Lightweight quantum-resistant authentication method based on lattice signature and quantum random number in v2g environment
Patent Information
- Application Number
- CN202610979722.9
- Authority / Receiving Office
- CN · China
- Patent Type
- Applications(China)
- Current Assignee / Owner
- Filing Date
- 2026-07-02
- Publication Date
- 2026-10-16
AI Technical Summary
[0005]为解决现有V2G通信认证方案在面临量子计算威胁时，难以兼顾高安全强度、轻量化开销与多场景灵活适配的技术问题，本发明提供了一种V2G环境下基于格签名和量子随机数的轻量级抗量子认证方法
本发明公开的V2G环境下基于格签名和量子随机数的轻量级抗量子认证方法，电动汽车EV与充电站CS之间采用第三方可信机构能源提供中心ESP颁发的证书辅助二者认证及密钥协商过程并利用基于格的PQC来对通信进行加密，确保二者通信时具备一定的抗量子能力，使用量子随机数生成会话密钥，使得会话密钥更具有随机性，不会被敌手所伪造。同时，本发明认证过程仅使用高效的密码运算，包括较小模数的整数环上向量/矩阵的加法和乘法、哈希函数、异或运算、拼接等，这种设计保证了本发明较高的通信效率与轻量化。本发明加密算法可以根据相关V2G场景下车辆密度指标、通信关键性以及位置敏感性去自行设置相关安全级别，实现不同V2G应用场景下对安全强度的不同需求。最后，与量子密钥分发等其他抗量子手段相比，本发明无需配备专用硬件，在有效控制成本的同时，能够更便捷地实现大规模部署，且在通信兼容性上展现出更优的适配能力。
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Abstract
Description
Technical Field
[0001] This invention relates to the field of vehicle networking technology, specifically a lightweight quantum-resistant authentication method based on lattice signatures and quantum random numbers in a V2G environment, as well as a system and computer-readable storage medium applying this method. Background Technology
[0002] With the acceleration of the global energy transition and the increasing popularity of electric vehicles (EVs), the interaction between EVs and the power grid has gradually become an important issue in the energy sector. EVs are not only widely used as an environmentally friendly mode of transportation, but their charging and battery storage capabilities also offer enormous potential for future smart grids and energy management. In recent years, V2G (Vehicle-to-Grid) technology has gradually become a research hotspot in the fields of smart grids, renewable energy integration, and energy storage. The core concept of V2G technology is to utilize the onboard battery of an EV as an energy storage unit, providing not only additional economic benefits to EV owners but also supporting grid load regulation and power balancing. When grid demand is high, EVs can feed power from their batteries back into the grid, alleviating power shortages; conversely, when grid load is low, EVs can charge and store energy. This bidirectional charging capability transforms EVs from mere energy consumers into flexible energy storage units within the energy supply chain. The application of V2G technology not only enhances the stability and reliability of the power grid but also brings economic benefits to EV owners. Owners can connect their vehicle's battery to the grid to provide energy support during peak electricity demand periods, thereby receiving compensation from the power company. Furthermore, as the proportion of renewable energy sources (such as solar and wind power) gradually increases, V2G technology can provide a flexible energy storage solution for the power grid, helping to balance the volatility of renewable energy and promote a broader green energy transition.
[0003] While V2G technology holds immense potential for energy conservation, it faces several challenges in practical application. In the V2G ecosystem, electric vehicles interact with charging stations to charge or discharge their batteries. During this interaction, electric vehicles must securely transmit various types of sensitive information to the charging station, including their identity, current State of Charge (SoC), target SoC, and specific charging / discharging preferences. However, due to the openness of Dedicated Short Range Communication (DSRC), this information exchange, typically conducted via the DSRC protocol, faces significant security risks. Adversaries can intercept, tamper with, replay, or delete messages, compromising the integrity and reliability of the V2G network. To address these vulnerabilities, a robust and secure communication framework is essential to ensure data confidentiality, integrity, and authentication across the entire network.
[0004] Currently, when EVs establish communication with charging stations (CS) and some servers, they typically use public-key cryptography, which relies on computational complexity such as integer factorization and discrete logarithms. This means the sender uses the receiver's public key to encrypt the message, and the receiver uses their private key to decrypt it. The public key is publicly shared; anyone can obtain it and use it to encrypt messages, while only the corresponding private key can decrypt them. Because traditional computers have limited computing power, they cannot break some classic cryptographic algorithms (such as RSA). However, with the advent of quantum computers, these classic cryptographic algorithms are easily cracked, thus communication security cannot be guaranteed. Summary of the Invention
[0005] To address the technical challenge of existing V2G communication authentication schemes in balancing high security strength, lightweight overhead, and flexible adaptation to multiple scenarios when facing quantum computing threats, this invention provides a lightweight quantum-resistant authentication method based on lattice signatures and quantum random numbers in a V2G environment.
[0006] To achieve the above objectives, the present invention provides the following technical solution: This invention discloses a lightweight quantum-resistant authentication method based on lattice signatures and quantum random numbers in a V2G environment, comprising the following steps: S1. Determine the security level based on the evaluation indicators of the V2G application scenario, and configure the lattice-based post-quantum cryptography algorithm parameters that match the security level; S2. The electric vehicle and the charging station generate their respective asymmetric key pairs based on the parameters of the post-quantum cryptography algorithm, and respectively initiate registration requests to a trusted energy provider center to obtain a first digital certificate, a second digital certificate and a corresponding initial private key issued by the energy provider center; S3. The electric vehicle acquires the current first-time information and generates a first quantum random number, constructs an authentication request message containing its identity identifier, and performs a lattice-based signature operation on the authentication request message using its own private key. Then, it packages the request signature result, the authentication request message, and the first digital certificate and sends them to the charging station. S4. After receiving the authentication request message, the charging station sequentially verifies the validity of the first time information, the legality of the first digital certificate, and the request signature result. If all verifications are passed, the charging station extracts the first quantum random number and generates a second quantum random number, constructs a response message containing its own identity identifier and the first quantum random number, performs a lattice-based signature operation on the response message using its own private key, and then packages and sends the response signature result, the response message, and the second digital certificate to the electric vehicle. S5. After receiving the response message, the electric vehicle sequentially verifies the validity of the time information in the response message, the legality of the second digital certificate, and the response signature result; if all verifications pass, the electric vehicle extracts the second quantum random number and performs a fusion calculation with the first quantum random number to generate a session key for secure communication between the electric vehicle and the charging station.
[0007] S6. The electric vehicle extracts the quantum public key of the charging station and uses the public key to perform lattice-based encryption on the session key on the electric vehicle side, generating ciphertext which is then sent to the charging station; the charging station uses its own private key to decrypt the ciphertext to obtain the session key.
[0008] As a further improvement to the above scheme, in step S1, the evaluation indicators include charging station location sensitivity, vehicle density indicators, and communication criticality; the post-quantum cryptography algorithm parameters include lattice dimension and modulus, and the values of lattice dimension and modulus are positively correlated with the level of security.
[0009] As a further improvement to the above scheme, steps S3 to S5 involve performing lattice-based signature operations and verifying the signature results based on ring fault-tolerant learning, specifically including the following processes: Key generation process: based on lattice dimension With modulus Define a polynomial ring From the polynomial ring random sampling public key matrix Sampling private keys in a discrete Gaussian distribution and error vector ; Compute public key component Finally, the public key is output. and private key ;in, Modulus The polynomial ring under the following conditions Modulo integers q ring Z q For coefficient ring, with x A polynomial ring with indefinite elements; Signature generation process: The signer hashes the message to obtain a message digest. Sample commitment vectors from a polynomial ring based on a discrete Gaussian distribution. The challenge value is generated by combining the message with a hash function. ; Calculate the response vector And check the norm of the response vector. Is it not greater than a rejection region threshold? The output will include the challenge value. and response vector The signature result; Signature verification process: The verifier hashes the received message to obtain a message digest. Check the norm of the response vector Is it not greater than the rejection region threshold? This is calculated based on the sender's public key. And a new challenge value is regenerated by using a hash function to calculate the result and the received message. Compare with the new challenge value Challenge value in the signature result If they match, the signature is considered valid.
[0010] As a further improvement to the above scheme, step S2, the registration process for electric vehicles specifically includes: Electric vehicle public key generation and private key to identify oneself Public key and private key Perform data concatenation to generate a dataset, and use a private key. Perform a signature operation on the dataset to generate a signature. Package the registration data Send to the energy supply center; The energy supply center received the registration data. And verify the signature Once it is valid, use your own private key. Identification of electric vehicles Public key and the preset certificate validity period Perform the signing to generate the first digital certificate. ; The energy supply center generates the initial private key for the electric vehicle and uses the public key. First digital certificate The initial private key is encrypted and returned to the electric vehicle, which then decrypts and stores it. Among them, charging stations are registered in accordance with the registration method for electric vehicles.
[0011] As a further improvement to the above scheme, in step S3, the electric vehicle obtains the current timestamp. Generate the first quantum random number and their own identity markers timestamp and the first quantum random number Concatenate the data to construct the authentication request message. Electric vehicles use private keys right The generated request signature result is The data packet format sent to the charging station is , This is the first digital certificate.
[0012] As a further improvement to the above scheme, step S4, the verification process after the charging station receives the data packet specifically includes: The charging station generates the current timestamp. Check if the time difference meets the requirements. ,in The preset time tolerance threshold; If satisfied The charging station uses the public key of the energy supply center. For the first digital certificate The process involves decryption and validity verification, calculation of hash values for comparison to verify certificate integrity, and verification of the challenge and response values in the signature component to validate the legitimacy of the electric vehicle's identity. If the electric vehicle is legitimate, the charging station will process the authentication request message. Perform hash processing and combine it with the data extracted from the first digital certificate. Use the public key of the electric vehicle in the system to verify the request signature result. Is it effective?
[0013] As a further improvement to the above scheme, in step S4, if the verification of the requested signature result passes, the charging station obtains the current timestamp. Generate a second quantum random number and the extracted first quantum random number As a temporary session key component The charging station will identify itself. timestamp Second quantum random number and temporary session key components Concatenate the data to construct the response message. Charging stations use private keys right The generated response signature result is The data packet format sent to the electric vehicle is , For a second digital certificate.
[0014] As a further improvement to the above scheme, in step S5, the electric vehicle reference charging station performs reverse verification logic, sequentially checking the timestamps. The effectiveness of the anti-replay function, the legitimacy of the charging station's identity, and the response signature result. The validity of the result is verified using quantum lattice cryptography; after all verifications pass, the electric vehicle will display its first quantum random number. With response message The second quantum random number extracted Perform an XOR operation to obtain the final session key. ,Right now .
[0015] This invention also discloses a lightweight quantum-resistant authentication system for performing the lightweight quantum-resistant authentication method based on lattice signatures and quantum random numbers in a V2G environment as described above; the system includes: An initialization module is used to determine the security level based on the evaluation indicators of the V2G application scenario and configure lattice-based post-quantum cryptography algorithm parameters that match the security level. The entity registration module is used to enable electric vehicles and charging stations to register their identities with the energy supply center and obtain the corresponding digital certificates and initial keys; The request and response module is used to control electric vehicles and charging stations to send message entities containing quantum random numbers and timestamps in both directions, and to send the message entities after genotyping the message bodies using a private key; The verification and key negotiation module is used by the receiver to perform hierarchical verification of time validity, digital certificate validity, and signature validity in sequence. After the two-way identity authentication is passed, the generated quantum random numbers are XORed and fused to generate the final session key.
[0016] The present invention also discloses a computer-readable storage medium having a computer program stored thereon, which, when executed by a processor, implements the steps of the lightweight quantum-resistant authentication method based on lattice signatures and quantum random numbers in a V2G environment as described above.
[0017] Compared with the prior art, the beneficial effects of the present invention are: This invention discloses a lightweight quantum-resistant authentication method based on lattice signatures and quantum random numbers in a V2G environment. The electric vehicle (EV) and the charging station (CS) use a certificate issued by a trusted third-party energy provider (ESP) to assist in the authentication and key negotiation process. Lattice-based PQC is used to encrypt the communication, ensuring a certain level of quantum resistance. Quantum random numbers are used to generate the session key, making it more random and resistant to forgery. Furthermore, the authentication process uses only efficient cryptographic operations, including addition and multiplication of vectors / matrices on integer rings with small moduli, hash functions, XOR operations, and concatenation. This design ensures high communication efficiency and lightweight operation. The encryption algorithm can be customized to set security levels based on vehicle density, communication criticality, and location sensitivity in different V2G scenarios, meeting varying security strength requirements. Finally, compared to other quantum-resistant methods such as quantum key distribution, this invention does not require dedicated hardware, effectively controlling costs while enabling easier large-scale deployment and exhibiting superior adaptability in communication compatibility. Attached Figure Description
[0018] Figure 1 This is a flowchart of a lightweight quantum-resistant authentication method based on lattice signatures and quantum random numbers in a V2G environment according to Embodiment 1 of the present invention.
[0019] Figure 2 This is a flowchart illustrating the initialization phase in Embodiment 1 of the present invention.
[0020] Figure 3 This is a schematic diagram of the lightweight quantum-resistant authentication system in Embodiment 2 of the present invention. Detailed Implementation
[0021] The technical solutions of the embodiments of the present invention will be clearly and completely described below with reference to the accompanying drawings. Obviously, the described embodiments are only some embodiments of the present invention, and not all embodiments. Based on the embodiments of the present invention, all other embodiments obtained by those skilled in the art without creative effort are within the scope of protection of the present invention.
[0022] Example 1
[0023] To address the challenge of authenticating the battery of an electric vehicle (EV) before charging or discharging it during interaction with a charging station (CS), this invention proposes a lightweight, quantum-resistant authentication method based on lattice signatures and quantum random numbers in a V2G environment. Please refer to [link / reference]. Figure 1This method mainly includes four stages: initialization, electric vehicle (EV) registration, charging station (CS) registration, and authentication and key negotiation. The symbol definitions used in this invention are shown in Table 1.
[0024] Table 1: Definitions of Relevant Symbols
[0025] During the initialization phase, based on relevant indicators such as charging station location sensitivity, vehicle density, and communication criticality, according to... Figure 2 Select an appropriate security level and corresponding parameter values. In the protocol of this scheme, the grid dimension... and modulus As core security parameters, these parameters collectively form the basic framework for the protocol's resistance to quantum attacks, permeating every key stage of the protocol's design and operation. (Lattice dimension) n As a core definition parameter of the polynomial ring structure, it directly determines the basic ring. (in (for polynomial rings) and modules q Lower ring The mathematical structure in which q The value varies depending on the security level: 2 16 ,2 24 ,2 32 ,2 40 ,2 48 This value not only defines the highest degree of the polynomial in the ring, but also standardizes the rules for polynomial operations within the ring. During key generation, n Constraining the public key matrix A Secret Key SK and error vector e The dimension and sampling space ensure the randomness and security of these core elements; in the signature generation and verification process, the commitment vector... y Challenge Value c and response vector z All operations are based on n The defined ring structure is expanded, and the parameters for checking the norm of the response vector during the verification process are... (in (For Gaussian parameters) is also directly related to n Related, and at different security levels, n The lattice dimension will be gradually adjusted from 512 in security level 1 to 2048 in security level 5 as the security level increases. This is achieved by increasing the lattice dimension to enhance the computational complexity of the lattice problem, thereby adapting to the security requirements of different risk scenarios. Modulus q This provides a closure guarantee for ring operations, clearly defining the range of values for the coefficients of elements in the ring. During key generation, it ensures that the error vector... eThe norm is much smaller than q / 2, to prevent errors from being masked by modulo operations and affecting key security; in signature verification, q / 2 serves as a critical threshold to ensure the accuracy of the verification logic, while q The value needs to be consistent with n The synergistic balance requires both sufficient size to resist lattice reduction attacks and control within a reasonable range to avoid excessive computational overhead. The synergistic effect of these two factors ultimately supports the post-quantum security performance and practical efficiency of this scheme in V2G scenarios.
[0026] In the protocol proposed in this invention, the key generation, signature generation, and signature verification processes are all constructed based on Ring-LWE in lattice cryptography, and post-quantum security is guaranteed through strict random sampling and computation rules. The specific process is as follows: 1. Key Generation Process: Key generation aims to generate public and private keys, providing the foundation for subsequent signing and verification. The process begins with a polynomial ring. Parameter initialization, that is, setting the corresponding grid dimensions according to the security level. n With modulus q First, from the ring random sampling public key matrix A This ensures that its elements are evenly distributed within the ring to guarantee randomness; subsequently, the private key... SK From the ring Sampling is performed in a short vector space, i.e., sampling within a discrete Gaussian distribution, to ensure key security; simultaneously, the error vector... e Used for sampling private key SK The same method from the ring The public key component is obtained through mid-sampling; finally, it is calculated using matrix multiplication and addition. Finally, the public key is output. and private key SK The public key is used for signature verification, while the secret key is held only by the signer.
[0027] 2. Signature Generation Process: Signature generation is the process by which the signer generates a valid signature for a message based on their private key. First, the signer... m Perform hashing Hash Process to obtain message digest μ Used to verify message integrity, then from the ring. Random sampling commitment vector in discrete Gaussian distribution y and calculate Next, with the message m Generate challenge values using a hash function. c Finally, the response vector is calculated using addition and multiplication on the ring. and check z Does the norm satisfy? The requirement of the rejection region ensures that the response vector remains a short vector, where... for z The norm of the expression. If the check passes, output the signature. Otherwise, resample the commitment vector. y Repeat the above process until the check passes.
[0028] 3. Signature Verification Process: Signature verification is performed by the verifier based on the public key. PK The core of verifying signature validity is to verify the response vector against the challenge value and the public key. PK Consistency. The verifier receives the message first. m ,sign and public key , to receive messages m Perform hashing Hash Process to obtain message digest Perform message integrity verification and check z Does the norm satisfy? The requirement of a rejection field ensures that the response vector is short and meets security requirements; subsequently, computation is performed based on the public key. and through a hash function and messages m Regenerate challenge values Finally, compare the generated challenge values. Challenge value in signature Check for consistency. If all conditions are met, the signature is considered valid; otherwise, it is considered invalid, and the message is rejected.
[0029] The above process leverages the short vector properties of lattice cryptography, the closure property of ring operations, and the parameter dimension. n Modulus q The collaborative constraints enable a quantum-resistant secure signature mechanism in the V2G scenario, while balancing computational efficiency and security.
[0030] The EV registration phase is the core process for EVs to complete identity authentication and distribute initial keys and certificates between the EV and the energy provider ESP. The entire process revolves around secure key generation, identity information signature verification, and encrypted storage. First, the EV generates its own key pair, namely a public key. and private key This key pair will serve as the core identity identifier for the EV in subsequent communication and authentication. Next, the EV will transmit its identity identifier... The newly generated private key and public key The data is concatenated to form a dataset containing complete identity and key information, and then the user's private key is used. Perform a signature operation on the dataset to generate a signature. This signature ensures that the identity and key information have not been tampered with during transmission and that the source is a legitimate electric vehicle (EV). After signing, the EV will transfer the identity... Public key and signature Packaged into Send to ESP for authentication. ESP receives the message sent by EV. After that, the first task is to verify the signature. The legitimacy of the received EV identity and key information is verified to confirm that the received EV identity and key information has not been tampered with and indeed originates from that EV. Once verification is successful, ESP will proceed based on the EV's identity. Public key and the preset certificate validity period Using their own private key Sign this information to generate a certificate specific to electric vehicles (EVs). This certificate will serve as a crucial credential for the EV to prove its legitimate identity when communicating with other entities, such as charging stations (CS). Simultaneously, the ESP will also generate a recognized initial private key for the electric vehicle. This certificate is used by the EV for initial secure communication during the authentication and key negotiation phases. Afterwards, the ESP will send the generated certificate... and initial key Using EV's public key Encryption is performed to form encrypted data packets. The EV public key is chosen for encryption to ensure that only the EV itself (holding the corresponding private key) can encrypt the data. This allows the system to decrypt and retrieve the certificate and initial key, ensuring the security of data transmission. Finally, the ESP encrypts the data packet. The encrypted data packet is sent back to the EV. Upon receiving the encrypted data packet, the EV will use its own private key. Decrypt it to obtain the certificate. and private key and decrypted Securely store the data to prepare for subsequent operations during the authentication and key negotiation phases.
[0031] The registration process for charging station CS (Customer Service) and electric vehicle (EV) is logically consistent. Both involve authentication, certificate generation, and initial key distribution between the charging station CS and ESP (Electronic Stability Program). The only differences lie in the entity identities, keys, and certificate parameters involved. At the start of the process, the CS automatically generates a pair of keys for identity verification and secure communication, i.e., a public key. and private key After that, CS will identify itself. The generated private key and public key The data is then concatenated to form a dataset containing the complete identity and key information of the charging stations, and its own private key is used. Sign the dataset and generate a signature. This ensures the integrity and legitimacy of the charging station's identity and key information during transmission to the ESP. After signing, the CS will... Public key and signature Packaged as The format is sent to the ESP, requesting completion of registration verification. The ESP receives the data sent by the CS. Then, first check the signature. Verification is performed to confirm that the received CS identity and key information has not been illegally tampered with and that its source is legitimate. After successful verification, ESP will determine the identity of CS. Public key and the preset validity period of the charging station certificate Using their own private key Sign this information to generate a CS-specific certificate. This certificate is crucial for CS to prove its legitimacy when communicating with EV. Simultaneously, ESP generates an initial private key for CS's subsequent use. This is used by CS for initial secure communication during subsequent authentication and key negotiation phases. ESP will then generate the certificate. and initial key Using CS public key Encryption is performed to form encrypted data packets. Using CS public-key encryption ensures that only those holding the corresponding private key can access the encryption. The CS can decrypt and obtain the certificate and private key, ensuring data security during transmission. Finally, the ESP will encrypt the data packets. The data is sent to the CS (Client / Server). Upon receiving the encrypted data packet, the CS uses its own private key. Decrypt it to obtain the certificate. and initial key and decrypted Secure storage lays the foundation for subsequent authentication and key negotiation phases with EVs.
[0032] The authentication and key negotiation phase is the core process by which the electric vehicle (EV) and the charging station (CS) establish a secure session key through two-way authentication and information exchange after completing their respective registrations. The entire process relies on the previously generated key, certificate, and preset cryptographic rules (such as hash processing, signature verification, Gaussian distribution parameter verification, etc.) to ensure the legitimacy of both communicating parties, the integrity of messages, and the security of the session key. The process begins with the EV initiating an authentication request. The EV first obtains its current timestamp. At the same time, a quantum random number is generated. (Quantum random numbers have stronger randomness, which can improve the security of subsequent keys), and then its own identity identifier. timestamp and quantum random numbers Pieced together, forming a message To ensure To ensure the integrity and legitimacy of the transmission process, EV will use the private key it generated during the registration phase. right Perform a signature operation to generate a signature. ,Right now After signing, EV will send the message. ,sign And the certificate obtained from the Energy Provider Center (ESP) during the registration phase. Packaged into an authentication request message The EV sends this information to the CS, officially initiating the authentication process. The CS receives the information sent by the EV. Next, a time validity check will be performed to generate the current timestamp. Through calculation and The difference is used to determine whether the authentication request is within the valid time window, i.e., to check... , This is a preset time tolerance threshold used to prevent replay attacks. If the time verification passes, CS will proceed to the certificate. Verification process: due to It is ESP using its own private key For EVs , and certificate validity period Signature generated, i.e. CS will first use ESP's public key Decryption Extracting from it Information and marked as First, based on the certificate validity period The certificate validity is verified, and then the extracted information is hashed to obtain... Simultaneously call EV-related hash values ,judge Whether or not Consistency, verifying message integrity; then from Extract the challenge value of the signature component and response value According to the rejection domain set during the initialization phase check Does it meet the requirements? Then use common parameters calculate The value of this calculation result and Hash processing is performed to obtain ,verify Whether or not Consistency is required. Only when all the above certificate verification steps pass can the EV's identity be confirmed as legitimate. After the EV's identity verification is successful, the CS will further verify the message. Validity: First, for Hash processing is performed to obtain , with the received EV Compare and confirm. It has not been tampered with; and from Extract component challenge value and response value ,check Does it meet the requirements? Then use EV's public key component calculate The value of this result and Hash processing is performed to obtain ,verify Whether or not Consistent. If the message Visa verification successful, CS will from Extracting quantum random numbers generated by EV And use it as the initial component of the session key to generate Complete the certification of EVs and After generation, the CS will initiate its own authentication request. The CS will first obtain the current timestamp. Generate quantum random numbers Then identify yourself timestamp Quantum random numbers And the newly generated Pieced together, forming a message Then, CS uses the private key it generated during the registration phase. right Perform signing, generate signature , and the message ,sign And the certificate obtained from ESP during the registration phase. Packaged into an authentication request message Send it to EV. EV receives the message sent by CS. Then, a similar process to that used when CS verifies EV will be repeated: first, the current timestamp will be generated. ,examine Ensure the request has not expired; then verify the certificate. : Through ESP's public key Decryption ,extract And marked as First, based on the certificate validity period The certificate validity is verified, and then its hash is processed to obtain... , call CS-related hash value and Compare; extract check ,calculate and Hash ,verify This confirms the CS identity is legitimate. Then, the verification message is sent. Validity: For Hash and Compare and extract check Using CS's public key component , calculate ,and Hash ,verify ,make sure Unaltered and of legitimate origin. When the CS's identity and message... After all verifications are passed, the EV will be from Extracting quantum random numbers generated by CS Combined with its previously generated Through XOR operation By combining the two, a session key is finally established between EV and CS. This session key will be used for encrypted transmission of subsequent data between the EV and CS, ensuring communication security throughout the charging process.
[0033] Electric vehicles use quantum public keys for charging stations PK csElectric vehicle side session key SEK The encryption process is performed, and the generated ciphertext is sent to the charging station; the charging station uses its own private key. SK cs Decrypting the ciphertext yields the session key used for secure communication between electric vehicles and charging stations. SEK .
[0034] Example 2
[0035] Please see Figure 3 This embodiment provides a lightweight quantum-resistant authentication system for executing the lightweight quantum-resistant authentication method based on lattice signatures and quantum random numbers in a V2G environment as described in Embodiment 1; the system includes: an initialization module 101, an entity registration module 102, a request and response module 103, and a verification and key negotiation module 104.
[0036] The initialization module 101 is used to determine the security level according to the evaluation indicators of the V2G application scenario, and configure the lattice-based post-quantum cryptography algorithm parameters that match the security level. The entity registration module 102 is used to enable electric vehicles and charging stations to register their identities with the energy supply center and obtain the corresponding digital certificates and initial keys; The request and response module 103 is used to control the electric vehicle and the charging station to initiate a message entity containing a quantum random number and a timestamp in both directions, and to send the message entity after genotyping the message body with a private key; The verification and key negotiation module 104 is used by the receiver to perform hierarchical verification of time validity, digital certificate validity, and signature validity in sequence. After the two-way identity authentication is passed, the generated quantum random numbers are XORed and fused to generate the final session key.
[0037] Example 3
[0038] This embodiment provides a computer-readable storage medium storing a computer program thereon. When the program is executed by a processor, it implements the steps of the lightweight quantum-resistant authentication method based on lattice signatures and quantum random numbers in the V2G environment as described in Embodiment 1.
[0039] The computer-readable storage medium may include flash memory, hard disk, multimedia card, card-type memory (e.g., SD or DX memory), random access memory (RAM), static random access memory (SRAM), read-only memory (ROM), electrically erasable programmable read-only memory (EEPROM), programmable read-only memory (PROM), magnetic memory, magnetic disk, optical disk, etc. In some embodiments, the storage medium may be an internal storage unit of a computer device, such as the hard disk or memory of the computer device. In other embodiments, the storage medium may also be an external storage device of the computer device, such as a plug-in hard disk, smart memory card, secure digital card, flash memory card, etc., provided on the computer device. Of course, the storage medium may include both internal storage units and external storage devices of the computer device. In this embodiment, the memory is typically used to store the operating system and various application software installed on the computer device. In addition, the memory can also be used to temporarily store various types of data that have been output or will be output.
[0040] The above description is only a preferred embodiment of the present invention, but the scope of protection of the present invention is not limited thereto. Any equivalent substitutions or modifications made by those skilled in the art within the scope of the technology disclosed in the present invention, based on the technical solution and inventive concept of the present invention, should be covered within the scope of protection of the present invention.
Claims
1. A lightweight quantum-resistant authentication method based on lattice signatures and quantum random numbers in a V2G environment, characterized in that, Includes the following steps: S1. Determine the security level based on the evaluation indicators of the V2G application scenario, and configure the lattice-based post-quantum cryptography algorithm parameters that match the security level; S2. The electric vehicle and the charging station generate their respective asymmetric key pairs based on the parameters of the post-quantum cryptography algorithm, and respectively initiate registration requests to a trusted energy provider center to obtain a first digital certificate, a second digital certificate and a corresponding initial private key issued by the energy provider center; S3. The electric vehicle acquires the current first-time information and generates a first quantum random number, constructs an authentication request message containing its identity identifier, and performs a lattice-based signature operation on the authentication request message using its own private key. Then, it packages the request signature result, the authentication request message, and the first digital certificate and sends them to the charging station. S4. After receiving the authentication request message, the charging station sequentially verifies the validity of the first time information, the legality of the first digital certificate, and the request signature result. If all verifications are passed, the charging station extracts the first quantum random number and generates a second quantum random number, constructs a response message containing its own identity identifier and the first quantum random number, performs a lattice-based signature operation on the response message using its own private key, and then packages and sends the response signature result, the response message, and the second digital certificate to the electric vehicle. S5. After receiving the response message, the electric vehicle sequentially verifies the validity of the time information in the response message, the legality of the second digital certificate, and the response signature result; if all verifications pass, the electric vehicle extracts the second quantum random number and performs a fusion calculation with the first quantum random number to generate a session key for secure communication between the electric vehicle and the charging station; S6. The electric vehicle extracts the quantum public key of the charging station and uses the public key to perform lattice-based encryption on the session key on the electric vehicle side, generating ciphertext which is then sent to the charging station; the charging station uses its own private key to decrypt the ciphertext to obtain the session key.
2. The lightweight quantum-resistant authentication method based on lattice signatures and quantum random numbers in a V2G environment according to claim 1, characterized in that, In step S1, the evaluation indicators include charging station location sensitivity, vehicle density indicators, and communication criticality; the post-quantum cryptography algorithm parameters include lattice dimension and modulus, and the values of lattice dimension and modulus are positively correlated with the level of security.
3. The lightweight quantum-resistant authentication method based on lattice signatures and quantum random numbers in a V2G environment according to claim 1, characterized in that, In steps S3 to S5, lattice-based signature computation and signature result verification are performed based on ring fault-tolerant learning. Includes the following processes: Key generation process: based on lattice dimension With modulus Define a polynomial ring From the polynomial ring random sampling public key matrix Sampling private keys in a discrete Gaussian distribution and error vector ; Compute public key component Finally, the public key is output. and private key ;in, Modulus The polynomial ring under the following conditions Modulo an integer q ring Z q For coefficient ring, with x A polynomial ring with indefinite elements; Signature generation process: The signer hashes the message to obtain a message digest. Sample commitment vectors from a polynomial ring based on a discrete Gaussian distribution. The challenge value is generated by combining the message with a hash function. ; Calculate the response vector And check the norm of the response vector. Is it not greater than a rejection region threshold? The output will include the challenge value. and response vector The signature result; Signature verification process: The verifier hashes the received message to obtain a message digest. Check the norm of the response vector Is it not greater than the rejection region threshold? This is calculated based on the sender's public key. And a new challenge value is regenerated from the calculation result and the received message using a hash function. Compare with the new challenge value Challenge value in the signature result If they match, the signature is considered valid.
4. The lightweight quantum-resistant authentication method based on lattice signatures and quantum random numbers in a V2G environment according to claim 1, characterized in that, In step S2, the registration process for electric vehicles specifically includes: Electric vehicle public key generation and private key to identify oneself Public key and private key Perform data concatenation to generate a dataset, and use a private key. Perform a signature operation on the dataset to generate a signature. Package the registration data Send to the energy supply center; The energy supply center received the registration data. And verify the signature Once it is valid, use your own private key. Identification of electric vehicles Public key and the preset certificate validity period Perform the signing to generate the first digital certificate. ; The energy supply center generates the initial private key for the electric vehicle and uses the public key. First digital certificate The initial private key is encrypted and returned to the electric vehicle, which then decrypts and stores it. Among them, charging stations are registered in accordance with the registration method for electric vehicles.
5. The lightweight quantum-resistant authentication method based on lattice signatures and quantum random numbers in a V2G environment according to claim 1, characterized in that, In step S3, the electric vehicle obtains the current timestamp. Generate the first quantum random number and their own identity markers timestamp and the first quantum random number Concatenate the data to construct the authentication request message. Electric vehicles use private keys right The generated request signature result is The data packet format sent to the charging station is , This is the first digital certificate.
6. The lightweight quantum-resistant authentication method based on lattice signatures and quantum random numbers in a V2G environment according to claim 5, characterized in that, In step S4, the verification process after the charging station receives the data packet specifically includes: The charging station generates the current timestamp. Check if the time difference meets the requirements. ,in The preset time tolerance threshold; If satisfied The charging station uses the public key of the energy supply center. For the first digital certificate The process involves decryption and validity verification, calculation of hash values for comparison to verify certificate integrity, and verification of challenge and response values in the signature component to validate the legitimacy of the electric vehicle's identity. If the electric vehicle is legitimate, the charging station will process the authentication request message. Perform hash processing and combine it with the data extracted from the first digital certificate. Use the public key of the electric vehicle in the system to verify the request signature result. Is it effective? 7. The lightweight quantum-resistant authentication method based on lattice signatures and quantum random numbers in a V2G environment according to claim 6, characterized in that, In step S4, if the verification of the requested signature result passes, the charging station obtains the current timestamp. Generate a second quantum random number and the extracted first quantum random number As a temporary session key component The charging station will identify itself. timestamp Second quantum random number and temporary session key components Concatenate the data to construct the response message. Charging stations use private keys right The generated response signature result is The data packet format sent to the electric vehicle is , For a second digital certificate.
8. The lightweight quantum-resistant authentication method based on lattice signatures and quantum random numbers in a V2G environment according to claim 7, characterized in that, In step S5, the electric vehicle reference charging station executes reverse verification logic, sequentially checking the timestamps. The effectiveness of the anti-replay function, the legitimacy of the charging station's identity, and the response signature result. The validity of the result is verified using quantum lattice cryptography; after all verifications pass, the electric vehicle will display its first quantum random number. With response message The second quantum random number extracted Perform an XOR operation to obtain the final session key. ,Right now .
9. A lightweight quantum-resistant authentication system, characterized in that, A system for executing a lightweight quantum-resistant authentication method based on lattice signatures and quantum random numbers in a V2G environment as described in any one of claims 1 to 8; the system comprises: An initialization module is used to determine the security level based on the evaluation indicators of the V2G application scenario and configure lattice-based post-quantum cryptography algorithm parameters that match the security level. The entity registration module is used to enable electric vehicles and charging stations to register their identities with the energy supply center and obtain the corresponding digital certificates and initial keys; The request and response module is used to control electric vehicles and charging stations to send message entities containing quantum random numbers and timestamps in both directions, and to send the message entities after genotyping the message bodies using a private key; The verification and key negotiation module is used by the receiver to perform hierarchical verification of time validity, digital certificate validity, and signature validity in sequence. After the two-way identity authentication is passed, the generated quantum random numbers are XORed and fused to generate the final session key.
10. A computer-readable storage medium having a computer program stored thereon, characterized in that, When the program is executed by the processor, it implements the steps of the lightweight quantum-resistant authentication method based on lattice signatures and quantum random numbers in a V2G environment as described in any one of claims 1 to 8.