An air traffic control display terminal trust assurance method and system based on data security

Abstract

The application discloses an air traffic control display terminal trust guarantee method and system based on data security, relates to the technical field of data security, and comprises the following steps: generating an initial phase-locked state based on the original space-time parameters of the first frame of air traffic control dynamic display elements, mapping the initial phase-locked state into rendering modulation parameters, and completing the first frame of rendering; collecting the actual pixel features of the corresponding regions of each dynamic element from a frame buffer, and obtaining the actual phase-locked state feedback value of the previous frame by analysis; fusing the original space-time parameters of the current frame and the actual phase-locked state feedback value of the previous frame, generating the target phase-locked state of the current frame through preset phase-locked iteration function operation, converting the target phase-locked state into rendering modulation parameters, and completing the current frame of rendering; comparing the deviation between the theoretical modulation value corresponding to the target phase-locked state of the current frame and the actual rendering collection result, and if the deviation exceeds a preset threshold, it is determined that the rendering link is tampered with, and a safety alarm and a trusted channel switching are triggered.

Description

Technical Field

[0001] This invention relates to the field of data security technology, and in particular to a reliable assurance method and system for air traffic control display terminals based on data security. Background Technology

[0002] Air traffic control systems are core infrastructure for ensuring civil aviation airspace safety and improving flight operation efficiency. Air traffic control display terminals serve as front-end interactive nodes for controllers to obtain flight dynamics, aeronautical information, and meteorological information and issue control instructions. The flight tracks, control instructions, and airspace status data they carry are all highly sensitive core operational data. The reliability of terminal operation and the authenticity of data display directly determine the accuracy of air traffic control decisions and are a key line of defense for civil aviation safety.

[0003] Currently, the security protection system of air traffic control is mainly built around the back-end data center and network transmission links. It generally adopts technical means such as transmission layer data encryption, network boundary access control, and server-side intrusion detection to ensure the security of data storage and transmission. For the front-end display terminal, the existing security mechanisms are mainly based on static access control, identity and permission verification, and terminal virus protection. Some solutions introduce trusted computing modules to realize static environment measurement during the terminal startup phase to verify the integrity of the terminal system kernel and critical applications.

[0004] However, existing technologies face significant technical bottlenecks in ensuring the reliability of air traffic control display terminals: they cannot perform low-latency, dynamic integrity verification and authenticity assurance of the entire chain of displayed data from reception and rendering to screen output while the terminal is running. Specifically, on the one hand, existing static reliability metrics can only verify the reliability of the system environment at the moment the terminal starts up, and cannot cover runtime attack scenarios such as malicious injection of the display process, data tampering in the rendering stage, and hijacking of the output buffer during continuous terminal operation. Once the terminal is breached during operation, the authenticity of the displayed data observed by the controller will completely lose its verification basis. On the other hand, air traffic control display terminals have strong real-time requirements. Flight tracks, dynamic intelligence, and other data need to be continuously updated at millisecond-level refresh rates. If conventional full data hash verification and digital signature verification mechanisms are introduced, significant computational latency and performance loss will occur, which cannot meet the real-time display requirements of air traffic control scenarios.

[0005] The aforementioned technical bottlenecks directly result in a lack of effective and practical technical safeguards for the authenticity of the data displayed by air traffic control display terminals during operation. This makes it difficult to resist targeted tampering attacks on the terminal display link, posing a security risk to air traffic control operations. Summary of the Invention

[0006] This invention provides a reliable assurance method for air traffic control display terminals based on data security, comprising: Step S10: Generate an initial phase-locked state based on the native spatiotemporal parameters of the dynamic display elements in the first frame of the air pipe, map it to the rendering modulation parameters, and complete the rendering of the first frame; Step S20: Sample the actual pixel features of the corresponding regions of each dynamic element from the frame buffer, and parse the actual phase-locked state feedback value of the previous frame. Step S30: Fuse the native spatiotemporal parameters of the current frame with the actual phase-locked state feedback value of the previous frame, generate the target phase-locked state of the current frame through a preset phase-locked iteration function, convert it into rendering modulation parameters, and then complete the rendering of the current frame. Step S40: Compare the theoretical modulation value corresponding to the target phase-locked state of the current frame with the deviation of the actual rendering back sampling result. If the deviation exceeds the preset threshold, it is determined that the rendering link has been tampered with, triggering a security alarm and trusted path switching.

[0007] The data security-based trust assurance method for air traffic control display terminals, as described above, generates an initial phase-locked state based on the native spatiotemporal parameters of the first frame's dynamic display elements of the air traffic control system, maps it to rendering modulation parameters, and completes the first frame rendering. Specifically, it includes the following sub-steps: Dynamic display elements are selected from the first frame of raw air traffic control and navigation information received, and the original spatiotemporal parameters of each dynamic display element are extracted. One-way hashing is performed based on the original spatiotemporal parameters to generate the initial phase-locked state feature values ​​of each dynamic element; The initial phase-locked state feature values ​​are split and mapped into bit segments to output sub-pixel level rendering modulation parameters. The rendering modulation parameters output in the previous step are used to correct the original rendering parameters, and the first frame rendering process is executed.

[0008] The trusted assurance method for air traffic control display terminals based on data security, as described above, includes the following native spatiotemporal parameters: unique flight identifier, element rendering plane coordinates, current flight altitude, and timestamp of the first frame data generation.

[0009] As described above, the data security-based trusted assurance method for air-to-air display terminals involves all native parameters being transmitted to the phase-locked loop unit built into the rendering engine via a trusted data bus, without going through the main operating system's memory scheduling.

[0010] The data security-based trust assurance method for air-to-air display terminals described above, wherein the phase-locked loop unit is implemented through a GPU general-purpose computing unit.

[0011] The trusted assurance method for air traffic control display terminals based on data security, as described above, wherein the phase-locked loop (PLL) unit is implemented through embedded hardware logic circuits.

[0012] The data security-based trust assurance method for air traffic control display terminals, as described above, involves retrieving the actual pixel features of the corresponding regions of each dynamic element from the frame buffer and parsing the actual phase-locked state feedback value of the previous frame. Specifically, it includes the following sub-steps: Retrieve the feature position parameters stored in the previous frame and delineate the re-sampling area for each dynamic feature in the frame buffer. Pixel-level sampling and separation are performed on the back-collected area to extract the actual location features and low-order color features of the elements; The actual position features and low-bit color features are quantized and calibrated to restore the rendering modulation parameters that actually took effect in the previous frame. Perform a reverse mapping operation on the actual effective rendering modulation parameters to generate the actual phase-locked state feedback value of the previous frame.

[0013] The data security-based trust assurance method for air traffic control display terminals, as described above, compares the theoretical modulation value corresponding to the current frame target phase-locked state with the actual rendering retrieval result. If the deviation exceeds a preset threshold, it is determined that the rendering link has been tampered with, triggering a security alarm and trust path switching. Specifically, it includes the following sub-steps: After the current frame is rendered, fixed-point pixel retrieval is performed to analyze and obtain the measured rendering modulation parameters of each dynamic element; Calculate the multidimensional deviation between the theoretical modulation value and the measured modulation value; Rendering link reliability determination is performed based on multi-dimensional deviation. Based on the credible judgment results, implement hierarchical output control and security measures.

[0014] The present invention also provides a reliable assurance system for an air traffic control display terminal based on data security, characterized in that it includes: a first frame rendering module, a feedback value parsing module, a current frame rendering module, and a reliability determination module; The first frame rendering module is used to generate the initial phase-locked state based on the original spatiotemporal parameters of the dynamic display elements in the first frame, map it to the rendering modulation parameters, and complete the first frame rendering. The feedback value parsing module is used to sample the actual pixel features of the corresponding regions of each dynamic element from the frame buffer and parse the actual phase-locked state feedback value of the previous frame. The current frame rendering module is used to fuse the original spatiotemporal parameters of the current frame with the actual phase-locked state feedback value of the previous frame, generate the target phase-locked state of the current frame through a preset phase-locked iteration function, convert it into rendering modulation parameters, and then complete the rendering of the current frame. The reliability determination module is used to compare the theoretical modulation value corresponding to the target phase-locked state of the current frame with the deviation of the actual rendering back sampling result. If the deviation exceeds the preset threshold, it is determined that the rendering link has been tampered with, triggering a security alarm and a trusted path switch.

[0015] The beneficial effects achieved by this invention are as follows: by constructing a reliable closed-loop phase-locked loop for the entire rendering chain, dynamic verification of the running state is achieved by relying on sub-pixel modulation that is imperceptible to the human eye; by adopting GPU on-chip sampling and segmented SM3 lightweight operation, the latency is extremely low to meet the millisecond refresh requirements of air traffic control; the four-dimensional spatiotemporal iterative coupling of flight business parameters makes tampering deviations easy to identify by amplifying them frame by frame; in case of anomalies, the reliable backup path is automatically switched, taking into account both airspace operation safety and visual disturbance-free control, and the safety logs are traceable and auditable. Attached Figure Description

[0016] To more clearly illustrate the technical solutions in the embodiments of the present invention or the prior art, the drawings used in the description of the embodiments or the prior art will be briefly introduced below. Obviously, the drawings described below are only some embodiments recorded in the present invention. For those skilled in the art, other drawings can be obtained based on these drawings.

[0017] Figure 1 This is a flowchart of a trusted assurance method for an air traffic control display terminal based on data security, provided in Embodiment 1 of this application. Figure 2 This is a schematic diagram of a data security-based air traffic control display terminal trusted assurance system provided in Embodiment 2 of this application. Detailed Implementation

[0018] The technical solutions of the embodiments of the present invention will be clearly and completely described below with reference to the accompanying drawings. Obviously, the described embodiments are only some, not all, of the embodiments of the present invention. Based on the embodiments of the present invention, all other embodiments obtained by those skilled in the art without creative effort are within the scope of protection of the present invention.

[0019] Example 1 like Figure 1 As shown, Embodiment 1 of this application provides a trusted assurance method for an air traffic control display terminal based on data security, including: Step S10: Generate an initial phase-locked state based on the native spatiotemporal parameters of the dynamic display elements in the first frame of the air pipe, map it to the rendering modulation parameters, and complete the rendering of the first frame; This step is the initial anchoring stage for the full-cycle phase-locked trusted rendering of the air traffic control display terminal. It is executed after the terminal completes static trusted startup and establishes a trusted connection for the air traffic control service data receiving link. Specifically, it includes the following sub-steps: Step S11: Select dynamic display elements from the received first frame of air traffic control flight information raw data and extract the original spatiotemporal parameters of each dynamic display element; The terminal receives the first frame of raw air traffic control aeronautical information data and selects the core air traffic control display elements that are dynamically updated frame by frame from the full display data. Specifically, these elements include four categories: flight sign elements, flight path segment elements, flight altitude marking elements, and conflict warning marking elements. Static base map elements such as airspace base map, airport outline, and sector boundaries do not participate in phase-locked loop (PLL) calculations and are rendered in the conventional manner.

[0020] For each selected dynamic display element, extract its inherent spatiotemporal parameters: unique flight identifier. Element rendering plane coordinates (Floating-point coordinates converted from airspace WGS-84 coordinates to screen pixel coordinates via a preset projection matrix, unit: pixels), current flight altitude (Unit: meters, rounded to integer) First frame data generation timestamp (Provided by the terminal hardware trusted clock, in milliseconds, and taken as a 32-bit integer value). All native parameters are transmitted to the phase-locked loop (PLL) unit built into the rendering engine via the trusted data bus. The PLL unit is implemented through the GPU general-purpose computing unit or embedded hardware logic circuits, without going through the main operating system's memory scheduling.

[0021] Step S12: Perform one-way hash operation based on the original spatiotemporal parameters to generate the initial phase-locked state feature values ​​of each dynamic element; The phase-locked loop (PLL) unit takes the native spatiotemporal parameters of each dynamic element as input, combined with a preset fixed initial confusion salt value. (In this embodiment, the value is 0x5A827999, a 32-bit unsigned integer constant, used to enhance the uniqueness of the initial reference for different terminals.) The initial phase-locked state characteristic values ​​of each element are generated by calculating the 32-bit truncated SM3 national cryptographic one-way hash function. The calculation formula is: ,in This is a function for converting coordinates to integers. The operation rule is to multiply the input floating-point coordinate value by 1000 times, round it down, and convert it to a 32-bit unsigned integer value. This is the 32-bit truncated output of the SM3 one-way hash function. The truncation rule is to take the lower 32 bits of the standard 256-bit output of SM3 as the final hash value. This is a bitwise XOR operation.

[0022] After the calculation is completed, the initial phase-locked state feature values ​​of all dynamic elements are written into the rendering engine's dedicated hardware security register. Neither the operating system kernel nor the main rendering process has direct read or write permissions; only the phase-locked operation unit can call it. Multiple related elements such as track segments, signs, and altitude markers corresponding to the same flight share the same phase-locked state feature value, ensuring phase-locked synchronization of all elements for a single flight.

[0023] Step S13: Perform bit segment splitting and mapping on the initial phase-locked state feature values ​​to output sub-pixel level rendering modulation parameters; This step involves analyzing the 32-bit initial phase-locked state characteristic values. The processing is divided into two consecutive stages: bit segmentation and numerical mapping. The entire process is a deterministic unidirectional operation, as detailed below: (1) Positional conventions and segment splitting; Unified convention: 32-bit unsigned integer The bits are numbered sequentially from least significant bit (LSB) to most significant bit (MSB) as bits 0 to 31. The bits are then arranged according to a fixed bit width. It is split into two non-overlapping major segments, with the last two bits of the lower major segment being reused as a color modulation segment: The lower 16-bit major segment consists of bits 0 to 15 consecutively, totaling 16 bits, with a corresponding decimal value range of 0 to 65535, and is used to calculate the sub-pixel offset in the x-direction. The high 16-bit major segment consists of bits 16 to 31, totaling 16 bits, with a decimal value range of 0 to 65535. It is used to calculate the sub-pixel offset in the y-direction. Multiplexed color bit field: It consists of bits 0 and 1 at the end of the lower 16-bit main bit field, a total of 2 bits, corresponding to the decimal value range of 0 to 3, and is used to calculate the low-bit modulation value of the color channel; this bit field is part of the lower 16-bit main bit field, and is a bit resource reuse, without occupying an additional independent bit width.

[0024] (2) The rendering parameters are obtained by mapping the numerical values ​​of the quantile segments; The phase-locked loop unit performs numerical transformations on the three split bit segments, mapping them to two types of rendering modulation parameters: ① Calculation of subpixel rendering offset; Convert the binary value of the lower 16 major bits to a decimal integer, denoted as . Calculate the subpixel rendering offset in the x-direction using the following formula. : ; Convert the binary value of the high 16 bits of the major field to a decimal integer, denoted as . Calculate the subpixel rendering offset in the y-direction using the following formula. : ; Through the above linear mapping, unsigned integer values ​​from 0 to 65535 are normalized to... The interval, in units of sub-pixels, has a maximum offset of no more than half a pixel, exceeding the human eye's spatial resolution threshold, but does not affect the controller's normal observation.

[0025] ② Calculation of low-bit modulation values ​​for color channels; The binary value of the multiplexed color bit segment (bits 0-1) is directly converted into a decimal integer to obtain the low-order modulation value of the color channel. The value ranges from 0 to 3. Since these 2 bits only account for 1 / 16384 of the precision of the lower 16-bit main bit segment, their numerical fluctuations have less than 0.003% impact on the sub-pixel offset in the x-direction, and will not change the imperceptible characteristic of the offset to the human eye. Therefore, bit segment resources can be safely reused. In this embodiment, the modulation value only applies to the lowest 2 bits of the blue channel of the RGB color value of dynamic elements. The blue channel is selected based on the fact that the human eye has the lowest sensitivity to the brightness of the blue band. Color depth changes within 2 bits cannot be detected by the naked eye and will not interfere with the normal visual effect of control and command.

[0026] After mapping is complete, the two types of rendering modulation parameters are synchronously passed to the corresponding registers of the vertex shader and fragment shader in the rendering pipeline.

[0027] Step S14: Correct the original rendering parameters using the rendering modulation parameters output in the previous step, and execute the first frame rendering process; For each dynamically displayed element, the rendering engine adjusts the original rendering plane coordinates. With subpixel rendering offset The final vertex coordinates are obtained by superposition; the lowest two bits of the blue channel of the original display color of the element are replaced with the low-bit modulation values ​​of the color channel. The final fragment color is obtained; then, primitive assembly, rasterization, and fragment shading are completed according to the normal rendering pipeline, and finally, the first frame rendering result is written to the frame buffer. After the first frame rendering is completed, the phase-locked loop unit calculates the minimum bounding rectangle of each dynamic element in the frame buffer, i.e., the pixel bounding box coordinates, based on the final vertex coordinates of each dynamic element; then, the initial phase-locked state feature value, the corresponding rendering modulation parameters, and the pixel bounding box coordinates of each dynamic element are stored together in the phase-locked state buffer as the trust benchmark and backsampling positioning basis for all subsequent frame phase-locked iterations, completing the initial phase-locked anchoring. After each subsequent frame rendering is completed, the pixel bounding box coordinates of the elements in the buffer are updated according to the same rules to ensure that the backsampling position matches the rendering result in real time.

[0028] Step S20: Sample the actual pixel features of the corresponding regions of each dynamic element from the frame buffer, and parse the actual phase-locked state feedback value of the previous frame. This step is the feedback acquisition stage of the phase-locked reliable rendering closed loop. It takes the frame buffer data after the previous frame is rendered and obtains the actual rendering phase-locked features of the previous frame through fixed-point back sampling, feature separation, and reverse mapping. This provides real feedback input for the phase-locked iteration calculation of the current frame, ensuring the effectiveness of the rendering self-consistent closed loop. Specifically, it includes the following sub-steps: Step S21: Retrieve the feature position parameters stored in the previous frame and delineate the re-sampling area for each dynamic feature in the frame buffer. The phase-locked loop unit retrieves the bounding box coordinates of all dynamic features stored in the previous frame from the phase-locked state buffer. Considering that the maximum value of the subpixel rendering offset is ±0.5 pixels, in order to avoid the features from exceeding the sampling range after offset, the original bounding box of each feature is expanded by 1 pixel in all directions to form the final back-sampling window area, and converted into the physical memory address range corresponding to the frame buffer.

[0029] The retrieval operation in this step is completed by the on-chip sampling unit of the GPU rendering engine directly reading the physical address of the frame buffer, without needing to copy to the main system memory and without consuming CPU computing resources; static elements such as the spatial base map and sector boundaries that do not participate in phase locking are not designated as retrieval areas and do not participate in subsequent sampling and parsing.

[0030] Step S22: Perform pixel-level sampling and separation on the re-sampled area to extract the actual location features and low-order color features of the elements; For each dynamic feature's backsampling window, the GPU on-chip sampling unit performs independent extraction of two types of features: The first step is to extract actual location features: firstly, remove background pixels of the static base map by performing pixel difference with the pre-stored static base map, and retain only the set of effective foreground pixels corresponding to the current dynamic element; calculate the weighted centroid coordinates (with pixel brightness as the weight) of the effective foreground pixel set, and use the floating-point coordinates of the centroid as the actual rendering position coordinates of the element, with pixel calculation accuracy reaching 1 / 256 sub-pixel level.

[0031] Secondly, low-bit color feature extraction: Select 3 to 5 (5 in this embodiment) solid color pixels far from the edge of the graphic from the effective foreground pixels, read the 8-bit grayscale value of the blue channel in the RGB color space of each pixel, take the mode result to exclude the color error caused by edge anti-aliasing, and extract the lowest 2 bits of the binary value of the 8-bit value as the measured low-bit feature of the color channel.

[0032] Step S23: Quantize and calibrate the actual position features and low-bit color features to restore the rendering modulation parameters that actually took effect in the previous frame; The calculated actual rendering position coordinates are then compared with the original rendering plane coordinates of the element in the previous frame to obtain the measured subpixel rendering offset. The unit is pixels, and the value strictly falls within the range of pixels under normal rendering conditions. Within the interval, k represents the current frame; The lowest two bits of the extracted blue channel binary value are directly converted into a decimal integer to obtain the measured low-bit modulation value of the color channel. The value range is 0 to 3.

[0033] If the measured subpixel offset exceeds If the interval is determined to be a sampling error or rendering anomaly, the theoretical modulation value of the previous frame is automatically used as the feedback input; if an anomaly occurs in the first frame, the initial theoretical modulation value calculated in step S10 is used to avoid divergence in phase-locked loop iteration.

[0034] Step S24: Perform a reverse mapping operation on the actual effective rendering modulation parameters to generate the actual phase-locked state feedback value of the previous frame; The phase-locked loop unit combines the three types of modulation parameters obtained from the actual measurement into a 32-bit integer actual phase-locked state feedback value according to the reverse rule that corresponds one-to-one with the forward mapping ("bit segment splitting mapping" in step S13). The specific reverse mapping rules are as follows: ①Based on the measured sub-pixel x-direction offset The 16-bit integer value is obtained by reverse calculation using the forward mapping formula. The inverse formula is: ,in This is a rounding function; similarly, it is based on the measured y-direction offset. The 16-bit integer value is obtained by reverse engineering. ; ② As the high 16 bits, The lower 16 bits are concatenated to obtain a 32-bit integer base value; ③Based on the measured low-bit modulation value of the color channel The binary value is used to cover bits 0-1 (the lowest two bits) of the aforementioned 32-bit integer base value to obtain the final actual phase-locked loop state feedback value. .

[0035] After the calculation is completed, the actual phase-locked state feedback values ​​of all dynamic elements are written into the input register of the phase-locked operation unit and used directly for the phase-locked iteration calculation in the next stage.

[0036] Step S30: Fuse the native spatiotemporal parameters of the current frame with the actual phase-locked state feedback value of the previous frame, generate the target phase-locked state of the current frame through a preset phase-locked iteration function, convert it into rendering modulation parameters, and then complete the rendering of the current frame. This step follows the feedback value of the actual phase-locked state of the previous frame output in step S20. Combined with the native spatiotemporal parameters of the current frame's air traffic control service, it generates the target phase-locked state of the current frame through a preset four-dimensional spatiotemporal phase-locked iteration function, and maps it to rendering modulation parameters to complete the rendering of the current frame, maintaining the continuous phase-locked relationship between frames. Specifically, it includes the following sub-steps: Step S31: Obtain the original spatiotemporal parameters of the dynamic elements in the current frame, and construct an iterative input set by combining them with the phase-locked feedback value of the previous frame; The phase-locked loop unit receives the raw air traffic control flight information data of the current frame and extracts all dynamic display elements and their corresponding native spatiotemporal parameters, including the unique identification of the flight, according to the same filtering rules as in step S11. The original rendering plane coordinates of the current frame Current flight altitude Current frame data generation timestamp Simultaneously, the actual phase-locked state feedback value of the previous frame, generated in step S20, is retrieved from the input register of the phase-locked operation unit. And retrieve the target phase-locked state feature value of the previous frame from the phase-locked state buffer. The three types of data together constitute the complete input set for the current frame's phase-locked loop iterative operation. All parameters are transmitted via a trusted data bus, bypassing the main operating system's memory scheduling, thus preventing input data from being tampered with.

[0037] Step S32: Perform four-dimensional spatiotemporal phase-locked loop iterative operation based on the iterative input set to generate target phase-locked state feature values ​​for the current frame; Based on the iterative input set constructed in the previous step, the phase-locked operation unit performs a four-dimensional spatiotemporal phase-locked iterative operation to generate the target phase-locked state feature values ​​of each dynamic element in the current frame, and the target phase-locked state feature value of the i-th dynamic element. The calculation formula is: ,in The deviation amplification factor is set to 1.27 in this embodiment, which is always greater than 1. Its function is: when the rendering link is tampered with and the feedback value deviates from the theoretical value, the deviation will be amplified frame by frame with frame iteration, so that the attack traces will be accumulated quickly into display anomalies that can be identified by the naked eye, and the attack can be automatically exposed without additional verification. To ensure the unidirectional irreversibility of the phase-locked loop iteration process, the 32-bit truncated SM3 national cryptographic one-way hash function, consistent with step S12, is used. Attackers cannot deduce the initial reference and historical parameters from the current state. This is a spatiotemporal constraint function for air traffic control services. It nonlinearly couples the native parameters of the current frame into 32-bit constraint features, ensuring a strong binding between the iteration process and air traffic control service data. Any tampering with the data outside of the service logic will inevitably lead to phase-locked loop (PLL) synchronization failure. This function uses 32-bit unsigned integers as the unified data type. The specific calculation process is as follows: ①y-coordinate position field offset operation: for integer y-coordinates Perform a left shift operation of 8 bits, shifting the effective bits from the 0th bit to the 8th bit, creating a high-low misalignment with the x-coordinate bit field. This avoids direct XOR of lower-order bits causing information cancellation, resulting in the first intermediate variable. ,Right now , This is a bitwise left shift operation; ② Planar coordinate feature fusion: Integerized x-coordinates With the first intermediate variable Performing a bitwise XOR operation completes the nonlinear coupling of two-dimensional planar coordinates, yielding planar spatial characteristic components. ,Right now , This is a bitwise XOR operation; ③ Height-time feature fusion: First, the timestamp is fused. Perform a left shift operation of 4 bits to misalign its bit fields with the altitude value, and then shift the flight altitude value... Perform a bitwise XOR operation with the shifted timestamp to couple the vertical and temporal dimensions, obtaining the spatiotemporal vertical feature components. ,Right now ; ④ Full-dimensional final coupled output: First, the planar spatial feature components are coupled together. Spatiotemporal perpendicular feature components Integer addition is performed, and a carry mechanism is introduced to create non-linear confusion, breaking the linearity of pure bitwise operations; then the addition result is compared with the flight's unique identifier. Performing a bitwise XOR operation and superimposing the identity dimension features, the final result is a 32-bit unsigned integer business spatiotemporal constraint feature value. When addition overflows, the result is automatically truncated to the lower 32 bits. ; After the operation is completed, the generated target phase-locked state feature value for the current frame is... It is temporarily stored in the rendering engine's dedicated hardware security register and simultaneously updated to the phase-locked state buffer as the baseline state for the next frame iteration.

[0038] Step S33: Perform segment splitting and mapping on the feature values ​​of the target phase-locked state in the current frame, and output the corresponding rendering modulation parameters; The phase-locked loop unit performs phase-locked state characteristic values ​​of the target in the current frame according to the bit segmentation and numerical mapping rules that are completely consistent with those in step S13. Process the data to generate the subpixel rendering offset for the current frame. With color channel low bit modulation value .

[0039] After mapping is complete, the two types of rendering modulation parameters are synchronously passed to the corresponding registers of the vertex shader and fragment shader in the rendering pipeline.

[0040] Step S34: Overlay rendering modulation parameters to complete the rendering of the current frame, and synchronously update the feature status cache information; The rendering engine corrects the original rendering parameters using the rendering modulation parameters output in the previous step and executes the rendering process for the current frame: for each dynamically displayed element, the original rendering plane coordinates are... With subpixel rendering offset The final vertex coordinates are obtained by superposition; the lowest two bits of the blue channel of the original display color of the element are replaced with the low-bit modulation values ​​of the color channel. The final fragment color is obtained; then primitive assembly, rasterization, and fragment shading are completed according to the normal rendering pipeline, and finally the rendering result of the current frame is written to the frame buffer.

[0041] After the current frame is rendered, the phase-locked loop unit updates the pixel bounding box coordinates of the corresponding elements according to the final vertex coordinates of each dynamic element, and refreshes the target phase-locked state feature value, rendering modulation parameters, and pixel bounding box coordinates of the current frame to the phase-locked state buffer, providing the latest reference for the resampling and phase-locked iteration of the next frame.

[0042] Step S40: Compare the theoretical modulation value corresponding to the target phase-locked state of the current frame with the deviation of the actual rendering back sampling result. If the deviation exceeds the preset threshold, it is determined that the rendering link has been tampered with, triggering a security alarm and trusted path switching. This step follows the rendering result of the current frame completed in step S30. By comparing the theoretical modulation value corresponding to the target phase-locked state with the measured modulation value obtained from frame re-sampling, the degree of deviation in the rendering link is quantified, the reliability is determined, and a graded security response is executed. This is the final verification and output control node of the entire method, and specifically includes the following sub-steps: Step S41: After the current frame is rendered, perform fixed-point pixel retrieval and analyze the measured rendering modulation parameters of each dynamic element; After the current frame is rendered and written to the frame buffer, the phase-locked loop (PLL) unit performs operations according to the same backsampling and feature parsing rules as steps S21-S23: it retrieves the updated bounding box coordinates of each dynamic element pixel in the current frame and expands them by 1 pixel to form a backsampling window; the GPU on-chip sampling unit reads the pixel data within the window, and after background culling, centroid calculation, and low-bit color extraction, it parses the measured sub-pixel rendering offsets corresponding to each dynamic element in the current frame to obtain the results. Compared with the measured low-bit modulation value of the color channel .

[0043] Step S42: Calculate the multidimensional deviation between the theoretical modulation value and the measured modulation value; The phase-locked loop unit retrieves the theoretical rendering modulation parameters for each element of the current frame generated in step S33 from the phase-locked state buffer, including the theoretical sub-pixel rendering offset. Compared with theoretical color channel low-bit modulation value The deviation values ​​are calculated from the position dimension and the color dimension respectively: One is the positional deviation. The spatial deviation between the theoretical offset coordinates and the measured offset coordinates is calculated using Euclidean distance. The calculation formula is as follows: ; The second is the color deviation. The numerical deviation between the theoretical modulation value and the measured modulation value is calculated using the absolute difference method. The calculation formula is as follows: ; The two types of deviations correspond to coordinate tampering and color tampering scenarios in the rendering link, respectively, and together they constitute a complete tampering detection dimension, ensuring that different types of rendering tampering can be effectively identified.

[0044] Step S43: Perform a rendering link reliability determination based on multi-dimensional deviation; Preset two types of deviation judgment thresholds: position deviation threshold (In this embodiment, the value is 0.15 subpixels), color deviation threshold (In this embodiment, the value is 1).

[0045] The judgment rule is as follows: If a single dynamic element simultaneously satisfies... and If any deviation exceeds the corresponding threshold, the rendering link of that element is deemed trustworthy; if any deviation exceeds the corresponding threshold, the rendering link corresponding to that element is deemed to have been tampered with. If all dynamic elements in the current frame are deemed trustworthy, the entire frame's rendering link is deemed trustworthy.

[0046] Step S44: Implement tiered output control and security measures based on the reliability assessment results; Based on the overall frame determination result, the phase-locked loop (PLL) unit executes the corresponding output control and security response: Full-frame reliable scenario: The current frame of the release frame buffer is output to the display screen normally; since the phase-locked modulation parameters are all in the range imperceptible to the human eye, no additional filtering is required, and the controller's observation effect is visually indistinguishable from the standard rendered image.

[0047] In the event of tampering: immediately intercept the display output of the current frame and prevent abnormal images from being presented to the controller; simultaneously trigger a visual security alarm, displaying the frame number where the tampering occurred, the corresponding flight's unique identifier, the type of deviation, and the magnitude of the deviation in the dedicated alarm area on the terminal; at the same time, automatically switch to the hardware-level independent trusted backup display path, where a trusted rendering unit independent of the main rendering system outputs a standard rendering of the original business data, ensuring that air traffic control and command services are not interrupted.

[0048] All element information, deviation data, and timestamps of tampering events are synchronously written to the terminal's immutable security log for post-event security auditing and attack tracing analysis.

[0049] Example 2 like Figure 2 As shown, Embodiment 2 of this application provides a trusted assurance system for an air traffic control display terminal based on data security, including: a first frame rendering module 21, a feedback value parsing module 22, a current frame rendering module 23, and a trustworthiness determination module 24; The first frame rendering module 21 is used to generate an initial phase-locked state based on the original spatiotemporal parameters of the dynamic display elements in the first frame, map it to rendering modulation parameters, and complete the first frame rendering. The feedback value parsing module 22 is used to sample the actual pixel features of the corresponding regions of each dynamic element from the frame buffer and parse the actual phase-locked state feedback value of the previous frame. The current frame rendering module 23 is used to fuse the original spatiotemporal parameters of the current frame with the actual phase-locked state feedback value of the previous frame, generate the target phase-locked state of the current frame through a preset phase-locked iteration function, convert it into rendering modulation parameters, and then complete the rendering of the current frame. The credibility determination module 24 is used to compare the theoretical modulation value corresponding to the target phase-locked state of the current frame with the deviation of the actual rendering back sampling result. If the deviation exceeds the preset threshold, it is determined that the rendering link has been tampered with, triggering a security alarm and trusted path switching.

[0050] The specific embodiments described above further illustrate the purpose, technical solution, and beneficial effects of the present invention. It should be understood that the above description is only a specific embodiment of the present invention and is not intended to limit the scope of protection of the present invention. Any modifications, equivalent substitutions, improvements, etc., made on the basis of the technical solution of the present invention should be included within the scope of protection of the present invention.

Claims

1. A reliable assurance method for air traffic control display terminals based on data security, characterized in that, include: Step S10: Generate an initial phase-locked state based on the native spatiotemporal parameters of the dynamic display elements in the first frame of the air pipe, map it to the rendering modulation parameters, and complete the rendering of the first frame; Step S20: Sample the actual pixel features of the corresponding regions of each dynamic element from the frame buffer, and parse the actual phase-locked state feedback value of the previous frame. Step S30: Fuse the native spatiotemporal parameters of the current frame with the actual phase-locked state feedback value of the previous frame, generate the target phase-locked state of the current frame through a preset phase-locked iteration function, convert it into rendering modulation parameters, and then complete the rendering of the current frame. Step S40: Compare the theoretical modulation value corresponding to the target phase-locked state of the current frame with the deviation of the actual rendering back sampling result. If the deviation exceeds the preset threshold, it is determined that the rendering link has been tampered with, triggering a security alarm and trusted path switching.

2. The trusted assurance method for air traffic control display terminals based on data security according to claim 1, characterized in that, The initial phase-locked state is generated based on the native spatiotemporal parameters of the dynamic display elements in the first frame of the air-to-air tube, mapped to rendering modulation parameters, and the first frame rendering is completed. The specific steps include the following: Dynamic display elements are selected from the first frame of raw air traffic control and navigation information received, and the original spatiotemporal parameters of each dynamic display element are extracted. One-way hashing is performed based on the original spatiotemporal parameters to generate the initial phase-locked state feature values ​​of each dynamic element; The initial phase-locked state feature values ​​are split and mapped into bit segments to output sub-pixel level rendering modulation parameters. The rendering modulation parameters output in the previous step are used to correct the original rendering parameters, and the first frame rendering process is executed.

3. The reliable assurance method for air traffic control display terminals based on data security according to claim 2, characterized in that, The native spatiotemporal parameters include: unique flight identifier, element rendering plane coordinates, current flight altitude, and timestamp of the first frame data generation.

4. The reliable assurance method for air traffic control display terminals based on data security according to claim 3, characterized in that, All native parameters are passed to the rendering engine's built-in phase-locked loop unit via a trusted data bus, without going through the main operating system's memory scheduling.

5. The reliable assurance method for air traffic control display terminals based on data security according to claim 4, characterized in that, The phase-locked loop unit is implemented through the GPU general-purpose computing unit.

6. The reliable assurance method for air traffic control display terminals based on data security according to claim 4, characterized in that, The phase-locked loop unit is implemented through embedded hardware logic circuits.

7. The trusted assurance method for air traffic control display terminals based on data security according to claim 1, characterized in that, The actual pixel features of the corresponding regions of each dynamic element are sampled from the frame buffer, and the actual phase-locked state feedback value of the previous frame is obtained by parsing. The specific steps include the following: Retrieve the feature position parameters stored in the previous frame and delineate the re-sampling area for each dynamic feature in the frame buffer. Pixel-level sampling and separation are performed on the back-collected area to extract the actual location features and low-order color features of the elements; The actual position features and low-bit color features are quantized and calibrated to restore the rendering modulation parameters that actually took effect in the previous frame. Perform a reverse mapping operation on the actual effective rendering modulation parameters to generate the actual phase-locked state feedback value of the previous frame.

8. The trusted assurance method for air traffic control display terminals based on data security according to claim 1, characterized in that, If the deviation between the theoretical modulation value corresponding to the current frame target phase-locked state and the actual rendering back sampling result exceeds a preset threshold, it is determined that the rendering link has been tampered with, triggering a security alarm and trusted path switching. The specific steps include the following: After the current frame is rendered, fixed-point pixel retrieval is performed to analyze and obtain the measured rendering modulation parameters of each dynamic element; Calculate the multidimensional deviation between the theoretical modulation value and the measured modulation value; Rendering link reliability determination is performed based on multi-dimensional deviation. Based on the credible judgment results, implement hierarchical output control and security measures.

9. A trusted assurance system for air traffic control display terminals based on data security, characterized in that, include: First frame rendering module, feedback value parsing module, current frame rendering module, and credibility determination module; The first frame rendering module is used to generate the initial phase-locked state based on the original spatiotemporal parameters of the dynamic display elements in the first frame, map it to the rendering modulation parameters, and complete the first frame rendering. The feedback value parsing module is used to sample the actual pixel features of the corresponding regions of each dynamic element from the frame buffer and parse the actual phase-locked state feedback value of the previous frame. The current frame rendering module is used to fuse the original spatiotemporal parameters of the current frame with the actual phase-locked state feedback value of the previous frame, generate the target phase-locked state of the current frame through a preset phase-locked iteration function, convert it into rendering modulation parameters, and then complete the rendering of the current frame. The reliability determination module is used to compare the theoretical modulation value corresponding to the target phase-locked state of the current frame with the deviation of the actual rendering back sampling result. If the deviation exceeds the preset threshold, it is determined that the rendering link has been tampered with, triggering a security alarm and a trusted path switch.

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