Source network load storage collaborative control oriented quantum-classical hybrid security authentication method

Abstract

The application discloses a quantum-classical hybrid security authentication method for source network load storage collaborative control and relates to the technical field of quantum communication. The quantum-classical hybrid security authentication method for source network load storage collaborative control comprises the following steps: S1, acquiring group control authentication observation data, and performing key state calibration and field scale unification; S2, generating asset source sealing, evaluating the access closure degree of a terminal into a group control authentication tree, and constructing a group control authentication tree; S3, completing quantum-classical hybrid authentication, and constructing a leaf key fragment distribution table; and S4, evaluating the group control authentication receipt closure degree, and executing abnormal leaf pruning. The application effectively improves the low latency, key isolation, cross-domain protection capability and authentication process traceability of multi-terminal group control authentication in the source network load storage collaborative control scene, and solves the problems of unclear internal and external asset authentication boundaries and the difficulty of quantum key and classical cryptographic system collaboration.

Description

Technical Field

[0001] This invention relates to the field of quantum communication technology, specifically to a quantum-classical hybrid security authentication method for source-grid-load-storage collaborative control. Background Technology

[0002] With the large-scale integration of distributed photovoltaic, energy storage battery management systems, electric vehicle charging piles, flexible load control terminals, and other source-grid-load-storage equipment, the authentication links between the main station, edge nodes, and terminals exhibit characteristics such as a large number of terminals, complex communication paths, mixed access of internal and external assets, short authentication windows, and frequent key calls. Existing technologies mostly use traditional symmetric or asymmetric cryptography for identity authentication, which lacks sufficient resistance to quantum computing attacks; a single quantum key distribution scheme is also difficult to be compatible with the State Grid's existing commercial cryptographic equipment, digital certificate system, and massive wireless terminal access scenarios.

[0003] For example, the invention patent with announcement number CN116055065B discloses an ADS-B data security authentication method based on tree-chain hybrid, including: dividing the real-time ADS-B message stream into several groups, defining the root hash of the data in each group as the group hash based on the hash tree structure; generating the root hash of each group using the SM3 hash algorithm through the hash tree structure; after generating the root hash in each group, constructing an intra-chain authentication architecture using the ADS-B data groups; cooperating with multiple aircraft within the same air traffic control area to elect a master aircraft node, with each aircraft generating an authentication short chain according to the intra-chain authentication architecture, the master aircraft node generating the root node according to the hash tree structure, and then signing the root node to construct an inter-chain authentication architecture; the receiving end caches each short chain, and after receiving the signed message, verifies the signed message using the user public key generated by the SM9 algorithm.

[0004] For example, invention patent CN120378122B discloses a lightweight secure authentication method based on a hybrid authentication architecture, including: centralized edge-level authentication for registering the IoT system; enabling communication between the IoT system's devices and an edge server; determining whether two devices needing to communicate are connected to the same edge server; if so, the two devices communicate within the same domain; otherwise, they communicate across domains. This invention, by combining centralized and decentralized authentication architectures, not only effectively improves the security, scalability, and real-time performance of the IoT system, but also solves the computational, storage, and latency problems inherent in traditional authentication methods while ensuring the performance of resource-constrained devices.

[0005] In existing technologies, current systems typically perform a handshake on each terminal individually during group control authentication, which can easily lead to edge authentication queue accumulation and acknowledgment delays. If a shared group key is used instead, it can easily trigger lateral impersonation and key proliferation risks within the group if a single terminal is compromised. This invention, building upon the existing master station security layer, edge security layer, terminal security layer, QKD key distribution, State Grid digital certificate authentication, external asset quantum pre-set key authentication, dynamic key updates, and full-process traceability mechanisms in the disclosure documents, further introduces a group control authentication tree, asset source sealing, root digest quantum authentication, leaf key sharding allocation table, leaf acknowledgment closure evaluation, and key lifecycle tracing mechanism to achieve system-level security enhancements in the source-grid-load-storage group control authentication process.

[0006] Therefore, in order to address the above issues, there is an urgent need for a quantum-classical hybrid security authentication method for source-grid-load-storage collaborative control. Summary of the Invention

[0007] Technical problems to be solved To address the shortcomings of existing technologies, this invention provides a quantum-classical hybrid security authentication method for source-grid-load-storage collaborative control, which solves the problems of unclear boundaries between internal and external asset authentication and the difficulty in coordinating quantum keys and classical cryptographic systems.

[0008] Technical solution To achieve the above objectives, this invention employs the following technical solution: a quantum-classical hybrid security authentication method for source-grid-load-storage collaborative control, comprising: S1, acquiring group control authentication observation data and performing time window relocation, link jitter correction, key state calibration, and field scale unification to obtain a group control authentication benchmark dataset; S2, based on the group control authentication benchmark dataset, generating an asset origin seal and constructing a terminal admission judgment sequence, evaluating the admission closure degree of terminals entering the group control authentication tree, and constructing the group control authentication tree; S3, based on the group control authentication tree, completing quantum-classical hybrid authentication, constructing a leaf key sharding allocation table, and generating leaf authentication tags; S4, based on the leaf authentication tags, evaluating the closure degree of group control authentication receipts, and performing abnormal leaf pruning.

[0009] Further, the specific steps for obtaining the group control authentication benchmark dataset by acquiring group control authentication observation data and performing time window relocation, link jitter correction, key status calibration, and field scale unification are as follows: Acquire group control authentication observation data; the group control authentication observation data includes edge reception timestamp, link round-trip delay, edge authentication queue length, concurrent authentication thread occupancy rate, link jitter value, terminal heartbeat time, State Grid digital certificate digest, certificate chain status, intranet access domain number, quantum pre-set key digest, external access domain number, edge isolation identifier, access domain identifier, terminal device type, terminal device number, key status, and remaining quantum key pool amount; perform time window relocation on the group control authentication observation data using an authentication window relocation method based on the edge reception timestamp; use the edge reception timestamp as the main timestamp for group control authentication, and use the link round-trip delay from the edge node to the terminal as the time window relocation method. The system corrects the terminal receipt timestamp using the median latency; it corrects link jitter in the group-controlled authentication observation data using a dynamic correction method based on the round-trip latency dispersion of the authentication link, calculating the normalized link jitter value for each terminal within the current authentication window; when the difference between the terminal's heartbeat time and the starting point of the current authentication window is greater than the heartbeat difference threshold, the terminal is marked as an initially identified online node; when the edge authentication queue length exceeds the edge node length threshold, the current authentication window is marked as a queue occupied window; the system uses a key status calibration method to calibrate the status of the group-controlled authentication observation data; key status includes inactive, valid, near expiration, frozen, and destroyed; and it uses a field scale unification method to normalize the edge authentication queue length, concurrent authentication thread occupancy rate, link jitter value, quantum key pool remaining amount, and heartbeat time difference to generate a group-controlled authentication benchmark dataset.

[0010] Furthermore, based on the group control authentication benchmark dataset, the specific steps for generating an asset origin seal and constructing a terminal access judgment sequence are as follows: Based on the group control authentication benchmark dataset, when the terminal belongs to the State Grid intranet asset, the State Grid digital certificate digest, certificate chain status, and intranet access domain number are written into the standard seal field group; when the terminal belongs to the external investor's external network asset, the quantum pre-set key digest, external access domain number, and edge isolation identifier are written into the standard seal field group; the supplemented standard seal field group is digested and sealed using the national cryptographic SM3 hash algorithm to generate an asset origin seal, and the version number records the SM3 hash of the current standard seal field group content. Using the hash value as a baseline, the seal version number is updated when the content of the field group changes. Each time an update is triggered, the seal version number is incremented sequentially, and the asset source seal is bound to the seal version number, seal generation time stamp, and edge node number. Using the current authentication window number as an index, the records of terminals to be authenticated within the same authentication window are filtered from the group control authentication baseline dataset and arranged in a fixed order according to the ascending order of edge reception time stamp, the dictionary order of access domain identifier, the dictionary order of terminal device type, and the numerical order of terminal device number, forming a candidate terminal sequence. The candidate terminals are numbered sequentially according to the arrangement order to generate a terminal admission judgment sequence.

[0011] Furthermore, the specific steps for evaluating the admission closure degree of terminals entering the group control authentication tree are as follows: A consistency comparison is performed on the asset ownership, access domain, authentication method, key source, and edge node ownership in the asset source seal to obtain the asset source seal consistency degree; the difference between the current authentication window start point and the terminal's most recent heartbeat timestamp is calculated to obtain the heartbeat timeliness difference; the window start point and window end point are read from the edge node authentication window configuration, and the difference is calculated to obtain the group control authentication window length; binding relationship verification is performed on State Grid intranet assets, and external access domain, hardware security module binding status, and edge isolation identifier verification is performed on external investor extranet assets to obtain the classic authentication validity value; the terminal's pre-set key status, temporary session key version status, quantum key batch records, and remaining quantum key pool quantity are linked for verification to obtain... The quantum key availability value is calculated as follows: The round-trip delay dispersion between edge nodes and terminals is normalized to obtain the link jitter normalization value; the admission closure of the terminal entering the group control authentication tree is evaluated: the asset source seal consistency of the terminal is incremented by one, divided by one, minus the asset source seal consistency, and then the sum of the anti-zero term is added, and the natural logarithm of the comparison value is taken, processed by the sigmoid function, to obtain the seal matching term; the heartbeat timeliness difference is divided by the sum of the current group control authentication window length and the anti-zero term, then the negative value is taken and exponentially calculated to obtain the heartbeat timeliness term; the square root of the product of the classical authentication effective value and the quantum key availability value is obtained to obtain the key authentication term; the link stability term is obtained by subtracting the square of the link jitter normalization value from one; the seal matching term, heartbeat timeliness term, key authentication term, and link stability term are multiplied sequentially to obtain the authentication tree admission closure value.

[0012] Further, the specific steps for constructing the group control authentication tree are as follows: Real-time comparison of the authentication tree's admission closure value and admission threshold; if the admission closure value is greater than or equal to the admission threshold, the corresponding terminal is written into the valid leaf node of the group control authentication tree; if the admission closure value is less than the admission threshold, the corresponding terminal is written into the candidate leaf node set; if the valid value of classical authentication is zero, or the available value of quantum key is zero, neither is written into a valid leaf node, and the corresponding terminal is marked as an authentication gap node; if the asset source seal of the external investor's external network assets is inconsistent with the current edge access domain, a cross-domain seal conflict identifier is generated, and the terminal is prohibited from entering the candidate leaf node set; the group control authentication tree is constructed according to the control domain number, feeder number, grid connection point number, terminal equipment type, asset source identifier, and authentication window number.

[0013] Furthermore, based on the group control authentication tree, the specific steps for completing quantum-classical hybrid authentication are as follows: Based on the group control authentication tree, each valid leaf node in the group control authentication tree is encoded according to a fixed field order to generate a leaf node digest; the leaf node digests under the same intermediate aggregation node are sorted according to the leaf node sequence number, and combined with the access domain identifier, terminal device type, communication channel digest, and asset source type to generate an intermediate aggregation node digest; the intermediate aggregation node digests are uniformly encoded and digested to generate the group control root digest; after receiving the group control root digest, the master station calls the quantum key fragment corresponding to the current quantum key batch in the quantum key management platform, and generates a root authentication ticket through commercial cryptographic equipment to complete the quantum-classical hybrid authentication; after receiving the root authentication ticket, the edge node sequentially verifies the consistency of the master station signature value, quantum key batch number, authentication window number, one-time count value, and group control root digest; when all verifications pass, the quantum key fragment corresponding to the current authentication window is locked as the window key resource.

[0014] Further, the specific steps for constructing the leaf key fragment allocation table are as follows: Based on the locked window key resources, construct the leaf key fragment allocation table using the window key resource index allocation method; traverse the valid leaf nodes in the group control authentication tree, and apply for an unoccupied key fragment range for the current leaf node in the window key resources; when the link jitter normalization value of the current terminal is greater than the link jitter threshold, apply for an additional backup key fragment range for the terminal, and write the index identifier of the backup range into the authentication receipt field of the current terminal to locate the backup key fragment during targeted retransmission; perform overlap detection between the key fragment range applied for by the current leaf node and the key fragment range of the allocated leaf node; when the overlap length of the fragments of two leaf nodes exceeds the overlap length threshold, it is determined to be a key fragment conflict; when a key fragment conflict occurs, the edge node reapplies for a fragment range for the current leaf node; if a conflict still occurs after k consecutive applications, the current leaf node is transferred to the candidate leaf node set and recorded as a key fragment conflict node.

[0015] Further, the specific steps for generating the leaf authentication tag are as follows: The leaf authentication tag is generated using a tag field binding verification method; the leaf authentication tag is sent to the terminal along with the corresponding terminal's directed authentication fragment, and is not disclosed to other terminals within the same group control authentication tree; after receiving the directed authentication fragment, the terminal verifies the authentication window number, leaf node sequence number, key version number, communication direction identifier, and message authentication code generated using the HMAC-SM3 algorithm based on the key fragment allocated to the leaf node in the leaf authentication tag; if the leaf authentication tag passes verification, the terminal generates an authentication success receipt; otherwise, the terminal generates an authentication failure receipt and writes the failure reason code.

[0016] Furthermore, based on the leaf authentication tag, the specific steps for evaluating the closure degree of the group control authentication receipt are as follows: The number of closed leaf nodes is obtained by statistically analyzing the authentication receipts received by the edge nodes; the number of valid leaf nodes is obtained by counting the number of terminals that pass the admission judgment and enter the set of valid leaf nodes in the current group control authentication tree; the number of pruned leaf nodes is obtained by counting the failure reason codes; the number of timeout leaf nodes is obtained by counting the leaf nodes that did not return authentication receipts at the end of the authentication window; the average receipt latency is obtained by averaging the difference between the edge sending time stamp and the edge receipt receiving time stamp of each closed leaf node; the number of nodes with inconsistent key versions is obtained by comparing the key version number in the terminal receipt with the key version number in the leaf key sharding allocation table; and the number of nodes with inconsistent key versions is obtained by comparing the asset source seal in the terminal receipt with the leaf nodes of the group control authentication tree. The number of nodes with inconsistent asset source seals is obtained by recording the asset source seals in the database. The basic closure ratio is obtained by dividing the number of closed leaf nodes by the sum of the number of valid leaf nodes and the anti-zeroing term. The leaf anomaly damping term is obtained by adding the number of pruned leaf nodes and the number of timeout leaf nodes, dividing by the number of closed leaf nodes plus one, and taking the natural logarithm. The delay damping term is obtained by dividing the average acknowledgment delay by the sum of the current group control authentication window length and the anti-zeroing term, then performing an exponential operation and subtracting one. The security conflict damping term is obtained by adding the number of nodes with inconsistent key versions and the number of nodes with inconsistent asset source seals, dividing by the sum of the number of valid leaf nodes and the anti-zeroing term, and taking the square root. The group control authentication closure value is obtained by dividing the basic closure ratio by one and adding the leaf anomaly damping term, the delay damping term, and the security conflict damping term.

[0017] Furthermore, the specific steps for performing abnormal leaf pruning are as follows: If the group control authentication closure value is greater than or equal to the closure threshold, a group control authentication closure identifier is generated; if the group control authentication closure value is less than the closure threshold, the process enters the local anomaly resolution stage without re-triggering the entire group's complete authentication. In the local anomaly resolution stage, when the leaf anomaly damping term exceeds the leaf anomaly resolution threshold, pruned leaf nodes and timeout leaf nodes are resolved first. When the delay damping term exceeds the delay resolution threshold, cellular link jitter, edge authentication queue length, and edge receipt cache status are resolved first. When the security conflict damping term exceeds the security conflict resolution threshold, the corresponding leaf key fragment is frozen first. Verify the asset source seal, key version number, and communication direction identifier; classify and mark nodes during the local anomaly analysis stage; when a node has an incorrect message authentication code, inconsistent key version, counter value rollback, expired window number, or mismatched communication direction, mark the corresponding leaf node as a pruning node; pruned nodes do not participate in the closure ratio calculation of the current authentication window, nor do they receive retransmission keys within the same authentication window; when a node experiences an initial acknowledgment timeout only due to link jitter, and the node has a backup key fragment identifier, edge nodes are allowed to perform a maximum of one directed retransmission for each leaf node with a backup key fragment identifier within the same authentication window.

[0018] Beneficial effects The present invention has the following beneficial effects: (1) This invention, through group control authentication observation and collection and time window relocation, unifies the main station generated time stamp, edge receiving time stamp, terminal receiving time stamp and edge receipt receiving time stamp under the edge authentication main time stamp, and corrects it in combination with the median link round-trip delay, so that the terminal online status, key status, link jitter status and receipt status in the group control authentication process can be accurately compared in the same authentication window, reducing the authentication timing disorder caused by cellular link jitter, terminal heartbeat lag and edge queue accumulation, and providing a stable data foundation for authentication tree admission and receipt closure judgment.

[0019] (2) This invention incorporates the consistency of asset source seal, heartbeat timeliness difference, classical authentication validity value, quantum key availability value and link jitter normalization value into the terminal admission judgment by calculating the admission closure value of the authentication tree. This makes it possible for the terminal to enter the group control authentication tree no longer to rely solely on the single condition of whether the certificate is valid or whether the device is online, but to consider asset ownership, authentication credentials, key status, online freshness and communication stability at the same time, thereby improving the credibility of the authentication tree construction and the ability to resist abnormal terminal interference.

[0020] (3) This invention, through window key resource locking and leaf key fragment allocation table, divides the quantum key fragment corresponding to the current authentication window into multiple terminal-specific key fragments, and binds them with leaf node sequence number, terminal quantum security chip serial number, asset source seal digest, communication direction identifier and key version number, so that different terminals within the same group control authentication tree cannot share the same key material. This solves the problem that the entire group of terminals can be impersonated or decrypted after a single point of failure of the shared group key.

[0021] (4) This invention, through leaf authentication tags and a terminal dual-end confirmation mechanism, binds the authentication window number, leaf node sequence number, key version number, one-time count value, communication direction identifier, group control root digest truncation value, and message authentication code to the terminal-directed authentication segment, and performs local verification by the terminal quantum security chip. The mechanism can identify abnormal states such as window expiration, inconsistent key version, inconsistent chip serial number, incorrect authentication tag, mismatched communication direction, and inconsistent asset source seal, thereby improving the terminal's ability to identify replay, impersonation, and cross-direction multiplexed messages.

[0022] Of course, any product implementing this invention does not necessarily need to achieve all of the advantages described above at the same time. Attached Figure Description

[0023] Figure 1 This is a flowchart of the quantum-classical hybrid security authentication method for source-grid-load-storage collaborative control of the present invention; Figure 2 This is a diagram showing the linkage between the group control authentication time window relocation and the key water level in this invention. Figure 3 This is a comparison chart of the terminal access closure value and key access factors of the present invention; Figure 4 This is a heatmap of the terminal admission factor matrix of the present invention; Figure 5 This is an analytical diagram of the group control authentication closure value and damping term of the present invention. Detailed Implementation

[0024] The technical solutions of the embodiments of the present invention will be clearly and completely described below with reference to the accompanying drawings. Obviously, the described embodiments are only some embodiments of the present invention, and not all embodiments. Based on the embodiments of the present invention, all other embodiments obtained by those skilled in the art without creative effort are within the scope of protection of the present invention.

[0025] Please see Figures 1-5This invention provides a technical solution: a quantum-classical hybrid security authentication method for source-grid-load-storage collaborative control, comprising: S1, acquiring group control authentication observation data and performing time window relocation, link jitter correction, key state calibration, and field scale unification to obtain a group control authentication benchmark dataset; S2, based on the group control authentication benchmark dataset, generating an asset source seal and constructing a terminal admission judgment sequence, evaluating the admission closure degree of the terminal entering the group control authentication tree, and constructing the group control authentication tree; S3, based on the group control authentication tree, completing quantum-classical hybrid authentication, constructing a leaf key sharding allocation table, and generating leaf authentication tags; S4, based on the leaf authentication tags, evaluating the closure degree of the group control authentication receipt, and performing abnormal leaf pruning.

[0026] Specifically, the steps to obtain the group control authentication benchmark dataset are as follows: This involves acquiring observation data, performing time window relocation, link jitter correction, key status calibration, and field scale unification. The entire process of group control authentication between the master station security layer, edge security layer, and terminal security layer in the source-grid-load-storage collaborative control system is dynamically collected to obtain group control authentication observation data. The group control authentication observation data includes edge reception timestamp, link round-trip delay, edge authentication queue length, concurrent authentication thread occupancy rate, link jitter value, terminal heartbeat time, State Grid digital certificate digest, certificate chain status, intranet access domain number, quantum pre-set key digest, external access domain number, edge isolation identifier, access domain identifier, terminal device type, terminal device number, key status, and quantum key pool remaining amount.

[0027] A time window relocation method based on edge reception time stamps is used to relocate the group control authentication observation data. The edge reception time stamp is used as the primary time stamp for group control authentication, and the terminal acknowledgment time stamp is corrected using the median round-trip delay of the link from the edge node to the terminal. A dynamic correction method based on the dispersion of the authentication link round-trip delay is used to correct link jitter in the group control authentication observation data, calculating the normalized link jitter value for each terminal within the current authentication window. When the difference between the terminal's heartbeat time and the start of the current authentication window is greater than a heartbeat difference threshold, the terminal is marked as a newly identified online node. When the length of the edge authentication queue exceeds the edge node length threshold... The system marks the current authentication window as a queue occupied window; it uses a key status labeling method to label the status of the group control authentication observation data; key status includes inactive, valid, near expiration, frozen, and destroyed; when a terminal's preset key status is frozen or destroyed, the corresponding terminal is not written into the subsequent authentication tree; when the remaining amount of the quantum key pool is lower than the expected consumption of the current authentication window, the current authentication window is marked as a low-water mark window; it uses a field scale unification method to normalize the edge authentication queue length, concurrent authentication thread occupancy rate, link jitter value, remaining amount of the quantum key pool, and heartbeat time difference to generate a group control authentication benchmark dataset. Each record in the group control authentication benchmark dataset corresponds to a terminal to be authenticated and includes an identity field, an asset field, a certificate field, a key field, a link field, a time window field, a random number segment, and a historical receipt field.

[0028] like Figure 2 The diagram shows the linkage between group control authentication window relocation and key watermark. With the authentication window number as the horizontal axis, the diagram displays the changes in median round-trip delay, upper bound of delay after jitter correction, mapping amount of weak online nodes, remaining quantum key pool resources, low key watermark threshold, and mapping amount of edge queue occupancy. Figure 2 It is evident that link latency, the number of weak online nodes, and edge queue occupancy status fluctuate synchronously within different authentication windows. When the upper bound of latency increases after jitter correction and the number of weak online nodes increases, it indicates that terminal acknowledgments are prone to window misalignment. When the remaining amount of the quantum key pool approaches the low watermark threshold, it indicates that the quantum key resources available for leaf key sharding within the current window are becoming scarce.

[0029] This implementation plan achieves time-series alignment of group control authentication observation data, noise reduction of link features, fine-grained differentiation of key status, and standardization of data format. It constructs a high-quality benchmark dataset, providing reliable data support for subsequent group control authentication link status assessment, dynamic scheduling of key resources, and early warning of authentication risks. This ensures the stable, efficient, and secure operation of the multi-level group control authentication process of the source-grid-load-storage collaborative control system.

[0030] Specifically, the steps for generating asset origin seals and constructing terminal access judgment sequences based on the group control authentication benchmark dataset are as follows: Based on the group control authentication benchmark dataset, when the terminal belongs to the State Grid intranet asset, the State Grid digital certificate digest, certificate chain status, and intranet access domain number are written into the standard seal field group; when the terminal belongs to the external investor's external network asset, the quantum pre-set key digest, external access domain number, and edge isolation identifier are written into the standard seal field group, and the fields in the field group are concatenated with a separator; the supplemented standard seal field group is digested and sealed using the national cryptographic SM3 hash algorithm to generate an asset source seal. The sealing result is stored as a hexadecimal string, and the version number records the SM3 hash value of the current standard seal field group content as the benchmark. When the content of the field group changes, the seal version number is updated. Each time an update is triggered, the seal version number is incremented sequentially, and the asset source seal is bound to the seal version number, seal generation time stamp, and edge node number. The binding relationship is connected through a hash chain to form an immutable record.

[0031] Using the current authentication window number as an index, records of terminals to be authenticated within the same authentication window are selected from the group control authentication benchmark dataset. These records are then arranged in a fixed order: ascending edge reception timescale, lexicographical order of access domain identifier, lexicographical order of terminal device type, and numerical order of terminal device number, forming a candidate terminal sequence. Adjacent records in the sequence are verified to ensure their edge reception timescales are not reversed. The candidate terminals are then numbered sequentially according to their arrangement to generate a terminal admission judgment sequence. This terminal admission judgment sequence does not alter the source-grid-load-storage control strategy itself; it is only used to determine whether a terminal is allowed to enter the group control authentication tree corresponding to the current authentication window.

[0032] This implementation plan generates asset source seals by sealing differentiated fields and encrypting them with national cryptographic hashes, enabling accurate traceability and tamper-proof verification of the source of assets on both internal and external networks, ensuring the trustworthiness and traceability of terminal identities. It also constructs a standardized terminal access judgment sequence based on multi-dimensional sorting rules, enabling orderly screening and time-sequence verification of terminals to be authenticated, accurately dividing terminal access permissions, effectively avoiding problems such as unauthorized terminal access and chaotic authentication sequences, and improving the rigor, security, and orderliness of terminal access control.

[0033] Specifically, the steps for evaluating the admission closure of a terminal entering the group control authentication tree are as follows: The consistency of asset source seals is compared to obtain the asset source seal consistency score. The asset source seal consistency score ranges from [0,1] and is calculated by dividing the field-by-field matching count by the total number of fields. Specifically, the certificate chain status and edge isolation identifier Boolean field match 1 otherwise 0, the access domain number matches exactly 1 otherwise 0, and the quantum pre-set key digest matching score is normalized to [0,1] before being included. The difference between the current authentication window start point and the terminal's most recent heartbeat timescale is calculated to obtain the heartbeat timeliness difference. The window start point and window end point are read from the edge node authentication window configuration, and the difference is calculated to obtain the group control authentication window length. Binding relationship verification is performed on assets within the State Grid intranet, and external access domain, hardware security module binding status, and edge isolation identifier verification is performed on external investor external network assets to obtain the classic authentication valid value. The classic authentication valid value ranges from [0,1]. The range is {0,1}, where 1 represents all valid checks and 0 represents any check that fails. The binding relationship check includes the consistency between the asset source seal version number and the hash chain bound to the edge node. The terminal's pre-set key status, temporary session key version status, quantum key batch records, and the remaining amount of the quantum key pool are checked together to obtain the quantum key usable value. The quantum key usable value is in the range [0,1] and is a weighted sum of four parts: 0.3 for a valid pre-set key, 0.2 for a temporary key version that has not expired, 0.3 for a quantum key batch that is within its validity period, and 0.2 for the remaining amount of the quantum key pool. The round-trip delay dispersion between the edge node and the terminal is normalized to obtain the link jitter normalized value. The link jitter normalized value is based on the standard deviation of the most recent 10 round-trip delays, divided by the maximum tolerable jitter threshold of 100ms, and truncated to the [0,1] interval. The dispersion is expressed as the standard deviation. The degree of admission closure of the terminal entering the group control authentication tree is evaluated.

[0034] The asset source seal consistency of the terminal is incremented by one, divided by one, and then the sum of the asset source seal consistency and the anti-zero term is added. The natural logarithm of the comparison value is then processed by the sigmoid function to obtain the seal matching term. The heartbeat timeliness difference is divided by the sum of the current group control authentication window length and the anti-zero term, then the negative value is taken and exponentially calculated to obtain the heartbeat timeliness term. The square root of the product of the classical authentication effective value and the quantum key available value is obtained to obtain the key authentication term. The link stability term is obtained by subtracting the square of the link jitter normalization value from one. The seal matching term, heartbeat timeliness term, key authentication term, and link stability term are multiplied in sequence to obtain the authentication tree admission closure value.

[0035] The specific formula for calculating the admission closure value of the authentication tree is as follows: ; In the formula, represents the authentication tree admission closure value of the i-th terminal, with a value ranging from zero to one, used to determine whether the terminal is allowed to enter the group control authentication tree corresponding to the current authentication window; i represents the terminal sequence number, which is obtained by sorting the candidate terminals in the current authentication window in order according to the edge reception time stamp, access domain identifier, terminal device type and terminal device number, with a value ranging from positive integers, used to distinguish different terminals to be authenticated; This represents the consistency of the asset source seal of the i-th terminal, used to characterize whether the asset source seal of the terminal matches the current group control authentication domain; It represents the heartbeat timeliness difference of the i-th terminal, which is used to characterize the freshness of the online status of the terminal; This indicates the current group control authentication window length, used to limit the valid time range of the current group control authentication judgment; This represents the valid value of the classic authentication for the i-th terminal, used to determine whether the classic identity authentication conditions of the terminal are met. This represents the available quantum key value for the i-th terminal, used to determine whether the terminal has the available quantum key authentication conditions within the current authentication window; This represents the link jitter normalization value of the i-th terminal, used to characterize the stability of the current communication link of that terminal; This indicates a zero-prevention term, which is obtained through system preset and has a value of 10 to the power of negative 6. It is used to avoid zero denominators or abnormal logarithmic calculations.

[0036] As shown in Table 1, the power terminal access security verification data table provides a quantitative explanation of each of the seven terminal numbers based on asset source, security verification indicators, and access judgment results: Terminal number T01 is a State Grid intranet asset, with a seal consistency of 0.98, heartbeat timeliness difference of 120, link jitter normalization value of 0.12, and access closure value of 0.91, resulting in a valid leaf node access; Terminal number T02 is a State Grid intranet asset, with a seal consistency of 0.95, heartbeat timeliness difference of 180, link jitter normalization value of 0.19, and access closure value of 0.86, resulting in a valid leaf node access; Terminal number T03 is an external investor asset, with a seal consistency of 0.93, heartbeat timeliness difference of 260, link jitter normalization value of 0.26, and access closure value of 0.81, resulting in a valid leaf node access; Terminal number T04... Terminal T05 is an asset from an external investor, with a seal consistency of 0.88, heartbeat timeliness difference of 410, link jitter normalization value of 0.38, and admission closure value of 0.69. Its admission result is a candidate leaf node. Terminal T06 is an asset from an external investor, with a seal consistency of 0.72, heartbeat timeliness difference of 350, link jitter normalization value of 0.31, and admission closure value of 0. Its admission result is an authentication gap node. Terminal T07 is an asset from an external investor, with a seal consistency of 0.41, heartbeat timeliness difference of 280, link jitter normalization value of 0.22, and admission closure value of 0.36. Its admission result is a cross-domain seal conflict.

[0037] Table 1. Power Terminal Access Security Verification Data Table like Figure 3 The chart shows a comparison of terminal access closure values ​​and key access factors. The chart uses terminal number as the horizontal axis and normalized values ​​as the vertical axis to illustrate the relationship between access closure values, asset origin seal consistency, link stability, and access thresholds for different terminals. Figure 3As can be seen, the admission closure values ​​of T01 to T03 are higher than the admission threshold, indicating that their asset source seal consistency, link stability, and authentication status meet the requirements for entering the group control authentication tree. T04 and T05 have high seal consistency, but their admission closure values ​​are lower than the threshold, indicating that they are affected by heartbeat timeout, link jitter, or key status, and should be treated as candidate leaf nodes. T06's admission closure value is close to zero, indicating that there is a quantum key unavailability or authentication gap. Although T07 has a high link stability, its asset source seal consistency is low, indicating a risk of cross-domain seal conflict. This diagram illustrates that this implementation scheme does not rely solely on a single online status for terminal admission, but rather comprehensively considers seal consistency, key authentication status, and link stability to select effective leaf nodes.

[0038] like Figure 4 The diagram shows a heatmap of the terminal admission factor matrix. The graph uses terminal number as the horizontal axis and admission factor as the vertical axis, displaying the normalized distribution of seal consistency, heartbeat timeliness, classical authentication, quantum key distribution, link stability, and admission closure value across different terminals. Figure 4 As can be seen, T01 to T03 maintain high levels across all admission factors, and their admission closure values ​​meet the admission requirements, making them suitable as valid leaf nodes to enter the group control authentication tree. While T04 and T05 have high seal consistency, their heartbeat timeliness and link stability terms decrease, leading to lower admission closure values, making them more suitable as candidate leaf nodes. T06's quantum key term is zero, reducing its admission closure value to zero, and it should be marked as an authentication gap node. T07's seal consistency is significantly low, indicating a risk of asset origin or access domain mismatch, and it should be treated as a cross-domain seal conflict node. This diagram is used to achieve terminal admission screening through multi-factor matrix comparison, rather than judging solely based on a single certificate status or online status.

[0039] This implementation plan enables precise quantitative grading of the access status of power terminals; it can effectively identify abnormal terminals such as valid leaf nodes, candidate nodes, authentication gaps, and cross-domain sealing conflicts, avoid the risk of misjudgment of access caused by a single indicator, accurately filter illegal, invalid, and unstable terminals, strengthen the multi-dimensional security verification capability of the source-grid-load-storage system terminal access, improve the rigor, comprehensiveness, and reliability of the screening of group control authentication tree nodes, and ensure the safe and orderly operation of the multi-level group control authentication architecture.

[0040] Specifically, the steps for constructing a group control authentication tree are as follows: The authentication tree's admission closure value and admission threshold are compared in real time. When the admission closure value is greater than or equal to the admission threshold, the corresponding terminal is written into a valid leaf node of the group control authentication tree. The admission threshold ranges from 0.75 to 0.95, with a default value of 0.85. When the admission closure value is less than the admission threshold, but the asset source seal consistency is greater than 0.9 and the heartbeat time difference is less than 15 seconds, the corresponding terminal is written into the candidate leaf node set. If the classical authentication validity value is zero, or the quantum key usable value is zero, neither is written into a valid leaf node. The corresponding terminal is marked as an authentication gap node. When the asset source seal of the external investor's external network assets is inconsistent with the current edge access domain, a cross-domain seal conflict identifier is generated, and the terminal is prohibited from entering the candidate leaf node set. The control domain number, feeder number, and grid connection point number are taken from the power business topology mapping table configured locally on the edge node. If they are missing, the default value "GLOBAL_DOMAIN" is used. A group control authentication tree is constructed according to the control domain number, feeder number, grid connection point number, terminal equipment type, asset source identifier, and authentication window number. The group control authentication tree includes a root node, intermediate aggregation nodes, and leaf nodes. The root node corresponds to the current authentication window, the intermediate aggregation nodes correspond to the terminal set under the same access domain, the same communication link, or the same equipment type, and the leaf nodes correspond to a single terminal that has passed the admission judgment. Finally, the group control authentication tree, the candidate leaf node set, the authentication gap node set, and the cross-domain seal conflict record are output.

[0041] This implementation plan improves the credibility of valid nodes in the group control authentication tree and reduces the risk of abnormal terminals, weakly authenticated terminals, and cross-domain terminals mixing into the main authentication tree. At the same time, the tree structure is constructed based on control domain, feeder, grid connection point, terminal type, asset source, and authentication window, so that the generation of group control root digest, leaf key fragmentation and distribution, authentication receipt closure, and anomaly tracing all have clear node affiliation relationships, which enhances the low latency, isolation, and traceability of the multi-terminal group control authentication process.

[0042] Specifically, the steps to complete quantum-classical hybrid authentication based on the swarm authentication tree are as follows: Based on the group control authentication tree, each valid leaf node in the group control authentication tree is encoded according to a fixed field order to generate a leaf node digest. The fixed field order is: terminal device number, asset source seal version number, seal generation time stamp, and edge node number. After concatenation in this order, SM3 hash is called. The leaf node digests under the same intermediate aggregation node are sorted according to the leaf node sequence number and combined with the access domain identifier, terminal device type, communication channel digest, and asset source type to generate an intermediate aggregation node digest. The intermediate aggregation node digests are uniformly encoded and digested to generate the group control root digest. The uniform encoding refers to concatenating all leaf node digests under the intermediate aggregation node according to the leaf node sequence number, and then concatenating them with the access domain identifier, terminal device type, communication channel digest, and asset source type, and then performing SM3 hash calculation on the whole.

[0043] After receiving the group control root digest, the master station calls the quantum key fragment corresponding to the current quantum key batch in the quantum key management platform and generates a root authentication ticket using commercial cryptographic equipment. The root authentication ticket includes the group control root digest, quantum key batch number, master station signature value, classical algorithm identifier, ticket validity period, authentication window number, and one-time count value. The ticket validity period does not exceed the sum of the current authentication window length and twice the link round-trip delay, and defaults to no more than three seconds, completing the quantum-classical hybrid authentication. After receiving the root authentication ticket, the edge nodes sequentially verify the consistency of the master station signature value, quantum key batch number, authentication window number, one-time count value, and group control root digest. When all verifications pass, the quantum key fragment corresponding to the current authentication window is locked as the window key resource. The locked window key resource is only used for the current authentication window, is not reused across windows, and is not pre-occupied by candidate leaf nodes.

[0044] In this implementation plan, by continuously verifying the consistency of the master station signature value, quantum key batch number, authentication window number, one-time count value, and group control root digest, and locking the quantum key fragments that pass the verification as the key resources of the current window, it is possible to prevent the replay of old tickets, cross-window reuse, and the pre-occupation of key materials by candidate nodes. This improves the window constraint of quantum key use, the real-time performance of the authentication process, and the security isolation effect of leaf key fragment allocation.

[0045] Specifically, the steps for constructing the leaf key fragmentation allocation table are as follows: Based on the locked window key resources, a leaf key fragment allocation table is constructed using a window key resource index allocation method, linearly allocated based on the starting offset address and fragment length. The valid leaf nodes in the group control authentication tree are traversed, and an unoccupied key fragment range is requested for the current leaf node from the window key resources. The key fragment length is either 16 bytes or 32 bytes, corresponding to a 128-bit or 256-bit temporary key, respectively. When the link jitter normalization value of the current terminal is greater than the link jitter threshold, an additional backup key fragment range is requested for the terminal. The backup key fragment range does not overlap with the primary key fragment range, and the index identifier of the backup range is written into the authentication receipt field of the current terminal. The backup key segment is located during targeted retransmission; the backup key segment is only used for one retransmission within the same authentication window; the overlap detection is performed between the key segment range requested by the current leaf node and the key segment range of the allocated leaf node, and the overlap detection adopts the interval endpoint comparison method; when the overlap length of the segments of two leaf nodes exceeds the overlap length threshold, it is determined to be a key segment conflict; when a key segment conflict occurs, the edge node re-requests a segment range for the current leaf node, and the offset step is one segment length when re-requesting; if a conflict still occurs after k consecutive requests, the current leaf node is transferred to the candidate leaf node set and recorded as a key segment conflict node, which does not affect other leaf nodes from continuing to generate key fragments.

[0046] For State Grid intranet assets, the State Grid digital certificate digest, certificate chain status digest, and intranet access domain number are written into the leaf key fragment allocation table, so that the leaf key fragment is bound to the State Grid digital certificate authentication result; for external investor external network assets, the quantum pre-set key digest, external access domain number, and edge isolation identifier are written into the leaf key fragment allocation table, so that the leaf key fragment is only used for restricted communication links within the external access domain.

[0047] In this implementation plan, by writing the State Grid digital certificate digest, certificate chain status digest, and intranet access domain number, or the quantum pre-set key digest, external access domain number, and edge isolation identifier into the leaf key fragment allocation table, the leaf key fragments are bound to the asset source and authentication method, thereby improving the verifiability of differentiated authentication of internal and external assets and the effect of key isolation within the group.

[0048] Specifically, the steps for generating the leaf authentication label are as follows: Leaf authentication tags are generated using a tag field binding verification method. Each leaf authentication tag contains an authentication window number, leaf node sequence number, key version number, communication direction identifier, and a message authentication code based on a key fragment. These fields are concatenated in a fixed order. The leaf authentication tag is sent to the terminal along with the corresponding targeted authentication fragment and is not disclosed to other terminals within the same group control authentication tree. The targeted authentication fragment is sent via unicast. After receiving the targeted authentication fragment, the terminal verifies the authentication window number, leaf node sequence number, key version number, communication direction identifier, and the message authentication code generated using the HMAC-SM3 algorithm based on the key fragment allocated to the leaf node. The HMAC-SM3 key is the key fragment allocated to the leaf node, and the message content is a concatenation of the authentication window number, leaf node sequence number, key version number, and communication direction identifier. If the leaf authentication tag verification passes, the terminal generates an authentication success receipt; otherwise, it generates an authentication failure receipt and writes a failure reason code. Failure reason codes include window expiration, key version inconsistency, chip serial number inconsistency, authentication tag error, communication direction mismatch, and asset origin seal inconsistency.

[0049] In this implementation scheme, by writing failure reason codes such as window expiration, key version inconsistency, chip serial number inconsistency, authentication tag error, communication direction mismatch, and asset source seal inconsistency when verification fails, clear evidence can be provided for abnormal leaf pruning, targeted retransmission, key fragment freezing, and authentication process traceability, thereby improving the isolation, verifiability, and anomaly location efficiency of the group control authentication process.

[0050] Specifically, the steps for evaluating the closure degree of group control authentication receipts based on leaf authentication tags are as follows: The number of closed leaf nodes is obtained by counting the authentication receipts received by the edge nodes; the number of valid leaf nodes is obtained by counting the number of terminals that have passed the admission judgment and entered the set of valid leaf nodes in the current group control authentication tree; the number of pruned leaf nodes is obtained by counting the failure reason codes; the number of timeout leaf nodes is obtained by counting the leaf nodes that did not return authentication receipts when the authentication window ended; the average receipt latency is obtained by counting the difference between the edge sending time stamp and the edge receipt receiving time stamp of each closed leaf node and averaging the values; the number of nodes with inconsistent key versions is obtained by comparing the key version number in the terminal receipt with the key version number in the leaf key fragment allocation table; the number of nodes with inconsistent asset source seals is obtained by comparing the asset source seal in the terminal receipt with the asset source seal recorded in the group control authentication tree leaf nodes. When the key versions are inconsistent, the edge node immediately freezes the key fragment of the corresponding leaf node and triggers the seal review process. The seal can only be unfrozen after the review is passed; the review result generated by the action chain is included in the security conflict damping term to realize the closed-loop linkage between the closure value and the key fragment locking mechanism.

[0051] The basic closure ratio is obtained by dividing the number of closed leaf nodes by the sum of the number of valid leaf nodes and the anti-zeroing term. The leaf node anomaly damping term is obtained by adding the number of pruned leaf nodes and the number of timeout leaf nodes, then dividing by the number of closed leaf nodes plus one, and taking the natural logarithm. The delay damping term is obtained by dividing the average acknowledgment delay by the sum of the current group control authentication window length and the anti-zeroing term, then performing an exponential operation and subtracting one. The security conflict damping term is obtained by adding the number of nodes with inconsistent key versions and the number of nodes with inconsistent asset source sealing, then dividing by the sum of the number of valid leaf nodes and the anti-zeroing term, and taking the square root. In the security conflict damping term, the number of frozen fragment operations caused by inconsistent key versions is used as a weighting factor with a default weight of 0.6, and the number of failed seal verifications is used as an additional term with a weight of 0.4. Both participate in the square root operation, ensuring that the closure value directly reflects the consistency of the key fragment locking state. The group control authentication closure value is obtained by dividing the basic closure ratio by one and adding the leaf node anomaly damping term, the delay damping term, and the security conflict damping term.

[0052] The specific formula for calculating the group control authentication closure value is as follows: ; In the formula, This represents the group control authentication closure value, used to indicate whether the group control authentication has been completed within the current authentication window; This indicates the number of closed leaf nodes, used to characterize the scale of terminals that have completed authentication closure within the current authentication window; This represents the number of valid leaf nodes, which serves as the baseline for the group control authentication closure statistics within the current authentication window. This represents the zero-prevention term, which is obtained through system preset and has a value of 10 to the power of negative 6. It is used to avoid zero denominators and reduce the impact of extremely small denominators on the calculation results. This indicates the number of leaf nodes pruned, representing the number of terminals pruned within the current authentication window due to incorrect authentication labels, inconsistent key versions, mismatched communication directions, or conflicting asset seals. This indicates the number of timeout leaf nodes, representing the number of terminals within the current authentication window that have not completed the closure due to link latency, terminal offline status, or lost receipt. This represents the average receipt delay, used to characterize the overall convergence speed of terminal authentication receipts within the current authentication window; This indicates the current group control authentication window length, used to limit the effective time range for current group control authentication, receipt convergence, and closure judgment; This indicates the number of nodes with inconsistent key versions, representing the number of terminals with key version conflicts within the current authentication window. This indicates the number of nodes with inconsistent asset source sealing, representing the number of terminals with inconsistent asset sources, access domains, or authentication methods within the current authentication window.

[0053] This implementation plan can promptly suppress leaf nodes with key conflicts or abnormal sealing from continuing to participate in authentication closure; it improves the accuracy of group control authentication closure judgment, avoids abnormal terminals from entering the normal closure result with delayed receipts, incorrect key versions or inconsistent asset sealing, and provides clear basis for abnormal leaf pruning, targeted retransmission, key freezing and authentication process traceability.

[0054] Specifically, the steps for pruning abnormal leaves are as follows: If the group control authentication closure value is greater than or equal to the closure threshold, a group control authentication closure identifier is generated. The closure threshold ranges from 0.7 to 0.95, with a default of 0.85. If the group control authentication closure value is less than the closure threshold, the process enters the local anomaly resolution phase without re-triggering the complete authentication. In the local anomaly resolution phase, when the leaf anomaly damping term exceeds the leaf anomaly resolution threshold, leaf nodes that have been pruned or timed out are resolved first. The leaf anomaly resolution threshold ranges from 0.25 to 0.45, with a default of 0.3. When the time delay damping term exceeds the time delay resolution threshold, cellular link jitter, edge authentication queue length, and edge receipt cache status are resolved first. The time delay resolution threshold ranges from 0.35 to 0.7, with a default of 0.5. When the security conflict damping term exceeds the security conflict resolution threshold, the corresponding leaf key fragment is frozen first, and the asset source seal, key version number, and communication direction identifier are verified. The threshold for security conflict resolution ranges from 0.15 to 0.3, with a default value of 0.2. When multiple damping items exceed their corresponding thresholds simultaneously, anomaly resolution is performed in the order of security conflict damping item, leaf anomaly damping item, and time delay damping item.

[0055] like Figure 5 The diagram shown illustrates the relationship between the group control authentication closure value and damping terms. The graph uses the authentication window number as the horizontal axis and the normalized value as the vertical axis, displaying the changes in the group control authentication closure value, leaf anomaly damping term, time delay damping term, security conflict damping term, and closure threshold. Figure 5 As can be seen, the group control authentication closure values ​​of W01, W02, and W07 are higher than the closure threshold, indicating that the leaf node acknowledgments within the corresponding authentication window converge well, with fewer abnormal nodes and security conflicts. The closure values ​​of W03 to W06 are lower than the closure threshold. Among them, the leaf abnormality damping term, time delay damping term, and security conflict damping term of W04 and W05 are significantly increased, indicating that there are problems such as node pruning, timeout nodes, acknowledgment delay, or inconsistent key versions in this stage.

[0056] During the local anomaly resolution phase, nodes are categorized and marked. When a node experiences an error in the message authentication code, inconsistent key version, backward count, expired window number, or mismatched communication direction, the corresponding leaf node is marked as a pruning node. Pruned nodes do not participate in the closure ratio calculation of the current authentication window and will no longer receive retransmission keys within the same authentication window. When a node experiences an initial acknowledgment timeout solely due to link jitter, and the node has a backup key fragment identifier, edge nodes are allowed to perform a maximum of one directed retransmission for each leaf node with a backup key fragment identifier within the same authentication window. The retransmission message must carry the original authentication window number, the original one-time count value, and the retransmission identifier. If the connection is still not closed after retransmission, the node is marked as a timeout pruning node.

[0057] When key leakage, terminal authentication failure, network failure, or device malfunction occurs, the leaf key fragment number is retrieved by reverse lookup using the terminal device number, and then the authentication is retrieved by reverse lookup using the leaf key fragment number. After the current authentication window ends, the used leaf key fragments are marked as expired, the key fragments corresponding to the pruned nodes are marked as frozen, and the key fragments corresponding to the closed nodes are destroyed.

[0058] In this implementation plan, by freezing key fragments for pruning nodes, destroying key fragments for closed nodes, and marking used fragments as expired, a closed-loop linkage between authentication results, node status, and key lifecycle can be formed, thereby improving the security isolation, anomaly location efficiency, and key usage traceability of the group control authentication process.

[0059] It should be noted that, in this document, relational terms such as "first" and "second" are used only to distinguish one entity or operation from another, and do not necessarily require or imply any such actual relationship or order between these entities or operations. Furthermore, the terms "comprising," "including," or any other variations thereof are intended to cover non-exclusive inclusion, such that a process, method, article, or apparatus that comprises a list of elements includes not only those elements but also other elements not expressly listed, or elements inherent to such process, method, article, or apparatus.

[0060] The preferred embodiments of the present invention disclosed above are merely illustrative of the invention. These preferred embodiments do not exhaustively describe all details, nor do they limit the invention to the specific implementations described. Clearly, many modifications and variations can be made based on the content of this specification. This specification selects and specifically describes these embodiments to better explain the principles and practical applications of the invention, thereby enabling those skilled in the art to better understand and utilize the invention. The invention is limited only by the claims and their full scope and equivalents.

Claims

1. A quantum-classical hybrid security authentication method for source-grid-load-storage collaborative control, characterized by: Includes the following steps: S1. Obtain group control authentication observation data, and perform time window relocation, link jitter correction, key status calibration and field scale unification to obtain the group control authentication benchmark dataset; S2, based on the group control authentication benchmark dataset, generates asset source seals and constructs a terminal access judgment sequence to evaluate the access closure degree of terminals entering the group control authentication tree and construct the group control authentication tree; S3, based on the group-controlled authentication tree, completes quantum-classical hybrid authentication, constructs a leaf key sharding distribution table, and generates leaf authentication tags; S4, based on the leaf authentication label, evaluates the closure degree of the group control authentication receipt and performs abnormal leaf pruning.

2. The quantum-classical hybrid security authentication method for source-grid-load-storage collaborative control according to claim 1, characterized in that: The specific steps for obtaining the group control authentication observation data, and performing time window relocation, link jitter correction, key status calibration, and field scale unification to obtain the group control authentication benchmark dataset are as follows: Obtain group control authentication observation data; The group control authentication observation data includes edge reception timestamp, link round-trip time, edge authentication queue length, concurrent authentication thread utilization rate, link jitter value, terminal heartbeat time, State Grid digital certificate digest, certificate chain status, intranet access domain number, quantum pre-set key digest, external access domain number, edge isolation identifier, access domain identifier, terminal device type, terminal device number, key status, and quantum key pool remaining amount; The authentication window relocation method based on edge reception time stamp is used to relocate the group control authentication observation data in time window. The edge reception time stamp is used as the main time stamp for group control authentication, and the terminal receipt time stamp is corrected by the median of the round-trip delay of the link from the edge node to the terminal. The link jitter is corrected for the group control authentication observation data by a dynamic correction method based on the dispersion of the authentication link round-trip delay, and the link jitter normalization value of each terminal in the current authentication window is calculated. When the difference between the terminal's heartbeat time and the starting point of the current authentication window is greater than the heartbeat difference threshold, the terminal is marked as a newly identified online node; when the length of the edge authentication queue exceeds the edge node length threshold, the current authentication window is marked as a queue occupied window; the group control authentication observation data is calibrated using a key status calibration method; key status includes inactive, valid, near expiration, frozen, and destroyed; The edge authentication queue length, concurrent authentication thread occupancy rate, link jitter value, quantum key pool remaining amount, and heartbeat time difference are normalized by the field scale unification method to generate a group control authentication benchmark dataset.

3. The quantum-classical hybrid security authentication method for source-grid-load-storage collaborative control according to claim 1, characterized in that: The specific steps for generating asset origin seals and constructing terminal access judgment sequences based on the group control authentication benchmark dataset are as follows: Based on the group control authentication benchmark dataset, when the terminal belongs to the State Grid intranet asset, the State Grid digital certificate digest, certificate chain status, and intranet access domain number are written into the standard seal field group; when the terminal belongs to the external investor's external network asset, the quantum pre-set key digest, external access domain number, and edge isolation identifier are written into the standard seal field group; the supplemented standard seal field group is digested and sealed using the national cryptographic SM3 hash algorithm to generate an asset source seal. The version number records the SM3 hash value of the current standard seal field group content as the benchmark. When the content of the field group changes, the seal version number is updated. Each time an update is triggered, the seal version number is incremented sequentially, and the asset source seal is bound to the seal version number, seal generation time stamp, and edge node number; Using the current authentication window number as an index, select the terminal records to be authenticated within the same authentication window from the group control authentication benchmark dataset, and arrange them in a fixed order according to the ascending order of edge reception time stamp, the dictionary order of access domain identifier, the dictionary order of terminal device type, and the numerical order of terminal device number to form a candidate terminal sequence; number them sequentially according to the arrangement order of the candidate terminal sequence to generate a terminal admission judgment sequence.

4. The quantum-classical hybrid security authentication method for source-grid-load-storage collaborative control according to claim 1, characterized in that: The specific steps for evaluating the access closure degree of the terminal entering the group control authentication tree are as follows: The consistency of asset source seal is obtained by comparing the asset ownership, access domain, authentication method, key source and edge node ownership in the asset source seal; the difference between the current authentication window start point and the terminal's most recent heartbeat time stamp is calculated to obtain the heartbeat timeliness difference. The system reads the start and end points of the authentication window from the edge node authentication window configuration and calculates the difference to obtain the group control authentication window length; it performs binding relationship verification on the State Grid intranet assets and external access domain, hardware security module binding status, and edge isolation identifier verification on the external investor's external network assets to obtain the valid value of classical authentication; it performs linkage verification on the terminal preset key status, temporary session key version status, quantum key batch record, and quantum key pool remaining quantity to obtain the quantum key usable value; The round-trip delay dispersion between edge nodes and terminals is normalized to obtain a normalized link jitter value; the admission closure degree of terminals entering the group control authentication tree is evaluated. Add one to the consistency of the asset source seal of the terminal, divide by one, subtract the consistency of the asset source seal, add the zero-prevention item, and take the natural logarithm of the comparison value. After processing by the sigmoid function, the seal matching item is obtained. Divide the heartbeat timeliness difference by the sum of the current group control authentication window length and the anti-zero item, then take the negative value and perform an exponential operation to obtain the heartbeat timeliness item; The key authentication term is obtained by multiplying the classical authentication effective value and the quantum key available value by square root; the link stability term is obtained by subtracting the square of the link jitter normalization value from one; the authentication tree admission closure value is obtained by multiplying the seal matching term, heartbeat validity term, key authentication term and link stability term in sequence.

5. The quantum-classical hybrid security authentication method for source-grid-load-storage collaborative control according to claim 1, characterized in that: The specific steps for constructing the group control authentication tree are as follows: The system compares the admission closure value and admission threshold of the authentication tree in real time. When the admission closure value is greater than or equal to the admission threshold, the corresponding terminal is written into the valid leaf node of the group control authentication tree. When the admission closure value is less than the admission threshold, the corresponding terminal is written into the candidate leaf node set. If the valid value of classical authentication is zero or the usable value of quantum key is zero, neither is written into the valid leaf node, and the corresponding terminal is marked as an authentication gap node. When the asset source seal of an external investor's external network assets is inconsistent with the current edge access domain, a cross-domain seal conflict identifier is generated, and the terminal is prohibited from entering the candidate leaf node set; a group control authentication tree is constructed according to the control domain number, feeder number, grid connection point number, terminal equipment type, asset source identifier, and authentication window number.

6. The quantum-classical hybrid security authentication method for source-grid-load-storage collaborative control according to claim 1, characterized in that: The specific steps for completing the quantum-classical hybrid authentication based on the group-controlled authentication tree are as follows: Based on the group control authentication tree, each valid leaf node in the group control authentication tree is encoded according to a fixed field order to generate a leaf node digest. The leaf node digests under the same intermediate aggregation node are sorted according to the leaf node sequence number and combined with the access domain identifier, terminal device type, communication channel digest, and asset source type to generate an intermediate aggregation node digest. The intermediate aggregation node digests are uniformly encoded and digested to generate the group control root digest. After receiving the group control root digest, the master station calls the quantum key fragment corresponding to the current quantum key batch in the quantum key management platform and generates a root authentication ticket through commercial cryptographic equipment to complete the quantum-classical hybrid authentication. After receiving the root authentication ticket, the edge node sequentially verifies the consistency of the master station signature value, quantum key batch number, authentication window number, one-time count value, and group control root digest. When all verifications pass, the quantum key fragment corresponding to the current authentication window is locked as the window key resource.

7. The quantum-classical hybrid security authentication method for source-grid-load-storage cooperative control according to claim 1, characterized in that: The specific steps for constructing the leaf key sharding allocation table are as follows: Based on the locked window key resources, a leaf key fragment allocation table is constructed using the window key resource index allocation method. The valid leaf nodes in the group control authentication tree are traversed, and an unoccupied key fragment range is requested for the current leaf node from the window key resources. When the link jitter normalization value of the current terminal is greater than the link jitter threshold, an additional backup key fragment range is requested for the terminal, and the index identifier of the backup range is written into the authentication receipt field of the current terminal for locating the backup key fragment during targeted retransmission. The key fragment range requested by the current leaf node is overlapped with the key fragment ranges of the allocated leaf nodes. When the overlap length of the fragments of two leaf nodes exceeds the overlap length threshold, it is determined to be a key fragment conflict. When a key fragment conflict occurs, the edge node re-requests a fragment range for the current leaf node. If a conflict still occurs after k consecutive requests, the current leaf node is transferred to the candidate leaf node set and recorded as a key fragment conflict node.

8. The quantum-classical hybrid security authentication method for source-grid-load-storage cooperative control according to claim 1, characterized in that: The specific steps for generating the leaf authentication label are as follows: Leaf authentication tags are generated using a tag field binding verification method; the leaf authentication tags are sent to the terminal along with the targeted authentication fragment of the corresponding terminal and are not disclosed to other terminals in the same group control authentication tree; After receiving the directed authentication segment, the terminal verifies the authentication window number, leaf node sequence number, key version number, communication direction identifier, and message authentication code generated by the HMAC-SM3 algorithm based on the key segment allocated to the leaf node in the leaf authentication tag. If the leaf authentication tag passes the verification, the terminal generates an authentication success receipt; otherwise, the terminal generates an authentication failure receipt and writes the failure reason code.

9. The quantum-classical hybrid security authentication method for source-grid-load-storage cooperative control according to claim 1, characterized in that: The specific steps for evaluating the closure degree of group control authentication receipts based on leaf authentication tags are as follows: The number of closed leaf nodes is obtained by counting the authentication received by the edge nodes through the receipt statistics; the number of valid leaf nodes is obtained by counting the number of terminals in the current group control authentication tree that pass the admission judgment and enter the set of valid leaf nodes. The number of leaf nodes to be pruned is obtained by counting the failure reason codes; the number of timeout leaf nodes is obtained by counting the leaf nodes that did not return an authentication receipt when the authentication window ended; the average receipt delay is obtained by counting the difference between the edge transmission time stamp and the edge receipt reception time stamp of each closed leaf node and taking the average value. The number of nodes with inconsistent key versions is obtained by comparing the key version number in the terminal receipt with the key version number in the leaf key sharding allocation table; the number of nodes with inconsistent asset source seals is obtained by comparing the asset source seal in the terminal receipt with the asset source seal recorded in the leaf node of the group control authentication tree. Divide the number of closed leaf nodes by the sum of the number of valid leaf nodes and the zero-prevention term to obtain the basic closure ratio; Add the number of pruned leaf nodes and the number of timeout leaf nodes, then divide by the number of closed leaf nodes plus one, and take the natural logarithm to obtain the leaf abnormal damping term; Divide the average acknowledgment delay by the sum of the current group control authentication window length and the zero-prevention term, then perform an exponential operation and subtract one to obtain the delay damping term; Add the number of nodes with inconsistent key versions and the number of nodes with inconsistent asset source sealing, then divide by the sum of the number of valid leaf nodes and the zero-prevention term, and take the square root to obtain the security conflict damping term. The group control authentication closure value is obtained by dividing the basic closure ratio by the sum of the leaf abnormal damping term, the time delay damping term, and the safety conflict damping term.

10. The quantum-classical hybrid security authentication method for source-grid-load-storage cooperative control according to claim 1, characterized in that: The specific steps for performing abnormal leaf pruning are as follows: If the group control authentication closure value is greater than or equal to the closure threshold, a group control authentication closure identifier is generated. If the group control authentication closure value is less than the closure threshold, the process enters the local anomaly resolution stage and does not re-trigger the complete group authentication. In the local anomaly resolution process, when the leaf anomaly damping term exceeds the leaf anomaly resolution threshold, leaf nodes that have been pruned and those that have timed out are resolved first. When the time delay damping term exceeds the time delay resolution threshold, cellular link jitter, edge authentication queue length, and edge receipt cache status are resolved first. When the security conflict damping term exceeds the security conflict resolution threshold, the corresponding leaf key fragment is frozen first, and the asset source seal, key version number, and communication direction identifier are verified. In the local anomaly analysis stage, nodes are classified and labeled respectively; When a node experiences an error in the message authentication code, inconsistent key version, counter value rollback, expired window number, or mismatched communication direction, the corresponding leaf node will be marked as a pruning node. Pruning nodes will not participate in the closure ratio calculation of the current authentication window, nor will they receive retransmission keys within the same authentication window. When a node experiences an initial acknowledgment timeout only due to link jitter, and the node has a backup key fragment identifier, edge nodes are allowed to perform a maximum of one directed retransmission for each leaf node with a backup key fragment identifier within the same authentication window.

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