An unmanned aerial vehicle countermeasure device self-supervision exception processing method, device and equipment

Abstract

The application discloses a self-supervision exception processing method, device and equipment of a UAV countermeasure equipment, the method is applied to the UAV countermeasure equipment with an independent monitoring link, comprising: collecting the transmission signal of the UAV countermeasure equipment in the process of executing the countermeasure task of the UAV countermeasure equipment; and obtaining at least one device running information related to the transmission signal in the UAV countermeasure equipment; determining the actual transmission state of the UAV countermeasure equipment according to the transmission signal, and determining the transmission enable state according to the at least one device running information, comparing the consistency of the actual transmission state and the transmission enable state, and determining and executing the exception processing action according to the comparison result. Thus, the problem that the UAV countermeasure equipment cannot respond quickly when an exception occurs in the countermeasure process in the prior art is solved.

Description

Technical Field

[0001] This application relates to the field of low-altitude safety technology, and in particular to a self-monitoring anomaly handling method, device and equipment for unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) countermeasures. Background Technology

[0002] With the increasing severity of low-altitude security threats, drone countermeasures equipment has become a crucial shield for low-altitude defenses. However, if these countermeasures malfunction, a defensive vacuum will directly result in the protected area being left vulnerable. Therefore, ensuring that drone countermeasures equipment has a rapid response capability under abnormal conditions is a critical issue that urgently needs to be addressed in the field of low-altitude security. Summary of the Invention

[0003] The purpose of this application is to provide a self-monitoring anomaly handling method, apparatus, and equipment for drone countermeasure devices, which solves the problem that existing drone countermeasure devices cannot respond quickly when anomalies occur during the countermeasure process.

[0004] In a first aspect, embodiments of this application provide a self-monitoring anomaly handling method for unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) countermeasures equipment, including: During the execution of countermeasures by the UAV countermeasures equipment, the transmission signals of the UAV countermeasures equipment are collected; and at least one piece of equipment operation information related to the transmission signals in the UAV countermeasures equipment is obtained. The actual launch state of the UAV countermeasure device is determined based on the transmitted signal, and the launch enable state is determined based on at least one of the device operation information, wherein the actual launch state is used to characterize whether there is a valid signal transmission, and the launch enable state is used to characterize whether signal transmission is allowed; The actual launch state is compared with the launch enable state for consistency, and based on the comparison result, an anomaly handling action is determined and executed.

[0005] In some possible embodiments, determining the actual launch status of the UAV countermeasure device based on the transmitted signal includes: Extract transmission status parameters from the transmitted signal; Based on the transmission status parameters, the actual transmission status is determined to be either a valid signal transmission or a non-valid signal transmission. The transmission status parameters include some or all of the following: transmission signal indication parameters, transmission frequency band, center frequency, bandwidth, power range, transmission trigger time parameters, cumulative transmission duration, and spectral envelope characteristics.

[0006] In some possible embodiments, determining the transmit enable state based on at least one of the device operating information includes: Based on at least one device operation information, identify whether the drone countermeasure device has any abnormal events; If the identification result indicates the presence of an abnormal event, then the transmit enable state is determined to be signal transmission disabled; if the identification result indicates the absence of an abnormal event, then the transmit enable state is determined to be signal transmission enabled. The abnormal events include some or all of the following: abnormal events of the main control unit of the UAV countermeasure device, abnormal events of the peripheral hardware of the UAV countermeasure device, and abnormal events of the independent monitoring link of the UAV countermeasure device.

[0007] In some possible embodiments, based on the comparison results, an exception handling action is determined and performed, including: If the comparison results are inconsistent and the transmission enable state is that signal transmission is not allowed, then the abnormality type is determined based on the actual transmission state and the abnormal event corresponding to the device operation information. Execute the exception handling action corresponding to the exception type.

[0008] In some possible embodiments, the anomaly type is determined based on the actual launch status and the abnormal events corresponding to the device operation information, including: If the abnormal event corresponding to the device operation information is an abnormal event of the main control unit, and the actual transmission state is that there is a valid signal transmission, then the abnormal type is determined to be the first type, and the abnormal handling action corresponding to the first type is hardware-level shutdown or hardware-level shutdown, and a high-priority alarm is output. If the abnormal event corresponding to the device operation information is an abnormal event of peripheral hardware, and the actual transmission status is that there is a valid signal transmission, then the abnormality type is determined to be the second type. The abnormality handling action corresponding to the second type is to start a multi-level shutdown path to perform hardware-level shutdown and push a maintenance alarm. If the abnormal event corresponding to the device operation information is an abnormal event of an independent monitoring link, and the actual transmission status is that there is a valid signal transmission, then the abnormality type is determined to be the third type, and the abnormality handling action corresponding to the third type is hardware-level shutdown and locking.

[0009] In some possible embodiments, based on the comparison results, an exception handling action is determined and performed, including: If the comparison results are consistent and the transmission enable state is to allow signal transmission, then the security constraints of the UAV countermeasure device are obtained, and the anomaly type is determined based on the transmission signal and the security constraints. Execute the exception handling action corresponding to the exception type.

[0010] In some possible embodiments, the security constraints include some or all of the following: a security-level emergency stop signal, an authorized countermeasure strategy, or a cooling-off period or standby period.

[0011] In some possible embodiments, the anomaly type is determined based on the transmitted signal and the security constraints, including: If the safety constraint is a safety-level emergency stop signal and the actual transmission state is that there is a valid signal being transmitted, then the anomaly type is determined to be the fourth type. The anomaly handling action corresponding to the fourth type is to immediately disconnect the transmission link and perform a stop-transmission review. If the safety constraint condition is in the cooling period or standby period, and the actual transmission state is that there is a valid signal transmission, then the anomaly type is determined to be the fifth type. The anomaly handling action corresponding to the fifth type is hardware-level shutdown, maintaining the locked state and recording. If the security constraint is an authorized countermeasure strategy, and at least one of the following does not satisfy the authorized countermeasure strategy: actual transmission frequency band, center frequency, bandwidth, power range, cumulative transmission duration, regional rules, and spectrum envelope characteristics, then the anomaly type is determined to be the sixth type. The anomaly handling action corresponding to the sixth type is to stop the current countermeasure task or to shut down at the hardware level.

[0012] In some possible embodiments, after determining and executing the exception handling action based on the comparison results, the method further includes: If the abnormality handling action is a hardware-level shutdown, then the acquisition of the transmission signal of the UAV countermeasure device continues. If the actual transmission status of the UAV countermeasure device is determined to be a valid signal transmission based on the transmission signal, a secondary shutdown alarm or lockout is triggered.

[0013] Secondly, embodiments of this application provide a self-monitoring anomaly handling device for unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) countermeasures equipment, comprising: An independent monitoring unit is used to collect the transmission signals of the UAV countermeasure equipment during the execution of countermeasure missions. The information acquisition unit is used to acquire at least one device operation information related to the transmitted signal in the UAV countermeasure equipment; A security arbitration unit is used to determine the actual launch status of the UAV countermeasure device based on the launch signal, and to determine the launch enable status based on at least one of the device operation information, wherein the actual launch status is used to characterize whether a valid signal is being launched, and the launch enable status is used to characterize whether signal launch is permitted; the actual launch status and the launch enable status are compared for consistency, and an anomaly handling action is determined based on the comparison result; The execution unit is used to perform exception handling actions.

[0014] Thirdly, embodiments of this application provide a drone countermeasure device, including at least one processor; and a memory communicatively connected to the at least one processor; wherein the memory stores instructions executable by the at least one processor, and the instructions are executed by the at least one processor to enable the at least one processor to execute any of the self-monitored anomaly handling methods of the drone countermeasure device provided in embodiments of this application.

[0015] Fourthly, embodiments of this application provide a computer storage medium storing a computer program, the computer program being used to cause a computer to execute a self-monitored anomaly handling method for any UAV countermeasure device provided in embodiments of this application.

[0016] This application provides a self-monitoring anomaly handling method, apparatus, and device for drone countermeasure equipment. During the execution of a countermeasure mission, the actual launch state determined by the transmission signal is compared with the launch enable state determined by at least one device operation information to obtain a comparison result. Based on the comparison result, anomaly handling actions are determined and executed, thereby enabling rapid identification and handling of anomalies in the drone countermeasure equipment, improving the reliability of the equipment.

[0017] Other features and advantages of this application will be set forth in the description which follows, and will be apparent in part from the description, or may be learned by practicing the application. The objectives and other advantages of this application may be realized and obtained by means of the structures particularly pointed out in the written description, claims, and drawings. Attached Figure Description

[0018] To more clearly illustrate the technical solutions of the embodiments of this application, the drawings used in the embodiments of this application will be briefly introduced below. Obviously, the drawings described below are only some embodiments of this application. For those skilled in the art, other drawings can be obtained based on these drawings without creative effort.

[0019] Figure 1 This is a schematic diagram illustrating the operation of drones and drone countermeasure equipment in related technologies; Figure 2 This is a flowchart of a self-monitoring anomaly handling method for a drone countermeasure device according to an embodiment of this application; Figure 3 This is a flowchart of a self-monitored anomaly handling method for a drone countermeasure device according to another embodiment of this application; Figure 4 This is a structural diagram of a self-monitoring anomaly handling device for a drone countermeasure equipment according to an embodiment of this application; Figure 5 This is a structural diagram of a self-monitoring anomaly handling device for a drone countermeasure equipment according to an embodiment of this application; Figure 6 This is a schematic diagram of a drone countermeasure device according to an embodiment of this application. Detailed Implementation

[0020] To further illustrate the technical solutions provided in the embodiments of this application, a detailed description is provided below in conjunction with the accompanying drawings and specific implementation methods. Although the embodiments of this application provide method operation steps as shown in the following embodiments or drawings, more or fewer operation steps may be included in the method based on conventional or non-inventive effort. For steps that do not logically have a necessary causal relationship, the execution order of these steps is not limited to the execution order provided in the embodiments of this application. In actual processing or when the control device executes the method, it may be executed sequentially or in parallel according to the method shown in the embodiments or drawings.

[0021] The following is a definition of the terms used in the specific implementation: 1. UAV countermeasure equipment: refers to equipment that radioly suppresses, interferes with, induces or blocks the remote control link, image transmission link, navigation link or combination thereof of a target UAV. It usually includes main control, radio frequency transceiver, power amplifier, antenna and power supply.

[0022] 2. Independent Monitoring Link: This refers to a monitoring link independent of the countermeasure main control link and the countermeasure execution link. It is used to detect the actual electromagnetic emission status of the device before, during, and after countermeasures. This link is independent of the main control link in at least one aspect of hardware, power supply, and processing logic, and does not rely on the main control software to report its status for judgment.

[0023] 3. Countermeasure Execution Link: This refers to the link that actually generates and transmits countermeasure signals according to the countermeasure command, including main control sending, radio frequency signal generation, frequency band selection, power amplification, switch control and antenna transmission.

[0024] 4. Security Arbitration Unit: This refers to the control unit that receives authorized countermeasure strategies, master control status, independent monitoring link detection results, and feedback information from various hardware components, and determines whether to allow the start, continuation, or termination of countermeasures.

[0025] 5. Actual transmission status: refers to the actual radio frequency operating status detected by an independent monitoring link, including at least one or more of the following: whether transmission has occurred, transmission start and end time, transmission frequency band, center frequency, bandwidth, power range, or spectrum occupancy characteristics.

[0026] 6. Authorized Countermeasure Strategy: This refers to the set of parameters allowed for a single countermeasure mission, including target frequency band, bandwidth, power limit, maximum continuous countermeasure duration, cooldown time, applicable scenarios, operator identity, mission number, and exception handling rules.

[0027] 7. Hardware-level shutdown: refers to the action of directly cutting off the countermeasure execution link by at least one of the following: security arbitration unit, watchdog, relay, power amplifier enable control, power module or RF switch, without relying on the normal response of the main control software.

[0028] 8. Cooling-off period: refers to the mandatory waiting time during which the system is prohibited from re-entering the counterattack launch state within a preset duration after a counterattack mission is completed.

[0029] 9. Watchdog: A monitoring unit used to monitor whether the master controller's heartbeat or control pulse is normal. When the master controller fails, gets stuck, or fails to respond after a timeout, the watchdog triggers a safety procedure.

[0030] 10. SDR (Software Defined Radio): A radio technology that uses programmable hardware and software to achieve signal transmission and reception, spectrum acquisition and analysis. In this article, it can be used as an implementation method for independent monitoring links, but it is not limited to the specific model USRP B210.

[0031] Combination Figure 1 As shown, the UAV includes a ground-based remote control unit and an airborne unit. The ground-based remote control unit transmits remote control commands and mission planning data to the airborne unit via an uplink or data transmission link. The authorized frequency bands for the uplink remote control link are, for example, 433MHz, 900MHz, 915MHz, 2.4GHz, 5.2GHz, and 5.8GHz. The downlink is used to transmit telemetry status and video images captured by the image transmission module back to the ground unit. The flight control module on the airborne unit performs fusion decisions based on the uplink commands and local sensor data such as positioning information provided by the navigation module, and feeds back the execution results via the downlink. The authorized frequency bands for the downlink image transmission link of the UAV ground-based remote control unit are, for example, 2.4GHz, 5.2GHz, and 5.8GHz. The positioning information provided by the navigation module can be provided by satellite navigation sources, such as GPS / BeiDou / GNSS. Common signals for UAV navigation and positioning links include GPS L1 and BeiDou B1.

[0032] In drone countermeasure equipment based on the above definition used in airports, key parks, important event sites, border control areas and other sensitive scenarios, the target drone is usually identified first through spectrum detection, radar detection, photoelectric tracking or multi-source fusion. Then, the main control unit of the drone countermeasure equipment controls the radio frequency transceiver link, power amplification link and transmitting antenna to suppress, block or induce interference on the target drone's mainstream 2.4GHz, 5.2GHz, 5.8GHz remote control link and image transmission link. It can also counteract other common remote control or data transmission frequency bands such as 433MHz, 900MHz, 915MHz, 2.4GHz, 5.2GHz, 5.8GHz and navigation link to achieve driving away, returning to base, forced landing or mission interruption.

[0033] Among existing drone countermeasure technologies, some solutions have begun to focus on reducing the impact on the surrounding electromagnetic environment. For example, they implement narrowband or matched interference based on the frequency band characteristics of the target drone, or reduce the impact on adjacent frequency bands and legitimate wireless services by setting the countermeasure duration, intermittent operation, dynamic power adjustment, and switching countermeasure modes. Some solutions also provide remote platform, log recording, event monitoring, and equipment operation information monitoring functions to improve equipment management capabilities.

[0034] However, the management solutions for the aforementioned drone countermeasures equipment are often insufficient. For example, if the drone countermeasures equipment malfunctions during the countermeasures process and cannot be resolved through the aforementioned management solutions, it will directly lead to the failure of the countermeasures and create a defense vacuum in the protected area.

[0035] Therefore, to address the problem of anti-drone countermeasure equipment failing during the countermeasure process due to anomalies in the existing technology, this invention provides a self-monitored anomaly handling method for anti-drone countermeasure equipment, combined with... Figure 2 As shown, its specific implementation includes: Step 201: During the execution of the countermeasure mission by the UAV countermeasure equipment, the transmission signal of the UAV countermeasure equipment is collected; and the operation information of at least one device related to the transmission signal in the UAV countermeasure equipment is obtained.

[0036] For example, the transmission signals of the drone countermeasures device can be acquired by any of the following methods or combinations.

[0037] For example, actual emission samples can be acquired through installed directional couplers, detector couplers, or power sampling branches; or the actual radiated signal can be received from the device in the near-field region or at a predetermined monitoring location using an independent monitoring antenna. This invention improves the accuracy of actual emission status detection by combining or arbitrarily processing the detection signals.

[0038] For example, the equipment operation information includes some or all of the following: operation information of the main control unit of the drone countermeasure equipment, operation information of the peripheral hardware of the drone countermeasure equipment, and operation information of the independent monitoring link of the drone countermeasure equipment. Peripheral hardware refers to components surrounding the main control unit, such as relays and power amplifier modules.

[0039] Step 202: Determine the actual launch status of the UAV countermeasure device based on the transmitted signal, and determine the launch enable status based on at least one device operation information, wherein the actual launch status is used to characterize whether there is a valid signal transmission, and the launch enable status is used to characterize whether signal transmission is allowed.

[0040] Step 203: Compare the actual launch state with the launch enable state, and determine and execute the abnormal handling action based on the comparison result.

[0041] In detail, the actual transmission state determined based on the transmitted signal reflects whether the UAV countermeasure device is transmitting a valid signal at the physical or radio frequency layer; the transmission enable state determined based on at least one device operation information reflects whether the UAV countermeasure device is allowed to transmit a signal at the control logic or security constraint level. When comparing the actual transmission state with the transmission enable state, if the actual transmission state indicates valid signal transmission and the transmission enable state indicates allowed signal transmission, then the two are considered consistent; if the actual transmission state indicates no valid signal transmission and the transmission enable state indicates disallowed signal transmission, then the device is considered to be in a normal stopped, standby, or locked state; if the actual transmission state indicates valid signal transmission but the transmission enable state indicates disallowed signal transmission, then the two are considered inconsistent, and the anomaly type and anomaly handling action are determined based on the corresponding device operation information; if the actual transmission state indicates no valid signal transmission but the transmission enable state indicates allowed signal transmission, then, in conjunction with the current countermeasure task stage, authorized countermeasure strategy, and transmission trigger command, the device is considered to be in a pending start state, a task completed state, or an execution link abnormal state. Based on the above comparison results, determine and execute the corresponding exception handling actions.

[0042] This allows for the assessment of whether the drone countermeasure equipment is under control from both internal and external perspectives, determining if there are any anomalies in the equipment, and identifying appropriate handling actions based on these anomalies. This addresses the issue of countermeasure failures caused by anomalies during the countermeasure process, thereby improving the reliability of the equipment.

[0043] In some embodiments, determining the actual launch status of the UAV countermeasures device based on the transmitted signal includes: Extract transmission status parameters from the transmitted signal; Based on the transmission status parameters, the actual transmission status is determined to be either a valid signal transmission or a non-valid signal transmission.

[0044] The transmission status parameters include some or all of the following: transmission signal indication parameters, transmission frequency band, center frequency, bandwidth, power range, transmission trigger time parameters, cumulative transmission duration, and spectral envelope characteristics.

[0045] The transmit signal indication parameter is a binary indication parameter used to characterize whether the UAV countermeasure device is currently in radio frequency output mode. A value of 1 indicates that a transmit signal is present, and a value of 0 indicates that no transmit signal is present.

[0046] The launch trigger time parameter characterizes the start time of the signal transmission by the UAV countermeasures device.

[0047] For example, if the transmission signal indication parameter of the transmission status parameter is 1, and the transmission frequency band, center frequency, bandwidth, power range, transmission trigger time parameter, cumulative transmission duration, and spectrum envelope characteristics all meet the authorization requirements, it is determined that the UAV countermeasure device has a valid signal transmission; otherwise, it is determined that the UAV countermeasure device does not have a valid signal transmission.

[0048] In some embodiments, the transmit enable state is determined based on at least one device operating information in the following manner: Based on at least one device operation information, identify whether the drone countermeasure device has any abnormal events; If the identification result indicates the presence of an abnormal event, the transmit enable state is determined to be "signal transmission not allowed"; if the identification result indicates the absence of an abnormal event, the transmit enable state is determined to be "signal transmission allowed".

[0049] In detail, the equipment operation information refers to the equipment operation information of the internal components. If an abnormal event is identified in the anti-drone device based on the equipment operation information of the internal components, the launch enable state is determined to be that the anti-drone device is not allowed to transmit signals; if no abnormal event is identified in the anti-drone device based on the equipment operation information of the internal components, the launch enable state is determined to be that the anti-drone device is allowed to transmit signals.

[0050] The abnormal events include some or all of the following: abnormal events of the main control unit of the drone countermeasure equipment, abnormal events of the peripheral hardware of the drone countermeasure equipment, and abnormal events of the independent monitoring link of the drone countermeasure equipment.

[0051] Specifically, if the internal component is the main control unit, then abnormal events include some or all of the following: The heartbeat signal of the main control unit is lost; The execution program of the main control unit has stopped; this can be understood as the main control unit being stuck. Restarting the main control unit; An abnormal shutdown caused by the main control unit autonomously issuing a stop command.

[0052] If the internal component is peripheral hardware, then the abnormal event includes some or all of the following: The temperature of the peripheral hardware exceeds the preset safe operating threshold. The current from the peripheral hardware exceeds the rated operating range; The enable control signal of the peripheral hardware does not match the actual output power state; Peripheral hardware adhesion; The peripheral hardware has been disconnected.

[0053] For example, if the peripheral hardware is a power amplifier module, an abnormal event such as the temperature of the peripheral hardware exceeding the preset safe operating threshold can be understood as the power amplifier module being abnormally overheated; if the peripheral hardware is a power amplifier module, an abnormal event such as the current of the peripheral hardware exceeding the rated operating range can be understood as the power amplifier module having abnormal current; if the peripheral hardware is a power amplifier module, an abnormal event such as the enable control signal of the peripheral hardware not matching the actual output power state can be understood as the power amplifier module being in an abnormal enable state; if the peripheral hardware is a relay, an abnormal event such as the peripheral hardware sticking together can be understood as the relay sticking together; if the peripheral hardware is a relay, an abnormal event such as the peripheral hardware displaying as disconnected can be understood as the relay displaying as disconnected.

[0054] If the internal components are monitored by independent links, then abnormal events include some or all of the following: The independent monitoring link is in a state of communication failure; this can be understood as the independent monitoring link being unable to communicate with the main control unit, etc. The calibration output parameters of the independent monitoring link exceed the allowable error range; this can be interpreted as the independent monitoring link calibration failing. The independent monitoring link outputs inconsistent judgment results for a preset number of consecutive times within a preset time period; this can be understood as an inability to stably output zero-transmission / stop-transmission judgment results.

[0055] It can be seen that by cross-verifying the main control unit, relay / power amplifier module, independent monitoring link and actual transmission status, dangerous states such as "commanded to shut down but actually not shut down" and "timeout has occurred but transmission is still ongoing" can be identified in a timely manner, thereby improving the reliability of anomaly identification.

[0056] In some embodiments, based on the comparison results, an exception handling action is determined and performed, including: If the comparison results are inconsistent and the transmit enable state is "signal transmission not allowed", then the anomaly type is determined based on the actual transmit state and the abnormal events corresponding to the equipment operation information. Execute the exception handling action corresponding to the exception type.

[0057] In detail, if the comparison results are inconsistent, and at least one device operation information determines that the transmission enable state is not allowed to transmit signals, that is, an abnormal event is identified based on the device operation information, then the abnormality type is determined directly based on the actual transmission state determined by the transmission signal and the abnormal event corresponding to the device operation information. Based on the correspondence between the abnormality type and the abnormality handling action, the abnormality handling action corresponding to the abnormality type is determined and executed.

[0058] For example, based on the actual launch status and the abnormal events corresponding to the equipment operation information, the abnormal type is determined, including: If the abnormal event corresponding to the device operation information is an abnormal event of the main control unit, and the actual transmission status is that there is a valid signal transmission, then the abnormal type is determined to be the first type. The abnormal handling action corresponding to the first type is hardware-level shutdown or hardware-level shutdown, and a high-priority alarm is output. If the abnormal event corresponding to the device operation information is an abnormal event of the peripheral hardware, and the actual transmission status is that there is a valid signal transmission, then the abnormality type is determined to be the second type. The abnormality handling action corresponding to the second type is to start a multi-level shutdown path to perform hardware-level shutdown and push a maintenance alarm. If the abnormal event corresponding to the device operation information is an abnormal event of an independent monitoring link, and the actual transmission status is that there is a valid signal transmission, then the abnormality type is determined to be the third type, and the abnormality handling action corresponding to the third type is hardware-level shutdown and locking.

[0059] Hardware-level shutdown refers to disabling the power amplifier, cutting off the transmission power supply, or controlling RF isolation to forcibly terminate transmission from the execution link side. By setting a hardware-level shutdown path that does not rely on the main control software, this invention can forcibly cut off the countermeasure execution link when the main control system crashes or devices fail, avoiding reliance on the main control software to complete the transmission stop control in the most dangerous scenarios.

[0060] Furthermore, if the abnormal handling action is a hardware-level shutdown, the transmission signal of the UAV countermeasure device will continue to be collected; if the actual transmission status of the UAV countermeasure device is determined to be that there is a valid signal transmission based on the transmission signal, a secondary shutdown alarm or lock will be triggered.

[0061] For example, the actual transmission status of the drone countermeasure device continues to be detected within the verification window Tverify. If it is confirmed within Tverify that there is no effective radiation in the target frequency band, the shutdown is considered successful, and there is no need to continue collecting transmission signals. If there is, a secondary shutdown alarm or lock is triggered.

[0062] By setting up a post-shutdown verification mechanism, it is possible to confirm whether the shutdown action is truly effective, thereby reducing the engineering risks caused by false shutdowns, false shutdowns, or residual emissions from devices.

[0063] For example, Table 1 shows the correspondence between exception types and exception handling actions.

[0064] Table 1

[0065] As shown in Table 1 above, for example, in the event of an abnormal event in the main control unit, such as the loss of the main control unit's heartbeat signal, the stagnation of the main control unit's execution program, or the restart of the main control unit, a hardware-level shutdown is directly implemented. This prevents the UAV countermeasures device from continuing to operate uncontrollably after a main control unit malfunction. Of course, after the hardware-level shutdown, verification can still be performed, that is, the transmission signal of the UAV countermeasures device is collected; it is then determined whether a signal is still being transmitted. If not, the action is terminated.

[0066] An abnormal event of the main control unit is an abnormal shutdown in which the main control unit autonomously issues a stop command. The hardware-level shutdown is directly adopted and a high-priority alarm is output. This solves the problem that the logic has been shut down but the physical transmission has not stopped.

[0067] As shown in Table 1 above, any abnormal event in the peripheral hardware, such as the power amplifier module temperature exceeding the preset safe operating threshold, the power amplifier module current exceeding the rated operating range, the power amplifier module enable control signal not matching the actual output power state, or relay sticking, will be directly shut down at the hardware level by starting a multi-level shutdown path and pushing a maintenance alarm. This improves the certainty of handling device-level fault scenarios.

[0068] The multi-level shutdown path refers to sending hardware-level shutdown instructions through multiple channels.

[0069] As shown in Table 1 above, any abnormal event of the independent monitoring link, such as independent monitoring link failure, calibration failure, or unstable judgment result, will be directly shut down and locked at the hardware level, thereby improving the certainty of handling device-level fault scenarios.

[0070] Optionally, an independent monitoring link failure lockout and device power-on / restart default safety state mechanism can be implemented to prevent accidental or faulty startup when monitoring capabilities are lacking.

[0071] In some embodiments, based on the comparison results, an exception handling action is determined and performed, including: If the comparison results are consistent and the transmission enable state is "allow signal transmission", then obtain the safety constraints of the UAV countermeasure equipment, and determine the anomaly type based on the transmission signal and the safety constraints. Execute the exception handling action corresponding to the exception type.

[0072] In detail, if the transmission enable state determined by the operation information of at least one device is that the signal transmission is allowed, that is, if no abnormal event is identified according to the device operation information, then the abnormality type is determined directly according to the transmission signal and safety constraints. Based on the correspondence between the abnormality type and the abnormality handling action, the abnormality handling action corresponding to the abnormality type is determined and the corresponding abnormality handling action is executed.

[0073] The safety constraints include some or all of the following: safety-level emergency stop signal, authorized countermeasure strategy, and being in a cooling-off period or standby period.

[0074] In some embodiments, determining the anomaly type based on the transmitted signal and security constraints includes: If the safety constraint is a safety-level emergency stop signal, and the actual transmission status is that there is a valid signal being transmitted, then the anomaly type is determined to be the fourth type. The anomaly handling action corresponding to the fourth type is to immediately disconnect the transmission link and perform a stop-transmission review. If the safety constraint is that it is in the cooling period or standby period, and the actual transmission state is that there is a valid signal transmission, then the anomaly type is determined to be the fifth type. The anomaly handling action corresponding to the fifth type is hardware-level shutdown, maintaining the locked state and recording. If the security constraint is an authorized countermeasure strategy, and at least one of the following does not satisfy the authorized countermeasure strategy: actual transmission frequency band, center frequency, bandwidth, power range, cumulative transmission duration, regional rules, and spectrum envelope characteristics, then the anomaly type is determined to be the sixth type. The anomaly handling action corresponding to the sixth type is to stop the current countermeasure task or to shut down at the hardware level. Of course, there can be other types, such as: out-of-band leakage, spurious emissions, or abnormal bandwidth occupation outside the authorized frequency band, and the actual transmission status is that there is a valid signal transmission; or the cumulative transmission duration exceeds the authorized maximum duration Tmax, and the actual transmission status is that there is a valid signal transmission; or the UAV countermeasure equipment is located in a prohibited area or a highly sensitive area but the current authorization level is insufficient, and the actual transmission status is that there is a valid signal transmission; or the positioning result is invalid, lacks credibility, or conflicts with the preset area rules, and the actual transmission status is that there is a valid signal transmission; or the scenario constraint conditions triggered by the air situation silence interlock, the area boundary prohibition interlock, or the strong authorization insufficient interlock, and the actual transmission status is that there is a valid signal transmission; or the manned aircraft cooperative signal or other external air situation information indicates that there is manned aircraft activity in the protected airspace, and the actual transmission status is that there is a valid signal transmission.

[0075] If manned aircraft coordination signals or other external air situation information indicate the presence of manned aircraft activity within the protected airspace, it constitutes a violation of the silent interlocking rules based on manned aircraft coordination signals or external air situation information.

[0076] For example, Table 2 shows the correspondence between exception types and exception handling actions.

[0077] Table 2

[0078] As shown in Table 2 above, different types of processing actions can be followed up with other actions. For example, if the abnormal type is the fourth type, that is, a local or remote emergency stop is triggered, the transmission link will be immediately cut off and a stop-transmission review will be performed, thus meeting the requirements for rapid emergency response in sensitive scenarios.

[0079] If the anomaly type is type 5, i.e., an unauthorized launch occurs during the cooldown or standby period, then shutdown, lockout, and anomaly logging are performed to prevent accidental launch, faulty launch, or residual launch.

[0080] At the same time, the lock reset mechanism can prevent the device from automatically recovering without confirmation after a serious malfunction.

[0081] In addition, embodiments of the present invention also provide the ability to monitor the surrounding spectrum through an independent monitoring link, thereby enabling timely detection of anomalies and improving the system's auxiliary application capabilities in airports and sensitive areas.

[0082] For example, if the anomaly type is the sixth type, such as the authorized countermeasure strategy being inconsistent with the transmission status parameters extracted from the transmitted signal, the current task will be stopped, and subsequent monitoring will continue to check whether there is still a transmitted signal. If so, a hardware-level shutdown will be performed, thus constraining the device from overstepping the countermeasure and reducing the impact on surrounding frequency bands.

[0083] For example, if there is out-of-band leakage, spurious emissions, or abnormal bandwidth occupation outside the authorized frequency band, the current task is stopped, and the system continues to monitor whether there are any transmission signals. If so, a hardware-level shutdown is performed and the system is locked, thus constraining the device's unintended leakage impact on surrounding frequency bands.

[0084] For example, if the cumulative launch duration exceeds the authorized maximum duration Tmax, or if the UAV countermeasures device is located in a prohibited area or a highly sensitive area but the current authorization level is insufficient; or if the positioning result is invalid, lacks credibility, or conflicts with the preset area rules, or if the scenario constraints are triggered by air situation silence interlock, area boundary no-launch interlock, or strong authorization insufficient interlock, then the hardware will be shut down. For example, if a manned aircraft coordination signal or other external air situation information is received indicating that there is manned aircraft activity in the protected airspace, but the actual transmission status is that there is a valid signal transmission, then the hardware-level shutdown is performed.

[0085] It should be noted that the exception handling actions corresponding to the exception types proposed in the embodiments of the present invention are only exemplary, and other exception handling actions may also be possible. For example, in the case of a non-fatal risk that has not yet met the abnormal hard shutdown condition but is close to the authorized boundary, a soft stop or power reduction instruction may be executed.

[0086] The above process utilizes a cross-verification mechanism between authorized countermeasure strategies, master control status, hardware feedback status, and actual launch status to improve the reliability of anomaly identification and boundary constraint capabilities. Simultaneously, in abnormal situations, a hardware-level shutdown mechanism enhances the determinism of anomaly handling.

[0087] In some embodiments, based on the comparison results, an exception handling action is determined and performed, including: If the comparison results are inconsistent and the transmit enable state is "signal transmission not allowed", then the anomaly type is determined based on the actual transmit state and the abnormal events corresponding to the equipment operation information. If the comparison results are consistent and the transmission enable state is "allow signal transmission", then obtain the safety constraints of the UAV countermeasure equipment, and determine the anomaly type based on the transmission signal and the safety constraints. Execute the exception handling action corresponding to the exception type.

[0088] As can be seen above, the core of this invention does not lie in improving the countermeasure signal waveform itself, but in constructing a security closed loop around the UAV countermeasure device, which includes "authorized boundary definition, independent monitoring of actual launch, multi-state cross-verification, hardware-level shutdown under abnormal conditions, and post-shutdown verification." Furthermore, the basis for determining whether the device has stopped launching no longer relies solely on the task status, button status, or platform status of the main control software, but rather on direct verification of the device's actual radio frequency transmission behavior through an independent monitoring link. This clearly distinguishes the technical differences between this invention and general log management, general timeout control, or general operation monitoring solutions.

[0089] In some embodiments, prior to step 201, the method further includes: Receive the target drone countermeasure mission and generate an authorized countermeasure strategy; for example, generate mission parameters by combining the target link type, allowed frequency band, power limit and countermeasure duration. Before initiating countermeasures, perform a self-test to confirm that the drone countermeasure equipment is in a non-launched state and meets the conditions for activation. The countermeasure execution link controlling the drone countermeasure equipment only enters the countermeasure state according to the authorized frequency band, authorized power and authorized duration, such as implementing limited-duration countermeasures on the target frequency band allowed in this mission.

[0090] Based on the above, combined with Figure 3 As shown, an embodiment of the present invention provides a countermeasure method, including: Step 301: Generate an authorized countermeasure strategy.

[0091] Once the detection system, host computer platform, or on-site operator confirms the existence of a target UAV that needs to be dealt with, the main control unit generates an authorized countermeasure strategy corresponding to this mission, which is used to limit the allowed launch boundaries and disposal conditions for this mission.

[0092] The basic authorization parameters include at least the following: the target frequency band or frequency point allowed for transmission, the center frequency range, the bandwidth range, the power limit, the maximum continuous countermeasure duration Tmax, the forced cooling duration Tcool, the allowed countermeasure modes, the operator's identity information, the task number, the equipment number, and the abnormal handling rules.

[0093] By setting the maximum continuous countermeasure duration and the forced cooling period, the present invention can further constrain the device to work continuously for a long time or to be repeatedly started during the cooling period, thereby reducing the risk of continuous interference and false start-up.

[0094] In some implementations, the scenario interlocking extension parameters may further include: the area level of the area where the equipment is located, area boundary rules, strong authorization requirements for highly sensitive areas, and silent interlocking rules based on manned aircraft cooperative signals or external air situation information.

[0095] By setting up a silent interlocking mechanism based on manned aircraft cooperative signals or external air situation information, the potential impact on manned aircraft and sensitive airspace can be reduced.

[0096] By setting up a hierarchical authorization mechanism based on regional boundary rules, it is possible to strengthen the control of usage boundaries in specific scenarios.

[0097] Step 302: Perform a self-check before countermeasures.

[0098] Before allowing the countermeasure execution link to enter the working state, a pre-countermeasure self-test is triggered, including the detection of relays, power amplifiers, RF switches, monitoring links, watchdogs and emergency stop links, to detect potential problems in advance.

[0099] The drone countermeasure equipment remains in a prohibited launch state by default after being powered on, restarted, or after the main control is restored.

[0100] Specifically, the first category is general hardware and link self-test, which includes at least: whether the main control heartbeat is normal, whether the watchdog is normal, whether the power supply status is normal, whether the temperature, current and voltage of the power amplifier module are within the allowable range, whether the relay feedback is in the off standby state, whether the RF switch is in the prohibited transmission state, and whether the independent monitoring unit detects abnormal residual transmission of the local unit in the target controlled frequency band.

[0101] The second category is position and air situation input self-check, which includes at least: whether the positioning module is normal, whether the positioning reliability meets the threshold, and whether the manned aircraft's cooperative signal receiving circuit (such as the ADS-B receiving circuit) or external air situation input interface is in a valid state.

[0102] If the independent monitoring unit fails to self-test, fails to calibrate, loses connection, or cannot reliably confirm that the device is in a non-transmitting state, or if the positioning results are missing, have insufficient reliability, or the air situation input status is abnormal, then the transmission lock will be maintained and the process will not proceed to step 303.

[0103] Step 303: Start the countermeasure execution link.

[0104] After the self-test passes, the parameters in the authorized countermeasure strategy are obtained.

[0105] Before actually enabling launch, launch access judgment is performed based on the current location, area rules, and air situation.

[0106] If the device is determined to be in a restricted area, in a highly sensitive area but without strong authorization, or if the protected airspace conditions corresponding to the detection of manned aircraft cooperative signals or external air situation information are met, the device will enter a silent lockout state, maintaining only monitoring capabilities and not engaging in counter-launch.

[0107] Only when the access conditions are met will the countermeasure execution unit be allowed to enable the authorized frequency bands, frequency points, and power levels, and enter the countermeasure working state. At the same time, the main control unit periodically sends heartbeat signals to the security arbitration unit, and the security arbitration unit synchronously starts the Tmax timer.

[0108] Step 304: Real-time acquisition of actual launch status.

[0109] During the countermeasure execution link operation, the actual transmission status parameters of the device are independently extracted based on the coupled sampling signal, near-field monitoring signal, or a combination of both, without relying on the status of the main control software.

[0110] Step 305: Perform state cross-validation. If the validation passes, proceed to step 303; otherwise, proceed to step 306.

[0111] It receives the authorized countermeasure strategy and safety constraints such as monitoring safety avoidance conditions from the main control unit, receives the real-time heartbeat, relay status and power amplifier status of the main control unit and the actual transmission status output by the independent monitoring unit, and performs cross-verification accordingly.

[0112] Anomalies include: the actual transmission frequency band or center frequency point exceeds the permitted range of the authorized countermeasure strategy; there is out-of-band leakage, spurious emission or abnormal bandwidth occupation exceeding the threshold outside the authorized frequency band; the actual transmission status of the device during the cooling or standby period is that there is a valid signal transmission.

[0113] The cumulative continuous transmission time exceeds Tmax; the main control unit has issued a stop command, but the actual transmission status is that there is a valid signal being transmitted; the main control heartbeat is lost, the main control is stuck or the main control is restarted, but the actual transmission status is that there is a valid signal being transmitted.

[0114] The relay feedback indicates that it is disconnected, but the actual transmission status shows that a valid signal is being transmitted; the power amplifier module is in an abnormal high temperature, abnormal current, or abnormal enable state, but the actual transmission status shows that a valid signal is being transmitted; a remote emergency stop command or a local hardware emergency stop signal is received, but the actual transmission status shows that a valid signal is being transmitted.

[0115] The independent monitoring link itself has lost connection, failed calibration, or cannot stably output judgment results; the device is located in a prohibited area or a highly sensitive area but the current authorization level is insufficient; the positioning result is invalid, has insufficient credibility, or conflicts with the preset area rules; the received manned aircraft cooperative signal or other external air situation information indicates that there is manned aircraft activity in the protected airspace, but the actual transmission status is that there is a valid signal transmission.

[0116] By setting a maximum continuous countermeasure duration and a forced cooling period, this invention can further constrain the device from operating continuously for extended periods or from repeated startups during the cooling period, thereby reducing the risk of continuous interference and accidental startup.

[0117] Step 306: Anomaly detection and hardware-level shutdown.

[0118] The exception handling action corresponding to the exception type determined in step 305 may include, for example, hardware-level shutdown, stopping the countermeasure task, locking, logging, etc.

[0119] Step 307: Verify whether a valid transmission exists after shutdown.

[0120] After the hardware-level shutdown is completed, the actual transmission status of the device continues to be detected in the verification window Tverify.

[0121] If no effective radiation is confirmed in the target frequency band within Tverify, the shutdown is considered successful. If transmission is still detected, it indicates a more serious device-level fault or shutdown path failure. The safety arbitration unit triggers a secondary shutdown strategy and can push high-priority anomaly alarms to the remote platform, monitoring terminal, or SMS module through the optional log alarm unit.

[0122] Step 308: Forced cooling, marking, and resetting.

[0123] When the countermeasure ends normally or the abnormal shutdown is completed, the cooldown period Tcool is activated.

[0124] Within Tcool, even if a new launch request is received, the countermeasure execution link is not allowed to re-enter a working state.

[0125] In the event of severe abnormal situations such as continued transmission after main control failure, leakage in the authorized frequency band out-of-band or spurious emission exceeding the threshold, or shutdown triggered during monitoring link failure, the system will remain locked after shutdown and will only be unlocked after manual on-site confirmation or when authorized remote reset conditions are met.

[0126] In cases where the system enters a silent lock state due to air situation silent interlocking or area rule hierarchical authorization interlocking, the system can only exit the lock state after the air situation is resolved, the area rule allows it, and the strong authorization conditions are met. At the same time, task logging and abnormal handling records can be completed.

[0127] By recording information such as operator, frequency band, duration, anomaly type, and shutdown path, this invention facilitates accountability, operational review, and regulatory compliance, thereby enhancing the supervisory and auditable attributes of the equipment.

[0128] Based on the same inventive concept, embodiments of the present invention also provide a self-monitoring anomaly processing device for unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) countermeasure equipment, combined with Figure 4 As shown, it includes: Independent monitoring unit 401 is used to collect the transmission signals of the UAV countermeasure equipment during the execution of countermeasure missions by the UAV countermeasure equipment; Information acquisition unit 402 is used to acquire at least one device operation information related to the transmitted signal in the UAV countermeasure equipment; The security arbitration unit 403 is used to determine the actual launch status of the UAV countermeasure device based on the launch signal, and to determine the launch enable status based on at least one device operation information. The actual launch status is used to characterize whether a valid signal is being launched, and the launch enable status is used to characterize whether signal launch is permitted. The actual launch status and the launch enable status are compared for consistency, and an anomaly handling action is determined based on the comparison result. Execution unit 404 is used to perform exception handling actions.

[0129] Optionally, the independent monitoring unit 401 is also used to extract transmission status parameters from the transmitted signal; The security arbitration unit 403 is also used to determine, based on the transmission status parameters, whether the actual transmission status is that there is a valid signal being transmitted or that there is no valid signal being transmitted. The transmission status parameters include some or all of the following: transmission signal indication parameters, transmission frequency band, center frequency, bandwidth, power range, transmission trigger time parameters, cumulative transmission duration, and spectral envelope characteristics.

[0130] Optional, the security arbitration unit 403 is specifically used for: Based on at least one device operation information, identify whether the drone countermeasure device has any abnormal events; If the identification result indicates the presence of an abnormal event, then the transmit enable state is determined to be signal transmission disabled; if the identification result indicates the absence of an abnormal event, then the transmit enable state is determined to be signal transmission enabled. The abnormal events include some or all of the following: abnormal events of the main control unit of the UAV countermeasure device, abnormal events of the peripheral hardware of the UAV countermeasure device, and abnormal events of the independent monitoring link of the UAV countermeasure device.

[0131] Optionally, the security arbitration unit 403 is specifically used to determine the abnormality type based on the actual transmission status and the abnormal event corresponding to the device operation information if the comparison result is inconsistent and the transmission enable state is not allowed to transmit signals. The execution unit 404 is specifically used to execute the exception handling action corresponding to the exception type.

[0132] Optional, the security arbitration unit 403 is specifically used for: If the abnormal event corresponding to the device operation information is an abnormal event of the main control unit, and the actual transmission state is that there is a valid signal transmission, then the abnormal type is determined to be the first type, and the abnormal handling action corresponding to the first type is hardware-level shutdown or hardware-level shutdown, and a high-priority alarm is output. If the abnormal event corresponding to the device operation information is an abnormal event of peripheral hardware, and the actual transmission status is that there is a valid signal transmission, then the abnormality type is determined to be the second type. The abnormality handling action corresponding to the second type is to start a multi-level shutdown path to perform hardware-level shutdown and push a maintenance alarm. If the abnormal event corresponding to the device operation information is an abnormal event of an independent monitoring link, and the actual transmission status is that there is a valid signal transmission, then the abnormality type is determined to be the third type, and the abnormality handling action corresponding to the third type is hardware-level shutdown and locking.

[0133] Optional, the security arbitration unit 403 is specifically used for: If the comparison results are consistent and the transmission enable state is to allow signal transmission, then the security constraints of the UAV countermeasure device are obtained, and the anomaly type is determined based on the transmission signal and the security constraints. The execution unit 404 is specifically used to execute the exception handling action corresponding to the exception type.

[0134] Optionally, the security constraints may include some or all of the following: security-level emergency stop signal, authorized countermeasure strategy, or being in a cooling-off period or standby period.

[0135] Optional, the security arbitration unit 403 is specifically used for: If the safety constraint is a safety-level emergency stop signal and the actual transmission state is that there is a valid signal being transmitted, then the anomaly type is determined to be the fourth type. The anomaly handling action corresponding to the fourth type is to immediately disconnect the transmission link and perform a stop-transmission review. If the safety constraint condition is in the cooling period or standby period, and the actual transmission state is that there is a valid signal transmission, then the anomaly type is determined to be the fifth type. The anomaly handling action corresponding to the fifth type is hardware-level shutdown, maintaining the locked state and recording. If the security constraint is an authorized countermeasure strategy, and at least one of the following does not satisfy the authorized countermeasure strategy: actual transmission frequency band, center frequency, bandwidth, power range, cumulative transmission duration, regional rules, and spectrum envelope characteristics, then the anomaly type is determined to be the sixth type. The anomaly handling action corresponding to the sixth type is to stop the current countermeasure task or to shut down at the hardware level.

[0136] Optionally, the independent monitoring unit 401 is also used for: If the abnormality handling action is a hardware-level shutdown, then the acquisition of the transmission signal of the UAV countermeasure device continues. If the actual transmission status of the UAV countermeasure device is determined to be a valid signal transmission based on the transmission signal, a secondary shutdown alarm or lockout is triggered.

[0137] Based on the above device, the functional modules can also include a main control unit 405, a counter-execution unit 406, and optional units, combined with... Figure 5 As shown, the division of labor among the seven functional units can be further explained as follows.

[0138] Independent monitoring unit 401. Used to detect the actual radiation status of the equipment.

[0139] Information acquisition unit 402. Used to acquire hardware feedback information such as relay status, power amplifier status, power supply status, main control heartbeat, temperature, and current, as well as the operation information of the independent monitoring link and the main control unit.

[0140] Security arbitration unit 403. Used to determine whether to allow startup, whether to allow continuation, and whether to perform hardware-level shutdown based on authorization status, master control status, actual transmission status, and hardware feedback information.

[0141] Execution unit 404. Used to perform abnormal handling actions. When the safety arbitration unit determines that shutdown is necessary, it disables the power amplifier enable, cuts off the transmit power supply, or controls the radio frequency isolation to forcibly terminate the transmit from the execution link side.

[0142] Main control unit 405. Used to receive detection results, manual instructions, or platform instructions, and generate an authorized countermeasure strategy corresponding to a countermeasure mission.

[0143] Countermeasure execution unit 406. Used to generate and transmit countermeasure signals according to the authorized countermeasure strategy.

[0144] Optional Units. In some implementations, the optional remote emergency stop unit 407 is used to trigger a complete device shutdown in an emergency; the optional log alarm unit 408 is used to perform logging, alarming, and tracing.

[0145] Based on Table 3 below, the input, output, and operational relationships of the seven types of functional units are as follows: Table 3

[0146] As shown in Table 3, the seven functional units mentioned above are responsible for task initiation, countermeasure execution, independent monitoring, security arbitration, information collection, hardware-level shutdown, and optional support functions, respectively, and together constitute the basic architecture for device self-monitoring and security constraints. Based on this, the key security constraint mechanisms of the seven functional units can be further explained as follows.

[0147] The seven functional units mentioned above do not operate in isolation, but rather form a self-monitoring and safety constraint closed loop through mechanisms such as independence constraints, default safe state, actual launch status acquisition, hardware-level shutdown paths, and out-of-band leakage monitoring. The relevant key mechanisms can be further explained below.

[0148] (1) Functional unit independence requirement. In a preferred embodiment, the independent monitoring unit and the main control unit are at least mutually independent in terms of hardware, power supply or processing logic. Furthermore, the security arbitration unit is also at least partially independent from the main control unit and is equipped with an independent watchdog or independent auxiliary power supply to ensure that hardware-level shutdown can still be performed when the main control unit malfunctions or crashes.

[0149] (2) Default Security State and Failure Lockout. In a preferred embodiment, the system sets an independent monitoring link failure lockout rule and a default security state rule. After power-on, restart, master control recovery, or task switching, the device is in a prohibited transmission state by default. The countermeasure execution link is only allowed to enter the transmission state when the independent monitoring link self-test passes, the device's non-transmission state is confirmed, the authorized countermeasure strategy is effective, and the security arbitration unit allows it. If the independent monitoring link is disconnected, calibration fails, sampling is abnormal, the judgment result is unstable, or it cannot be reliably confirmed that there is no valid local transmission, the security arbitration unit maintains the transmission lockout and does not allow the countermeasure execution link to be enabled.

[0150] (3) Actual transmission status acquisition method. In a preferred embodiment, the independent monitoring unit acquires the actual transmission status of the unit through any of the following methods or combinations thereof. In some embodiments, the independent monitoring unit may be implemented using a software-defined radio (SDR) module, and combined with spectrum acquisition and analysis algorithms to complete status detection.

[0151] a. Acquire actual transmission samples by using directional couplers, detector couplers, or power sampling branches installed in the counter-transmission link; b. Receive the actual radiation signal of the device in the near field area of ​​the equipment or at a predetermined monitoring location using an independent monitoring antenna.

[0152] (4) Hardware-level shutdown path. In a preferred embodiment, the hardware-level shutdown path adopts a multi-level redundant structure, including but not limited to: disabling the power amplifier enable, disconnecting the transmitter power supply relay, cutting off the power supply to the RF transceiver module, and controlling the RF switch to switch to the isolation state or absorption state. At least two shutdown paths are directly controlled by the safety arbitration unit to avoid shutdown failure caused by a single-level device failure.

[0153] (5) Out-of-band leakage and spurious emission monitoring. In a further embodiment, the independent monitoring unit not only detects the transmission status within the licensed frequency band, but also monitors out-of-band leakage, spurious emissions, and abnormal bandwidth occupancy outside the licensed frequency band. Preferably, the above monitoring can be implemented by an independent monitoring unit based on software-defined radio (SDR) combined with a spectrum analysis algorithm. When the detection result continuously exceeds a preset threshold within a preset observation window, the security arbitration unit considers it as a risk of frequency band violation, bandwidth violation, or abnormal leakage, and includes it in the anomaly determination.

[0154] The following reference Figure 6 This application describes a drone countermeasure device comprising an independent monitoring link according to one embodiment of the present application. Figure 6 The drone countermeasure device shown is merely an example and should not impose any limitations on the functionality and scope of use of the embodiments of this application.

[0155] like Figure 6 As shown, the drone countermeasure device is presented in the form of a general-purpose electronic device. The components of the drone countermeasure device may include, but are not limited to: at least one processor 601, at least one memory 602, and a bus 603 connecting different system components (including memory 602 and processor 601). Memory 602 stores instructions executable by processor 601, which, when executed by processor 601, enable processor 601 to perform any of the methods provided in the above embodiments.

[0156] Bus 603 represents one or more of several bus structures, including a memory bus or memory controller, peripheral bus, processor, or local bus using any of the various bus structures.

[0157] The memory 602 may include a readable medium in the form of volatile memory, such as random access memory (RAM) 612 and / or cache memory 622, and may further include read-only memory (ROM) 632.

[0158] The memory 602 may also include a program / utility 652 having a set (at least one) of program modules 642, including but not limited to: an operating system, one or more application programs, other program modules, and program data, each or some combination of these examples may include an implementation of a network environment.

[0159] The drone countermeasure device can also communicate with one or more external devices 604 (e.g., keyboard, pointing device, etc.), one or more devices that enable a user to interact with the drone countermeasure device, and / or any device that enables the drone countermeasure device to communicate with one or more other electronic devices (e.g., router, modem, etc.). This communication can be performed via input / output (I / O) interface 605. Furthermore, the drone countermeasure device can also communicate with one or more networks (e.g., local area network (LAN), wide area network (WAN), and / or public networks, such as the Internet) via network adapter 606. Figure 6 As shown, network adapter 606 communicates with other modules used in the drone countermeasure device via bus 603. It should be understood that, although not shown in the figure, other hardware and / or software modules can be used in conjunction with the drone countermeasure device, including but not limited to: microcode, device drivers, redundant processors, external disk drive arrays, RAID systems, tape drives, and data backup storage systems.

[0160] In some possible implementations, various aspects of the self-monitored anomaly handling method for a drone countermeasure device provided in this application can also be implemented in the form of a program product, which includes program code. When the program product is run on a computer device, the program code is used to cause the computer device to perform the steps in the self-monitored anomaly handling method for a drone countermeasure device according to various exemplary embodiments of this application described above.

[0161] The program product may employ any combination of one or more readable media. A readable medium may be a readable signal medium or a readable storage medium. A readable storage medium may be, for example,—but not limited to—an electrical, magnetic, optical, electromagnetic, infrared, or semiconductor system, apparatus, or device, or any combination thereof. More specific examples of readable storage media (a non-exhaustive list) include: an electrical connection having one or more wires, a portable disk, a hard disk, random access memory (RAM), read-only memory (ROM), erasable programmable read-only memory (EPROM or flash memory), optical fiber, portable compact disk read-only memory (CD-ROM), optical storage devices, magnetic storage devices, or any suitable combination thereof.

[0162] The program product of the self-monitored anomaly handling method for unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) countermeasure equipment according to the embodiments of this application can be a portable compact disc read-only memory (CD-ROM) and include program code, and can run on an electronic device. However, the program product of this application is not limited thereto. In this document, the readable storage medium can be any tangible medium that contains or stores a program that can be used by or in conjunction with an instruction execution system, apparatus, or device.

[0163] A readable signal medium may include a data signal propagated in baseband or as part of a carrier wave, carrying readable program code. This propagated data signal may take various forms, including but not limited to electromagnetic signals, optical signals, or any suitable combination thereof. A readable signal medium may also be any readable medium other than a readable storage medium, capable of sending, propagating, or transmitting a program for use by or in conjunction with an instruction execution system, apparatus, or device.

[0164] The program code contained on the readable medium may be transmitted using any suitable medium, including but not limited to wireless, wired, optical fiber, RF, etc., or any suitable combination thereof.

[0165] Program code for performing the operations of this application can be written in any combination of one or more programming languages, including object-oriented programming languages ​​such as Java and C++, and conventional procedural programming languages ​​such as C or similar languages. The program code can execute entirely on the user's electronic device, partially on the user's device, as a standalone software package, partially on the user's electronic device and partially on a remote electronic device, or entirely on a remote electronic device or server. In cases involving remote electronic devices, the remote electronic device can be connected to the user's electronic device via any type of network—including a local area network (LAN) or a wide area network (WAN)—or can be connected to an external electronic device (e.g., via the Internet using an Internet service provider).

[0166] It should be noted that although several units or sub-units of the device have been mentioned in the detailed description above, this division is merely exemplary and not mandatory. In fact, according to embodiments of this application, the features and functions of two or more units described above can be embodied in one unit. Conversely, the features and functions of one unit described above can be further divided and embodied by multiple units.

[0167] Furthermore, although the operations of the method of this application are described in a specific order in the accompanying drawings, this does not require or imply that these operations must be performed in that specific order, or that all the operations shown must be performed to achieve the desired result. Additionally or alternatively, certain steps may be omitted, multiple steps may be combined into one step, and / or one step may be broken down into multiple steps.

[0168] Those skilled in the art will understand that embodiments of this application can be provided as methods, systems, or computer program products. Therefore, this application can take the form of a completely hardware embodiment, a completely software embodiment, or an embodiment combining software and hardware aspects. Furthermore, this application can take the form of a computer program product embodied on one or more computer-usable storage media (including but not limited to disk storage, CD-ROM, optical storage, etc.) containing computer-usable program code.

[0169] This application is described with reference to flowchart illustrations and block diagrams of methods, apparatus (systems), and computer program products according to embodiments of this application. It will be understood that each block and / or block in the flowchart illustrations and block diagrams, as well as combinations of blocks and flows in the flowchart illustrations and block diagrams, can be implemented by computer program instructions. These computer program instructions can be provided to a processor of a general-purpose computer, special-purpose computer, embedded processor, or other programmable data processing apparatus to produce a machine, such that the instructions, which execute via the processor of the computer or other programmable data processing apparatus, create a machine for implementing the flowchart. Figure 1 One or more processes and boxes Figure 1 A device that provides the functions specified in one or more boxes.

[0170] These computer program instructions may also be stored in a computer-readable storage medium that can direct a computer or other programmable data processing device to function in a particular manner, such that the instructions stored in the computer-readable storage medium produce an article of manufacture including instruction means, which are implemented in a process Figure 1 One or more processes and boxes Figure 1 The function specified in one or more boxes.

[0171] These computer program instructions may also be loaded onto a computer or other programmable data processing equipment to cause a series of operational steps to be performed on the computer or other programmable equipment to produce a computer-implemented process, thereby providing instructions that execute on the computer or other programmable equipment for implementing the process. Figure 1 One or more processes and boxes Figure 1 The steps of the function specified in one or more boxes.

[0172] Although preferred embodiments of this application have been described, those skilled in the art, upon learning the basic inventive concept, can make other changes and modifications to these embodiments. Therefore, the appended claims are intended to be interpreted as including the preferred embodiments as well as all changes and modifications falling within the scope of this application.

[0173] Obviously, those skilled in the art can make various modifications and variations to this application without departing from the spirit and scope of this application. Therefore, if such modifications and variations fall within the scope of the claims of this application and their equivalents, this application also intends to include such modifications and variations.

Claims

1. A self-monitored anomaly handling method for unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) countermeasure equipment, characterized in that, include: During the execution of countermeasures by the UAV countermeasures equipment, the transmission signals of the UAV countermeasures equipment are collected; And to obtain operational information of at least one device related to the transmitted signal in the UAV countermeasure device; The actual launch state of the UAV countermeasure device is determined based on the transmitted signal, and the launch enable state is determined based on at least one of the device operation information, wherein the actual launch state is used to characterize whether there is a valid signal transmission, and the launch enable state is used to characterize whether signal transmission is allowed; The actual launch state is compared with the launch enable state for consistency, and based on the comparison result, an anomaly handling action is determined and executed.

2. The method according to claim 1, characterized in that, Determining the actual launch status of the UAV countermeasures device based on the transmitted signal includes: Extract transmission status parameters from the transmitted signal; Based on the transmission status parameters, the actual transmission status is determined to be either a valid signal transmission or a non-valid signal transmission. The transmission status parameters include some or all of the following: transmission signal indication parameters, transmission frequency band, center frequency, bandwidth, power range, transmission trigger time parameters, cumulative transmission duration, and spectral envelope characteristics.

3. The method according to claim 1, characterized in that, Determining the transmit enable state based on at least one of the device operating information includes: Based on at least one device operation information, identify whether the drone countermeasure device has any abnormal events; If the identification result indicates the presence of an abnormal event, then the transmit enable state is determined to be signal transmission disabled; if the identification result indicates the absence of an abnormal event, then the transmit enable state is determined to be signal transmission enabled. The abnormal events include some or all of the following: abnormal events of the main control unit of the UAV countermeasure device, abnormal events of the peripheral hardware of the UAV countermeasure device, and abnormal events of the independent monitoring link of the UAV countermeasure device.

4. The method according to any one of claims 1 to 3, characterized in that, Based on the comparison results, determine and execute exception handling actions, including: If the comparison results are inconsistent and the transmission enable state is that signal transmission is not allowed, then the abnormality type is determined based on the actual transmission state and the abnormal event corresponding to the device operation information. Execute the exception handling action corresponding to the exception type.

5. The method according to claim 4, characterized in that, Based on the actual launch status and the abnormal events corresponding to the equipment operation information, the abnormality type is determined, including: If the abnormal event corresponding to the device operation information is an abnormal event of the main control unit, and the actual transmission state is that there is a valid signal transmission, then the abnormal type is determined to be the first type, and the abnormal handling action corresponding to the first type is hardware-level shutdown or hardware-level shutdown, and a high-priority alarm is output. If the abnormal event corresponding to the device operation information is an abnormal event of peripheral hardware, and the actual transmission status is that there is a valid signal transmission, then the abnormality type is determined to be the second type. The abnormality handling action corresponding to the second type is to start a multi-level shutdown path to perform hardware-level shutdown and push a maintenance alarm. If the abnormal event corresponding to the device operation information is an abnormal event of an independent monitoring link, and the actual transmission status is that there is a valid signal transmission, then the abnormality type is determined to be the third type, and the abnormality handling action corresponding to the third type is hardware-level shutdown and locking.

6. The method according to any one of claims 1 to 3, characterized in that, Based on the comparison results, determine and execute exception handling actions, including: If the comparison results are consistent and the transmission enable state is to allow signal transmission, then the security constraints of the UAV countermeasure device are obtained, and the anomaly type is determined based on the transmission signal and the security constraints. Execute the exception handling action corresponding to the exception type.

7. The method according to claim 6, characterized in that, The security constraints include some or all of the following: security-level emergency stop signal, authorized countermeasure strategy, and being in a cooling-off period or standby period.

8. The method according to claim 7, characterized in that, Based on the transmitted signal and the security constraints, the anomaly type is determined, including: If the safety constraint is a safety-level emergency stop signal and the actual transmission state is that there is a valid signal being transmitted, then the anomaly type is determined to be the fourth type. The anomaly handling action corresponding to the fourth type is to immediately disconnect the transmission link and perform a stop-transmission review. If the safety constraint condition is in the cooling period or standby period, and the actual transmission state is that there is a valid signal transmission, then the anomaly type is determined to be the fifth type. The anomaly handling action corresponding to the fifth type is hardware-level shutdown, maintaining the locked state and recording. If the security constraint is an authorized countermeasure strategy, and at least one of the following does not satisfy the authorized countermeasure strategy: actual transmission frequency band, center frequency, bandwidth, power range, cumulative transmission duration, regional rules, and spectrum envelope characteristics, then the anomaly type is determined to be the sixth type. The anomaly handling action corresponding to the sixth type is to stop the current countermeasure task or to shut down at the hardware level.

9. The method according to claim 5 or 8, characterized in that, After determining and executing exception handling actions based on the comparison results, the method further includes: If the abnormality handling action is a hardware-level shutdown, then the acquisition of the transmission signal of the UAV countermeasure device continues. If the actual transmission status of the UAV countermeasure device is determined to be a valid signal transmission based on the transmission signal, a secondary shutdown alarm or lockout is triggered.

10. A self-monitoring anomaly handling device for unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) countermeasure equipment, characterized in that, include: An independent monitoring unit is used to collect the transmission signals of the UAV countermeasure equipment during the execution of countermeasure missions. The information acquisition unit is used to acquire at least one device operation information related to the transmitted signal in the UAV countermeasure equipment; A security arbitration unit is used to determine the actual launch status of the UAV countermeasure device based on the launch signal, and to determine the launch enable status based on at least one of the device operation information, wherein the actual launch status is used to characterize whether a valid signal is being launched, and the launch enable status is used to characterize whether signal launch is permitted; the actual launch status and the launch enable status are compared for consistency, and an anomaly handling action is determined based on the comparison result; The execution unit is used to perform exception handling actions.

11. A drone countermeasure device, characterized in that, The method includes at least one processor; and a memory communicatively connected to the at least one processor; wherein the memory stores instructions executable by the at least one processor to enable the at least one processor to perform the method as described in any one of claims 1-9.

12. A computer storage medium, characterized in that, The computer storage medium stores a computer program that enables the computer to perform the method as described in any one of claims 1-9.

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