A marine fuel control system and a marine vessel

Abstract

The application relates to a ship fuel control system, which comprises a process control unit, a safety control unit, a first uninterrupted power supply unit, a second uninterrupted power supply unit, a network exchange unit and at least two human-computer interaction terminals; the process control unit and the safety control unit are independently arranged; the first uninterrupted power supply unit supplies power for the process control unit; the second uninterrupted power supply unit supplies power for the safety control unit; the power supply ends of the network exchange unit and the human-computer interaction terminals are respectively electrically connected with the output ends of the first uninterrupted power supply unit and the output ends of the second uninterrupted power supply unit. The two sets of power sources of the ship fuel control system are independently isolated to meet the ship fuel safety specification, the cross power supply of the upper equipment eliminates the single-point power supply failure of the monitoring equipment, the compliance and the operation reliability are simultaneously improved, and the ship has corresponding advantages.

Description

Technical Field

[0001] This application relates to the field of marine fuel control technology, and in particular to a marine fuel control system and a corresponding ship. Background Technology

[0002] As a core component of a ship's fuel supply system, the compliance and reliability of the fuel control system's architecture design directly determine the ship's operational safety. According to current regulations on the safety of low-flash-point fuels for ships, the fuel control system typically needs to be divided into two independent functional parts: process control and safety control. These parts are responsible for regulation, monitoring, and alarms under normal operating conditions, and for safety shut-off and protection actions under emergency conditions, thereby reducing safety risks caused by common-cause failures.

[0003] Currently, most ship fuel control systems in the industry are custom-developed by fuel supply equipment manufacturers based on project requirements, and a unified standardized architecture has not yet been formed. Regarding power redundancy design, existing solutions generally adopt coarse-grained system-level redundancy configurations: some solutions configure a single redundant power supply for the entire control system, which cannot meet the power supply independence requirements of the two functional parts; while some solutions configure independent power supply circuits for the two functional parts, the upper-level monitoring equipment and network switching equipment are only connected to a single power supply. A single power supply failure will still cause the entire upper-level monitoring function to fail, failing to completely eliminate the potential for single-point failures on the power supply side, and there is still room for improvement in power supply reliability.

[0004] At the level of external system interface design, the industry has not yet formed a unified classification and access standard. Different manufacturers have different standards for the transmission methods of conventional monitoring signals and safety emergency signals: some solutions mix safety emergency signals into the transmission of general communication links, which poses a risk of safety signals failing when communication is interrupted; some solutions use hard-wired connections for all external signals, resulting in high redundancy in on-site wiring and increased construction and maintenance costs. At the same time, existing systems lack standardized cross-compartment communication adaptation solutions for different ship cabin layouts. The communication connection between the central control area and the bridge area is mostly customized for the project, which is prone to signal attenuation problems due to excessive transmission distance. In addition, multiple human-machine interaction terminals in existing systems often use redundant configurations with completely identical permissions, which cannot ensure operational safety while also taking into account the economy of equipment reuse.

[0005] Regarding the aforementioned technologies, the inventors believe that existing ship fuel control systems still have technical shortcomings in terms of power supply redundancy accuracy, interface standardization, and cross-cabin communication adaptability, making it difficult to simultaneously meet the multiple requirements of compliance, high reliability, and design economy. Therefore, there is an urgent need to develop a ship fuel control system and a ship. Summary of the Invention

[0006] To address the issues of high single-point failure risk, non-standard interface design, and difficulty in balancing design reusability and compliance in existing solutions, this application provides a marine fuel control system. It addresses the technical limitations of existing marine fuel control systems in simultaneously achieving full decoupling of power supply between control and safety subsystems, standardized classification of external interfaces, and standardized adaptation of cross-compartment communication. By constructing a unified dual-subsystem architecture that complies with marine fuel safety regulations, this application also provides a marine vessel.

[0007] The technical solution for a ship fuel control system provided in this application is as follows: A ship fuel control system is powered by the ship's main power distribution unit, which includes independent power distribution output circuits, denoted as a first power supply branch and a second power supply branch. The ship fuel control system includes a process control unit, a safety control unit, a first uninterruptible power supply unit, a second uninterruptible power supply unit, a network switching unit, and at least two human-machine interface terminals. The process control unit and the safety control unit are independently configured. The process control unit is configured for control, status monitoring, and routine alarm handling under normal fuel system operating conditions, while the safety control unit is configured for safety control and emergency alarm handling under emergency fuel system operating conditions. The input terminal of the first uninterruptible power supply unit is connected to... The first power supply branch is connected to the first power supply branch, and its output is connected to the power supply terminal of the process control unit to supply power to the process control unit; the input terminal of the second uninterruptible power supply unit is connected to the second power supply branch, and its output is connected to the power supply terminal of the safety control unit to supply power to the safety control unit; the power supply terminals of the network switching unit and the human-machine interaction terminal are respectively electrically connected to the output terminals of the first uninterruptible power supply unit and the second uninterruptible power supply unit; the process control unit and the safety control unit are respectively communicatively connected to the network switching unit, and the human-machine interaction terminal interacts with the process control unit and the safety control unit respectively through the network switching unit.

[0008] The power supply, core control circuit, and safety action output circuit of the process control unit and safety control unit are completely independent and have no electrical coupling, fully meeting the mandatory requirements of the standard for safety independence. The network switching unit and human-machine interaction terminal only belong to the data display and interaction layer and do not directly participate in the execution of safety actions. They are not links that are required to be isolated by the standard. By allowing these shared devices to be connected to two independent power supplies, the independence of the safety system will not be compromised, and the single point of failure that would cause the overall interruption of the upper-level monitoring will be completely eliminated.

[0009] By adopting the above technical solution, uninterruptible power supply (UPS) units from different power distribution branches are configured for the independent process control unit and safety control unit. At the same time, the power supply terminals of the network switching unit and all human-machine interaction terminals are simultaneously connected to the output terminals of the two UPS units, thus constructing a power supply topology with fully decoupled power supply of the underlying subsystems and dual-circuit redundancy of shared equipment in the upper layer. This achieves power supply isolation between the two subsystems from the power source to the load end, which complies with the mandatory requirements of the marine fuel safety regulations for common-cause fault protection. It also eliminates the single-point fault risk of the overall interruption of the upper-level monitoring and communication functions due to the failure of a single power supply. Under the premise of controlling hardware costs, it effectively improves the reliability and compliance of the power supply architecture of the control system.

[0010] Optionally, the at least two human-machine interaction terminals include a central control-side human-machine interaction terminal and a driver-side human-machine interaction terminal respectively located at different physical locations on the ship; the central control-side human-machine interaction terminal is configured to have full operation permissions for system control, alarm display and status monitoring; the driver-side human-machine interaction terminal is configured to have only viewing permissions for alarm display and status monitoring.

[0011] Optionally, the transmission distance between the network switching unit and the driver-side human-machine interface terminal is greater than a distance threshold preset according to the signal transmission attenuation characteristics; the ship fuel control system further includes: a photoelectric conversion unit group, which is disposed on the signal transmission path between the network switching unit and the driver-side human-machine interface terminal, and is configured to establish a communication connection between the network switching unit and the driver-side human-machine interface terminal through an optical fiber transmission medium.

[0012] Optionally, the distance threshold ranges from 85 meters to 95 meters.

[0013] Optionally, there are at least two network switching units, including a first network switching unit and a second network switching unit that are redundantly configured; the process control unit, the safety control unit, and the human-machine interaction terminal all establish bidirectional communication connections with the first network switching unit and the second network switching unit, respectively.

[0014] Optionally, the ship fuel control system further includes: a printing unit, which is located at the same physical location on the ship as the centralized control side human-machine interface terminal, is communicatively connected to the network exchange unit, and is configured to output system historical alarm records.

[0015] Optionally, the process control unit is provided with multiple serial communication interfaces; the safety control unit is provided with multiple direct-connect electrical interfaces.

[0016] Optionally, for the same external system that is simultaneously connected to the process control unit and the safety control unit, its normal operating condition monitoring signal is transmitted to the process control unit through the serial communication interface, and its emergency operating condition safety signal is transmitted to the safety control unit through the direct-connect electrical interface.

[0017] Optionally, the ship fuel control system further includes multiple emergency cut-off operation units respectively located at different physical locations on the ship; all emergency cut-off operation units are connected to the safety control unit through the direct-connect electrical interface.

[0018] Optionally, the ship fuel control system further includes multiple emergency cut-off operation units respectively located at different physical locations on the ship; each of the emergency cut-off operation units is connected to the safety control unit through the direct-connection electrical interface; the process control unit is provided with a direct-connection electrical interface to receive airlock door limit switch signals for airlock positive pressure monitoring.

[0019] Another aspect of the present invention provides a ship, including the ship fuel control system provided by the present invention.

[0020] In summary, this application includes at least one of the following beneficial technical effects: 1. The ship fuel control system provided by this invention achieves both compliance and high redundancy at extremely low hardware cost. It configures two control units with independent power supply branches isolated from each other, and connects the shared communication and human-machine equipment to the two power supply branches. On the one hand, it cuts off the power source process and the common failure path of the safety subsystem, meeting the hard safety specifications of power supply isolation for ship low flashpoint fuel systems. On the other hand, it eliminates single-circuit power failures of the upper-level monitoring and communication equipment, improving the overall power supply fault tolerance of the system. The hierarchical human-machine terminal permissions further avoid the safety risks caused by misoperation in the bridge. The dual-redundant network switching unit reduces the probability of single-point interruption of the communication link. Long-distance fiber optic transmission combined with threshold judgment eliminates the problem of cross-cabin signal attenuation. The dual-channel differentiated interface of the internal and external systems distinguishes between conventional communication and safety hard-wired signals, taking into account both simple wiring and the reliability of emergency signals. The electrical isolation of the safety output circuit blocks mutual interference between control signals on both sides. The multi-point emergency cut-off unit broadens the coverage of emergency operations. The centralized control printing unit realizes the traceability of alarm data. The independent access of the airlock signal improves the monitoring of the explosion-proof status of the cabin.

[0021] 2. The ship provided by this invention relies on a power supply architecture with dual-system source isolation and cross-redundancy of upper-level equipment to avoid common-cause power failures in the fuel control link from the perspective of the entire ship's power supply. The supporting design of dual-level signal access, hierarchical human-machine interface, and isolated safety circuit is adapted to the ship's centralized control and navigation zone operation layout. It not only meets the mandatory safety specifications for low flashpoint fuel ships, but also improves the real-time reliability of fuel monitoring and emergency cut-off during navigation. It reduces the risk of various control failures under ship navigation conditions, such as cross-cabin communication attenuation, misoperation, and signal crosstalk. It can balance compliance and equipment layout economy without the need for two complete and independent control hardware sets, and is adapted to the installation requirements of limited engine room space on ships. Attached Figure Description

[0022] Figure 1 This is a schematic diagram of a ship fuel control system module according to an embodiment of the present invention.

[0023] Figure 2 This is a schematic diagram of the power supply design framework for the LNG fuel control system according to an embodiment of the present invention.

[0024] Figure 3 This is a schematic diagram of the signal design framework for the LNG fuel control system according to an embodiment of the present invention. Detailed Implementation

[0025] To better understand the above-mentioned objectives, features, and advantages of the present invention, the present invention will be further described in detail below with reference to the accompanying drawings and specific embodiments. It should be noted that, unless otherwise specified, the embodiments and features described in these embodiments can be combined with each other.

[0026] Many specific details are set forth in the following description in order to provide a full understanding of the invention. However, the invention may also be practiced in other ways different from those described herein, and therefore the scope of protection of the invention is not limited to the specific embodiments disclosed below.

[0027] For various types of operating vessels carrying low-flashpoint clean fuels such as LNG, methanol, and liquid ammonia, including ocean-going container ships, bulk carriers, inland waterway dual-fuel vessels, and port bunkering vessels: Ocean-going LNG container ships have engine rooms and bridges separated by over 100 meters. If conventional systems use the same power source for safety and control subsystems, a short circuit in the engine room power distribution can lead to simultaneous power loss of the safety cut-off function. Long-distance communication using only network cables also results in signal attenuation and alarm delays. Inland waterway methanol dual-fuel bulk carriers have limited engine room space; using two completely independent control and human-machine interface (HMI) systems would encroach on piping installation space and increase modification costs. Port ammonia bunkering vessels require crew members to monitor operating conditions in the bridge and prohibit issuing fuel adjustment commands; ordinary system HMIs lack hierarchical access control, making them prone to accidental fuel cut-off triggers. The following embodiments illustrate the ship fuel control system provided by the present invention, which can not only meet the mandatory independent power supply requirements of safety systems for low flash point fuel ships, but also stably avoid the operational defects that conventional systems cannot handle, such as power supply failure due to common causes, signal attenuation, misoperation, and interruption of safety signal communication, under conditions where the ship's engine room space is compact, the cross-cabin communication distance is extremely long, and the driving area only allows monitoring and prohibits operation.

[0028] The ship fuel control system in the following embodiments is powered by the ship's main power distribution unit, which includes independent power distribution output circuits, referred to as the first feed branch and the second feed branch (not shown). The following is in conjunction with the appendix... Figure 1-3 This application will be described in further detail.

[0029] This application discloses a ship fuel control system. (Refer to...) Figure 1 The ship fuel control system includes a process control unit 1, a safety control unit 2, a first uninterruptible power supply unit 31, a second uninterruptible power supply unit 32, a network switching unit 4, and two human-machine interaction terminals 5. The process control unit 1 and the safety control unit 2 are set up independently. The process control unit 1 is configured for control, status monitoring and routine alarm handling under normal operating conditions of the fuel system, while the safety control unit 2 is configured for safety control and emergency alarm handling under emergency operating conditions of the fuel system. The input terminal of the first uninterruptible power supply unit 31 is connected to the first feed branch, and the output terminal is connected to the power supply terminal of the process control unit 1 to supply power to the process control unit 1. The input terminal of the second uninterruptible power supply unit 32 is connected to the second feed branch, and the output terminal is connected to the power supply terminal of the safety control unit 2 to supply power to the safety control unit 2. The power supply terminals of the network switching unit 4 and the human-machine interaction terminal 5 are electrically connected to the output terminals of the first uninterruptible power supply unit 31 and the second uninterruptible power supply unit 32, respectively. The process control unit 1 and the safety control unit 2 are respectively communicatively connected to the network switching unit 4, and the human-machine interaction terminal 5 interacts with the process control unit 1 and the safety control unit 2 through the network switching unit 4.

[0030] Specifically, the process control unit 1 and the safety control unit 2 are two independent hardware control devices. Their control cores, power supply circuits, and input / output signal circuits are independent of each other, and they independently perform the normal operating condition control and emergency operating condition safety protection of the fuel system.

[0031] In a preferred embodiment, an electrical isolation structure is provided between the output circuit of the safety control unit 2 and the process control output circuit of the process control unit 1 to block electrical coupling interference between the two types of control signals, avoid short circuits on the process side and surges entering the safety circuit causing emergency protection failure, and enhance the fault resistance capability of the safety action execution link.

[0032] In a preferred embodiment, the two human-machine interface terminals 5 include a central control-side human-machine interface terminal 51 and a bridge-side human-machine interface terminal 52, respectively located at different physical locations on the ship. The central control-side human-machine interface terminal 51 is configured to have full operational permissions for system control, alarm display, and status monitoring; the bridge-side human-machine interface terminal 52 is configured to have only viewing permissions for alarm display and status monitoring. By dividing the human-machine interface terminals in different locations into operational and monitoring categories, the bridge terminal only allows data viewing and locks the fuel adjustment and emergency reset operation command output channels, thus preventing crew misoperation from triggering abnormal fuel system shutdowns at the source of interaction.

[0033] In a preferred embodiment, there are two network switching units 4. The addition of a second network switching unit 4 forms a dual communication bus architecture. When a single switch experiences hardware failure or a network port short circuit, the communication link can be automatically switched to prevent complete interruption of monitoring and alarm data transmission and improve the fault tolerance of the entire system's data interaction.

[0034] In a preferred embodiment, the transmission distance between the network switching unit 4 and the driver-side human-machine interface terminal 52 is pre-set to be greater than a distance threshold based on signal transmission attenuation characteristics. An example distance threshold ranges from 85 meters to 95 meters. Figure 3 In the example scenario, an optoelectronic conversion unit group 7 is added to the section where the communication line length exceeds the threshold to convert the electrical signal into an optical fiber signal for transmission, eliminating the signal attenuation and electromagnetic interference problems caused by long-distance network cable transmission, and ensuring that there is no delay in data synchronization between distant compartments.

[0035] In a preferred embodiment, the process control unit 1 is provided with multiple serial communication interfaces; the safety control unit 2 is provided with multiple direct-connect electrical interfaces. For the same external system simultaneously connected to both the process control unit 1 and the safety control unit 2, its normal operating condition monitoring signals are transmitted to the process control unit 1 through the serial communication interfaces, and its emergency operating condition safety signals are transmitted to the safety control unit 2 through the direct-connect electrical interfaces. By distinguishing between the process subsystem communication interfaces and the safety subsystem hard-wired interfaces, normal operating condition data is transmitted via serial communication, while emergency cut-off and pressure protection signals are directly connected to external actuators via independent hard-wired connections, thus balancing simplified wiring with the real-time performance and reliability of safety signal transmission.

[0036] In a preferred embodiment, independent emergency cut-off units are configured in multiple locations, including the engine room, refueling station, and cockpit. The signals of each emergency cut-off unit are individually connected to the safety control unit 2. Damage to the circuit of a single cut-off mechanism does not affect the emergency triggering of other locations, thus expanding the coverage of rapid fault handling.

[0037] In a preferred embodiment, a printing unit 6 connected to the network switching unit 4 is added to record and solidify all alarm timing data of the fuel system in real time, forming an unalterable original fault record, providing hardware data support for fault tracing and ship compliance inspection.

[0038] In a preferred embodiment, the input signal circuit and output signal circuit of the safety control unit 2 are set independently of the signal circuit of the process control unit 1; the output signal circuit includes a safety action output circuit; the input signal circuit is equipped with a line status monitoring structure; an electrical isolation structure is provided between the safety action output circuit and the control output circuit of the process control unit 1, and the safety action output circuit is directly connected to external valve actuators and switch opening / closing devices. A separate explosion-proof monitoring signal acquisition line for the airlock is connected to the safety control unit 2. This branch is physically separated from the conventional fuel monitoring circuit to prevent the failure of the compartment explosion-proof sensor from interfering with the operation of the main control system and to meet the monitoring safety requirements of dangerous compartments.

[0039] In a preferred embodiment, the output terminals of the first uninterruptible power supply unit 31 and the second uninterruptible power supply unit 32 are integrated with an automatic switching module. When the voltage of a single power supply drops or power is cut off, the load power supply switching is completed in milliseconds, eliminating the phenomenon of short-term power failure and communication interruption of the upper device, and further improving the continuity of power supply.

[0040] In a preferred embodiment, overcurrent and surge protection branches are added to the output side of the uninterruptible power supply unit 31 and the second uninterruptible power supply unit 32 to suppress instantaneous impact voltage on the ship's power grid, prevent power surges from damaging the switch and the precision low-voltage components of the human-machine terminal, and extend the service life of the monitoring hardware.

[0041] A specific embodiment also provides a ship equipped with the ship fuel control system provided in any of the embodiments.

[0042] The following combination Figure 2 and Figure 3 The following is a detailed explanation. A specific embodiment provides a framework and interface design scheme for the LNG control system of single / dual-fuel vessels. The framework design is divided into two parts: power supply and signal, as described below. Figure 2 and Figure 3 As shown. The system's equipment mainly consists of two workstations as human-machine interface terminals 5 (one located in the central control room for system control, alarm, and status monitoring; the other located in the driver's cab for system alarm and status monitoring only), a printing unit 6 consisting of a printer (located in the central control room), two sets of switches as network switching units 4 (mutually redundant, located in the central control room), a process control box, and a safety control box. The process control box integrates a process control unit 1 and a first uninterruptible power supply unit 31, while the safety control box integrates a safety control unit 2 and a second uninterruptible power supply unit 32.

[0043] like Figure 2 As shown, the ship's autonomous power distribution board is equipped with two independent feeder branches, No. 1 and No. 2. The engine room is equipped with a process control box and a safety control box. The process control box has a built-in first uninterruptible power supply unit 31, exemplified by UPSA. The input of UPSA is connected to feeder branches No. 1 and No. 2 of the autonomous power distribution board, and the output of UPSA is connected to the process control unit 1 in the process control box. The safety control box has a built-in second uninterruptible power supply unit 32, exemplified by UPSB. The input of UPSB is also connected to feeder branches No. 1 and No. 2 of the autonomous power distribution board, and the output of UPSB is connected to the safety control unit 2 in the safety control box. The outputs of UPSA and UPSB are connected to the power distribution unit. The power distribution unit provides two cross-redundant power supplies to two network switching units 4 (e.g., switch A and switch B), the central control room human-machine interface terminal 51 (e.g., OS1), the driver's cab human-machine interface terminal 52 (e.g., OS2), and the printing unit 6 (e.g., using an alarm printer). The process control unit 1 and safety control unit 2 establish communication links with switch A and switch B respectively. The central control room OS1, driver's cab OS2, and printer complete bidirectional data interaction with the process control unit 1 and safety control unit 2 respectively through the two switches.

[0044] According to IGF regulations, the LNG fuel control system should be divided into two independent subsystems: process control and safety. The process control system handles control, alarms, and status monitoring under normal conditions, while the safety system handles safety control and alarms under emergency conditions. Process control unit 1 and safety control unit 2 are integrated in separate control boxes, but share the workstations in the central control room and driver's cab.

[0045] Reference Figure 1 and 2In a specific embodiment, the control boxes of the two independent subsystems (i.e., the process control box and the safety control box) are respectively equipped with uninterruptible power supplies (UPS), the first uninterruptible power supply unit 31 and the second uninterruptible power supply unit 32, whose power supply comes from different feeder panels of the main power distribution board to avoid power failure due to single point of failure; the power supply of the two workstations and the switch comes from the uninterruptible power supplies (UPS) of the two subsystems respectively, forming redundant power supply.

[0046] refer to Figure 3 In this specific embodiment, the internal communication of the control system uses Ethernet connection, and is equipped with two redundant sets of switches A and B (i.e., two network switching units 4). The two network switching units 4 interact with two independent process control boxes, safety control boxes, and workstations via NETA and NETB dual communication buses. A printer is installed in the central control room for printing historical alarm records. In the example, if the communication distance between the central control room and the driver's cab exceeds 90 meters (i.e., the transmission distance between the two exceeds a distance threshold preset according to the signal transmission attenuation characteristics), a photoelectric conversion device, namely photoelectric conversion unit group 7, is also configured to avoid signal transmission attenuation. This mainly includes a photoelectric converter 71, a fiber optic fusion splice box 72, and an optical fiber patch cord 73. The example process control box has multiple serial communication interfaces and multiple direct-connect electrical interfaces with external systems. According to relevant rules and specifications, the interface system includes a tank monitoring system, a nitrogen system, a main system, an auxiliary system, a boiler system (if any), a gas detection system, an engine room monitoring and alarm system, and a ventilation system. All of these systems use MODBUS RTU RS485 communication connection. Additionally, the airlock door limit switch signal needs to be connected to this system separately for positive pressure monitoring within the airlock, using a hardwired connection. Of course, the interface system can have more interfaces or other types of interfaces depending on actual requirements, and can also connect to other systems; there are no limitations.

[0047] The example safety control box has multiple serial communication interfaces with external systems. In accordance with relevant rules and specifications, the interface system includes a fire alarm system, an emergency shut-off system, a main unit system, an auxiliary unit system, a boiler system (if any), a gas detection system, and an engine room monitoring and alarm system. All of these systems are connected by hard wires to ensure the stability and timeliness of signal transmission in emergency situations.

[0048] In specific embodiments, to avoid potential common-cause failures, the safety system is independent of the control system, including its power supply and input / output signals. Signals required by the safety system should be hardwired and loop monitoring implemented. Output signals required for safety actions should be electrically isolated from the control system; that is, output signals should be isolated from any control loop and connected to, for example, separate solenoid valve and circuit breaker contacts / coils.

[0049] In a specific embodiment, the ship's fuel control system also includes an emergency shut-off button, which is located near the exit of the bridge, ship's safety center, central control room, fire control station, and fuel preparation room.

[0050] As can be seen from the above embodiments, the provided ship fuel control system incorporates the requirements of various classification societies and the IGF Code, and is an applicable architecture for LNG fuel control systems, making the design of the control system simpler and clearer.

[0051] The ship fuel control system provided in the specific embodiment effectively solves the design difficulties of power supply, signal framework and external system interface of LNG control system for single / dual fuel ships, meets the requirements of relevant classification societies and rules and regulations, reduces unreasonable and non-standard situations in the design of the system by equipment manufacturers, and provides valuable experience for the design of control systems for subsequent LNG fuel ships.

[0052] In this application, the term "multiple" refers to at least two or more, unless otherwise expressly defined. The terms "install," "connect," "link," and "fix," etc., should be interpreted broadly. For example, "connect" can be a fixed connection, a detachable connection, or an integral connection; "link" can be a direct connection or an indirect connection through an intermediate medium. Those skilled in the art can understand the specific meaning of the above terms in this invention according to the specific circumstances. In the description of this specification, the terms "one embodiment," "some embodiments," "specific embodiment," etc., refer to specific features, structures, materials, or characteristics described in connection with that embodiment or example, which are included in at least one embodiment or example of the present invention. In this specification, the illustrative expressions of the above terms do not necessarily refer to the same embodiment or example. Moreover, the specific features, structures, materials, or characteristics described can be combined in any suitable manner in one or more embodiments or examples.

Claims

1. A ship fuel control system, powered by the ship's main power distribution unit, the main power distribution unit comprising independent power distribution output circuits, respectively denoted as a first feed branch and a second feed branch; characterized in that: The ship fuel control system includes: The system includes a process control unit, a safety control unit, a first uninterruptible power supply unit, a second uninterruptible power supply unit, a network switching unit, and at least two human-machine interaction terminals. The process control unit and the safety control unit are set independently of each other. The process control unit is configured for control, status monitoring and routine alarm handling under normal operating conditions of the fuel system, and the safety control unit is configured for safety control and emergency alarm handling under emergency operating conditions of the fuel system. The input terminal of the first uninterruptible power supply unit is connected to the first feed branch, and the output terminal is connected to the power supply terminal of the process control unit to supply power to the process control unit. The input terminal of the second uninterruptible power supply unit is connected to the second feed branch, and the output terminal is connected to the power supply terminal of the safety control unit to supply power to the safety control unit; The power supply terminals of the network switching unit and the human-computer interaction terminal are respectively electrically connected to the output terminals of the first uninterruptible power supply unit and the second uninterruptible power supply unit. The process control unit and the safety control unit are respectively communicatively connected to the network switching unit, and the human-machine interaction terminal interacts with the process control unit and the safety control unit respectively through the network switching unit.

2. The ship fuel control system according to claim 1, characterized in that: The at least two human-machine interaction terminals include a central control side human-machine interaction terminal and a driver side human-machine interaction terminal respectively set at different physical locations on the ship; the central control side human-machine interaction terminal is configured to have full operation permissions for system control, alarm display and status monitoring; the driver side human-machine interaction terminal is configured to only have viewing permissions for alarm display and status monitoring.

3. The ship fuel control system according to claim 2, characterized in that: The transmission distance between the network switching unit and the driver-side human-machine interface terminal is greater than a distance threshold preset according to the signal transmission attenuation characteristics. The ship fuel control system further includes: a photoelectric conversion unit group, which is disposed on the signal transmission path between the network switching unit and the driver-side human-machine interface terminal, and is configured to establish a communication connection between the network switching unit and the driver-side human-machine interface terminal through an optical fiber transmission medium.

4. The ship fuel control system according to claim 3, characterized in that: The distance threshold ranges from 85 meters to 95 meters.

5. The ship fuel control system according to claim 2, characterized in that: The ship fuel control system also includes a printing unit, which is located at the same physical location on the ship as the centralized control side human-machine interface terminal, is communicatively connected to the network exchange unit, and is configured to output system historical alarm records.

6. The ship fuel control system according to claim 1, characterized in that: The number of network switching units is at least two, including a first network switching unit and a second network switching unit that are redundantly configured; the process control unit, the safety control unit, and the human-machine interaction terminal all establish bidirectional communication connections with the first network switching unit and the second network switching unit, respectively.

7. The ship fuel control system according to claim 1, characterized in that: The process control unit is provided with multiple serial communication interfaces; the safety control unit is provided with multiple direct-connect electrical interfaces; for the same external system that is simultaneously connected to the process control unit and the safety control unit, its normal operating condition monitoring signal is transmitted to the process control unit through the serial communication interface, and its emergency operating condition safety signal is transmitted to the safety control unit through the direct-connect electrical interface.

8. The ship fuel control system according to claim 7, characterized in that: The ship fuel control system also includes multiple emergency cut-off operation units located at different physical locations on the ship; each of the emergency cut-off operation units is connected to the safety control unit via the direct-connection electrical interface; the process control unit is equipped with a direct-connection electrical interface to receive airlock door limit switch signals for airlock positive pressure monitoring.

9. The ship fuel control system according to any one of claims 1 to 8, characterized in that: The input signal circuit and output signal circuit of the safety control unit are set independently of the signal circuit of the process control unit; the output signal circuit includes a safety action output circuit; the input signal circuit is provided with a line status monitoring structure; the safety action output circuit and the control output circuit of the process control unit are provided with an electrical isolation structure, and the safety action output circuit is directly connected to external valve actuators and switch opening / closing devices.

10. A ship, characterized in that: Includes the ship fuel control system as described in any one of claims 1 to 9.

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