control system, including the main lobe pointing angle, half-power angle range, side lobe suppression amplitude, and multi-beam combination configuration, thereby achieving controllable and precise space interference.

[0048] Furthermore, the radiation coverage control includes: Determining the main lobe pointing and half-power angle: Half-power angle:

[0049] in: Half-power angle: This represents the beamwidth at which the radiation gain decreases by 3dB. It is used to determine the width of the interference coverage and ensure that the UAV is always affected within the target area. The maximum horizontal boundary angle of the target coverage area represents the maximum angle of the UAV's boundary on the horizontal plane. It is obtained by estimating the UAV's position and combining it with the geographic coordinates of the station area, and determines the horizontal coverage range of the interference. : Minimum horizontal boundary angle of the target coverage area, representing the minimum angular boundary of the UAV on the horizontal plane; Main lobe center direction:

[0050] in: The maximum vertical boundary angle of the target coverage area represents the maximum value of the angular domain boundary of the UAV in the vertical direction. It is calculated in combination with the height of the station facilities and the flight altitude to determine the vertical coverage range of the interference. : Minimum vertical boundary angle of the target coverage area, representing the minimum angular boundary of the UAV in the vertical direction; The center of the main lobe in the horizontal direction indicates the direction in which the interference signal radiates the strongest energy, maximizing the interference energy's effect on the UAV communication link. The center of the main lobe in the vertical direction; The location of the main lobe center and the half-power angle are determined by the maximum and minimum values ​​of the horizontal and vertical boundary angles of the target coverage area. Sidelobe suppression:

[0051] in: Sidelobe direction gain is used to determine whether leakage gain after sidelobe suppression will affect existing equipment in the station area. : Main lobe directional gain, the maximum interference signal radiation intensity within the target coverage area; Sidelobe suppression coefficient: A coefficient used to limit the sidelobe from exceeding the amplitude ratio of the main lobe. It is obtained according to the antenna equipment specifications or interference requirements to avoid false interference to normal wireless communication in the substation (such as industrial control transmission and inspection tools). Multi-beam superposition:

[0052] in: Combined radiation gain represents the result of combining multiple beams to cover a larger area. By weighting and superimposing beams from different directions, the coverage range is made continuous and without blind spots. : No. Beam gain in each direction; : No. The weighting coefficients of each directional beam are used to control the distribution of interference intensity in different directions when covering a wide area; Number of beams.

[0053] S6. Based on the radiation direction control parameters, perform jamming transmission to obtain the UAV jamming results.

[0054] In this embodiment, the interference emission includes: The main threat posed by drones operating from substations stems from the continuity and anti-jamming capabilities of their communication links. Once the control link is compromised, the drone cannot continue to hover, take photos, or carry dangerous devices into critical areas. While S5 provides radiation direction control parameters that allow energy to be accurately directed in the spatial direction corresponding to the drone's communication link, the method for launching and destroying the drone's control link is still undetermined.

[0055] Based on the obtained radiation direction control parameters, the interference signal is precisely transmitted to disrupt the UAV communication link, thereby obtaining the UAV interference result and avoiding false interference to the station area communication equipment, thus achieving the goal of blocking, suppressing and destroying the UAV communication link.

[0056] Specific implementation methods include: Radiation direction control parameter import: The radiation direction control parameters output by S5 are input into the jamming transmission control unit. This control unit is responsible for adjusting the orientation, beamwidth and energy distribution ratio of the transmitting antenna array according to these parameters to ensure that the electromagnetic behavior of the transmitting hardware array is consistent with the radiation direction control parameters, instead of using the default or constant omnidirectional transmission mode, so as to ensure that the jamming signal can accurately act on the target UAV airspace. Interference energy direction locking: The main lobe direction is determined according to the radiation direction control parameters, and the peak power of the interference signal is directionally sent to the location of the UAV communication link, so that the interference energy is concentrated and stable in the target airspace, improving the link destruction efficiency and ensuring that the signal quality of the UAV receiver degrades to the point where communication cannot be maintained; Coverage maintenance: When the drone flies or moves within a small area, the interference coverage width is maintained according to the half power angle. Even if the target experiences low-frequency vibration or short-distance movement, stable interference is maintained, making it impossible for the drone to restore the communication link. Sidelobe suppression and multi-beam spread execution: If the UAV crosses a wide airspace or enters the station area from different directions, multiple beams are superimposed and transmitted according to the sidelobe suppression constraint and weighted beam configuration to form continuous coverage, ensuring that energy from non-target directions does not generate false interference, and keeping UAVs in a communication suppression state in a wide range of areas. Interference Result Acquisition: Based on the failure feedback of the UAV communication link (such as changes in controlled actions, abnormal flight attitude, and triggering of return-to-home command), directional interference is continuously maintained until the target is completely disabled, and the UAV interference result is obtained, such as the UAV being forced to return to home, hovering, or crashing, thereby achieving the goal of UAV defense in substations.

[0057] Example 2: Reference Figure 2This is the second embodiment of the present invention, which provides a radio counter-jamming system for the security defense of unmanned aerial vehicles in substations, including the following functional modules: Frequency analysis module: Collects the continuous radio spectrum that can be received in the substation area and combines it with the electromagnetic distribution characteristics in the substation area to extract the frequency distribution range of the UAV communication signal based on the spectrum analysis results; Link identification module: Utilizes frequency distribution to analyze the modulation mode of communication signals within the frequency band, analyze signal bandwidth, and identify image transmission and remote control channels, thereby obtaining the link structure adopted by the UAV; Power calculation module: Based on the UAV link structure, combined with the station area wireless propagation loss model and the measured received power of the UAV communication signal, calculate the minimum interference power required to cause the UAV link to fail. Signal generation module: Generates an interference signal that is consistent with the target channel or achieves coverage suppression based on the minimum interference power; Direction control module: Based on the S4 interference signal, combined with the UAV azimuth angle, station area antenna pattern and airspace coverage, the target pointing angle and radiation coverage range are set, and the radiation direction control parameters are output. Signal transmission module: Based on the radiation direction control parameters, it transmits interference signals in a directional manner and continuously monitors the communication status of the UAV during the interference process. It triggers continuous suppression or tracking coverage based on link changes to achieve the goal of UAV defense in substations.

[0058] Example 3: In practical applications, this invention can be used to precisely suppress illegal drone communication links near substations, with a 220kV outdoor substation as a typical scenario for illustration.

[0059] In this scenario, a broadband spectrum receiver deployed above the station perimeter continuously monitors wireless signals in the airspace. When a drone approaching the station activates its remote control and image transmission links, its communication signals will appear on the receiver's spectrum as fixed bandwidth, repetitive burst patterns, and a specific modulation structure. The receiver performs frequency domain separation and bandwidth identification on this spectrum to determine the actual occupied range of the two communication links, providing direct evidence for subsequent link structure identification. Subsequently, the modulation analysis of these two identified frequency band communication signals is performed. By identifying carrier symbol changes and packet header structures, it can be determined that the drone uses OFDM multi-carrier image transmission and employs a spread spectrum frequency hopping communication mechanism in the remote control channel. Simultaneously, based on the burst period and signal packet structure at the link end, it can be determined that the drone uses a communication structure with separate channels for independent image transmission and control links, prioritizing high-bitrate video data transmission in the image transmission link and command interaction in the remote control link. These structural characteristics can be practically applied to the precise positioning of jamming strategies; that is, both channels must be suppressed simultaneously to disrupt overall drone control; otherwise, only image transmission may be jammed while the drone can still be commanded by the pilot.

[0060] Based on the above structure, the communication power of the UAV receiver in the airspace of the substation is measured on the ground. At the same time, by combining the propagation loss model with the density of steel structure equipment in the station and the reflection characteristics of open channels, the minimum interference power required to achieve suppression of the image transmission link and the remote control link is calculated respectively. The interference power slightly higher than this result is selected as the actual transmission power of the interference signal transmitter to ensure that there will be no problem of over-suppression or under-suppression.

[0061] Based on the communication characteristics of these two links, two types of interference signals are constructed: a broadband suppression signal in the same frequency band is generated for the OFDM image transmission link, and a directional frequency-hopping coverage signal is generated for the spread spectrum remote control link. Finally, a phased array interference antenna array deployed on the perimeter towers along the substation tracks the azimuth of the target UAV, and then transmits the interference signal directionally according to the calculated radiation direction control parameters. This transmission process can directly affect the UAV in the airspace with a specific main lobe direction without causing spillover effects on external communication equipment. After approximately 1 to 3 seconds of interference transmission, both the UAV's remote control and image transmission links are disrupted, with typical failure behaviors including hovering, returning to base, or forced landing, thus achieving the goal of substation airspace security defense.

[0062] Example 4: This embodiment also provides a computer device applicable to a radio counter-jamming system for the security defense of drones in substations, including a memory and a processor; the memory is used to store computer-executable instructions, and the processor is used to execute the computer-executable instructions to realize the radio counter-jamming system for the security defense of drones in substations as proposed in the above embodiment.

[0063] This embodiment also provides a storage medium storing a computer program that, when executed by a processor, implements a radio counter-jamming system for the security defense of unmanned aerial vehicles in substations, as proposed in the above embodiment.

[0064] The computer device can be a terminal, comprising a processor, memory, communication interface, display screen, and input devices connected via a system bus. The processor provides computing and control capabilities. The memory includes non-volatile storage media and internal memory. The non-volatile storage media stores the operating system and computer programs. The internal memory provides an environment for the operation of the operating system and computer programs stored in the non-volatile storage media. The communication interface is used for wired or wireless communication with external terminals; wireless communication can be achieved through Wi-Fi, carrier networks, NFC (Near Field Communication), or other technologies. The display screen can be an LCD screen or an e-ink screen. The input devices can be a touch layer covering the display screen, buttons, a trackball, or a touchpad on the computer device's casing, or an external keyboard, touchpad, or mouse.

[0065] If a function is implemented as a software functional unit and sold or used as an independent product, it can be stored in a computer-readable storage medium. Based on this understanding, the technical solution of this invention, or the part that contributes to the prior art, or a part of the technical solution, can be embodied in the form of a software product. This computer software product is stored in a storage medium and includes several instructions to cause a computer device (which may be a personal computer, server, or network device, etc.) to execute all or part of the steps of the methods of the various embodiments of this invention. The aforementioned storage medium includes various media capable of storing program code, such as USB flash drives, portable hard drives, read-only memory (ROM), random access memory (RAM), magnetic disks, or optical disks.

[0066] The logic and / or steps represented in the flowchart or otherwise described herein, for example, can be considered as a sequenced list of executable instructions for implementing logical functions, and can be embodied in any computer-readable medium for use by, or in conjunction with, an instruction execution system, apparatus, or device (such as a computer-based system, a processor-including system, or other system that can fetch and execute instructions from, an instruction execution system, apparatus, or device). For the purposes of this specification, "computer-readable medium" can be any means that can contain, store, communicate, propagate, or transmit programs for use by, or in conjunction with, an instruction execution system, apparatus, or device.

[0067] More specific examples (a non-exhaustive list) of computer-readable media include: electrical connections (electronic devices) having one or more wires, portable computer disk drives (magnetic devices), random access memory (RAM), read-only memory (ROM), erasable and editable read-only memory (EPROM or flash memory), fiber optic devices, and portable optical disc read-only memory (CDROM). Furthermore, computer-readable media can even be paper or other suitable media on which programs can be printed, because programs can be obtained electronically, for example, by optically scanning the paper or other media, followed by editing, interpreting, or otherwise processing as necessary, and then stored in computer memory.

[0068] It should be understood that various parts of the present invention can be implemented in hardware, software, firmware, or a combination thereof. In the above embodiments, multiple steps or methods can be implemented in software or firmware stored in memory and executed by a suitable instruction execution system. For example, if implemented in hardware, as in another embodiment, it can be implemented using any one or a combination of the following techniques known in the art: discrete logic circuits having logic gates for implementing logical functions on data signals, application-specific integrated circuits (ASICs) having suitable combinational logic gates, programmable gate arrays (PGAs), field-programmable gate arrays (FPGAs), etc.

[0069] It should be noted that the above embodiments are only used to illustrate the technical solutions of the present invention and are not intended to limit it. Although the present invention has been described in detail with reference to preferred embodiments, those skilled in the art should understand that modifications or equivalent substitutions can be made to the technical solutions of the present invention without departing from the spirit and scope of the technical solutions of the present invention, and all such modifications or substitutions should be covered within the scope of the claims of the present invention.

Claims

1. A radio counter-jamming system for the security defense of unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) in substations, characterized in that, Includes the following steps: Step S1: Identify the communication frequency of the UAV based on the electromagnetic characteristics of the substation to obtain the frequency distribution; Step S2: Identify communication links based on frequency distribution to obtain the link structure; Step S3: Calculate the interference power based on the link structure to obtain the interference power; Step S4: Generate an interference signal based on the interference power to obtain the interference signal; Step S5: Set the pointing coverage based on the interference signal to obtain the radiation direction control parameters; Step S6: Conduct jamming transmission according to the radiation direction control parameters to obtain the UAV jamming results.

2. The radio counter-jamming system for the security defense of unmanned aerial vehicles in substations according to claim 1, characterized in that, The communication frequency identification in step S1 includes: In the context of high noise and multiple reflections in substations, the UAV signal can be distinguished from the substation noise by multi-path reflection difference screening, thus obtaining the communication frequency distribution of the UAV.

3. A radio counter-jamming system for the security defense of unmanned aerial vehicles in substations according to claim 2, characterized in that, The multipath reflection difference screening includes: Multiple spectrum scans were conducted on the airspace of the substation area. Suspected frequency bands were identified by combining the background electromagnetic noise of the substation area. By utilizing the differences in signal strength received from different directions of the substation, the signal changes of the same suspected frequency band were compared at multiple monitoring points to confirm the UAV signal.

4. A radio counter-jamming system for the security defense of unmanned aerial vehicles in substations according to claim 1, characterized in that, The communication link identification in step S2 includes: Based on the obtained frequency distribution, frequency band information is extracted, the link type and communication method used by the UAV in the station area are identified, and the data encoding, frame structure and transmission direction in the link are determined to obtain the link structure.

5. A radio counter-jamming system for the security defense of unmanned aerial vehicles in substations according to claim 1, characterized in that, The interference power calculation in step S3 includes: Based on the obtained link structure, the interference power calculation model is used, combined with the characteristics of strong noise and metal reflection in the substation, to calculate the interference power corresponding to various link structures.

6. A radio counter-jamming system for the security defense of unmanned aerial vehicles in substations according to claim 5, characterized in that, The interference power calculation model includes: ； in: Interference transmission power; : Effective signal power of the drone receiver; The minimum operating signal-to-interference ratio (SIR) threshold for the link; Propagation loss; : Background noise power in the station area.

7. A radio counter-jamming system for the security defense of unmanned aerial vehicles in substations according to claim 1, characterized in that, The generation of interference signals in step S4 includes: Based on the obtained interference power, a propagable electromagnetic wave with specific spectral distribution and time characteristics corresponding to different link types is generated through the signal generation process, thus obtaining the interference signal.

8. A radio counter-jamming system for the security defense of unmanned aerial vehicles in substations according to claim 1, characterized in that, The pointer overwrite setting in step S5 includes: Based on the obtained interference signal, the power is concentrated in the direction of the UAV by controlling the radiation coverage area, and the radiation direction control parameters are obtained.

9. A radio counter-jamming system for the security defense of unmanned aerial vehicles in substations according to claim 1, characterized in that, The interference transmission in step S6 includes: Based on the obtained radiation direction control parameters, the interference signal is precisely transmitted to disrupt the UAV's communication link and obtain the UAV interference result.

10. A radio counter-jamming system for the security defense of unmanned aerial vehicles in substations according to claim 1, characterized in that, Includes the following functional modules: Frequency analysis module, link identification module, power calculation module, signal generation module, direction control module, and signal transmission module.

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