Hydrogen energy train hybrid power system communication control method and system

Abstract

The application provides a hydrogen energy train hybrid power system communication control method and system, which realizes three breakthroughs through a quantum key driving principle: a dynamic key is first bound with real-time vehicle speed and hydrogen pressure to generate physically unclonable encrypted instruction streams, greatly improving attack resistance; a controller power distribution mechanism based on key entropy value real-time regulation is constructed, attack response delay is compressed to within 100ms, and operation interruption rate is reduced; a quantum vibration sensor and key reset mechanism are coupled to trigger power grading regulation when the vibration frequency spectrum is greater than 50dB, and the mechanical-network combined protection problem is solved; power optimization driven by entropy value and quantum key synchronous management are simultaneously realized, hydrogen energy loss rate per 100km is reduced, and multi-dimensional breakthroughs in safety protection, real-time control and energy efficiency optimization are achieved.

Description

Technical Field

[0001] This invention belongs to the interdisciplinary field of hydrogen energy power and new energy rail transit technology, quantum communication and information security technology, and rail transit equipment technology, and is applied to hydrogen fuel cell hybrid trains. Background Technology

[0002] As the core carrier of the green transformation of rail transit, hydrogen-powered trains have made significant progress in power system integration and range performance, but their reliability and safety still face dual challenges: on the one hand, the robustness of hydrogen-electric hybrid power systems under complex operating conditions is insufficient, resulting in a significantly higher rate of operation interruption than traditional power systems; on the other hand, the on-board control network is difficult to resist quantum computing attacks, and there is a risk of hydrogen supply interruption or power distribution disorder.

[0003] The core flaw in existing technologies lies in the failure to achieve deep integration of security protection and power control. First, quantum communication technology is only deployed at the vehicle-to-ground scheduling data transmission layer, resulting in physical-level logical isolation from the onboard fuel cell control system and hybrid power controller. This prevents encryption keys from directly participating in power allocation decisions, creating a dual-track independent operation of communication encryption and power control. Second, existing hydrogen energy optimization strategies focus on improving electrolysis efficiency and optimizing energy recovery ratios. Control commands are still transmitted in plaintext via the traditional CAN bus. In a quantum computing attack scenario, attackers could tamper with the hydrogen supply pressure setpoint or fuel cell output limit, causing overpressure in the hydrogen storage tank or power overload. Third, vibration sensors and the key management system lack data interaction. When abnormal vibration in the hydrogen pipeline causes a sudden change in spectral characteristics, the system still uses the old key to encrypt the leakage alarm, increasing the security response delay. These flaws collectively lead to a dual deficiency in resistance to quantum attacks and robustness under complex operating conditions.

[0004] Therefore, it is urgent to build a secure control architecture that combines high reliability and resistance to quantum attacks by leveraging the dynamic characteristics of quantum keys and the strong coupling of the hydrogen electricity control system, in order to break through the current technological bottlenecks. Summary of the Invention

[0005] The purpose of this invention is to address the dual shortcomings of existing hydrogen-powered trains: insufficient robustness of the hydrogen-electric hybrid power system under complex operating conditions leading to a high rate of operational interruption, and vulnerability of the onboard control network to quantum attacks, resulting in hydrogen supply disruptions. This invention proposes a communication control method for hydrogen-powered train hybrid power systems based on the quantum key distribution principle. By integrating the dynamic characteristics of quantum keys with the hydrogen-electric control link, a key-power collaborative response mechanism is constructed, ultimately overcoming the limitations of the separation between security protection and power control in existing technologies, and achieving the goal of reliable operation under all operating conditions resistant to quantum attacks.

[0006] To achieve the above objectives, the present invention provides a communication control method for a hydrogen-powered train hybrid power system, the method comprising: Vehicle speed and hydrogen pressure signals are acquired through the first acquisition unit; The vehicle speed signal and hydrogen pressure signal are hashed using a key generation module to obtain a dynamic key. If the entropy value of the dynamic key is greater than or equal to a preset threshold, the power allocation instruction is encrypted through the first channel based on the dynamic key. The first controller decrypts the power distribution command and adjusts the output power of the battery pack based on the decrypted power distribution command.

[0007] Furthermore, the method also includes: If the entropy value of the dynamic key is less than the preset threshold, a start command is sent to the regenerative braking hydrogen production device through the regenerative braking hydrogen production start module, and a load reduction command and a preventive shutdown command are sent to the fuel cell controller and the hydrogen supply interlock valve controller, respectively.

[0008] Furthermore, the method also includes: If the entropy value of the dynamic key is less than the preset threshold for a duration exceeding a first preset time, the linkage monitoring function of the quantum vibration sensor will be automatically activated, and an audible and visual alarm signal will be issued through the train control system. The train control system will then control the vehicle to reduce its speed to the preset speed.

[0009] Furthermore, the method also includes: The quantum vibration sensor collects vibration data of the hydrogen pipeline and transmits it to the FFT analysis module. The vibration data is processed by the FFT analysis module to obtain the amplitude signal and output to the threshold comparator; The threshold comparator compares the amplitude signal with a preset first amplitude threshold and a second amplitude threshold used to classify the vibration fault level of the hydrogen pipeline. Based on the comparison interval, the fault level is determined and a graded response and handling instruction is issued.

[0010] Furthermore, the step of using the threshold comparator to compare the amplitude signal with its preset first amplitude threshold and second amplitude threshold for classifying the vibration fault level of the hydrogen pipeline, and issuing a graded response and handling command after determining the fault level based on the comparison interval includes: When the amplitude signal is greater than the first amplitude threshold and less than or equal to the second amplitude threshold, the threshold comparator sends a dynamic key reset trigger signal to the key management unit and a power reduction trigger signal to the power grading control unit. After receiving the signal, the key management unit performs a dynamic key forced reset, and after receiving the signal, the power grading control unit controls the fuel cell to reduce its power.

[0011] Furthermore, the steps of the tiered response and handling instruction also include: When the amplitude signal is greater than the second amplitude threshold, the threshold comparator sends a key entropy value zeroing trigger signal to the key management unit and a further power reduction trigger signal to the power grading control unit. After receiving the signal, the key management unit sets the key entropy value to zero. After receiving the signal, the power grading control unit controls the fuel cell to further reduce the power and links the hydrogen supply interlock valve to perform preventive shutdown.

[0012] Furthermore, the steps of the tiered response and handling instruction also include: When the amplitude signal exceeds the first amplitude threshold and the duration is longer than the second preset time, the threshold comparator sends a key entropy value zeroing trigger signal to the key management unit. After receiving the signal, the key management unit sets the key entropy value to zero, starts the regenerative braking hydrogen production device to operate according to the set rated power, and locks the fuel cell load increase command.

[0013] Furthermore, the method also includes: The hydrogen leakage signal from the hydrogen storage tank is collected by the second acquisition unit; The hash value of the hydrogen leakage signal from the hydrogen storage tank is digitally signed using the second channel to generate signature data. The signature data is sent to the second controller via the train control bus. The second controller verifies the signature validity of the signature data. If the verification is successful, the hydrogen storage tank outlet is closed and the valve status is returned; if the verification fails, the operation is rejected and an alarm is triggered.

[0014] Furthermore, the first channel and the second channel are physically isolated, with independent wiring for the two channels and separate grounding for the shielding layer.

[0015] Furthermore, the dynamic key is updated in real time as the vehicle speed signal and hydrogen pressure signal change.

[0016] This invention provides a quantum key-driven communication control system for hydrogen-powered trains, the system comprising: The first acquisition unit is used to acquire vehicle speed signals and hydrogen pressure signals; A key generation module is used to perform hash operations on the vehicle speed signal and hydrogen pressure signal to obtain a dynamic key; If the entropy value of the dynamic key is greater than or equal to a preset threshold, the first channel is used to encrypt the power allocation instruction based on the dynamic key. The first controller is used to decrypt the power distribution command and adjust the output power of the battery pack based on the decrypted power distribution command.

[0017] Furthermore, the system also includes: if the entropy value of the dynamic key is less than the preset threshold, a regenerative braking hydrogen production start-up module is used to send a start command to the regenerative braking hydrogen production device, and send a load reduction command and a preventive shutdown command to the fuel cell controller and the hydrogen supply interlock valve controller, respectively.

[0018] Furthermore, the system also includes: If the entropy value of the dynamic key is less than the preset threshold for a period of time exceeding a preset time, the quantum vibration sensor, used to monitor the vibration data of the hydrogen pipeline, will issue an audible and visual alarm signal through the train control system, and control the vehicle to reduce its speed to a preset speed through the train control system.

[0019] Furthermore, the system also includes an FFT analysis module, used to receive vibration data of the hydrogen pipeline collected by the quantum vibration sensor and output amplitude signals.

[0020] Furthermore, the system also includes a threshold comparator, which is used to compare the amplitude signal with a preset first amplitude threshold and a second amplitude threshold for classifying the vibration fault level of the hydrogen pipeline, and issue a graded response and handling command after determining the fault level based on the comparison interval.

[0021] Furthermore, the system also includes a key management unit and a power grading control unit, and the threshold comparator is connected to the key management unit and the power grading control unit respectively; When the amplitude signal is greater than the first amplitude threshold and less than or equal to the second amplitude threshold, the key management unit is used to execute a dynamic key forced reset after receiving a dynamic key reset trigger signal from the threshold comparator; the power level control unit is used to control the fuel cell to reduce power after receiving a power reduction trigger signal from the threshold comparator. When the amplitude signal is greater than the second amplitude threshold, the key management unit is used to receive the key entropy value zeroing trigger signal sent by the threshold comparator and then set the key entropy value to zero. The power level control unit is used to receive the further power reduction trigger signal sent by the threshold comparator and then control the fuel cell to further reduce the power, and link the hydrogen supply interlock valve to perform preventive shutdown. When the amplitude signal exceeds the first amplitude threshold and the duration is longer than the second preset time, the key management unit is used to receive the key entropy value zeroing trigger signal sent by the threshold comparator, set the key entropy value to zero, start the regenerative braking hydrogen production device to operate according to the set rated power, and lock the fuel cell load increase command.

[0022] Furthermore, the system also includes: The second acquisition unit is used to acquire hydrogen leakage signals from the hydrogen storage tank; The second channel digitally signs the hash value of the hydrogen leakage signal from the hydrogen storage tank and generates signature data. The second controller is used to receive signature data sent from the train control bus, verify the validity of the signature data, close the hydrogen storage tank outlet and send back the valve status if the verification is successful; otherwise, it refuses to execute and triggers an alarm.

[0023] Furthermore, the first channel and the second channel are physically isolated, with independent wiring for the two channels and separate grounding for the shielding layer.

[0024] Furthermore, the first channel is a hydrogen-electric control channel, equipped with a dynamic symmetric encryption module, and connected to the driver's cab power distribution command input terminal.

[0025] Furthermore, the first controller is a hybrid power controller with a built-in decryption unit.

[0026] Furthermore, the second channel is a hydrogen safety channel, configured with a quantum signature module, and connected to the hydrogen leakage sensor on the hydrogen storage tank side.

[0027] Furthermore, the second controller is a hydrogen supply interlock valve controller, which has an embedded signature verification unit that uses a preset public key to verify the validity of the signature data; the hydrogen supply interlock valve is controlled by the hydrogen supply interlock valve controller.

[0028] Furthermore, the quantum vibration sensor has axial and radial dual probes arranged on the outlet pipeline flange of the hydrogen storage tank, and the FFT analysis module and threshold comparator are connected in series.

[0029] Furthermore, the FFT analysis module has a built-in library of typical fault spectrum features, and the FFT analysis module outputs the main peak frequency and corresponding amplitude to the threshold comparator in real time.

[0030] Furthermore, the dynamic symmetric encryption module of the hydrogen-electric control channel and the built-in decryption unit of the hybrid power controller synchronously receive the same version of the dynamically updated key in real time.

[0031] The present invention provides an electronic device, including a memory, a processor, and a computer program stored in the memory and executable on the processor, wherein the processor executes the program to implement the method described above.

[0032] The present invention provides a computer-readable storage medium storing a computer program that, when executed by a processor, implements the method described above.

[0033] This invention generates a physically unclonable encrypted command stream by binding a dynamic key to vehicle speed and hydrogen pressure in real time, thereby avoiding the risk of hydrogen supply commands being cracked or tampered with under quantum computing attacks, achieving a significant leap in anti-attack capability. By real-time regulating the power distribution of the hybrid power controller through key entropy, it avoids the hydrogen-electric system from going out of control due to delayed network attack response, compressing the attack response delay to less than 100ms, achieving a significant reduction in operational interruption rate. By coupling a quantum vibration sensor with a key reset mechanism, it triggers graded power regulation when the vibration spectrum is >50dB, thereby avoiding the disconnect between mechanical failure and network security response, overcoming the challenge of joint protection under complex operating conditions. Simultaneously, it achieves entropy-driven power optimization and vehicle-to-ground quantum synchronization management, thereby avoiding the disconnect between energy efficiency optimization and command security, achieving a reduction in hydrogen consumption per 100 kilometers. Attached Figure Description

[0034] Figure 1 This is a diagram of the overall system architecture. Figure 2 Here is a flowchart of the quantum key binding mechanism; Figure 3 This is a schematic diagram of dual-channel secure communication. Figure 4 This is a schematic diagram of vibration linkage control. Detailed Implementation

[0035] To make the objectives, technical solutions, and advantages of this application clearer, the following detailed description is provided in conjunction with specific embodiments and accompanying drawings. It should be particularly noted that the embodiments described in this application are only a part of the embodiments of this application, and not all of them. All other embodiments obtained by those skilled in the art based on the embodiments of this application without creative effort are within the scope of protection of this application.

[0036] It should be noted that, unless otherwise defined, the technical or scientific terms used in the embodiments of this application should have the ordinary meaning understood by one of ordinary skill in the art to which this application pertains. The terms "first," "second," and similar terms used in the embodiments of this application do not indicate any order, quantity, or importance, but are merely used to distinguish different components. Terms such as "comprising" or "including" mean that the element or object preceding the word encompasses the elements or objects listed after the word and their equivalents, without excluding other elements or objects. Terms such as "connected" or "linked" are not limited to physical or mechanical connections, but can include electrical connections, whether direct or indirect. Terms such as "upper," "lower," "left," and "right" are only used to indicate relative positional relationships; when the absolute position of the described object changes, the relative positional relationship may also change accordingly.

[0037] The existing onboard control network for hydrogen hybrid trains has two major shortcomings: First, the quantum encryption link and the hydrogen electric power control system are independent of each other, the key cannot participate in power allocation decisions, and the encryption instructions are easily tampered with by quantum computing, causing power disturbances in fuel cells and overpressure in hydrogen storage tanks; Second, there is no linkage mechanism between hydrogen pipeline vibration fault monitoring, hydrogen leakage safety protection and key security detection, and the three types of risks of network attacks, pipeline mechanical failures and hydrogen leakage are handled independently, resulting in delayed response and significant operational safety hazards.

[0038] This invention establishes a three-layer integrated architecture: a quantum key distribution layer, a secure communication layer, and a power execution layer, along with supporting components. Figure 4 The hydrogen pipeline quantum vibration fault linkage subsystem shown uses the key entropy value as the security judgment benchmark for the entire system. It couples the hydrogen pipeline vibration spectrum hierarchical processing, post-quantum signature leakage verification, and dual-channel redundancy protection mechanism to achieve coordinated linkage of communication security, power regulation, and hydrogen safety protection, thus solving the defects of the separation of security and control in the existing technology.

[0039] To enable those skilled in the art to better understand the present application, the technical solutions in the embodiments of the present application will be clearly and completely described below with reference to the accompanying drawings. Obviously, the described embodiments are only a part of the embodiments of the present application, and not all of them. All other embodiments obtained by those skilled in the art based on the embodiments of the present application without creative effort are within the scope of protection of the present application. (Refer to...) Figure 1 This is a diagram illustrating the overall architecture of the hydrogen-powered train hybrid power communication control system of the present invention. The system consists of a quantum key distribution layer, a secure communication layer, a power execution layer, and additional supporting components. Figure 4 The vibration linkage subsystem shown consists of four parts. All components are selected from commercially available hardware known in the field. The structure and working principle of each component are existing technologies. The innovation lies in the hardware wiring topology and cross-module linkage control logic.

[0040] This embodiment provides a communication control system for a hydrogen-powered train, which adopts a hierarchical system architecture, including a first acquisition unit, a key generation module, a first channel, and a first controller. The first acquisition unit includes a vehicle speed sensor and a hydrogen pressure sensor, used to acquire vehicle speed signals and hydrogen pressure signals; The key generation module includes a quantum key random number generator, which is deployed inside the hydrogen-powered train. This quantum key random number generator receives vehicle speed signals from the vehicle speed sensor and hydrogen pressure signals from the hydrogen pressure sensor in real time, and dynamically generates a quantum true random number sequence through hash operations, which is output as a dynamic key, thereby realizing the physical-level binding of the key with the train's operating status. The dynamic key data generated by the quantum key random number generator is sent to the entropy calculation module inside the FPGA, and the calculation result of the entropy calculation module is transmitted to the threshold comparator integrated on the same chip.

[0041] If the entropy value of the dynamic key is greater than or equal to a preset threshold, the first channel is used to encrypt the power distribution command based on the dynamic key; the first channel is a hydrogen-electric control channel, configured with a dynamic symmetric encryption module, connected to the driver's cab power distribution command input terminal, and encrypts the power distribution command from the hydrogen-powered train driver's cab in real time.

[0042] The first controller is a hybrid power controller with a built-in decryption unit for decrypting the power distribution command and adjusting the output power of the battery pack based on the decrypted power distribution command. The dynamic symmetric encryption module of the hydrogen-electric control channel and the built-in decryption unit of the hybrid power controller synchronously receive the same version of the dynamically updated key in real time.

[0043] In this embodiment, the system further includes a regenerative braking hydrogen production start-up module and a quantum vibration sensor. If the entropy value of the dynamic key is less than the preset threshold, the regenerative braking hydrogen production start-up module sends a start command to the regenerative braking hydrogen production device and sends a load reduction command and a preventive shutdown command to the fuel cell controller and the hydrogen supply interlock valve controller, respectively. If the duration for which the entropy value of the dynamic key is less than the preset threshold exceeds a first preset time, the quantum vibration sensor is used to monitor the vibration data of the hydrogen pipeline, issue an audible and visual alarm signal through the train control system, and control the vehicle to reduce its speed to a preset speed through the train control system. The quantum vibration sensor has axial and radial dual probes arranged on the outlet pipeline flange of the hydrogen storage tank.

[0044] In this embodiment, the system further includes an FFT analysis module, a threshold comparator, a key management unit, and a power grading control unit; the quantum vibration sensor is connected in series with the FFT analysis module and the threshold comparator. The FFT analysis module is used to receive vibration data of the hydrogen pipeline collected by the quantum vibration sensor and output amplitude signals; the FFT analysis module has a built-in typical fault spectrum feature library, and the FFT analysis module outputs the main peak frequency and corresponding amplitude to the threshold comparator in real time.

[0045] The threshold comparator is used to compare the amplitude signal with its preset first amplitude threshold and second amplitude threshold for classifying the vibration fault level of the hydrogen pipeline, and issue a graded response and handling command after determining the fault level based on the comparison interval. The threshold comparator is connected to the key management unit and the power grading control unit respectively. When the amplitude signal is greater than the first amplitude threshold and less than or equal to the second amplitude threshold, the key management unit is used to execute a dynamic key forced reset after receiving a dynamic key reset trigger signal from the threshold comparator. The power grading control unit is used to control the fuel cell to reduce power after receiving a power reduction trigger signal from the threshold comparator. When the amplitude signal is greater than the second amplitude threshold, the key management unit is used to receive the key entropy value zeroing trigger signal sent by the threshold comparator and then set the key entropy value to zero. The power level control unit is used to receive the further power reduction trigger signal sent by the threshold comparator and then control the fuel cell to further reduce the power, and link the hydrogen supply interlock valve to perform preventive shutdown. When the amplitude signal exceeds the first amplitude threshold and the duration is longer than the second preset time, the key management unit is used to receive the key entropy value zeroing trigger signal sent by the threshold comparator, set the key entropy value to zero, start the regenerative braking hydrogen production device to operate according to the set rated power, and lock the fuel cell load increase command.

[0046] In this embodiment, the system further includes a second acquisition unit, a second channel, and a second controller; The second acquisition unit includes a hydrogen leak sensor for acquiring hydrogen leak signals from the hydrogen storage tank; The second channel is a hydrogen safety channel. It is equipped with a quantum signature module and connected to the hydrogen leakage sensor on the side of the hydrogen storage tank. It digitally signs the hash value of the hydrogen leakage signal of the hydrogen storage tank and generates signature data, which is output to the hydrogen supply interlock valve controller. After closing, it cuts off the hydrogen supply path from the hydrogen storage tank to the fuel cell and simultaneously feeds back the valve status signal to the train control system.

[0047] The second controller is a hydrogen supply interlock valve controller. The hydrogen supply interlock valve controller has an embedded signature verification unit that uses a preset public key to verify the validity of the signature data. The hydrogen supply interlock valve is controlled by the hydrogen supply interlock valve controller, which is used to receive the signature data sent by the train control bus, verify the signature validity of the signature data, close the hydrogen storage tank outlet and send back the valve status if the verification is successful, and refuse to execute and trigger an alarm if the verification fails.

[0048] In this embodiment, a physical isolation barrier is installed between the hydrogen-electric control channel and the hydrogen safety channel. The train control buses for the two channels are each laid with independent cable trays, and the shielding layers of the two buses are each grounded separately.

[0049] In one specific implementation, the hardware components of the hydrogen-electric control channel include an AES-QRNG dynamic symmetric encryption module and a built-in decryption unit in the hybrid power controller. The power distribution command wiring from the driver's cab control console is connected to the input terminal of the AES-QRNG dynamic symmetric encryption module. The key interface of the AES-QRNG dynamic symmetric encryption module is synchronously connected to the quantum key random number generator. After encryption, the ciphertext is transmitted to the decryption unit inside the hybrid power controller via a dual-redundant CAN2.0B bus. The hardware of the hydrogen safety channel includes a hydrogen leak sensor, a post-quantum signature module, a hydrogen supply interlock valve controller, and a hydrogen supply interlock valve. The hydrogen leak sensor deployed in the hydrogen storage tank area outputs a 4-20mA analog current signal, which is converted from analog to digital and then connected to the post-quantum signature module. The post-quantum signature module is equipped with the CRYSTALS-Dilithium post-quantum signature algorithm and outputs a 2420-byte signature data frame, which is sent to the hydrogen supply interlock valve controller via an independent security bus. The hydrogen supply interlock valve controller integrates a signature verification unit. The controller drive port is connected to the hydrogen supply interlock valve at the front end of the hydrogen storage pipeline. At the same time, the controller has a reserved feedback signal line for connection to the whole vehicle train control system. The post-quantum public and private keys associated with the post-quantum signature module are updated weekly according to the established system, and the key refresh operation is automatically completed during the nighttime shutdown phase of the train.

[0050] In one specific implementation, the hybrid power controller receives the decrypted power distribution command and sends it to the fuel cell, lithium battery pack, and regenerative braking hydrogen production unit, respectively. This command includes the target total power demand and power distribution ratio. The fuel cell output power is dynamically adjusted based on the key entropy value: when H(kn) > 7.9, an increase output command is prioritized for the fuel cell, while a supplementary power supply command is sent to the lithium battery pack; when the entropy value drops below 7.0, a start command is sent to the regenerative braking hydrogen production unit, and a load reduction command is sent to the fuel cell. Furthermore, when the quantum vibration sensor detects a vibration spectrum in the hydrogen pipeline exceeding 50dB, a key reset command triggers a preventative shutdown via the secure communication layer, activating the hydrogen supply interlock valve. This provides hydrogen supply safety protection against both mechanical failures and network attacks.

[0051] The hybrid power controller's decryption output port has three wiring connections, which are respectively connected to the fuel cell controller, the lithium battery BMS management system, and the control terminal of the regenerative braking hydrogen production device. The fuel cell controller directly controls the power output of the fuel cell stack, the lithium battery BMS manages the charging and discharging status of the lithium battery pack, and the regenerative braking hydrogen production device has a built-in water electrolysis hydrogen production module. The mechanical end of the hydrogen supply interlock valve is connected in series in the hydrogen delivery pipeline from the hydrogen storage tank outlet to the fuel cell, and the electrical end is controlled by the output command of the hydrogen supply interlock valve controller.

[0052] This embodiment realizes a closed-loop system for key generation, security determination, command encryption, and power adjustment. It uses the randomness of quantum keys as a prerequisite for vehicle power control, breaking the traditional design pattern of separating encryption and power control.

[0053] Reference Figures 2 to 3 This invention provides a hydrogen-powered train hybrid power communication control method, applying a hydrogen-powered train hybrid power communication control system as described in the above embodiments. The method includes the following steps: Vehicle speed and hydrogen pressure signals are acquired through the first acquisition unit; The vehicle speed signal and hydrogen pressure signal are hashed using a key generation module to obtain a dynamic key. If the entropy value of the dynamic key is greater than or equal to a preset threshold, the power allocation instruction is encrypted through the first channel based on the dynamic key. The first controller decrypts the power distribution command and adjusts the output power of the battery pack based on the decrypted power distribution command.

[0054] The first acquisition unit includes a vehicle speed sensor and a hydrogen pressure sensor; the key generation module includes a quantum key random number generator, which is deployed inside the hydrogen-powered train. This quantum key random number generator receives the vehicle speed signal output from the vehicle speed sensor and the hydrogen pressure signal output from the hydrogen pressure sensor in real time, and dynamically generates a quantum true random number sequence through hash operation as a dynamic key, thereby realizing the physical-level binding of the key with the train's operating status; the dynamic key data generated by the quantum key random number generator is sent to the entropy calculation module inside the FPGA, and the calculation result of the entropy calculation module is transmitted to the threshold comparator integrated on the same chip.

[0055] The first channel is the hydrogen-electric control channel, which is equipped with a dynamic symmetric encryption module and connected to the driver's cab power distribution command input terminal to encrypt the power distribution commands from the hydrogen-powered train driver's cab in real time.

[0056] The first controller is a hybrid power controller with a built-in decryption unit, which is used to decrypt the power distribution command and adjust the output power of the battery pack based on the decrypted power distribution command.

[0057] The hydrogen-powered train hybrid power communication control method provided in this application is the same as the method technical solution shown in the above system embodiment. Its implementation principle and beneficial effects are similar, and will not be repeated here.

[0058] Furthermore, based on the above embodiments, the method further includes: If the entropy value of the dynamic key is less than the preset threshold, a start command is sent to the regenerative braking hydrogen production device through the regenerative braking hydrogen production start module, and a load reduction command and a preventive shutdown command are sent to the fuel cell controller and the hydrogen supply interlock valve controller, respectively.

[0059] Furthermore, based on the above embodiments, the method further includes: If the entropy value of the dynamic key is less than the preset threshold for a duration exceeding a first preset time, the linkage monitoring function of the quantum vibration sensor will be automatically activated, and an audible and visual alarm signal will be issued through the train control system. The train control system will then control the vehicle to reduce its speed to the preset speed.

[0060] Furthermore, based on the above embodiments, the method further includes: The quantum vibration sensor collects vibration data of the hydrogen pipeline and transmits it to the FFT analysis module. The vibration data is processed by the FFT analysis module to obtain the amplitude signal and output to the threshold comparator; The threshold comparator compares the amplitude signal with a preset first amplitude threshold and a second amplitude threshold used to classify the vibration fault level of the hydrogen pipeline. Based on the comparison interval, the fault level is determined and a graded response and handling instruction is issued.

[0061] Furthermore, based on the above embodiments, the method further includes: The steps of comparing the amplitude signal with a preset first amplitude threshold and a second amplitude threshold used to classify the vibration fault level of the hydrogen pipeline using the threshold comparator, and issuing a graded response and handling command after determining the fault level based on the comparison interval, include: When the amplitude signal is greater than the first amplitude threshold and less than or equal to the second amplitude threshold, the threshold comparator sends a dynamic key reset trigger signal to the key management unit and a power reduction trigger signal to the power grading control unit. After receiving the signal, the key management unit performs a dynamic key forced reset, and after receiving the signal, the power grading control unit controls the fuel cell to reduce its power.

[0062] Furthermore, based on the above embodiments, the step of issuing a graded response and handling instruction further includes: When the amplitude signal is greater than the second amplitude threshold, the threshold comparator sends a key entropy value zeroing trigger signal to the key management unit and a further power reduction trigger signal to the power grading control unit. After receiving the signal, the key management unit sets the key entropy value to zero. After receiving the signal, the power grading control unit controls the fuel cell to further reduce the power and links the hydrogen supply interlock valve to perform preventive shutdown.

[0063] Furthermore, based on the above embodiments, the step of issuing a graded response and handling instruction further includes: When the amplitude signal exceeds the first amplitude threshold and the duration is longer than the second preset time, the threshold comparator sends a key entropy value zeroing trigger signal to the key management unit. After receiving the signal, the key management unit sets the key entropy value to zero, starts the regenerative braking hydrogen production device to operate according to the set rated power, and locks the fuel cell load increase command.

[0064] Furthermore, based on the above embodiments, the method further includes: The hydrogen leakage signal from the hydrogen storage tank is collected by the second acquisition unit; The hash value of the hydrogen leakage signal from the hydrogen storage tank is digitally signed using the second channel to generate signature data. The signature data is sent to the second controller via the train control bus. The second controller verifies the signature validity of the signature data. If the verification is successful, the hydrogen storage tank outlet is closed and the valve status is returned; if the verification fails, the operation is rejected and an alarm is triggered.

[0065] The second acquisition unit includes a hydrogen leak sensor; the second channel is a hydrogen safety channel, configured with a quantum signature module, connected to the hydrogen leak sensor on the hydrogen storage tank side, digitally signatures the hash value of the hydrogen leak signal of the hydrogen storage tank and generates signature data, which is output to the hydrogen supply interlock valve controller. After closing, it cuts off the hydrogen supply path from the hydrogen storage tank to the fuel cell, and at the same time feeds back the valve status signal to the train control system.

[0066] The second controller is a hydrogen supply interlock valve controller, which has an embedded signature verification unit that uses a preset public key to verify the validity of the signature data. The hydrogen supply interlock valve is controlled by the hydrogen supply interlock valve controller, which receives the signature data sent by the train control bus, verifies the signature validity of the signature data, and closes the hydrogen storage tank outlet and sends back the valve status if the verification is successful; otherwise, it refuses to execute and triggers an alarm.

[0067] Furthermore, based on the above embodiments, the method further includes: The first and second channels are physically isolated, with independent wiring for the two channels and separate grounding for the shielding layer.

[0068] like Figure 2As shown in the illustration, in a specific implementation of a hybrid power communication control method for hydrogen-powered trains, the input nodes on the left are a vehicle speed sensor and a hydrogen pressure sensor. The vehicle speed sensor collects the train's running speed v in real time, with a range of 0-200 km / h, while the hydrogen pressure sensor collects the hydrogen storage tank outlet pressure p in real time, with a range of 0-70 MPa. The two analog signals are converted into digital signals by their respective signal conditioning circuits and synchronously transmitted to the quantum key random number generator in the quantum key drive layer at a sampling rate of 100 Hz.

[0069] The quantum key random number generator integrates a SHA-3 hash operation unit. After performing a bitwise XOR operation on the received train speed v and hydrogen storage tank outlet pressure p, it compresses the data using the Keccak-256 algorithm to generate a 256-bit dynamic key kn. The generation function of this dynamic key kn is kn=SHA-3(v⊕p). The dynamic key generation process is physically bound to the real-time operating status of the train, and the update frequency is no less than 1 kHz.

[0070] The dynamic key kn is fed into the entropy calculation module, which uses the Shannon entropy formula H(kn) = -Σp·log2p to calculate the randomness measure of the key sequence and outputs the entropy value H(kn). This entropy value H(kn) is used as the input to the decision threshold comparator and compared with a preset threshold of 7.9. When H(kn) ≥ 7.9, it indicates that the current key randomness is sufficient and the communication link is secure. A "Yes" signal is output to the fuel cell dominant mode activation module, which sends a command to the hybrid power controller, requesting the fuel cell output ratio to increase to 60%-80%, while the lithium battery pack operates as an auxiliary power source. When H(kn) < 7.9, it indicates that the key randomness has decreased, and there may be network attacks or channel interference. A "No" signal is output to the regenerative braking hydrogen production start module. This module immediately sends a command to the regenerative braking device to start water electrolysis for hydrogen production at 120% rated power, while simultaneously sending a load reduction command to the fuel cell to reduce the output power by 15%-30% and triggering the hydrogen supply interlock valve to perform a preventative shutdown.

[0071] Throughout the process, the preset entropy threshold of 7.9 is set based on the following: when H(kn) ≥ 7.9, the key (a truly random sequence conforming to the NIST SP 800-90B standard) is a pseudo-random sequence, and its resistance to quantum attacks reaches the design limit; when the entropy value remains below 7.0 for more than 5 seconds after the first preset time, the quantum vibration sensor will be activated for additional monitoring, forming a multi-level security response mechanism. Signals are transmitted between modules via hardwired connections or the train control bus to reduce signal transmission latency and ensure that the entire response time from key generation to power mode switching is controlled within 100 ms. Figure 3As shown in the diagram, in a specific implementation of a hybrid power communication control method for a hydrogen-powered train, the hydrogen-electric control channel originates from a power distribution command issued from the driver's cab. This command enters the hydrogen-electric control channel in CAN 2.0B frame format, first reaching the AES-QRNG dynamic symmetric encryption module. This module receives the dynamic key kn from the quantum key distribution layer in real time, performs encryption operations on the command payload using a 256-bit key, and outputs ciphertext. The encrypted ciphertext frame is transmitted via the train control bus, employing a dual-redundant physical medium in the line. The ciphertext is then transmitted via the train control bus to the decryption unit built into the hybrid power controller. The decryption unit uses the synchronously updated same dynamic key kn to decrypt the ciphertext, recovering the original command, and executes control based on the decrypted power distribution value. The end-to-end delay of the entire hydrogen-electric control channel from command input to decryption output does not exceed 5ms.

[0072] In this specific implementation of a hybrid power communication control method for hydrogen-powered trains, the hydrogen safety channel operates independently and in parallel with the hydrogen-electric control channel, separated by a physical isolation barrier. The hydrogen safety channel originates from a hydrogen leak sensor installed in the hydrogen storage tank area. This sensor outputs an analog signal, which, after analog-to-digital conversion, is sent to the post-quantum signature module. The signature module uses a weekly updated post-quantum key pair to digitally sign the hash value of the leak signal, generating 2420 bytes of signature data, which is transmitted via the train control bus. The signature data reaches the hydrogen supply interlock valve controller, where an embedded signature verification unit verifies the signature validity using a preset public key. Upon successful verification, the controller drives the electromagnetic pilot valve to close the hydrogen storage tank outlet and simultaneously reports the valve status to the train control system. If signature verification fails, execution is refused and an alarm is triggered.

[0073] In this specific embodiment, the hydrogen-electric control channel and the hydrogen safety channel are completely isolated at the physical layer. The train control buses of the hydrogen-electric control channel and the hydrogen safety channel run on independent cable trays, and their shielding layers are grounded separately. At the logical layer, a dual-channel encryption controller manages the key distribution of the two channels. The dynamic key kn is injected only into the AES-QRNG dynamic symmetric encryption module on the hydrogen-electric control channel side, and the post-quantum signature key is injected only into the post-quantum signature module on the hydrogen safety channel side. The outputs of the two channels ultimately converge at the power execution layer. The hybrid power controller receives the decrypted power command, which is then used by the hydrogen interlock valve to receive the verified shutdown command. When a network attack causes an anomaly in the encrypted data of the hydrogen-electric control channel, the hydrogen safety channel can still independently perform a safe shutdown. Conversely, when the signature verification of the hydrogen safety channel fails, the hydrogen-electric control channel can actively reduce its power output by monitoring the key entropy value (i.e., judging the H(kn) threshold), forming cross-channel redundancy protection.

[0074] In this embodiment, the present invention achieves end-to-end secure communication encompassing instruction input, encryption / signature, bus transmission, decryption / verification, and execution. Through dual safeguards of physical isolation and logical coordination, it ensures that the hydrogen-powered train can maintain critical safety functions even under quantum attacks. Figure 4 As shown in the illustration, a specific implementation of a communication control method for hydrogen-powered trains involves deploying Guoyi Quantum NV-100 quantum vibration sensors at two points along the flange connection of the hydrogen storage tank outlet pipeline. These sensors employ a dual-probe arrangement, with axial and radial probes tightly bonded to the pipeline outer wall using a specialized coupling agent. The axial probe detects tensile vibration of the pipeline, while the radial probe detects fluid impact vibration. The quantum vibration sensors have a sampling frequency of 10 kHz, a measurement range of 1-5000 Hz, and an output signal of 4-20mA current loop, which is transmitted via a shielded cable to the FFT analysis module in the analysis layer. Upon receiving the vibration signal, the FFT analysis module performs a Fast Fourier Transform (FFT) to convert the time-domain waveform into a frequency-domain spectrum.

[0075] The spectrum graph shows frequency (0-5000 Hz) on the horizontal axis and amplitude (dB) on the vertical axis. The module includes a built-in library of typical fault spectrum features: 800-1500 Hz corresponds to pipeline resonance, 2000-3000 Hz corresponds to valve leakage, and above 4000 Hz corresponds to compressor blade damage. The FFT analysis module outputs the main peak frequency and corresponding amplitude to a threshold comparator in real time.

[0076] The threshold comparator has dual amplitude thresholds: a first amplitude threshold of 50dB and a second amplitude threshold of 70dB. The threshold comparator continuously judges the input amplitude: when the amplitude is ≤50dB, it is considered a normal state; when the amplitude is >50dB and ≤70dB, it is considered a warning state; when the amplitude is >70dB, it is considered a dangerous state. The comparison results are transmitted in digital signal form to the key management unit and the power grading control unit respectively. The FFT analysis module, key management unit, and power grading control unit are all integrated within the same FPGA hardware, and data interaction is completed via the chip's internal bus.

[0077] Furthermore, based on the above implementation method, upon receiving the warning status signal, the key management unit immediately issues a key reset command to the quantum key random number generator, forcibly refreshing the dynamic key kn. The reset process is completed within 10ms. Simultaneously, the power grading control unit executes a tiered response based on the comparison results: in the warning state, it sends a 15% power reduction command to the hybrid power controller; in the danger state, it sends a 30% power reduction command and performs a preventative shutdown via the hydrogen supply interlock valve through the safety communication layer. The power reduction command is transmitted to the fuel cell controller via the train control bus, achieving a rapid reduction in output power by decreasing the PWM duty cycle.

[0078] Furthermore, as a specific implementation of the hybrid power communication control method for hydrogen-powered trains, when the amplitude continuously exceeds 50dB for more than 100ms (the second preset time), the key management unit will forcibly set the key entropy value H(kn) to zero, triggering the regenerative braking hydrogen production device to start at 120% rated power, while simultaneously blocking the fuel cell load increase command. The total delay of the entire above-mentioned linkage response process (from vibration signal acquisition to power reduction) does not exceed 200ms, achieving deep coupling between mechanical faults and network security response.

[0079] Combining the above Figures 1 to 4 The following is a detailed explanation of the overall process for system power-on initialization, normal system operation, key entropy value anomaly fault response, hydrogen pipeline vibration anomaly graded linkage response, and extreme emergency response to hydrogen leakage.

[0080] I. Specific Implementation Steps for System Power-On Initialization After the train's main power supply is switched on, all hardware modules of the system execute the power-on self-test process in a predetermined order. First, the quantum key random number generator starts the whole-machine self-test program, and outputs the initial true random number sequence after the self-test is completed. Then, the dual-channel encryption controller completes the initialization of the dual processing units. The system retrieves the preset quantum public key and private key pair from the independent power failure protection storage area to complete the loading configuration. The quantum key is automatically replaced and updated weekly by default. After the controller initialization is completed, the vehicle speed sensor and hydrogen pressure sensor start synchronously, continuously collecting real-time vehicle speed v and hydrogen storage tank outlet pressure p at a sampling frequency of 100Hz. The quantum key random number generator first receives the first set of initial sensor data v=0km / h, p=35MPa, performs a bitwise XOR operation v⊕p on the two sets of digital signals, and then compresses and generates the first 256-bit sequence using the SHA-3 and Keccak-256 algorithm. The initial dynamic key kn is used; the entropy calculation module calls the Shannon entropy calculation formula H(kn)=-Σp·log2p to complete the initial key entropy value calculation. The measured initial entropy value H(kn)=7.95, which is greater than the preset threshold of 7.9. The threshold comparator determines that the output high-level valid signal is sent to the fuel cell dominant mode activation module, the vehicle system initialization is completed, and it automatically switches to normal operation waiting condition, and waits to receive the power distribution control command issued by the driver's cab.

[0081] II. Implementation of System Normal Operating Conditions 2.1 Quantum Key Dynamic Generation and Real-time Entropy Monitoring Process During normal train operation, the speed sensor and hydrogen pressure sensor continuously collect operating parameters at a synchronous sampling rate of 100Hz. The quantum key random number generator continuously generates a 256-bit dynamic key according to the generation formula kn=SHA-3(v⊕p). The overall key update frequency is stably maintained at 1kHz. After each new dynamic key is generated, it is simultaneously sent in real time through two channels: one is sent to the AES-QRNG dynamic symmetric encryption module in the hydrogen-electric control channel, and the other is sent to the decryption unit built into the hybrid power controller, ensuring that the keys at both encryption and decryption ends are refreshed synchronously. The key is synchronously sent to the entropy calculation module to calculate the key Shannon entropy H(kn) in real time. Under normal stable driving conditions, the key entropy value stably meets the requirement of H(kn)≥7.9, and the threshold comparator continuously outputs a valid signal to maintain the fuel cell-dominated operating mode.

[0082] 2.2 Encryption, transmission, and power distribution execution of hydrogen-electric control channel commands The driver's cab control console outputs power distribution commands according to the train's operating requirements. The commands are encapsulated in CAN2.0B extended frame format, with a fixed communication ID of 0x18F00101. The data length of a single frame is 8 bytes, and the frame payload includes the target total power of the vehicle and the power distribution ratio of each power source. The original commands are sent to the AES-QRNG dynamic symmetric encryption module. The module retrieves the dynamically updated key kn and performs AES-256 symmetric encryption on the command payload to generate ciphertext frames. The ciphertext is transmitted down to the hybrid power controller decryption unit via the dual-redundant train control bus. The decryption unit uses the same version of the synchronized key to decrypt the ciphertext. The end-to-end total delay of the entire hydrogen-electric control channel from command input to decryption output is controlled within 5ms. In this embodiment, the measured total transmission time of a single channel under normal operating conditions is 4.7ms.

[0083] The hybrid power controller uses the decrypted original commands to split the power output. In fuel cell-dominated mode, it controls the fuel cell output power to be kept stable at 60%-80%. In this example, the vehicle is rated at 250kW, and the fuel cell outputs 70% of the rated power, which is 175kW. The remaining 75kW of power is supplemented by the auxiliary discharge of the lithium battery pack. The total output of the vehicle is 250kW to meet the acceleration requirements of the train. Under conditions of surplus energy, such as downhill coasting, the fuel cell output ratio is reduced to 60%. At the same time, the hybrid power controller issues commands to start the regenerative braking hydrogen production device, using the surplus braking energy to carry out water electrolysis to produce hydrogen.

[0084] 2.3 Hydrogen safety passage routine standby workflow The hydrogen leak sensor on the hydrogen storage tank side monitors the hydrogen concentration around the tank in real time. When there is no leak, the sensor outputs a normal reference signal, and the quantum signature module remains in standby mode. Once a trace of hydrogen leak occurs, the hydrogen leak sensor outputs an excessive current signal of 4-20mA. After the signal is sent to the quantum signature module, the module performs CRYSTALS-Dilithium digital signature processing on the hash value of the leak signal, generating a fixed 2420-byte signature data packet, which is transmitted to the hydrogen supply interlock valve controller via an independent physically isolated hydrogen safety channel bus. The signature verification unit inside the controller retrieves a preset public key to verify the validity of the signature. If the signature verification is successful, the controller drives the electromagnetic pilot valve to close the hydrogen supply interlock valve and shuts off the hydrogen storage tank outlet passage, simultaneously sending a valve closure status signal back to the train control system. If the signature verification fails, the controller refuses to execute the valve closure action and triggers an audible and visual fault alarm.

[0085] 2.4 Implementation of Dual-Channel Cross-Channel Redundancy Protection The hydrogen-electric control channel and the hydrogen safety channel rely on physical isolation to achieve cross-channel redundancy protection. When a network attack causes the encrypted data of the hydrogen-electric control channel to fail abnormally, the independent hydrogen safety channel is not affected by the fault and can still independently complete the hydrogen leakage monitoring and emergency shutdown of the hydrogen supply interlock valve. Conversely, when the hydrogen safety channel experiences a signature verification failure, the hydrogen-electric control channel relies on the key entropy value real-time monitoring mechanism to automatically execute the vehicle power reduction operation after the key entropy value is abnormal, and relies on the dual-channel logic collaboration to achieve full system safety backup.

[0086] III. Fault Implementation Procedure for Abnormal Key Entropy Value (Quantum Attack / Channel Interference) When the vehicle is subjected to a quantum computing attack or the vehicle communication channel is subjected to strong electromagnetic interference, the randomness of the quantum key drops significantly. The entropy calculation module monitors in real time and obtains H (kn=7.5, which is lower than the safety threshold of 7.9). The threshold comparator switches to output an invalid level signal to the regenerative braking hydrogen production start-up module. After receiving the trigger signal, the module immediately issues two control commands: the first command controls the regenerative braking hydrogen production device to start operation at 120% rated power and carry out full-load water electrolysis to produce hydrogen; the second command is issued to the fuel cell controller to control the fuel cell output power to be reduced by 20% from 175kW to 140kW, and at the same time sends a preventive shutdown command to the hydrogen supply interlock valve controller to drive the hydrogen supply interlock valve to cut off the hydrogen output from the hydrogen storage tank in advance.

[0087] If the key entropy value continues to decrease, when H(kn) < 7.0 and remains so for more than 5 seconds, the system automatically triggers the quantum vibration sensor linkage monitoring program, and the train control system simultaneously illuminates the fault audible and visual alarm. The onboard control program automatically limits the train's maximum operating speed to 80km / h, guiding the vehicle to the nearest station for maintenance. The overall response time from the identification of abnormal key entropy value to the switching of the vehicle's power mode is controlled within 100ms. In this embodiment, the actual measured time for the entire process is 97.2ms, which meets the SIL4 railway safety level timing specification.

[0088] IV. Implementation of Graded and Inter-agency Collaboration for Abnormal Vibration in Hydrogen Pipelines The FFT analysis module has a built-in fixed fault spectrum feature library: the 800-1500Hz frequency band corresponds to pipeline resonance faults, the 2000-3000Hz frequency band corresponds to valve leakage faults, and the frequency band above 4000Hz corresponds to compressor blade damage faults. The quantum vibration sensor continuously collects pipeline vibration signals in the 1-5000Hz range at a sampling frequency of 10kHz. The time domain signal is sent to the FFT analysis module to be converted into frequency domain amplitude (dB) data. The threshold comparator presets two levels of judgment criteria: the first amplitude preset (50dB) and the second amplitude threshold (70dB), and classifies and manages the operation in two levels: early warning and danger.

[0089] 4.1 Warning conditions (50dB < vibration amplitude ≤ 70dB) In this embodiment, a flange resonance fault occurred in the pipeline. The quantum vibration sensor collected a vibration amplitude of 62dB and a main peak frequency of 1200Hz, which falls within the 800-1500Hz pipeline resonance characteristic frequency band. After the FFT analysis was completed, the fault data was output to the threshold comparator. After the threshold comparator determined that it was in a warning state, it simultaneously sent trigger signals to the key management unit and the power grading control unit. After receiving the instruction, the key management unit completed the forced refresh and reset of the dynamic key kn inside the quantum key random number generator within a 10ms time limit. The power grading control unit output a power reduction instruction of 15% to the hybrid power controller. The fuel cell output power was reduced from 175kW to 148.75kW. The total time from vibration signal acquisition to the completion of the power reduction was 180ms, which is less than the 200ms limit.

[0090] 4.2 Hazardous operating conditions (vibration amplitude > 70dB) A leak occurred in the hydrogen storage pipeline valve, causing the vibration amplitude to climb to 78dB with a peak frequency of 2500Hz, matching the valve leakage spectrum. After the threshold comparator determined the danger level, the key management unit directly forced the key entropy value H (kn) to zero. The power grading control unit issued a 30% load reduction command, reducing the fuel cell output power to 122.5kW. Simultaneously, the safety communication layer coordinated with the hydrogen supply interlock valve to perform an emergency shutdown operation, and the regenerative braking hydrogen production unit simultaneously operated at 120% rated power. The entire vehicle simultaneously triggered an emergency shutdown procedure to avoid the risk of hydrogen leakage and explosion. When the vibration amplitude was >50dB and the duration exceeded 100ms, the system additionally locked all fuel cell load control commands and continuously started the regenerative braking hydrogen production unit at full power.

[0091] V. Implementation of Extreme Emergency Response to Hydrogen Leakage When a hydrogen storage tank leaks due to a seal failure, the hydrogen leak sensor detects that the hydrogen concentration around the tank has reached 1000 ppm, exceeding the limit. The sensor then outputs an excessive analog current signal, which is sent to the quantum signature module in the hydrogen safety channel. The module performs a CRYSTALS-Dilithium digital signature on the leak signal hash value to generate 2420 bytes of signature data. This data is transmitted to the hydrogen supply interlock valve controller via an independent secure bus. The controller's internal signature verification unit retrieves a preset public key to verify the signature. If the verification is valid, the controller immediately drives the electromagnetic pilot valve to close the main outlet valve of the hydrogen storage tank, cutting off all hydrogen supply paths. Simultaneously, the controller uploads a valve closure status feedback message to the vehicle's train control system. If the signature data is tampered with or the verification fails, the controller directly locks the hydrogen supply interlock valve opening circuit and triggers a vehicle fault alarm, alerting maintenance personnel to promptly investigate the leak location.

[0092] All hardware models in this embodiment are commercially available products commonly used in the rail transit industry. Those skilled in the art can select other equivalent models according to actual needs without affecting the scope of protection of this invention. The core innovation of this invention lies in the novel combination method of known modules and the cross-layer linkage control logic, rather than the hardware improvement of a single module. All timing parameters in this embodiment are based on actual hardware test results to ensure the reliability and real-time performance of the system in an industrial environment. This embodiment covers all critical operating conditions, including system initialization, normal operation, quantum attack response, mechanical failure response, and hydrogen leakage response, and can fully support the implementation of the technical solution of this invention. VI. Explanation of Parameter Correlation and Collaborative Optimization All key parameters in this invention are not set independently, but rather through systematic and collaborative optimization, forming a parameter system that supports and constrains each other: Key update frequency and attack response time are coordinated: a key update frequency of 1kHz determines that the quantum attack response time must be ≤100ms, otherwise the attacker may use the old key to launch an attack; Vibration amplitude threshold and power derating ratio are coordinated: a 50dB amplitude threshold corresponds to a 15% derating ratio, and a 70dB amplitude threshold corresponds to a 30% derating ratio, ensuring a gradient in the safe response. Entropy threshold and key update cycle work together: The security threshold of 7.9 is matched with the update cycle of 1kHz to ensure that each key has sufficient randomness; Sensor sampling rate and FFT analysis accuracy work in tandem: A sampling rate of 10kHz matches 1024-point FFT analysis, enabling a frequency resolution of 10Hz and accurate identification of fault characteristic frequencies.

[0093] This example also provides an electronic device, including a memory, a processor, and a computer program stored in the memory and executable on the processor, wherein the processor executes the program to implement the method described in the above embodiments.

[0094] This embodiment also provides a computer-readable storage medium storing a computer program that, when executed by a processor, implements the method described in the above embodiment.

[0095] To address the dual shortcomings of insufficient robustness and the disconnect between quantum communication and power control in hydrogen-powered trains, as described in the background technology, this invention achieves targeted improvements through a triple coupling mechanism: First, it pioneers the real-time binding of dynamic keys with vehicle speed and hydrogen pressure, generating a physically unclonable encrypted command stream, fundamentally resisting the risk of hydrogen supply command tampering caused by quantum computing attacks; Second, it constructs a real-time power regulation mechanism from key entropy value to the controller, compressing the attack response delay to within 100ms, breaking the technical barrier that quantum communication is limited to the scheduling layer, and reducing the interruption rate under complex operating conditions; Third, it couples quantum vibration sensors with a key reset mechanism, triggering power graded regulation and key refresh when the vibration spectrum is >50dB, overcoming the engineering challenge of disconnected response to mechanical failures and network security. These methods, through deep coupling of the dynamic characteristics of the key with the hydrogen-electric control link, simultaneously achieve multi-dimensional leaps in anti-quantum attack capabilities, real-time control accuracy, and energy efficiency optimization.

Claims

1. A communication control method for a hydrogen-powered train hybrid power system, characterized in that, The method includes: Vehicle speed and hydrogen pressure signals are acquired through the first acquisition unit; The vehicle speed signal and hydrogen pressure signal are hashed using a key generation module to obtain a dynamic key. If the entropy value of the dynamic key is greater than or equal to a preset threshold, the power allocation instruction is encrypted through the first channel based on the dynamic key. The first controller decrypts the power distribution command and adjusts the output power of the battery pack based on the decrypted power distribution command.

2. The control method according to claim 1, characterized in that, The method further includes: If the entropy value of the dynamic key is less than the preset threshold, a start command is sent to the regenerative braking hydrogen production device through the regenerative braking hydrogen production start module, and a load reduction command and a preventive shutdown command are sent to the fuel cell controller and the hydrogen supply interlock valve controller, respectively.

3. The control method according to claim 2, characterized in that, The method further includes: If the entropy value of the dynamic key is less than the preset threshold for a duration exceeding a first preset time, the linkage monitoring function of the quantum vibration sensor will be automatically activated, and an audible and visual alarm signal will be issued through the train control system. The train control system will then control the vehicle to reduce its speed to the preset speed.

4. The control method according to claim 3, characterized in that, The method further includes: The quantum vibration sensor collects vibration data of the hydrogen pipeline and transmits it to the FFT analysis module. The vibration data is processed by the FFT analysis module to obtain the amplitude signal and output to the threshold comparator; The threshold comparator compares the amplitude signal with a preset first amplitude threshold and a second amplitude threshold used to classify the vibration fault level of the hydrogen pipeline. Based on the comparison interval, the fault level is determined and a graded response and handling instruction is issued.

5. The control method according to claim 4, characterized in that, The steps of comparing the amplitude signal with a preset first amplitude threshold and a second amplitude threshold used to classify the vibration fault level of the hydrogen pipeline using the threshold comparator, and issuing a graded response and handling command after determining the fault level based on the comparison interval, include: When the amplitude signal is greater than the first amplitude threshold and less than or equal to the second amplitude threshold, the threshold comparator sends a dynamic key reset trigger signal to the key management unit and a power reduction trigger signal to the power grading control unit. After receiving the signal, the key management unit performs a dynamic key forced reset, and after receiving the signal, the power grading control unit controls the fuel cell to reduce its power.

6. The control method according to claim 5, characterized in that, The step of issuing graded response and handling instructions also includes: When the amplitude signal is greater than the second amplitude threshold, the threshold comparator sends a key entropy value zeroing trigger signal to the key management unit and a further power reduction trigger signal to the power grading control unit. After receiving the signal, the key management unit sets the key entropy value to zero. After receiving the signal, the power grading control unit controls the fuel cell to further reduce the power and links the hydrogen supply interlock valve to perform preventive shutdown.

7. The control method according to claim 6, characterized in that, The step of issuing graded response and handling instructions also includes: When the amplitude signal exceeds the first amplitude threshold and the duration is longer than the second preset time, the threshold comparator sends a key entropy value zeroing trigger signal to the key management unit. After receiving the signal, the key management unit sets the key entropy value to zero, starts the regenerative braking hydrogen production device to operate according to the set rated power, and locks the fuel cell load increase command.

8. The control method according to claim 1, characterized in that, The method further includes: The hydrogen leakage signal from the hydrogen storage tank is collected by the second acquisition unit; The hash value of the hydrogen leakage signal from the hydrogen storage tank is digitally signed using the second channel to generate signature data. The signature data is sent to the second controller via the train control bus. The second controller verifies the signature validity of the signature data. If the verification is successful, the hydrogen storage tank outlet is closed and the valve status is returned; if the verification fails, the operation is rejected and an alarm is triggered.

9. The control method according to any one of claims 1 or 8, characterized in that, The first and second channels are physically isolated, with independent wiring for the two channels and separate grounding for the shielding layer.

10. The control method according to claim 1, characterized in that, The dynamic key is updated in real time as the vehicle speed signal and hydrogen pressure signal change.

11. A communication control system for a hydrogen-powered train hybrid power system, characterized in that, The system includes: The first acquisition unit is used to acquire vehicle speed signals and hydrogen pressure signals; A key generation module is used to perform hash operations on the vehicle speed signal and hydrogen pressure signal to obtain a dynamic key; If the entropy value of the dynamic key is greater than or equal to a preset threshold, the first channel is used to encrypt the power allocation instruction based on the dynamic key. The first controller is used to decrypt the power distribution command and adjust the output power of the battery pack based on the decrypted power distribution command.

12. The control system according to claim 11, characterized in that, The system further includes: if the entropy value of the dynamic key is less than the preset threshold, a regenerative braking hydrogen production start-up module is used to send a start command to the regenerative braking hydrogen production device, and send a load reduction command and a preventive shutdown command to the fuel cell controller and the hydrogen supply interlock valve controller, respectively.

13. The control system according to claim 12, characterized in that, The system also includes: If the entropy value of the dynamic key is less than the preset threshold for a period of time exceeding a preset time, the quantum vibration sensor, used to monitor the vibration data of the hydrogen pipeline, will issue an audible and visual alarm signal through the train control system, and control the vehicle to reduce its speed to a preset speed through the train control system.

14. The control system according to claim 13, characterized in that, The system also includes an FFT analysis module, which receives vibration data of the hydrogen pipeline collected by the quantum vibration sensor and outputs amplitude signals.

15. The control system according to claim 14, characterized in that, The system further includes a threshold comparator, which compares the amplitude signal with a preset first amplitude threshold and a second amplitude threshold for classifying the vibration fault level of the hydrogen pipeline, and issues a graded response and handling command after determining the fault level based on the comparison interval.

16. The control system according to claim 15, characterized in that, The system also includes a key management unit and a power hierarchical control unit, and the threshold comparator is connected to the key management unit and the power hierarchical control unit respectively. When the amplitude signal is greater than the first amplitude threshold and less than or equal to the second amplitude threshold, the key management unit is used to execute a dynamic key forced reset after receiving a dynamic key reset trigger signal from the threshold comparator; the power level control unit is used to control the fuel cell to reduce power after receiving a power reduction trigger signal from the threshold comparator. When the amplitude signal is greater than the second amplitude threshold, the key management unit is used to receive the key entropy value zeroing trigger signal sent by the threshold comparator and then set the key entropy value to zero. The power level control unit is used to receive the further power reduction trigger signal sent by the threshold comparator and then control the fuel cell to further reduce the power, and link the hydrogen supply interlock valve to perform preventive shutdown. When the amplitude signal exceeds the first amplitude threshold and the duration is longer than the second preset time, the key management unit is used to receive the key entropy value zeroing trigger signal sent by the threshold comparator, set the key entropy value to zero, start the regenerative braking hydrogen production device to operate according to the set rated power, and lock the fuel cell load increase command.

17. The control system according to claim 11, characterized in that, The system also includes: The second acquisition unit is used to acquire hydrogen leakage signals from the hydrogen storage tank; The second channel digitally signs the hash value of the hydrogen leakage signal from the hydrogen storage tank and generates signature data. The second controller is used to receive signature data sent from the train control bus, verify the validity of the signature data, close the hydrogen storage tank outlet and send back the valve status if the verification is successful; otherwise, it refuses to execute and triggers an alarm.

18. The control system according to claim 17, characterized in that, The first and second channels are physically isolated, with independent wiring for the two channels and separate grounding for the shielding layer.

19. The control system according to claim 11, characterized in that, The first channel is a hydrogen-electricity control channel, equipped with a dynamic symmetric encryption module, and connected to the driver's cab power distribution command input terminal.

20. The control system according to claim 11, characterized in that, The first controller is a hybrid power controller with a built-in decryption unit.

21. The control system according to claim 17, characterized in that, The second channel is a hydrogen safety channel, configured with a quantum signature module, and connected to the hydrogen leakage sensor on the hydrogen storage tank side.

22. The control system according to claim 17, characterized in that, The second controller is a hydrogen supply interlock valve controller, which has an embedded signature verification unit that uses a preset public key to verify the validity of the signature data; the hydrogen supply interlock valve is controlled by the hydrogen supply interlock valve controller.

23. The control system according to claim 13, characterized in that, The quantum vibration sensor has axial and radial dual probes arranged on the outlet pipeline flange of the hydrogen storage tank, and is connected in series with the FFT analysis module and the threshold comparator.

24. The control system according to claim 14, characterized in that, The FFT analysis module has a built-in library of typical fault spectrum features, and the FFT analysis module outputs the main peak frequency and corresponding amplitude to the threshold comparator in real time.

25. The control system according to any one of claims 19 or 20, characterized in that, The dynamic symmetric encryption module of the hydrogen-electric control channel and the built-in decryption unit of the hybrid power controller synchronously receive the same version of the dynamically updated key in real time.

26. An electronic device comprising a memory, a processor, and a computer program stored in the memory and executable on the processor, characterized in that, When the processor executes the program, it implements the method of any one of claims 1 to 10.

27. A computer-readable storage medium, characterized in that, The storage medium stores a computer program that, when executed by a processor, implements the method described in any one of claims 1 to 10.

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