MAC CE security protection

Abstract

Embodiments of this disclosure provide a solution for MAC CE security protection. In this solution, a device transmits a MAC message including at least one MAC PDU to another device. The MAC PDU in the at least one MAC PDU indicates a security type and a message authentication code. The security type indicates a codec metric used to generate the message authentication code. The message authentication code is generated based on the codec metric and on at least one of the following: a first key associated with the device or another device, a second key associated with the Radio Resource Control (RRC) layer, or information associated with the device or another device.

Description

Technical Field

[0001] Various exemplary embodiments of this disclosure generally relate to the telecommunications field, and more specifically to methods, apparatuses, devices, and computer-readable storage media for security protection of Media Access Control (MAC) control elements (CE). Background Technology

[0002] A communication network can be used as a facility to enable communication between two or more communication devices or to provide communication devices with access to a data network. A mobile or wireless communication network is an example of a communication network. Communication devices may be served by an application server.

[0003] Communication networks can operate according to standards provided by organizations such as the 3rd Generation Partnership Project (3GPP) or the European Telecommunications Standards Institute (ETSI). Examples of standards provided by 3GPP are the so-called 3GPP standards used for generations of cellular technology, such as the 3GPP standards for 4G, 5G, 6G, etc. Summary of the Invention

[0004] In a first aspect of this disclosure, an apparatus is provided. The apparatus includes at least one processor; and at least one memory storing instructions, which, when executed by the at least one processor, cause the apparatus to at least: transmit a MAC message including at least one MAC Protocol Data Unit (PDU) to another apparatus. The MAC PDU in the at least one MAC PDU indicates a security type and a message authentication code. The security type indicates a codec metric used to generate the message authentication code. The message authentication code is generated based on the codec metric and on at least one of: a first key associated with the apparatus or the other apparatus, a second key associated with the Radio Resource Control (RRC) layer, or information associated with the apparatus or the other apparatus.

[0005] In a second aspect of this disclosure, a method is provided. The method includes transmitting a MAC message including at least one MAC PDU to another device. The MAC PDU in the at least one MAC PDU indicates a security type and a message authentication code. The security type indicates a codec metric used to generate the message authentication code. The message authentication code is generated based on the codec metric and on at least one of: a first key associated with the device or the other device, a second key associated with an RRC layer, or information associated with the device or the other device.

[0006] In a third aspect of this disclosure, an apparatus is provided. The apparatus includes components for transmitting a MAC message including at least one MAC PDU to another apparatus. The MAC PDU in the at least one MAC PDU indicates a security type and a message authentication code. The security type indicates a codec metric used to generate the message authentication code. The message authentication code is generated based on the codec metric and on at least one of: a first key associated with the apparatus or the other apparatus, a second key associated with the Radio Resource Control (RRC) layer, or information associated with the apparatus or the other apparatus.

[0007] In a fourth aspect of this disclosure, a computer-readable medium is provided. The computer-readable medium includes instructions stored thereon for causing a device to at least execute the method according to the second aspect.

[0008] It should be understood that the summary portion is not intended to identify key or essential features of the embodiments of this disclosure, nor is it intended to limit the scope of this disclosure. Other features of this disclosure will become readily apparent from the following description. Attached Figure Description

[0009] Some exemplary embodiments will now be described with reference to the accompanying drawings, in which: Figure 1 An example communication environment in which example embodiments of this disclosure may be implemented is shown; Figure 2 The LTM cell handover command MAC CE is shown. Figure 3 A schematic diagram of the LTM cell handover command MAC CE is shown; Figure 4 An overview of the MAC structure is shown; Figure 5A An example DL MAC PDU is shown; Figure 5B An example UL MAC PDU is shown; Figure 6 The key hierarchy generation process in 5GS (5G system) is illustrated; Figure 7A An example data encryption process is shown; Figure 7B An example derivation of MAC-I / NAS-MAC or XMAC-I / XNAS-MAC is shown; Figure 8 The protocol stack for supporting RRC and NAS connectivity for Integrated Access and Backhaul Mobile Terminal (IAB-MT) is shown. Figure 9 A flowchart is shown illustrating an example method implemented at a device according to some example embodiments of the present disclosure; Figure 10 Examples of MAC PDUs according to some exemplary embodiments of this disclosure are shown; Figure 11 A simplified block diagram of a device suitable for implementing example embodiments of the present disclosure is shown; and Figure 12 A block diagram of an example computer-readable medium according to some example embodiments of the present disclosure is shown.

[0010] Throughout the accompanying drawings, the same or similar reference numerals denote the same or similar elements. Detailed Implementation

[0011] The principles of this disclosure will now be described with reference to some exemplary embodiments. It should be understood that these embodiments are described merely for illustration and to help those skilled in the art understand and implement this disclosure, and do not imply any limitation on the scope of this disclosure. The embodiments described herein can be implemented in various ways other than those described below.

[0012] In the following description and claims, unless otherwise defined, all technical and scientific terms used herein have the same meaning as commonly understood by one of ordinary skill in the art to which this disclosure pertains.

[0013] References to "an embodiment," "embodiment," "example embodiment," etc., in this disclosure indicate that the described embodiment may include a particular feature, structure, or characteristic, but not every embodiment needs to include that particular feature, structure, or characteristic. Furthermore, such phrases do not necessarily refer to the same embodiment. Moreover, when a particular feature, structure, or characteristic is described in connection with an embodiment, whether explicitly described or not, it is believed that its influence on such feature, structure, or characteristic in conjunction with other embodiments is within the knowledge of those skilled in the art.

[0014] It should be understood that although various elements may be described herein using prefixes such as “first,” “second,” etc., these elements should not be limited by these terms. These terms are used only to distinguish one element from another, and they do not restrict the order of the terms. For example, without departing from the scope of the exemplary embodiments, a first element may be referred to as a second element, and similarly, a second element may be referred to as a first element. As used herein, the term “and / or” includes any and all combinations of one or more of the listed terms.

[0015] As used herein, “at least one of the following: ” and “at least one of ” and similar wording, where the list of two or more elements is connected by “and” or “or”, means at least any one of the elements, or at least any two or more of the elements, or at least all of the elements.

[0016] As used herein, unless explicitly stated otherwise, the execution step “in response to A” does not indicate that the step must be performed immediately after “A” occurs, and may include one or more intervention steps.

[0017] The terminology used herein is for the purpose of describing particular embodiments only and is not intended to limit the exemplary embodiments. As used herein, the singular forms “a,” “an,” and “the” are also intended to include the plural forms unless the context clearly indicates otherwise. It will be further understood that the terms “comprising,” “including,” “having,” “having,” “including,” and / or “comprising” as used herein specify the presence of the stated features, elements, and / or components, etc., but do not exclude the presence or addition of one or more other features, elements, components, and / or combinations thereof.

[0018] As used in this application, the term "circuit system" may refer to one or more of the following: (a) Hardware circuit implementation only (such as implementation in analog and / or digital circuits only), and (b) A combination of hardware circuitry and software, such as (if applicable): (i) A combination of (multiple) analog and / or digital hardware circuits and software / firmware, and (ii) Any part of a hardware processor (including multiple digital signal processors, software, and multiple memories, which work together to enable a device (such as a mobile phone or server) to perform various functions), and (c) (Multiple) hardware circuits and / or (multiple) processors, such as (multiple) microprocessors or a portion thereof, which require software (e.g. firmware) to operate, but may not exist when the software is not required to operate.

[0019] The definition of "circuit system" applies to all uses of the term in this application, including any claim. As yet another example, as used in this application, the term "circuit system" also covers implementations of hardware circuitry or processors (or processors) or hardware circuitry or processors and their accompanying software and / or firmware. The term "circuit system" also covers, for example (and if applicable to a particular claim element), baseband integrated circuits or processor integrated circuits for mobile devices or similar integrated circuits in servers, cellular network devices, or other computing or networking devices.

[0020] As used herein, the term "communication network" refers to a network that conforms to any suitable communication standard, such as New Radio (NR), Long Term Evolution (LTE), LTE-A Advanced (LTE-A), Wideband Code Division Multiple Access (WCDMA), High-Speed ​​Packet Access (HSPA), Narrowband Internet of Things (NB-IoT), etc. Furthermore, communication between terminal devices and network devices in a communication network can be performed according to any suitable intergenerational communication protocol, including but not limited to first-generation (1G), second-generation (2G), 2.5G, 2.75G, third-generation (3G), fourth-generation (4G), 4.5G, fifth-generation (5G), 5G Advanced, 5.5G, sixth-generation (6G) communication protocols and / or any other currently known or future-developed protocols. Embodiments of this disclosure can be applied to a variety of communication systems. Given the rapid development of communications, there will naturally be future types of communication technologies and systems that can implement this disclosure. The scope of this disclosure should not be limited to the aforementioned systems only.

[0021] As used herein, the term "network device" refers to a node in a communication network through which terminal devices access the network and receive services. Network devices can refer to base stations (BS) or access points (APs), such as Node B (NodeB or NB), evolved Node B (eNodeB or eNB), NR NB (also known as gNB), Remote Radio Unit (RRU), Radio Head (RH), Remote Radio Head (RRH), repeater, Integrated Access and Backhaul (IAB) node, low-power nodes (such as femtonodes, piconodes), non-terrestrial network (NTN) or non-terrestrial network equipment (such as satellite network equipment, low Earth orbit (LEO) satellites, and geostationary Earth orbit (GEO) satellites), spacecraft network equipment, etc., depending on the terminology and technology employed. In some example embodiments, the Radio Access Network (RAN) split architecture includes centralized units (CUs) and distributed units (DUs). This architecture can be applied to IAB donor nodes. An IAB node includes a mobile terminal (IAB-MT) portion that behaves like a UE toward its parent node, and a DU portion that behaves like a base station toward the next-hop IAB node.

[0022] The term "terminal device" refers to any terminal device capable of wireless communication. As an example and not a limitation, a terminal device may also be referred to as a communication device, user equipment (UE), subscriber station (SS), portable subscriber station, mobile station (MS), or access terminal (AT). Terminal devices can include, but are not limited to, mobile phones, cellular phones, smartphones, Voice over IP (VoIP) phones, wireless local loop phones, tablets, wearable terminal devices, personal digital assistants (PDAs), portable computers, desktop computers, image capture terminal devices (such as digital cameras), gaming terminal devices, music storage and playback devices, in-vehicle wireless terminal devices, wireless endpoints, mobile stations, laptop embedded devices (LEEs), laptop devices (LMEs), USB dongles, smart devices, wireless customer premises equipment (CPEs), Internet of Things (IoT) devices, watches or other wearable devices, head-mounted displays (HMDs), vehicles, drones, medical devices and applications (e.g., remote surgery), industrial devices and applications (e.g., robots and / or other wireless devices operating in the context of industrial and / or automated processing chains), consumer electronics devices, devices operating on commercial and / or industrial wireless networks, etc. The terminal device may also correspond to the mobile terminal (MT) portion of an IAB node (e.g., a relay node). In the following description, the terms "terminal device," "communication device," "terminal," "user equipment," and "UE" are used interchangeably.

[0023] As used herein, the terms “resource,” “transmission resource,” “resource block,” “physical resource block” (PRB), “uplink resource,” or “downlink resource” can refer to any resource used to perform communication, such as communication between a terminal device and a network device, including resources in the time domain, frequency domain, spatial domain, code domain, or any other combination of time, frequency, spatial, and / or code domain resources used to implement communication. In the following, unless explicitly stated otherwise, resources in both the frequency and time domains will be used as examples of transmission resources used to describe some exemplary embodiments of this disclosure. Note that the exemplary embodiments of this disclosure are equally applicable to other resources in other domains.

[0024] Figure 1 An example communication environment 100 in which exemplary embodiments of the present disclosure may be implemented is shown. In the communication environment 100, a plurality of communication devices, including a first device 110 and a second device 120, can communicate with each other. The first device 110 may be a terminal device or a UE. The second device 120 may be a network device, a network node, a BS, a gNB, or an eNB. The first device 110 may communicate with the second device 120 within the coverage area of ​​a cell managed by the second device 120.

[0025] As used herein, the transmission direction from the second device 120 to the first device 110 is referred to as the downlink (DL), and the transmission direction from the first device 110 to the second device 120 is referred to as the uplink (UL).

[0026] It should be understood that Figure 1 The number of devices, equipment, and their connections shown is for illustrative purposes only and does not imply any limitation. Communication environment 100 may include any suitable number of devices configured to implement the exemplary embodiments of this disclosure. Although not shown, it should be understood that one or more additional devices or equipment may be located in the cell, and one or more additional cells may be deployed in communication environment 100. For example, in Figure 1 The diagram depicts a terminal device; however, it should be understood that the communication environment 100 may include additional terminal devices besides the terminal device shown.

[0027] Communication in communication environment 100 can be implemented according to any suitable communication protocol(s), including but not limited to cellular communication protocols, wireless local area network communication protocols (such as IEEE 802.11, etc.), and / or any other currently known or future-developed protocols. Furthermore, communication can utilize any suitable wireless communication technology, including but not limited to: Code Division Multiple Access (CDMA), Frequency Division Multiple Access (FDMA), Time Division Multiple Access (TDMA), Frequency Division Duplex (FDD), Time Division Duplex (TDD), Multiple-Input Multiple-Output (MIMO), Orthogonal Frequency Division Multiple Access (OFDM), Discrete Fourier Transform Extended OFDM (DFT-s-OFDM), and / or any other currently known or future-developed technologies. For example, new waveforms can be developed and adopted during runtime via artificial intelligence / machine learning (AI / ML) technologies.

[0028] Work within 3GPP has introduced advanced features aimed at improving mobility processes. Specifically, there are research projects focusing on Layer 1 (L1) / Layer 2 (L2) triggered mobility (LTM). Regarding LTM cell handover commands, the MAC layer specification defines the MAC CE frame, such as... Figure 2 As shown, it illustrates the LTM cell handover command MAC CE 200. The LTM cell handover command MAC CE 200 can include seven octet bytes (OCT). Each OCT can include, for example, Figure 2One or more fields are shown. For example, OCT 3 may include a Reserved (R) field and a Transport Configuration Indicator (TCI) Status Identifier (ID) field. For inter-CU LTM features / functions, the source gNB sends a MAC CE cell handover command message to the UE, allowing the UE to select or derive the relevant session keys used for handover. In this context, session keys refer to those session keys used during key processing in the handover. For vertical key derivation, the next-hop chain counter (NCC) value needs to be signaled to the UE.

[0029] Figure 3 A schematic diagram of an LTM cell handover command MAC CE is shown, illustrating a potential scheme for transmitting NCC values ​​via the LTM cell handover command MAC CE frame. For example... Figure 3 As shown, the NCC value is based on three binary digits. Specifically, Figure 2 The three (R) bits in the LTM cell handover command MAC CE 200 can be replaced by the NCC value. Figure 3 The structure shown is only one example; other placements of the NCC value are possible. However, this paper assumes that the MAC frame carries the NCC value. From a security perspective, MAC CE frames are unprotected. For example, there is no encryption, no integrity protection, and no replay protection. From a risk assessment perspective, because the NCC value is used to select the key further used to derive the session key, robust security mechanisms are required. Generally, MAC CE security solutions should be usable for different features. In other words, the security solution should be generic, and protection of the NCC value should be the first use case for the security solution.

[0030] To examine this more comprehensively at the entity level, the MAC layer framework should be considered, namely the MAC layer building blocks and the building blocks that primarily create / consume MAC CEs. Figure 4 An overview of the MAC architecture for the device is shown 400. As shown, multiple layers, such as upper and lower layers, can be specified. Multiple channels and protocols can be configured for these channels. MAC CEs can be transmitted via control function blocks such as MAC layer control function blocks. MAC CE values ​​are created / consumed by MAC layer control function blocks. Various MAC CEs can be generated by... Figure 4 The MAC control function block shown is created or consumed.

[0031] First-level checks of the defined MAC CEs have shown that not all MAC CEs have the same sensitivity. Therefore, not all MAC CEs need to be protected in the same way. Thus, a potential solution should consider introducing MAC CE channels, where each channel provides a separate / different level of security. On the other hand, the transmission rate of MAC CEs is also a factor; some MAC CEs will be transmitted very frequently, while others will be transmitted infrequently. This is another reason for introducing MAC CE channels. MAC CE values ​​will be transmitted via transport blocks (TBs). This can be referenced... Figure 5A and Figure 5B To understand, Figure 5A and Figure 5B Example DL MAC PDU 500A and example UL MAC PDU 500B are shown. For DL ​​transmissions, MACCE frames will be included before the MAC CE SDU, while for UL transmissions, these will be appended after the MAC SDU. However, the MACCE framework is the same for both DL and UL, and this framework anticipates the use of both fixed-size and variable-size MAC CE SDUs. Therefore, depending on the format, the MAC CE subheader may or may not require a length value.

[0032] For security reasons, namely encryption and integrity protection, key derivation and keystream generation are required. Key derivation is used in the context of the key hierarchy defined by 3GPP, such as... Figure 6 As shown, it illustrates the key hierarchy generation process 600 in 5GS. Different keys (e.g., K) are obtained by running the Key Derivation Function (KDF). RRCint The KDF is placed within Radio Resource Control (RRC). The KDF will use different inputs to derive the output key. Keystream generation uses an algorithmic core (e.g., AES, Snow 5G, ZUC) and other relevant input parameters to compute the output keystream, which is then XORed with the plaintext input bitstream.

[0033] Keystream generation is essential for encryption (see...) Figure 7A It illustrates an example data encryption process 700A and integrity protection (see [reference]). Figure 7B The example derivation process shown in 700B for MAC-I / Non-Access Layer (NAS)-MAC (or XMAC-I / XNAS-MAC) is different. Figure 7AAs shown, on the sender's side, a plaintext block can be encrypted based on a keystream block to obtain a ciphertext block. The keystream block can be generated based on the key, count, bearer, direction, and length. On the receiver's side, a plaintext block can be obtained from the ciphertext block based on the keystream block. Similarly, a keystream block can be generated based on the key, count, bearer, direction, and length.

[0034] like Figure 7B As shown, on the sender side, MAC-I or NAS-MAC can be generated based on the key, count, message, direction, and bearer. On the receiver side, XMAC-I or XNAS-MAC can be obtained based on the key, count, message, direction, and bearer.

[0035] To gain a more comprehensive view at the system level, the end-to-end RAN / CN architecture should be considered. More specifically, the split-gNB should be considered more carefully, as the introduction of MAC CE security and key deployment adds new aspects. Figure 8 The protocol stack 800 for supporting RRC and NAS connections in IAB-MT is shown. It should be understood that, as Figure 8 The protocol stack 800 shown is for illustrative purposes only, and other deployments are possible. As illustrated, an IAB node such as IAB Node 2 (e.g., IAB-MT) can communicate with the AMF via the NAS layer. IAB Node 2 can communicate with IAB donors such as the CU via the RRC layer and the Packet Data Convergence Protocol (PDCP) layer. Furthermore, between IAB Node 2 and another IAB node such as IAB Node 1 (e.g., IAB-DU), the corresponding Radio Link Control (RLC), MAC, and Physical (PHY) layers are connected. MAC messages such as MAC CE can be transmitted between IAB Node 1 and IAB Node 2 via the MAC layer.

[0036] As described above, the KDF is mapped to the RRC, and the RRC in this deployment is mapped to the gNB-CU. The PDCP can be divided into PDCPc and PDCPu, and both handle decryption / encryption and / or integrity protection / authentication. There is no clear separation between them. The PDCP in this deployment is mapped to the gNB-CU. In this deployment, key derivation and keystream generation are always processed internally within the gNB-CU. The KgNB is always protected and maintained internally within the gNB-CU. Now, to introduce MAC CE security, it may be necessary to maintain the key material within the MAC layer of the gNB-DU.

[0037] Several challenges arise when extending security features to MAC CE at the MAC layer. For example, a suitable framework is needed to integrate security operations such as encryption and / or integrity protection into existing MAC CE mechanisms. A proper key derivation process is expected to provide the necessary keys for MAC CE protection. The generation and distribution of key streams used for MAC CE security should be carefully managed, especially in split-gNB or other complex network deployments. Furthermore, replay protection needs to be introduced for MAC CE frames to prevent malicious reuse of earlier transmissions.

[0038] According to some example embodiments of this disclosure, a solution for MAC CE security protection is provided. In this solution, a device sends a MAC message including at least one MAC PDU to another device. The MAC PDU in the at least one MAC PDU indicates a security type and a message authentication code. The security type indicates the encoding / decoding metric used to generate the message authentication code. The message authentication code is generated based on the encoding / decoding metric and on at least one of the following: a first key associated with the device or the other device, a second key associated with the Radio Resource Control (RRC) layer, or information associated with the device or the other device. This enhances the security of the MAC CE.

[0039] Figure 9 A flowchart of an example method 900 implemented at a device according to some example embodiments of the present disclosure is shown. For the purposes of discussion, [the following will be discussed]. Figure 1 The method 900 is described from the perspective of the first device 110. It should be understood that in some example embodiments, the method 900 may also be implemented by the second device 120 or any other device or apparatus.

[0040] In block 910, first device 110 transmits a MAC message to another device (such as second device 120). The MAC message includes at least one MAC PDU. In embodiments where first device 110 transmits the MAC message to second device 120, first device 110 may be referred to as the sender or transmitter of the MAC message, and second device 120 may be referred to as the receiver of the MAC message. It should be understood that in some example embodiments, first device 110 may be the receiver of the MAC message, and second device 120 may be the sender or transmitter of the MAC message. The roles of first device 110 and second device 120 may be interchanged.

[0041] In exemplary embodiments of this disclosure, at least one MAC PDU (such as a single MAC PDU among a plurality of MAC PDUs or the last MAC PDU) indicates a security type and a message authentication code. The security type indicates the codec metric used to generate the message authentication code. The message authentication code (also known as MAC-I) can be used to authenticate the sender of a MAC message. As an example, the codec metric used to generate the message authentication code may include hash functions such as Secure Hash Algorithm (SHA) 2, SHA3, Hash-based Message Authentication Code (HMAC)-SHA2, HMAC-SHA3 functions, etc. SHA2 may be based on standards such as Federal Information Processing Standards Publication (FIPS) 180-4. SHA3 may be based on standards such as FIPS 202. It should be understood that the codec metric can be any suitable currently developed or future function or algorithm used to derive the authentication code or representation. The scope of this disclosure is not limited thereto. For the purposes of discussion, some exemplary embodiments in which the codec metric is a hash function will be described. In embodiments where the codec metric is a hash function, the security type may also be referred to as a hash type or an HMAC type. The HMAC type can be included in the security tag (SecTag) of the MAC message. The SecTag can be used for hash algorithm or function selection. This is relevant because the hash function can be selected from either the SHA2 or SHA3 family.

[0042] In the example, the message authentication code is generated based on a codec metric and a first key associated with either the first device 110 or the second device 120. For example, the first key could be a key of the second device 120. In some example embodiments, the second device 120 may include a gNB distributed unit (DU) and a gNB centralized unit (CU). The first key could be a key of the gNB-DU (referred to as "K"). gNB-DU ) or gNB-CU key (referred to as "K") gNB-CU KDF, specifically designed for MAC CE protection, can generate and provide features such as K... gNB-DU or K gNB-CU New keys such as K. These keys can also be used to calculate MAC CE-protected session keys, such as K. MACint .

[0043] In some example embodiments, the first device 110 may be based on a first key (such as K). gNB-DU or K gNB-CU To generate session keys (such as K) for MAC messages. MACintThe first device 110 can generate a message authentication code based on a session key and according to a codec metric such as a hash function. The first device 110 can generate a MAC message by including the message authentication code. For example, a private key K... MACint It can be used as input to HMAC-SHA2 or HMAC-SHA3 functions, and the result of key-hash MAC is MAC CE MAC-I, which needs to be sent together with the associated MAC CE frame.

[0044] In another example, the message authentication code is generated based on a codec metric and a second key associated with the Radio Resource Control (RRC) layer. For example, the second key could be an RRC key, such as K. RRCint Or any other existing or future RRC session key. The first device 110 can generate a message authentication code based on the RRC session key and according to a codec metric. The first device 110 can generate a MAC message by including the message authentication code. In some cases, a single key can be used for a single function. Assuming the MAC CE information is considered an RRC message transmission, then in this case, K... RRCint It can be (re)used for keyed hashing. By reusing existing session keys as input for hash calculations, the amount of work in the implementation can be reduced.

[0045] In another example, the message authentication code is generated based on encoding / decoding metrics and information associated with the first device 110, such as UE-specific information. For example, the first device 110 may generate a third key based on the UE-specific information. The UE-specific information can be accessed by the Universal Subscriber Identity Module (USIM), Unified Data Management (UDM), Authentication Credentials Repository and Processing Function (ARPF), etc. This scheme essentially uses keys known to the UE and the UDM / ARPF. In this case, only these two entities possess the relevant keys, and only these two entities can compute the session key used for MAC CE framework protection.

[0046] The first device 110 can generate a message authentication code based on a third key and according to a codec metric. For example, the secret or key used for the key-hash MAC can be derived from UE-specific information known only to the USIM and UDM / ARPF. The first device 110 can generate a MAC message by including the message authentication code. The key used for hash calculation can be independent of, for example, a third key. Figure 6 The key hierarchy is shown. For the UE side, this key hierarchy isn't a major issue because the UE possesses the secret key K and has implemented all necessary hash algorithms. For the gNB side, however, this key hierarchy presents a greater challenge because the gNB relies on the information it receives. Therefore, the authentication process, especially the propagation of K... gNBThose parts may need to be expanded using the key used for hash value (MAC-I) calculation.

[0047] It should be understood that these example embodiments for deriving message authentication codes are described for illustrative purposes only and do not imply any limitations. These example embodiments may be varied or combined.

[0048] Several example embodiments regarding the generation of message authentication codes have been described. In some example embodiments, the generated message authentication codes may not be protected or encrypted.

[0049] A MAC PDU may also include a MAC CE Service Data Unit (SDU), a header, etc. A MAC CE SDU may include information related to control elements. The MAC CE SDU or its header may be protected for integrity and / or encrypted. Figure 10 Examples of MAC PDUs according to some exemplary embodiments of the present disclosure are shown. As shown, the MAC PDU includes a header, such as an R / F / LCID / L subheader 1010, and a variable-size MAC CE 1020. The variable-size MAC CE may include a MAC CESDU 1021, a MAC CE (MAC-I) 1022, and a MAC CE SecTag 1023.

[0050] In some example embodiments, at least one MAC PDU includes a MAC PDU and at least one additional MAC PDU. The at least one additional MAC PDU may be integrity protected and / or encrypted.

[0051] In some example embodiments, the MAC PDU may also indicate the channel identifier (CID), the MAC layer sequence number used for replay protection, the length of the secure MAC CE in the MAC message, etc. The CID may indicate the cryptographic protection of the MAC message, the sensitivity of the MAC message, etc.

[0052] A MAC frame can consist of a subheader and an associated MAC CE block. For backward compatibility purposes, the MAC frame remains unchanged. Fixed-size or variable-size MAC CEs can still exist. The corresponding header remains as specified and may not use the existing (R)-bit.

[0053] Assuming a traditional entity is receiving an integrity-protected MAC CE frame, it can read and interpret the frame because the subheader is not encrypted. Since the MAC SDU is located immediately after the subheader, the traditional receiving entity can read and interpret it. The SecTag and MAC-I can be read but not interpreted. If the SecTag and MAC-I are not interpreted, these two elements can be discarded by the traditional implementation.

[0054] As described above, in some example embodiments, the MAC CE SDU may be integrity protected. MAC-I may typically be unprotected. Secure MAC CE frames may be integrity protected. To protect MAC messages, a new key can be generated as described above.

[0055] The hash functions used to generate the keys can be standardized and made available on the network node side because they have already been introduced by other features. Therefore, this scheme simplifies and reduces the workload in implementation. The hash functions can be placed at higher layers, but also at the MAC layer. This also applies to integrity verification.

[0056] These example implementations support backward compatibility. Integrity-protected frames can be read and interpreted by conventional receiving entities.

[0057] SecTag can always be at the end, and from a relevance perspective, information elements start from right to left. IE's length can be adjusted in the future according to new requirements.

[0058] It should be understood that the methods and frame structures proposed in this paper for MAC CE security protection can be used for various types of MAC CE, including but not limited to: - Semi-persistent (SP) Channel State Information Reference Signal (CSI-RS) / Channel State Information Interference Measurement (CSI-IM) resource set activation / deactivation MAC CE; - Non-periodic CSI triggers state sub-selection MAC CE; - MAC CE activated / deactivated for the UE-specific Physical Downlink Shared Channel (PDSCH) Transport Configuration Indicator (TCI) status; - MAC CE for TCI status indication specific to the UE; -Activation / deactivation of MAC CE regarding SP CSI reports for the Physical Uplink Control Channel (PUCCH); - Activation / deactivation of MAC CE for the enhanced SP CSI report of PUCCH; -SP probe reference signal (SRS) activates / deactivates MAC CE; -PUCCH spatial relation activation / deactivation MAC CE; - Enhanced PUCCH spatial relation activation / deactivation MAC CE; -SP Zero Power (ZP) CSI-RS Resource Set Activation / Deactivation MAC CE; - Recommended bit rate MAC CE; - Enhanced SP / Aperiodic (AP) SRS Spatial Relationship Indicator MAC CE; -SRS path loss reference RS update MAC CE; -PUSCH path loss reference RS update MAC CE; - SRS spatial relationship indication MAC CE based on serving cell set; -SP locates SRS activation / deactivation MAC CE; -Timed incremental MAC CE; - Protection symbol MAC CE; - Positioning measurement gap activation / deactivation command MAC CE; -PPW activation / deactivation command MAC CE; -Activation / deactivation of MAC CE for PUCCH spatial relationships with PUCCH repetition in multiple transmit-receive-point (TRP) PUCCH; - MAC CE update for PUCCH power control set updates for multiple TRP PUCCH repetitions; - Unify TCI status activation / deactivation of MAC CE; -Differential Koffset MAC CE; -Case-7 Timing Advance Offset MAC CE; -DL TX power adjustment MAC CE; - Sub-Integrated Access and Backhaul Distributed Unit (IAB-DU) Limited Beam Indicator MAC CE; - Timing status indicator MAC CE; - PSI-based SDU discard activation / deactivation MAC CE; - Beam Fault Detection Reference Signal (BFD-RS) indicates MAC CE; - Recommended beam indicator MAC CE for Integrated Access and Backhaul Mobile Terminal (IAB-MT); Adjust MAC CE for the UL power spectral density (PSD) range of IAB; -Case-6 Timed Request MAC CE; - Network Controlled Repeater (NCR) Backhaul Link Beam Indicator (MAC CE); -NCR access link beam indicator MAC CE; - Enhanced unified TCI state activation / deactivation MAC CE; -LTM cell handover command MAC CE; - Candidate cell TCI status activation / deactivation MAC CE; - Aggregate SP to locate SRS activation / deactivation MAC CE.

[0059] In some example embodiments, the means capable of performing any of the methods 900 (e.g., Figure 1 The first device 110 may include a component for performing the corresponding operation of method 900. This component may be implemented in any suitable form. For example, the component may be implemented in a circuit system or a software module. The device may be implemented as or included in... Figure 1 In the first device 110.

[0060] In some example embodiments, the apparatus includes components for transmitting a MAC message comprising at least one MAC PDU to another apparatus. The MAC PDU in the at least one MAC PDU indicates a security type and a message authentication code. The security type indicates a codec metric used to generate the message authentication code. The message authentication code is generated based on the codec metric and on at least one of the following: a first key associated with the apparatus or the other apparatus, a second key associated with the RRC layer, or information associated with the apparatus or the other apparatus.

[0061] Figure 11 This is a simplified block diagram of a device 1100 suitable for implementing exemplary embodiments of the present disclosure. The device 1100 can be provided to implement a communication device, such as... Figure 1 The first device 110 or the second device 120 shown. As shown, device 1100 includes one or more processors 1110, one or more memories 1120 coupled to processor 1110, and one or more communication modules 1140 coupled to processor 1110.

[0062] Communication module 1140 is used for bidirectional communication. Communication module 1140 has one or more communication interfaces to support communication with one or more other modules or devices. The communication interface can represent any interface necessary for communication with other network elements. In some example embodiments, communication module 1140 may include at least one antenna.

[0063] As a non-limiting example, processor 1110 can be any type suitable for a local technology network and can include one or more of the following: general-purpose computer, special-purpose computer, microprocessor, digital signal processor (DSP), and processor based on a multi-core processor architecture. Device 1100 can have multiple processors, such as application-specific integrated circuit chips, which are time-dependent on the clock of a synchronous main processor.

[0064] Memory 1120 may include one or more non-volatile memories and one or more volatile memories. Examples of non-volatile memories include, but are not limited to, read-only memory (ROM) 1124, electrically programmable read-only memory (EPROM), flash memory, hard disk, compact optical disc (CD), digital video disc (DVD), optical disc, laser disc, and other magnetic and / or optical storage. Examples of volatile memories include, but are not limited to, random access memory (RAM) 1122 and other volatile memories that do not retain data during power outages.

[0065] Computer program 1130 includes computer-executable instructions that are executed by an associated processor 1110. The instructions of program 1130 may include instructions for performing operations / actions of some example embodiments of this disclosure. Program 1130 may be stored in memory (e.g., ROM 1124). Processor 1110 can perform any suitable actions and processes by loading program 1130 into RAM 1122.

[0066] Example embodiments of this disclosure can be implemented by program 1130, enabling device 1100 to execute as described in the reference. Figure 9 Any process discussed in this disclosure. Exemplary embodiments of this disclosure may also be implemented by hardware or a combination of software and hardware.

[0067] In some example embodiments, program 1130 may be tangibly contained in a computer-readable medium, which may be included in device 1100 (such as in memory 1120) or in other storage devices accessible by device 1100. Device 1100 may load program 1130 from the computer-readable medium into RAM 1122 for execution. In some example embodiments, the computer-readable medium may include any type of non-transitory storage medium, such as ROM, EPROM, flash memory, hard disk, CD, DVD, etc. The term "non-transitory" as used herein is a limitation on the medium itself (i.e., tangible, not tactile), rather than a limitation on the persistence of data storage (e.g., RAM versus ROM).

[0068] Figure 12 An example of a computer-readable medium 1200 is shown, which may be in the form of a CD, DVD, or other optical storage disc. The computer-readable medium 1200 has a program 1130 stored thereon.

[0069] Generally, the various embodiments of this disclosure can be implemented in hardware or dedicated circuitry, software, logic, or any combination thereof. Some aspects can be implemented in hardware, and others can be implemented in firmware or software that can be executed by a controller, microprocessor, or other computing device. Although various aspects of the embodiments of this disclosure are shown and described as block diagrams, flowcharts, or using some other graphical representation, it should be understood that the blocks, apparatuses, systems, techniques, or methods described herein can be implemented in hardware, software, firmware, dedicated circuitry or logic, general-purpose hardware, or controllers or other computing devices, or some combination thereof, as non-limiting examples.

[0070] Some exemplary embodiments of this disclosure also provide at least one computer program product tangibly stored on a computer-readable medium, such as a non-transitory computer-readable medium. The computer program product includes computer-executable instructions that execute in a device on a target physical or virtual processor, such as those included in a program module, to perform any of the methods described above. Typically, a program module includes routines, programs, libraries, objects, classes, components, data structures, etc., that perform a particular task or implement a particular abstract data type. In various embodiments, the functionality of a program module can be combined or split among program modules as needed. The machine-executable instructions for a program module can execute within a local or distributed device. In a distributed device, the program module can reside on both local and remote storage media.

[0071] Program code used to perform the methods of this disclosure may be written in any combination of one or more programming languages. The program code may be provided to a processor or controller of a general-purpose computer, special-purpose computer, or other programmable data processing apparatus, such that, when executed by the processor or controller, the program code enables the functions / operations specified in the flowcharts and / or block diagrams to be implemented. The program code may be executed entirely on a machine, partially on a machine, as a stand-alone software package, partially on a machine and partially on a remote machine, or entirely on a remote machine or server.

[0072] In the context of this disclosure, computer program code or related data may be carried by any suitable carrier wave to enable a device, apparatus, or processor to perform the various processes and operations described above. Examples of carrier waves include signals, computer-readable media, etc.

[0073] Computer-readable media can be computer-readable signal media or computer-readable storage media. Computer-readable media can include, but is not limited to, electronic, magnetic, optical, electromagnetic, infrared, or semiconductor systems, apparatuses, or devices, or any suitable combination thereof. More specific examples of computer-readable storage media will include electrical connections having one or more wires, portable computer disks, hard disks, random access memory (RAM), read-only memory (ROM), erasable programmable read-only memory (EPROM or flash memory), optical fibers, portable optical disc read-only memory (CD-ROM), optical storage devices, magnetic storage devices, or any suitable combination thereof.

[0074] Furthermore, although operations are described in a specific order, this should not be construed as requiring that such operations be performed in the specific order shown or sequentially, or requiring that all shown operations be performed to achieve the desired result. In some cases, multitasking and parallel processing may be advantageous. Similarly, although several specific implementation details are included in the above discussion, these should not be construed as limiting the scope of this disclosure, but rather as a description of features that may be specific to particular embodiments. Unless explicitly stated otherwise, certain features described in the context of a single embodiment may also be implemented in combination in a single embodiment. Conversely, unless explicitly stated otherwise, various features described in the context of a single embodiment may also be implemented individually or in any suitable sub-combination in multiple embodiments.

[0075] Although this disclosure has been described in language specific to structural features and / or methodological actions, it should be understood that the disclosure as defined in the appended claims is not necessarily limited to the specific features or actions described above. Rather, the specific features and actions described above are disclosed as exemplary forms for implementing the claims.

Claims

1. A device for communication, comprising: At least one processor; as well as At least one memory stores instructions that, when executed by the at least one processor, cause the device to at least: Transmits a Media Access Control (MAC) message to another device, the MAC message including at least one MAC Protocol Data Unit (PDU). The MAC PDU in at least one of the MAC PDUs indicates the security type and message authentication code. The security type indicates the encoding / decoding metric used to generate the message authentication code, and The message authentication code is generated based on the encoding / decoding metric and at least one of the following: The first key associated with the device or the other device, The second key associated with the Radio Resource Control (RRC) layer, or Information associated with the device or the other device.

2. The apparatus of claim 1, wherein the apparatus includes a network device, and the first key includes a key of a distributed unit or a key of a central unit of the network device, and The device is further caused to: A session key for the MAC message is generated based on the first key; The message authentication code is generated based on the session key and according to the encoding / decoding metric. as well as The MAC message is generated by including the message authentication code.

3. The apparatus of claim 1, wherein the second key comprises an RRC session key, and The device is further caused to: The message authentication code is generated based on the RRC session key and according to the encoding / decoding metric; and The MAC message is generated by including the message authentication code.

4. The apparatus of claim 1, wherein the information associated with the apparatus or the other apparatus includes user equipment (UE) specific information, and The device is further caused to: A third key is generated based on the specific information of the UE; The message authentication code is generated based on the third key and according to the encoding / decoding metric; and The MAC message is generated by including the message authentication code.

5. The apparatus of claim 4, wherein the UE-specific information is accessible by at least one of the following: Universal Subscriber Identity Module (USIM) Unified Data Management (UDM), or ARRF (Authorization Credentials Repository and Processing Functions) 6. The apparatus of claim 1, wherein the encoding / decoding metric comprises a hash function.

7. The apparatus of claim 1, wherein the message authentication code is unprotected or unencrypted.

8. The apparatus of claim 1, wherein the MAC PDU further comprises at least one of the following: The MAC control element CE service data unit SDU includes a payload portion, or Newspaper masthead.

9. The apparatus of claim 8, wherein at least one of the MAC CE SDU or the header is protected for integrity and / or encrypted.

10. The apparatus of claim 9, wherein the at least one MAC PDU comprises the MAC PDU and at least one additional MAC PDU, and the at least one additional MAC PDU is protected for integrity and / or encrypted.

11. The apparatus of claim 1, wherein the MAC PDU further indicates at least one of the following: A channel identifier that indicates at least one of the following: cryptographic protection of the MAC message or the sensitivity of the MAC message. MAC layer sequence number used for replay protection, or The length of the secure MAC CE in the MAC message.

12. The apparatus according to any one of claims 1 to 11, wherein the apparatus includes a terminal device, and the other apparatus includes a network device, or The device includes a network device, and the other device includes a terminal device.

13. A method for communication, comprising: Transmits a Media Access Control (MAC) message to another device, the MAC message including at least one MAC Protocol Data Unit (PDU). The MAC PDU in at least one of the MAC PDUs indicates the security type and message authentication code. The security type indicates the encoding / decoding metric used to generate the message authentication code, and The message authentication code is generated based on the encoding / decoding metric and at least one of the following: The first key associated with the device or the other device, The second key associated with the Radio Resource Control (RRC) layer, or Information associated with the device or the other device.

14. An apparatus for communication, comprising: A means for transmitting a Media Access Control (MAC) message to another device, the MAC message including at least one MAC Protocol Data Unit (PDU). The MAC PDU in at least one of the MAC PDUs indicates the security type and message authentication code. The security type indicates the encoding / decoding metric used to generate the message authentication code, and The message authentication code is generated based on the encoding / decoding metric and at least one of the following: The first key associated with the device or the other device, The second key associated with the Radio Resource Control (RRC) layer, or Information associated with the device or the other device.

15. A computer-readable medium comprising instructions stored thereon for causing a device to perform at least the method according to claim 13.

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