Oil and gas pipeline third-party damage prediction positioning, alarm method, device and storage medium

Abstract

The application discloses an oil and gas pipeline third-party damage prediction positioning and alarm method, equipment and a storage medium, and belongs to the technical field of oil and gas pipeline danger prediction. The application takes an oil and gas pipeline station as a node, and a pipeline line as an edge to establish an oil and gas pipeline transportation network; a social risk percentage is introduced to determine a target value of each node in the oil and gas pipeline transportation network, and a probability that a terrorist attack is not prevented by factory security is determined; a terrorist attack target loss probability model and an expected loss model are established based on the target value of the node and the probability that the terrorist attack is not prevented by factory security; a safety margin is introduced to calculate optimal attack resources and optimal defense resources of the oil and gas pipeline transportation network; and the optimal attack resources and the optimal defense resources are used to predict a terrorist attack loss probability of each node in the oil and gas pipeline transportation network based on the terrorist attack target loss probability model. The method can accurately realize overseas oil and gas pipeline third-party damage prediction positioning and alarm.

Description

Technical Field

[0001] This invention belongs to the field of oil and gas pipeline hazard prediction technology, and specifically relates to a method, equipment and storage medium for predicting, locating and alarming third-party damage to oil and gas pipelines. Background Technology

[0002] Third-party damage to pipelines can be categorized into accidental and intentional damage. Overseas pipelines traverse countries and regions with complex cultural, political, and geopolitical backgrounds, making them susceptible to the influence of international events along the pipeline route, thus making them vulnerable to intentional third-party damage. Therefore, effectively assessing, predicting, locating, and alerting to potential losses from terrorist attacks on oil and gas pipelines is a crucial issue.

[0003] A patent with publication number CN116066754A proposes an intelligent risk identification method for cyber-physical security of oil and gas pipelines. This method constructs a system model corresponding to the oil and gas pipeline system to predict potential accidents and corresponding handling strategies that may occur during system operation under information security threats. While this method can improve the ability of oil and gas pipeline systems to cope with information security threats, it still cannot reasonably predict the probability of third-party damage to oil and gas pipelines.

[0004] The probability of pipeline leakage failure is the core of quantitative pipeline risk assessment, and its calculation methods mainly include qualitative, semi-quantitative, and quantitative methods. Quantitative methods, such as fault trees, event trees, and Bayesian networks, rely on historical failure data to minimize the influence of subjective factors. While these methods have their advantages, terrorist attacks lack a causal relationship, making it impossible to construct fault trees, event trees, or Bayesian networks for them. Furthermore, the selection of probabilities for basic events in fault trees, event trees, and Bayesian networks is subject to unavoidable subjective influences, resulting in low accuracy in prediction, location, and alarm systems. Summary of the Invention

[0005] To address the issues of high subjective influence on loss probability assessment and low accuracy in third-party damage prediction and location alarms for overseas oil and gas pipelines, this invention proposes a method for predicting and locating third-party damage to oil and gas pipelines, comprising the following steps:

[0006] Establish an oil and gas pipeline transportation network with oil and gas pipeline stations as nodes and pipeline lines as edges;

[0007] The social risk percentage is introduced to determine the target value for each node in the oil and gas pipeline transportation network, and to determine the probability that each node will encounter a terrorist attack and that the terrorist attack will not be prevented by factory security.

[0008] Based on the target value of nodes and the probability that a terrorist attack is not prevented by factory security, establish a terrorist attack target loss probability model and an expected loss model;

[0009] Introducing safety margins to calculate the optimal attack and defense resources for oil and gas pipeline transportation networks;

[0010] Based on the optimal attack resources and optimal defense resources, the probability of terrorist attack loss at each node in the oil and gas pipeline transportation network is predicted using the terrorist attack target loss probability model.

[0011] Furthermore, determining the target value for each node in the oil and gas pipeline transportation network includes the following steps:

[0012] Determine the degree of each node, and use the numerical value of the degree to represent the importance of the node;

[0013] Determine the social risk percentage of each node, and determine the second importance of each node based on its social risk percentage and its overall importance.

[0014] The target value of the corresponding node is determined based on the second importance of the node.

[0015] Furthermore, the degree of a node is the number of nodes that a node in the oil and gas pipeline transportation network is directly connected to other nodes.

[0016] Furthermore, determining the social risk percentage of each node, and determining the second importance of each node based on its social risk percentage and its overall importance, includes the following steps:

[0017] Determine the social risk value for each node and the overall social risk value for all nodes;

[0018] The social risk percentage of each node is determined by the ratio of the social risk value of each node to the total social risk value of all nodes.

[0019] The second importance of a node is obtained by multiplying its social risk percentage by its importance.

[0020] Furthermore, determining the target value of the corresponding node based on the magnitude of the node's second importance includes the following steps:

[0021] Sort each node in descending order according to its second importance, and assign each node a corresponding target value based on its second importance.

[0022] The ratio of target values ​​of adjacent nodes is determined based on the maximum target value of a node, the minimum target value of a node, and the number of nodes.

[0023] The target value of a node is determined based on the ratio of the target values ​​of its neighboring nodes and the maximum target value of the node.

[0024] Furthermore, the formula for calculating the ratio of target values ​​between adjacent nodes is as follows:

[0025]

[0026] Where β is the ratio of the target values ​​of adjacent nodes; V Max V represents the maximum objective value of the node. Min Let n be the minimum objective value of the node; n is the number of nodes.

[0027] The formula for calculating the target value of a node, based on the ratio of the target values ​​of adjacent nodes and the maximum target value of the node, is as follows:

[0028] V i =V Max β i-n (i = 1, ... n)

[0029] Among them, V i This represents the target value of the i-th node after sorting, where i is the i-th node after sorting.

[0030] Furthermore, the formula for calculating the probability that a terrorist attack occurs at each node and is not prevented by factory security is as follows:

[0031]

[0032] In the formula, p _nd_i S represents the probability that node i encounters a terrorist attack but is not prevented by factory security; all S is the area enclosed by extending 100 li (approximately 50 kilometers) in each of the four cardinal directions (east, west, south, and north) from the boundary of node i; c Let p be the area within the region bounded by the boundary of node i extending 1 kilometer in each of the four cardinal directions (east, west, south, and north); let number_i be the number of security personnel; p person_i This enhances the ability of node i security personnel to defend against terrorist attacks.

[0033] Furthermore, the establishment of the probability model for the loss of terrorist attack targets includes the following steps:

[0034] A model for the probability of loss of targets in terrorist attacks was established;

[0035] Based on the set content, determine the attack resources allocated by the attacker to launch an attack against the node and the defense resources allocated to defend against the attack against the node;

[0036] A model for the probability of terrorist attack target loss is established based on the probability that a terrorist attack at a node is not prevented by factory security, the attack resources allocated to launch the attack, the defense resources allocated to defend against the attack, and the target value of the node.

[0037] Furthermore, the settings include:

[0038] The terrorists' attacks were limited to nodes within the oil and gas pipeline transportation network;

[0039] The node's value is represented by its target value.

[0040] Terrorists allocate attack resources to various dispersed nodes to launch terrorist attacks.

[0041] Furthermore, the probability model for the loss of the terrorist attack target is as follows:

[0042]

[0043] Wherein, p(V i A i D i ) _new Let A be the target loss probability of node i in a terrorist attack. i D represents the attack resources allocated by the attacker to launch an attack against node i. i V represents the defense resources allocated by the defender to protect node i from attacks; i p is the target value for node i; _nd_i Let represent the probability that node i encounters a terrorist attack but is not prevented by factory security.

[0044] Furthermore, the expected loss model is as follows:

[0045]

[0046] Among them, EL i p(V) represents the expected loss of the defender against a terrorist attack at node i. i A i D i ) _new _ represents the target loss probability of terrorist attack node i; A i D represents the attack resources allocated by the attacker to launch an attack against node i. i V represents the defense resources allocated by the defender to protect node i from attacks; i Let i be the target value of node i, where i is the i-th node after sorting.

[0047] Furthermore, the formula for calculating the attacker's optimal attack resources is as follows:

[0048]

[0049] Among them, A 0 (V,D) -new 'm' represents the optimal attack resource; 'm' represents the safety margin; 'V' represents the target value; 'D' represents the defense resource.

[0050] The formula for calculating the optimal defense resources for the defending side is as follows:

[0051]

[0052] Among them, D 0 _new is the optimal defense resource; V is the target value; EL is the expected loss to balance; m is the safety margin.

[0053] Furthermore, the optimal attack resources and optimal defense resources are determined according to the following steps:

[0054] S1: Determine the initial value of the attacker's expected loss and the defender's defense resources for a certain node;

[0055] S2: Calculate the attack resources of the node using the initial values ​​of expected loss, defense resources, and target value;

[0056] S3: Calculate the defense resources of the node based on the calculated attack resources of the node;

[0057] S4: Determine whether the calculated defense resources of the node are equal to the defense resources of the current node. If they are equal, proceed to step S5. If they are not equal, return to S1 to re-initialize the node's defense resources and repeat the calculation of the node's attack resources and defense resources until the current node's defense resources are equal to the calculated node's defense resources.

[0058] S5: When the defense resources of each node are equal to the calculated defense resources of the node, the defense resources of each node are aggregated to calculate the total defense resources, and it is determined whether the calculated total defense resources are equal to the total defense resources. If they are not equal, return to S1 to re-initialize the expected loss, and repeat the steps of S1-S5 until the calculated total defense resources are equal to the total defense resources.

[0059] S6: Repeat the above S1-S5 iterative process until the attacker continuously adjusts the attack resources so that no matter how the defender adjusts the defense resources, the expected loss of each node is equal. At this time, the balanced expected loss is obtained, and the corresponding attack resources and defense resources are the optimal attack resources and optimal defense resources.

[0060] Furthermore, determining the initial value of the expected loss for an attacker targeting a specific node includes the following steps:

[0061] The expected loss range of a node is determined using the aforementioned expected loss model;

[0062] The initial value of the expected loss of a node is determined based on the maximum and minimum values ​​of its expected loss.

[0063] The initial value of the expected loss is determined according to the following formula:

[0064] EL = min _EL +(max _EL -min _EL )×r1

[0065] Where EL is the initial value assigned to the expected loss, min _EL The minimum of the expected loss; max _EL is the maximum expected loss; r1 is a random number between (0,1).

[0066] Furthermore, the initial values ​​of the defense resources are determined according to the following formula:

[0067]

[0068] in, Let i be the minimum defensive resources for node i. D is the defense resource for node i. i The maximum value of r1; r2 is a random number between (0,1).

[0069] Secondly, this invention proposes an alarm method for oil and gas pipelines being damaged by a third party, comprising:

[0070] The probability of terrorist attack losses at each node in the oil and gas pipeline transportation network is determined using the aforementioned third-party damage prediction and location method for oil and gas pipelines.

[0071] Based on the probability of loss of the terrorist attack target, the risk level of each node is determined and corresponding alarm measures are formulated.

[0072] Furthermore, the process of determining the risk level of each node based on the probability of loss of the terrorist attack target and formulating corresponding alarm measures includes:

[0073] When the probability of loss of the terrorist attack target is less than or equal to the first set value, the terrorist attack risk level is low and no security improvement measures are taken.

[0074] When the probability of loss of the terrorist attack target is greater than the first set value and less than or equal to the second set value, the terrorist attack risk level is general risk, and it is confirmed that the security forces are operating in accordance with the established procedures.

[0075] When the probability of loss of the terrorist attack target is greater than the second set value and less than or equal to the third set value, the terrorist attack risk level is a major risk, and engineering or management measures are added to reduce the risk level.

[0076] When the probability of loss of the target of the terrorist attack is greater than the third set value, the terrorist attack risk level is a serious risk, and engineering or management measures are taken to reduce the risk level within a specified period.

[0077] Thirdly, this invention proposes a third-party damage prediction and location system for oil and gas pipelines, comprising:

[0078] The transportation network establishment unit is used to establish an oil and gas pipeline transportation network with oil and gas pipeline stations as nodes and pipeline lines as edges.

[0079] The model parameter determination unit is used to introduce the percentage of social risk to determine the target value of each node in the oil and gas pipeline transportation network, and to determine the probability that each node will encounter a terrorist attack and that the terrorist attack will not be prevented by the factory security.

[0080] The model building unit is used to build a probability model of terrorist attack target loss and an expected loss model based on the target value of the node and the probability that the terrorist attack was not prevented by the factory security.

[0081] The optimal resource calculation unit is used to calculate the optimal attack resources and optimal defense resources of the oil and gas pipeline transportation network by introducing safety margins.

[0082] The terrorist attack loss probability prediction unit is used to predict the probability of terrorist attack losses at each node in the oil and gas pipeline transportation network based on the optimal attack resources and optimal defense resources and using the terrorist attack target loss probability model.

[0083] Furthermore, the probability model for the loss of the terrorist attack target is as follows:

[0084]

[0085] Wherein, p(V i A i D i ) _new Let A be the target loss probability of node i in a terrorist attack. i D represents the attack resources allocated by the attacker to launch an attack against node i. i V represents the defense resources allocated by the defender to protect node i from attacks; i p is the target value for node i; _nd_i Let represent the probability that node i encounters a terrorist attack but is not prevented by factory security.

[0086] Fourthly, the present invention proposes an electronic device, including a processor, a communication interface, a memory, and a communication bus, wherein the processor, the communication interface, and the memory communicate with each other through the communication bus;

[0087] Memory, which stores computer programs;

[0088] The processor, when executing the program stored in the memory, implements the method for predicting and locating third-party damage to oil and gas pipelines.

[0089] Fifthly, the present invention proposes a computer-readable storage medium storing a computer program, which, when run, executes the method for predicting and locating third-party damage to oil and gas pipelines.

[0090] In a sixth aspect, the present invention proposes a computer program product, including a computer program / instruction, which, when executed by a processor, implements the aforementioned method for predicting and locating third-party damage to oil and gas pipelines.

[0091] The beneficial effects of this invention are:

[0092] This invention proposes a method for predicting and locating third-party damage to oil and gas pipelines, comprising steps such as establishing an oil and gas pipeline transportation network, determining the importance and target values ​​of nodes, establishing a probability model of damage from terrorist attacks, calculating optimal attack resources and optimal defense resources, and predicting the probability of damage from terrorist attacks on overseas oil and gas pipelines. By introducing a social risk value into the calculation of node importance, the method aims to prevent the probability of mass casualties in terrorist attacks from exceeding the acceptable range for the public. Furthermore, by incorporating parameters such as the probability of a terrorist attack not being prevented by factory security, the coverage ratio of cameras at oil and gas pipeline stations, and the number and age of security personnel into the probability model of damage from terrorist attacks, the method can more realistically reflect the probability of damage at each station, making the constructed model more realistic and reliable. This invention also adds a safety margin to the optimal attack resources and optimal defense resources, allowing for a more maximal estimation of optimal attack resources and a more conservative allocation of optimal defense resources. The above method can accurately achieve prediction, location, and alarm for third-party damage to overseas oil and gas pipelines.

[0093] Other features and advantages of the invention will be set forth in the description which follows, and will be apparent in part from the description, or may be learned by practicing the invention. The objects and other advantages of the invention may be realized and obtained by means of the structures pointed out in the description, claims and drawings. Attached Figure Description

[0094] To more clearly illustrate the technical solutions in the embodiments of the present invention or the prior art, the drawings used in the description of the embodiments or the prior art will be briefly introduced below. Obviously, the drawings described below are some embodiments of the present invention. For those skilled in the art, other drawings can be obtained based on these drawings without creative effort.

[0095] Figure 1 A flowchart of a third-party damage prediction and location method for oil and gas pipelines proposed in an embodiment of the present invention is shown;

[0096] Figure 2 A schematic diagram of the oil and gas pipeline transportation network proposed in an embodiment of the present invention is shown;

[0097] Figure 3 A schematic diagram of an oil and gas pipeline transportation network constructed from 20 nodes and 34 edges, as proposed in an embodiment of the present invention, is shown.

[0098] Figure 4 This invention illustrates a flowchart of the process for determining the probability of losses from terrorist attacks during the transportation of overseas oil and gas pipelines.

[0099] Figure 5 A schematic diagram of a third-party damage prediction and location system for oil and gas pipelines according to an embodiment of the present invention is shown.

[0100] Figure 6 A schematic diagram of an electronic device according to an embodiment of the present invention is shown. Detailed Implementation

[0101] To make the objectives, technical solutions, and advantages of the embodiments of the present invention clearer, the technical solutions of the embodiments of the present invention will be clearly and completely described below with reference to the accompanying drawings. Obviously, the described embodiments are only some embodiments of the present invention, not all embodiments. Based on the embodiments of the present invention, all other embodiments obtained by those skilled in the art without creative effort are within the scope of protection of the present invention.

[0102] This embodiment proposes a method for predicting and locating third-party damage to oil and gas pipelines, such as... Figure 1 As shown, it includes the following steps:

[0103] S1: Establish an oil and gas pipeline transportation network with oil and gas pipeline stations as nodes and pipeline routes as edges; the general structure of the oil and gas pipeline transportation network is as follows: Figure 2 As shown, the dots represent oil and gas pipeline stations, and the lines connecting the nodes represent pipeline routes.

[0104] In one embodiment of the present invention, an overseas oil and gas pipeline network is selected as an example. This overseas oil and gas pipeline has one terminal station and one beginning station, four pigging stations, one metering station, and 13 pipeline valve chambers along the route. The oil and gas transportation relationships between the stations are shown in Table 1.

[0105] Table 1. Inter-station oil and gas transportation relationships

[0106]

[0107]

[0108] The magnitude of social risk at each station, The number of security personnel in different age groups is shown in Table 2, where S cS is the area within the region bounded by the boundaries of the oil and gas pipeline station extending 1 kilometer in each of the four cardinal directions (east, west, south, and north) that can be covered by cameras at the oil and gas pipeline station; all It refers to the area enclosed by extending 100 li (approximately 50 kilometers) in each of the four directions (east, west, south, and north) from the boundary of the oil and gas pipeline station.

[0109] Table 2. Social risk values ​​of stations, The number of security personnel in different age groups

[0110]

[0111]

[0112] Using overseas oil and gas pipeline stations as nodes and pipeline routes as edges, an oil and gas pipeline transportation network is constructed, such as... Figure 3 As shown, the oil and gas pipeline transportation network has a total of 20 nodes and 34 edges.

[0113] S2: Introduce the percentage of social risk to determine the target value for each node in the oil and gas pipeline transportation network, and determine the probability that a terrorist attack was not prevented by factory security;

[0114] S2.1, Determine the degree of each node, and use the value of the degree of each node to represent the importance of the node;

[0115] It should be noted that the degree of a node is the number of nodes directly connected to it. The degree of a node reflects its connectivity and interaction capabilities in the network. The higher the degree of a node, the greater its importance in the overseas pipeline transportation network. The formula for calculating the degree of a node is shown in Equation (1).

[0116]

[0117] Where, k _i Let represent the degree of node i, and n represent the number of nodes, where i = 1, 2, ..., n; A ij A represents the connection from node i to node j. ji This indicates the connection status from node j to node i. The connection status between nodes is represented by 1 and 0, where 1 indicates a connection and 0 indicates no connection.

[0118] It should be noted that, in order to avoid the probability of mass casualties in terrorist attacks exceeding the acceptable range for the general public, this invention not only considers the social risks caused by pipeline pressure, flow rate, temperature, and the number of surrounding villages and people, but also introduces a social risk percentage. The social risk percentage represents the proportion of the social risk value of each node to the total social risk value, and is used to characterize the magnitude of the social risk value of that node. The calculation formula is shown in Equation (2).

[0119]

[0120] Where, α i F represents the percentage of social risk for node i; i Let i be the social risk value of node i. Let n be the overall social risk value, and n be the number of nodes.

[0121] S2.2, determine the social risk percentage of each node, and determine the second importance of the node based on the social risk percentage of each node and the importance of the node; the second importance is the node importance considering the social risk value.

[0122] It should be noted that in this invention, the value obtained by multiplying the social risk percentage by the degree of the node is recorded as the second importance of the node. The new node importance ranking is obtained based on the second importance of the node. The calculation formula for the second importance of the node is shown in Equation (3).

[0123] I_new i =α i ×I i (3)

[0124] Among them, I i The importance of node i considering only the degree of the node (numerical value versus the degree k of the node). _i (same), α i Let I_new be the percentage of social risk for node i. i Let i be the second most important node.

[0125] S2.3, determine the target value of the corresponding node based on the second importance of the node.

[0126] The nodes are sorted according to their second importance. An assignment algorithm is then used to assign a target value to each node, for example, by arranging them from largest to smallest. The specific process is as follows:

[0127] Set the maximum and minimum target values ​​for nodes, assign the maximum target value to the node with the highest second importance value, and assign the minimum target value to the node with the lowest second importance value;

[0128] The target ratio of adjacent nodes is calculated based on the maximum target value, the minimum target value, and the number of nodes. The formula for calculating the target ratio of adjacent nodes is shown in equation (4).

[0129]

[0130] Where β is the ratio of the target values ​​of adjacent nodes; V Max V represents the maximum objective value of the node. Min is the minimum objective value of the node; n is the number of nodes.

[0131] In this embodiment, the percentage of social risk of a node and the node importance (including the node's primary importance and the node's secondary importance) are shown in Table 3.

[0132] Table 3. Percentage of Social Risk and Importance of Nodes

[0133] node Node importance Social risk percentage Second importance of a node metering station 14 0.108401084 1.517615176 First stop 7 0.140921409 0.422764228 Last station 3 0.054200542 0.379403794 Piling Station-1 3 0.091598916 0.274796748 Pit Station-2 3 0.081300813 0.243902439 Piling Station-3 3 0.06504065 0.195121951 Line valve chamber-1 3 0.059620596 0.178861789 Line valve chamber-2 3 0.048780488 0.146341463 Line valve chamber-3 3 0.043360434 0.130081301 Line valve chamber-4 3 0.032520325 0.097560976 Line valve chamber-5 3 0.042276423 0.084552846 Line Valve Chamber-6 3 0.027100271 0.081300813 Line valve chamber-7 3 0.037940379 0.075880759 Piling Station-4 2 0.024390244 0.073170732 Line Valve Chamber-10 2 0.035230352 0.070460705 Line Valve Chamber-11 2 0.032520325 0.06504065 Line Valve Chamber-12 2 0.016260163 0.048780488 Line valve chamber-13 2 0.021680217 0.043360434 Line valve chamber-8 2 0.019512195 0.03902439 Line control room-9 2 0.017344173 0.034688347

[0134] The target value of node i in the oil and gas pipeline transportation network can be approximately calculated based on the ratio of the target values ​​of adjacent nodes, as shown in formula (5).

[0135] V i =V Max β i-n (i=1,...n) (5)

[0136] Among them, V i V represents the target value of the sorted i-th node. Max Let β be the maximum target value of the node, β be the ratio of the target values ​​of adjacent nodes, i be the i-th node, and n be the total number of nodes.

[0137] From the node importance ranking in Table 3, it can be seen that the metering station is the node with the largest target value. The maximum target value for the node is set to 10, and the minimum target value is 0.002. According to formula (4), the following is calculated: Therefore, the target value for each node is V. i =10 × 1.5656 i-20 (i = 1, ... 20), therefore the target values ​​for each node are determined as shown in Table 4.

[0138] Table 4 Node Target Values

[0139] serial number node Number of nodes sorted in descending order Target value 1 metering station 20 10 (Settings) 2 Last stop 19 19 6.3873 3 First stop 18 18 4.0798 4 Piling Station-1 17 2.6059 5 Pit Station-2 16 1.6645 6 Piling Station-3 15 1.0632 7 Line valve chamber-1 14 0.6791 8 Line valve chamber-2 13 0.4337 9 Line valve chamber-7 12 0.277 10 Line valve chamber-3 11 0.177 11 Line valve chamber-13 10 0.113 12 Line valve chamber-4 9 0.0722 13 Line Valve Chamber-10 8 0.0461 14 Line Valve Chamber-6 7 0.0295 15 Line Valve Chamber-12 6 0.0188 16 Line valve chamber-8 5 0.012 17 Line valve chamber-5 4 0.0077 18 Line control room-9 3 0.0049 19 Piling Station-4 2 0.0031 20 Line Valve Chamber-11 1 0.002 (Setting)

[0140] In practical applications, the stronger the security force, the lower the probability of a terrorist attack occurring at that node. Therefore, this invention introduces the probability that a terrorist attack will be prevented by factory security. The probability that a terrorist attack will not be prevented by factory security can be determined based on the station's social risk value in Table 2. The number of security personnel in different age groups is calculated using the formula shown in (6).

[0141]

[0142] Where, p _nd_i S represents the probability that node i encounters a terrorist attack but is not prevented by factory security; all The area enclosed by extending 1 kilometer in each of the four directions (east, west, south, and north) from the boundary of the oil and gas pipeline station; S cLet p be the area within the region bounded by the boundaries of the oil and gas pipeline station extending 100 li (approximately 50 kilometers) in each of the four cardinal directions (east, west, south, and north), which can be covered by cameras at the oil and gas pipeline station; number_i represents the number of security personnel at node i; p person_i To represent the ability of security personnel at node i to resist terrorist attacks, for example, security personnel are p corresponding to young adults aged 20-45, middle-aged people aged 45-60, and elderly people over 60. person_i The values ​​are 0.8, 0.7, and 0.6 respectively.

[0143] p can be calculated using formula (6). _nd_i = [0.1493,0.0995,0.1668,0.1387,0.1468,0.1041,0.0499,0.1269,0.0039,0.0775,0.0866,0.0393,0.0291,0.0698,0.0599,0.1553,0.0184,0.2947,0.1284,0.0254].

[0144] S3: Based on the target value of nodes and the probability that a terrorist attack is not prevented by factory security, establish a terrorist attack target loss probability model and an expected loss model;

[0145] For example, the probability of loss of a target in a terrorist attack on a transportation network is the product of the probability that the attacker may escape detection while carrying out the plan and the conditional probability that the terrorist attack will succeed under the condition that it is not detected, as shown in formula (7).

[0146]

[0147] Where p is the probability of loss from a terrorist attack at node i; V i Let A be the target value for node i; i The attack resources allocated by the attacker to launch an attack against node i; D i The defense resources allocated by the defender to protect node i from attacks.

[0148] Based on p(V) i A i D i The constructed expected loss model is as follows:

[0149]

[0150] Among them, EL i Let be the expected loss of node i.

[0151] However, formula (7) only considers the defensive role of reconnaissance against terrorist attacks. But nodes, namely oil and gas pipeline stations, have local security forces to resist terrorist attacks. When a factory's security forces are stronger, the probability of a terrorist attack is lower. Therefore, this invention introduces the probability of a terrorist attack being prevented by factory security to establish a model of the probability of loss of terrorist attack targets.

[0152] A model for the probability of loss of a terrorist attack target is established based on the target value of nodes and the probability that a terrorist attack will not be prevented by factory security. This is achieved through the following steps:

[0153] S3.1 Before establishing the probability model of the loss of terrorist attack targets, the following settings are made for the probability model of the loss of terrorist attack targets:

[0154] (1) When terrorists intend to launch a terrorist attack on a transportation network, the target of the attack is limited to the nodes in the oil and gas pipeline transportation network, that is, the nodes are attacked by terrorists.

[0155] (2) Use the target value of the node to represent the node value;

[0156] (3) Terrorists plan to allocate attack resources to launch terrorist attacks on various scattered nodes in the oil and gas pipeline transportation network. The total attack resources are fixed at A. t .

[0157] S3.2, Based on the set content, determine the attack resources allocated by the attacker to launch an attack against the node and the defense resources allocated by the defense strategy to defend against the attack against the node;

[0158] The attackers of the terrorist attack were based on the total attack resource A. t The size of the node and the actual situation of the oil and gas pipeline transportation network under control will affect the allocation of attack resources A. i This maximizes the total expected loss of the transportation network nodes. Simultaneously, the defender, knowing the total attack resources A... t And total defense resources D t Under fixed conditions, defense resources are allocated to nodes in the transportation network. i To minimize the expected loss.

[0159] S3.3, establish a terrorist attack target loss probability model based on the probability that a terrorist attack is not prevented by factory security, the attack resources allocated to launch the attack, the defense resources allocated to defend against the attack, and the target value.

[0160] The constructed probability model for the loss of terrorist attack targets is as follows:

[0161]

[0162] The expected loss model is determined based on the target value of each node and the terrorist attack target loss probability model, and the constructed expected loss model is as follows:

[0163]

[0164] Wherein, p(V i ,A i ,D i ) _new is the target loss probability of terrorist attack node i; EL i is the expected loss of the terrorist attack defender; V i is the target value of node i; A i is the attack resource allocated by the attacker to launch an attack on node i; D i is the defense resource allocated by the defender to defend against the attack on node i; p _nd_i is the probability that a terrorist attack encountered by node i is not prevented by plant security, which is calculated according to formula (6).

[0165] S4: Introduce a safety margin to calculate the optimal attack resource and optimal defense resource of the oil and gas pipeline transportation network; in the embodiment of the present invention, a safety margin m (0<m<1) is added on the basis of the optimal attack resource, which can estimate the optimal attack resource to a greater extent, and allocate the optimal defense resource in a more conservative situation. When the target value of the node and the allocation of defense resources are determined, the attack resource that causes the maximum social loss is the optimal attack resource for terrorists to launch an attack, and the optimal defense resource is determined by using the optimal attack resource.

[0166] For example, if no safety margin is introduced, the calculation formula for the optimal attack resource of the nodes in the oil and gas pipeline transportation network is as follows:

[0167]

[0168] Hereby, the calculation formula for calculating the optimal defense resource according to the optimal attack resource is as follows:

[0169]

[0170] Wherein, A 0 (V,D) _new is the optimal attack resource; D 0 is the optimal defense resource; V is the target value; D is the defense resource.

[0171] The specific process of calculating the optimal attack resource and optimal defense resource of the oil and gas pipeline transportation network by introducing the safety margin is as follows:

[0172] S4.1: Respectively assign initial values to the expected loss of the attacker for a certain node and the defense resource of the defender;

[0173] S4.1.1, Determining the initial value of the expected loss for an attacker targeting a certain node includes:

[0174] (1) The expected loss range of the node is determined using the expected loss model (i.e., the maximum and minimum values ​​of the expected loss are determined);

[0175] (2) The initial value of the expected loss for each node is determined based on the maximum and minimum values ​​of the expected loss. The initial value of the expected loss is determined according to the following formula:

[0176] EL = min _EL +(max _EL -min _EL )×r1(13)

[0177] Where EL is the initial value assigned to the expected loss of node i, min _EL Let max be the minimum value of the expected loss for node i. _EL Let r1 be the maximum value of the expected loss of node i; r1 is a random number between (0,1).

[0178] In this embodiment, the expected loss EL of the corresponding node is generated using formula (11). i = [6.8307,5.2937,3.265,1.6742,1.3603,0.591,0.3831,0.1531,0.051,0.203,0.101,0.0716,0.0459,0.0287,0.0095,0.009,0.0051,0.0038,0.0026,0.0008].

[0179] When the target value and defense resource allocation of the transportation network nodes are determined, the attack resource that causes the greatest social loss is the optimal attack resource for terrorists to launch an attack.

[0180] S4.1.2, the initial values ​​of the defense resources assigned to a certain node's defender are determined as follows:

[0181] (1) Determine the maximum and minimum values ​​of the defense resources of the defender against a certain node;

[0182] (2) Determine the initial values ​​of the node's defense resources based on the maximum and minimum values ​​of the defense resources. The initial values ​​of the defense resources are determined according to the following formula:

[0183]

[0184] in, Let i be the minimum defensive resources for node i. r1 is the maximum value of the defense resources of node i; r2 is a random number between (0,1).

[0185] The total attack resource A in this embodiment t The total defense resources are 20, and the total defense resources are D. t The value is 120. Based on the results in Table 4, the matrix of the target values ​​in this embodiment is as follows:

[0186] [10, 6.3873, 4.0798, 2.6059, 1.6645, 1.0632, 0.6791, 0.4337, 0.277, 0.177, 0.113, 0.0722, 0.0461, 0.0295, 0.0188, 0.012, 0.0077, 0.0049, 0.0031, 0.002], therefore, the minimum value of the expected loss for each node is 0, and the maximum value is respectively...

[0187] [10,6.3873,4.0798,2.6059,1.6645,1.0632,0.6791,0.4337,0.277,0.177,0.113,0.0722,0.0461,0.0295,0.0188,0.012,0.0077,0.0049,0.0031,0.002].

[0188] Based on total defense resources D t The value is 120, therefore the defense resource D for each node is... i The value range is [0, 120]. The initial value of the defense resources of the corresponding node is generated by formula (10) as D = [6.73, 6.0383, 3.3535, 0.8901, 3.4046, 0.4329, 7.6439, 8.4825, 2.9804, 3.7463, 0.2181, 0.2162, 5.3129, 2.855, 7.4348, 8.942, 5.2138, 6.4633, 0.251, 4.8382].

[0189] S4.2, determine the balanced expected loss, optimal attack resources, and optimal defense resources based on the initial values ​​of the expected loss, the initial values ​​of the defense resources, and the target values ​​of the nodes.

[0190] The formula for calculating the optimal attack resources after introducing a safety margin is as follows:

[0191]

[0192] Among them, A 0 (V,D) _newV represents the optimal attack resource; D represents the target value; m represents the defense resource; and m represents the safety margin, which in one embodiment of the present invention is m = 0.5.

[0193] Given the optimal attack resources for the transport network nodes, the optimal defense resources are calculated according to formula (16).

[0194]

[0195] Among them, D 0 _new For optimal defense resources; A 0 _new is the optimal attack resource; V is the target value; EL is the expected loss to balance; m is the safety margin, and in one embodiment of the present invention, m = 0.5.

[0196] S5: Based on the optimal attack resources and optimal defense resources, use the terrorist attack target loss probability model to predict the terrorist attack loss probability of each node in the oil and gas pipeline transportation network.

[0197] Based on the calculations of S2-S4, the target values, expected loss initial values, defense resource initial values, and the probability that a terrorist attack was not prevented by factory security were determined for the 20 nodes in this embodiment. The results are shown in Table 5.

[0198] Table 5 Target Value V i Initialize the expected loss EL and the defense resources D. i Summary Table

[0199]

[0200]

[0201] Based on the optimal attack resource A 0 (Formula 13) Optimal defensive resource D 0 (Formula 14) The formula further updates and iterates the expected loss EL to finally obtain the balanced expected loss. This is based on the fact that during a terrorist attack, the attacker continuously adjusts the attack resources A. i The allocation and deployment attempt to maximize the expected loss EL, while the defender continuously adjusts the defense resources D. i The allocation and deployment attempt to minimize the expected loss EL, that is, both sides try to make the expected loss reach their own ideal state, and the result that is favorable to one side is the result that is unfavorable to the other side. When the attacker continuously adjusts the attack resources so that no matter how the defender adjusts the defense resources, the expected loss of each node is equal, the expected loss at this time is the balanced expected loss.

[0202] in accordance with Figure 4The process involves initializing the expected loss (EL) and the defense resources (D). i With the target value V i Calculate the balanced expected loss and the optimal attack resource A. 0 Optimal defense resource D 0 The specific process is as follows:

[0203] (1): Determine the initial value EL of the expected loss for the attacker and the initial value D of the defense resources for the defender for a certain node. i ;

[0204] (2): Initialize EL using expected loss and D using defensive resources. i With the target value V i Calculate the attack resources of node i

[0205] (3): Based on Defense resources of computing node i

[0206] (4): Determine the defense resources D of the current node. i With calculated defense resources Check if they are equal; if they are equal, proceed to step (5); if they are not equal, it means that the current defense resource allocation is not optimal, then return to (1) to re-initialize the node defense resources, and then repeat the solution for attack resources. and defensive resources until

[0207] (5): When each node reaches At that time, the defense resources of each node are aggregated, and the total defense resources D are calculated. 0 And determine the calculated total defense resources D. 0 Is it related to the total defense resources D? t If they are equal, it means that the overall configuration of defense resources has not yet reached a balanced state. It is necessary to return to S1, re-initialize the expected loss EL, and repeat steps (1)-(5) until D. 0 =D t .

[0208] (6) Repeat the iterative process (1)-(5) above until the attacker continuously adjusts the attack resources so that the expected loss of each node is equal no matter how the defender adjusts the defense resources. At this point, the balanced expected loss is obtained. In this balanced state, the corresponding attack resources and defense resources are the optimal attack resources and optimal defense resources. The probability of terrorist attack loss of each node is calculated using the optimal attack resources and optimal defense resources.

[0209] Following the above iterative process, the calculation results are shown in Table 6:

[0210] Table 6 Balance Expected Loss and Optimal Attack Resources A 0 With optimal defense resources D 0 Summary Table

[0211]

[0212]

[0213] Optimal attack resource A 0 Optimal defense resource D 0 The probability p of a terrorist attack not being prevented by factory security _nd_i As the attack resources, defense resources, and probability of terrorist attacks not being prevented by factory security at node i, the probability of terrorist attack loss at each node of the overseas oil and gas pipeline is calculated in formula (9).

[0214]

[0215] The probability of terrorist attack losses, p(V), can be obtained at each node during the overseas oil and gas pipeline transportation period. i A i D i ) _new = [1.493e-05,9.95e-06,1.668e-05,0.0779,0.1182,0.0967,0.0041,0.116,0.0034,0.0496,0.0866,0.02,0.0191,0.0501,0.0447,0.0896,0.0121,0.0838,0.0218,0.007], as shown in Table 7:

[0216] Table 7 Probability of Terrorist Attack Losses at Each Node

[0217]

[0218]

[0219] Based on the above-mentioned method for predicting and locating third-party damage to oil and gas pipelines, in an exemplary embodiment of the present invention, an alarm method for third-party damage to oil and gas pipelines is proposed, comprising the following steps:

[0220] The probability of terrorist attack losses at each node in the oil and gas pipeline transportation network was determined using the aforementioned third-party damage prediction and location method for oil and gas pipelines.

[0221] Based on the probability of loss of the terrorist attack target, the risk level of each node is determined and corresponding alarm measures are formulated.

[0222] In this embodiment, based on the numerical value of the probability of loss from terrorist attacks on overseas oil and gas pipeline stations obtained from the assessment, the risk value of suffering terrorist attacks is divided into low risk, general risk, major risk, and severe risk. The terrorist attack risk classification is shown in Table 8.

[0223] Table 8. Terrorist Attack Risk Classification

[0224]

[0225] Based on the probability of terrorist attack losses at each site in Table 8 and the risk classification in Table 9, the terrorist attack risk classification of each node was determined, as shown in Table 9.

[0226] Table 9. Terrorist Attack Risk Classification for Each Node

[0227]

[0228] As shown in Table 10, the stations with major risks are Pipeline Station-1, Pipeline Station-3, Line Valve Chamber-13, Line Valve Chamber-6, Line Valve Chamber-8, Line Control Room-9, and Line Valve Chamber-11. Yellow alerts need to be issued, and appropriate engineering or management measures should be added to reduce the risks to an acceptable level. The stations with serious risks are Pipeline Station-2 and Line Valve Chamber-2. Red alerts need to be issued, and engineering or management measures should be taken within the specified time period to reduce the risks to an acceptable level, so as to achieve predictive location alarm for overseas oil and gas pipelines.

[0229] Based on the same inventive concept, this invention also proposes a third-party damage prediction and location system for oil and gas pipelines, such as... Figure 5 As shown, it includes:

[0230] The transportation network establishment unit is used to establish an oil and gas pipeline transportation network with oil and gas pipeline stations as nodes and pipeline lines as edges.

[0231] The model parameter determination unit is used to introduce the percentage of social risk to determine the target value of each node in the oil and gas pipeline transportation network, and to determine the probability that each node will encounter a terrorist attack and that the terrorist attack will not be prevented by the factory security.

[0232] The model building unit is used to build a probability model of terrorist attack target loss and an expected loss model based on the target value of the node and the probability that the terrorist attack was not prevented by the factory security.

[0233] The optimal resource calculation unit is used to calculate the optimal attack resources and optimal defense resources of the oil and gas pipeline transportation network by introducing safety margins.

[0234] The terrorist attack loss probability prediction unit is used to predict the probability of terrorist attack losses at each node in the oil and gas pipeline transportation network based on the optimal attack resources and optimal defense resources and using the terrorist attack target loss probability model.

[0235] The execution steps and prediction and positioning methods of the transportation network establishment unit, model parameter determination unit, model establishment unit, optimal resource calculation unit, and terrorist attack loss probability prediction unit are the same, and will not be described in detail here.

[0236] Another exemplary embodiment of the present invention provides an electronic device. For example... Figure 6 As shown, the electronic device includes at least one processor 601, at least one communication interface 602, at least one memory 603, and at least one communication bus 604; wherein the processor 601, communication interface 602, and memory 603 communicate with each other through the communication bus 604.

[0237] Memory 603 stores computer programs;

[0238] The processor 601 is used to execute the program stored in the memory 603 to implement the method for predicting and locating third-party damage to oil and gas pipelines.

[0239] Optionally, the communication interface can be an interface of a communication module, such as the interface of a GSM module; the processor may be a CPU, an Application Specific Integrated Circuit (ASIC), or one or more integrated circuits configured to implement embodiments of the present invention. The memory may include high-speed RAM and may also include non-volatile memory, such as at least one disk storage device. The memory stores a program, and the processor calls the program stored in the memory to execute some or all of the above-described method embodiments.

[0240] Based on the same inventive concept, embodiments of this application also provide a computer-readable storage medium storing a computer program, which, when executed, implements some or all of the above-described method embodiments. Optionally, the storage medium may be a non-transitory computer-readable storage medium, such as a ROM, random access memory (RAM), CD-ROM, magnetic tape, floppy disk, and optical data storage device.

[0241] Based on the same inventive concept, embodiments of this application also provide a computer program product, including a computer program / instructions, which are executed by a processor of some or all of the above-described method embodiments.

[0242] Although the present invention has been described in detail with reference to the foregoing embodiments, those skilled in the art should understand that modifications can still be made to the technical solutions described in the foregoing embodiments, or equivalent substitutions can be made to some of the technical features; and these modifications or substitutions do not cause the essence of the corresponding technical solutions to deviate from the spirit and scope of the technical solutions of the embodiments of the present invention.

Claims

1. A method for predicting and locating third-party damage to oil and gas pipelines, characterized in that, Includes the following steps: Establish an oil and gas pipeline transportation network with oil and gas pipeline stations as nodes and pipeline lines as edges; The social risk percentage is introduced to determine the target value for each node in the oil and gas pipeline transportation network, and to determine the probability that each node will encounter a terrorist attack and that the terrorist attack will not be prevented by factory security. Based on the target value of nodes and the probability that a terrorist attack is not prevented by factory security, establish a terrorist attack target loss probability model and an expected loss model; Introducing safety margins to calculate the optimal attack and defense resources for oil and gas pipeline transportation networks; Based on the optimal attack resources and optimal defense resources, the probability of terrorist attack loss at each node in the oil and gas pipeline transportation network is predicted using the terrorist attack target loss probability model.

2. The method for predicting and locating third-party damage to oil and gas pipelines according to claim 1, characterized in that, Determining the target value for each node in the oil and gas pipeline transportation network includes the following steps: Determine the degree of each node, and use the numerical value of the degree to represent the importance of the node; Determine the social risk percentage of each node, and determine the second importance of each node based on its social risk percentage and its overall importance. The target value of the corresponding node is determined based on the second importance of the node.

3. The method for predicting and locating third-party damage to oil and gas pipelines according to claim 2, characterized in that, The degree of a node is the number of nodes that are directly connected to other nodes in an oil and gas pipeline transportation network.

4. The method for predicting and locating third-party damage to oil and gas pipelines according to claim 2, characterized in that, Determining the social risk percentage of each node, and determining the second importance of each node based on its social risk percentage and the node's overall importance, includes the following steps: Determine the social risk value for each node and the overall social risk value for all nodes; The social risk percentage of each node is determined by the ratio of the social risk value of each node to the total social risk value of all nodes. The second importance of a node is obtained by multiplying its social risk percentage by its importance.

5. The method for predicting and locating third-party damage to oil and gas pipelines according to claim 2, characterized in that, Determining the target value of a node based on its second importance includes the following steps: Sort each node in descending order according to its second importance, and assign each node a corresponding target value based on its second importance. The ratio of target values ​​of adjacent nodes is determined based on the maximum target value of a node, the minimum target value of a node, and the number of nodes. The target value of a node is determined based on the ratio of the target values ​​of its neighboring nodes and the maximum target value of the node.

6. The method for predicting and locating third-party damage to oil and gas pipelines according to claim 5, characterized in that, The formula for calculating the ratio of target values ​​between adjacent nodes is as follows: Where β is the ratio of the target values ​​of adjacent nodes; V Max V represents the maximum objective value of the node. Min Let n be the minimum objective value of the node; n is the number of nodes. The formula for calculating the target value of a node, based on the ratio of the target values ​​of adjacent nodes and the maximum target value of the node, is as follows: V i =V Max β i-n (i=1,...n) Among them, V i This represents the target value of the i-th node after sorting, where i is the i-th node after sorting.

7. The method for predicting and locating third-party damage to oil and gas pipelines according to claim 1, characterized in that, The formula for calculating the probability that a terrorist attack will not be prevented by factory security at each node is as follows: In the formula, p _nd_i S represents the probability that node i encounters a terrorist attack but is not prevented by factory security; all S is the area enclosed by extending 100 li (approximately 50 kilometers) in each of the four cardinal directions (east, west, south, and north) from the boundary of node i; c Let p be the area within the region bounded by the boundary of node i extending 1 kilometer in each of the four cardinal directions (east, west, south, and north); let number_i be the number of security personnel; p person_i This enhances the ability of node i security personnel to defend against terrorist attacks.

8. The method for predicting and locating third-party damage to oil and gas pipelines according to claim 7, characterized in that, The establishment of the probability model for the loss of terrorist attack targets includes the following steps: A model for the probability of loss of targets in terrorist attacks was established; Based on the set content, determine the attack resources allocated by the attacker to launch an attack against the node and the defense resources allocated to defend against the attack against the node; A model for the probability of terrorist attack target loss is established based on the probability that a terrorist attack at a node is not prevented by factory security, the attack resources allocated to launch the attack, the defense resources allocated to defend against the attack, and the target value of the node.

9. The method for predicting and locating third-party damage to oil and gas pipelines according to claim 8, characterized in that, The settings include: The terrorists' attacks were limited to nodes within the oil and gas pipeline transportation network; The node's value is represented by its target value. Terrorists allocate attack resources to various dispersed nodes to launch terrorist attacks.

10. The method for predicting and locating third-party damage to oil and gas pipelines according to claim 9, characterized in that, The probability model for the loss of terrorist attack targets is as follows: Wherein, p(V i A i D i ) _new Let A be the target loss probability of node i in a terrorist attack. i D represents the attack resources allocated by the attacker to launch an attack against node i. i V represents the defense resources allocated by the defender to protect node i from attacks; i p is the target value for node i; _nd_i Let represent the probability that node i encounters a terrorist attack but is not prevented by factory security.

11. The method for predicting and locating third-party damage to oil and gas pipelines according to claim 1 or 10, characterized in that, The expected loss model is as follows: Among them, EL i p(V) represents the expected loss of the defender against a terrorist attack at node i. i A i D i ) _new Let A be the target loss probability of node i in a terrorist attack. i D represents the attack resources allocated by the attacker to launch an attack against node i. i V represents the defense resources allocated by the defender to protect node i from attacks; i Let i be the target value of node i, where i is the i-th node after sorting.

12. The method for predicting and locating third-party damage to oil and gas pipelines according to claim 1, characterized in that, The formula for calculating the attacker's optimal attack resources is as follows: Among them, A 0 (V,D) -new 'm' represents the optimal attack resource; 'm' represents the safety margin; 'V' represents the target value; 'D' represents the defense resource. The formula for calculating the optimal defense resources for the defending side is as follows: Among them, D 0 _new is the optimal defense resource; V is the target value; EL is the expected loss to balance; m is the safety margin.

13. The method for predicting and locating third-party damage to oil and gas pipelines according to claim 1, characterized in that, The optimal attack resources and optimal defense resources are determined according to the following steps: S1: Determine the initial value of the attacker's expected loss and the defender's defense resources for a certain node; S2: Calculate the attack resources of the node using the initial values ​​of expected loss, defense resources, and target value; S3: Calculate the defense resources of the node based on the calculated attack resources of the node; S4: Determine whether the calculated defense resources of the node are equal to the defense resources of the current node. If they are equal, proceed to step S5. If they are not equal, return to S1 to re-initialize the node's defense resources and repeat the calculation of the node's attack resources and defense resources until the current node's defense resources are equal to the calculated node's defense resources. S5: When the defense resources of each node are equal to the calculated defense resources of the node, the defense resources of each node are aggregated to calculate the total defense resources, and it is determined whether the calculated total defense resources are equal to the total defense resources. If they are not equal, return to S1 to re-initialize the expected loss, and repeat the steps of S1-S5 until the calculated total defense resources are equal to the total defense resources. S6: Repeat the above S1-S5 iterative process until the attacker continuously adjusts the attack resources so that no matter how the defender adjusts the defense resources, the expected loss of each node is equal. At this time, the balanced expected loss is obtained, and the corresponding attack resources and defense resources are the optimal attack resources and optimal defense resources.

14. The method for predicting and locating third-party damage to oil and gas pipelines according to claim 13, characterized in that, Determining the initial value of the expected loss for an attacker targeting a specific node includes the following steps: The expected loss range of a node is determined using the aforementioned expected loss model; The initial value of the expected loss of a node is determined based on the maximum and minimum values ​​of its expected loss. The initial value of the expected loss is determined according to the following formula: EL=min _EL +(max _EL -my _EL )×r1 Where EL is the initial value assigned to the expected loss, min _EL The minimum of the expected loss; max _EL is the maximum expected loss; r1 is a random number between (0,1).

15. The method for predicting and locating third-party damage to oil and gas pipelines according to claim 13, characterized in that, The initial values ​​for the defense resources are determined according to the following formula: in, Let i be the minimum defensive resources for node i. D is the defense resource for node i. i The maximum value of r1; r2 is a random number between (0,1).

16. An alarm method for detecting damage to oil and gas pipelines by a third party, characterized in that, include: The probability of terrorist attack losses at each node in the oil and gas pipeline transportation network is determined using the third-party damage prediction and location method for oil and gas pipelines as described in any one of claims 1-15. Based on the probability of loss of the terrorist attack target, the risk level of each node is determined and corresponding alarm measures are formulated.

17. A third-party damage prediction and location system for oil and gas pipelines, characterized in that, include: The transportation network establishment unit is used to establish an oil and gas pipeline transportation network with oil and gas pipeline stations as nodes and pipeline lines as edges. The model parameter determination unit is used to introduce the percentage of social risk to determine the target value of each node in the oil and gas pipeline transportation network, and to determine the probability that each node will encounter a terrorist attack and that the terrorist attack will not be prevented by the factory security. The model building unit is used to build a probability model of terrorist attack target loss and an expected loss model based on the target value of the node and the probability that the terrorist attack was not prevented by the factory security. The optimal resource calculation unit is used to calculate the optimal attack resources and optimal defense resources of the oil and gas pipeline transportation network by introducing safety margins. The terrorist attack loss probability prediction unit is used to predict the probability of terrorist attack losses at each node in the oil and gas pipeline transportation network based on the optimal attack resources and optimal defense resources and using the terrorist attack target loss probability model.

18. The third-party damage prediction and location system for oil and gas pipelines according to claim 17, characterized in that, The probability model for the loss of terrorist attack targets is as follows: Wherein, p(V i A i D i ) _new Let A be the target loss probability of node i in a terrorist attack. i D represents the attack resources allocated by the attacker to launch an attack against node i. i V represents the defense resources allocated by the defender to protect node i from attacks; i p is the target value for node i; _nd_i Let represent the probability that node i encounters a terrorist attack but is not prevented by factory security.

19. An electronic device, characterized in that, It includes a processor, a communication interface, a memory, and a communication bus, wherein the processor, the communication interface, and the memory communicate with each other through the communication bus; Memory, which stores computer programs; The processor, when executing a program stored in the memory, implements the method for predicting and locating third-party damage to oil and gas pipelines as described in any one of claims 1-15.

20. A computer-readable storage medium storing a computer program, characterized in that, When the computer program is run, it executes the method for predicting and locating third-party damage to oil and gas pipelines as described in any one of claims 1-15.

21. A computer program product, comprising a computer program / instructions, characterized in that, When the computer program / instruction is executed by the processor, it implements the method for predicting and locating third-party damage to oil and gas pipelines as described in any one of claims 1-15.

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