Method, device, equipment, medium, vehicle and system for generating structured evidence package

Abstract

The application provides a structured evidence package generation method and device, electronic equipment, computer readable storage medium, vehicle and system. A plurality of mobile perception nodes report a plurality of source perception data packages. A data package directory identifier is extracted. An event time sequence anchor chain, a source credibility marker, a credible perception evidence unit and an evidence chain bearing record are sequentially generated. A structured data package is obtained by field packaging template partitioning.

Description

Technical Field

[0001] This application relates to the fields of regional anomaly perception data processing and evidence data encapsulation technology, and more specifically, to a method, apparatus, electronic device, computer-readable storage medium, vehicle, and system for generating structured evidence packages. Background Technology

[0002] In scenarios such as regional anomaly risk verification, insurance claim assistance, public safety incident debriefing, and vehicle-to-everything (V2X) group perception data applications, multiple distributed data collection terminals upload different types of environmental perception records related to the same anomaly event. To enable subsequent verification to reconstruct the event process based on these records, it is necessary to correlate the collection time, collection source, device reliability status, and data usage criteria, thereby ensuring the data materials corresponding to the anomaly event have high verifiability and traceability.

[0003] In a current regional anomaly event data processing scheme, a central platform typically receives raw records uploaded from multiple data acquisition terminals and sorts them according to the platform's reception time. The central platform then saves the raw records, device registration information, authorization logs, and transmission logs to different data tables. When the verification terminal needs to review an anomaly event, it retrieves records from multiple data tables and searches them by event number or upload batch.

[0004] However, the above-mentioned solution has certain technical drawbacks. Because the original records, device status records, authorization records, and transmission records are stored separately, and the event sequence mainly depends on the platform's reception time, it is easily affected by network arrival delays and duplicate record uploads. Furthermore, there is a lack of fixed associations under the same processing link between different sources, different sensing types, and device integrity statuses. The verification end needs to repeatedly read and compare across multiple record locations, resulting in low temporal continuity, source reliability, integrity correlation, and encapsulation consistency of the abnormal event data materials. This makes it difficult to meet the technical requirements for rapid verification and subsequent transfer of regional abnormal event data. Summary of the Invention

[0005] This application provides a method, apparatus, electronic device, computer-readable storage medium, vehicle, and system for generating structured evidence packages, to at least alleviate the aforementioned technical problems.

[0006] A method for generating a structured evidence package, comprising: Receive multi-source sensing data packets reported by multiple mobile sensing nodes within the target area for abnormal sensing events in the same area, and extract the data packet directory identifier from the multi-source sensing data packets; The sampling time field is read according to the data packet directory identifier, and the sampling time field is time-series anchored based on the unified time synchronization mark to generate an event time-series anchor chain. Based on the data packet directory identifier, read the node anonymity identifier and the perception modality field, and perform source dispersion verification processing on the node anonymity identifier and the perception modality field to obtain the source trust mark; In response to the source trust mark, the hardware signature field is read according to the data packet directory identifier, the hardware signature field is subjected to integrity verification processing, and a trust-aware evidence unit is generated. Read the collection authorization credential field according to the data packet directory identifier, and perform link binding processing on the trusted perception evidence unit, the event time sequence anchor chain and the collection authorization credential field to generate an evidence chain carrying record; The evidence chain carrying records are partitioned and encapsulated according to the field encapsulation template to obtain a structured data packet.

[0007] An apparatus for generating a structured evidence package, comprising: The directory identifier extraction module is configured to receive multi-source sensing data packets reported by multiple mobile sensing nodes in the target area for abnormal sensing events in the same area, and extract the data packet directory identifier from the multi-source sensing data packets. The timing anchoring module is configured to read the sampling time field according to the data packet directory identifier, perform timing anchoring processing on the sampling time field based on the unified timing mark, and generate an event timing anchor chain. The source dispersion verification module is configured to read the node anonymity identifier and the perception modality field according to the data packet directory identifier, and perform source dispersion verification processing on the node anonymity identifier and the perception modality field to obtain the source trust mark; The integrity verification module is configured to, in response to the source trust mark, read the hardware signature field according to the data packet directory identifier, perform integrity verification processing on the hardware signature field, and generate a trust-aware evidence unit. The link binding module is configured to read the collection authorization credential field according to the data packet directory identifier, perform link binding processing on the trusted perception evidence unit, the event time sequence anchor chain and the collection authorization credential field, and generate an evidence chain carrying record. The partitioning and encapsulation module is configured to perform partitioning and encapsulation processing on the evidence chain carrying records according to the field encapsulation template to obtain structured data packets.

[0008] An electronic device, comprising: Processor; and Memory for storing the executable instructions of the processor; The processor is configured to execute the above-described method for generating the structured evidence package by executing the executable instructions.

[0009] A computer-readable storage medium having a computer program stored thereon, which, when executed by a processor, implements the above-described method for generating a structured evidence package.

[0010] A vehicle includes an onboard communication component, an onboard processing component, and an onboard storage component; The vehicle-mounted communication component is configured to receive multi-source sensing data packets reported by multiple mobile sensing nodes within the target area for abnormal sensing events in the same area. The on-board processing component is configured to extract a data packet directory identifier from the multi-source sensing data packet; The vehicle-mounted storage component is configured to store a unified time synchronization mark and a field encapsulation template; The vehicle-mounted processing component is further configured to read the sampling time field according to the data packet directory identifier, perform time-series anchoring processing on the sampling time field based on the unified time synchronization mark, and generate an event time-series anchor chain. The vehicle-mounted processing component is further configured to read the node anonymity identifier and the perception modality field according to the data packet directory identifier, and perform source dispersion verification processing on the node anonymity identifier and the perception modality field to obtain a source trust mark; The vehicle-mounted processing component is further configured to, in response to the source trusted marker, read the hardware signature field according to the data packet directory identifier, perform integrity verification processing on the hardware signature field, and generate a trusted perception evidence unit. The vehicle-mounted processing component is further configured to read the collection authorization credential field according to the data packet directory identifier, perform link binding processing on the trusted perception evidence unit, the event time sequence anchor chain and the collection authorization credential field, and generate an evidence chain carrying record. The vehicle-mounted processing component is further configured to perform partitioning and encapsulation processing on the evidence chain carrying record according to the field encapsulation template to obtain a structured data packet.

[0011] A system for generating structured evidence packages includes multiple mobile sensing nodes, evidence package generation nodes, and verification terminals; The multiple mobile sensing nodes are configured to generate multi-source sensing data packets for abnormal sensing events in the same area, and send the multi-source sensing data packets to the evidence packet generation node; The evidence packet generating node is configured to receive the multi-source sensing data packets reported by the multiple mobile sensing nodes within the target area, and extract the data packet directory identifier from the multi-source sensing data packets; The evidence packet generation node is also configured to read the sampling time field according to the data packet directory identifier, perform time-series anchoring processing on the sampling time field based on the unified time synchronization mark, and generate an event time-series anchor chain. The evidence packet generation node is further configured to read the node anonymity identifier and the perceptual modality field according to the data packet directory identifier, and perform source dispersion verification processing on the node anonymity identifier and the perceptual modality field to obtain a source trust mark; The evidence packet generation node is also configured to, in response to the source trust mark, read the hardware signature field according to the data packet directory identifier, perform integrity verification processing on the hardware signature field, and generate a trust-aware evidence unit. The evidence packet generation node is also configured to read the collection authorization credential field according to the data packet directory identifier, perform link binding processing on the trusted perception evidence unit, the event timeline anchor chain and the collection authorization credential field, and generate an evidence chain carrying record. The evidence package generation node is also configured to perform partitioning and encapsulation processing on the evidence chain carrying records according to the field encapsulation template to obtain structured data packets; The verification terminal is configured to receive the structured data packet and read the event sequence directory, trusted evidence unit directory, integrity verification directory, and authorization credential directory according to the packet header index in the structured data packet.

[0012] The technical advantages of the technical solution provided in this application are: The structured evidence package generation method of this application addresses the technical shortcomings of existing regional anomaly event data processing schemes, such as the scattered storage of various records, the dependence of event order on platform reception time, and the difficulty in associating duplicate sources and device integrity status within the same processing link. It first receives multi-source sensing data packets reported by multiple mobile sensing nodes within the target area for the same regional anomaly sensing event, and extracts the data packet directory identifier from these packets. Compared to traditional schemes that directly save original records according to upload batch or reception order, this application uses the data packet directory identifier as a unified entry point for subsequently reading the sampling time field, node anonymity identifier, sensing modality field, hardware signature field, and acquisition authorization credential field. This allows multiple fields under the same anomaly sensing event to be read around the same directory relationship, reducing the probability of subsequent cross-table lookups and field mismatches, and providing a more stable data entry point for the continuous processing of event data materials.

[0013] This application reads the sampling time field based on the data packet directory identifier and performs time-series anchoring processing on the sampling time field based on a unified time synchronization mark to generate an event time-series anchor chain. Traditional solutions mainly rely on the platform's receiving time to arrange event records, which is easily affected by transmission delays, network congestion, and batch retransmissions. This application combines the sampling time field with the unified time synchronization mark for time-series anchoring, enabling the data materials corresponding to anomaly detection events to generate an event time-series anchor chain around the sampling side's time relationship. Therefore, when the verification end subsequently reads structured data packets, it can view the data sequence relationship of anomaly detection events based on the event time-series anchor chain. Compared to methods that only sort based on receiving time, the interpretability and traceability of the event time-series relationship are higher.

[0014] This application reads the node anonymity identifier and the perception modality field based on the data packet directory identifier, and performs source dispersion verification processing on the node anonymity identifier and the perception modality field to obtain a source trust mark. Traditional solutions usually store multiple upload records as a data set under the same event. Multiple reports from the same or a single source are easily included in the same verification material, making it difficult to determine the degree of source dispersion. Before generating the trustworthy perception evidence unit, this application first performs source dispersion verification through the node anonymity identifier and the perception modality field, so that the source trust mark participates in the subsequent processing link. This gives the data material entering the subsequent integrity verification and link binding a clearer source screening basis, reducing the interference of duplicate source records on the verification results of abnormal events.

[0015] This application responds to the source trust mark by reading the hardware signature field based on the data packet directory identifier, performing integrity verification on the hardware signature field, and generating a trusted sensing evidence unit. In traditional solutions, device status records and sampling payload records are often scattered in different storage locations, requiring additional association of device registration information and payload summary information during verification, resulting in a long integrity verification chain. This application reads the hardware signature field only when the source trust mark meets the subsequent processing conditions, and generates a trusted sensing evidence unit through integrity verification. This allows the source verification result and hardware integrity verification result to be integrated within the trusted sensing evidence unit, preventing data that has not undergone scattered source verification from directly entering the evidence unit generation process, and improving the technical credibility of the sensing evidence portion in the subsequent structured data packet.

[0016] This application reads the collection authorization credential field based on the data packet directory identifier, and performs link binding processing on the trusted perception evidence unit, event timeline anchor chain, and collection authorization credential field to generate an evidence chain carrying record. In traditional solutions, authorization records are usually stored separately from perception records, requiring the re-establishment of the association during subsequent verification or transfer, which can easily lead to unclear correspondence between authorization basis and perception evidence. This application generates an evidence chain carrying record by binding the trusted perception evidence unit, event timeline anchor chain, and collection authorization credential field in the same link binding process, forming a readable and fixed association between perception evidence, event timeline, and authorization basis. Compared to the method of temporarily retrieving multiple logs and then splicing them together, the reading path of event materials at the verification end is clearer.

[0017] This application partitions and encapsulates the evidence chain records using a field encapsulation template to obtain structured data packets. In traditional solutions, event materials are typically scattered as raw files, log records, or database entries, requiring the verification end to rely on different interfaces and field definitions when reading them. This application partitions and encapsulates the evidence chain records using a field encapsulation template, enabling the structured data packets to carry different field areas related to event verification. Therefore, the verification end receiving the structured data packets can read the corresponding content based on a unified encapsulation structure. Compared to a distributed log-based storage method, this significantly improves the consistency of data encapsulation, ease of subsequent transfer, and verification processing efficiency. Attached Figure Description

[0018] Figure 1 This is a scenario for a method to generate a structured evidence package according to an embodiment of this application; Figure 2 This application provides a method for generating a structured evidence package. Figure 3 This application provides an apparatus for generating a structured evidence package. Figure 4 An electronic device is described in an embodiment of this application; Figure 5 This application provides an embodiment of a computer-readable storage medium. Figure 6 This application describes a vehicle as an example of its embodiments. Figure 7 This application provides a system for generating structured evidence packages. Detailed Implementation

[0019] like Figure 1 The illustration shows a scenario illustrating a method for generating a structured evidence package according to an embodiment of this application; as shown... Figure 2 The diagram illustrates a method for generating a structured evidence package according to an embodiment of this application, comprising the following steps: Receive multi-source sensing data packets reported by multiple mobile sensing nodes within the target area for abnormal sensing events in the same area, and extract the data packet directory identifier from the multi-source sensing data packets; The sampling time field is read according to the data packet directory identifier, and the sampling time field is time-series anchored based on the unified time synchronization mark to generate an event time-series anchor chain. Based on the data packet directory identifier, read the node anonymity identifier and the perception modality field, and perform source dispersion verification processing on the node anonymity identifier and the perception modality field to obtain the source trust mark; In response to the source trust mark, the hardware signature field is read according to the data packet directory identifier, the hardware signature field is subjected to integrity verification processing, and a trust-aware evidence unit is generated. Read the collection authorization credential field according to the data packet directory identifier, and perform link binding processing on the trusted perception evidence unit, the event time sequence anchor chain and the collection authorization credential field to generate an evidence chain carrying record; The evidence chain carrying records are partitioned and encapsulated according to the field encapsulation template to obtain a structured data packet.

[0020] Optionally, extracting the data packet directory identifier from the multi-source sensing data packet includes: The access gateway receives the multi-source sensing data packet, and the access gateway reads the packet header directory area in the multi-source sensing data packet; The access gateway reads the event directory code, link entry index segment, node index segment, sensing modality index segment, sampling time index segment, hardware signature index segment, and acquisition authorization index segment from the packet header directory area. The access gateway writes the event directory code, the link ingress index segment, the node index segment, the sensing modality index segment, the sampling time index segment, the hardware signature index segment, and the acquisition authorization index segment into the directory identifier bearer record; The data packet directory identifier is generated based on the directory identifier carrying record.

[0021] Preferably, in the specific technical implementation of the access gateway, the access gateway is a protocol entry processing node located between multiple mobile sensing nodes and the subsequent structured evidence packet generation process. The protocol entry processing node is used to perform access verification, boundary positioning, and directory reading preparation processing on the multi-source sensing data packets before entering the subsequent structured evidence packet generation process. The access gateway does not change the sensing payload content in the multi-source sensing data packets, but confirms whether the multi-source sensing data packets can enter the receiving buffer through access verification, confirms the position of the packet header directory area in the multi-source sensing data packets through boundary positioning, and forms the packet body access record required for subsequent reading of the packet header directory area through directory reading preparation processing, so that the subsequent process of extracting the data packet directory identifier from the multi-source sensing data packets has a unified data entry point. Within the target area, multiple mobile sensing nodes may include vehicles, vehicle-mounted sensing terminals, roadside mobile acquisition terminals, and other mobile sensing nodes capable of reporting environmental sensing records. After the aforementioned vehicles, vehicle-mounted sensing terminals, roadside mobile acquisition terminals, and other mobile sensing nodes capable of reporting environmental sensing records generate multi-source sensing data packets around the same area's abnormal sensing events, the multi-source sensing data packets typically carry one or more sensing contents from thermal anomaly records, gas concentration deviation records, vibration and impact records, pedestrian density records, or traffic movement records. When the access gateway receives multi-source sensing data packets, it first establishes a receive buffer based on the arrival order of the communication connection and writes each multi-source sensing data packet into the packet body temporary storage location in the receive buffer. The access gateway then reads the outer length field, transmission completion flag, and header start flag of the multi-source sensing data packet to generate a packet body access record. The packet body access record describes whether the multi-source sensing data packet has been transmitted successfully, where the header directory area begins, and whether the header directory area can be read continuously. The outer length field forms the packet body length status in the packet body access record, the transmission completion flag forms the transmission completion status, and the header start flag forms the header start position. After the access gateway maintains a correspondence between the packet body access record and the multi-source sensing data packets, it can directly locate the header directory area of ​​the multi-source sensing data packet when reading the header directory area subsequently, avoiding repeated scanning of the directory field from the entire sensing payload content. Therefore, in this application, the access gateway converts multi-source sensing data packets with multiple sources, multiple sensing types, and multiple arrival times into access objects that can be read by the packet header directory area. The access object continues to carry the sensing payload content and packet body access record in the multi-source sensing data packets. The packet body access record further participates in the formation of subsequent reception status records, so that the data packet directory identifier can be formed from the directory information of the multi-source sensing data packets, rather than being temporarily inferred from the sensing payload content. This ensures that the subsequent event timing anchor chain, source trust mark, trust sensing evidence unit, and evidence chain carrying record all have the same directory entry.

[0022] Preferably, the specific implementation process for receiving the multi-source sensing data packets is as follows: The access gateway establishes an event receiving queue in the receiving buffer for abnormal sensing events in the same area. The event receiving queue is arranged according to the packet header start mark and transmission integrity mark carried by the multi-source sensing data packets, combined with the arrival order of the communication connection. The event receiving queue is not based on the physical value of the sensing payload content. Before entering the access gateway, the multi-source sensing data packets reported by multiple mobile sensing nodes may come from different communication entry points, different sampling modes, and different sampling times. If these multi-source sensing data packets are directly written into subsequent evidence materials, it will be difficult for the subsequent verification end to determine the temporal relationship, source relationship, and integrity relationship between the multi-source sensing data packets. After receiving the multi-source sensing data packets, the access gateway first performs a byte boundary check on the multi-source sensing data packets to identify whether the multi-source sensing data packets contain a readable packet header directory area. The byte boundary check is based on the outer length field and packet header start mark in the packet body access record, and the result of the byte boundary check is written back to the packet body access record so that the packet body access record can continue to reflect the readable status of the multi-source sensing data packets. The access gateway then performs transmission segment splicing on the multi-source sensing data packets, writing consecutive transmission segments belonging to the same multi-source sensing data packet back to the same packet body temporary storage location, thus forming a received multi-source sensing data packet. The received multi-source sensing data packet continues to carry the original sensing payload content. Simultaneously, the access gateway generates a reception status record based on the received multi-source sensing data packet and the packet body access record. The reception status record includes at least the packet body temporary storage location, the packet header start position, the packet body length status, and the communication entry source status. The reception status record is not the final output data packet directory identifier; it is used to provide a location basis for subsequent reading of the packet header directory area. Specifically, the packet body temporary storage location originates from the receive buffer, the packet header start position originates from the packet header start marker in the packet body access record, the packet body length status originates from the outer length field in the packet body access record, and the communication entry source status originates from the communication entry point corresponding to the multi-source sensing data packet when it enters the access gateway. The access gateway then filters out multi-source sensing data packets whose packet header start position cannot be located or whose packet body length status cannot be matched based on the reception status record, and retains the readable multi-source sensing data packets in the event reception queue. Through the above processing, multi-source sensing data packets are transformed from irregular communication arrival objects into resolvable objects with packet body temporary storage location, packet header start location, packet body length status, and communication entry source status. This resolvable object participates in subsequent packet header directory area reading, so that the generation of data packet directory identifier is based on the field index relationship of the packet header directory area, rather than based on a single record of reception time or transmission order.

[0023] Preferably, when the access gateway reads the header directory area in the multi-source sensing data packet, it first generates a header reading cursor based on the header start position in the receiving status record, and uses the header reading cursor to read the header boundary marker from the start segment of the multi-source sensing data packet. In this application, the header directory area is a directory-based field area in the multi-source sensing data packet used to describe the positional relationships of fields within the sensing payload content. The header directory area does not directly replace the sampling time field, node anonymity identifier, sensing modality field, hardware signature field, or acquisition authorization credential field; instead, it stores the index position, reading boundary, and directory correspondence of the sampling time field, node anonymity identifier, sensing modality field, hardware signature field, and acquisition authorization credential field in the multi-source sensing data packet. When reading the header directory area, the access gateway first determines the start and end boundaries of the header directory area based on the header boundary markers and writes the start and end boundaries into the directory boundary record. The access gateway then reads the directory order marker in the header directory area based on the directory boundary record to determine whether each index segment within the header directory area is arranged according to the identifiable field order. Directory boundary records are used to limit the reading range when subsequently reading event directory codes, link entry index segments, node index segments, sensing modality index segments, sampling time index segments, hardware signature index segments, and acquisition authorization index segments. Directory order markers are used to limit the reading order of event directory codes, link entry index segments, node index segments, sensing modality index segments, sampling time index segments, hardware signature index segments, and acquisition authorization index segments. For multi-source sensing data packets generated by vehicle group sensing, the sensing payload content may contain multi-modal environmental signals. Without a packet header directory area, subsequent processing requires searching for the sampling time field, node anonymity identifier, sensing modality field, hardware signature field, and acquisition authorization credential field item by item in the sensing payload content, which can easily lead to field misalignment. The packet header directory area separates the directory information in the multi-source sensing data packet from the sensing payload content, allowing the access gateway to determine the subsequent field reading entry only by reading the packet header directory area. Therefore, the role of the packet header directory area in this application is to organize the sampling time field, node anonymity identifier, sensing mode field, hardware signature field, and acquisition authorization credential field distributed in the multi-source sensing data packet into an indexable directory relationship; this directory relationship is further written into the directory identifier carrying record, providing a direct source for generating the data packet directory identifier.

[0024] Preferably, when the access gateway reads the event directory code, link ingress index segment, and node index segment from the packet header directory area, it first determines the reading position of the event directory code based on the directory boundary record and directory sequence marker, and then reads the event directory code from the packet header directory area. In this application, the event directory code is used to identify the directory content for grouping multi-source sensing data packets reported by multiple mobile sensing nodes into the same area's abnormal sensing event. The event directory code does not describe the degree of abnormality, nor does it participate in the numerical calculation of the sensing payload content; instead, it is used to aggregate multi-source sensing data packets corresponding to the same area's abnormal sensing event at the directory level. After reading the event directory code, the access gateway writes the event directory code into the event directory temporary storage location and uses the event directory code in the event directory temporary storage location to determine the directory affiliation of multi-source sensing data packets in the event receiving queue, so that the directory identifiers of subsequently generated data packets can point to the same area's abnormal sensing event. The access gateway continues to read the link entry index segment according to the directory order. In this application, the link entry index segment is used to indicate the index content of the communication entry corresponding to the multi-source sensing data packet when it enters the access gateway. The link entry index segment has a reading relationship with the link entry mark in the subsequent source dispersion verification process. The access gateway can read the link entry mark from the multi-source sensing data packet through the link entry index segment, thereby identifying duplicate source records under the same communication entry. The access gateway then reads the node index segment. In this application, the node index segment is used to locate the field entry of the node anonymity identifier in the multi-source sensing data packet. The node index segment itself is not the node anonymity identifier; the node index segment is used to enable the subsequent source dispersion verification process to read the node anonymity identifier from the multi-source sensing data packet. The event directory code, the link entry index segment, and the node index segment together constitute the source directory part. The source directory part, on the one hand, classifies the multi-source sensing data packets into the same area of ​​abnormal sensing events, and on the other hand, provides an index basis for subsequent identification of communication entry and node anonymity identifier. After the source directory portion is written into the directory identifier bearer record, the directory identifier bearer record can continue to provide pre-field entries for the generation of the source trusted mark based on the source directory portion. Among them, the link entry index segment in the source directory portion is used to read the link entry mark, and the node index segment in the source directory portion is used to read the node anonymous mark. The link entry mark and the node anonymous mark jointly participate in the source distributed verification process to obtain the source trusted mark.

[0025] Preferably, when the access gateway reads the sensing modality index segment, sampling time index segment, hardware signature index segment, and acquisition authorization index segment from the packet header directory area, it first reads the sensing modality index segment within the reading range defined by the directory boundary record, and writes the sensing modality index segment to the temporary storage location of the modality directory. The temporary storage location of the modality directory is used to temporarily store the sensing modality index segment and maintain the correspondence between the sensing modality index segment and the current multi-source sensing data packet before it is written to the directory identifier carrying record. In this application, the sensing modality index segment is used to locate the field entry of the sensing modality field; the sensing modality field is used to describe the type of sensing content in the multi-source sensing data packet, such as thermal anomaly record, gas concentration deviation record, vibration and impact record, pedestrian density record, or traffic movement record. The sensing modality index segment participates in the subsequent source dispersion verification process, so that the source trust mark is not only determined based on the node anonymity identifier, but also can be combined with the sensing modality field to determine the source dispersion relationship of different sensing types. The access gateway continues to read the sampling time index segment, which, in this application, serves as the field entry point for locating the sampling time field. After the sampling time field enters subsequent timing anchoring processing, it, together with the unified timing mark, generates an event timing anchor chain. The sampling time index segment enables the generation of the event timing anchor chain to be based on the sampling-side time field, rather than solely on the arrival time of the receiving buffer. The access gateway then reads the hardware signature index segment, which is used to locate the hardware signature field. The hardware signature field contains the reading entry points for the trusted execution environment signature fragment, the device certificate digest field, and the sampling payload digest field. The hardware signature index segment thus becomes the catalog basis for the subsequent generation of trusted perception evidence units. Finally, the access gateway reads the acquisition authorization index segment, which is used to locate the acquisition authorization credential field. The acquisition authorization credential field participates in subsequent link binding processing, ensuring that the trusted perception evidence unit, the event timing anchor chain, and the acquisition authorization credential field are written into the same evidence chain bearer record. The perceptual modality index segment, sampling time index segment, hardware signature index segment, and acquisition authorization index segment together constitute the evidence catalog section. The evidence catalog section enables subsequent processing of four types—timing, source, integrity, and authorization—to obtain field entries from the same packet header directory area. Specifically, the perceptual modality index segment in the evidence catalog section participates in the reading of perceptual modality fields, the sampling time index segment in the evidence catalog section participates in the reading of sampling time fields, the hardware signature index segment in the evidence catalog section participates in the reading of hardware signature fields, and the acquisition authorization index segment in the evidence catalog section participates in the reading of acquisition authorization credential fields, thereby reducing field correspondence deviations caused by subsequent cross-location searches.

[0026] Preferably, when the access gateway writes the event directory code, the link ingress index segment, the node index segment, the sensing modality index segment, the sampling time index segment, the hardware signature index segment, and the acquisition authorization index segment into the directory identifier bearer record, it first establishes a directory identifier bearer record corresponding to the multi-source sensing data packet. The directory identifier bearer record can be stored in a structured record format with a fixed field order. In this application, the directory identifier bearer record converts the directory content read from the packet header directory area into a reusable directory bearer object for subsequent processing stages. The directory identifier bearer record does not store the complete sensing payload content, but rather stores the order relationship, source relationship, and field ingress relationship among the event directory code, link ingress index segment, node index segment, sensing modality index segment, sampling time index segment, hardware signature index segment, and acquisition authorization index segment. When the access gateway writes the directory identifier bearer record, it first writes the event directory code to the event directory location of the directory identifier bearer record, enabling the directory identifier bearer record to be associated with abnormal sensing events in the same area. Then, the access gateway writes the link ingress index segment and the node index segment to the source directory location of the directory identifier bearer record, enabling the directory identifier bearer record to provide an entry point for subsequent reading of node anonymity identifiers and link ingress markers. Next, the access gateway writes the sensing modality index segment and the sampling time index segment to the spatiotemporal modality directory location of the directory identifier bearer record, enabling the directory identifier bearer record to provide an entry point for subsequent reading of sensing modality fields and sampling time fields. Finally, the access gateway writes the hardware signature index segment and the acquisition authorization index segment to the evidence directory location of the directory identifier bearer record, enabling the directory identifier bearer record to provide an entry point for subsequent reading of hardware signature fields and acquisition authorization credential fields. The event directory location, source directory location, spatiotemporal modality directory location, and evidence directory location together constitute the internal directory location relationship of the directory identifier carrying record. This internal directory location relationship is used to preserve the reading order of the event directory code, link entry index segment, node index segment, sensing modality index segment, sampling time index segment, hardware signature index segment, and acquisition authorization index segment when generating the data packet directory identifier. When generating the data packet directory identifier based on the directory identifier carrying record, the event directory location, source directory location, spatiotemporal modality directory location, and evidence directory location in the directory identifier carrying record are sequentially concatenated and their consistency verified to form the data packet directory identifier. In this application, the data packet directory identifier serves as a field reading navigation identifier for multi-source sensing data packets. The data packet directory identifier associates abnormal sensing events, communication entry points, mobile sensing nodes, sensing modalities, sampling times, hardware integrity information, and acquisition authorization information within the same region under the same directory entry.Subsequently, when reading the sampling time field, node anonymity identifier, perception modality field, hardware signature field, and acquisition authorization credential field based on the data packet directory identifier, the corresponding index segment is obtained from the data packet directory identifier. This enables the event timeline anchor chain, source trust mark, trust perception evidence unit, and evidence chain carrying record to be generated sequentially on the same directory basis.

[0027] Optionally, the step of reading the sampling time field according to the data packet directory identifier, performing time-series anchoring processing on the sampling time field based on the unified time synchronization mark, and generating an event time-series anchor chain includes: The sampling time field is read from the multi-source sensing data packet according to the sampling time index segment in the data packet directory identifier; Read the node's local sampling time from the sampling time field; Read the timing sequence marker and communication arrival time returned by the timing server from the unified timing marker; The local sampling time of the node is calibrated based on the timing sequence marker returned by the timing server to obtain the calibrated sampling time; The calibration sampling time is time-sliced ​​according to the communication arrival time to obtain the time-slice sequence number. An event anchor record is established, the time slice sequence number is written into the event anchor record, and the event time sequence anchor chain is generated based on the event anchor record.

[0028] Preferably, the specific implementation process of reading the sampling time field from the multi-source sensing data packet according to the sampling time index segment in the data packet directory identifier is as follows: The data packet directory identifier is generated by the directory identifier carrier record in the preprocessing. The directory identifier carrier record has saved the order relationship, source relationship and field entry relationship between the event directory code, link entry index segment, node index segment, sensing modality index segment, sampling time index segment, hardware signature index segment and acquisition authorization index segment. Therefore, the data packet directory identifier is not simply a packet number, but a directory navigation entry for reading fields inside the multi-source sensing data packet. The sampling time index segment is located in the spatiotemporal modality directory position in the data packet directory identifier. In this application, the sampling time index segment is used to locate the field entry, field boundary and field reading length of the sampling time field in the multi-source sensing data packet, so that the subsequent timing anchoring process can read the sampling-side time information carried by the sampling time field from the multi-source sensing data packet, instead of inferring the sampling-side time information carried by the sampling time field based on the arrival order relationship in the receiving buffer. In a regional anomaly detection scenario, multiple mobile sensing nodes may upload records of thermal anomalies, gas concentration deviations, vibration and impact, pedestrian density, or traffic movement around the same regional anomaly detection event. The communication links between different mobile sensing nodes have varying arrival delays. The sampling time index segment fixes the sampling-side time information carried by the sampling time field within the directory reading relationship of the multi-source sensing data packet, allowing subsequent readings of the sampling time field to avoid the physical value area within the sensing payload content. Specifically, the sampling time index segment is first read from the data packet directory identifier. Then, based on the sampling time index segment, the start and end reading positions of the sampling time field in the multi-source sensing data packet are determined, and these positions are written into the sampling time field reading record. The sampling time field reading record continues to participate in subsequent processing of reading the sampling time field from the multi-source sensing data packet, providing a reusable location basis for the reading action of the sampling time field. Thus, a continuous processing relationship is formed between the sampling time index segment, the sampling time field reading record, and the sampling time field, from the directory navigation entry to the field reading position, providing a directory positioning basis for subsequent reading nodes' local sampling time.

[0029] Preferably, when reading the sampling time field from the multi-source sensing data packet, the corresponding field interval in the multi-source sensing data packet is located first according to the sampling time field read record formed in the previous order, and the sampling time field is read within this field interval. The field interval is defined by the start and end read positions in the sampling time field read record, and the field interval is used to distinguish the reading range of the sampling time field from the physical value area in the sensing payload content. In this application, the multi-source sensing data packet is not a simple environmental data file, but a cataloged data object reported by multiple mobile sensing nodes for abnormal sensing events in the same area. The multi-source sensing data packet carries the sensing payload content on the one hand, and stores the field entry relationship through the packet header directory area on the other hand. The sensing payload content can correspond to thermal anomaly records, gas concentration deviation records, vibration and impact records, pedestrian density records, or traffic movement records. The packet header directory area enables the sampling time field, node anonymity identifier, sensing mode field, hardware signature field, and acquisition authorization credential field to be read sequentially. When reading the sampling time field, the physical quantities in the sensing payload content are not time-series inferred, nor is the communication arrival order of the multi-source sensing data packets directly used as the sampling order. Instead, the sampling time field written on the mobile sensing node side is read according to the field range indicated by the sampling time index segment. Specifically, the first byte of the sampling time field is first determined using the start reading position in the sampling time field reading record, and the end reading position is then used to determine the end boundary of the sampling time field. Subsequently, the sampling time field is subjected to field format recognition to form a sampling time field format record. The sampling time field format record is used to indicate whether the sampling time field contains a node local sampling time, a sampling sequence marker, and a sampling segment boundary. The sampling sequence marker is used to assist in identifying the local sampling order written when the same mobile sensing node samples continuously in the sampling time field format record. The sampling segment boundary is used to assist in limiting the field segment range where the node local sampling time is located in the sampling time field format record. Neither the sampling sequence marker nor the sampling segment boundary replaces the node local sampling time, but rather serves together with the node local sampling time as the identification content of the sampling time field format record. The sampling time field format record continues to participate in the reading of the local sampling time of subsequent nodes, enabling the local sampling time of nodes to be continuously extracted from the sampling time field. Thus, a direct association from directory index to field reading is formed between the multi-source sensing data packet and the sampling time field, providing a sampling-side time source for the subsequent unified timing mark to participate in timing anchoring processing.

[0030] Preferably, in the specific technical implementation of reading the node's local sampling time from the sampling time field, the position of the local time field in the sampling time field is first identified according to the sampling time field format record, and the node's local sampling time is read from the local time field position. The local time field position originates from the sampling segment boundary in the sampling time field format record. The local time field position is used to define the reading entry point of the node's local sampling time in the sampling time field. The local time field position does not participate in subsequent time base correction, but only provides a field positioning basis for reading the node's local sampling time. In this application, the node's local sampling time is the sampling-side time value written by the mobile sensing node when collecting thermal anomaly records, gas concentration deviation records, vibration and impact records, pedestrian density records, or traffic movement records. The node's local sampling time reflects the local time order in which the sensing payload content is collected on the mobile sensing node side, rather than the time order in which the multi-source sensing data packets arrive at the access gateway. Since multiple mobile sensing nodes may be distributed in different locations within the target area, and the local time bases of multiple mobile sensing nodes have slight offsets, if the node's local sampling time is directly written into the event timeline anchor chain, there will be a timeline alignment deviation between different multi-source sensing data packets of abnormal sensing events in the same area. To prevent such deviations from being carried over into subsequent evidence chain records, after reading the local sampling time of the node, it is necessary to write the local sampling time into a local sampling time carrying record. This local sampling time carrying record is used to store the local sampling time of the node, the source of the sampling time field, and the directory source relationship of the multi-source sensing data packets. Specifically, firstly, the local sampling time of the node is written to correspond with the event directory code in the data packet directory identifier, associating the local sampling time of the node with abnormal sensing events in the same area. Then, a directory correspondence is established between the local sampling time of the node and the node index segment and sensing modality index segment in the data packet directory identifier, enabling the local sampling time of the node to continue to be associated with mobile sensing nodes and sensing modality fields. The local sampling time carrying record then participates in calibration processing and is mapped to the timing sequence marker returned by the timing server in the unified timing marker, so that the node-side sampling order can be converted into the unified timing basis required for the event timing anchor chain.

[0031] Preferably, before reading the timing sequence marker and communication arrival time returned by the timing server from the unified timing marker, the unified timing marker stored locally or associated with the reception status record is read first. In this application, the unified timing marker is used to map the local time relationship of multiple mobile sensing nodes to timing reference information under the same timing reference; the unified timing marker does not replace the node's local sampling time, but provides a calibration reference for the node's local sampling time. The unified timing marker can be generated when the access gateway receives multi-source sensing data packets, or it can be stored correspondingly with the reception status record after the access gateway completes the reception status record; regardless of the storage method, the unified timing marker needs to maintain a correspondence with the multi-source sensing data packets, the reception status record, and the data packet directory identifier. The timing sequence marker returned by the timing server is the sequence reference content in the unified timing marker, used to indicate the unified timing order adopted by the access gateway when reading or verifying multi-source sensing data packets; the communication arrival time is the arrival reference content in the unified timing marker, used to record the receiving-side time corresponding to when the multi-source sensing data packet enters the access gateway. In specific implementation, firstly, based on the event directory code in the data packet directory identifier and the communication entry source status in the receiving status record, the unified timing mark corresponding to the current multi-source sensing data packet is located; then, the timing sequence mark returned by the timing server is read from the unified timing mark, and the timing sequence mark returned by the timing server is written into the timing reference record; subsequently, the communication arrival time is read from the unified timing mark, and the communication arrival time is written into the same timing reference record. The timing reference record keeps the timing sequence mark returned by the timing server and the communication arrival time in the same record, and the timing reference record subsequently participates in the generation of sampling time calibration records and time slice realignment records; wherein, the timing sequence mark returned by the timing server in the timing reference record is used to calibrate the local sampling time of the node, and the communication arrival time in the timing reference record is used to perform time slice realignment processing on the calibration sampling time. Thus, a continuous technical relationship is formed between the unified timing mark, the timing sequence mark returned by the timing server, the communication arrival time, and the timing reference record, from the unified timing source to the subsequent calibration processing and time slice realignment processing.

[0032] Preferably, in the specific method for determining the timing sequence marker and communication arrival time returned by the timing server, the timing server does not participate in the acquisition of sensing payload content, nor does it perform content judgment on thermal anomaly records, gas concentration deviation records, vibration and shock records, pedestrian density records, or traffic movement records. In this application, the timing server provides a unified time reference source for multi-source sensing data packets corresponding to multiple mobile sensing nodes. The timing sequence marker returned by the timing server can be composed of the sequence number of continuous timing responses, the timing response time period marker, and the timing synchronization status. The sequence number of continuous timing responses is used to express the order in which the access gateway obtains the timing response, the timing response time period marker is used to express the timing reference interval to which the timing sequence marker returned by the timing server belongs, and the timing synchronization status is used to express whether the timing sequence marker returned by the timing server is in a state that can be used for calibration processing. The sequence number of continuous timing responses, the timing response time period marker, and the timing synchronization status jointly participate in forming the timing sequence marker returned by the timing server, so that the timing sequence marker returned by the timing server can indicate the timing reference position used by the access gateway when receiving multi-source sensing data packets. The arrival time of communication is written by the access gateway when the multi-source sensing data packet enters the receive buffer and is included in the unified timing mark as a time reference for the receiving side. Specifically, after receiving the multi-source sensing data packet and forming a receive status record, the access gateway submits the communication entry source status and packet body temporary storage position in the receive status record to the timing record processing process. The timing record processing process reads the timing sequence mark returned by the timing server and writes it correspondingly to the packet body temporary storage position. Then, it reads the communication arrival time and writes it correspondingly to the same packet body temporary storage position. Through this corresponding writing, a corresponding packet body relationship is formed between the timing sequence mark returned by the timing server, the communication arrival time, and the multi-source sensing data packet. This corresponding packet body relationship is further written into the timing reference record, so that the timing reference record can both express the unified timing status of the receiving side and retain the arrival reference when the multi-source sensing data packet enters the access gateway. When the local sampling time of the node is subsequently calibrated, the timing sequence marker returned by the timing server is used to determine the calibration reference, and the communication arrival time is used to limit the homing range to which the calibration sampling time belongs, so that the event timing anchor chain can reflect the correspondence between the sampling side time and the receiving side time.

[0033] Preferably, the specific implementation process of calibrating the local sampling time of the node according to the timing sequence marker returned by the timing server to obtain the calibrated sampling time is as follows: First, the local sampling time of the node is read from the local sampling time bearer record; then, the timing sequence marker returned by the timing server is read from the timing reference record; and the local sampling time of the node and the timing sequence marker returned by the timing server are written into the sampling time calibration record. The sampling time calibration record is used to store the local sampling time of the node and the timing sequence marker returned by the timing server required for the calibration process. The sampling time calibration record is not the final event timeline anchor chain, but an intermediate bearer record used to generate the calibrated sampling time. In this application, the calibration process maps the local sampling times written by different mobile sensing nodes to the same timing sequence reference without changing the content of the sensing payload, so that multiple multi-source sensing data packets in the same area of ​​abnormal sensing events can be placed on a unified timeline. In practice, the timing reference offset is first determined based on the timing sequence marker returned by the timing server. This offset represents the time difference between the node's local sampling time and the unified timing reference. Then, the timing reference offset is used to correct the node's local sampling time to generate a calibration sampling time. To avoid communication arrival delays directly overwriting the sampling time, the calibration process does not directly replace the communication arrival time with the calibration sampling time. Instead, it retains the sampling-side attributes of the node's local sampling time and uses the timing sequence marker returned by the timing server to perform a unified reference mapping on the node's local sampling time. After the calibration sampling time is generated, it is written back to the sampling time calibration record, and the sampling time calibration record is kept in correspondence with the data packet directory identifier. The calibration sampling time then participates in the time slice realignment process. This process continues to use the communication arrival time to limit the realignment range of the calibration sampling time, thus ensuring that the event timing anchor chain retains both the sampling time source of the mobile sensing node and the unified timing basis required for comparisons across mobile sensing nodes.

[0034] Preferably, in the specific technical implementation of time-slice realignment processing of the calibration sampling time according to the communication arrival time to obtain the time-slice sequence position, the communication arrival time is first read from the time synchronization reference record, and then the calibration sampling time is read from the sampling time calibration record. The communication arrival time and the calibration sampling time are then written into the time-slice realignment record. The role of the communication arrival time in this application is not to replace the calibration sampling time, nor to rewrite the event occurrence time as the access gateway reception time, but rather to limit the receiving-side time range into which the calibration sampling time should be assigned, avoiding the incorrect assignment of different multi-source sensing data packets to the same time position due to batch retransmission by mobile sensing nodes or communication delays. In this application, the time-slice realignment processing converts continuous calibration sampling times into discrete time-slice positions that facilitate the organization of event time-series anchor chain. In specific implementation, time slice boundary rules are first determined based on the sampling frequency requirements of abnormal sensing events in the same area. These rules can be configured according to the timing granularity of a unified timing mark or the data reporting cycle of abnormal sensing events in the area. The time slice boundary rules describe how the time boundaries between adjacent time slices are divided. Then, the arrival reference range corresponding to the current multi-source sensing data packet is determined based on the communication arrival time, and the time slice position to which the calibration sampling time belongs is found within the arrival reference range to form a time slice sequence number. The receiving-side time range is limited by the arrival reference range, which is jointly determined by the communication arrival time and the time slice boundary rules. The receiving-side time range participates in limiting the time slice position of the calibration sampling time. In this application, the time slice sequence number is a discrete position identifier of the calibration sampling time in the event time-series anchor chain. The time slice sequence number is used to subsequently read trusted sensing evidence units according to the event time-series anchor chain, and to record a time-series gap mark when no corresponding trusted sensing evidence unit is found in an adjacent time slice sequence number. After the time slice sequence is formed, the time slice sequence is written into the time slice reset record, and the time slice reset record is kept in correspondence with the data packet directory identifier, so that the subsequent event anchor record can directly read the time slice sequence.

[0035] Preferably, the specific implementation process of establishing an event anchor bearer record, writing the time slice sequence number into the event anchor bearer record, and generating the event timing anchor chain based on the event anchor bearer record is as follows: First, an event anchor bearer record is established according to the event directory code in the data packet directory identifier. The event anchor bearer record is used to carry the time slice sequence number, calibration sampling time, and directory source relationship corresponding to each multi-source sensing data packet under the same area abnormal sensing event. In this application, the event anchor bearer record is a time-series bearer record that converts the previously generated time slice sequence number from the time slice location record of a single packet into a time-series bearer record that can be uniformly read by abnormal sensing events in the same area; the event anchor bearer record does not store the complete sensing payload content, but rather stores the correspondence between the time slice sequence number and the data packet directory identifier. When establishing an event anchor record, the event directory code is first written to the event directory location of the event anchor record, associating the event anchor record with anomaly detection events in the same area. Then, the time slice sequence number is written to the time slice sequence number location of the event anchor record, enabling the event anchor record to express the temporal position of the current multi-source sensing data packet within the same area's anomaly detection event. Subsequently, the calibration sampling time and data packet directory identifier are written to the directory source location of the event anchor record, allowing subsequent reading of the event time-series anchor chain to trace the source of the sampling time field corresponding to the time slice sequence number. When generating an event time-series anchor chain based on the event anchor record, multiple event anchor records under the same area's anomaly detection event are arranged sequentially according to their time slice sequence number, and a temporal connection relationship is established between adjacent time slice sequence numbers to generate the event time-series anchor chain. In this application, the event time sequence anchor chain is the time sequence directory structure of multi-source sensing data packets under abnormal sensing events in the same area. When the event time sequence anchor chain is subsequently linked with the trusted sensing evidence unit and the collection authorization credential field, it can provide a time sequence organization basis for the evidence chain carrying record, so that the event time sequence directory in the structured data packet can reflect the sampling order of the multi-source sensing data packets.

[0036] Optionally, the step of reading the node anonymity identifier and the perceptual modality field according to the data packet directory identifier, and performing source dispersion verification processing on the node anonymity identifier and the perceptual modality field to obtain a source trust mark includes: The node anonymity identifier is read from the multi-source sensing data packet based on the node index segment in the data packet directory identifier; The sensing modality field is read from the multi-source sensing data packet according to the sensing modality index segment in the data packet directory identifier; Based on the link ingress index segment in the data packet directory identifier, read the link ingress marker from the multi-source sensing data packet; Write the node anonymity identifier, the perception modality field, and the link ingress marker into the source verification bearer record; Based on the source verification bearer record, identify the anonymous identifier of duplicate nodes under the same link ingress marker, and generate a duplicate source removal marker; Based on the duplicate source removal flag, the corresponding multi-source sensing data packets are filtered out to obtain candidate sensing data packets; A cross-modal source correspondence table is established based on the sensing modality field and the link ingress marker in the candidate sensing data packet, and the source trust marker is determined based on the cross-modal source correspondence table.

[0037] Preferably, the specific implementation process of reading the node anonymous identifier from the multi-source sensing data packet according to the node index segment in the data packet directory identifier is as follows: the node index segment has maintained the same directory order relationship with the event directory code, link entry index segment, sensing modality index segment, sampling time index segment, hardware signature index segment, and acquisition authorization index segment in the preceding directory identifier carrying record. In this application, the node index segment is used to locate the index content of the field entry where the node anonymous identifier is located in the multi-source sensing data packet. Since when multiple mobile sensing nodes in the target area upload multi-source sensing data packets around the same abnormal sensing event in the same area, the real device identities of multiple mobile sensing nodes do not enter the subsequent structured data packets. However, the subsequent source dispersion verification process needs to determine whether different multi-source sensing data packets come from duplicate mobile sensing nodes. Therefore, the node anonymous identifier is used to express the distinguishable source of the mobile sensing node without exposing the real device identity. In specific implementation, the node index segment is first read from the data packet directory identifier. Then, based on the node index segment, the start and end positions of the node fields in the multi-source sensing data packet are determined, and these positions are written into the node anonymous identifier read record. The node anonymous identifier read record continues to participate in the process of reading node anonymous identifiers from the multi-source sensing data packet, ensuring that the reading range of the node anonymous identifier does not overlap with fields in the sensing payload content such as thermal anomaly records, gas concentration deviation records, vibration and impact records, pedestrian density records, or traffic movement records. After the access gateway reads the node anonymous identifier based on the node anonymous identifier read record, it establishes a correspondence between the node anonymous identifier and the event directory code in the data packet directory identifier, so that the node anonymous identifier belongs to the same area of ​​abnormal sensing events. The access gateway then establishes a correspondence between the node anonymous identifier and the multi-source sensing data packet, so that the subsequent source verification bearer record can use the node anonymous identifier as the basic field for source distributed verification processing. Thus, the node index segment is not isolated directory content, but participates in the generation of subsequent source trust labels through the node anonymous identifier read record, the node anonymous identifier, and the source verification bearer record, giving the trustworthy sensing evidence units in the structured data packet a verifiable source basis.

[0038] Preferably, in the specific implementation of reading the sensing modality field from the multi-source sensing data packet according to the sensing modality index segment in the data packet directory identifier, the sensing modality index segment is located in the spatiotemporal modality directory position in the data packet directory identifier, and together with the node index segment, provides a field entry for source dispersion verification processing. In this application, the sensing modality index segment is used to locate the field entry, field boundary, and field reading length of the sensing modality field in the multi-source sensing data packet; the sensing modality field in this application is used to characterize the sensing type to which the sensing payload content in the current multi-source sensing data packet belongs, enabling subsequent source dispersion verification processing to distinguish the data source corresponding to thermal anomaly records, gas concentration deviation records, vibration and impact records, pedestrian density records, or traffic movement records. When multiple mobile sensing nodes report multi-source sensing data packets around abnormal sensing events in the same area, if only the node anonymity identifier is used to determine whether the source is dispersed, the upload relationship of the same mobile sensing node under different sensing types will be missed, and it will be difficult to determine whether the same sensing type is excessively concentrated under a single link entry marker; therefore, the sensing modality field and the node anonymity identifier need to be jointly written into the source verification bearer record. In specific implementation, the sensing modality index segment is first read from the data packet directory identifier. Then, based on the sensing modality index segment, the start and end positions of the sensing modality fields in the multi-source sensing data packets are determined, and these positions are written into the sensing modality field read record. Subsequently, sensing modality fields are read from the multi-source sensing data packets based on the sensing modality field read record, and the sensing modality fields are maintained in correspondence with the event directory code, node index segment, and sampling time index segment in the data packet directory identifier. Maintaining a correspondence between the sensing modality fields and the event directory code ensures that the sensing modality fields belong to the same region's abnormal sensing events; maintaining a correspondence between the sensing modality fields and the node index segment allows the sensing modality fields to participate in source dispersion verification processing together with the node anonymity identifier; maintaining a correspondence between the sensing modality fields and the sampling time index segment allows multi-source sensing data packets of different sensing types to be organized according to the sampling time sequence in the subsequent event time sequence anchor chain. Thus, the sensing modality index segment, the sensing modality field read record, and the sensing modality fields form a continuous reading relationship, and the sensing modality fields continue to participate in the establishment of the cross-modality source correspondence table.

[0039] Preferably, the specific implementation process of reading the link entry mark from the multi-source sensing data packet according to the link entry index segment in the data packet directory identifier is as follows: the link entry index segment has been saved as the source directory part in the preceding directory identifier carrying record. In this application, the link entry index segment is used to locate the index content of the field entry where the link entry mark is located. In this application, the link entry mark is used to characterize the communication entry source corresponding to the multi-source sensing data packet when it enters the access gateway, so that the subsequent source dispersion verification process can identify whether there are duplicate node anonymous identifiers under the same communication entry source. When multiple mobile sensing nodes in the target area upload multi-source sensing data packets through different communication entry sources, multiple reports of the same node anonymous identifier may occur under the same communication entry source, or the same communication entry source may centrally forward multi-source sensing data packets with the same sensing modality field. If the integrity verification process is directly performed on these multi-source sensing data packets in the future, duplicate source records will enter the trusted sensing evidence unit generation process. In specific implementation, the access gateway first reads the link ingress index segment from the data packet directory identifier. Then, based on the link ingress index segment, it determines the start and end positions of the link field in the multi-source sensing data packet and writes these positions into the link ingress mark read record. The access gateway then reads the link ingress mark from the link ingress mark read record and compares it with the communication ingress source state in the received state record to form a link ingress consistency record. This record indicates whether the link ingress mark corresponds to the communication ingress source state formed when the access gateway receives the multi-source sensing data packet. The link ingress consistency record continues to participate in the writing of the source verification bearer record, ensuring that the record not only stores the link ingress mark itself but also the correspondence between the link ingress mark and the communication ingress source state. The link ingress mark, along with the node anonymity identifier and the sensing modality field, constitutes the basic fields for source dispersion verification processing. This enables the identification of duplicate node anonymities under the same link ingress mark and the generation of duplicate source removal tags.

[0040] Preferably, in the specific technical implementation of writing the node anonymity identifier, the sensing modality field, and the link ingress marker into the source verification bearer record, a source verification bearer record corresponding to the abnormal sensing event in the same area is first established. This source verification bearer record carries the node anonymity identifier, sensing modality field, link ingress marker, and link ingress consistency record corresponding to each multi-source sensing data packet under the same abnormal sensing event in the same area. In this application, the source verification bearer record aggregates source-related fields from different index segments of the data packet directory identifier into the same verifiable record, so that subsequent source-distributed verification processing does not need to repeatedly read the node anonymity identifier, sensing modality field, and link ingress marker in different field intervals of the multi-source sensing data packets. In specific implementation, firstly, the event directory code in the data packet directory identifier is written to the event directory position of the source verification bearer record, so that the source verification bearer record belongs to the same area's abnormal sensing event; then, the node anonymity identifier is written to the node source position of the source verification bearer record, so that the source verification bearer record can record the mobile sensing node source corresponding to the current multi-source sensing data packet; subsequently, the sensing modality field is written to the modality source position of the source verification bearer record, so that the source verification bearer record can record the sensing type source corresponding to the current multi-source sensing data packet; next, the link ingress marker is written to the link source position of the source verification bearer record, so that the source verification bearer record can record the communication ingress source corresponding to the current multi-source sensing data packet; finally, the link ingress consistency record is written to the link consistency position of the source verification bearer record, so that the source verification bearer record can save the correspondence between the link ingress marker and the communication ingress source status. After the node anonymity identifier, sensing modality field, and link ingress marker are written to the source verification bearer record, the source verification bearer record forms the basis for source verification under the same area's abnormal sensing event. This source verification basis continues to participate in the identification of duplicate node anonymity identifiers, the generation of duplicate source elimination tags, and the screening of candidate sensing data packets, so that the generation of source trust tags does not depend on a single field, but is based on the combination relationship between mobile sensing node source, sensing type source, and communication entry source.

[0041] Preferably, the specific implementation process for identifying duplicate node anonymous identifiers under the same link ingress marker based on the source verification bearer record and generating duplicate source elimination markers is as follows: First, the link ingress marker is read according to the link source position in the source verification bearer record, and the source verification bearer record is processed by link grouping with the link ingress marker as the group entry to form a link ingress grouping record. The link ingress grouping record is used to store multiple node anonymous identifiers, multiple sensing modality fields, and corresponding data packet directory identifiers under the same link ingress marker. The same link ingress marker is used in this application to indicate that multiple multi-source sensing data packets enter the access gateway through the same communication ingress source; in the anti-manipulation verification scenario of multi-source sensing data packets, if the same node anonymous identifier appears repeatedly under the same link ingress marker, the multi-source sensing data packets corresponding to the same node anonymous identifier should not all enter the subsequent trusted sensing evidence unit generation process. In specific implementation, the node anonymous identifiers are read item by item from the link ingress grouping record, and the node anonymous identifiers in the link ingress grouping record are deduplicated and compared; when the same node anonymous identifier exists under the same link ingress marker, the same node anonymous identifier is written into the duplicate node anonymous identifier record. In this application, the duplicate node anonymity identifier record is used to identify the anonymous identifier of a node that reports duplicate data from the same communication ingress source, along with its corresponding data packet directory identifier. Next, a duplicate source removal flag is generated based on the duplicate node anonymity identifier record. This flag indicates which multi-source sensing data packets should be excluded in subsequent candidate sensing data packet screening. The duplicate source removal flag does not delete the multi-source sensing data packet itself; instead, it writes a removal status to the corresponding data packet directory identifier in the source verification bearer record, enabling subsequent candidate sensing data packet screening to identify duplicate source records based on the duplicate source removal flag. Thus, a continuous processing relationship is formed between the source verification bearer record, the link ingress packet record, the duplicate node anonymity identifier record, and the duplicate source removal flag, from link packet processing to duplicate source location, providing a basis for source screening of subsequent candidate sensing data packets.

[0042] Preferably, in the specific technical implementation of filtering out corresponding multi-source sensing data packets according to the duplicate source rejection flag to obtain candidate sensing data packets, the duplicate source rejection flag is first read from the source verification bearer record, and the data packet directory identifier corresponding to the duplicate node anonymous identifier record is located according to the duplicate source rejection flag; then, the corresponding multi-source sensing data packet is searched in the event receiving queue according to the data packet directory identifier, and the found multi-source sensing data packet is written with a source rejection status. The source rejection status is used to indicate that the multi-source sensing data packet does not participate in the subsequent cross-modal source correspondence table establishment because there is a duplicate node anonymous identifier under the same link ingress flag. The source rejection status does not change the sensing payload content in the multi-source sensing data packet, nor does it change the packet header directory area of ​​the multi-source sensing data packet. When filtering out multi-source sensing data packets in the event receiving queue, multi-source sensing data packets that have not been written with a source rejection status are first retained, and then multi-source sensing data packets that have not been written with a source rejection status are written into the candidate data packet queue to obtain candidate sensing data packets. The candidate data packet queue is used to store multi-source sensing data packets that have not been written with a source rejection status, and the candidate data packet queue continues to serve as the source for reading candidate sensing data packets. In this application, candidate sensing data packets are multi-source sensing data packets filtered out by duplicate source removal markers. These candidate sensing data packets still retain the directory read relationships of node anonymity identifiers, sensing modality fields, and link ingress markers, and continue to retain subsequent read entries for sampling time fields, hardware signature fields, and acquisition authorization credential fields. In subsequent processing, candidate sensing data packets are used to establish a cross-modal source correspondence table, which is formed based on data packet objects after source dispersion, rather than based on all originally arriving multi-source sensing data packets. Thus, a filtering relationship is formed between the duplicate source removal markers and the candidate sensing data packets. The candidate sensing data packets continue to inherit the node anonymity identifier, sensing modality field, and link ingress marker from the source verification bearer record, providing a data foundation for determining the source trust mark.

[0043] Preferably, the specific implementation process for establishing a cross-modal source correspondence table based on the sensing modality field and the link ingress marker in the candidate sensing data packet is as follows: First, read the data packet directory identifier from the candidate sensing data packet, and then read the sensing modality field according to the sensing modality index segment in the data packet directory identifier. Next, read the link ingress marker according to the link ingress index segment in the data packet directory identifier. Then, write the sensing modality field, the link ingress marker, and the data packet directory identifier corresponding to the candidate sensing data packet into the cross-modal source preparation record. The cross-modal source preparation record is used to put the sensing type source and the communication ingress source in the candidate sensing data packet into the same record, so that the subsequent cross-modal source correspondence table can express the distribution relationship of different sensing type sources under different communication ingress sources. In this application, the cross-modal source correspondence table is a data table used to describe the correspondence between different sensing modality fields and different link ingress markers under abnormal sensing events in the same area. In the specific establishment process, the sensing modality field is used as the row field, and the link ingress marker is used as the column field. At the intersection of the row and column fields, the data packet directory identifier and the number of node anonymity identifiers for the corresponding candidate sensing data packets are recorded. The sensing modality field corresponds to sensing types such as thermal anomaly records, gas concentration deviation records, vibration and shock records, pedestrian density records, or traffic movement records. The link ingress marker corresponds to the communication ingress source when multi-source sensing data packets enter the access gateway. The intersection is used to indicate the candidate sensing data packets included under a specific communication ingress source for a given sensing type. After establishing the cross-modal source correspondence table, it continues to participate in the determination of source trust markers, enabling the source trust markers to reflect the distribution of candidate sensing data packets across different sensing modality fields and different link ingress markers, rather than solely relying on the number of candidate sensing data packets. Thus, the cross-modal source correspondence table organizes the sensing modality field, link ingress marker, data packet directory identifier, and the number of node anonymity identifiers in the candidate sensing data packets into a verifiable source distribution structure.

[0044] Preferably, in the specific implementation of determining the source trusted marker according to the cross-modal source correspondence table, the row fields corresponding to each sensing modality field in the cross-modal source correspondence table are first read, and the column fields corresponding to each link ingress marker are read. Then, the data packet directory identifier and node anonymity identifier quantity records in the intersection of the row and column fields are read to form a source distribution verification record. The source distribution verification record is used to describe the degree of dispersion of candidate sensing data packets between the sensing modality field and the link ingress marker under the same abnormal sensing event. In this application, the source trusted marker is a result marker of the source dispersion verification process, used to characterize whether the node anonymity identifier and the sensing modality field have passed the source dispersion verification process. The source trusted marker subsequently participates in the hardware signature field reading and integrity verification process. Only when the source trusted marker characterizes that the source dispersion verification process has passed, will the hardware signature field be read according to the data packet directory identifier and a trusted sensing evidence unit be generated. Specifically, the determination process involves first checking the source distribution verification record to determine if the same sensing modality field is concentrated only under the same link ingress marker; then checking if there are records of the number of anonymous node identifiers that remain concentrated under the same link ingress marker after filtering by duplicate source elimination markers; and finally checking if there are mutually corroborating link ingress marker distribution relationships between different sensing modality fields. If the source distribution verification record indicates that the candidate sensing data packets have a usable dispersion relationship among multiple sensing modality fields and multiple link ingress markers, a source trusted marker that has passed the source dispersion verification process is generated based on the source distribution verification record. If the source distribution verification record indicates that the candidate sensing data packets are concentrated in a single link ingress marker or a single sensing modality field, a source trusted marker that has not passed the source dispersion verification process is generated based on the source distribution verification record. Both source trusted markers that have passed and those that have not passed the source dispersion verification process are considered source trusted marker status results. After the source trusted marker is generated, it is written back to the source verification bearer record, and the source trusted marker is associated with the corresponding data packet directory identifier, so that subsequent integrity verification processes responding to the source trusted marker can directly read the source trusted marker. Therefore, the source trust label continues to pass the processing results of duplicate source removal label, candidate sensing data packet and cross-modal source correspondence table to the trust sensing evidence unit generation process.

[0045] Optionally, in response to the source trust mark, reading the hardware signature field according to the data packet directory identifier, performing integrity verification processing on the hardware signature field, and generating a trust-aware evidence unit includes: When the source trust mark characterizes the node anonymity identifier and the sensing modality field through source dispersion verification, the hardware signature field is read from the multi-source sensing data packet according to the hardware signature index segment in the data packet directory identifier; Read the Trusted Execution Environment signature fragment, the Device Certificate Digest field, and the Sample Payload Digest field from the hardware signature field; Perform certificate chain backtracking verification on the device certificate digest field to generate a certificate trust tag; Perform load consistency verification on the sampled load summary field to generate a load trust tag; When both the certificate trust mark and the payload trust mark are confirmed to be in a passed state, an integrity verification pass mark is generated based on the trusted execution environment signature fragment; The sampling payload summary field, the source trust tag, and the integrity verification are written into the evidence unit integrity bearer record via tags; The trusted perception evidence unit is generated based on the integrity-bearing record of the evidence unit.

[0046] Preferably, before responding to the source trusted marker and reading the hardware signature field according to the hardware signature index segment in the data packet directory identifier, the source trusted marker corresponding to the current multi-source sensing data packet in the source verification bearer record is read first, and the source trusted marker is verified against the event directory code, node index segment, and sensing modality index segment in the data packet directory identifier. In this application, the source trusted marker is the state result after the source distributed verification process performs combined verification of the node anonymity identifier and the sensing modality field; the node anonymity identifier is used to express the distinguishable source of the mobile sensing node, and the sensing modality field is used to express the sensing type to which the sensing payload content in the multi-source sensing data packet belongs. After both enter the source distributed verification process, duplicate node anonymity identifiers under the same link entry marker can be identified, and the concentrated distribution of the same sensing modality field on the link entry marker can also be identified. If the source trusted marker indicates that the node anonymity identifier and the sensing modality field have not passed the source distributed verification process, the current multi-source sensing data packet does not enter the hardware signature field reading process, and the source trusted marker is retained in the source verification bearer record so that subsequent structured data packets retain the source of the multi-source sensing data packet that has not entered the trusted sensing evidence unit generation process. If the source trusted marker characterizes the node's anonymity identifier and the sensing modality field, and passes the source dispersion verification process, it indicates that the current multi-source sensing data packet has completed duplicate source removal and cross-modal source correspondence table verification at the source level. Reading the hardware signature field next ensures that integrity verification is performed after source dispersion verification. This sequence prevents the source trusted marker from being an isolated state marker, but rather uses it as a trigger condition for reading the hardware signature field to continue participating in the trusted sensing evidence unit generation process. This avoids data that has not undergone source dispersion verification directly entering the integrity verification process, thus ensuring that the trusted sensing evidence unit has both a source dispersion basis and a hardware integrity basis.

[0047] Preferably, the specific implementation process of reading the hardware signature field from the multi-source sensing data packet according to the hardware signature index segment in the data packet directory identifier is as follows: First, read the hardware signature index segment from the data packet directory identifier, and determine the start and end positions of the hardware signature field in the multi-source sensing data packet based on the hardware signature index segment. Then, write the start and end positions of the hardware signature field into the hardware signature field reading record. In this application, the hardware signature index segment is used to locate the field entry, field boundary, and field reading length of the hardware signature field. In this application, the hardware signature field carries the hardware integrity proof content formed by the mobile sensing node corresponding to the multi-source sensing data packet during sampling, enabling subsequent integrity verification processing to determine whether the sensing payload content in the multi-source sensing data packet maintains a correspondence with the trusted execution environment signature fragment of the mobile sensing node. Since the sensing payload content in multi-source sensing data packets can include thermal anomaly records, gas concentration deviation records, vibration and impact records, pedestrian density records, or traffic movement records, the hardware signature field cannot be read in combination with the physical numerical areas of the aforementioned sensing payload content. Therefore, the hardware signature index segment limits the reading range through the hardware signature field reading record, separating the hardware signature field from the sensing payload content at the directory level. After the access gateway reads the hardware signature field according to the hardware signature field reading record, it establishes a correspondence between the hardware signature field and the source trust mark, the data packet directory identifier, and the multi-source sensing data packet, and writes this correspondence into the hardware signature field reading record. The hardware signature field reading record then participates in the field parsing of the hardware signature field, enabling the trusted execution environment signature fragment, the device certificate digest field, and the sampling payload digest field to be read from the hardware signature field according to the field boundaries. Thus, a continuous processing relationship is formed between the hardware signature index segment, the hardware signature field reading record, and the hardware signature field, from the directory index to the integrity verification entry point.

[0048] Preferably, in the specific technical implementation of reading the trusted execution environment signature fragment from the hardware signature field, the hardware signature field is first subjected to field format recognition to generate a hardware signature field format record. The hardware signature field format record is used to describe whether the hardware signature field contains the fragment boundaries of the trusted execution environment signature fragment, the device certificate digest field, and the sampling payload digest field. In this application, the trusted execution environment signature fragment is a signature fragment formed after the mobile sensing node signs the sampling payload digest field or the sensing payload content corresponding to the sampling payload digest field within the trusted execution environment. The trusted execution environment signature fragment does not directly represent the physical values ​​of thermal anomaly records, gas concentration deviation records, vibration and impact records, pedestrian density records, or traffic movement records, but rather represents the integrity proof content of the aforementioned sensing payload content after being written by the trusted execution environment on the mobile sensing node side. Specifically, during reading, the start and end positions of the trusted execution environment signature fragment are first determined according to the trusted execution environment signature fragment boundaries in the hardware signature field format record. Then, the trusted execution environment signature fragment is extracted from the hardware signature field and written into the trusted execution environment signature fragment carrying record. The Trusted Execution Environment (TEE) signature fragment bearer record continues to maintain the correspondence between the TEE signature fragment and the data packet directory identifier, source trust mark, and sampled payload digest fields. This allows for the generation of an integrity verification pass mark based on the TEE signature fragment when both the certificate trust mark and the payload trust mark are confirmed as passed. The TEE signature fragment bearer record also corresponds to the device certificate digest field, ensuring that the TEE signature fragment is not merely standalone signature data but can continue to participate in the generation of the integrity verification pass mark after the device certificate digest field has undergone certificate chain backtracking verification.

[0049] Preferably, in the specific technical implementation of reading the device certificate digest field from the hardware signature field, the boundary of the device certificate digest field is first read from the hardware signature field format record, and the reading range of the device certificate digest field in the hardware signature field is determined according to the boundary of the device certificate digest field. In this application, the device certificate digest field is the certificate digest content formed after summarizing the content of the device certificate held by the mobile sensing node; the device certificate digest field is used to indicate whether the mobile sensing node associated with the current multi-source sensing data packet can be traced back to the pre-registered device certificate digest baseline record. The device certificate digest field does not directly expose the complete device certificate content, nor does it replace the node anonymity identifier; the node anonymity identifier is used for source dispersion verification processing, and the device certificate digest field is used for certificate chain backtracking verification. The two undertake different data processing functions in the trusted sensing evidence unit generation process. Specifically, during reading, the device certificate digest field is first read from the hardware signature field according to the boundary of the device certificate digest field, and the device certificate digest field is written into the device certificate digest field carrying record; the device certificate digest field carrying record stores the correspondence between the device certificate digest field, the data packet directory identifier, the node anonymity identifier, and the trusted execution environment signature fragment. Subsequently, the pre-registered device certificate digest reference record is read based on the device certificate digest field. This reference record is stored by the mobile sensing node before the structured evidence packet generation process and describes the backtracking relationship between the mobile sensing node's device certificate digest and its superior certificate digest. The device certificate digest field carrying record and the device certificate digest reference record are jointly used in subsequent certificate chain backtracking verification, ensuring that the certificate trust mark is formed based on the digest correspondence between the device certificate digest field and the device certificate digest reference record, rather than based on the device name or communication entry point status. Therefore, after being read from the hardware signature field, the device certificate digest field continues to serve as the core input for certificate chain backtracking verification.

[0050] Preferably, in the specific implementation of reading the sampling payload summary field from the hardware signature field, the boundary of the sampling payload summary field is first read from the hardware signature field format record, and the reading range of the sampling payload summary field in the hardware signature field is determined according to the boundary of the sampling payload summary field. In this application, the sampling payload summary field is the payload summary content obtained after summarizing the sensing payload content in the multi-source sensing data packet. The sampling payload summary field is used for subsequent payload consistency verification to determine whether the sensing payload content pointed to by the hardware signature field is consistent with the sensing payload content actually stored in the multi-source sensing data packet. The sampling payload summary field does not replace the sensing modality field. The sensing modality field is used to describe the sensing type to which the sensing payload content belongs, and the sampling payload summary field is used to describe the content characteristics of the sensing payload content after summarization. Specifically, during reading, the sampling payload summary field is first read from the hardware signature field according to the boundary of the sampling payload summary field, and the sampling payload summary field is written into the sampling payload summary field carrying record; the sampling payload summary field carrying record stores the correspondence between the sampling payload summary field, the data packet directory identifier, the sensing modality field, the trusted execution environment signature fragment, and the hardware signature field. Subsequently, the sensing payload content within the multi-source sensing data packet is located based on the data packet directory identifier. The sensing payload content undergoes digest processing with the same caliber as the sampled payload digest field to obtain the recalculated sampled payload digest field. The recalculated sampled payload digest field then proceeds together with the sampled payload digest field for payload consistency verification. By linking the sampled payload digest field and the recalculated sampled payload digest field within the same processing chain through the record carried by the sampled payload digest field, the generation of subsequent payload trust tags can be based on the internal content consistency of the multi-source sensing data packet, rather than solely relying on the trusted execution environment signature fragment or device certificate digest field.

[0051] Preferably, in the specific implementation of performing certificate chain backtracking verification on the device certificate digest field to generate a certificate trust mark, the device certificate digest field is first read from the device certificate digest field bearer record, then the device certificate digest base record corresponding to the device certificate digest field is read, and the device certificate digest field and the device certificate digest base record are written into the certificate chain backtracking verification record. In this application, the certificate chain backtracking verification compares the device certificate digest field with the superior certificate digest relationship in the device certificate digest base record level by level according to the digest correspondence relationship in the device certificate digest field bearer record to determine whether the hardware integrity proof content corresponding to the mobile sensing node is in a backtrackable state. Specifically, the certificate level entry corresponding to the current device certificate digest field is first determined based on the device certificate digest field bearer record, and then the corresponding superior certificate digest record is searched in the device certificate digest base record based on the certificate level entry; subsequently, the current device certificate digest field and the superior certificate digest record are verified for digest correspondence, and the verification result is written into the certificate chain backtracking verification record. If the certificate chain backtracking verification record indicates that the device certificate digest field can form a continuous backtracking relationship with the device certificate digest baseline record, then a certificate trust mark in a passed state is generated based on the certificate chain backtracking verification record; if the certificate chain backtracking verification record indicates that the device certificate digest field cannot form a continuous backtracking relationship with the device certificate digest baseline record, then a certificate trust mark in a failed state is generated based on the certificate chain backtracking verification record. In this application, the certificate trust mark is the state mark of the device certificate digest field after certificate chain backtracking verification; the certificate trust mark subsequently participates in the generation of the integrity verification pass mark together with the payload trust mark, so that the trusted sensing evidence unit depends not only on the consistency of the sampled payload digest field, but also on the backtrackability of the hardware integrity proof content corresponding to the mobile sensing node.

[0052] Preferably, in the specific implementation of performing load consistency verification on the sampled load summary field to generate a load trust mark, the sampled load summary field is first read from the sampled load summary field carrying record, and then the recalculated sampled load summary field is read from the sampled load summary field carrying record. The sampled load summary field and the recalculated sampled load summary field are then written into the load consistency verification record. In this application, the load consistency verification compares the sampled load summary field carried in the hardware signature field with the recalculated sampled load summary field regenerated based on the sensing load content in the multi-source sensing data packet to determine whether the sensing load content pointed to by the hardware signature field is consistent with the sensing load content actually stored in the multi-source sensing data packet. Specifically, the field entry corresponding to the sensing load content in the data packet directory identifier is first read, then the sensing load content in the multi-source sensing data packet is read according to the field entry, and a recalculated sampled load summary field is formed according to the same summary processing caliber as the sampled load summary field. Subsequently, the recalculated sampled load summary field is compared item by item with the sampled load summary field, and the comparison result is written into the load consistency verification record. If the load consistency verification record indicates that the recalculated sampled load summary field is consistent with the sampled load summary field, a load trust mark in a passed state is generated based on the load consistency verification record. If the load consistency verification record indicates that the recalculated sampled load summary field is inconsistent with the sampled load summary field, a load trust mark in a failed state is generated based on the load consistency verification record. In this application, the load trust mark is a status mark of the sampled load summary field after load consistency verification. The load trust mark, together with the certificate trust mark, serves as a prerequisite for generating the integrity verification pass mark, thus establishing a verifiable content consistency relationship among the sampled load summary field, the recalculated sampled load summary field, the sensed load content, and the hardware signature field.

[0053] Preferably, when both the certificate trust mark and the payload trust mark are confirmed to be in a passed state, an integrity verification pass mark is generated based on the trusted execution environment signature fragment, and the sampled payload digest field, the source trust mark, and the integrity verification pass mark are written into the evidence unit integrity bearer record. The specific implementation is as follows: First, the certificate trust mark is read from the certificate chain backtracking verification record, then the payload trust mark is read from the payload consistency verification record, and the certificate trust mark and the payload trust mark are written into the integrity status determination record. The integrity status determination record is used to store the status combination of the certificate trust mark and the payload trust mark. Only when the integrity status determination record indicates that both the certificate trust mark and the payload trust mark are in a passed state will the trusted execution environment signature fragment in the trusted execution environment signature fragment bearer record continue to be read. The role of the trusted execution environment signature fragment in this step is to serve as the signature basis for generating the integrity verification pass mark after the device certificate digest field completes the certificate chain backtracking verification and the sampled payload digest field completes the payload consistency verification. Specifically, the trusted execution environment signature fragment, the certificate trust mark, the payload trust mark, and the data packet directory identifier are first written into the integrity mark generation record, and then the integrity verification pass mark is generated based on the integrity mark generation record. In this application, the integrity verification pass mark is the integrity status result formed after the hardware signature field has undergone source dispersion verification, certificate chain backtracking verification, and payload consistency verification. Subsequently, an evidence unit integrity bearer record is established, and the sampled payload digest field, source trust mark, and integrity verification pass mark are written into the evidence unit integrity bearer record. The sampled payload digest field records the digest basis corresponding to the sensing payload content; the source trust mark records the source basis for the node anonymity identifier and sensing modality field after source dispersion verification; and the integrity verification pass mark records the integrity basis for the hardware signature field after integrity verification. The evidence unit integrity bearer record continues to participate in the generation of trusted sensing evidence units, enabling the trusted sensing evidence unit to simultaneously carry the source dispersion result, payload consistency result, and hardware integrity result.

[0054] Optionally, generating the trusted sensing evidence unit based on the evidence unit integrity-bearing record includes: The sampling time field is read according to the sampling time index segment in the data packet directory identifier, and the sensing mode field is read according to the sensing mode index segment in the data packet directory identifier; Write the sampling time field, the perception mode field, and the evidence unit integrity record into the evidence unit carrying record; Configure a modal directory code for the evidence unit carrying record based on the perceptual modal field; The evidence unit carrying record is encapsulated and indexed according to the modal catalog code to generate the trusted perception evidence unit.

[0055] Preferably, the specific implementation process of reading the sampling time field according to the sampling time index segment in the data packet directory identifier is as follows: The data packet directory identifier has been generated by the directory identifier carrier record in the preprocessing. The directory identifier carrier record stores the order relationship, source relationship, and field entry relationship among the event directory code, link entry index segment, node index segment, sensing modality index segment, sampling time index segment, hardware signature index segment, and acquisition authorization index segment. Therefore, the sampling time index segment is not an isolated time label, but points to the directory entry of the sampling time field in the multi-source sensing data packet. The sampling time field is used to carry the sampling-side time information written by the mobile sensing node when acquiring sensing payload content. The sampling-side time information will subsequently participate in the generation of the event timeline anchor chain and continue to establish a timeline association with the trusted sensing evidence unit in the link binding process. In specific implementation, the sampling time index segment is first read from the data packet directory identifier. Then, based on the sampling time index segment, the start position, end position, and reading length of the sampling time field in the multi-source sensing data packet are determined, and the start position, end position, and reading length of the sampling time field are written into the sampling time field reading record. Subsequently, the sampling time field is read from the multi-source sensing data packet according to the sampling time field reading record, and an evidence field correspondence is established between the sampling time field and the data packet directory identifier and the evidence unit integrity carrying record. This evidence field correspondence enables the subsequent evidence unit carrying record to simultaneously inherit both the temporal source and the integrity source, avoiding the situation where the trusted sensing evidence unit only saves the integrity verification result without the sampling time source. In real-time sensing scenarios of vehicle groups, multiple mobile sensing nodes may upload multi-source sensing data packets at different communication arrival times. If the trusted sensing evidence unit does not retain the sampling time field, it will be difficult to establish a consistent reading relationship between the trusted sensing evidence unit directory in the subsequent structured data packet and the event temporal directory. Thus, a continuous processing relationship is formed between the sampling time index segment, the sampling time field reading record, the correspondence between the sampling time field and the evidence field, from the directory entry to the reading of the time sequence field. The sampling time field continues to participate in the generation of the trusted perception evidence unit as the time sequence basis of the evidence unit carrying record.

[0056] Preferably, in the specific implementation of reading the sensing modality field according to the sensing modality index segment in the data packet directory identifier, the sensing modality index segment maintains the same directory order relationship with the sampling time index segment, the hardware signature index segment, and the acquisition authorization index segment in the preceding directory identifier carrying record. The sensing modality index segment is used to locate the field entry, field boundary, and field reading length of the sensing modality field in the multi-source sensing data packet. In this application, the sensing modality field describes the sensing type to which the sensing payload content in the multi-source sensing data packet belongs, such as thermal anomaly record, gas concentration deviation record, vibration and shock record, pedestrian density record, or traffic movement record. The sensing modality field does not participate in the physical numerical calculation of the sensing payload content during the generation of the trusted sensing evidence unit, but provides a basis for configuring the modality directory code for the evidence unit carrying record, so that trusted sensing evidence units corresponding to different sensing types can be read modally in the trusted sensing evidence unit directory. In specific implementation, the sensing modality index segment is first read from the data packet directory identifier. Then, based on the sensing modality index segment, the start position, end position, and read length of the sensing modality field in the multi-source sensing data packet are determined. The start position, end position, and read length of the sensing modality field are then written into the sensing modality field read record. Subsequently, the sensing modality field is read from the multi-source sensing data packet based on the sensing modality field read record, and an evidence field correspondence is established between the sensing modality field and the data packet directory identifier, the sampling time field, and the evidence unit integrity carrying record. The evidence field correspondence is used to indicate that the temporal source, sensing type source, and integrity verification source in the same trusted sensing evidence unit come from the same multi-source sensing data packet, rather than being temporarily combined during subsequent encapsulation. For regional abnormal sensing events, if thermal anomaly records and gas concentration deviation records exist simultaneously, the sensing modality field enables the trusted sensing evidence unit to retain the sensing type source when entering the structured data packet, thereby facilitating the verification end to distinguish evidence units of different sensing types based on the trusted sensing evidence unit directory. Thus, the perceptual modality index segment, the perceptual modality field reading record, the correspondence between the perceptual modality field and the evidence field form a continuous reading relationship, and the perceptual modality field continues to participate in the generation of the evidence unit carrying record and the modality directory code.

[0057] Preferably, in the specific technical implementation of writing the sampling time field, the perception modality field, and the evidence unit integrity bearer record into the evidence unit bearer record, an evidence unit bearer record corresponding to the current multi-source perception data packet is first established. This evidence unit bearer record is used to place the sampling time field, the perception modality field, and the evidence unit integrity bearer record in the same field bearer record. The evidence unit integrity bearer record has already saved the sampling payload summary field, the source trust flag, and the integrity verification pass flag in the preprocessing. The sampling payload summary field is used to record the summary basis corresponding to the perception payload content. The source trust flag is used to record the node anonymity identifier and the source basis of the perception modality field through source dispersion verification processing. The integrity verification pass flag is used to record the integrity basis of the hardware signature field completing integrity verification processing. After the sampling time field and the evidence unit integrity bearer record are jointly written into the evidence unit bearer record, the evidence unit bearer record can express the sampling time source corresponding to the trustworthy perception evidence unit; after the perception modality field and the evidence unit integrity bearer record are jointly written into the evidence unit bearer record, the evidence unit bearer record can express the perception type source corresponding to the trustworthy perception evidence unit. In specific implementation, firstly, the data packet directory identifier is written to the directory source position of the evidence unit carrying record, enabling the evidence unit carrying record to trace back the reading entry of the sampling time field and the sensing modality field; then, the sampling time field is written to the time-series source position of the evidence unit carrying record, enabling the evidence unit carrying record to subsequently bind to the event time-series anchor chain; subsequently, the sensing modality field is written to the modality source position of the evidence unit carrying record, enabling the evidence unit carrying record to subsequently configure the modality directory code; finally, the evidence unit integrity carrying record is written to the integrity source position of the evidence unit carrying record, enabling the evidence unit carrying record to accept source dispersion results, payload consistency results, and hardware integrity results. Through the above writing process, the evidence unit carrying record fixes the time-series source, sensing type source, and integrity source as associated fields under the same multi-source sensing data packet, and implements the correspondence of the evidence fields in the directory source position, time-series source position, modality source position, and integrity source position of the evidence unit carrying record. When performing encapsulation and indexing processing based on the modal catalog code, it is not necessary to re-find the correspondence between the sampling time field, the perceptual modality field, and the evidence unit integrity carrying record.

[0058] Preferably, the specific implementation process of configuring modal catalog codes for the evidence unit carrying record according to the perceptual modality field is as follows: first, the perceptual modality field is read from the modal source position of the evidence unit carrying record; then, the modal category corresponding to the current perceptual load content is determined according to the perceptual modality field; and the modal category is written into the modal catalog code configuration record. The modal category is used to express the perceptual type classification corresponding to the perceptual modality field. The modal category is determined by the perceptual modality field and continues to participate in the configuration of the modal catalog code. In this application, the modal catalog code is a catalog code used to indicate the source of the perceptual type within the trusted perceptual evidence unit. The modal catalog code does not replace the perceptual modality field, but converts the modal category corresponding to the perceptual modality field into a catalog field suitable for encapsulation index processing and reading. The perceptual modality field is usually used to describe the perceptual type, such as thermal anomaly record, gas concentration deviation record, vibration and impact record, pedestrian density record, or traffic movement record; the modal catalog code is used to establish a reading entry corresponding to the above perceptual type in the trusted perceptual evidence unit catalog, so that the verification end can read the corresponding trusted perceptual evidence unit according to the modal catalog code. In specific implementation, a pre-configured modal directory code mapping record is first read. This record stores the correspondence between perceptual modal fields, modal categories, and modal directory codes. This mapping record can be configured during the deployment of the structured evidence package generation process and saved along with the field encapsulation template. Subsequently, the perceptual modal fields read from the evidence unit carrying record and the modal categories determined by these fields are matched against the mapping record to determine the modal directory code corresponding to each perceptual modal field. After determining the modal directory code, it is written to the modal directory position of the evidence unit carrying record, and a correspondence is maintained between the modal directory code and the perceptual modal fields, modal categories, sampling time fields, and the evidence unit integrity carrying record. Through this correspondence, the modal directory code not only indicates the perceptual type to which the trusted perceptual evidence unit belongs but also serves as a classification entry point for subsequent encapsulation indexing processing. Thus, a continuous processing relationship is formed between the perceptual modality field, the modality category, the modality directory code mapping record, the modality directory code configuration record, and the modality directory code, from perceptual type description to directory code configuration, and the modality directory code continues to participate in the encapsulation and indexing processing of the trusted perceptual evidence unit.

[0059] Preferably, in the specific implementation of encapsulating and indexing the evidence unit carrier record according to the modal directory code, the modal directory code is first read from the modal directory position of the evidence unit carrier record. Then, the directory source position, time source position, modal source position, and integrity source position in the evidence unit carrier record are read. The modal directory code, the data packet directory identifier, the sampling time field, the perception modality field, and the evidence unit integrity carrier record are written into the evidence unit encapsulation index record. The evidence unit encapsulation index record is used to store the index reading relationship of the evidence unit carrier record in the subsequent trusted perception evidence unit directory. In this application, the encapsulation indexing process configures the index relationship that can be read by the subsequent trusted perception evidence unit directory for the evidence unit carrier record without changing the content of each field in the evidence unit carrier record. The modal directory code plays a crucial role in the encapsulation indexing process by determining the modal partition entry of the current evidence unit carrying record within the trusted sensing evidence unit directory. The sampling time field determines the temporal arrangement of the current evidence unit carrying record within the same modal partition entry. The evidence unit integrity carrying record determines whether the current evidence unit carrying record possesses source dispersion results, payload consistency results, and hardware integrity results. Specifically, the modal index position is first configured in the evidence unit encapsulation index record based on the modal directory code. Then, the temporal index position is configured in the evidence unit encapsulation index record based on the sampling time field. Subsequently, the integrity index position is configured in the evidence unit encapsulation index record based on the integrity verification pass mark in the evidence unit integrity carrying record. The modal index position, the temporal index position, and the integrity index position together constitute the evidence unit index position relationship, which is used to maintain a fixed association between the sensing type, sampling time, and integrity status when subsequently generating trusted sensing evidence units. Through the encapsulation indexing process, the evidence unit carrying record is transformed from a field carrying record into an indexed evidence unit carrying record with a modal index position, a temporal index position, and an integrity index position. The indexed evidence unit carrying record continues to participate in the generation of trusted perception evidence units.

[0060] Preferably, the specific implementation process for generating the trusted sensing evidence unit is as follows: first, read the evidence unit encapsulation index record; then, read the indexed evidence unit carrier record according to the evidence unit index position relationship in the evidence unit encapsulation index record; and finally, read the sampling time field, sensing modality field, and evidence unit integrity carrier record in the evidence unit carrier record according to the indexed evidence unit carrier record. In this application, the trusted sensing evidence unit is configured as an evidence unit object that can be referenced by the structured data package by configuring the sampling time field, sensing modality field, and evidence unit integrity carrier record according to the modality directory code under the same multi-source sensing data package. The trusted sensing evidence unit does not store all the original sensing payload content, but rather stores the sampling time source, sensing type source, sampling payload summary field, source trust flag, and integrity verification pass flag related to the sensing payload content, enabling the trusted sensing evidence unit to serve as the basic content of sensing evidence partitioning in the structured data package. In the specific generation process, the modal directory code is first written into the modal directory position of the trusted sensing evidence unit according to the evidence unit index position relationship. Then, the sampling time field is written into the time sequence directory position of the trusted sensing evidence unit. Subsequently, the sensing modality field is written into the modal source position of the trusted sensing evidence unit, and the evidence unit integrity carrying record is written into the integrity directory position of the trusted sensing evidence unit. After writing, the trusted sensing evidence unit is kept in correspondence with the data packet directory identifier, so that when the trusted sensing evidence unit is read according to the time slice sequence in the event time sequence anchor chain, the directory source of the trusted sensing evidence unit can be traced through the data packet directory identifier. The trusted sensing evidence unit continues to participate in the subsequent link binding process and, together with the event time sequence anchor chain and the collection authorization credential field, generates the evidence chain carrying record. Thus, the trusted sensing evidence unit concentrates the previous source dispersion verification processing, integrity verification processing, sampling time sequence reading, and sensing modality reading into the same evidence unit object, so that subsequent structured data packets can read the evidence content in the sensing evidence partition in the form of a trusted sensing evidence unit directory.

[0061] Optionally, the step of reading the collection authorization credential field according to the data packet directory identifier, and performing link binding processing on the trusted perception evidence unit, the event timeline anchor chain, and the collection authorization credential field to generate an evidence chain carrying record includes: The collection authorization credential field is read from the multi-source sensing data packet based on the collection authorization index segment in the data packet directory identifier; The trusted sensing evidence unit is read according to the time slice sequence in the event time sequence anchor chain; When no corresponding trusted sensing evidence unit is found in the adjacent time slice sequence, the position where no corresponding trusted sensing evidence unit is found is recorded as a time gap marker; Read the unit identifier from the trusted sensing evidence unit; Write the unit identifier, the timing gap marker, the event timing anchor chain, and the acquisition authorization credential field into the link bearer record; The evidence chain bearer record is generated based on the link bearer record.

[0062] Preferably, the specific implementation process of reading the acquisition authorization credential field from the multi-source sensing data packet according to the acquisition authorization index segment in the data packet directory identifier is as follows: the acquisition authorization index segment has maintained the same directory order relationship with the event directory code, link entry index segment, node index segment, sensing modality index segment, sampling time index segment, and hardware signature index segment in the preceding directory identifier carrying record. In this application, the acquisition authorization index segment is used to locate the field entry, field boundary, and field reading length of the acquisition authorization credential field in the multi-source sensing data packet. In this application, the acquisition authorization credential field is used to carry the data acquisition authorization basis formed by the mobile sensing node before or during the acquisition of sensing payload content, so that the subsequent link binding process can bind the sensing evidence source of the trusted sensing evidence unit and the acquisition authorization source of the acquisition authorization credential field in the same evidence chain carrying record. In specific implementation, the acquisition authorization index segment is first read from the data packet directory identifier. Then, based on the acquisition authorization index segment, the start position, end position, and read length of the acquisition authorization credential field in the multi-source sensing data packet are determined, and the start position, end position, and read length are written into the acquisition authorization credential field read record. Subsequently, the acquisition authorization credential field is read from the multi-source sensing data packet according to the acquisition authorization credential field read record, and an authorization field correspondence is established between the acquisition authorization credential field and the data packet directory identifier, the event time-series anchor chain, and the trusted sensing evidence unit. The authorization field correspondence is used to indicate that the multi-source sensing data packet corresponding to the acquisition authorization credential field, the time slice sequence in the event time-series anchor chain, and the trusted sensing evidence unit all originate from the same data packet directory identifier. Thus, a continuous processing relationship from directory entry to authorization field reading is formed between the acquisition authorization index segment, the acquisition authorization credential field read record, the acquisition authorization credential field, and the authorization field correspondence. The acquisition authorization credential field continues to participate in the generation of the evidence chain bearer record as the acquisition authorization source in the link bearer record.

[0063] Preferably, the specific implementation process of reading the trusted sensing evidence unit according to the time slice sequence position in the event time sequence anchor chain is as follows: First, the event time sequence anchor chain is read. The event time sequence anchor chain has been generated based on the event anchor bearer record in the preceding time sequence anchoring process. The event anchor bearer record stores the time slice sequence position, calibration sampling time, and directory source relationship of each multi-source sensing data packet under the same regional abnormal sensing event. In this application, the time slice sequence position is the discrete time sequence position of the calibration sampling time in the same regional abnormal sensing event. The time slice sequence position is not a simple receiving sequence number, but is formed by calibrating the node's local sampling time with a unified timing mark and combining it with the communication arrival time for time slice realignment processing. In this application, the trusted sensing evidence unit is an evidence unit object that can be referenced by structured data packets by configuring the sampling time field, sensing modality field, and evidence unit integrity bearer record according to the modality directory code under the same multi-source sensing data packet. In specific implementation, the current time slice position is first read from the event time sequence anchor chain. Then, the corresponding event anchor bearer record is read according to the current time slice position, and the data packet directory identifier corresponding to the current time slice position is read from the event anchor bearer record. Subsequently, the corresponding trusted sensing evidence unit is searched in the trusted sensing evidence unit directory according to the data packet directory identifier, and the found trusted sensing evidence unit is written into the time slice evidence read record. The time slice evidence read record is used to store the read relationship between the time slice position, the data packet directory identifier, and the trusted sensing evidence unit, so that subsequent link bearer records can be written into trusted sensing evidence units according to the time sequence position of the event time sequence anchor chain, rather than according to the generation order of trusted sensing evidence units. Through the time slice evidence read record, a time sequence read relationship is established between the time slice position in the event time sequence anchor chain and the trusted sensing evidence unit. Subsequently, when no corresponding trusted sensing evidence unit is found in an adjacent time slice position, a time sequence gap mark can be recorded based on the time sequence read relationship.

[0064] Preferably, in the specific technical implementation of determining whether a corresponding trusted sensing evidence unit has not been found for adjacent time slice positions, multiple event anchor point carrying records arranged according to time slice positions in the event time sequence anchor point chain are first read, and adjacent time slice position relationships are established based on the time slice positions in each event anchor point carrying record. In this application, the adjacent time slice position relationship is used to represent the connection relationship between two consecutive discrete time-series positions in an abnormal sensing event in the same area. The adjacent time slice position relationship does not indicate that the physical locations of two multi-source sensing data packets are adjacent, nor does it indicate that two mobile sensing nodes are adjacent, but rather it represents the sequential relationship between two time slice positions in the event time sequence anchor point chain. Specifically, the first time slice position and the second time slice position following the first time slice position are first read from the event time sequence anchor point chain, and the first and second time slice positions are written into the adjacent time slice position verification record; subsequently, the trusted sensing evidence unit is searched based on the data packet directory identifier corresponding to the first time slice position, and the trusted sensing evidence unit is searched based on the data packet directory identifier corresponding to the second time slice position. If a corresponding trusted sensing evidence unit can be retrieved at the first time slice position, but not at the second time slice position, or if a corresponding trusted sensing evidence unit cannot be retrieved at the first time slice position but can be retrieved at the second time slice position, then the position where the corresponding trusted sensing evidence unit was not retrieved is written into the adjacent time slice position verification record. The adjacent time slice position verification record is used to store the adjacent time slice position relationship, the retrieved trusted sensing evidence units, and the positions where the corresponding trusted sensing evidence unit was not retrieved. Through this process, a traceable retrieval relationship is formed between the adjacent time slice position relationship, the time slice position, and the trusted sensing evidence unit. The subsequent generation of time sequence gap markers can be based on the adjacent time slice position verification record, rather than on the subjective judgment of the verification end during subsequent readings.

[0065] Preferably, when no corresponding trusted sensing evidence unit is found in an adjacent time slice, the specific implementation process of recording the position where no corresponding trusted sensing evidence unit is found as a timing gap marker is as follows: First, the position where no corresponding trusted sensing evidence unit is found is read from the adjacent time slice verification record, and the position where no corresponding trusted sensing evidence unit is found is verified against the time slice position in the event timing anchor chain. In this application, the position where no corresponding trusted sensing evidence unit is found is a timing position in the event timing anchor chain where a time slice position exists, but there is no trusted sensing evidence unit corresponding to that time slice position in the trusted sensing evidence unit directory. In this application, the timing gap marker is a structured marker used to record the missing position of trusted sensing evidence unit in the event timing anchor chain. The timing gap marker does not modify the event timing anchor chain, nor does it create a new trusted sensing evidence unit. Instead, it uses the position where no corresponding trusted sensing evidence unit is found as the timing integrity prompt content in the link binding process. In specific implementation, the locations where no corresponding trusted sensing evidence unit was found are first written into the timing gap preparation record, along with the corresponding time slice sequence number and data packet directory identifier. Then, timing gap markers are generated based on the timing gap preparation record, and these markers are linked to the event timing anchor chain. If multiple locations in the same area's abnormal sensing event have no corresponding trusted sensing evidence unit found, multiple timing gap markers are generated and written into the timing gap marker record in the order of their time slice sequence numbers. These timing gap marker records continue to participate in the writing of the link bearer record, ensuring that the link bearer record not only stores the unit identifiers corresponding to the found trusted sensing evidence units but also the timing gap markers for those where no corresponding trusted sensing evidence unit was found. Thus, the timing gap markers transmit the timing continuity information in the event timing anchor chain to the evidence chain bearer record, providing verifiable evidence for subsequent reading of the correspondence between the event timing directory and the trusted sensing evidence unit directory in structured data packets.

[0066] Preferably, in the specific technical implementation of reading the unit identifier from the trusted sensing evidence unit, the retrieved trusted sensing evidence unit is first located according to the time slice evidence reading record, and the unit identifier field in the trusted sensing evidence unit is read. In this application, the unit identifier is an index identifier used to reference the corresponding trusted sensing evidence unit in the evidence chain carrying record. The unit identifier does not replace the sampling time field, sensing modality field, sampling payload summary field, source trust mark, or integrity verification pass mark in the trusted sensing evidence unit; instead, it converts the trusted sensing evidence unit formed by the above fields into a unit entry that can be referenced by the link binding processing. Specifically, the modality directory position, timing directory position, and integrity directory position of the trusted sensing evidence unit are first read, and it is determined whether the trusted sensing evidence unit has a complete unit structure based on these positions. When the trusted sensing evidence unit has a complete unit structure, the unit identifier is read from the unit identifier field of the trusted sensing evidence unit and written into the unit identifier reading record. The unit identifier reading record is used to store the correspondence between unit identifiers, time slice sequences, data packet directory identifiers, and trusted sensing evidence units. This allows the link bearer record to trace back to the corresponding trusted sensing evidence unit when the unit identifier is subsequently written into the link bearer record. For anomaly sensing events in the same area, multiple trusted sensing evidence units may correspond to different time slice sequences and different sensing modality fields. If the link bearer record directly writes the complete trusted sensing evidence unit, it will increase the size of the link bearer record and make it difficult to reuse with subsequent sensing evidence partitions. By reading the unit identifier, the link bearer record can reference the trusted sensing evidence unit with the unit identifier, enabling the event timeline anchor chain, timeline gap marker, and collection authorization credential fields to be associated with the trusted sensing evidence unit in the link bearer record.

[0067] Preferably, the specific implementation process of writing the unit identifier, the timing gap marker, the event timing anchor chain, and the acquisition authorization credential field into the link bearer record is as follows: First, a link bearer record corresponding to the abnormal perception event in the same area is established. The link bearer record is used to carry the unit identifier of the trusted perception evidence unit, the timing organization of the event timing anchor chain, the acquisition authorization source of the acquisition authorization credential field, and the timing gap marker. After the unit identifier is written into the link bearer record, the link bearer record can reference the trusted perception evidence unit through the unit identifier; after the timing gap marker is written into the link bearer record, the link bearer record can record the position in the event timing anchor chain where the corresponding trusted perception evidence unit is not retrieved; after the event timing anchor chain is written into the link bearer record, the link bearer record can express the timing organization relationship between the time slice positions under the abnormal perception event in the same area; after the acquisition authorization credential field is written into the link bearer record, the link bearer record can express the acquisition authorization source corresponding to the trusted perception evidence unit. In specific implementation, firstly, the event directory code is written to the event directory position of the link-bearing record, making the link-bearing record belong to the same area of ​​anomaly detection events; then, the event time sequence anchor chain is written to the time sequence chain position of the link-bearing record, enabling the link-bearing record to retain the time sequence organization relationship between time slice positions; subsequently, the unit identifier in the unit identifier reading record is written to the evidence unit reference position of the link-bearing record, enabling the link-bearing record to reference trusted sensing evidence units through unit identifiers; next, the time sequence gap mark is written to the time sequence gap position of the link-bearing record, enabling the link-bearing record to record the position where the corresponding trusted sensing evidence unit was not retrieved; finally, the collection authorization credential field is written to the authorization source position of the link-bearing record, enabling the link-bearing record to establish a fixed association between the unit identifier of the trusted sensing evidence unit and the collection authorization source. The above writing process enables the link-bearing record to simultaneously carry four types of directory relationships: time sequence, evidence, gap, and authorization, providing a link-level carrying foundation for the subsequent generation of evidence chain carrying records.

[0068] Preferably, when generating the evidence chain bearer record based on the link bearer record, the event directory position, time sequence chain position, evidence unit reference position, time sequence gap position, and authorization source position in the link bearer record are first read, and the link organization order of the evidence chain bearer record is established according to the above positions. In this application, the link bearer record is a bearer record that places the trusted perception evidence unit, event time sequence anchor chain, collection authorization credential field, and time sequence gap mark under the same link level; in this application, the evidence chain bearer record is an evidence chain organization record that can be further partitioned and encapsulated by the field encapsulation template based on the link bearer record. In specific implementation, firstly, the event directory code in the event directory location is written to the event identification location of the evidence chain carrying record, enabling the evidence chain carrying record to associate with anomaly perception events in the same area; then, the event time sequence anchor chain in the time sequence chain location is written to the event time sequence location of the evidence chain carrying record, enabling the evidence chain carrying record to retain the time sequence organization relationship of multi-source perception data packets; subsequently, the unit identifier in the evidence unit reference location is written to the evidence unit reference location of the evidence chain carrying record, enabling the evidence chain carrying record to reference trusted perception evidence units; next, the time sequence gap mark in the time sequence gap location is written to the time sequence gap location of the evidence chain carrying record, enabling the evidence chain carrying record to retain the location where the corresponding trusted perception evidence unit was not retrieved; finally, the collection authorization credential field in the authorization source location is written to the authorization source location of the evidence chain carrying record, enabling the evidence chain carrying record to retain the collection authorization source corresponding to the trusted perception evidence unit. After completing the above writing, the event identification location, event time sequence location, evidence unit reference location, time sequence gap location, and authorization source location in the evidence chain carrying record are sequentially verified to obtain a partitionable encapsulated evidence chain carrying record. The evidence chain carrying record that can be partitioned and encapsulated continues to participate in the partitioning and encapsulation process of the field encapsulation template, so that the subsequent header partition, time sequence partition, perception evidence partition, integrity partition and authorization credential partition can read the corresponding fields respectively.

[0069] Preferably, after the evidence chain carrying record is generated, a link binding verification record can also be formed based on the evidence chain carrying record. This allows for direct reading of the field correspondence in the link binding verification record when the evidence chain carrying record is partitioned and encapsulated according to the field encapsulation template. The link binding verification record does not replace the evidence chain carrying record but is used to store the correspondence between the event timing anchor chain, unit identifier, timing gap marker, and collection authorization credential fields in the evidence chain carrying record. Specifically, the event timing anchor chain in the event timing position is first read from the evidence chain carrying record, and the unit identifier in the evidence unit reference position is read according to the time slice sequence in the event timing anchor chain. If the unit identifier corresponding to the time slice sequence exists, the time slice binding relationship between the time slice sequence and the unit identifier is written into the link binding verification record. If the unit identifier corresponding to the time slice sequence does not exist, the time slice gap relationship between the time slice sequence and the timing gap marker is written into the link binding verification record. Subsequently, the collection authorization credential field is read from the authorization source location of the evidence chain carrying record, and the collection authorization credential field is written into the same link binding verification record along with the time slice binding relationship or time slice gap relationship. This allows the link binding verification record to express the relationship between the unit identifier, time sequence gap marker, and collection authorization credential field of the trusted sensing evidence unit under the same time slice sequence. The link binding verification record continues to participate in determining the field writing position of subsequent field encapsulation templates, ensuring a consistent reading path between the time sequence partition, the sensing evidence partition, and the authorization credential partition. Thus, the evidence chain carrying record is not only the output of the link binding process, but also continues to transmit the binding relationship between the trusted sensing evidence unit, the event time sequence anchor chain, and the collection authorization credential field to the partition encapsulation process of the structured data packet through the link binding verification record.

[0070] 8. The method for generating a structured evidence package according to claim 1, characterized in that the step of partitioning and encapsulating the evidence chain carrying records according to the field encapsulation template to obtain a structured data package includes: Read the locally stored field encapsulation template. The field encapsulation template consists of the field positions, field boundary markers, and field verification criteria of the header partition, time sequence partition, perception evidence partition, integrity partition, and authorization credential partition, respectively. The field writing position in the evidence chain carrying record is determined according to the field position in the field encapsulation template. The field boundaries of the packet header partition, the time sequence partition, the perception evidence partition, the integrity partition, and the authorization credential partition are set according to the field boundary markers in the field encapsulation template. Based on the field verification criteria in the field encapsulation template, generate the respective partition verification marks for the packet header partition, the time sequence partition, the perception evidence partition, the integrity partition, and the authorization credential partition; The evidence chain carrying record is partitioned and encapsulated according to the field write position, the field boundary, and the partition verification mark to obtain the structured data packet.

[0071] Preferably, the specific implementation process of reading the locally stored field encapsulation template is as follows: During the deployment of the structured evidence package generation process, the field encapsulation template establishes a corresponding relationship with a local template storage area readable by the access gateway. This local template storage area is used to store common field arrangement rules, partition boundary rules, and verification generation rules for anomaly detection events in different regions. In this application, the field encapsulation template is used to convert the event identification content, event sequence content, trusted perception evidence content, integrity verification content, and collection authorization content in the evidence chain carrying record into a templated description record of the corresponding fields for each partition in the structured data package. The field encapsulation template does not replace the evidence chain carrying record, nor does it change the unit identifier, sequence gap marker, event sequence anchor chain, and collection authorization credential fields in the evidence chain carrying record. Instead, it provides a basis for writing fields for the evidence chain carrying record to enter the partition encapsulation process. In practice, the process begins by reading the template index record from the local template storage area and determining the field encapsulation template corresponding to the current structured evidence package generation process based on the template index record. Then, the header partition, time-series partition, perceived evidence partition, integrity partition, and authorization credential partition within the field encapsulation template are read. The field positions, field boundary markers, and field verification criteria for each of these partitions are then read. After reading, the field encapsulation template is written to the field encapsulation template read record. This record stores the source location, header partition, time-series partition, perceived evidence partition, integrity partition, authorization credential partition, field positions, field boundary markers, and field verification criteria of the field encapsulation template. This field encapsulation template read record continues to participate in subsequent field write position determination, field boundary setting, and partition verification marker generation, ensuring that subsequent partition encapsulation processing does not require temporary determination of which partition each field in the evidence chain carrying record should enter. Therefore, the field encapsulation template reads records and becomes the direct template source for structured data packet partitioning and encapsulation processing. The field positions, field boundary markers, and field verification criteria read from the records by the field encapsulation template continue to serve as the basis for generating subsequent field write position mapping records, field boundary setting records, and partition verification markers.

[0072] Preferably, the field encapsulation template consists of the field positions, field boundary markers, and field verification criteria of the header partition, time sequence partition, perceived evidence partition, integrity partition, and authorization credential partition, respectively. The specific technical meanings are as follows: In this application, the header partition carries the entry index content of the structured data packet, enabling the verification end to first read the partition entry in the structured data packet through the header partition; the time sequence partition carries the event time sequence anchor chain and time slice sequence, enabling the structured data packet to retain the sampling order relationship of the multi-source perceived data packets; the perceived evidence partition carries the unit identifier and the trusted perceived evidence unit referenced by the unit identifier, enabling the structured data packet to read the corresponding perceived evidence content through the trusted perceived evidence unit directory; the integrity partition carries the integrity verification pass mark, payload trust mark, certificate trust mark, and the integrity verification content corresponding to the above marks, enabling the structured data packet to retain the integrity status of the trusted perceived evidence unit; the authorization credential partition carries the collection authorization credential field, enabling the structured data packet to retain the collection authorization source corresponding to the trusted perceived evidence unit. The field position describes which partition and position within the structured data packet a field in the evidence chain carrying record should be written to; the field boundary marker describes the start and end boundaries of each partition and the field splitting position; the field verification caliber describes the field range and verification object used when generating partition verification marks for each partition. Through this configuration, the field encapsulation template converts the link organization content in the evidence chain carrying record into partitionable field organization rules. Subsequently, the field writing position is determined based on the field position, the field boundary is set based on the field boundary marker, and a partition verification mark is generated based on the field verification caliber. The field position, the field boundary marker, and the field verification caliber correspond to the subsequent field writing position mapping record, field boundary setting record, and partition verification mark, respectively, enabling the template content in the field encapsulation template to enter the partition encapsulation process item by item.

[0073] Preferably, the specific implementation process for determining the field write position in the evidence chain carrier record based on the field position in the field encapsulation template is as follows: First, the field positions corresponding to the packet header partition, timing partition, perceived evidence partition, integrity partition, and authorization credential partition are read from the record read from the field encapsulation template. Then, the event identification position, event timing position, evidence unit reference position, timing gap position, and authorization source position in the evidence chain carrier record are read. In this application, the field write position is the target position that each field in the evidence chain carrier record should be written to in the corresponding partition of the structured data packet. The field write position is not the original field position in the evidence chain carrier record, but is obtained by correspondingly converting the field position in the field encapsulation template with the event identification position, event timing position, evidence unit reference position, timing gap position, and authorization source position in the evidence chain carrier record. In specific implementation, firstly, the event identification position in the evidence chain carrying record is mapped to the field position in the packet header partition to determine the field write position in the packet header partition; then, the event timing position in the evidence chain carrying record is mapped to the field position in the timing partition to determine the field write position in the timing partition; subsequently, the evidence unit reference position in the evidence chain carrying record is mapped to the field position in the perception evidence partition to determine the field write position in the perception evidence partition; next, the integrity verification content in the evidence chain carrying record is mapped to the field position in the integrity partition to determine the field write position in the integrity partition; finally, the authorization source position in the evidence chain carrying record is mapped to the field position in the authorization credential partition to determine the field write position in the authorization credential partition. The above mapping results are written to a field write position mapping record, which is used to store the mapping relationship between each field in the evidence chain carrying record and the field write position of each partition in the structured data packet. The field write position mapping record continues to participate in subsequent partition encapsulation processing, enabling the partition encapsulation processing to write the evidence chain carrying record into the structured data packet according to the field write position, rather than simply splicing them according to the original arrangement order of the evidence chain carrying record.

[0074] Preferably, the specific implementation process of setting the field boundaries of the packet header partition, the timing partition, the perceptual evidence partition, the integrity partition, and the authorization credential partition according to the field boundary markers in the field encapsulation template is as follows: First, the field boundary markers are read from the records read from the field encapsulation template, and then the field boundaries of the packet header partition, the timing partition, the perceptual evidence partition, the integrity partition, and the authorization credential partition are determined according to the field boundary markers. In this application, the field boundaries are the readable range of each partition within the structured data packet. The field boundaries are used to distinguish the packet header partition, the timing partition, the perceptual evidence partition, the integrity partition, and the authorization credential partition, avoiding boundary confusion of fields in different partitions during subsequent reading. In specific implementation, firstly, the field boundaries of the packet header partition are set according to the field boundary markers corresponding to the packet header partition, so that the packet header partition can accommodate event recognition content and partition entry content; then, the field boundaries of the time sequence partition are set according to the field boundary markers corresponding to the time sequence partition, so that the time sequence partition can accommodate event time sequence anchor chain, time slice sequence, and time sequence gap marker; subsequently, the field boundaries of the perception evidence partition are set according to the field boundary markers corresponding to the perception evidence partition, so that the perception evidence partition can accommodate unit identifier and the trusted perception evidence unit directory entry referenced by the unit identifier; next, the field boundaries of the integrity partition are set according to the field boundary markers corresponding to the integrity partition, so that the integrity partition can accommodate integrity verification pass markers and integrity verification content; finally, the field boundaries of the authorization credential partition are set according to the field boundary markers corresponding to the authorization credential partition, so that the authorization credential partition can accommodate the acquisition authorization credential field. The field boundaries of the packet header partition, time sequence partition, perception evidence partition, integrity partition, and authorization credential partition are jointly written into the field boundary setting record, and the field boundary setting record continues to participate in the partition encapsulation process, so that the fields in the evidence chain carrying record can be written and read in the structured data packet according to the field boundaries. The field boundary setting record also maintains a corresponding relationship with the field write position mapping record, so that the field write position can fall within the corresponding packet header partition field boundary, time sequence partition field boundary, perception evidence partition field boundary, integrity partition field boundary and authorization credential partition field boundary.

[0075] Preferably, the specific implementation process for generating partition verification marks for the header partition, the time sequence partition, the perceived evidence partition, the integrity partition, and the authorization credential partition based on the field verification criteria in the field encapsulation template is as follows: First, the field verification criteria are read from the field encapsulation template reading record, and then the field verification criteria are mapped to the field write position mapping record and the field boundary setting record. In this application, the field verification criteria are used to limit the range, order, and boundaries of fields that need to be verified when generating partition verification marks for each partition; the field verification criteria do not change the field content, but rather provide a unified verification reading range for the generation of partition verification marks. In specific implementation, firstly, the event recognition content and partition entry content within the field boundary of the packet header partition are read according to the field verification criteria of the packet header partition to generate a packet header partition verification mark; then, the event time-series anchor chain, time slice sequence, and time-series gap mark within the field boundary of the time-series partition are read according to the field verification criteria of the time-series partition to generate a time-series partition verification mark; subsequently, the unit identifier and trusted perception evidence unit directory entry within the field boundary of the perception evidence partition are read according to the field verification criteria of the perception evidence partition to generate a perception evidence partition verification mark; next, the integrity verification pass mark and integrity verification content within the field boundary of the integrity partition are read according to the field verification criteria of the integrity partition to generate an integrity partition verification mark; finally, the acquisition authorization credential field within the field boundary of the authorization credential partition is read according to the field verification criteria of the authorization credential partition to generate an authorization credential partition verification mark. The packet header partition verification mark, time-series partition verification mark, perception evidence partition verification mark, integrity partition verification mark, and authorization credential partition verification mark are collectively written as partition verification marks into the partition verification mark record. The partition verification mark record continues to participate in the partition encapsulation process, enabling the structured data packet to be read by the subsequent verification end to determine whether the fields of each partition retain the field range and field order at the time of encapsulation according to the partition verification mark. Thus, the field verification criteria, field boundary setting records, and field write position mapping records together provide the verification object and verification range for the partition verification mark.

[0076] Preferably, when performing partitioning and encapsulation processing on the evidence chain carrying record according to the field write position, the field boundary, and the partition verification mark, the field write position mapping record, the field boundary setting record, and the partition verification mark record are first read, and then written into the partition encapsulation preparation record. The partition encapsulation preparation record is used to place the field write position, field boundary, and partition verification mark in the same processing record, so that field positioning, field segmentation, and field verification can be completed in the same processing link when writing structured data packets later. In specific implementation, firstly, based on the field write position mapping record, the event identification content in the evidence chain carrying record is written to the field write position defined by the packet header partition field boundary; then, the event time sequence anchor chain, time slice sequence, and time sequence gap mark in the evidence chain carrying record are written to the field write position defined by the time sequence partition field boundary; subsequently, the unit identifier and trusted perception evidence unit directory entry in the evidence chain carrying record are written to the field write position defined by the perception evidence partition field boundary; next, the integrity verification pass mark and integrity verification content in the evidence chain carrying record are written to the field write position defined by the integrity partition field boundary; finally, the collection authorization credential field in the evidence chain carrying record is written to the field write position defined by the authorization credential partition field boundary. After the fields are written, the packet header partition verification mark, time sequence partition verification mark, perception evidence partition verification mark, integrity partition verification mark, and authorization credential partition verification mark in the partition verification mark record are written to the corresponding packet header partition, time sequence partition, perception evidence partition, integrity partition, and authorization credential partition, respectively, so that each partition has a partition verification mark corresponding to its field content. Through the above-mentioned partitioning and encapsulation process, the evidence chain carrying record is transformed from a single link organization record into a partitioned evidence packet record that includes a packet header partition, a time sequence partition, a sensed evidence partition, an integrity partition, and an authorization credential partition. The partitioned evidence packet record continues to participate in the generation of structured data packets.

[0077] Preferably, in the specific implementation of obtaining the structured data packet, the header partition, time sequence partition, perceived evidence partition, integrity partition, and authorization credential partition in the partitioned evidence packet record are read first, and the corresponding partition verification mark in each partition is read. In this application, the structured data packet is a readable encapsulated object formed by encapsulating the event identification content, event time sequence content, trusted perceived evidence content, integrity verification content, and acquisition authorization content in the evidence chain carrier record according to a field encapsulation template. The readable encapsulated object is used by the verification end to read the field content in the structured data packet level by level according to the header partition, time sequence partition, perceived evidence partition, integrity partition, and authorization credential partition. The structured data packet does not simply save the entire evidence chain carrier record as a file, but rather encapsulates different fields in the evidence chain carrier record separately according to the header partition, time sequence partition, perceived evidence partition, integrity partition, and authorization credential partition, enabling the verification end to read the corresponding field according to the partition entry. In the specific generation process, firstly, the header partition of the partitioned evidence packet record is written into the header partition of the structured data packet, so that the header partition carries the entry of each partition and the header partition verification mark; then, the time sequence partition is written into the time sequence partition of the structured data packet, so that the time sequence partition carries the event time sequence anchor chain, time slice sequence, time sequence gap mark, and time sequence partition verification mark; subsequently, the perception evidence partition is written into the perception evidence partition of the structured data packet, so that the perception evidence partition carries the unit identifier, the trusted perception evidence unit directory entry, and the perception evidence partition verification mark; next, the integrity partition is written into the integrity partition of the structured data packet, so that the integrity partition carries the integrity verification pass mark, integrity verification content, and integrity partition verification mark; finally, the authorization credential partition is written into the authorization credential partition of the structured data packet, so that the authorization credential partition carries the collection authorization credential field and the authorization credential partition verification mark. After the above writing is completed, the structured data packet is kept in correspondence with the data packet directory identifier, the evidence chain carrying record, and the field encapsulation template, so that the subsequent verification end can trace back the directory source, evidence chain source, and template source of the structured data packet. The directory source corresponds to the data packet directory identifier, the evidence chain source corresponds to the evidence chain carrying record, and the template source corresponds to the field encapsulation template, thereby avoiding the directory source, evidence chain source, and template source becoming isolated records.

[0078] Preferably, after the structured data packet is generated, a structured data packet read record can also be formed based on the structured data packet. This read record does not replace the structured data packet itself, but is used to store the read correspondence between the header partition, timing partition, perceived evidence partition, integrity partition, and authorization credential partition within the structured data packet. Specifically, the process begins by reading the partition entry corresponding to the header partition of the structured data packet, and then reading the timing partition, perceived evidence partition, integrity partition, and authorization credential partition based on the partition entry. Next, the event timing anchor chain in the timing partition is read, and the unit identifier in the perceived evidence partition is read based on the time slice sequence in the event timing anchor chain. Then, the trusted perceived evidence unit directory entry in the perceived evidence partition is read based on the unit identifier, and the integrity verification pass flag in the integrity partition is read based on the trusted perceived evidence unit directory entry. Finally, the acquisition authorization credential field in the authorization credential partition is read, and the read relationship between the acquisition authorization credential field and the time slice sequence, unit identifier, and integrity verification pass flag is written into the structured data packet read record. The structured data packet read record continues to serve as an auxiliary record for the verification end to read the structured data packet, enabling the verification end to read the event sequence content, trusted perception evidence content, integrity verification content, and collection authorization content step by step according to the partition entry of the packet header partition. Thus, the field encapsulation template not only participates in the generation of the structured data packet but also maintains a traceable field read relationship among multiple partitions in the structured data packet through the structured data packet read record. The field read relationship in the structured data packet read record continues to correspond to the packet header partition, time sequence partition, perceived evidence partition, integrity partition, and authorization credential partition in the structured data packet, ensuring that the partition encapsulation result of the structured data packet can be verified on the verification end side according to the same read path.

[0079] Optionally, obtaining the structured data packet includes: The packet header partition is encapsulated as a packet header index, the time series partition is encapsulated as an event time series directory, the perception evidence partition is encapsulated as a trusted perception evidence unit directory, the integrity partition is encapsulated as an integrity verification directory, and the authorization credential partition is encapsulated as an authorization credential directory. The packet header index, the event sequence directory, the trusted perception evidence unit directory, the integrity verification directory, and the authorization credential directory are encapsulated into a packet body; Perform package body digest encapsulation processing on the package body to generate an unmodifiable archive tag; The immutable encapsulation mark is written into the packet header index to obtain the structured data packet with the immutable encapsulation mark written into it, so that the verification end receiving the structured data packet can read the event sequence directory, the trusted perception evidence unit directory, the integrity verification directory and the authorization credential directory according to the packet header index.

[0080] Preferably, the specific implementation process of encapsulating the packet header partition into a packet header index is as follows: First, read the packet header partition in the partitioned evidence packet record, and read the event identification content, partition entry content, packet header partition field boundaries, and packet header partition verification flag from the packet header partition; then, according to the field positions configured for the packet header partition in the field encapsulation template, write the event identification content to the event identification position of the packet header index, write the partition entry content to the directory entry position of the packet header index, and write the packet header partition verification flag to the packet header verification position of the packet header index. In this application, the packet header index is the entry navigation record of the structured data packet. The packet header index does not carry the complete event timeline anchor chain, trusted awareness evidence unit directory, integrity verification directory, or authorization credential directory, but rather carries the reading entry, field boundaries, and verification entry of the event timeline directory, trusted awareness evidence unit directory, integrity verification directory, and authorization credential directory in the packet body. By encapsulating the packet header partition into a packet header index, the subsequent verification end, upon receiving the structured data packet, can first read the packet header index and then locate the event sequence directory, trusted sensing evidence unit directory, integrity verification directory, and authorization credential directory based on the packet header index, without needing to scan fields segment by segment in the packet body. During the encapsulation process, the packet header index also maintains a correspondence with the data packet directory identifier and the evidence chain carrying record. The data packet directory identifier is used to trace the directory source of the multi-source sensing data packet, and the evidence chain carrying record is used to trace the link source of the event sequence directory, trusted sensing evidence unit directory, integrity verification directory, and authorization credential directory in the structured data packet. After the packet header index encapsulation is completed, the packet header index is written to the packet header index encapsulation record. The packet header index encapsulation record continues to participate in the packet body encapsulation, enabling the event sequence directory, trusted sensing evidence unit directory, integrity verification directory, and authorization credential directory in the packet body to obtain a read entry point through the packet header index. Thus, a continuous processing relationship from partition fields to entry index is formed between the packet header partition, the packet header index, and the packet header index encapsulation record. The packet header index encapsulation record continues to provide the packet header-side entry basis for establishing the packet body encapsulation order.

[0081] Preferably, in the specific implementation of encapsulating the time-series partition into an event time-series directory, the time-series partition in the partitioned evidence packet record is first read, and the event time-series anchor chain, time slice sequence, time-series gap marker, and time-series partition verification marker are read from the time-series partition. In this application, the event time-series directory is a directory record used to store the time-series organization relationship of multiple multi-source sensing data packets under anomaly sensing events in the same area within a structured data packet. The event time-series directory does not replace the trusted sensing evidence unit directory, but rather provides the time-series reading order for the trusted sensing evidence unit directory. Specifically, during encapsulation, a time-series directory entry is first established according to the arrangement order of each time slice sequence in the event time-series anchor chain, and then each time slice sequence is written into the corresponding time-series directory entry; subsequently, the corresponding data packet directory identifier is read according to the time slice sequence, and the data packet directory identifier is written into the same time-series directory entry, enabling the time-series directory entry to trace back the directory source of the corresponding multi-source sensing data packet. If a timing gap marker exists in the timing partition, it is written into the timing directory entry corresponding to the time slice position. This allows the event timing directory to simultaneously express the time slice position of an existing trusted sensing evidence unit and the position where no corresponding trusted sensing evidence unit has been retrieved. After the timing partition verification marker is written into the timing verification position of the event timing directory, the event timing directory retains the field range and field order of the timing partition during encapsulation. After the above encapsulation is completed, the event timing directory is written into the event timing directory encapsulation record. The event timing directory encapsulation record continues to participate in the package body encapsulation and maintains a correspondence with the event timing directory entry in the package header index. Thus, a continuous processing relationship is formed between the timing partition, the event timing directory, and the event timing directory encapsulation record, from time slice position organization to directory-based reading. The event timing directory encapsulation record continues to provide timing-side directory basis for the event timing directory position in the package body.

[0082] Preferably, the specific implementation process of encapsulating the perceived evidence partition into a trusted perceived evidence unit directory is as follows: First, the perceived evidence partition in the partitioned evidence package record is read, and the unit identifier, trusted perceived evidence unit directory entry, trusted perceived evidence unit, and perceived evidence partition verification mark are read from the perceived evidence partition. In this application, the trusted perceived evidence unit directory is a directory record used to store the index relationship of trusted perceived evidence units in the structured data package. The trusted perceived evidence unit directory does not need to repeatedly store all perceived payload content; instead, a readable perceived evidence directory is established through the directory relationship between the unit identifier, the trusted perceived evidence unit directory entry, and the corresponding trusted perceived evidence unit. Specifically, during encapsulation, a trusted perceived evidence unit directory entry is first established using the unit identifier as the directory entry, and then the trusted perceived evidence unit directory entry corresponding to the unit identifier is written into the trusted perceived evidence unit directory entry. Subsequently, the modal directory position, temporal directory position, and integrity directory position in the trusted perceived evidence unit are read, and these positions are written into the same trusted perceived evidence unit directory entry, so that the trusted perceived evidence unit directory entry can express the perceived type, sampling time source, and integrity source of the trusted perceived evidence unit. After the perceptual evidence partition verification mark is written to the perceptual evidence verification location in the trusted perceptual evidence unit directory, the trusted perceptual evidence unit directory can retain the field range and field order of the perceptual evidence partition during encapsulation. After the above encapsulation is completed, the trusted perceptual evidence unit directory is written to the trusted perceptual evidence unit directory encapsulation record, and the trusted perceptual evidence unit directory encapsulation record maintains a correspondence with the trusted perceptual evidence unit directory entry in the packet header index. Thus, a continuous processing relationship is formed between the perceptual evidence partition, the trusted perceptual evidence unit directory, and the trusted perceptual evidence unit directory encapsulation record, from unit identifier reference to perceptual evidence directoryized reading. The trusted perceptual evidence unit directory encapsulation record continues to provide the perceptual evidence side directory basis for the location of the trusted perceptual evidence unit directory in the packet body.

[0083] Preferably, in the specific implementation of encapsulating the integrity partition into an integrity verification directory, the integrity partition in the partitioned evidence package record is first read, and the integrity verification pass flag, payload trust flag, certificate trust flag, integrity verification content, and integrity partition verification flag are read from the integrity partition. In this application, the integrity verification directory is a directory record used to store the integrity status corresponding to the trusted sensing evidence unit in the structured data package. The integrity verification directory does not replace the trusted sensing evidence unit directory, but rather establishes a correspondence with the unit identifier in the trusted sensing evidence unit directory, enabling the verification end to read the corresponding integrity verification content according to the unit identifier. During the encapsulation process, firstly, an integrity verification directory entry is established based on the unit identifier. Then, the integrity verification corresponding to that unit identifier is written into the integrity verification directory entry via a tag. Subsequently, the payload trust tag and certificate trust tag are written into the same integrity verification directory entry, enabling the integrity verification directory entry to express the status results of payload consistency verification and certificate chain backtracking verification. Next, the integrity verification content is written into the integrity content position within the integrity verification directory entry. The integrity verification content includes certificate chain backtracking verification records, payload consistency verification records, and integrity status determination records. These records collectively serve as the source of integrity content in the integrity verification directory entry. After the integrity partition verification tag is written into the integrity verification position of the integrity verification directory, the integrity verification directory can retain the field range and field order of the integrity partition during encapsulation. After completing the above encapsulation, the integrity verification directory is written into the integrity verification directory encapsulation record, and the integrity verification directory encapsulation record maintains a correspondence with the integrity verification directory entry in the packet header index. Thus, a continuous processing relationship is formed between the integrity partition, the integrity verification directory, and the integrity verification directory encapsulation record, from the integrity status result to the directory-based verification reading. The integrity verification directory encapsulation record continues to provide the integrity-side directory basis for the location of the integrity verification directory in the package body.

[0084] Preferably, the specific implementation process of encapsulating the authorization credential partition into an authorization credential directory is as follows: First, read the authorization credential partition in the partitioned evidence package record, and then read the collection authorization credential field, the authorization field correspondence, and the authorization credential partition verification flag from the authorization credential partition. In this application, the authorization credential directory is a directory record used to store the binding relationship between the collection authorization credential field and its corresponding trusted perception evidence unit in the structured data packet. The authorization credential directory does not replace the collection authorization credential field, but rather enables the collection authorization credential field to be read by the verification end according to the time slice sequence and unit identifier. Specifically, during encapsulation, first, an authorization credential directory item is established based on the collection authorization credential field, and then the collection authorization credential field is written into the authorization field position in the authorization credential directory item; subsequently, the data packet directory identifier, time slice sequence, and unit identifier in the authorization field correspondence are read, and the data packet directory identifier, time slice sequence, and unit identifier are written into the same authorization credential directory item, so that the authorization credential directory item can express the correspondence between the collection authorization credential field and the trusted perception evidence unit and the event time sequence anchor chain. After the authorization credential partition verification mark is written to the authorization credential verification position in the authorization credential directory, the authorization credential directory can retain the field range and field order of the authorization credential partition during encapsulation. After the above encapsulation is completed, the authorization credential directory is written to the authorization credential directory encapsulation record, and the authorization credential directory encapsulation record is kept in correspondence with the authorization credential directory entry in the packet header index. Thus, a continuous processing relationship is formed between the authorization credential partition, the authorization credential directory, and the authorization credential directory encapsulation record, from collecting the authorization source to reading the directoryized authorization. The authorization credential directory encapsulation record continues to provide the authorization credential directory source for subsequent packet encapsulation and continues to provide the authorization credential side directory basis for the authorization credential directory position in the packet body.

[0085] Preferably, the specific implementation process of encapsulating the packet header index, the event sequence directory, the trusted sensing evidence unit directory, the integrity verification directory, and the authorization credential directory into a packet body is as follows: First, read the packet header index encapsulation record, the event sequence directory encapsulation record, the trusted sensing evidence unit directory encapsulation record, the integrity verification directory encapsulation record, and the authorization credential directory encapsulation record, and establish the packet body encapsulation order according to the partition entry order in the packet header index. The packet body encapsulation order is used to limit the writing order of the packet header index, the event sequence directory, the trusted sensing evidence unit directory, the integrity verification directory, and the authorization credential directory in the packet body. The packet body encapsulation order is determined by the partition entry order in the packet header index and continues to participate in the generation of the packet body encapsulation record. In this application, the packet body is the main encapsulation object that carries the contents of each directory in the structured data packet. The packet body does not change the field content in each directory, but organizes the packet header index, the event sequence directory, the trusted sensing evidence unit directory, the integrity verification directory, and the authorization credential directory into a readable packet body structure according to the packet body encapsulation order. In specific implementation, the packet header index is first written to the packet body's packet header index location, giving the packet body entry navigation; then, the event sequence directory is written to the packet body's event sequence directory location, ensuring the packet body retains the event sequence reading path; subsequently, the trusted sensing evidence unit directory is written to the packet body's trusted sensing evidence unit directory location, ensuring the packet body retains the sensing evidence reading path; next, the integrity verification directory is written to the packet body's integrity verification directory location, ensuring the packet body retains the integrity verification reading path; finally, the authorization credential directory is written to the packet body's authorization credential directory location, ensuring the packet body retains the acquisition authorization reading path. After completing the above writing, a packet body encapsulation record is formed. The packet body encapsulation record is used to save the packet body encapsulation order and the positional relationship of the packet header index, event sequence directory, trusted sensing evidence unit directory, integrity verification directory, and authorization credential directory within the packet body. The packet body encapsulation record continues to participate in the packet body digest encapsulation process, enabling the subsequent generation of unchangeable sealing tags to read the packet body content according to a unified packet body field range. Thus, the packet body transforms multiple directories from scattered partition encapsulation results into a directory combination object that can be encapsulated as a whole, and the directory combination object continues to participate in the packet body digest encapsulation process as the packet body content.

[0086] Preferably, in the specific implementation of performing package body digest encapsulation processing on the package body to generate an unmodifiable sealing tag, the package body encapsulation record is first read, and the field ranges of the package header index, event sequence directory, trusted sensing evidence unit directory, integrity verification directory, and authorization credential directory within the package body are determined according to the package body encapsulation record; then, the package header index, event sequence directory, trusted sensing evidence unit directory, integrity verification directory, and authorization credential directory are read sequentially according to the positional relationship in the package body encapsulation record, and the reading results are written to the package body digest preparation record. The package body digest preparation record is used to store the directory content read from the package body field range, and the package body digest preparation record continues to participate in the generation of package body digest content. In this application, the package body digest encapsulation processing performs consistency solidification processing on the directory content within the package body, so that the directory content after package body encapsulation can be subsequently verified through the same unmodifiable sealing tag. The packet body digest encapsulation process does not alter the field content within the packet body, nor does it regenerate the event sequence directory, trusted evidence unit directory, integrity verification directory, or authorization credential directory. Instead, after reading the packet body field range, it performs digest processing on the directory content within that range to generate the packet body digest content. Subsequently, the packet body digest content, packet body encapsulation record, and data packet directory identifier are written into the immutable sealing mark generation record, and an immutable sealing mark is generated based on this record. In this application, the immutable sealing mark is a sealing status marker corresponding to the packet body field range, packet body digest content, and data packet directory identifier. It is used to determine whether the directory content within the packet body retains the field range and field order at the time of encapsulation when the verification end reads the structured data packet. The immutable sealing mark does not replace the partition verification marks but forms the overall sealing basis for the packet header index, event sequence directory, trusted evidence unit directory, integrity verification directory, and authorization credential directory at the packet body level. Thus, a continuous processing relationship is formed between the package body summary preparation record, the package body summary content, the record for generating the immutable archive marker, and the immutable archive marker, from the directory combination object to the overall archive state. The overall archive state continues to be passed to the package header index through the immutable archive marker.

[0087] Preferably, the specific implementation process of writing the immutable encapsulation mark into the packet header index to obtain the structured data packet with the immutable encapsulation mark is as follows: First, read the immutable encapsulation mark in the immutable encapsulation mark generation record and read the packet header index in the packet header index encapsulation record; then, according to the packet header verification position and the encapsulation mark writing position in the packet header index, write the immutable encapsulation mark into the encapsulation mark writing position in the packet header index. The encapsulation mark writing position is pre-configured in the field encapsulation template along with the field position of the packet header partition, and is passed to the writing process through the packet header index encapsulation record; the encapsulation mark writing position is used to limit the writing entry of the immutable encapsulation mark in the packet header index, so that the immutable encapsulation mark can be read from the packet header index by the verification end. After the immutable encapsulation mark is written into the packet header index, the packet header index can not only provide the reading entry of the event sequence directory, the trusted awareness evidence unit directory, the integrity verification directory, and the authorization credential directory, but also provide the encapsulation mark writing position for whether the packet body is kept in the encapsulated state. After writing is complete, the packet header index is updated to the packet header index containing the immutable sealing mark, and the packet header index containing the immutable sealing mark is rewritten to the packet header index position of the packet body. Subsequently, a structured data packet containing the immutable sealing mark is generated based on the packet header index containing the immutable sealing mark, the event sequence directory, the trusted awareness evidence unit directory, the integrity verification directory, and the authorization credential directory in the packet body. In this application, the structured data packet containing the immutable sealing mark is a structured data packet that carries the packet body sealing status in the packet header index, enabling the verification end to read the directory entry starting from the packet header index and simultaneously read the immutable sealing mark to seal and verify the packet body. Thus, a continuous processing relationship is formed between the immutable sealing mark, the packet header index, the packet body, and the structured data packet, from digest sealing to entry writing to structured encapsulation. The structured data packet continues to provide the verification end with the directory reading entry and sealing verification entry through the packet header index.

[0088] Preferably, in the specific implementation where the verification terminal receiving the structured data packet reads the event sequence directory, the trusted sensing evidence unit directory, the integrity verification directory, and the authorization credential directory based on the packet header index, the verification terminal first reads the packet header index written in the structured data packet with the immutable sealing mark, and then reads the event sequence directory entry, the trusted sensing evidence unit directory entry, the integrity verification directory entry, the authorization credential directory entry, and the immutable sealing mark from the packet header index. In this application, the verification terminal reads each directory based on the packet header index by partitioning and reading the event sequence content, the sensing evidence content, the integrity verification content, and the collection authorization content according to the entry navigation relationship formed during the encapsulation of the structured data packet. In practice, the verification end first reads the event timing directory from the event timing directory entry, and then reads the time slice sequence and timing gap marker from the event timing directory; next, it reads the trusted perception evidence unit directory from the trusted perception evidence unit directory entry, and reads the corresponding unit identifier and trusted perception evidence unit directory item according to the time slice sequence; then, it reads the integrity verification directory from the integrity verification directory entry, and reads the integrity verification pass marker, payload trust marker, and certificate trust marker according to the unit identifier; finally, it reads the authorization credential directory from the authorization credential directory entry, and reads the acquisition authorization credential field according to the time slice sequence or unit identifier. After the verification end completes the reading, it can perform encapsulation verification on the packet body according to the non-modifiable encapsulation marker, and form a verification reading record based on the reading relationship between the packet header index, event timing directory, trusted perception evidence unit directory, integrity verification directory, and authorization credential directory. The verification reading record is used to explain whether the event timing content, perception evidence content, integrity verification content, and acquisition authorization content in the structured data packet maintain the directory correspondence at the time of encapsulation. Therefore, structured data packets can achieve continuous processing from entry point reading to directory verification through packet header index, and the verification reading record continues to save the directory reading relationship formed by this continuous processing.

[0089] like Figure 3 As shown, this is an embodiment of a structured evidence package generation apparatus according to this application, which includes: The directory identifier extraction module is configured to receive multi-source sensing data packets reported by multiple mobile sensing nodes in the target area for abnormal sensing events in the same area, and extract the data packet directory identifier from the multi-source sensing data packets. The timing anchoring module is configured to read the sampling time field according to the data packet directory identifier, perform timing anchoring processing on the sampling time field based on the unified timing mark, and generate an event timing anchor chain. The source dispersion verification module is configured to read the node anonymity identifier and the perception modality field according to the data packet directory identifier, and perform source dispersion verification processing on the node anonymity identifier and the perception modality field to obtain the source trust mark; The integrity verification module is configured to, in response to the source trust mark, read the hardware signature field according to the data packet directory identifier, perform integrity verification processing on the hardware signature field, and generate a trust-aware evidence unit. The link binding module is configured to read the collection authorization credential field according to the data packet directory identifier, perform link binding processing on the trusted perception evidence unit, the event time sequence anchor chain and the collection authorization credential field, and generate an evidence chain carrying record. The partitioning and encapsulation module is configured to perform partitioning and encapsulation processing on the evidence chain carrying records according to the field encapsulation template to obtain structured data packets.

[0090] like Figure 4 As shown, an electronic device according to an embodiment of this application includes: Processor; and Memory for storing the executable instructions of the processor; The processor is configured to execute the method for generating a structured evidence package as described in any one of the present application by executing the executable instructions.

[0091] like Figure 5 As shown, a computer-readable storage medium according to an embodiment of this application stores a computer program, characterized in that the computer program, when executed by a processor, implements the method for generating a structured evidence package as described in any one of this application.

[0092] like Figure 6 As shown, this is a vehicle according to an embodiment of the present application, which includes an on-board communication component, an on-board processing component, and an on-board storage component; The vehicle-mounted communication component is configured to receive multi-source sensing data packets reported by multiple mobile sensing nodes within the target area for abnormal sensing events in the same area. The on-board processing component is configured to extract a data packet directory identifier from the multi-source sensing data packet; The vehicle-mounted storage component is configured to store a unified time synchronization mark and a field encapsulation template; The vehicle-mounted processing component is further configured to read the sampling time field according to the data packet directory identifier, perform time-series anchoring processing on the sampling time field based on the unified time synchronization mark, and generate an event time-series anchor chain. The vehicle-mounted processing component is further configured to read the node anonymity identifier and the perception modality field according to the data packet directory identifier, and perform source dispersion verification processing on the node anonymity identifier and the perception modality field to obtain a source trust mark; The vehicle-mounted processing component is further configured to, in response to the source trusted marker, read the hardware signature field according to the data packet directory identifier, perform integrity verification processing on the hardware signature field, and generate a trusted perception evidence unit. The vehicle-mounted processing component is further configured to read the collection authorization credential field according to the data packet directory identifier, perform link binding processing on the trusted perception evidence unit, the event time sequence anchor chain and the collection authorization credential field, and generate an evidence chain carrying record. The vehicle-mounted processing component is further configured to perform partitioning and encapsulation processing on the evidence chain carrying record according to the field encapsulation template to obtain a structured data packet.

[0093] like Figure 7 As shown, this is an embodiment of a structured evidence package generation system, which includes multiple mobile sensing nodes, evidence package generation nodes, and verification terminals. The multiple mobile sensing nodes are configured to generate multi-source sensing data packets for abnormal sensing events in the same area, and send the multi-source sensing data packets to the evidence packet generation node; The evidence packet generating node is configured to receive the multi-source sensing data packets reported by the multiple mobile sensing nodes within the target area, and extract the data packet directory identifier from the multi-source sensing data packets; The evidence packet generation node is also configured to read the sampling time field according to the data packet directory identifier, perform time-series anchoring processing on the sampling time field based on the unified time synchronization mark, and generate an event time-series anchor chain. The evidence packet generation node is further configured to read the node anonymity identifier and the perceptual modality field according to the data packet directory identifier, and perform source dispersion verification processing on the node anonymity identifier and the perceptual modality field to obtain a source trust mark; The evidence packet generation node is also configured to, in response to the source trust mark, read the hardware signature field according to the data packet directory identifier, perform integrity verification processing on the hardware signature field, and generate a trust-aware evidence unit. The evidence packet generation node is also configured to read the collection authorization credential field according to the data packet directory identifier, perform link binding processing on the trusted perception evidence unit, the event timeline anchor chain and the collection authorization credential field, and generate an evidence chain carrying record. The evidence package generation node is also configured to perform partitioning and encapsulation processing on the evidence chain carrying records according to the field encapsulation template to obtain structured data packets; The verification terminal is configured to receive the structured data packet and read the event sequence directory, trusted evidence unit directory, integrity verification directory, and authorization credential directory according to the packet header index in the structured data packet.

[0094] The above Figures 3-7 For an exemplary description, please refer to the above. Figure 1 This will not be elaborated upon here.

Claims

1. A method for generating a structured evidence package, characterized in that, include: Receive multi-source sensing data packets reported by multiple mobile sensing nodes within the target area for abnormal sensing events in the same area, and extract the data packet directory identifier from the multi-source sensing data packets; The sampling time field is read according to the data packet directory identifier, and the sampling time field is time-series anchored based on the unified time synchronization mark to generate an event time-series anchor chain. Based on the data packet directory identifier, read the node anonymity identifier and the perception modality field, and perform source dispersion verification processing on the node anonymity identifier and the perception modality field to obtain the source trust mark; In response to the source trust mark, the hardware signature field is read according to the data packet directory identifier, the hardware signature field is subjected to integrity verification processing, and a trust-aware evidence unit is generated. Read the collection authorization credential field according to the data packet directory identifier, perform link binding processing on the trusted perception evidence unit, the event time sequence anchor chain and the collection authorization credential field, and generate an evidence chain carrying record; The evidence chain carrying records are partitioned and encapsulated according to the field encapsulation template to obtain a structured data packet.

2. The method for generating a structured evidence package according to claim 1, characterized in that, Extracting the data packet directory identifier from the multi-source sensing data packet includes: The access gateway receives the multi-source sensing data packet, and the access gateway reads the packet header directory area in the multi-source sensing data packet; The access gateway reads the event directory code, link entry index segment, node index segment, sensing modality index segment, sampling time index segment, hardware signature index segment, and acquisition authorization index segment from the packet header directory area. The access gateway writes the event directory code, the link ingress index segment, the node index segment, the sensing modality index segment, the sampling time index segment, the hardware signature index segment, and the acquisition authorization index segment into the directory identifier bearer record; The data packet directory identifier is generated based on the directory identifier carrying record.

3. The method for generating a structured evidence package according to claim 2, characterized in that, The step of reading the sampling time field according to the data packet directory identifier, performing time-series anchoring processing on the sampling time field based on the unified time synchronization mark, and generating an event time-series anchor chain includes: The sampling time field is read from the multi-source sensing data packet according to the sampling time index segment in the data packet directory identifier; Read the node's local sampling time from the sampling time field; Read the timing sequence marker and communication arrival time returned by the timing server from the unified timing marker; The local sampling time of the node is calibrated based on the timing sequence marker returned by the timing server to obtain the calibrated sampling time; The calibration sampling time is time-sliced ​​according to the communication arrival time to obtain the time-slice sequence number. An event anchor record is established, the time slice sequence number is written into the event anchor record, and the event time sequence anchor chain is generated based on the event anchor record.

4. The method for generating a structured evidence package according to claim 2, characterized in that, The step of reading the node anonymity identifier and the perceptual modality field according to the data packet directory identifier, and performing source dispersion verification processing on the node anonymity identifier and the perceptual modality field to obtain the source trust mark includes: The node anonymity identifier is read from the multi-source sensing data packet based on the node index segment in the data packet directory identifier; The sensing modality field is read from the multi-source sensing data packet according to the sensing modality index segment in the data packet directory identifier; Based on the link ingress index segment in the data packet directory identifier, read the link ingress marker from the multi-source sensing data packet; Write the node anonymity identifier, the perception modality field, and the link ingress marker into the source verification bearer record; Based on the source verification bearer record, identify the anonymous identifier of duplicate nodes under the same link ingress marker, and generate a duplicate source removal marker; Based on the duplicate source removal flag, the corresponding multi-source sensing data packets are filtered out to obtain candidate sensing data packets; A cross-modal source correspondence table is established based on the sensing modality field and the link ingress marker in the candidate sensing data packet, and the source trust marker is determined based on the cross-modal source correspondence table.

5. The method for generating a structured evidence package according to claim 2, characterized in that, In response to the source trust mark, the hardware signature field is read according to the data packet directory identifier, integrity verification processing is performed on the hardware signature field, and a trust-aware evidence unit is generated, including: When the source trust mark characterizes the node anonymity identifier and the sensing modality field through source dispersion verification, the hardware signature field is read from the multi-source sensing data packet according to the hardware signature index segment in the data packet directory identifier; Read the Trusted Execution Environment signature fragment, the Device Certificate Digest field, and the Sample Payload Digest field from the hardware signature field; Perform certificate chain backtracking verification on the device certificate digest field to generate a certificate trust tag; Perform load consistency verification on the sampled load summary field to generate a load trust tag; When both the certificate trust mark and the payload trust mark are confirmed to be in a passed state, an integrity verification pass mark is generated based on the trusted execution environment signature fragment; The sampling payload summary field, the source trust tag, and the integrity verification are written into the evidence unit integrity bearer record via tags; The trusted perception evidence unit is generated based on the integrity-bearing record of the evidence unit.

6. A device for generating a structured evidence package, characterized in that, include: The directory identifier extraction module is configured to receive multi-source sensing data packets reported by multiple mobile sensing nodes in the target area for abnormal sensing events in the same area, and extract the data packet directory identifier from the multi-source sensing data packets. The timing anchoring module is configured to read the sampling time field according to the data packet directory identifier, perform timing anchoring processing on the sampling time field based on the unified timing mark, and generate an event timing anchor chain. The source dispersion verification module is configured to read the node anonymity identifier and the perception modality field according to the data packet directory identifier, and perform source dispersion verification processing on the node anonymity identifier and the perception modality field to obtain the source trust mark; The integrity verification module is configured to, in response to the source trust mark, read the hardware signature field according to the data packet directory identifier, perform integrity verification processing on the hardware signature field, and generate a trust-aware evidence unit. The link binding module is configured to read the collection authorization credential field according to the data packet directory identifier, perform link binding processing on the trusted perception evidence unit, the event time sequence anchor chain and the collection authorization credential field, and generate an evidence chain carrying record. The partitioning and encapsulation module is configured to perform partitioning and encapsulation processing on the evidence chain carrying records according to the field encapsulation template to obtain structured data packets.

7. An electronic device, characterized in that, include: processor; as well as Memory for storing the executable instructions of the processor; The processor is configured to execute the method for generating a structured evidence package according to any one of claims 1 to 6 by executing the executable instructions.

8. A computer-readable storage medium having a computer program stored thereon, characterized in that, When the computer program is executed by a processor, it implements the method for generating a structured evidence package as described in any one of claims 1 to 6.

9. A vehicle, characterized in that, This includes in-vehicle communication components, in-vehicle processing components, and in-vehicle storage components; The vehicle-mounted communication component is configured to receive multi-source sensing data packets reported by multiple mobile sensing nodes within the target area for abnormal sensing events in the same area. The on-board processing component is configured to extract a data packet directory identifier from the multi-source sensing data packet; The vehicle-mounted storage component is configured to store a unified time synchronization mark and a field encapsulation template; The vehicle-mounted processing component is further configured to read the sampling time field according to the data packet directory identifier, perform time-series anchoring processing on the sampling time field based on the unified time synchronization mark, and generate an event time-series anchor chain. The vehicle-mounted processing component is further configured to read the node anonymity identifier and the perception modality field according to the data packet directory identifier, and perform source dispersion verification processing on the node anonymity identifier and the perception modality field to obtain a source trust mark; The vehicle-mounted processing component is further configured to, in response to the source trusted marker, read the hardware signature field according to the data packet directory identifier, perform integrity verification processing on the hardware signature field, and generate a trusted perception evidence unit. The vehicle-mounted processing component is further configured to read the collection authorization credential field according to the data packet directory identifier, perform link binding processing on the trusted perception evidence unit, the event time sequence anchor chain and the collection authorization credential field, and generate an evidence chain carrying record. The vehicle-mounted processing component is further configured to perform partitioning and encapsulation processing on the evidence chain carrying record according to the field encapsulation template to obtain a structured data packet.

10. A system for generating structured evidence packages, characterized in that, This includes multiple mobile sensing nodes, evidence package generation nodes, and verification terminals; The multiple mobile sensing nodes are configured to generate multi-source sensing data packets for abnormal sensing events in the same area, and send the multi-source sensing data packets to the evidence packet generation node; The evidence packet generating node is configured to receive the multi-source sensing data packets reported by the multiple mobile sensing nodes within the target area, and extract the data packet directory identifier from the multi-source sensing data packets; The evidence packet generation node is also configured to read the sampling time field according to the data packet directory identifier, perform time-series anchoring processing on the sampling time field based on the unified time synchronization mark, and generate an event time-series anchor chain. The evidence packet generation node is further configured to read the node anonymity identifier and the perceptual modality field according to the data packet directory identifier, and perform source dispersion verification processing on the node anonymity identifier and the perceptual modality field to obtain a source trust mark; The evidence packet generation node is also configured to, in response to the source trust mark, read the hardware signature field according to the data packet directory identifier, perform integrity verification processing on the hardware signature field, and generate a trust-aware evidence unit. The evidence packet generation node is also configured to read the collection authorization credential field according to the data packet directory identifier, perform link binding processing on the trusted perception evidence unit, the event timeline anchor chain and the collection authorization credential field, and generate an evidence chain carrying record. The evidence package generation node is also configured to perform partitioning and encapsulation processing on the evidence chain carrying records according to the field encapsulation template to obtain structured data packets; The verification terminal is configured to receive the structured data packet and read the event sequence directory, trusted evidence unit directory, integrity verification directory, and authorization credential directory according to the packet header index in the structured data packet.

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