Post-quantum cryptography embodied intelligent anti-quantum situation awareness and defense method

Abstract

The application relates to the technical field of information security, and provides a post-quantum cryptography embodied intelligent anti-quantum situation awareness and defense method, which comprises the following steps: obtaining post-quantum key information and running situation information of a robot, evaluating an effective protection value and rolling prediction of security demand changes; obtaining a switching cutoff time based on the effective protection value and the security demand changes, and generating a target post-quantum key; identifying an allowed switching node and a predicted arrival time based on the running situation information; screening a target switching node in the allowed switching node, completing pre-deployment of the target post-quantum key before the target switching node is reached, and activating when the robot reaches the target switching node. The application solves the problem that the post-quantum key update time and the continuous action execution of the robot are difficult to coordinate.

Description

Technical Field

[0001] This application relates to the field of information security technology, and in particular to a post-quantum cryptography embodied intelligence anti-quantum situational awareness and defense method. Background Technology

[0002] Existing solutions typically acquire information on communication risks, network status, computing resources, and current password protection status to assess the security risks faced by the device. When protection capabilities are insufficient, a new post-quantum key is generated or the password configuration is adjusted. In the actual operation of embodied intelligent robots, the robot often needs to continuously execute planned actions while receiving control commands. When it senses that the current post-quantum key's protection capabilities cannot meet security requirements, the robot may be in the execution range of a critical action. If a new key is directly updated and enabled at this time, the key switching process will cause resource contention and state conflicts with the real-time transmission of current control commands, potentially leading to packet loss or delays, thus disrupting the stability of continuous operation. If a fixed waiting time is used before switching, the robot's actual action progress is dynamically time-varying due to factors such as load, friction, and environmental disturbances. The preset time often deviates from the actual action node; switching too early leaves the conflict risk unresolved, while switching too late means the security window has passed.

[0003] Therefore, as can be seen from the above phenomena, post-quantum key updates are usually triggered by changes in security status. However, the actual appropriate key switching time for the robot is constrained by the continuity of actions and the actual execution progress. There is a time deviation between the triggering time and the appropriate execution time corresponding to the two. At the same time, the completion time of the robot's actions will change with the actual operating status, making it difficult for the predetermined switching time to stably correspond to the robot's truly suitable switching state. This results in a dynamic mismatch between the post-quantum key switching time and security protection requirements. Summary of the Invention

[0004] This application provides a post-quantum cryptography-based embodied intelligent quantum-resistant situational awareness and defense method to address the problem in the prior art where the timing of post-quantum key updates is difficult to coordinate with the continuous action execution process of a robot, and there is a time deviation between the key update requirements corresponding to changes in security state and the actual appropriate switching time of the robot, which leads to a delay in security response during key switching.

[0005] A method for embodied intelligence in post-quantum cryptography to resist quantum situational awareness and defense includes: The robot's post-quantum key information and operational status information are obtained; the effective protection value is evaluated based on the post-quantum key information; and the changes in security requirements are predicted in a rolling manner based on the operational status information. The protection capability is matched with the effective protection value and the change in security requirements to obtain the switching deadline, and the key update process is performed based on the change in security requirements to obtain the target post-quantum key; Based on the operational status information, a handover opportunity analysis is performed to obtain the allowed handover nodes and their corresponding estimated arrival times. Among the allowed switching nodes, a target switching node is determined whose expected arrival time is no later than the switching deadline, and the pre-deployment and activation process of the target post-quantum key is performed based on the target switching node.

[0006] Based on the above technical solution, in the embodied intelligent quantum-resistant situational awareness and defense method for post-quantum cryptography provided in this application, by rolling the matching of the effective protection value of the post-quantum key with the changes in security requirements under the robot's operating state, the switching deadline when the current key protection capability will be insufficient can be obtained in advance; at the same time, by combining the robot's action execution process to identify the allowed switching nodes and the expected arrival time, the target switching node is selected under the security deadline constraint, and the target post-quantum key is pre-deployed. Activation is then performed when the robot reaches the appropriate action node, thereby coordinating the post-quantum key update requirements with the actual action progress of the robot, reducing the interference of key switching on the continuous control process, and shortening the duration of the insufficient protection capability state.

[0007] In conjunction with the first aspect above, in one possible implementation, the evaluation of the effective protection value includes: Extract the algorithm security parameters, key length, key lifespan, and usage time of the current post-quantum key from the post-quantum key information; The algorithm's security parameters and key length are matched with the preset protection value mapping relationship to obtain the basic protection value of the current quantum key; The ratio of the used time to the key lifetime is calculated to obtain the time decay amount, and the base protection value is attenuated and corrected using the time decay amount to obtain the effective protection value of the current quantum key.

[0008] In conjunction with the first aspect above, in one possible implementation, the rolling prediction of changes in security requirements includes: The communication status sequence, planned action sequence, and current execution progress are extracted from the operational status information, and the planned duration of each planned action is read from the planned action sequence. Starting from the current moment, the preset prediction interval is divided into multiple prediction periods in chronological order; Each communication state in the communication state sequence is matched with a preset risk level range to obtain the corresponding communication risk value. Adjacent communication risk values ​​are compared to obtain the communication risk change trend. Based on the current communication risk value and the communication risk change trend, the communication risk value for each prediction period is updated sequentially. Based on the current execution progress and the planned duration of each planned action, each planned action is mapped to a predicted time period. The protection requirement value pre-configured for the corresponding planned action is read, and the protection requirement value is compared with the communication risk value of the corresponding predicted time period. The larger value is taken as the security requirement value of the corresponding predicted time period. After the operational status information is updated, the safety requirement values ​​for each prediction period are obtained again, forming the aforementioned safety requirement changes.

[0009] By extracting the communication state sequence, planned action sequence, and current execution progress, the changes in communication state are extrapolated over time. The protection requirement value corresponding to the future planned action is compared with the communication risk value, and the larger value is used to form the security requirement value for each prediction period, thereby forming the change in security requirement. This solves the problem that key updates are triggered solely based on the current communication risk, which cannot identify changes in protection requirement in the robot's future action phases in advance.

[0010] In conjunction with the first aspect above, in one possible implementation, the protection capability matching includes: Read the security requirement values ​​corresponding to each prediction period, and compare the effective protection value with each security requirement value in turn; When the effective protection value is lower than the security requirement value for the corresponding predicted period for the first time, the start time of the predicted period shall be taken as the switching cutoff time. When the security requirement value for each prediction period is not higher than the effective protection value, the current quantum key is maintained, and after the security requirement is updated, the security requirement value for each prediction period is compared with the effective protection value again.

[0011] In conjunction with the first aspect above, in one possible implementation, the execution of the key update process includes: From the changes in security requirements, starting from the predicted period corresponding to the switching deadline, the predicted periods in which the security requirement value is continuously higher than the effective protection value are sequentially connected in time until the first predicted period in which the security requirement value is not higher than the effective protection value appears, thus obtaining the target protection interval. The peak demand value is obtained by comparing the security demand values ​​within the target protection interval, and the protection duration is obtained by summing the duration of each predicted time period within the target protection interval. Using the peak demand as the target protection lower limit, select algorithm security parameters and key lengths with corresponding protection values ​​not lower than the target protection lower limit, and use the protection duration as the key lifecycle lower limit. Set a key lifecycle not shorter than the protection duration to obtain the target key parameters. Based on the target key parameters, key generation is performed to obtain the target post-quantum key.

[0012] Extracting the continuous high-demand interval after the switching deadline from the predicted changes in security requirements, using the demand peak of this interval to constrain the algorithm security parameters and key length of the target key, and using the duration of high demand to constrain the key lifecycle, the target post-quantum key is generated accordingly, thus solving the problem of mismatch between the protection strength and effective period of the new key and the actual future security requirements.

[0013] In conjunction with the first aspect above, in one possible implementation, the execution of the switching opportunity analysis includes: Extract the planned action sequence and current execution progress from the operational status information, locate the current planned action based on the current execution progress, and read the action end condition, action start condition and continuous control status flag corresponding to the adjacent planned actions in the current planned action and its subsequent planned actions. The continuous control status flag includes a first flag value and a second flag value, wherein the first flag value is used to indicate that the planned action still needs continuous control instructions to maintain execution, and the second flag value is used to indicate that the planned action has been removed from continuous control. Adjacent planned actions are grouped into action connection pairs according to the order of action execution. For each action connection pair, the action connection position is identified where the previous planned action meets the action end condition, the continuous control status flag changes from the first flag value to the second flag value, and the subsequent planned action has not yet met the action start condition. The action connection position is marked as an allowed switching node.

[0014] In conjunction with the first aspect above, in one possible implementation, the process of obtaining the expected arrival time includes: Extract the robot's current execution progress, actual execution speed, and actual load from the operational status information; locate the current planned action based on the current execution progress; and extract the planned execution speed and planned load of the current planned action. Based on the current execution progress, the remaining planned duration of the current planned action is obtained, and the planned duration of each planned action between the current planned action and each allowed switching node is extracted from the planned action sequence. The remaining planned duration is added to the extracted planned duration to obtain the remaining planned duration of each allowed switching node. Based on the deviation of the actual execution speed from the planned execution speed, and the deviation of the actual load from the planned load, the remaining planned time is corrected to obtain the corrected remaining time. The corrected remaining time is then added to the current time to obtain the estimated arrival time of each allowed switching node.

[0015] In conjunction with the first aspect above, in one possible implementation, the process of determining the target switching node includes: After obtaining the target quantum key, the key writing time and key confirmation time required to complete the pre-deployment are obtained. The key writing time and key confirmation time are added together to obtain the pre-deployment time. The current time is added to the pre-deployment time to obtain the earliest activation time. The estimated arrival time of each allowed switching node is compared with the earliest available activation time and the switching deadline. Allowed switching nodes whose estimated arrival time is not earlier than the earliest available activation time and not later than the switching deadline are retained to obtain available switching nodes. When the available switching nodes are not empty, the available switching nodes are arranged from earliest to latest according to their expected arrival time, and the available switching node at the top of the sort is taken as the target switching node.

[0016] The earliest activating moment is determined by the time required for the quantum key to be written and confirmed after the target is set. The switching time window is defined by this moment and the switching deadline. Then, nodes whose expected arrival time falls into this window are selected from the allowed switching nodes as target switching nodes, thus solving the problem of the misalignment between the key preparation completion time and the robot's safe switching opportunity.

[0017] In conjunction with the first aspect mentioned above, one possible implementation also includes: When the available switching nodes are empty, the planned actions corresponding to the earliest activating time to the switching deadline are extracted from the operational status information, and the target planned action in continuous control state is selected from them; when the robot executes the target planned action, and the current time is not earlier than the earliest activating time and not later than the switching deadline, the target planned action is paused, so that the robot pauses the continuous movement of the target planned action and maintains the current pose; after the target planned action is out of continuous control, the corresponding action pause position is marked as an allowed switching node and used as an emergency switching node, and the emergency switching node is used as the target switching node.

[0018] In conjunction with the first aspect above, in one possible implementation, the pre-deployment and activation processing of the quantum key after the execution target includes: Before the robot runs to the target switching node, the target post-quantum key is deployed to the robot and the control terminal that establishes control communication with the robot, and a target key identifier is configured for the target post-quantum key; The control terminal sends key confirmation information carrying the target key identifier. The robot terminal matches the locally deployed target post-quantum key based on the target key identifier and completes key confirmation. The confirmed target post-quantum key is set to a pending activation state, while the current post-quantum key is kept for control communication. When the robot reaches the target switching node, it invokes the corresponding target post-quantum key based on the target key identifier, and switches the target post-quantum key from the pending state to the effective state.

[0019] Compared with the prior art, this application has the following beneficial effects: 1. By evaluating the effective protection value based on post-quantum key information and combining the robot's operational status to predict the changes in security requirements for each prediction period, the judgment of key protection capability is extended from the current state to the future temporal state. This allows for the identification of critical moments where protection capability is insufficient before the current post-quantum key expires, reserving processing time for subsequent key updates.

[0020] 2. Identify allowed switching nodes based on the planned action sequence, current execution progress, and continuous control status. Adjust the expected arrival time of each allowed switching node based on the actual execution speed and load status to ensure that the key switching timing corresponds to the robot's actual action execution process, thereby reducing the interference of key switching on the transmission of continuous control commands and the action connection process.

[0021] 3. By using the switching deadline and the earliest activating time of the target quantum key to jointly limit the switching time window, and selecting the target switching node from the allowed switching nodes whose expected arrival time falls within the time window, a unified timing matching relationship is formed between security requirement constraints, key preparation process and robot action state, so as to avoid switching too early or exceeding the latest time allowed by security requirements.

[0022] It should be understood that the descriptions of technical features, technical solutions, beneficial effects, or similar language in this application do not imply that all features and advantages can be achieved in any single embodiment. Rather, it is understood that the description of a feature or beneficial effect means that a specific technical feature, technical solution, or beneficial effect is included in at least one embodiment. Therefore, the descriptions of technical features, technical solutions, or beneficial effects in this specification do not necessarily refer to the same embodiment. Furthermore, the technical features, technical solutions, and beneficial effects described in this embodiment can be combined in any suitable manner. Those skilled in the art will understand that embodiments can be implemented without one or more specific technical features, technical solutions, or beneficial effects of a particular embodiment. In other embodiments, additional technical features and beneficial effects may be identified in specific embodiments that do not embody all embodiments. Attached Figure Description

[0023] Figure 1 A flowchart illustrating a post-quantum cryptography-based embodied intelligence quantum-resistant situational awareness and defense method provided in this application embodiment; Figure 2 A schematic diagram of the security requirement prediction process in a post-quantum cryptography embodied intelligence anti-quantum situational awareness and defense method provided in this application embodiment; Figure 3 A schematic diagram of the key update process in a post-quantum cryptography embodied intelligence anti-quantum situational awareness and defense method provided in this application embodiment; Figure 4 A schematic diagram of the switching opportunity analysis process in a post-quantum cryptography embodied intelligence anti-quantum situational awareness and defense method provided in this application embodiment; Figure 5 A schematic diagram of the key switching process in a post-quantum cryptography embodied intelligence anti-quantum situational awareness and defense method provided in this application embodiment; Detailed Implementation In the description of this application, unless otherwise stated, " / " means "or," for example, A / B can mean A or B. The "and / or" in this document is merely a description of the relationship between related objects, indicating that three relationships can exist. For example, A and / or B can represent: A alone, A and B simultaneously, and B alone. Furthermore, "at least one" means one or more, and "multiple" means two or more. The terms "first," "second," etc., do not limit the quantity or order of execution, and "first," "second," etc., do not necessarily imply differences.

[0024] It should be noted that, in this application, the terms "exemplary" or "for example" are used to indicate that something is being described as an example, illustration, or illustration. Any embodiment or design described as "exemplary" or "for example" in this application should not be construed as being more preferred or advantageous than other embodiments or design solutions. Specifically, the use of terms such as "exemplary" or "for example" is intended to present the relevant concepts in a concrete manner.

[0025] Example 1: like Figure 1 As shown, this embodiment provides a method for embodied intelligence-based quantum situational awareness and defense in post-quantum cryptography, specifically including the following steps: S1. Obtain the robot's post-quantum key information and operational status information, evaluate the effective protection value based on the post-quantum key information, and predict changes in security requirements based on the operational status information.

[0026] Specifically, the post-quantum key information refers to the security attribute data of the post-quantum key currently used by the robot, such as its algorithm security parameters, key length, lifespan, and usage duration; the operational status information refers to the operational status data of the robot, such as its current communication status, planned actions, and execution progress; the effective protection value is used to characterize the actual quantum resistance capability that the current key still possesses after a period of use, and is a benchmark quantity for determining whether the key can continue to be used; the change in security requirements is used to characterize the changing trend of the level of security protection required by the robot in the future as communication risks and task execution plans progress over time, and is another benchmark quantity for determining when a key switch must be completed.

[0027] In one optional implementation, the robot's current key parameter configuration and usage records are collected to obtain post-quantum key information. Algorithm security parameters, key length, key lifespan, and usage duration are extracted from the post-quantum key information and comprehensively evaluated to obtain an effective protection value. Simultaneously, the communication status between the robot and the control terminal and the execution progress of the predetermined task execution plan are collected to obtain operational status information. Based on the operational status information, communication risks and task execution requirements in the future period are predicted segment by segment. The prediction is continuously updated as the operational status information is updated to obtain changes in security requirements.

[0028] S2. Match the protection capability with the changes in security requirements based on the effective protection value to obtain the switching deadline, and perform key update processing based on the changes in security requirements to obtain the target post-quantum key.

[0029] Specifically, the switching deadline refers to the latest time limit at which the effective protection value of the current key will be exceeded by changes in security requirements, and the key must be switched; the target post-quantum key refers to a new key generated based on security requirements after the switching deadline, used to replace the current key.

[0030] In one optional implementation, the effective protection value and the change in security requirements are compared segment by segment on the time axis to determine the time position where the relationship between the two reverses, thus obtaining the switching cutoff time; then, the security requirements after the switching cutoff time are extracted from the change in security requirements, and parameters such as the security strength and effective duration that the new key should have are determined accordingly, and key generation is performed based on the determined parameters to obtain the target post-quantum key.

[0031] This step transforms the changing trend of security requirements over time into a defined time limit, and simultaneously generates a new key that matches the security requirements after this limit. This ensures that the generation and deployment of the key are completed before the security requirements are truly exhausted, leaving room for subsequent operations to find switching opportunities that take into account the robot's motion state before this limit.

[0032] S3. Based on the operational status information, perform a handover opportunity analysis to obtain the allowed handover nodes and their corresponding estimated arrival times.

[0033] Specifically, the allowed switching node refers to the time point at which the robot breaks free from the constraints of continuous control commands during the execution of a predetermined planned action. Performing a key switch at this point will not cause resource contention with the real-time transmission of control commands. The expected arrival time refers to the predicted time required for the robot to reach the corresponding allowed switching node.

[0034] In one optional implementation, the control continuity between adjacent planned actions is extracted from the operational status information, and the position where the control command transmission has been interrupted after the previous planned action has been completed and the next planned action has not yet started is identified as the allowed switching node; then the actual execution state of the robot is extracted from the operational status information, and the deviation of the actual execution state from the planned state is used to correct the time required to reach each allowed switching node, so as to obtain the corresponding expected arrival time.

[0035] This step identifies permissible switching nodes that will not conflict with the transmission of control commands from the continuity of the robot's planned actions. It also dynamically corrects the time required to reach the node based on the robot's actual execution status, so that the estimated arrival time can accurately reflect the robot's actual arrival time, providing a processing basis for subsequent determination of switching nodes.

[0036] S4. Determine the target switching node among the allowed switching nodes whose expected arrival time is no later than the switching deadline, and perform the pre-deployment and activation process of the target post-quantum key based on the target switching node.

[0037] Specifically, the target switching node refers to a node that meets the time limit constraint on the security side and the execution condition that the robot's motion side does not conflict with the transmission of control commands; the pre-deployment and activation process refers to the deployment and confirmation of the target quantum key before reaching the target switching node, and the activation of the key when the robot runs to the target switching node.

[0038] In one optional implementation, the expected arrival time of each allowed switching node is compared with the switching deadline one by one to determine the target switching node whose expected arrival time is not later than the switching deadline; the deployment and confirmation of the target post-quantum key are completed before the robot runs to the target switching node, and the target post-quantum key is activated when the robot runs to the node, so that the target post-quantum key is used to protect subsequent control communication from that moment.

[0039] This step compares the time limit on the security side with the estimated arrival time corrected on the motion side, and makes up for the time required for on-site processing by completing deployment and confirmation in advance, so that the key switching can be completed when the robot's actual operating status and security protection requirements are met at the same time.

[0040] Based on the above technical solution, this embodiment first obtains two benchmark quantities characterizing the current actual protection capability of the key and the future trend of security requirements. Based on these, it determines the time limit for the key to be switched and generates a replacement key simultaneously. Then, it identifies candidate switching positions that will not conflict with the transmission of control commands from the control continuity of the robot's planned actions, and dynamically corrects the time to reach the position based on the actual execution state. Finally, it unifies the time limit on the security side with the timing after dynamic correction on the motion side to determine the actual switching node and complete the deployment and activation preparation of the key in advance. In this way, the key update time limit driven by security requirements is connected with the control continuity constraints in the robot's motion process, which solves the problems in the prior art where there is resource competition and state conflict between the key switching timing and the continuous motion execution process of the robot, and the fixed waiting time is difficult to adapt to the dynamic changes in the actual motion progress of the robot. It realizes the dynamic adaptation of the post-quantum key switching timing with the robot's actual security protection requirements and motion execution state.

[0041] Example 2: like Figure 2 As shown, based on Example 1, this example provides a detailed explanation of the evaluation process for effective protection values ​​and the prediction process for changes in security requirements.

[0042] First, the algorithm identifier, key bit length, key lifespan setting, and key activation timestamp corresponding to the currently used key are read from the robot's local key management program. The algorithm identifier is mapped to pre-set algorithm security parameters, and the difference between the key activation timestamp and the current time is taken as the usage duration. This yields the algorithm security parameters, key length, key lifespan, and usage duration in the post-quantum key information. In an optional implementation, the algorithm security parameters are set according to the security level of the NIST post-quantum cryptography standard to which the algorithm belongs; a higher level indicates a higher security strength against quantum attacks. Simultaneously, the information from the control communication link between the robot and the control terminal at multiple consecutive sampling times is read. Signal-to-noise ratio (SNR), packet loss rate, and latency are used to form a communication state sequence. SNR, packet loss rate, and latency reflect the operational stability of the control communication link. When communication stability decreases or security anomalies increase, the communication risk value is increased. The system reads the confirmed list of planned actions to be executed and the preset execution duration of each planned action from the robot task scheduler to obtain the planned action sequence in the operational status information. It also reads the currently executing planned action, the execution duration of the current planned action, and the position of completed planned actions in the planned action sequence. Based on the execution duration of the current planned action and the preset execution duration, the system obtains the execution progress of the current planned action, thus obtaining the current execution progress in the operational status information.

[0043] Based on the algorithm's security parameters and key length, the basic protection value of the current post-quantum key is retrieved from a pre-constructed hierarchical mapping table. In an optional implementation, the basic protection value is represented by a score from 0 to 10, with higher values ​​indicating stronger initial protection capabilities of the key in an unused state. The hierarchical mapping table is pre-constructed as follows: using the minimum quantum computing resources required for each level of algorithm in the NIST post-quantum cryptography standard (Category 1 to Category 5) as a benchmark, the difference in required computing resources between adjacent levels is calculated. The score interval between each level is determined according to the relative proportion of this difference multiple. The larger the difference multiple, the greater the score gap between adjacent levels, thereby determining the starting score and segment span for each level. Within each segment, the offset corresponding to different key lengths under that level is added to the starting score of that segment to obtain the specific score corresponding to that key length. The combination of each security level and key length, along with its corresponding score, is then filled into the hierarchical mapping table one by one.

[0044] The ratio of the used time to the key lifetime is calculated to obtain the time-related decay. A decay rate coefficient is determined based on the algorithm's security parameters. The base protection value is then exponentially decayed based on the decay rate coefficient and the time-related decay to obtain the effective protection value of the current quantum key. The calculation formula is as follows: , in, To effectively protect values, Basic protection value, For algorithm security parameters, The preset basic decay rate constant, Duration of use For the key lifetime; in an optional implementation, the preset base decay rate constant The value was determined by fitting measured attenuation data of the protection capability of historical keys under standard usage conditions, and was set to 0.8.

[0045] Furthermore, starting from the current moment, the preset prediction interval is divided into multiple prediction periods in chronological order; in one embodiment, the preset prediction interval is 300s, and the duration of each prediction period is 30s, resulting in a total of 10 prediction periods.

[0046] Each communication state in the communication state sequence is matched with a preset risk level range to obtain the communication risk value corresponding to each communication state. The preset risk level range is divided based on the combined value range of three parameters: signal-to-noise ratio, packet loss rate, and latency. According to the historical probability of communication link interruption or data anomaly corresponding to each parameter combination, it is divided into multiple risk levels. The higher the probability of risk occurrence, the greater the communication risk value. In one embodiment, the communication risk value is represented by 0 to 10 points and divided into 5 risk levels, with each level spanning 2 points.

[0047] Specifically, the risk level range is defined by setting separate grading thresholds for three parameters: signal-to-noise ratio (SNR), packet loss rate, and latency. For example, the SNR grading thresholds are 10dB, 15dB, 20dB, and 25dB; the packet loss rate grading thresholds are 1%, 3%, 5%, and 8%; and the latency grading thresholds are 20ms, 50ms, 100ms, and 200ms. Each parameter is divided into five levels, with higher level values ​​indicating a worse communication status. For the current values ​​of the three parameters, their respective level values ​​are determined, and the highest level value among the three is taken as the risk level of the communication status at that moment. In other words, the overall risk level is determined by the worst-performing parameter among the three.

[0048] The communication risk values ​​corresponding to adjacent communication states in the communication state sequence are compared to obtain the adjacent risk difference values. The risk difference between the two adjacent communication risk values ​​closest to the current time is taken as the current communication risk change trend. The communication risk value corresponding to the current time is used as the recursive starting value, and the current communication risk change trend is sequentially accumulated to each subsequent prediction period to obtain the communication risk value for each prediction period. When the recursed communication risk value exceeds the preset risk value upper limit or is lower than the preset risk value lower limit, it is truncated according to the risk value upper limit or risk value lower limit, respectively. In order to limit the prediction deviation caused by long-term recursion, the communication risk change trend is extended only to a preset number of prediction periods. After exceeding this range, the last prediction value is maintained. In an optional embodiment, in order to avoid the change trend being extended indefinitely to prediction periods far from the current time and causing prediction distortion, the extension number of the change trend is limited to within 5 prediction periods. The communication risk value of the prediction period exceeding this range is maintained as the value of the 5th prediction period and no longer increases or decreases.

[0049] Based on the current execution progress and the planned duration of each planned action, each planned action is mapped to a corresponding predicted time period. That is, based on the currently completed planned actions and their cumulative elapsed time, combined with the preset execution duration of subsequent planned actions, the start and end times of each planned action are sequentially determined to fall within a given predicted time period. The pre-configured protection requirement values ​​for the corresponding planned actions are read; these protection requirement values ​​characterize the minimum requirements for control communication password protection during the execution of the corresponding planned action. The control permission level, action reversibility flag, and anomaly impact level are read from the task configuration data of the planned actions. The control permission level characterizes the scope of authority within which the corresponding control command can change the robot's motion state. A reversible marker is used to characterize whether the planned action can be restored to its pre-action state after abnormal execution. The abnormality impact level is used to characterize the degree to which abnormal control commands cause deviations in robot pose, trajectory, or operation results. The control authority level, action reversibility marker, and abnormality impact level are matched with a preset action protection requirement mapping relationship to obtain the protection requirement value for the corresponding planned action. The protection requirement value adopts an evaluation scale of 0 to 10 points, consistent with the communication risk value and effective protection value. The protection requirement value is compared with the communication risk value for the corresponding prediction period, and the larger value is taken as the security requirement value for the prediction period, so that the corresponding prediction period simultaneously meets the password protection requirements for communication status and planned actions.

[0050] After the operational status information is updated, the above processing is re-executed so that the security requirement values ​​for each prediction period are updated in a rolling manner according to the communication status and the current execution progress, thus forming changes in security requirements.

[0051] Example 3: like Figure 3As shown in Example 1, this example provides a detailed explanation of the process for determining the handover deadline and the specific process for key update.

[0052] The effective protection value of the current post-quantum key and the security requirement value corresponding to each prediction period are read. The effective protection value is compared with the security requirement value of each prediction period in sequence, from the most recent to the furthest prediction period. When the effective protection value is lower than the security requirement value of the corresponding prediction period for the first time, the start time of that prediction period is taken as the switching cutoff time. When the security requirement value of each prediction period is not higher than the effective protection value, it is determined that the current post-quantum key can still be used, and no switching cutoff time is generated. After the security requirement changes are obtained again with the update of the operational status information, the security requirement value of each prediction period is compared with the effective protection value again.

[0053] Furthermore, starting from the predicted time period corresponding to the switching deadline, the security requirement values ​​of each predicted time period are read sequentially according to the prediction time sequence; when the security requirement value of the corresponding predicted time period is higher than the current effective protection value, the predicted time period is included in the target protection interval, and the next predicted time period is read; when a predicted time period with a security requirement value not higher than the current effective protection value appears for the first time, the connection is stopped, and the previously continuously included predicted time periods are combined to form the target protection interval.

[0054] In each predicted time period within the target protection zone, the corresponding security requirement value is read one by one and compared numerically. The maximum value obtained from the comparison is determined as the peak requirement, which represents the most stringent security requirement level that the key needs to meet within the target protection zone. The duration of each predicted time period is summed up sequentially, and the total duration is determined as the protection duration, which represents the continuous span of the target protection zone in the time dimension. The peak requirement and the protection duration characterize the protection requirements between the target protection zones from two dimensions: high and low values ​​and short duration, respectively. Both serve as the basis for subsequently determining the target key parameters.

[0055] Based on the peak demand, the lowest security level and key length combination corresponding to the peak demand is retrieved from the hierarchical mapping table and used as the target algorithm security parameter and target key length. The target key lifecycle is determined based on the protection duration, and the target key lifecycle value is not less than the protection duration. In an optional implementation, if the protection duration exceeds the preset standard protection duration of the key corresponding to the security level of the retrieved target algorithm security parameter, the target algorithm security parameter is upgraded by one security level based on the retrieved level. The standard protection duration is pre-configured based on historical usage data of keys at different security levels, with the standard protection duration for Category 1 being 2 hours, Category 2 4 hours, Category 3 6 hours, Category 4 9 hours, and Category 5 12 hours.

[0056] The post-quantum cryptography algorithm corresponding to the security parameters of the target algorithm is determined as the key generation algorithm to be invoked. For example, when the security parameters of the target algorithm correspond to the Kyber algorithm in the NIST standard, the corresponding polynomial ring parameters and modulus are determined according to the target key length. A random seed is generated, and a public matrix is ​​obtained by sampling based on the seed. At the same time, a private key polynomial and a noise polynomial are sampled. The private key polynomial and the public matrix are operated on and superimposed with the noise polynomial to obtain the public key polynomial. The private key polynomial and the public key polynomial together constitute the key material. The lifespan of the target key is bound to the generated key material as validity information to obtain the target post-quantum key carrying lifespan information. The lifespan of the target key starts counting when the target post-quantum key switches from the pending activation state to the valid state.

[0057] It should be noted that in this embodiment, the two quantities used to determine the security level and lifespan of the new key are limited to the peak demand and the duration of protection within the target protection zone, respectively. Furthermore, based on the security level determined by the peak demand, the security level is further adjusted according to the duration of protection, so that the security strength and effective duration of the target quantum key can cover the most stringent security requirements within the target protection zone and match the duration of these stringent requirements. This avoids determining the key parameters based solely on the highest demand at a certain moment, while ignoring the additional requirements for protection capabilities imposed by the continuous exposure time.

[0058] Example 4: like Figure 4 As shown in Example 1, this example provides a detailed explanation of the analysis process for handover opportunities, the process for obtaining the expected arrival time, and the process for determining the target handover node.

[0059] The planned action sequence and current execution progress are extracted from the operational status information. The current planned action is located based on the current execution progress, and the current planned action and subsequent planned actions are read from the planned action sequence. The action termination condition, action initiation condition, and continuous control status flag corresponding to each adjacent planned action are read. The action termination condition refers to the pose, force, or time constraints on which a planned action is determined to have been completed. The action initiation condition refers to the pre-constraint conditions on which the next planned action can be started. The continuous control status flag includes a first flag value and a second flag value. The first flag value is used to indicate that the planned action still requires continuous control commands to maintain execution. At this time, the robot's posture or trajectory depends on the controller's continuous correction at a fixed period. Interrupting the transmission of control commands will lead to pose deviation or trajectory tracking inaccuracy. The second flag value is used to indicate that the planned action has been removed from continuous control. At this time, the robot's current motion state no longer depends on the continuous output of control commands. Interrupting the transmission of control commands will not change the robot's current physical state.

[0060] According to the execution order of the actions, adjacent planned actions are paired into action connection pairs. Based on the planned control relationship of each action connection pair, the action connection position is identified where the previous planned action meets the action end condition, its continuous control status flag changes from the first flag value to the second flag value, and the subsequent planned action has not yet met the action start condition. The action connection position is marked as an allowed switching node.

[0061] It should be noted that this embodiment limits the allowed switching node to a time point where three conditions are simultaneously met between action pairs, rather than the entire execution interval corresponding to a planned action marked with the second marker value: the completion of the previous planned action and its departure from continuous control only indicates that the action itself no longer needs continuous instructions to maintain it. However, if the subsequent planned action has already met the start conditions and is about to start execution, the control channel will be re-occupied by the continuous control status marker of the subsequent planned action. At this time, the switching operation may still conflict with the start process of the subsequent planned action. Only during the gap between when the previous planned action has left continuous control and the subsequent planned action has not yet met the start conditions is the control channel truly idle. The key switching operation occupying this channel will not cause resource competition with any continuous control instructions of the planned action. The gap position is identified pair by pair on the action pair basis, so that the granularity of the allowed switching node is accurate to the actual idle time position between two planned actions, rather than generally considering the entire execution interval of the planned action marked with the second marker value as the switchable range.

[0062] Furthermore, the robot's current execution progress, actual execution speed, and actual load are extracted from the operational status information. The current planned action is determined based on the current execution progress, and the planned execution speed and planned load of the current planned action are extracted. Based on the current execution progress and the preset execution duration of the current planned action, the remaining planned duration of the current planned action is calculated. For each allowed switching node, the planned duration of each planned action from the current planned action to the allowed switching node is extracted. The remaining planned duration of the current planned action is sequentially added to the extracted planned durations of each planned action to obtain the remaining planned duration of the corresponding allowed switching node.

[0063] Based on the deviation between the actual execution speed and the planned execution speed, and the deviation between the actual load and the planned load, the remaining planned time is adjusted as follows to obtain the adjusted remaining time. : , in, For the remaining time of the plan, To ensure the speed of plan execution, For actual execution speed, For planned load, For actual load, A preset coupling coefficient is used; when the actual execution speed is lower than the planned execution speed, the remaining planned time is amplified according to the ratio of the two to obtain a basic correction result; in one embodiment, the preset coupling coefficient... The value is 0.5, which is determined by fitting the measured execution time deviation data of the robot under different load exceedance ratios.

[0064] The estimated arrival time of each allowed switching node is obtained by adding the corrected remaining time to the current time.

[0065] It should be noted that this embodiment does not use the method of independently correcting the speed deviation and load deviation and then taking a weighted average or directly adding them. Instead, the load deviation term is designed as a coupled form modulated by the speed deviation term, so that the correction result of the expected arrival time can reflect the actual working condition that the output capacity of the drive mechanism is further compressed when the load exceeds the plan and the execution lag occurs at the same time, rather than treating the two deviations as unrelated factors that act independently. The expected arrival time obtained in this way can more accurately reflect the actual time when the robot reaches the allowable switching node under the combined working condition that both the load and speed deviate from the plan, compared with the result of correcting only according to the planned duration or only according to a single deviation.

[0066] Example 5: like Figure 5As shown in Example 1, this example provides a detailed explanation of the process for determining the target switching node, the emergency switching branch, and the pre-deployment and activation of the target post-quantum key.

[0067] The key writing time required to write the target quantum key to the robot and control terminals after deployment is obtained, and the key confirmation time required to confirm the consistency of the target quantum key at both ends after writing are obtained. The key writing time and the key confirmation time are added together to obtain the pre-deployment time. The current time is added to the pre-deployment time to obtain the earliest activation time.

[0068] The estimated arrival time of each allowed switching node is compared with the earliest available activation time and the switching deadline. Allowed switching nodes whose estimated arrival time is no earlier than the earliest available activation time and no later than the switching deadline are retained to obtain available switching nodes. The available switching nodes are arranged from earliest to latest according to their estimated arrival time, and the available switching node at the top of the list is determined as the target switching node.

[0069] When no allowable switching node satisfies the above time boundaries, a planned action in continuous control is selected as the target planned action from the planned actions corresponding to the earliest activating time to the switching deadline. When the robot executes the target planned action, and the current time is neither earlier than the earliest activating time nor later than the switching deadline, the original continuous control process of the target planned action is paused, and the target planned action is switched to local hold control on the robot end. The robot end maintains the current pose and no longer relies on the control end to continuously send continuous control commands. After the target planned action is separated from the continuous control of the control end, the action position corresponding to entering local hold control is marked as an allowable switching node, and this allowable switching node is further used as an emergency switching node, and the emergency switching node is used as the target switching node. Specifically, in an emergency switching scenario, after the target planned action enters local hold control, its continuous control status mark changes from the first mark value to the second mark value, indicating that the action has been separated from the continuous control command of the control end. Unlike the mark switching after the normal planned action ends, the mark switching here does not occur because the action has been completed, but because the control mode has changed from continuous control of the control end to local hold control.

[0070] Local hold control refers to the robot establishing a hold target based on its current position and attitude at the time of switching, and the robot's local controller maintaining the hold target so that the robot remains stable while the control terminal suspends the transmission of continuous control commands. After the quantum key is activated after the target is set, the local hold control is exited, and the subsequent control process of the target's planned action is resumed. Therefore, the emergency switch node is not formed by changing the continuous control state flag, but by changing the actual control method of the target's planned action, so that the continuous control commands of the control terminal temporarily exit the current action execution process.

[0071] Before the robot reaches the target switching node, the target post-quantum key is deployed to the robot and the control terminal that establishes control communication with the robot, and a target key identifier is configured for the target post-quantum key. The control terminal generates key confirmation information carrying the target key identifier based on the deployed target post-quantum key and sends the key confirmation information to the robot. The robot matches the locally deployed target post-quantum key according to the target key identifier and verifies the key confirmation information using the matched target post-quantum key. After successful verification, the target post-quantum key at both ends is confirmed, and the target post-quantum key is set to a pending state, while the current post-quantum key continues to be used for control communication.

[0072] Specifically, the target post-quantum key verification involves the control terminal generating random confirmation data and using the key material corresponding to the target post-quantum key deployed on the control terminal to perform cryptographic processing on the random confirmation data to form the key confirmation information; the robot terminal calls the local corresponding key material according to the target key identifier and performs corresponding cryptographic verification on the key confirmation information. When the recovered confirmation data is consistent with the carried confirmation verification data, the key confirmation is determined to be successful.

[0073] When the robot reaches the target switching node, it invokes the target post-quantum key, which is in a pending state, according to the target key identifier. The target post-quantum key is switched from a pending state to an active state, and the protection of subsequent control communication by the current post-quantum key is stopped, so that the target post-quantum key can be used for control communication after the target switching node. In the case of using an emergency switching node, after the target post-quantum key enters an active state, the control communication between the robot and the control terminal is restored, and local hold control is exited, so that the robot can continue to execute the target planned action.

[0074] In the above embodiments, implementation can be achieved, in whole or in part, through software, hardware, firmware, or any combination thereof. When implemented using software programs, implementation can be, in whole or in part, in the form of a computer program product. This computer program product includes one or more computer instructions. When the computer program instructions are loaded and executed on a computer, all or part of the processes or functions described in the embodiments of this application are generated. The computer can be a general-purpose computer, a special-purpose computer, a computer network, or other programmable device. The computer instructions can be stored in a computer-readable storage medium or transmitted from one computer-readable storage medium to another. For example, computer instructions can be transmitted from one website, computer, server, or data center to another website, computer, server, or data center via wired (e.g., coaxial cable, fiber optic, digital subscriber line (DSL)) or wireless (e.g., infrared, wireless, microwave, etc.) means. The computer-readable storage medium can be any available medium accessible to a computer or a data storage device containing one or more servers, data centers, etc., that can be integrated with the medium. The available media can be magnetic media (e.g., floppy disks, hard disks, magnetic tapes), optical media (e.g., DVDs), or semiconductor media (e.g., solid-state disks (SSDs)).

[0075] Although this application has been described herein in conjunction with various embodiments, those skilled in the art, by reviewing the accompanying drawings, disclosure, and appended claims, will understand and implement other variations of the disclosed embodiments in carrying out the claimed application. In the claims, the word "comprising" does not exclude other components or steps, and "a" or "an" does not exclude multiple instances. A single processor or other unit can implement several functions listed in the claims. While different dependent claims may recite certain measures, this does not mean that these measures cannot be combined to produce good results.

[0076] Although this application has been described in conjunction with specific features and embodiments, it is obvious that various modifications and combinations can be made thereto without departing from the spirit and scope of this application. Accordingly, this specification and drawings are merely exemplary illustrations of this application as defined by the appended claims, and are considered to cover any and all modifications, variations, combinations, or equivalents within the scope of this application. Clearly, those skilled in the art can make various alterations and modifications to this application without departing from the spirit and scope of this application. Thus, if such modifications and modifications of this application fall within the scope of the claims of this application and their equivalents, this application is also intended to include such modifications and modifications.

Claims

1. A method for embodied intelligence in post-quantum cryptography to resist quantum situational awareness and defense, characterized in that, include: The robot's post-quantum key information and operational status information are obtained; the effective protection value is evaluated based on the post-quantum key information; and the changes in security requirements are predicted in a rolling manner based on the operational status information. The protection capability is matched with the effective protection value and the change in security requirements to obtain the switching deadline, and the key update process is performed based on the change in security requirements to obtain the target post-quantum key; Based on the operational status information, a handover opportunity analysis is performed to obtain the allowed handover nodes and their corresponding estimated arrival times. Among the allowed switching nodes, a target switching node is determined whose expected arrival time is no later than the switching deadline, and the pre-deployment and activation process of the target post-quantum key is performed based on the target switching node.

2. The method according to claim 1, characterized in that, The effective protection value for assessment includes: Extract the algorithm security parameters, key length, key lifespan, and usage time of the current post-quantum key from the post-quantum key information; The algorithm's security parameters and key length are matched with the preset protection value mapping relationship to obtain the basic protection value of the current quantum key; The ratio of the used time to the key lifetime is calculated to obtain the time decay amount, and the base protection value is attenuated and corrected using the time decay amount to obtain the effective protection value of the current quantum key.

3. The method according to claim 1, characterized in that, The rolling prediction of changes in security requirements includes: The communication status sequence, planned action sequence, and current execution progress are extracted from the operational status information, and the planned duration of each planned action is read from the planned action sequence. Starting from the current moment, the preset prediction interval is divided into multiple prediction periods in chronological order; Each communication state in the communication state sequence is matched with a preset risk level range to obtain the corresponding communication risk value. Adjacent communication risk values ​​are compared to obtain the communication risk change trend. Based on the current communication risk value and the communication risk change trend, the communication risk value for each prediction period is updated sequentially. Based on the current execution progress and the planned duration of each planned action, each planned action is mapped to a predicted time period. The protection requirement value pre-configured for the corresponding planned action is read, and the protection requirement value is compared with the communication risk value of the corresponding predicted time period. The larger value is taken as the security requirement value of the corresponding predicted time period. After the operational status information is updated, the safety requirement values ​​for each prediction period are obtained again, forming the aforementioned safety requirement changes.

4. The method according to claim 3, characterized in that, The protection capability matching includes: Read the security requirement values ​​corresponding to each prediction period, and compare the effective protection value with each security requirement value in turn; When the effective protection value is lower than the security requirement value for the corresponding predicted period for the first time, the start time of the predicted period shall be taken as the switching cutoff time. When the security requirement value for each prediction period is not higher than the effective protection value, the current quantum key is maintained, and after the security requirement is updated, the security requirement value for each prediction period is compared with the effective protection value again.

5. The method according to claim 3, characterized in that, The execution key update process includes: From the changes in security requirements, starting from the predicted period corresponding to the switching deadline, the predicted periods in which the security requirement value is continuously higher than the effective protection value are sequentially connected in time until the first predicted period in which the security requirement value is not higher than the effective protection value appears, thus obtaining the target protection interval. The peak demand value is obtained by comparing the security demand values ​​within the target protection interval, and the protection duration is obtained by summing the duration of each predicted time period within the target protection interval. Using the peak demand as the target protection lower limit, select algorithm security parameters and key lengths with a basic protection value not lower than the target protection lower limit, and use the protection duration as the key lifecycle lower limit. Set a key lifecycle not shorter than the protection duration to obtain the target key parameters. Based on the target key parameters, key generation is performed to obtain the target post-quantum key.

6. The method according to claim 1, characterized in that, The execution switching opportunity analysis includes: Extract the planned action sequence and current execution progress from the operational status information, locate the current planned action based on the current execution progress, and read the action end condition, action start condition and continuous control status flag corresponding to the adjacent planned actions in the current planned action and its subsequent planned actions. The continuous control status flag includes a first flag value and a second flag value, wherein the first flag value is used to indicate that the planned action still needs continuous control instructions to maintain execution, and the second flag value is used to indicate that the planned action has been removed from continuous control. Adjacent planned actions are grouped into action connection pairs according to the order of action execution. For each action connection pair, the action connection position is identified where the previous planned action meets the action end condition, the continuous control status flag changes from the first flag value to the second flag value, and the subsequent planned action has not yet met the action start condition. The action connection position is marked as an allowed switching node.

7. The method according to claim 6, characterized in that, The process of obtaining the estimated arrival time includes: Extract the robot's current execution progress, actual execution speed, and actual load from the operational status information; locate the current planned action based on the current execution progress; and extract the planned execution speed and planned load of the current planned action. Based on the current execution progress, the remaining planned duration of the current planned action is obtained, and the planned duration of each planned action between the current planned action and each allowed switching node is extracted from the planned action sequence. The remaining planned duration is added to the extracted planned duration to obtain the remaining planned duration of each allowed switching node. Based on the deviation of the actual execution speed from the planned execution speed, and the deviation of the actual load from the planned load, the remaining planned time is corrected to obtain the corrected remaining time. The corrected remaining time is then added to the current time to obtain the estimated arrival time of each allowed switching node.

8. The method according to claim 1, characterized in that, The process of determining the target switching node includes: After obtaining the target quantum key, the key writing time and key confirmation time required to complete the pre-deployment are obtained. The key writing time and key confirmation time are added together to obtain the pre-deployment time. The current time is added to the pre-deployment time to obtain the earliest activation time. The estimated arrival time of each allowed switching node is compared with the earliest available activation time and the switching deadline. Allowed switching nodes whose estimated arrival time is not earlier than the earliest available activation time and not later than the switching deadline are retained to obtain available switching nodes. When the available switching nodes are not empty, the available switching nodes are arranged from earliest to latest according to their expected arrival time, and the available switching node at the top of the sort is taken as the target switching node.

9. The method according to claim 8, characterized in that, Also includes: When the available switching nodes are empty, extract the planned actions from the earliest activating time to the switching deadline time from the operational status information, and select the target planned actions that are in continuous control state from them. When the robot executes the target planned action, and the current time is not earlier than the earliest activating time and not later than the switching deadline time, the target planned action is paused, so that the robot pauses the continuous movement of the target planned action and maintains the current pose; after the target planned action is decoupled from continuous control, the corresponding action pause position is marked as an allowed switching node and used as an emergency switching node, and the emergency switching node is used as the target switching node.

10. The method according to claim 8, characterized in that, The pre-deployment and activation process of the quantum key after the execution target is achieved includes: Before the robot runs to the target switching node, the target post-quantum key is deployed to the robot and the control terminal that establishes control communication with the robot, and a target key identifier is configured for the target post-quantum key; The control terminal sends key confirmation information carrying the target key identifier. The robot terminal matches the locally deployed target post-quantum key based on the target key identifier and completes key confirmation. The confirmed target post-quantum key is set to a pending activation state, while the current post-quantum key is kept for control communication. When the robot reaches the target switching node, it invokes the corresponding target post-quantum key based on the target key identifier, and switches the target post-quantum key from the pending state to the effective state.

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