Quantum secure root key multi-tree derivation method and device

Abstract

The application provides a root key multi-way tree derivation method and device for quantum security, and the method comprises the following steps: acquiring key derivation requirement parameters; the key derivation requirement parameters comprise deployment end dimension parameters, function dimension parameters and use dimension parameters; a root key is obtained through random generation according to a preset quantum random number generator; a multi-way tree derivation path is determined according to the root key and the key derivation requirement parameters; the levels of the multi-way tree derivation path comprise a first level corresponding to the deployment end dimension parameters, a second level corresponding to the function dimension parameters and a third level corresponding to the use dimension parameters; a derivation path identifier is determined according to the multi-way tree derivation path; and a target derivation key is obtained through key derivation according to the root key and the derivation path identifier. Through the combination of the root key and the multi-way tree derivation path for key derivation, the flexibility and security of the key derivation can be improved.

Description

Technical Field

[0001] This application relates to the field of key derivation technology, and in particular to a root key multi-branch tree derivation method and apparatus for quantum security. Background Technology

[0002] Existing key derivation methods typically employ unary trees or linear derivation structures, starting from a single root key and supporting only a single path of key derivation. When faced with multi-terminal deployment requirements on both the device and server sides, and the differentiated key needs of different functional categories and application scenarios, traditional unary tree structures struggle to provide flexible one-to-many and multi-level multi-branch derivation capabilities. Furthermore, traditional root keys are often generated by pseudo-random number generators, whose security relies on algorithmic complexity rather than true physical randomness. In a quantum computing environment, this presents a risk of being analyzed and predicted, further weakening the security foundation of the entire key system.

[0003] Therefore, improving the flexibility and security of key derivation is an urgent issue to be addressed. Summary of the Invention

[0004] This application provides a root key multi-branch tree derivation method and apparatus for quantum security. By using a root key generated by quantum random numbers as the root of trust, a multi-branch tree derivation path is constructed and key derivation is performed based on three dimensions: deployment end, function, and purpose, thereby improving the flexibility and security of key derivation.

[0005] In a first aspect, embodiments of this application provide a root key multi-way tree derivation method for quantum security, the method comprising: Obtain key derivation requirement parameters; the key derivation requirement parameters include deployment dimension parameters, functional dimension parameters, and purpose dimension parameters; The root key is generated randomly using a preset quantum random number generator; the root key is then physically burned into the preset key storage area inside the target chip corresponding to the dimensional parameters of the deployment end. Based on the root key and the key derivation requirement parameters, a multi-branch tree derivation path is determined; the hierarchy of the multi-branch tree derivation path includes the first level corresponding to the deployment dimension parameter, the second level corresponding to the function dimension parameter, and the third level corresponding to the purpose dimension parameter. The derivation path identifier is determined based on the multi-branch tree derivation path; The target derived key is obtained by derivation based on the root key and the derivation path identifier.

[0006] Secondly, embodiments of this application provide a root key multi-way tree derivation device for quantum security, the device comprising: The acquisition module is used to acquire key derivation requirement parameters; the key derivation requirement parameters include deployment dimension parameters, functional dimension parameters, and purpose dimension parameters. The generation module is used to randomly generate a root key according to a preset quantum random number generator; the root key is physically burned into the preset key storage area inside the target chip corresponding to the dimensional parameters of the deployment end; The first determining module is used to determine a multi-branch tree derivation path based on the root key and the key derivation requirement parameters; the hierarchy of the multi-branch tree derivation path includes a first level corresponding to the deployment dimension parameters, a second level corresponding to the functional dimension parameters, and a third level corresponding to the purpose dimension parameters. The second determining module is used to determine the derivation path identifier based on the multi-branch tree derivation path; The derivation module is used to derive a key based on the root key and the derivation path identifier to obtain the target derivation key.

[0007] Thirdly, embodiments of this application provide an electronic device, including a processor, a memory, a communication interface, and one or more programs, wherein the one or more programs are stored in the memory and configured to be executed by the processor, and the programs include instructions for performing steps in any method of the first aspect of this application.

[0008] Fourthly, embodiments of this application provide a computer-readable storage medium storing a computer program for electronic data interchange, wherein the computer program causes a computer to perform some or all of the steps described in any method of the first aspect of this application.

[0009] Fifthly, embodiments of this application provide a computer program product, wherein the computer program product includes a non-transitory computer-readable storage medium storing a computer program operable to cause a computer to perform some or all of the steps described in any method of the first aspect of this application. The computer program product may be a software installation package.

[0010] It is evident that combining multi-branch tree derivation paths mapped through multiple dimensions with quantum-secure root keys can not only meet the differentiated key derivation needs of multiple terminals and scenarios and improve the flexibility of key management, but also ensure the overall security strength of the key system by relying on the physically solidified root key storage mechanism. Attached Figure Description

[0011] To more clearly illustrate the technical solutions of the embodiments of this application, the drawings used in the description of the embodiments will be briefly introduced below. Obviously, the drawings described below are some embodiments of this application. For those skilled in the art, other drawings can be obtained based on these drawings without creative effort.

[0012] Figure 1 This is a system architecture diagram of a key derivation system provided in an embodiment of this application; Figure 2 This is an application scenario diagram of a key derivation system provided in an embodiment of this application; Figure 3 This is a schematic diagram of a multi-branch tree derivation architecture provided in an embodiment of this application; Figure 4 This is a schematic diagram of the structure of an electronic device provided in an embodiment of this application; Figure 5 This is a flowchart illustrating a root key multi-way tree derivation method for quantum security provided in an embodiment of this application; Figure 6 This is a schematic diagram of a process for determining a derived path identifier provided in an embodiment of this application; Figure 7 This is a schematic diagram of a process for determining a target salinity provided in an embodiment of this application; Figure 8 This is a block diagram of the functional modules of a root key multi-branch tree derivation device for quantum security provided in an embodiment of this application. Detailed Implementation

[0013] To enable those skilled in the art to better understand the present application, the technical solutions in the embodiments of the present application will be clearly and completely described below with reference to the accompanying drawings. Obviously, the described embodiments are only some embodiments of the present application, and not all embodiments. Based on the embodiments in the present application, all other embodiments obtained by those of ordinary skill in the art without creative effort are within the scope of protection of the present application.

[0014] The terms "first," "second," etc., in the specification, claims, and accompanying drawings of this application are used to distinguish different objects, not to describe a specific order. Furthermore, the terms "comprising" and "having," and any variations thereof, are intended to cover non-exclusive inclusion. For example, a process, method, system, product, or apparatus that includes a series of steps or units is not limited to the listed steps or units, but may optionally include steps or units not listed, or may optionally include other steps or units inherent to these processes, methods, products, or apparatuses.

[0015] It should be understood that the term "and / or" in this document is merely a description of the relationship between related objects, indicating that three relationships can exist. For example, A and / or B can represent: A existing alone, A and B existing simultaneously, or B existing alone. Additionally, the character " / " in this document indicates that the preceding and following related objects are in an "or" relationship. In the embodiments of this application, "multiple" refers to two or more.

[0016] In the embodiments of this application, "at least one item" or its similar expression refers to any combination of these items, including any combination of a single item or a plurality of items. "One or more" means one or more, while "multiple" means two or more. For example, "at least one item" of a, b, or c can represent the following seven cases: a, b, c; a and b; a and c; b and c; a, b, and c. Each of a, b, and c can be an element or a set containing one or more elements.

[0017] In this application embodiment, "connection" refers to various connection methods such as direct connection or indirect connection to realize communication between devices. This application embodiment does not limit this in any way.

[0018] In this document, the term "embodiment" means that a particular feature, structure, or characteristic described in connection with an embodiment may be included in at least one embodiment of this application. The appearance of this phrase in various places throughout the specification does not necessarily refer to the same embodiment, nor is it a separate or alternative embodiment mutually exclusive with other embodiments. It will be explicitly and implicitly understood by those skilled in the art that the embodiments described herein can be combined with other embodiments.

[0019] The following is an explanation of the relevant terms used in this application: SHAKE128 refers to a scalable output function based on the SHA-3 family. It is a secure hash algorithm recognized by post-quantum cryptography and is used to replace the traditional SHA-256 to provide hashing capabilities resistant to quantum computing attacks.

[0020] HKDF-SHAKE128 refers to a combination algorithm based on HMAC key derivation function and scalable output function. It uses HKDF as the derivation framework and SHAKE128 to replace the traditional SHA-256 as the underlying pseudo-random function. It is used to replace the traditional HKDF-SHA256 to provide key derivation capability resistant to quantum computing attacks.

[0021] One-Time Password (OTP): This refers to a dynamic password that can only be used once and expires after use. It is mainly used for identity authentication and can effectively resist replay attacks.

[0022] Existing key derivation methods typically employ unary trees or linear derivation structures, starting from a single root key and supporting only a single path of key derivation. When faced with multi-terminal deployment requirements on both the device and server sides, and the differentiated key needs of different functional categories and application scenarios, traditional unary tree structures struggle to provide flexible one-to-many and multi-level multi-branch derivation capabilities. Furthermore, traditional root keys are often generated by pseudo-random number generators, whose security relies on algorithmic complexity rather than true physical randomness. In a quantum computing environment, this presents a risk of being analyzed and predicted, further weakening the security foundation of the entire key system.

[0023] Therefore, improving the flexibility and security of key derivation is an urgent issue to be addressed.

[0024] To address the aforementioned issues, this application provides a root key multi-branch tree derivation method and apparatus for quantum security. First, key derivation requirement parameters are obtained; these parameters include deployment dimension parameters, functional dimension parameters, and usage dimension parameters. Then, a root key is randomly generated using a preset quantum random number generator. The root key is physically written to a preset key storage area within the target chip corresponding to the deployment dimension parameters. Next, a multi-branch tree derivation path is determined based on the root key and the key derivation requirement parameters. The multi-branch tree derivation path has a hierarchy including a first level corresponding to the deployment dimension parameters, a second level corresponding to the functional dimension parameters, and a third level corresponding to the usage dimension parameters. Then, a derivation path identifier is determined based on the multi-branch tree derivation path. Finally, key derivation is performed based on the root key and the derivation path identifier to obtain the target derivation key.

[0025] It is evident that combining multi-branch tree derivation paths mapped through multiple dimensions with quantum-secure root keys can not only meet the differentiated key derivation needs of multiple terminals and scenarios and improve the flexibility of key management, but also ensure the overall security strength of the key system by relying on the physically solidified root key storage mechanism.

[0026] For easier understanding, please refer to Figure 1 , Figure 1 This is a system architecture diagram of a key derivation system provided in an embodiment of this application. The key derivation system includes a root key management unit, a derivation path construction unit, and a hierarchical key derivation unit.

[0027] The root key management unit integrates a quantum random number generator, which generates a 256-bit true random number as the root key through a physical quantum random process. The root key is then physically programmed into a preset key storage area within the target chip. This key storage area is a one-time programmable fuse storage area; once programmed, it is physically unreadable and can only be accessed directly by the chip's internal key derivation logic through a dedicated hardware interface. It is inaccessible by any external software commands or debugging interfaces.

[0028] The derivation path construction unit is responsible for determining the path information and preparing the derivation parameters required for key derivation. This unit first obtains key derivation requirement parameters including deployment dimension, functional dimension, and usage dimension. Based on these parameters, it determines a multi-branch tree derivation path consisting of the first, second, and third levels, and concatenates them in hierarchical order to generate a derivation path identifier. Before key derivation at each level, this unit is responsible for constructing two core parameters: the target salt value and the derivation context. The target salt value is constructed as follows: the chip's unique identifier, the current level identifier, and the derivation path identifier are concatenated, processed by a hash function to obtain the basic salt value, and then XORed with the entropy source generated by the quantum random number generator for the current level to obtain the target salt value. The derivation context is constructed as follows: a preset fixed label, the current level identifier, the chip identifier, and the current timestamp are concatenated in sequence to form the derivation context.

[0029] The hierarchical key derivation unit performs specific key derivation calculations. Starting with the root key provided by the root key management unit and guided by the derivation path identifier provided by the derivation path construction unit, this unit performs derivation operations layer by layer from top to bottom. For each level, the hierarchical key derivation unit uses the derivation key output from the previous level as the input key material for this level, and the target salt value and derivation context constructed by the derivation path construction unit as derivation parameters. It then calls the HKDF quantum-resistant cryptographic derivation function based on SHAKE128 to sequentially complete the extraction and expansion operations, generating the output derivation key for this level. Specifically, the extraction operation thoroughly mixes the input key material with the target salt value to generate a statistically uniform intermediate derivation key; the expansion operation binds the intermediate derivation key with the derivation context and a preset key length to generate the final hierarchical derivation key.

[0030] It is evident that by combining physically unreadable storage of the root key, flexible mapping of multi-branch tree paths, and quantum-resistant hierarchical derivation with independent introduction of entropy sources and timestamps at each level, the physical security of the root key is ensured, while achieving flexible expansion of key derivation in terms of deployment, function, and application, and significantly enhancing resistance to quantum computing attacks.

[0031] For easier understanding, please refer to Figure 2 , Figure 2 This is an application scenario diagram of a key derivation system provided in this application embodiment. The key derivation requirement parameters are the triggering input source for the entire key derivation process. These are configuration parameters carried when the upper-layer business initiates a derivation request, including three types of parameters: deployment dimension, functional dimension, and purpose dimension. These parameters are used to limit the deployment role, functional classification, and business purpose of this derivation, serving as the dimensional basis for subsequent derivation path mapping and key operation. The key derivation system is the core computing carrier for executing the entire key derivation process. It is deployed in the secure computing domain of the corresponding target chip and integrates functional logic such as root key management, path mapping construction, and hierarchical cryptographic derivation. After receiving the input key derivation requirement parameters, it completes all processing steps, including parameter verification, multi-branch tree path matching, and hierarchical key derivation operations, in a closed loop within the chip's hardware security domain. The plaintext key does not leak out of the chip's external interface throughout the entire process. The target derivation key is the final output of the system, corresponding to the input key derivation requirement parameters. It possesses scenario-specific cryptographic capabilities and can be directly provided to the corresponding business module for specific business scenarios such as identity authentication, data encryption, log signature verification, and policy control.

[0032] For easier understanding, please refer to Figure 3 , Figure 3 This is a schematic diagram of a multi-branch tree derivation architecture provided in an embodiment of this application. The multi-branch tree derivation architecture uses a physically fixed root key as the top-level root node and adopts a three-level tree-like hierarchical structure. It expands from top to bottom according to three dimensions: deployment end, function, and purpose, forming a structured key derivation path system.

[0033] The first level is the deployment dimension layer, which takes the root key as the unified derivation starting point and is divided into two parallel first-level branches: the terminal side branch and the server side branch. These branches correspond to the key derivation entry points for two deployment scenarios: terminal devices and server backends, respectively, thereby achieving physical isolation and same-source control of the dual-end key spaces.

[0034] The second level is the functional dimension layer, which extends into corresponding second-level functional branches under each first-level branch: the terminal-side branch has two types of second-level branches, namely the session branch and the backup branch, which correspond to the identity authentication and key recovery functional scenarios, respectively; the server-side branch has two types of second-level branches, namely the audit branch and the control branch, which correspond to the log signature verification and policy control functional scenarios, respectively, to achieve key space isolation between different functional categories.

[0035] The third level is the usage dimension layer, where corresponding business usage leaf nodes are attached to the end of each secondary functional branch: the session branch corresponds to the temporary OTP node, the backup branch corresponds to the recovery key node, the audit branch corresponds to the log signature node, and the control branch corresponds to the policy encryption node. Each leaf node corresponds to a target derived key for a certain type of final business use, providing dedicated key output for specific business scenarios.

[0036] It should be noted that in this multi-branch tree derivation architecture, each level of branch node corresponds to an independent key derivation operation. The derivation key of the upper-level node serves as the input key material for the lower-level branch. Derivation is performed level by level, and spatial isolation is achieved layer by layer. This not only allows for flexible adaptation to various business needs through the multi-branch structure, but also ensures the overall security of the key system by relying on the hierarchical isolation mechanism.

[0037] The following is combined with Figure 4 The electronic devices in the embodiments of this application will be described. Figure 4 This is a schematic diagram of the structure of an electronic device provided in an embodiment of this application, such as... Figure 4 As shown, the electronic device includes one or more processors, a memory, a communication interface, and one or more programs. The processor is connected to the memory and the communication interface via an internal communication bus.

[0038] The processor can be used for: Obtain key derivation requirement parameters; the key derivation requirement parameters include deployment dimension parameters, functional dimension parameters, and purpose dimension parameters; The root key is generated randomly using a preset quantum random number generator; the root key is then physically burned into the preset key storage area inside the target chip corresponding to the dimensional parameters of the deployment end. Based on the root key and the key derivation requirement parameters, a multi-branch tree derivation path is determined; the hierarchy of the multi-branch tree derivation path includes the first level corresponding to the deployment dimension parameter, the second level corresponding to the function dimension parameter, and the third level corresponding to the purpose dimension parameter. The derivation path identifier is determined based on the multi-branch tree derivation path; The target derived key is obtained by derivation based on the root key and the derivation path identifier.

[0039] The one or more programs are stored in the aforementioned memory and configured to be executed by the aforementioned processor, and the one or more programs include instructions for performing any step in the above method embodiments.

[0040] The processor can be a central processing unit (CPU), a general-purpose processor, a digital signal processor (DSP), an application-specific integrated circuit (ASIC), a field-programmable gate array (FPGA), or other programmable logic devices, transistor logic devices, hardware components, or any combination thereof. It can implement or execute the various exemplary logic blocks, cells, and circuits described in conjunction with the disclosure of this application. The processor can also be a combination that implements computational functions, such as a combination of one or more microprocessors, a combination of a DSP and a microprocessor, etc. The communication unit can be a communication interface, transceiver, transceiver circuit, etc., and the storage unit can be a memory.

[0041] The memory can be volatile or non-volatile, or a combination of both. Non-volatile memory can be read-only memory (ROM), programmable read-only memory (PROM), erasable programmable read-only memory (EPROM), electrically erasable programmable read-only memory (EEPROM), or flash memory. Volatile memory can be random access memory (RAM), used as an external cache. By way of example, but not limitation, many forms of random access memory (RAM) are available, such as static RAM (SRAM), dynamic RAM (DRAM), synchronous DRAM (SDRAM), double data rate synchronous DRAM (DDR SDRAM), enhanced synchronous DRAM (ESDRAM), synchronous linked DRAM (SLDRAM), and direct rambus RAM (DR RAM).

[0042] It is understood that the electronic device may include more or fewer structural elements than those shown in the block diagram above, such as a power module, physical buttons, a Wi-Fi module, a speaker, a Bluetooth module, sensors, a display module, etc., without limitation. It is understood that the electronic device may incorporate elements such as... Figure 1 The system architecture described above.

[0043] After understanding the software and hardware architecture of this application, the following will be combined with... Figure 5 This application describes a root key multi-way tree derivation method for quantum security in its embodiments. Figure 5 This is a flowchart illustrating a root key multi-way tree derivation method for quantum security provided in an embodiment of this application, specifically including the following steps: Step S501: Obtain the key derivation requirement parameters.

[0044] The key derivation requirement parameters include deployment dimension parameters, functional dimension parameters, and usage dimension parameters.

[0045] Specifically, the deployment dimension parameter identifies the deployment end corresponding to this key derivation, with values ​​limited to two categories: terminal side and server side. These correspond to the derivation branches of the target chip on the terminal device and the server side, respectively, and are used to map the first-level node of the multi-branch tree derivation path. The function dimension parameter identifies the function category of the derived key, with values ​​limited to four categories: session, backup, audit, and control, corresponding to four functional scenarios: identity authentication, key recovery, log signature verification, and policy control, respectively. This is used to map the second-level node of the multi-branch tree derivation path. The purpose dimension parameter identifies the final business purpose of the derived key, with values ​​limited to four categories: temporary OTP, recovery key, log signature, and policy encryption. It has a preset one-to-one correspondence with the function dimension parameter and is used to map the third-level leaf node of the multi-branch tree derivation path.

[0046] Step S502: The root key is obtained by randomly generating a quantum random number using a preset quantum random number generator.

[0047] The root key is physically burned into the preset key storage area inside the target chip corresponding to the deployment end dimension parameter.

[0048] Specifically, in a secure, isolated chip environment, the target chip's built-in quantum random number generator is invoked. Based on a quantum physics random source, the raw entropy value is collected, and after entropy extraction, bias removal, and cryptographic post-processing, a 256-bit high-entropy true random root key is generated. The entire generation process is executed in a closed loop within the chip's secure domain, with no plaintext key leaking out of the chip's external interface. For the two types of target chips at the deployment end, the terminal-side chip and the server-side chip employ a pre-configured root key scheme, ensuring that both ends can derive a consistent target key based on the same path.

[0049] Then, the generated root key is physically burned into the key storage area (i.e., the one-time programmable fuse storage area) of the target chip corresponding to the deployment dimension parameter. This key storage area is a chip hardware-level secure storage area. After burning, it is irreversible and cannot be erased or tampered with. At the same time, the key storage area is configured with hardware access control. Only the chip's internal hardware cryptographic derivation engine can directly read the root key plaintext. Upper-layer software and external communication buses cannot access or export the root key, thereby constructing the physical trust root of the key system.

[0050] Step S503: Determine the multi-branch tree derivation path based on the root key and the key derivation requirement parameters.

[0051] The hierarchy of the multi-branch tree derivation path includes the first level corresponding to the deployment dimension parameter, the second level corresponding to the function dimension parameter, and the third level corresponding to the purpose dimension parameter.

[0052] The specific steps for determining the multi-way tree derivation path based on the root key and the key derivation requirement parameters include: S11. Using the root key as the derivation starting point, determine the first-level branch corresponding to the derivation starting point according to the deployment end dimension parameters; the first-level branch includes any one of the following: terminal-side branch, server-side branch; S12. Determine the second-level branch corresponding to the first-level branch based on the functional dimension parameters; the second-level branch includes any one of the following: session branch, backup branch, audit branch, and control branch; S13. Determine the third-level node corresponding to the second-level branch based on the usage dimension parameters; the third-level node includes any one of the following: temporary OTP node, recovery key node, log signature node, policy encryption node; S14. Determine the multi-branch tree derivation path based on the first level branch, the second level branch, and the third level node.

[0053] In a specific embodiment, firstly, the root key physically stored in the key storage area of ​​the target chip is used as the root node of the multi-branch tree (i.e., the derivation starting point). Then, the values ​​of the deployment-side dimension parameters are read, and a preset first-level mapping table is queried to complete branch matching: when the deployment-side dimension parameter is terminal-side, the terminal-side branch is matched as the first-level branch; when the deployment-side dimension parameter is server-side, the server-side branch is matched as the first-level branch. Simultaneously, the matching process performs a first-level parameter validity check to confirm that the parameter value is within a preset enumeration range. If the check fails, the derivation process is terminated and a branch parameter error is returned.

[0054] Then, under the locked first-level branch, the values ​​of the functional dimension parameters are read, and the corresponding second-level mapping table is queried to match the second-level branches of the corresponding functional categories: the session branch corresponds to identity authentication functional scenarios, the backup branch corresponds to key recovery functional scenarios, the audit branch corresponds to log signature verification functional scenarios, and the control branch corresponds to policy management functional scenarios. Simultaneously, a hierarchical dependency check is performed to confirm that the branch corresponding to the current functional dimension parameter belongs to the selected first-level branch, ensuring consistency between the second-level branch architecture on the terminal side and the server side, and guaranteeing consistency of the derivation results along the same path on both ends.

[0055] Next, under the locked second-level branch, the values ​​of the purpose dimension parameters are read, and the corresponding third-level mapping table is queried to match the terminal leaf nodes of the corresponding business purpose: the temporary OTP node belongs to the session branch, the recovery key node belongs to the backup branch, the log signature node belongs to the audit branch, and the policy encryption node belongs to the control branch. Simultaneously, a dependency check of purpose and function is performed to confirm that the current purpose node belongs to the selected second-level function branch. If the dimension correspondence does not match, the process terminates and returns a dimension dependency error.

[0056] Finally, the first-level branches, second-level branches, and third-level nodes are sorted in top-down hierarchical order to obtain the multi-branch tree derivation path. A path integrity check can also be performed on this multi-branch tree derivation path to confirm that the number of path levels corresponds one-to-one with the number of dimension parameters. If the check passes, the multi-branch tree derivation path is output as input for subsequent derivation path identifier generation.

[0057] It is evident that by mapping the deployment end, function, and purpose layer by layer, the key requirements are transformed into a structured multi-branch tree derivation path, enabling the key system to be flexibly expanded in multi-terminal deployment, multi-business function, and multi-security application scenarios.

[0058] Step S504: Determine the derivation path identifier based on the multi-branch tree derivation path.

[0059] For easier understanding, please refer to Figure 6 , Figure 6 This is a flowchart illustrating a process for determining a derivation path identifier according to an embodiment of this application. The specific steps for determining the derivation path identifier based on the multi-branch tree derivation path include: S21. Obtain the identifiers corresponding to the first-level branch, the second-level branch, and the third-level node respectively, to obtain the first-level identifier, the second-level identifier, and the third-level identifier; S22. According to the hierarchical order of the multi-branch tree derivation path, the first level identifier, the second level identifier, and the third level identifier are sequentially concatenated to generate the derivation path identifier.

[0060] In a specific embodiment, a pre-stored identifier mapping table is retrieved from the target chip. This identifier mapping table is a static configuration table, where each branch and node corresponds to a globally unique standard identifier string, and the identifier value is fixed and cannot be dynamically modified. Based on this identifier mapping table, the identifiers corresponding to the first-level branch, the second-level branch, and the third-level node are determined, resulting in the first-level identifier, the second-level identifier, and the third-level identifier. For example, if the first-level branch is a "terminal-side branch," its corresponding first-level identifier is "device"; if the first-level branch is a "server-side branch," its corresponding first-level identifier is "server." Then, using a preset fixed separator as the level separator, the strings are concatenated strictly according to the top-down level order of the multi-branch tree derivation path to form a complete derivation path identifier.

[0061] As can be seen, by concatenating the three-dimensional multi-branch tree paths in hierarchical order to form a uniquely determined derivation path identifier, the cryptographic isolation of different path identifiers corresponding to different derivation needs is ensured, providing a clear and reproducible path input for subsequent hierarchical key derivation.

[0062] Step S505: Perform key derivation based on the root key and the derivation path identifier to obtain the target derivation key.

[0063] The derivation path identifier includes a first-level identifier, a second-level identifier, and a third-level identifier. The specific steps for obtaining the target derivation key based on the root key and the derivation path identifier include: S31. The root key is determined as the first derived key; the first derived key is the input key corresponding to the first level; S32. For the first level, perform key derivation based on the first derived key and the first level identifier to obtain a second derived key; the second derived key is the input key corresponding to the second level. S33. For the second level, perform key derivation based on the second derived key and the second level identifier to obtain a third derived key; the third derived key is the input key corresponding to the third level. S34. For the third level, perform key derivation based on the third derived key and the third level identifier to obtain the target derived key.

[0064] In a specific embodiment, after obtaining the root key and the derivation path identifier, the key derivation execution phase begins. A top-down, layer-by-layer derivation strategy can be adopted, using the root key as the starting point and deriving level by level along the multi-branch tree derivation path until the final target derivation key is obtained. The entire derivation process constitutes a key derivation chain from root to leaf, where the output key of each level in the chain serves as the input key for the next level, ensuring the continuity and irreversibility of the key derivation chain.

[0065] The process begins with initializing the derivation chain, where the root key, pre-programmed into the key storage area of ​​the target chip, is designated as the first derivation key. This first derivation key also serves as the input key for the first level of the multi-branch tree derivation path, providing initial key material for subsequent derivation operations. It should be noted that the root key is generated by a quantum random number generator and physically programmed into the chip, rendering it unreadable after programming. It can only be accessed directly through a hardware interface by the chip's internal key derivation logic.

[0066] Specifically, for the first level of the multi-branch tree derivation path, the first derived key is used as the input key material, and the first-level identifier is used as the core path parameter. Combined with the entropy source generated by the quantum random number generator for this level and the current timestamp, a derivation function (i.e., a quantum-resistant cryptographic derivation function) is invoked to perform the key derivation operation, generating the second derived key. This second derived key is the input key corresponding to the second level. The introduction of the entropy source and timestamp during the derivation process ensures the freshness and unpredictability of the key.

[0067] Specifically, for the second level of the multi-branch tree derivation path, the second derived key output from the previous level is used as the input key material, and the second-level identifier is used as the core path parameter. Similarly, combining the entropy source generated for this level and the current timestamp, the derivation function is called to perform the key derivation operation, generating the third derived key. This third derived key is the input key corresponding to the third level. The design of independently introducing entropy sources for each level ensures cryptographic isolation between keys at different levels.

[0068] Specifically, for the third level of the multi-branch tree derivation path, the third derivation key is used as the input key material, the third level identifier is used as the core path parameter, and the entropy source generated for this level and the current timestamp are combined to call the derivation function to perform the key derivation operation and generate the final target derivation key.

[0069] As can be seen, by starting with the root key and passing the derivation layer by layer along the multi-branch tree hierarchy, it is ensured that each level key depends only on the previous level key and the current level identifier, thus achieving the irreversibility of the derivation chain and cryptographic isolation between keys of different paths.

[0070] Specifically, the step of deriving a second derived key based on the first derived key and the first level identifier for the first level includes: S41. Obtain the first layer entropy source randomly generated by the quantum random number generator for the first layer; S42. Obtain the first timestamp when the first level begins executing key derivation; S43. Obtain the chip identifier corresponding to the target chip; the chip identifier includes any one of the following: terminal-side chip identifier, server-side chip identifier; S44. Determine the target salt value based on the chip identifier, the first level identifier, the derived path identifier, and the first level entropy source; S45. The preset fixed tag, the first level identifier, the chip identifier, and the first timestamp are concatenated to obtain the derived context; the fixed tag is used to identify the quantum security domain to which the current key derivation operation belongs; S46. Determine the second derived key based on the first derived key, the target salt value, the derived context, and the preset key length.

[0071] In a specific embodiment, before entering the first-level derivation operation, the quantum random number generator built into the target chip is invoked to generate a 128-bit true random number based on a quantum physical random entropy source, serving as the first-level entropy source exclusive to the first level. This first-level entropy source corresponds one-to-one with the derivation level, operates only on the first-level derivation, is not reused with other levels, and possesses unpredictability and non-repeatability. It is used to inject quantum true random entropy into the salt value, enhancing the anti-attack strength of the derivation process. The generation process of the first-level entropy source is completed entirely within the chip's internal secure domain, without exposing the original entropy value externally. At the same moment the first-level derivation operation is initiated, the trusted system time output by the target chip's built-in hardware real-time clock is read, generating a 64-bit Unix-formatted first timestamp with a time accuracy of no less than milliseconds. This first timestamp is an independent time constraint factor for the first level, collected separately from and independently of the timestamps of other levels. It is used to bind the derivation results from a time dimension, resisting replay attacks, and simultaneously supporting key validity management.

[0072] Then, the chip identifier is read from the factory-fixed fields corresponding to the target chip. This chip identifier is a unique code for the chip and cannot be tampered with after leaving the factory. Specifically, the target chip deployed on the terminal device corresponds to the terminal-side chip identifier, and the target chip deployed on the server backend corresponds to the server-side chip identifier. The chip identifier will participate in the construction of the salt value and the derived context to achieve a strong binding between the key and the chip hardware entity, ensuring that different chips cannot derive the same key even if they use the same path.

[0073] Next, the chip identifier, first-level identifier, derivation path identifier, and first-level entropy source are concatenated and hashed to obtain the target salt value. Then, a statically fixed tag embedded within the target chip is retrieved. This fixed tag is a dedicated domain identifier for the quantum-safe derivation system, with a fixed and unmodifiable value, used to distinguish derivation scenarios of different cryptographic systems. Following a preset order, the fixed tag, first-level identifier, chip identifier, and first timestamp are concatenated to generate the first-level derivation context. This derivation context is used as an info parameter in the calculation, binding the derivation key to its security domain, derivation level, hardware identity, and derivation time in multiple dimensions, preventing key mixing and cross-scenario replay in different scenarios. Finally, the HKDF key derivation algorithm based on SHAKE128 is used to derive the second derivation key based on the first derivation key, target salt value, derivation context, and preset key length.

[0074] It is evident that by introducing entropy sources and timestamps, and binding chip identifiers, hierarchical identifiers, and derivation paths together to the target salt value and derivation context for quantum-resistant key derivation, the random independence, timeliness, and device binding strength of each layer of derivation keys are enhanced.

[0075] For easier understanding, please refer to Figure 7 , Figure 7 This is a flowchart illustrating a process for determining a target salt value according to an embodiment of this application. The specific steps for determining the target salt value based on the chip identifier, the first-level identifier, the derived path identifier, and the first-level entropy source include: S51. Concatenate the chip identifier, the first level identifier, and the derived path identifier to obtain a first string; S52. Based on a preset hash function, perform hash processing on the first string to obtain a basic salt value; S53. Perform an XOR operation between the base salt value and the first layer entropy source to obtain the target salt value.

[0076] In a specific embodiment, firstly, the chip identifier corresponding to the target chip, the first-level identifier corresponding to the current derived level, and the derived path identifier, which is formed by concatenating the first-level identifier, the second-level identifier, and the third-level identifier in hierarchical order, are obtained. Then, the chip identifier, the first-level identifier, and the derived path identifier are concatenated according to a preset concatenation order to obtain a first string. For example, if the chip identifier is "CHIP-001", the first-level identifier is "device", and the derived path identifier (i.e., "path_string") is "device||backup||recovery", then the first string is represented as "CHIP-001||device||path_string". Here, "backup" is the second-level identifier corresponding to the backup branch, and "recovery" is the third-level identifier corresponding to the recovery key node.

[0077] Then, a preset hash function (such as the quantum-resistant hash function SHAKE128) is invoked to hash the first string. Since SHAKE128 is a sponge-based scalable output function, it possesses security properties resistant to quantum computing attacks, and its output hash value is computationally indistinguishable from a true random number. A bit string of a preset length is then extracted from the SHAKE128 output as the base salt value. Next, the first-layer entropy source generated by the quantum random number generator for the current first level is obtained; this first-layer entropy source is a 128-bit true random number. Finally, the base salt value and the first-layer entropy source are XORed bitwise to obtain the target salt value.

[0078] It is evident that by hashing and compressing the chip identifier, hierarchy identifier, and path identifier and then XORing them with a true random entropy source, a strong binding between the salt value and device identity, the derived path, and the inseparability with the freshness of the entropy source are achieved, providing a unique and unpredictable randomized input for resisting quantum key derivation.

[0079] The specific steps for determining the second derived key based on the first derived key, the target salt value, the derivation context, and the preset key length include: S61. Use the first derived key as the input key material and the target salt value as the salt parameter; S62. Call a preset derived function to extract the input key material and the salt parameter to generate an intermediate derived key; S63. Use the intermediate derived key as the basic key material and the derived context as the information binding parameter; S64. Based on the key length, call the derived function to extend the basic key material and the information binding parameters to generate the second derived key.

[0080] In a specific embodiment, firstly, the first derived key is used as the input key material of a preset derivation function (i.e., the HKDF-SHAKE128 derivation function), and the target salt value is used as the salt parameter of the derivation function. Then, the extraction module inside the derivation function is called to extract the input key material and the salt parameter. During the extraction process, the derivation function utilizes its sponge structure absorption phase to fully absorb and compress the input key material and the salt parameter, and then outputs a fixed-length bit string through the squeezing phase. This bit string is the intermediate derivation key.

[0081] Then, the intermediate derived key is used as the base key material for the derived function, the derived context is used as the information binding parameter, and the preset key length is used as the output length parameter. The extension module within the derived function is then called to extend the base key material, information binding parameter, and output length parameter. During the extension process, the extension module uses the base key material as a seed and the information binding parameter as a customized label to sequentially generate an output key stream with the same key length. This output key stream is the second derived key.

[0082] It's important to note that the information binding parameters play a domain separation role at this stage. Because the derived context contains fixed tags, hierarchy identifiers, chip identifiers, and timestamps, this information is indivisibly bound to the second derived key. Different chips, different hierarchy levels, or different derivation times will result in completely different generated second derived keys. This strong binding mechanism ensures a strict correspondence between the key and the device identity, derivation path, and generation time, preventing key reuse attacks across devices, paths, or time periods.

[0083] It is evident that by first compressing the input key and target salt value into a statistically uniform intermediate key, and then expanding the intermediate key with the derived context of binding path, device, and time information, the strong binding relationship between the derived key and device, path, and timeliness, as well as the computational isolation between different derived paths, are enhanced.

[0084] The above primarily describes the solutions of the embodiments of this application from the perspective of the method execution process. It is understood that, in order to achieve the above functions, the electronic device includes corresponding hardware structures and / or software modules for executing each function. Those skilled in the art should readily recognize that, in conjunction with the units and algorithm steps of the various examples described in the embodiments provided herein, this application can be implemented in hardware or a combination of hardware and computer software. Whether a function is executed by hardware or by computer software driving hardware depends on the specific application and design constraints of the technical solution. Those skilled in the art can use different methods to implement the described functions for each specific application, but such implementation should not be considered beyond the scope of this application.

[0085] This application embodiment can divide the electronic device into functional units according to the above method example. For example, each function can be divided into a separate functional unit, or two or more functions can be integrated into one processing unit. The integrated unit can be implemented in hardware or as a software functional unit. It should be noted that the unit division in this application embodiment is illustrative and only represents one logical functional division. In actual implementation, there may be other division methods.

[0086] When dividing each function into modules according to its corresponding function. Figure 8 This is a functional block diagram of a root key multi-way tree derivation device for quantum security provided in an embodiment of this application. The root key multi-way tree derivation device 800 for quantum security includes: The acquisition module 810 is used to acquire key derivation requirement parameters; the key derivation requirement parameters include deployment dimension parameters, functional dimension parameters, and purpose dimension parameters. The generation module 820 is used to randomly generate a root key according to a preset quantum random number generator; the root key is physically burned into the preset key storage area inside the target chip corresponding to the deployment end dimension parameter; The first determining module 830 is used to determine a multi-branch tree derivation path based on the root key and the key derivation requirement parameters; the hierarchy of the multi-branch tree derivation path includes a first level corresponding to the deployment dimension parameters, a second level corresponding to the functional dimension parameters, and a third level corresponding to the purpose dimension parameters. The second determining module 840 is used to determine the derivation path identifier based on the multi-branch tree derivation path; The derivation module 850 is used to derive a key based on the root key and the derivation path identifier to obtain a target derivation key.

[0087] Optionally, the derivation path identifier includes a first-level identifier, a second-level identifier, and a third-level identifier. In the process of deriving the target derived key based on the root key and the derivation path identifier, the derivation module 850 is specifically used for: The root key is determined as the first derived key; the first derived key is the input key corresponding to the first level; For the first level, a key is derived based on the first derived key and the first level identifier to obtain a second derived key; the second derived key is the input key corresponding to the second level. For the second level, a third derived key is derived based on the second derived key and the second level identifier; the third derived key is the input key corresponding to the third level. For the third level, the target derived key is obtained by derivation based on the third derived key and the third level identifier.

[0088] Optionally, in the process of deriving a second derived key based on the first derived key and the first level identifier for the first level, the derivation module 850 is further specifically used for: Obtain the first layer entropy source randomly generated by the quantum random number generator for the first layer; Obtain the first timestamp at which the key derivation process begins at the first level; Obtain the chip identifier corresponding to the target chip; the chip identifier includes any one of the following: terminal-side chip identifier, server-side chip identifier; The target salt value is determined based on the chip identifier, the first level identifier, the derived path identifier, and the first level entropy source. The pre-set fixed tag, the first-level identifier, the chip identifier, and the first timestamp are concatenated to obtain the derived context; the fixed tag is used to identify the quantum security domain to which the current key derivation operation belongs; The second derived key is determined based on the first derived key, the target salt value, the derived context, and the preset key length.

[0089] Optionally, in determining the target salt value based on the chip identifier, the first level identifier, the derived path identifier, and the first level entropy source, the derivation module 850 is further specifically used for: The chip identifier, the first-level identifier, and the derived path identifier are concatenated to obtain the first string; Based on a preset hash function, the first string is hashed to obtain a basic salt value; The target salt value is obtained by performing an XOR operation between the base salt value and the first layer entropy source.

[0090] Optionally, in determining the second derived key based on the first derived key, the target salt value, the derivation context, and the preset key length, the derivation module 850 is further specifically configured to: The first derived key is used as the input key material, and the target salt value is used as the salt parameter; The input key material and the salt parameter are extracted and processed by calling a preset derived function to generate an intermediate derived key; The intermediate derived key is used as the base key material, and the derived context is used as the information binding parameter. Based on the key length, the derived function is called to expand the basic key material and the information binding parameters to generate the second derived key.

[0091] Optionally, in determining the multi-branch tree derivation path based on the root key and the key derivation requirement parameters, the first determining module 830 is specifically used for: Using the root key as the derivation starting point, the first-level branch corresponding to the derivation starting point is determined according to the deployment end dimension parameters; the first-level branch includes any one of the following: terminal-side branch, server-side branch; The second-level branch corresponding to the first-level branch is determined based on the functional dimension parameters; the second-level branch includes any one of the following: session branch, backup branch, audit branch, and control branch; The third-level node corresponding to the second-level branch is determined based on the aforementioned usage dimension parameters; the third-level node includes any one of the following: temporary OTP node, recovery key node, log signature node, and policy encryption node; The multi-branch tree derivation path is determined based on the first-level branch, the second-level branch, and the third-level node.

[0092] Optionally, in determining the derivation path identifier based on the multi-branch tree derivation path, the second determining module 840 is specifically used for: Obtain the identifiers corresponding to the first-level branch, the second-level branch, and the third-level node respectively to obtain the first-level identifier, the second-level identifier, and the third-level identifier; According to the hierarchical order of the multi-branch tree derivation path, the first level identifier, the second level identifier, and the third level identifier are sequentially concatenated to generate the derivation path identifier.

[0093] It should be noted that the specific implementation of each operation can be described in the corresponding description of the method embodiments shown above. The root key multi-branch tree derivation device 800 for quantum security can be used to execute the method embodiments of this application, and will not be described again here.

[0094] This application also provides a computer-readable storage medium storing a computer program for electronic data interchange, which causes a computer to perform some or all of the steps of any of the methods described in the above method embodiments, wherein the computer includes an electronic device.

[0095] This application also provides a computer program product, which includes a non-transitory computer-readable storage medium storing a computer program operable to cause a computer to perform some or all of the steps of any of the methods described in the above method embodiments. The computer program product may be a software installation package, and the computer may include an electronic device.

[0096] It should be noted that, for the sake of simplicity, the above embodiments are all described as a series of actions. Those skilled in the art should understand that this application is not limited to the described order of actions, as some steps in the embodiments of this application can be performed in other orders or simultaneously. Furthermore, those skilled in the art should also understand that the embodiments described in the specification are preferred embodiments, and the actions, steps, modules, or units involved are not necessarily essential to the embodiments of this application.

[0097] In the above embodiments, the descriptions of each embodiment in this application have different focuses. For parts not described in detail in a certain embodiment, please refer to the relevant descriptions in other embodiments.

[0098] Those skilled in the art will understand that all or part of the processes in the methods of the above embodiments can be implemented by a computer program instructing related hardware. This program can be stored in a computer-readable storage medium, and when executed, it can include the processes described in the above method embodiments. The aforementioned storage medium includes various media capable of storing program code, such as ROM or random access memory (RAM), magnetic disks, or optical disks.

[0099] The steps of the methods or algorithms described in the embodiments of this application can be implemented in hardware or by a processor executing software instructions. The software instructions can consist of corresponding software modules, which can be stored in RAM, flash memory, ROM, EPROM, electrically erasable programmable read-only memory (EEPROM), registers, hard disk, portable hard disk, read-only optical disk (CD-ROM), or any other form of storage medium well known in the art. An exemplary storage medium is coupled to a processor, enabling the processor to read information from and write information to the storage medium. Of course, the storage medium can also be a component of the processor. The processor and storage medium can reside in an ASIC. Furthermore, the ASIC can reside in a terminal device or management device. Alternatively, the processor and storage medium can exist as discrete components in the terminal device or management device.

[0100] Those skilled in the art will recognize that, in one or more of the examples above, the functions described in the embodiments of this application can be implemented, in whole or in part, by software, hardware, firmware, or any combination thereof. When implemented in software, it can be implemented, in whole or in part, as a computer program product. This computer program product includes one or more computer instructions. When these computer program instructions are loaded and executed on a computer, all or part of the processes or functions described in the embodiments of this application are generated. The computer can be a general-purpose computer, a special-purpose computer, a computer network, or other programmable device. The computer instructions can be stored in a computer-readable storage medium or transmitted from one computer-readable storage medium to another. For example, the computer instructions can be transmitted from one website, computer, server, or data center to another via wired (e.g., coaxial cable, fiber optic, digital subscriber line (DSL)) or wireless (e.g., infrared, wireless, microwave, etc.) means. The computer-readable storage medium can be any available medium accessible to a computer or a data storage device such as a server or data center that integrates one or more available media. The available media can be magnetic media (e.g., floppy disks, hard disks, magnetic tapes), optical media (e.g., digital video discs (DVDs)), or semiconductor media (e.g., solid-state disks (SSDs)).

[0101] The modules / units included in the various devices and products described in the above embodiments can be software modules / units, hardware modules / units, or a combination of both. For example, for devices and products applied to or integrated into a chip, all modules / units can be implemented using hardware methods such as circuits, or at least some modules / units can be implemented using software programs that run on a processor integrated within the chip, while the remaining (if any) modules / units can be implemented using hardware methods such as circuits. For devices and products applied to or integrated into a chip module, all modules / units can be implemented using hardware methods such as circuits. Different modules / units can be located in the same component (e.g., chip, circuit module, etc.) or different components of the chip module, or at least some modules / units can be implemented using hardware methods such as circuits. The implementation is achieved through a software program that runs on the processor integrated within the chip module. The remaining modules / units (if any) can be implemented using hardware methods such as circuits. For various devices and products applied to or integrated into terminal equipment, each of their modules / units can be implemented using hardware methods such as circuits. Different modules / units can be located in the same component (e.g., chip, circuit module, etc.) or different components within the terminal equipment. Alternatively, at least some modules / units can be implemented through a software program that runs on the processor integrated within the terminal equipment, while the remaining modules / units (if any) can be implemented using hardware methods such as circuits.

[0102] The specific embodiments described above further illustrate the purpose, technical solution, and beneficial effects of the embodiments of this application. It should be understood that the above descriptions are merely specific embodiments of the embodiments of this application and are not intended to limit the protection scope of the embodiments of this application. Any modifications, equivalent substitutions, improvements, etc., made on the basis of the technical solutions of the embodiments of this application should be included within the protection scope of the embodiments of this application.

Claims

1. A root key multi-branch tree derivation method for quantum security, characterized in that, The method includes: Obtain key derivation requirement parameters; the key derivation requirement parameters include deployment dimension parameters, functional dimension parameters, and purpose dimension parameters; The root key is generated randomly using a preset quantum random number generator; the root key is then physically burned into the preset key storage area inside the target chip corresponding to the dimensional parameters of the deployment end. Based on the root key and the key derivation requirement parameters, a multi-branch tree derivation path is determined; the hierarchy of the multi-branch tree derivation path includes the first level corresponding to the deployment dimension parameter, the second level corresponding to the function dimension parameter, and the third level corresponding to the purpose dimension parameter. The derivation path identifier is determined based on the multi-branch tree derivation path; The target derived key is obtained by derivation based on the root key and the derived path identifier. The derivation path identifier includes a first-level identifier, a second-level identifier, and a third-level identifier. The step of deriving the target derivation key based on the root key and the derivation path identifier includes: The root key is determined as the first derived key; the first derived key is the input key corresponding to the first level; For the first level, a key is derived based on the first derived key and the first level identifier to obtain a second derived key; the second derived key is the input key corresponding to the second level. For the second level, a third derived key is derived based on the second derived key and the second level identifier; the third derived key is the input key corresponding to the third level. For the third level, the target derived key is obtained by derivation based on the third derived key and the third level identifier.

2. The method as described in claim 1, characterized in that, The step of deriving a second derived key based on the first derived key and the first level identifier for the first level includes: Obtain the first layer entropy source randomly generated by the quantum random number generator for the first layer; Obtain the first timestamp at which the key derivation process begins at the first level; Obtain the chip identifier corresponding to the target chip; the chip identifier includes any one of the following: terminal-side chip identifier, server-side chip identifier; The target salt value is determined based on the chip identifier, the first level identifier, the derived path identifier, and the first level entropy source. The pre-set fixed tag, the first-level identifier, the chip identifier, and the first timestamp are concatenated to obtain the derived context; the fixed tag is used to identify the quantum security domain to which the current key derivation operation belongs; The second derived key is determined based on the first derived key, the target salt value, the derived context, and the preset key length.

3. The method as described in claim 2, characterized in that, The step of determining the target salt value based on the chip identifier, the first-level identifier, the derived path identifier, and the first-level entropy source includes: The chip identifier, the first-level identifier, and the derived path identifier are concatenated to obtain the first string; Based on a preset hash function, the first string is hashed to obtain a basic salt value; The target salt value is obtained by performing an XOR operation between the base salt value and the first layer entropy source.

4. The method as described in claim 2, characterized in that, Determining the second derived key based on the first derived key, the target salt value, the derivation context, and the preset key length includes: The first derived key is used as the input key material, and the target salt value is used as the salt parameter; The input key material and the salt parameter are extracted and processed by calling a preset derived function to generate an intermediate derived key; The intermediate derived key is used as the base key material, and the derived context is used as the information binding parameter. Based on the key length, the derived function is called to expand the basic key material and the information binding parameters to generate the second derived key.

5. The method as described in claim 1, characterized in that, The step of determining the multi-branch tree derivation path based on the root key and the key derivation requirement parameters includes: Using the root key as the derivation starting point, the first-level branch corresponding to the derivation starting point is determined according to the deployment end dimension parameters; the first-level branch includes any one of the following: terminal-side branch, server-side branch; The second-level branch corresponding to the first-level branch is determined based on the functional dimension parameters; the second-level branch includes any one of the following: session branch, backup branch, audit branch, and control branch; The third-level node corresponding to the second-level branch is determined based on the aforementioned usage dimension parameters; the third-level node includes any one of the following: temporary OTP node, recovery key node, log signature node, and policy encryption node; The multi-branch tree derivation path is determined based on the first-level branch, the second-level branch, and the third-level node.

6. The method as described in claim 5, characterized in that, The step of determining the derivation path identifier based on the multi-branch tree derivation path includes: Obtain the identifiers corresponding to the first-level branch, the second-level branch, and the third-level node respectively to obtain the first-level identifier, the second-level identifier, and the third-level identifier; According to the hierarchical order of the multi-branch tree derivation path, the first level identifier, the second level identifier, and the third level identifier are sequentially concatenated to generate the derivation path identifier.

7. A root key multi-branch tree derivation device for quantum security, used to perform the method as described in any one of claims 1-6, characterized in that, The device includes: The acquisition module is used to acquire key derivation requirement parameters; the key derivation requirement parameters include deployment dimension parameters, functional dimension parameters, and purpose dimension parameters. The generation module is used to randomly generate a root key according to a preset quantum random number generator; the root key is physically burned into the preset key storage area inside the target chip corresponding to the dimensional parameters of the deployment end; The first determining module is used to determine a multi-branch tree derivation path based on the root key and the key derivation requirement parameters; the hierarchy of the multi-branch tree derivation path includes a first level corresponding to the deployment dimension parameters, a second level corresponding to the functional dimension parameters, and a third level corresponding to the purpose dimension parameters. The second determining module is used to determine the derivation path identifier based on the multi-branch tree derivation path; The derivation module is used to derive a key based on the root key and the derivation path identifier to obtain the target derivation key.

8. An electronic device, characterized in that, include: Processor, memory, communication interface, and one or more programs; The one or more programs are stored in the memory and configured to be executed by the processor, the programs including instructions for performing the steps of the method as described in any one of claims 1-6.

9. A computer-readable storage medium, characterized in that, The computer-readable storage medium stores a computer program, the computer program including program instructions that, when executed by a processor, cause the processor to perform the method as described in any one of claims 1-6.

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