Safety control method and device based on vehicle-mounted touch screen and vehicle

Abstract

The embodiment of the application relates to the technical field of vehicles, and discloses a safety control method and device based on a vehicle-mounted touch screen and a vehicle, the method comprising the following steps: if detecting that a user in a vehicle acts on the vehicle-mounted touch screen through a touch operation, determining a target function area touched by the user in the vehicle, and acquiring a safety level of the target function area; determining whether to trigger a touch verification strategy according to a current working condition of the vehicle and the safety level to obtain a trigger judgment result; and determining whether to intercept a touch event corresponding to the touch operation according to the trigger judgment result. The application can improve passive touch recognition accuracy and improve driving safety.

Description

Technical Field

[0001] This application relates to the field of vehicle technology, specifically to a safety control method, device, and vehicle based on an in-vehicle touchscreen. Background Technology

[0002] In-vehicle infotainment (IVI) systems have deeply integrated key vehicle control functions such as window operation, door unlocking, seat adjustment, powertrain control, emergency call (eCall), and hazard warning lights, with the touchscreen serving as the primary input channel for these functions. Under extreme dynamic conditions such as sudden braking or collisions, the human body may experience unintentional limb displacement due to inertia, with parts such as the arm, wrist, or back of the hand potentially making passive contact with the touchscreen, resulting in passive touch events and potentially causing secondary safety accidents. Traditional solutions often employ palm pressure-based anti-mistouch technology, relying solely on the static morphological characteristics of touch signals such as contact area and pressure value for filtering. This can easily lead to the failure to intercept high-risk functions or the excessive restriction of low-risk functions, resulting in low accuracy in passive touch recognition and hindering driving safety. Summary of the Invention

[0003] In view of the above problems, this application provides a safety control method, device and vehicle based on an in-vehicle touch screen to solve the problem of low accuracy of passive touch recognition.

[0004] According to one aspect of the embodiments of this application, a safety control method based on an in-vehicle touchscreen is provided, the method comprising: If a user inside the vehicle is detected to be performing a touch operation on the vehicle's touchscreen, the target functional area touched by the user is determined, and the security level of the target functional area is obtained. Based on the vehicle's current operating status and the aforementioned safety level, determine whether to trigger the touch verification strategy and obtain the trigger judgment result; Based on the trigger judgment result, determine whether to intercept the touch event corresponding to the touch operation.

[0005] According to another aspect of the embodiments of this application, a safety control device based on an in-vehicle touch screen is provided, the device comprising: The first processing module is used to determine the target functional area touched by the user in the vehicle and obtain the security level of the target functional area if a touch operation of the user in the vehicle is detected on the vehicle touch screen. The second processing module is used to determine whether to trigger the touch verification strategy and obtain the trigger judgment result based on the current operating status of the vehicle and the safety level. The third processing module is used to determine whether to intercept the touch event corresponding to the touch operation based on the trigger judgment result.

[0006] According to another aspect of the embodiments of this application, a vehicle is provided, including the above-described apparatus, to cause the vehicle to perform some or all of the steps in the above-described method.

[0007] This application's embodiments divide different functional areas of the in-vehicle touchscreen into different security levels, thereby enabling differentiated security control for various interaction scenarios. After determining the target functional area touched by the user in the vehicle, the security level corresponding to that area can be accurately obtained, and a comprehensive judgment can be made based on the current operating status of the vehicle to determine whether to trigger the touch verification strategy. In this way, unnecessary verification interference can be reduced when the driving environment is relatively safe, while the touch verification strategy can be activated in a timely manner under high-risk conditions, balancing driving safety and user operation convenience. Determining whether to block the touch event corresponding to the touch operation based on the trigger judgment result can effectively prevent the driver from accidentally touching or operating key functions under extreme conditions, reducing the driving risk caused by unexpected interactions, while avoiding the user experience degradation caused by a one-size-fits-all blocking of all touch operations. It can accurately identify the operating intention of the user in the vehicle and ensure driving safety.

[0008] The above description is merely an overview of the technical solutions of the embodiments of this application. In order to better understand the technical means of the embodiments of this application and to implement them in accordance with the contents of the specification, and to make the above and other objects, features and advantages of the embodiments of this application more obvious and understandable, specific implementation methods of this application are described below. Attached Figure Description

[0009] The accompanying drawings are for illustrative purposes only and are not intended to limit the scope of this application. Furthermore, the same reference numerals denote the same parts throughout the drawings. In the drawings: Figure 1 A flowchart illustrating the safety control method based on an in-vehicle touchscreen provided in this application is shown. Figure 2 This paper shows a schematic diagram of the structure of an embodiment of the safety control device based on an in-vehicle touch screen according to this application; Figure 3 A schematic diagram of an embodiment of the electronic device provided in this application is shown. Detailed Implementation

[0010] Exemplary embodiments of the present application will now be described in more detail with reference to the accompanying drawings. Although exemplary embodiments of the present application are shown in the drawings, it should be understood that the present application may be implemented in various forms and should not be limited to the embodiments set forth herein.

[0011] It is understood that before using the technical solutions disclosed in the various embodiments of this application, users should be informed of the types, scope of use, and usage scenarios of the personal information involved in this application in an appropriate manner in accordance with relevant laws and regulations, and user authorization should be obtained.

[0012] Traditional solutions primarily rely on palm pressure-based anti-accidental touch technology and static limitation strategies for driving functions, exhibiting significant functional safety deficiencies. These solutions judge touch signals based on static morphological characteristics such as contact area and pressure value, failing to integrate real-time motion information such as vehicle acceleration and attitude. They cannot distinguish between normal active operation and passive touches caused by inertia in extreme conditions such as sudden braking or collisions, leading to the failure to intercept high-risk functions. Secondly, traditional solutions lack differentiated control over functional safety levels, treating high-risk functions like window operation and power control indiscriminately compared to low-risk functions like media adjustment. Furthermore, they fail to protect against the symmetrical risk of critical rescue functions like eCall and hazard warning lights being accidentally deactivated during collisions. Related protection mechanisms often rely on fixed timeouts or manual confirmation for exit, lacking adaptive recovery strategies based on actual vehicle conditions, thus failing to meet the functional safety requirements of intelligent cockpits in extreme dynamic scenarios.

[0013] Figure 1 A flowchart illustrating the safety control method based on an in-vehicle touchscreen according to this application is shown. Figure 1 As shown, the safety control method based on an in-vehicle touchscreen includes the following steps: S110: If a touch operation by a user inside the vehicle on the vehicle touch screen is detected, the target functional area touched by the user inside the vehicle is determined, and the security level of the target functional area is obtained.

[0014] In this embodiment, a pre-defined functional safety level mapping table is provided. This table includes target functional areas and their corresponding safety levels stored in a correspondence relationship. The functional safety level mapping table is stored as a configurable file, supports dynamic loading by vehicle model, and the mapping content is not bound to specific function names. It is filled in by the OEM (Original Equipment Manufacturer) according to the vehicle model's functional configuration, thus possessing cross-vehicle adaptation capabilities.

[0015] In this embodiment, safety levels can be pre-set for unused functional areas of the vehicle touchscreen based on the degree of safety hazard posed by accidental touches under extreme conditions (emergency braking, collision). This application does not limit the dimensions or number of safety levels. This application uses four safety levels as an example. As an example, the safety levels include Level 1, Level 2, Level 3, and Level 4, with the safety levels decreasing sequentially. The risk of safety injury to the user inside the vehicle from touch operations corresponding to Level 1, Level 2, Level 3, and Level 4 decreases sequentially.

[0016] For example, operations such as unlocking doors and controlling high-risk power devices are classified as Level 1 safety; operations such as adjusting windows, sunroof, and seats are classified as Level 2 safety; operations such as adjusting volume, air conditioning settings, and media controls are classified as Level 3 safety; and emergency response functions such as eCall and hazard warning lights are classified as Level 4 safety. Level 1 touch operations must be directly intercepted during emergency braking or a collision. Level 2 and Level 3 touch operations require a touch verification strategy to determine whether to intercept them. Level 4 touch operations do not require interception during emergency braking or a collision, and in a collision, reverse state maintenance control must be implemented to prevent activated emergency response functions from being passively deactivated by touch.

[0017] S120: Determine whether to trigger the touch verification strategy based on the vehicle's current operating status and safety level, and obtain the trigger judgment result.

[0018] In this embodiment, the operating conditions include: normal driving state, emergency braking state, collision state, and step-by-step recovery state. The step-by-step recovery state refers to the stationary state transitioned from the emergency braking state or the collision state. In the step-by-step recovery state, the vehicle has come to a complete stop after the emergency braking or collision, and can gradually exit the protection mode through a gradient approach.

[0019] S130: Determine whether to intercept the touch event corresponding to the touch operation based on the trigger judgment result.

[0020] In this embodiment, considering that the management of touch operations needs to strike a balance between safety and user usability, touch operations with extremely low or extremely high safety levels during emergency braking or collisions do not need to trigger touch verification strategies. Touch operations with extremely low safety levels pose a very low risk of injury to users inside the vehicle and do not need to be blocked. Touch operations with extremely high safety levels pose a very high risk of injury to users inside the vehicle and are directly blocked to prevent the execution of the corresponding touch event, without requiring additional verification and increasing system overhead.

[0021] In the event of emergency braking or a collision, touch operations with a medium safety level require triggering a touch verification strategy. This strategy further determines whether the touch operation is active or passive. For active touch operations, the corresponding touch event is not intercepted. For passive touch operations, the corresponding touch event is intercepted to prevent secondary safety incidents.

[0022] In one alternative approach, the operating condition is determined based on the vehicle's operating data, which includes the vehicle's acceleration amplitude, acceleration direction, collision sensor signals, acceleration change rate, duration of impacts where the acceleration amplitude exceeds a preset impact threshold, driving speed, and acceleration fluctuation standard deviation.

[0023] The magnitude of acceleration includes the absolute value of longitudinal acceleration and the absolute value of lateral acceleration. The rate of change of acceleration includes the rate of change of longitudinal acceleration and the rate of change of lateral acceleration.

[0024] As an example, the absolute values ​​of longitudinal and lateral acceleration can be determined by taking the absolute values ​​of the longitudinal and lateral acceleration signals from the vehicle's CAN bus. Alternatively, the projection components of the resultant acceleration onto the vehicle's longitudinal and lateral axes can be calculated from the triaxial acceleration data acquired by the local IMU, and then the absolute values ​​of the components can be taken to obtain the absolute values ​​of longitudinal and lateral acceleration.

[0025] As an example, the direction of acceleration can be determined by obtaining the sign of the longitudinal acceleration: when the longitudinal acceleration value is negative, the acceleration direction is determined to be the deceleration direction (opposite to the vehicle's direction of travel). When the longitudinal acceleration value is positive, the acceleration direction is determined to be the acceleration direction (same as the vehicle's direction of travel).

[0026] As an example, if a vehicle is equipped with a separate collision sensor, the collision sensor signal can be obtained through the collision sensor.

[0027] As an example, the method for obtaining the rate of change of acceleration is as follows: Longitudinal and lateral acceleration data are continuously collected at a preset sampling period. The acceleration values ​​of two adjacent sampling periods are then differentially calculated, and divided by the sampling period to obtain the rate of change of acceleration for the corresponding axis. The formula for calculating the rate of change of longitudinal acceleration is: jerk_x(t) = [a_x(t)] a_x(t 1)] / Δt, the formula for calculating the rate of change of lateral acceleration is: jerk_y(t)=[a_y(t)] / Δt a_y(t 1)] / Δt, where t is the current sampling time, t 1 represents the previous sampling time, and Δt represents the sampling period. jerk_x(t) represents the rate of change of longitudinal acceleration at the current sampling time, and jerk_y(t) represents the rate of change of lateral acceleration at the current sampling time. a_x(t) represents the longitudinal acceleration at the current sampling time. 1) represents the longitudinal acceleration at the previous sampling time, and a_y(t) represents the longitudinal acceleration at the current sampling time. 1) represents the longitudinal acceleration corresponding to the previous sampling time.

[0028] As an example, the method for obtaining the standard deviation of acceleration fluctuation is as follows: collect the IMU triaxial composite acceleration data of the most recent N sampling points in a sliding window, calculate the standard deviation σ of the composite acceleration within the window, and use it as the standard deviation of acceleration fluctuation to quantify the vibration intensity of the vehicle.

[0029] The safety control method based on the vehicle touchscreen also includes: (1) If the operating data meets at least one of the judgment conditions, the current operating condition of the vehicle is determined to be a collision state.

[0030] The operational data must meet at least one of the following criteria: (1) The collision sensor signal indicates that a vehicle has been involved in a collision.

[0031] (2) The acceleration amplitude is greater than the preset collision amplitude, and the absolute value of the acceleration change rate is greater than or equal to the preset collision change rate Th_crash_jerk, and the impact duration is less than the preset collision upper limit threshold T_crash_max. The acceleration amplitude being greater than the preset collision amplitude means that the absolute value of the longitudinal acceleration is greater than the preset collision amplitude Th_crash_amp or the absolute value of the lateral acceleration is greater than the preset collision amplitude Th_crash_amp.

[0032] In this embodiment, the collision event determination has a higher priority than other operating conditions determination. If the current operating condition of the vehicle is determined to be a collision state, the state machine directly jumps to the collision state without executing the subsequent determination process of other operating conditions such as emergency braking state and normal driving state.

[0033] In this embodiment, the determination of the collision state introduces a combination constraint of the rate of change of acceleration and the duration of impact, which can effectively distinguish the short-term sudden impact characteristics of a collision from the long-term gradual deceleration characteristics of emergency braking, and avoid misjudging low-speed collisions as emergency braking, resulting in insufficient protection strength.

[0034] In this embodiment of the application, compared with the single acceleration amplitude threshold judgment, the three-dimensional feature joint judgment greatly reduces the probability of confusion between the emergency braking state and the collision state.

[0035] (2) If the acceleration amplitude is greater than the preset emergency braking amplitude, the acceleration direction is the deceleration direction, the impact duration is greater than the preset emergency braking lower threshold, and the absolute value of the acceleration change rate is less than the preset collision change rate, then the current operating state of the vehicle is determined to be an emergency braking state. An acceleration amplitude greater than the preset emergency braking amplitude refers to an absolute value of longitudinal acceleration greater than the preset emergency braking amplitude Th_brake. In this application, the magnitudes of the preset emergency braking amplitude and the preset collision amplitude are not limited. As an example, the preset emergency braking amplitude can be less than, greater than, or equal to the preset collision amplitude. In this embodiment, when the current operating state of the vehicle is determined to be an emergency braking state, the state machine directly jumps to the emergency braking state. In this embodiment, if the previous operating state of the vehicle is determined to be an emergency braking state, and the current operating state is a collision state, then the state machine immediately jumps to the collision state and interrupts the touch verification strategy under the emergency braking state. The collision state can interrupt the touch verification strategy under the emergency braking state.

[0036] In this embodiment, the determination of the emergency braking state is based on a combination of features, such as acceleration direction being deceleration, longer impact duration, and lower rate of change of acceleration, to accurately match the dynamic characteristics of emergency braking, avoid misjudging hard emergency braking as a collision, and prevent the touch verification strategy from being too strict and affecting the user's normal operation.

[0037] In this embodiment, the problem of insufficient protection strength in emergency braking scenarios is avoided, and false triggering caused by overly sensitive collision detection is prevented. It achieves accurate matching of touch verification strategies under different extreme working conditions, balancing security and usability.

[0038] (3) If the rate of change of acceleration is within the preset steady-state range, then the current operating condition of the vehicle is determined to be normal driving condition.

[0039] In this embodiment, the preset steady-state range can be calibrated based on the acceleration fluctuation characteristics during normal vehicle operation. For example, it can be set to a condition where the absolute value of the rate of change of acceleration is less than a preset steady-state threshold and the duration exceeds a preset steady-state confirmation duration, thus excluding the influence of instantaneous disturbances such as road bumps. When the state machine is in normal driving mode, all touch operations are executed normally without triggering additional touch verification strategies, ensuring the smoothness of normal user operations.

[0040] In this embodiment, special control is only deactivated when the vehicle is running smoothly, avoiding repeated switching of operating conditions in scenarios such as frequent starts and stops and minor bumps, thus reducing interference with normal user operation.

[0041] (4) If the driving speed is 0, and the standard deviation of acceleration fluctuation is less than or equal to the preset standard deviation threshold, and the duration of the driving speed being 0 and the standard deviation of acceleration fluctuation being less than or equal to the preset standard deviation threshold is greater than or equal to the preset duration threshold, then the current operating state of the vehicle is determined to be a step-by-step recovery state. Specifically, when the vehicle is currently in the step-by-step recovery state, the corresponding touch verification strategies are sequentially deactivated according to the order of collision state, emergency braking state, and normal driving state, with a preset time step, to avoid the risk of instantaneous misoperation caused by a one-time full switch of the control strategy.

[0042] In this embodiment of the application, when the driving speed is not 0 or the standard deviation of acceleration fluctuation is greater than the preset standard deviation threshold, the timing is restarted and the duration is reset to 0.

[0043] In this embodiment, the acceleration fluctuation standard deviation σ is the statistical standard deviation of the triaxial composite acceleration within the sliding window, used to quantify the residual vibration intensity of the vehicle: the smaller σ is, the weaker the vehicle vibration, and the closer it is to a completely stationary state. The preset duration threshold T_still is the calibrable stationary confirmation duration, used to eliminate misjudgments caused by instantaneous disturbances and ensure that the vehicle is in a continuously stable stationary state.

[0044] In this embodiment, the triggering of the step-by-step recovery state adopts a three-element joint judgment logic: the first element is the driving speed condition, which requires the CAN bus driving speed signal to be continuously 0, excluding scenarios where the vehicle is coasting at low speed but has not completely stopped. The second element is the vibration intensity condition, which requires σ ≤ a preset standard deviation threshold Th_still (continuously satisfied, excluding scenarios where the vehicle body continues to shake after a collision, or where the vehicle speed v is 0 but still in a dynamic state, such as when it hits an obstacle). The third element is the time coupling condition, which requires the time span for the first two conditions to be met simultaneously to be ≥ a preset duration threshold T_still, avoiding false triggering caused by instantaneous changes in a single condition. The exit timer is automatically reset to zero when any condition is interrupted, such as when a secondary collision causes a sudden increase in σ, or when the vehicle moves briefly and v is not 0, the duration will be re-accumulated to ensure the robustness of the judgment to complex disturbances. The completion timestamp of the step to release the corresponding touch verification strategy is recorded in the protection event log for subsequent functional safety auditing and fault backtracking. After all steps are completed, the state machine transitions to the normal driving state.

[0045] In this embodiment, when the vehicle is in an emergency braking or collision state, it enters a protection mode and executes a differentiated touch verification strategy for touch events of the vehicle body control functions according to a preset functional safety level mapping table. This application also includes a fallback exit mechanism: when the total duration of the protection mode exceeds the configurable maximum protection duration, regardless of whether the ternary joint judgment logic is satisfied, a trigger signal is forcibly sent to the state machine to enter a step-by-step recovery state. This prevents the protection mode from permanently continuing due to extreme scenarios such as the vehicle being suspended over a guardrail or stuck in mud, ensuring the availability of touchscreen controls for escape by users inside the vehicle in emergency situations.

[0046] Furthermore, preset parameters such as the preset standard deviation threshold and preset duration threshold can be dynamically adjusted based on the vehicle's real-time status. For example, when a collision sensor has been triggered, the preset duration threshold can be appropriately extended to ensure the vehicle comes to a complete stop. When suspension displacement sensor signals are available, the amount of suspension displacement change can be incorporated into the vibration determination criteria, further improving the accuracy of static state determination.

[0047] In this embodiment, compared to the fixed timeout exit scheme, the ternary joint determination effectively avoids the risk of prematurely disengaging the protection while the vehicle is still swaying, reducing the probability of secondary misoperation. Compared to the mandatory manual confirmation scheme, it eliminates the defect that the protection cannot be disengaged when the driver is injured or disabled, ensuring the availability of escape after an accident. The fallback exit mechanism provides a clear upper bound constraint on the protection duration, achieving a balance between safety and availability in extreme scenarios.

[0048] In this embodiment of the application, after determining the current operating condition of the vehicle, the current operating condition and the current timestamp are recorded as the operating condition timestamp corresponding to the operating condition.

[0049] In one optional approach, S120 determines whether to trigger the touch verification strategy based on the vehicle's current operating status and safety level, obtaining a trigger judgment result, including: Sa1: When the vehicle is currently in a collision state or an emergency braking state, and the safety level is Level 1, which indicates the degree of safety injury risk to the user inside the vehicle caused by the touch operation is greater than or equal to the first level threshold, the trigger judgment result is determined to be not to trigger the touch verification strategy.

[0050] Sa2: When the vehicle is currently in a collision state or an emergency braking state, and the safety level is the second level, which indicates that the risk of safety injury to the user inside the vehicle caused by the touch operation is less than the first level threshold and greater than or equal to the second level threshold, the trigger judgment result is determined to trigger the touch verification strategy.

[0051] Sa3: When the vehicle is currently in a collision state or an emergency braking state, and the safety level is the third level, which indicates that the risk of safety injury to the user inside the vehicle caused by the touch operation is less than the second level threshold and greater than or equal to the third level threshold, the trigger judgment result is determined to trigger the touch verification strategy.

[0052] Sa4: If the vehicle is currently in a collision state or an emergency braking state, and the safety level is the fourth level, which indicates that the risk of safety injury to the user inside the vehicle caused by touch operation is less than the third level threshold, the trigger judgment result is determined to be that the touch verification strategy is not triggered.

[0053] In this embodiment of the application, the first degree threshold is greater than the second degree threshold, and the second degree threshold is greater than the third degree threshold.

[0054] In this embodiment, for high-risk functions of the first level (such as door unlocking and high-risk power control), accidental touches could directly cause personal injury or death. Therefore, under extreme conditions, the touch verification strategy is directly not triggered, and subsequent interception is executed to avoid the possibility of accidental activation of high-risk functions. For rescue functions of the fourth level (such as eCall and hazard warning lights), the core requirement is to ensure accessibility and status continuity under extreme conditions. Therefore, the touch verification strategy is also not triggered to avoid the verification process hindering the user's emergency operation. For touch operations of the second and third levels, which have a moderate safety level, the risk of accidental touches and the need for usability coexist. Therefore, the touch verification strategy is triggered, and further intent recognition is used to balance safety and ease of operation.

[0055] In one optional approach, S130 determines whether to intercept the touch event corresponding to the touch operation based on the trigger determination result, including: Sb1: If the trigger judgment result is that the touch verification strategy is not triggered, and the current working condition of the vehicle is a collision state or an emergency braking state, and the safety level is the first level, then the touch event corresponding to the touch operation is intercepted.

[0056] Sb2: If the trigger judgment result is that the touch verification strategy is not triggered, and the current working state of the vehicle is a collision state or an emergency braking state, the safety level is level four, and the touch event corresponding to the touch operation is not blocked.

[0057] Sb3: If the trigger judgment result indicates that the touch verification policy has been triggered, then the touch operation is verified using the touch verification policy to obtain the touch verification result. Based on the touch verification result, it is determined whether to block the touch event corresponding to the touch operation.

[0058] This application breaks away from the traditional one-size-fits-all touch control model, implementing differentiated strategies for functions with different security levels. This avoids insufficient verification of high-risk (Level 1) functions while preventing over-control of Level 4 rescue functions, and retains a refined intent recognition space for medium-risk functions. This tiered triggering mechanism, while ensuring core safety objectives under extreme conditions, minimizes unnecessary verification processes that interfere with normal user operation, balancing functional safety with the usability of user interaction.

[0059] In one alternative approach, Sb3 includes Sb31: when the vehicle's current operating condition is a collision state and the safety level is level two, a touch verification strategy is used to verify the touch operation, and a touch verification result is obtained, including: Obtain the confirmation gesture corresponding to the touch operation.

[0060] Determine if the touch operation matches the confirmation gesture.

[0061] If the touch operation matches a confirmation gesture, the touch verification result is an active touch. Alternatively, if the touch operation does not match a confirmation gesture, the touch verification result is a passive touch.

[0062] In this embodiment of the application, as an example, the confirmed operation gesture includes a dual gesture sequence of long press and swipe, specifically including a preset long press threshold and a preset swipe threshold corresponding to the touch operation.

[0063] As an example, the specific implementation of determining whether a touch operation matches a confirmation gesture is as follows: Get the duration of the touch operation.

[0064] Determine whether the duration of touch is greater than or equal to the preset long press threshold.

[0065] Obtain the sliding displacement corresponding to the touch operation.

[0066] Determine whether the sliding displacement is greater than or equal to the preset sliding threshold.

[0067] When the duration of touch is greater than or equal to a preset long press threshold and the swipe displacement is greater than or equal to a preset swipe threshold, the touch operation is determined to match the confirmation operation gesture.

[0068] If the duration of touch is less than a preset long press threshold or the swipe distance is less than a preset swipe threshold, the touch operation is determined to be a mismatch between the confirmation gesture and the touch operation.

[0069] In the embodiments of this application, the impact intensity that the vehicle body bears under collision conditions is much higher than that under emergency braking conditions. The passive displacement of human limbs is usually manifested as instantaneous, irregular bouncing or sliding, which is difficult to satisfy the combined constraints of continuous pressing and directional sliding at the same time. The dual verification logic can reduce the false judgment rate of passive touch control, further improve the recognition accuracy, and solve the defect of high false trigger rate under severe impact scenarios.

[0070] In one alternative approach, Sb3 includes Sb32: when the vehicle's current operating condition is emergency braking and the safety level is level two, a touch verification strategy is used to verify the touch operation, and a touch verification result is obtained, including: Get the duration of the touch operation.

[0071] Determine whether the duration of touch is greater than or equal to the preset long press threshold.

[0072] If the duration of the touch is greater than or equal to the preset long-press threshold, the touch verification result is an active touch. Alternatively, if the duration of the touch is less than the preset long-press threshold, the touch verification result is a passive touch.

[0073] In this embodiment of the application, as an example, the touch duration refers to the time difference between the timestamp when the vehicle touchscreen first detects a valid touch point (i.e., the touch point's contact area is greater than or equal to a preset minimum effective contact area, and the touch point is not marked as a noise point) and the timestamp when the valid touch point leaves the vehicle touchscreen or is determined to be an invalid disconnection. The sliding displacement refers to the straight-line distance between the starting position coordinates and the current position coordinates (or the ending position coordinates) of the valid touch point within the touch duration.

[0074] In this embodiment, the inertial force during emergency braking has a relatively long duration but low impact intensity. Passive human touch is mostly instantaneous, while active operation naturally involves a longer pressing duration. High recognition accuracy can be achieved simply by controlling the touch duration, eliminating the need for sliding displacement verification, thus reducing computational overhead and improving response speed. Furthermore, unlike the touch verification strategy under collision conditions, the verification conditions are relaxed in emergency braking scenarios to avoid excessively restricting normal user operation needs (such as adjusting seat position to mitigate the impact of emergency braking), while the touch verification strategy is tightened in collision scenarios to maximize safety. In addition, the statistical analysis of touch duration eliminates signal jitter and momentary touch interruption interference, ensuring stable and effective touch recognition even under slight vehicle vibration, preventing the interception of normal operations due to misjudgment.

[0075] In one alternative approach, Sb3 includes Sb33: when the vehicle's current operating condition is a collision state or an emergency braking state, and the safety level is level three, a touch verification strategy is used to verify the touch operation, and a touch verification result is obtained, including: Calculate multiple verification metrics. These metrics include at least one of the following: timing metrics, touch sliding direction metrics, touch pressure metrics, and contact area metrics. The timing metrics are determined based on the touch operation timestamp and the operating condition timestamp. The touch sliding direction metrics are determined based on the touch operation's sliding displacement vector and the vehicle's body acceleration vector. The touch pressure metrics are determined based on the maximum touch pressure corresponding to the touch operation. The contact area metrics are determined based on the ratio of the touch contact area corresponding to the touch operation to a preset baseline contact area.

[0076] The weights of each verification indicator under the current operating condition of the vehicle are obtained.

[0077] A comprehensive score is calculated based on each verification indicator and its corresponding weight.

[0078] If the overall score is greater than or equal to the preset score, the touch verification result is passive touch. Alternatively, if the overall score is less than the preset score, the touch verification result is active touch.

[0079] In this embodiment of the application, as an example, the time series index is calculated as follows: Δt = T_touch - T_event.

[0080] T_touch represents the timestamp of the touch operation, that is, the timestamp of the first valid touch point detected by the touch operation. T_event represents the timestamp of the operating status.

[0081] Δt represents the time difference between the timestamp of the touch operation corresponding to the touch operation and the timestamp of the operating status corresponding to the operating status.

[0082] When Δt∈[0, T_window], the timing index F_time=1-Δt / T_window. The smaller Δt is, the closer F_time is to 1, which means that the timing coupling between touch operation and working condition is higher.

[0083] When Δt > T_window, F_time = 0, which means that the touch operation is not related to the operating status.

[0084] T_window is a preset time window threshold based on the working condition. For example, it can be configured to 300ms in emergency braking and can be extended to 800ms in collision condition (to cover the delayed passive touch caused by continuous vibration after the collision).

[0085] As an example, the calculation method for the touch swipe direction index is as follows: Extract the sliding displacement vector v_touch=(x_n-x_1,y_n-y_1), where (x_1,y_1) are the coordinates of the first valid touch point, and (x_n,y_n) are the coordinates of the last valid touch point.

[0086] Obtain the vehicle's body acceleration vector v_acc=(a_x, a_y), where a_x is the longitudinal acceleration and a_y is the lateral acceleration.

[0087] Calculate the cosine similarity between the two vectors: F_dir = |cosθ| = |(v_touch·v_acc) / (||v_touch||×||v_acc||)|. Normalize the result to the interval [0, 1]. The closer F_dir is to 1, the higher the consistency between the sliding direction and the inertial force direction.

[0088] As an example, the touch pressure index is calculated by extracting the pressure time series of touch operations, obtaining the pressure curve, and detecting the maximum touch pressure P_max in it.

[0089] Preset the peak pressure threshold P_threshold and the rise slope threshold k_threshold.

[0090] If P_max≥P_threshold and the rising slope of the pressure curve k_rise≥k_threshold, then it is determined that there is a power storage characteristic of active touch, and the touch pressure index F_pressure=0.

[0091] Otherwise, the touch pressure index F_pressure = 1 - min(P_max / P_threshold, 1) × min(k_rise / k_threshold, 1), and the result is normalized to the interval [0, 1]. The closer F_pressure is to 1, the more the pressure characteristics conform to passive touch characteristics. Here, k_rise is the average slope of the pressure rising from the 10% peak value to the 90% peak value.

[0092] As an example, the contact area index is calculated as follows: obtain the touch contact area A corresponding to the touch operation, and a preset reference fingertip contact area A_base (which can be obtained through calibration tests). Calculate the ratio r of the touch contact area to the preset reference contact area as r=A / A_base. A preset area multiple threshold Th_area (for example, 2.5) is set. If A≤A_base, the contact area index F_area=0. If A≥Th_area×A_base, F_area=1. If A_base<A<Th_area×A_base, F_area=(r-1) / (Th_area-1), and the result is normalized to the interval [0, 1]. The closer F_area is to 1, the more the contact area conforms to the passive touch characteristics of non-fingertip parts such as the back of the hand and the wrist.

[0093] In the embodiment of the present application, as an example, the weights corresponding to each verification index in the hard braking state and the collision state are not completely the same. For example, under a collision condition, the vehicle body vibration lasts longer, the inertial impact is more intense, and the time sequence coupling feature between passive touch and the working condition event is more significant, so the weight of the time sequence index is higher. While under a hard braking condition, the direction of the inertial force is stable and single, and the direction feature of passive limb sliding is more obvious, so the weight proportion of the touch sliding direction index is relatively higher. As an example, the corresponding weights of the time sequence index, the touch sliding direction index, the touch pressure index, and the contact area index in the hard braking state are sequentially: 0.35, 0.30, 0.20, 0.15. As an example, the corresponding weights of the time sequence index, the touch sliding direction index, the touch pressure index, and the contact area index in the collision state are sequentially: 0.40, 0.30, 0.20, 0.10.

[0094] In the embodiment of the present application, as an example, the corresponding preset scores in the hard braking state and the collision state are different. For example, the corresponding preset scores in the hard braking state and the collision state are 0.6 and 0.5 respectively.

[0095] The embodiment of the present application realizes accurate matching between the touch verification strategy and the working condition features. In the hard braking state, by reducing the preset score and optimizing the weight distribution, the interference to normal operations of central control functions is reduced, and the operation convenience of the user during the impact mitigation process is guaranteed. In the collision state, by increasing the time sequence weight and lowering the preset score, the recognition sensitivity of passive touch is greatly improved, and secondary safety risks are effectively prevented.

[0096] In this embodiment, the method of calculating the comprehensive score can be replaced by calculating the comprehensive score through a lightweight classifier on the edge (decision tree, small neural network, etc.). The lightweight classifier on the edge is trained with a large amount of real extreme working condition data to achieve adaptive optimization of the weights of each verification index, thereby improving the accuracy of passive touch recognition. Applying a lightweight classifier on the edge requires a certain amount of computing power for edge inference, and is suitable for high-computing-power IVI platforms with NPU (Neural Processing Unit) acceleration capabilities.

[0097] In one alternative approach, Sb3 includes Sb34: determining whether to block the touch event corresponding to the touch operation based on the touch verification result, including: If the touch verification result is an active touch, then the touch event corresponding to the touch operation will not be blocked.

[0098] If the touch verification result is passive touch, then the touch event corresponding to the touch operation is intercepted.

[0099] In this embodiment, configurable parameters such as preset collision amplitude, preset emergency braking amplitude, preset duration threshold, preset long press threshold, and preset score can be updated remotely by the OEM via OTA to adapt to the parameter tuning needs of different vehicle models and user scenarios. At the same time, it supports continuous parameter optimization based on real vehicle data without requiring a complete IVI system upgrade.

[0100] In this embodiment of the application, for a platform with access to suspension displacement sensor signals, the change in displacement of each wheel of the suspension can be used as a supplementary basis for determining the vehicle vibration state. Together with the standard deviation of acceleration fluctuation, it constitutes the judgment condition for the step-by-step recovery state, thereby improving the accuracy of the step-by-step recovery state judgment under complex road conditions.

[0101] In this embodiment, when the vehicle is currently in a collision state or an emergency braking state, and the safety level is Level 1, which indicates the risk of safety injury to the user inside the vehicle caused by touch operation is greater than or equal to a first level threshold, a simple touch processing strategy can be triggered. For example, the HAL layer interception switch can be directly activated, and all subsequent touch events that hit Level 1 can be hard-discarded without additional verification. This eliminates the need for the touch verification strategy calculation process in the Framework layer and the need to report to the application layer for business logic judgment. This completely blocks the unintentional activation path of extremely dangerous functions such as door unlocking and high-risk power control at the architectural level, reduces the risk of interception failure caused by upper-layer software anomalies or dynamic changes in UI layout, reduces system computing power consumption, and ensures the timeliness of core safety control under extreme conditions.

[0102] If the vehicle is currently in a collision or emergency braking state, and the safety level is Level 4 (indicating that the risk of injury to the occupants from touch operation is less than the third-level threshold), a simple touch handling strategy can be set. For example, in reverse state maintenance control, a preset period is used to poll whether to block Level 4 touch operations. If a function is detected to be abnormally disabled or blocked due to a touch event, a recovery command is proactively issued to re-execute the touch event.

[0103] In this embodiment, a safety control system can be constructed based on the method provided in this application. The safety control system is deployed on the Android system framework of the in-vehicle IVI and adopts a two-layer architecture with the HAL layer and the Framework layer working together to achieve layered safety management of touch events. Specifically, the HAL layer deploys a touch event interception module and a SafeZoneMap management module, responsible for completing the first-level coordinate matching and interception of touch events before they enter the Android input event distribution chain. The Framework layer deploys the ExtremeWorkloadSafetyService (EWSS), which implements control logic such as signal acquisition, working condition recognition, state machine management, execution of differentiated touch verification strategies, and reverse state maintenance control.

[0104] Based on the above architecture, the system achieves precise mapping and dynamic updating of the interception area through the full lifecycle management of SafeZoneMap. During the initialization phase, when EWSS starts, it loads the pre-configured functional safety level mapping table, calls the View coordinate query interface to obtain the position and size parameters of the controls corresponding to the first level in the vehicle touch screen (such as door unlocking, high-risk power control, etc.) in the screen coordinate system, combines them with the factory calibration coefficients of the vehicle touch screen to complete the conversion from the View coordinate system to the HAL touch coordinate system, constructs the initial SafeZoneMap and writes it to the shared memory area of ​​the HAL layer, providing a coordinate reference for the underlying interception.

[0105] Considering the dynamic changes in UI layout such as page switching, control rearrangement, split-screen activation, and pop-up layers in in-vehicle application scenarios, the system designed a dynamic synchronization mechanism for SafeZoneMap: EWSS registers a global layout change listener callback with WindowManager. When a UI layout change event is detected, the latest screen coordinate area of ​​the S1 functional control is recalculated in real time, and the SafeZoneMap is atomically updated by calling the HAL layer interface through Binder IPC. This ensures the thread safety and consistency of coordinate updates and avoids the offset or failure of the interception area caused by UI layout changes.

[0106] In emergency braking or collision situations, the HAL layer interception logic takes effect in real time: Before each touch event is reported, the touch driver first queries the SafeZoneMap to determine if the current touch coordinates fall within the first-level target functional area. If a match is found, the touch event is discarded directly at the HAL layer, blocking it from entering the Android input event queue and subsequent distribution chain, achieving architecture-level hard isolation interception. If a match is not found, the event is allowed to be reported normally, and the Framework layer executes subsequent differentiated touch and verification strategies based on the security level of the corresponding functional area. This ensures the absolute interception strength of the first-level function, avoids the performance bottleneck caused by single-level processing, and effectively resists the risk of interception failure caused by upper-layer software anomalies.

[0107] This application addresses the issue that traditional palm pressure-based accidental touch prevention solutions rely solely on static morphological characteristics of touch signals, such as contact area and pressure value, for judgment. They fail to establish a correlation between touch behavior and vehicle motion, making it difficult to distinguish between active and passive touches under high-acceleration conditions like sudden braking or collisions, leading to the failure of high-risk function interception. This application solves this problem by calculating timing indicators, touch sliding direction indicators, touch pressure indicators, and contact area indicators, and assigning differentiated weights to each verification indicator based on the current operating condition to calculate a comprehensive score. This effectively distinguishes between active and passive touches with different physical mechanisms, reducing the rate of missed passive touch recognition while minimizing misjudgments of normal operations and improving touch recognition accuracy under extreme conditions.

[0108] This application addresses the lack of a reasonable state exit mechanism in traditional solutions. Fixed timeout exit schemes may prematurely deactivate protection while the vehicle is still in a dynamic state, while forced manual confirmation schemes can lead to a permanent state of incapacitation if the driver is injured or incapacitated, hindering occupant escape. This application uses a vehicle stationary state as the criterion that the vehicle speed is 0 and the acceleration fluctuation standard deviation is less than or equal to a preset standard deviation threshold, and that the duration of this condition is greater than or equal to a preset duration threshold. The exit timer is reset when either condition fails, and a maximum protection duration is set as a fallback exit mechanism. After the vehicle comes to a complete stop, the corresponding touch verification strategies are sequentially deactivated according to a preset time step, in the order of collision state, emergency braking state, and normal driving state. This balances safety protection strength under extreme conditions with occupant escape availability after an accident, achieving an engineering balance between safety and usability.

[0109] This application's embodiments take into account the problem that traditional anti-accidental touch solutions only aim to prevent passive touch activation of functions, resulting in a lack of symmetry and failing to protect against the risk of rescue functions such as eCall and hazard warning lights being passively turned off by touch during collisions. By activating reverse state maintenance control for the fourth-level rescue function during a collision, the system polls at a preset period to see if the fourth-level touch operation is blocked. If the function is detected to be abnormally turned off or blocked due to a touch event, a recovery command is actively issued to re-execute the touch event, significantly reducing the probability of emergency rescue signals being interrupted due to accidental touches after a collision and improving the reliability of the rescue function.

[0110] This application embodiment takes into account that relying solely on a single acceleration amplitude threshold cannot accurately distinguish between emergency braking and low-speed collision events. The two types of events have overlapping areas in peak acceleration, which can easily lead to mismatch in protection strategies. By introducing a feature combination of acceleration change rate and impact duration for judgment, the probability of confusion between emergency braking and collision events is effectively reduced, ensuring that differentiated protection strategies matching their characteristics are triggered under different operating conditions.

[0111] This application embodiment addresses the problem that traditional solutions apply a uniform touch restriction strategy to all vehicle body control functions without implementing differentiated control based on functional safety hazard levels. This results in insufficient protection for high-risk functions such as door unlocking and excessive restrictions on low-risk functions such as media adjustment. By using a pre-set functional safety level mapping table, the in-vehicle touch screen functional area is divided into four safety levels: Level 1 (extremely dangerous), Level 2 (dangerous), Level 3 (neutral), and Level 4 (must be retained). Differentiated touch event handling strategies are configured for each level. This ensures strong interception of high-risk functions while reducing excessive control over low-risk functions, thus balancing functional safety and the usability of user interaction.

[0112] This application's embodiments consider the risk of high-risk function touch interception control being bypassed by upper-layer software if implemented at the application layer or Framework layer, and the potential for coordinate mapping failure in scenarios with dynamic UI layout changes such as page switching and split-screen. By deploying the first-level function touch interception at the Android HAL layer, interception is completed before touch events are reported to the Framework layer. UI layout change events are monitored, and coordinate mapping is synchronized in real-time via Binder IPC, achieving architecture-level isolation control, improving the robustness of interception control, and preventing interception failure in scenarios with dynamic UI changes.

[0113] This application addresses the problem that traditional solutions lack clear control logic under extreme concurrent conditions or state transitions, making it difficult to meet the deterministic requirements of functional safety certification for system behavior. By modeling the protection control logic as a finite state machine including normal driving state, emergency braking state, collision state, and step-by-step recovery state, the transition conditions, priority rules, and interruption mechanisms of each state are clearly defined. The collision state has a higher priority than the emergency braking state and can jump directly from any state, ensuring that the system's control behavior is deterministic under complex combinations of operating conditions. This provides a traceable basis for functional safety auditing and fault backtracking.

[0114] Figure 2 A schematic diagram of an embodiment of the safety control device based on an in-vehicle touchscreen is shown. Figure 2 As shown, the safety control device 200 based on the vehicle touchscreen includes: The first processing module 210 is used to determine the target functional area touched by the user in the vehicle and obtain the security level of the target functional area if a touch operation of the user in the vehicle is detected on the vehicle touch screen.

[0115] The second processing module 220 is used to determine whether to trigger the touch verification strategy and obtain the trigger judgment result based on the current operating status and safety level of the vehicle.

[0116] The third processing module 230 is used to determine whether to intercept the touch event corresponding to the touch operation based on the trigger judgment result.

[0117] In one optional approach, the operating condition is determined based on vehicle operating data, including the vehicle's acceleration amplitude, acceleration direction, collision sensor signal, rate of change of acceleration, duration of impact where the acceleration amplitude exceeds a preset impact threshold, driving speed, and standard deviation of acceleration fluctuation. The vehicle-mounted touchscreen-based safety control device 200 further includes a fourth processing module, used to determine the vehicle's current operating condition as a collision state if the operating data meets at least one of the determination conditions. The determination conditions include at least one of the following: the collision sensor signal indicates that a collision event has occurred.

[0118] The acceleration amplitude is greater than the preset collision amplitude, and the absolute value of the acceleration change rate is greater than or equal to the preset collision change rate, and the impact duration is less than the preset collision upper limit threshold.

[0119] If the acceleration amplitude is greater than the preset emergency braking amplitude, the acceleration direction is the deceleration direction, the impact duration is greater than the preset emergency braking lower limit threshold, and the absolute value of the acceleration change rate is less than the preset collision change rate, then the current operating condition of the vehicle is determined to be an emergency braking state.

[0120] If the rate of change of acceleration is within the preset steady-state range, then the current operating condition of the vehicle is determined to be normal driving condition.

[0121] If the driving speed is 0, and the standard deviation of acceleration fluctuation is less than or equal to a preset standard deviation threshold, and the duration of the driving speed being 0 and the standard deviation of acceleration fluctuation being less than or equal to the preset standard deviation threshold is greater than or equal to a preset duration threshold, then the vehicle's current operating condition is determined to be a step-by-step recovery state. Specifically, when the vehicle is currently in the step-by-step recovery state, the corresponding touch verification strategies are sequentially deactivated in the order of collision state, emergency braking state, and normal driving state.

[0122] In one alternative embodiment, the second processing module 220 includes: The first processing unit is used to determine that the trigger judgment result is not to trigger the touch verification strategy when the current working condition of the vehicle is a collision state or an emergency braking state, and the safety level is the first level, which is used to indicate the degree of safety injury risk caused by touch operation to the user in the vehicle is greater than or equal to the first degree threshold.

[0123] The second processing unit is used to determine the trigger judgment result as triggering the touch verification strategy when the current working condition of the vehicle is a collision state or an emergency braking state, and the safety level is a second level, which is used to indicate the degree of safety injury risk caused by touch operation to the user in the vehicle is less than the first level threshold and greater than or equal to the second level threshold.

[0124] The third processing unit is used to determine the trigger judgment result as triggering the touch verification strategy when the current working condition of the vehicle is a collision state or an emergency braking state, and the safety level is the third level, which is used to indicate the degree of safety injury risk caused by touch operation to the user in the vehicle is less than the second level threshold and greater than or equal to the third level threshold.

[0125] The fourth processing unit is used to determine the trigger judgment result as not to trigger the touch verification strategy when the current working condition of the vehicle is a collision state or an emergency braking state, and the safety level is the fourth level, which is used to indicate that the degree of safety injury risk caused by touch operation to the user in the vehicle is less than the third level threshold.

[0126] In one alternative embodiment, the third processing module 230 includes: The fifth processing unit is used to intercept the touch event corresponding to the touch operation if the trigger judgment result is that the touch verification strategy is not triggered, and the current working state of the vehicle is a collision state or an emergency braking state, and the safety level is the first level.

[0127] The sixth processing unit is used to not intercept touch events corresponding to touch operations if the trigger judgment result is that the touch verification strategy is not triggered, and the current operating state of the vehicle is a collision state or an emergency braking state, and the safety level is level four.

[0128] The seventh processing unit is used to verify the touch operation using the touch verification strategy if the trigger judgment result indicates that the touch verification strategy has been triggered, and to obtain the touch verification result. Based on the touch verification result, it determines whether to block the touch event corresponding to the touch operation.

[0129] In one alternative approach, when the vehicle's current operating condition is a collision state and the safety level is level two, the seventh processing unit is used to obtain the confirmation gesture corresponding to the touch operation.

[0130] Determine if the touch operation matches the confirmation gesture.

[0131] If the touch operation matches a confirmation gesture, the touch verification result is an active touch. Alternatively, if the touch operation does not match a confirmation gesture, the touch verification result is a passive touch.

[0132] In one alternative approach, when the vehicle is currently in an emergency braking state and the safety level is Level 2, the seventh processing unit is used to obtain the touch duration corresponding to the touch operation.

[0133] Determine whether the duration of touch is greater than or equal to the preset long press threshold.

[0134] If the duration of the touch is greater than or equal to the preset long-press threshold, the touch verification result is an active touch. Alternatively, if the duration of the touch is less than the preset long-press threshold, the touch verification result is a passive touch.

[0135] In one optional approach, when the vehicle's current operating condition is a collision state or an emergency braking state, and the safety level is level three, the seventh processing unit calculates multiple verification indicators. These verification indicators include at least one of the following: timing indicator, touch sliding direction indicator, touch pressure indicator, and contact area indicator. The timing indicator is determined based on the touch operation timestamp corresponding to the touch operation and the operating condition timestamp corresponding to the operating condition. The touch sliding direction indicator is determined based on the touch operation's sliding displacement vector and the vehicle's body acceleration vector. The touch pressure indicator is determined based on the maximum touch pressure corresponding to the touch operation. The contact area indicator is determined based on the ratio of the touch contact area corresponding to the touch operation to a preset reference contact area.

[0136] The weights of each verification indicator under the current operating condition of the vehicle are obtained.

[0137] A comprehensive score is calculated based on each verification indicator and its corresponding weight.

[0138] If the overall score is greater than or equal to the preset score, the touch verification result is passive touch. Alternatively, if the overall score is less than the preset score, the touch verification result is active touch.

[0139] In an alternative embodiment, the seventh processing unit is further configured to not intercept the touch event corresponding to the touch operation if the touch verification result is an active touch.

[0140] If the touch verification result is passive touch, then the touch event corresponding to the touch operation is intercepted.

[0141] According to another aspect of the embodiments of this application, a vehicle is provided, including the above-described safety control device based on an in-vehicle touch screen, so that the vehicle performs some or all of the steps in the above method.

[0142] Figure 3 The diagram shows a structural schematic of an embodiment of the electronic device of this application. The specific embodiments of this application do not limit the specific implementation of the electronic device.

[0143] like Figure 3 As shown, the electronic device may include: a processor 302, a communications interface 304, a memory 306, and a communications bus 308.

[0144] The processor 302, communication interface 304, and memory 306 communicate with each other via communication bus 308. Communication interface 304 is used to communicate with other network elements such as clients or other servers. The processor 302 executes program 310, specifically performing the relevant steps described in the embodiment of the safety control method for vehicle-mounted touchscreens.

[0145] Specifically, program 310 may include program code, which includes computer-executable instructions.

[0146] Processor 302 may be a central processing unit (CPU), an application-specific integrated circuit (ASIC), or one or more integrated circuits configured to implement the embodiments of this application. The electronic device includes one or more processors, which may be processors of the same type, such as one or more CPUs, or processors of different types, such as one or more CPUs and one or more ASICs.

[0147] Memory 306 is used to store program 310. Memory 306 may include high-speed RAM memory, and may also include non-volatile memory, such as at least one disk storage device.

[0148] This application provides a computer-readable storage medium storing a computer program that, when executed by a processor, implements the safety control method based on an in-vehicle touchscreen in any of the above method embodiments.

[0149] The algorithms or displays provided herein are not inherently related to any particular computer, virtual system, or other device. Furthermore, the embodiments in this application are not directed to any particular programming language.

[0150] Numerous specific details are set forth in the specification provided herein. However, it will be understood that embodiments of this application may be practiced without these specific details. Similarly, for the purpose of simplification and aiding understanding of one or more aspects of the invention, in the above description of exemplary embodiments of this application, various features of the embodiments are sometimes grouped together in a single embodiment, figure, or description thereof. The claims, which follow the detailed description, are hereby expressly incorporated into that detailed description, wherein each claim itself is a separate embodiment of this application.

[0151] Those skilled in the art will understand that the modules in the device of the embodiment can be adaptively changed and placed in one or more devices different from that embodiment. Modules, units, or components in the embodiment can be combined into a single module, unit, or component, and further, they can be divided into multiple sub-modules, sub-units, or sub-components, except that at least some of such features and / or processes or units are mutually exclusive.

[0152] It should be noted that the above embodiments are illustrative of this application and not restrictive, and those skilled in the art can devise alternative embodiments without departing from the scope of the appended claims. In the claims, any reference signs placed between parentheses should not be construed as limiting the claims. The word "comprising" does not exclude the presence of elements or steps not listed in the claims. The word "a" or "an" preceding an element does not exclude the presence of a plurality of such elements. This application can be implemented by means of hardware comprising several different elements and by means of a suitably programmed computer. In the unit claims enumerating several means, several of these means may be embodied by the same item of hardware. The use of the words first, second, and third, etc., does not indicate any order. These words can be interpreted as names. The steps in the above embodiments, unless otherwise specified, should not be construed as limiting the order of execution.

Claims

1. A safety control method based on an in-vehicle touchscreen, characterized in that, The method includes: If a user inside the vehicle is detected to be performing a touch operation on the vehicle's touchscreen, the target functional area touched by the user is determined, and the security level of the target functional area is obtained. Based on the vehicle's current operating status and the aforementioned safety level, determine whether to trigger the touch verification strategy and obtain the trigger judgment result; Based on the trigger judgment result, determine whether to intercept the touch event corresponding to the touch operation.

2. The method according to claim 1, characterized in that, The operating condition is determined based on the vehicle's operating data, which includes the vehicle's acceleration amplitude, acceleration direction, collision sensor signal, acceleration rate of change, duration of impact where the acceleration amplitude exceeds a preset impact threshold, driving speed, and acceleration fluctuation standard deviation; the method further includes: If the operating data satisfies at least one of the determination conditions, then the current operating condition of the vehicle is determined to be a collision state; wherein, the operating data satisfying the determination conditions includes at least one of the following: the collision sensor signal indicates that the vehicle has experienced a collision event; The acceleration amplitude is greater than the preset collision amplitude, and the absolute value of the acceleration change rate is greater than or equal to the preset collision change rate, and the impact duration is less than the preset collision upper limit threshold. If the acceleration amplitude is greater than the preset emergency braking amplitude, the acceleration direction is the deceleration direction, the impact duration is greater than the preset emergency braking lower limit threshold, and the absolute value of the acceleration change rate is less than the preset collision change rate, then the current operating condition of the vehicle is determined to be an emergency braking state. If the rate of change of acceleration is within a preset steady-state range, then the current operating condition of the vehicle is determined to be a normal driving state. If the driving speed is 0, and the standard deviation of acceleration fluctuation is less than or equal to a preset standard deviation threshold, and the duration of the driving speed being 0 and the standard deviation of acceleration fluctuation being less than or equal to the preset standard deviation threshold is greater than or equal to a preset duration threshold, then the current operating state of the vehicle is determined to be a step-by-step recovery state; wherein, when the vehicle is currently in the step-by-step recovery state, the corresponding touch verification strategy is deactivated in the order of collision state, emergency braking state, and normal driving state.

3. The method according to claim 2, characterized in that, The step of determining whether to trigger the touch verification strategy based on the vehicle's current operating status and the safety level to obtain the trigger judgment result includes: When the current operating state of the vehicle is a collision state or an emergency braking state, and the safety level is a first level used to indicate the degree of safety injury risk caused by the touch operation to the user in the vehicle that is greater than or equal to a first degree threshold, the trigger judgment result is determined to be that the touch verification strategy is not triggered. When the current operating state of the vehicle is a collision state or an emergency braking state, and the safety level is a second level used to indicate that the degree of safety injury risk caused by the touch operation to the user in the vehicle is less than the first level threshold and greater than or equal to the second level threshold, the trigger judgment result is determined to trigger the touch verification strategy. When the current operating state of the vehicle is a collision state or an emergency braking state, and the safety level is a third level that indicates the degree of safety injury risk caused by the touch operation to the user in the vehicle is less than the second level threshold and greater than or equal to the third level threshold, the trigger judgment result is determined to trigger the touch verification strategy. If the vehicle is currently in a collision state or an emergency braking state, and the safety level is a fourth level that indicates the degree of safety injury risk to the user inside the vehicle caused by the touch operation is less than the third level threshold, then the trigger judgment result is determined to be that the touch verification strategy is not triggered.

4. The method according to claim 3, characterized in that, The step of determining whether to intercept the touch event corresponding to the touch operation based on the trigger judgment result includes: If the triggering judgment result is that the touch verification strategy is not triggered, and the current working state of the vehicle is a collision state or an emergency braking state, and the safety level is the first level, the touch event corresponding to the touch operation is intercepted. If the triggering judgment result is that the touch verification strategy is not triggered, and the current working state of the vehicle is a collision state or an emergency braking state, the safety level is the fourth level, and the touch event corresponding to the touch operation is not intercepted. If the trigger determination result is to trigger a touch verification strategy, then the touch operation is verified using the touch verification strategy to obtain a touch verification result; based on the touch verification result, it is determined whether to intercept the touch event corresponding to the touch operation.

5. The method according to claim 4, characterized in that, When the vehicle's current operating condition is a collision state and the safety level is level two, the step of verifying the touch operation using the touch verification strategy to obtain the touch verification result includes: Obtain the confirmation gesture corresponding to the touch operation; Determine whether the touch operation matches the confirmation gesture; If the touch operation matches the confirmation gesture, then the touch verification result is an active touch; or... If the touch operation does not match the confirmation gesture, the touch verification result is passive touch.

6. The method according to claim 4, characterized in that, When the vehicle is currently in an emergency braking state and the safety level is level two, the process of verifying the touch operation using the touch verification strategy to obtain the touch verification result includes: Obtain the touch duration corresponding to the touch operation; Determine whether the duration of the touch is greater than or equal to a preset long-press threshold; If the duration of the touch is greater than or equal to the preset long-press threshold, then the touch verification result is an active touch; or, If the duration of the touch is less than the preset long press threshold, the touch verification result is passive touch.

7. The method according to claim 4, characterized in that, When the vehicle's current operating condition is a collision state or an emergency braking state, and the safety level is level three, the process of verifying the touch operation using the touch verification strategy to obtain the touch verification result includes: Calculate multiple verification indicators; wherein, the verification indicators include at least one of timing indicators, touch sliding direction indicators, touch pressure indicators, and contact area indicators. The timing indicators are determined based on the touch operation timestamp corresponding to the touch operation and the working condition timestamp corresponding to the working condition. The touch sliding direction indicators are determined based on the sliding displacement vector of the touch operation and the vehicle body acceleration vector. The touch pressure indicators are determined based on the maximum touch pressure corresponding to the touch operation. The contact area indicators are determined based on the ratio of the touch contact area corresponding to the touch operation to a preset reference contact area. The weights of each verification index under the current operating condition of the vehicle are obtained. A comprehensive score is calculated based on each of the verification indicators and the weights corresponding to each of the verification indicators. If the overall score is greater than or equal to the preset score, then the touch verification result is passive touch; or, If the overall score is less than the preset score, then the touch verification result is active touch.

8. The method according to claim 4, characterized in that, The step of determining whether to intercept the touch event corresponding to the touch operation based on the touch verification result includes: If the touch verification result is an active touch, then the touch event corresponding to the touch operation will not be blocked; If the touch verification result is passive touch, then the touch event corresponding to the touch operation is intercepted.

9. A safety control device based on an in-vehicle touchscreen, characterized in that, The device includes: The first processing module is used to determine the target functional area touched by the user in the vehicle and obtain the security level of the target functional area if a touch operation of the user in the vehicle is detected on the vehicle touch screen. The second processing module is used to determine whether to trigger the touch verification strategy and obtain the trigger judgment result based on the current operating status of the vehicle and the safety level. The third processing module is used to determine whether to intercept the touch event corresponding to the touch operation based on the trigger judgment result.

10. A vehicle comprising the means as described in claim 9, for causing the vehicle to operate according to the method of any one of claims 1-8.

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