Quantum key-based power grid power data security management and control method

Abstract

The application relates to the technical field of power system data security, and discloses a power grid power data security management and control method based on quantum keys, which comprises the following steps: acquiring power data and marking a security level, and differentiating quantum state coding according to the security level; based on the quantum state coding, a parameter-key hybrid frame structure is constructed, a parameter redundancy transmission mechanism is introduced, and a parameter area dynamic key parameter is recovered according to a large number decision; and based on the parameter area dynamic key parameter and an initial key in a key area, combined with real-time topological information of a power grid, a final dynamic key parameter is determined. By constructing the parameter-key hybrid frame structure, introducing the parameter redundancy transmission mechanism, and recovering the parameter area dynamic key parameter according to the large number decision, the hidden danger that a privacy amplification parameter is eavesdropped or tampered with in a classical channel negotiation process is eliminated.

Description

Technical Field

[0001] This invention relates to the field of power system data security technology, and more specifically, to a method for power grid data security management based on quantum key distribution. Background Technology

[0002] With the deepening of the construction of new power systems, the power grid has evolved from the traditional unidirectional chain structure of "source-grid-load" to a complex multidimensional network of coordinated interaction between "source-grid-load-storage". Massive amounts of terminal equipment (PMU, RTU, intelligent converged terminals, distributed energy controllers, etc.) generate multi-type, multi-level, and multi-directional power data, and the secure transmission of this data directly determines the operational safety of the power grid.

[0003] Currently, the industry is gradually introducing quantum key distribution (QKD) technology to address the threat posed by quantum computing to traditional encryption systems. However, existing technologies still have the following prominent shortcomings in real-world power grid environments: (1) Privacy amplification parameters in the existing quantum key distribution process are usually obtained through classical channel negotiation, which poses a risk of eavesdropping, and the eavesdropping behavior is difficult to detect. For example, the invention patent application CN105553648A, which proposes to extract privacy amplification parameters from the bit stream negotiated by the quantum channel, only selects the strategy based on "bit error rate + risk probability + security level of the data to be encrypted", and once the strategy is selected, it remains fixed and cannot cope with the real-time changes in the security situation during power grid transmission.

[0004] (2) Existing technologies typically employ fixed encryption strategies, which cannot be dynamically adjusted based on the channel characteristic parameters of the power grid data unit (such as transmission path attributes, quantum state attributes, and security level attributes). For example, the invention patent application CN120639279A, which proposes a method for secure transmission of industrial internet data based on quantum key distribution, uses a two-dimensional model of "transmission path attributes - quantum state attributes" for correlation calculation. The weight coefficients are fixed and do not consider the time-varying characteristics of the power grid topology. That is, the power grid topology will change frequently due to events such as fault isolation, planned maintenance, and black start. The key parameters generated by the fixed model will quickly become invalid after the topology changes.

[0005] (3) Power grid data has multiple service level characteristics (such as dispatch instructions are the highest security level, load management data is the medium security level, and operation monitoring data is the ordinary security level). In addition, dynamic key parameter conflicts and abnormal parameters of adjacent nodes may occur during power grid data transmission. However, existing quantum key distribution methods have not established a key control mechanism linked with the power grid service security level, and lack an effective power grid topology awareness conflict resolution mechanism and dynamic correction means.

[0006] In summary, to achieve secure management and control of power grid data, it is urgent to establish a full-link quantum key security management and control method to ensure the secure transmission of power grid data. Summary of the Invention

[0007] To overcome the aforementioned deficiencies of the prior art, this invention provides a quantum key-based method for secure management and control of power grid data, in order to address the security risks arising from classical channel negotiation of privacy amplification parameters in the context of multi-level data coexistence in the power grid.

[0008] To achieve the above objectives, embodiments of the present invention provide a method for secure management and control of power grid data based on quantum key distribution, comprising: acquiring power data and labeling it with security levels; preparing quantum state codes based on security level differentiation; constructing a parameter-key hybrid frame structure based on quantum state codes and introducing a parameter redundancy transmission mechanism; recovering dynamic key parameters in the parameter region based on large number decision; determining final dynamic key parameters based on the dynamic key parameters in the parameter region and the initial key in the key region, combined with real-time power grid topology information; and executing a hierarchical privacy amplification strategy and its situation-driven hot switching based on the final dynamic key parameters and the security level.

[0009] In a preferred embodiment, the step of acquiring power data and labeling security levels includes: acquiring power grid data and dividing power data into units based on business type; and labeling the divided power data units with security levels.

[0010] In a preferred embodiment, the step of constructing a parameter-key hybrid frame structure based on quantum state coding and introducing a parameter redundancy transmission mechanism to recover the dynamic key parameters of the parameter area based on a large number decision includes: defining a parameter-key hybrid frame structure based on differentiated quantum state coding; wherein the parameter-key hybrid frame structure includes: a frame synchronization header, a parameter area, a key area, and a checksum tail; encrypting the parameter area, introducing a parameter redundancy transmission mechanism, recovering the parameter area information based on a large number decision, and parsing to obtain the dynamic key parameters of the parameter area.

[0011] In a preferred embodiment, the encryption of the parameter area, the introduction of a parameter redundancy transmission mechanism, and the recovery of the parameter area information based on a large number decision include: generating an encryption key corresponding to the security level of the power data unit; performing bit-by-bit XOR encryption on the parameter area using a quantum one-time mask based on the generated encryption key; and, considering the inherent transmission characteristics of the quantum channel, introducing a parameter redundancy transmission mechanism based on the encrypted parameter area and recovering the parameter area information based on a large number decision.

[0012] In a preferred embodiment, determining the final dynamic key parameters based on the dynamic key parameters of the parameter area and the initial key of the key area, combined with the real-time topology information of the power grid, includes: obtaining a real-time topology snapshot of the power grid based on the transmission path of the current power data unit, and determining the set of adjacent nodes; calculating the comprehensive correlation index of each adjacent node based on the determined set of adjacent nodes; selecting candidate key nodes according to the comprehensive correlation index, and recursively expanding along the topology path to obtain a key input set arranged in the order of the transmission path; and obtaining the final dynamic key parameters based on the key input set and the dynamic key parameters of the parameter area, through a pre-configured quantum key distribution model and the initial key carried in the key area.

[0013] In a preferred embodiment, determining the final dynamic key parameters through a pre-configured quantum key distribution model includes: obtaining model dynamic key parameters based on the key input set and parameter area dynamic key parameters through the pre-configured quantum key distribution model; and performing an adaptation check based on the model dynamic key parameters and the actual length of the initial key carried in the key area of ​​the parameter-key hybrid frame structure, and correcting to obtain the final dynamic key parameters.

[0014] In a preferred embodiment, the step of executing a hierarchical privacy amplification strategy and its situation-driven hot switching based on the final dynamic key parameters and security level includes: introducing a hierarchical privacy amplification strategy and selecting a privacy amplification strategy of the corresponding level based on the security level and the final dynamic key parameters; obtaining dynamic indicators of power grid security situation during the execution of the hierarchical privacy amplification strategy; and performing a lossless hot switching with a double buffer when the dynamic indicators of power grid security situation undergo a threshold jump.

[0015] In a preferred embodiment, the lossless hot-switching of the dual buffer includes: security upgrade switching based on the current hierarchical privacy amplification strategy, efficiency upgrade switching based on the security posture and data timeliness window, and seamless switching of the dual buffer.

[0016] In a preferred embodiment, the method further includes: setting up a three-level progressive self-healing decision chain driven by anomalies based on the transmission process of executing a hierarchical privacy amplification strategy.

[0017] In a preferred embodiment, the transmission process based on the execution of the hierarchical privacy amplification strategy, which sets up an anomaly-driven three-level progressive self-healing decision chain, includes: real-time collection of key operational indicators of each node during the transmission process of executing the hierarchical privacy amplification strategy, calculation of node parameter difference values ​​and identification of abnormal reference nodes; setting up a three-level progressive self-healing decision chain, and triggering the self-healing decision chain based on the identified abnormal reference nodes.

[0018] The beneficial effects of this invention are: (1) By acquiring power data and labeling it with security level, quantum state coding is prepared according to the security level differentiation, so as to realize the power grid security level feedforward to the quantum state preparation stage, thereby realizing the physical layer mapping of "security level-coding dimension", so that high security level data can obtain higher dimension physical layer protection from the quantum state preparation stage, and eliminate the risk of security label being tampered with; (2) By constructing a “parameter-key hybrid frame structure” and introducing a parameter redundancy transmission mechanism, the dynamic key parameters of the parameter area are recovered based on the large number decision, thus eliminating the hidden danger of privacy amplification parameters being eavesdropped or tampered with during the classical channel negotiation process; (3) By combining the dynamic key parameters of the parameter area and the initial key of the key area with the real-time topology information of the power grid, the final dynamic key parameters are determined, so as to realize the adaptive adjustment between the key node and the power grid operation status, and make the key parameters follow the changes in the power grid topology in real time. (4) By implementing a graded privacy amplification strategy and its situation-driven hot switching based on the final dynamic key parameters and security level, the security management strategy can be adjusted in real time with the change of security situation without interrupting business, thus realizing the upgrade from static configuration to dynamic adaptation. Attached Figure Description

[0019] Figure 1 This is a flowchart illustrating a quantum key-based method for secure management and control of power grid data. Figure 2 A time-series interaction diagram of the entire process of quantum key distribution and management; Figure 3 A layered architecture diagram for the differential mapping of power grid security levels and the hierarchical privacy amplification strategy; Figure 4 This is a state transition diagram of a three-level progressive self-healing decision chain. Detailed Implementation

[0020] The technical solutions of the embodiments of the present invention will be clearly and completely described below with reference to the accompanying drawings. Obviously, the described embodiments are only some embodiments of the present invention, and not all embodiments. Based on the embodiments of the present invention, all other embodiments obtained by those of ordinary skill in the art without creative effort are within the scope of protection of the present invention.

[0021] Please see Figure 1 This invention provides a quantum key-based method for secure management and control of power grid data, comprising: acquiring power data and labeling it with security levels; preparing quantum state codes based on security level differences; constructing a parameter-key hybrid frame structure based on the quantum state codes and introducing a parameter redundancy transmission mechanism; recovering the dynamic key parameters of the parameter area based on large number decision; determining the final dynamic key parameters based on the dynamic key parameters of the parameter area and the initial key of the key area, combined with real-time power grid topology information; and executing a hierarchical privacy amplification strategy and its situation-driven hot switching based on the final dynamic key parameters and the security level.

[0022] By acquiring power data and labeling it with security levels, and preparing quantum state codes based on the differences in security levels, the power grid security level is fed forward to the quantum state preparation stage, thereby realizing a physical layer mapping of "security level - coding dimension". This allows high-security-level data to obtain higher-dimensional physical layer protection from the quantum state preparation stage, without relying on upper-layer protocol identifiers, eliminating the risk of security label tampering. By constructing a "parameter-key hybrid frame structure" and introducing a parameter redundancy transmission mechanism, the dynamic key parameters in the parameter area are recovered based on large number decision, eliminating the risk of privacy amplification parameters being eavesdropped or tampered with during classical channel negotiation. By determining the final dynamic key parameters based on the dynamic key parameters in the parameter area and the initial key in the key area, combined with real-time power grid topology information, the final dynamic key parameters are determined, enabling adaptive adjustment between the key node and the power grid operating status, so that the key parameters follow the changes in power grid topology in real time. By executing a hierarchical privacy amplification strategy and its situation-driven hot switching based on the final dynamic key parameters and security level, the security management strategy can be adjusted in real time with changes in security situation without interrupting business, realizing an upgrade from static configuration to dynamic adaptation.

[0023] Please see Figure 2 To more clearly illustrate the method for secure management and control of power grid data based on quantum key distribution, the technical solution of this invention is described in detail below: S1. Obtain power grid data and its security level, and prepare quantum state codes based on the differences in security level; By acquiring power grid data, the data is divided into multiple power data units based on business type, and the security level of each power data unit is labeled. Then, based on the security level of the acquired power data units, a coding dimension corresponding to the security level is used in the quantum state preparation stage to obtain the quantum state code. Specifically: S11. Obtain power grid data, divide power data units according to business type, and mark the security level of power data units; S111. Obtain power data transmission requests from the power grid dispatch center, substation, distributed energy station, or distribution network terminal. The power data includes: dispatch instructions, protection action signals, stability control commands, remote operation instructions, load forecast data, distributed energy dispatch data, AGC / AVC regulation instructions, PMU synchronization phasor data, steady-state telemetry and telecontrol data, power quality data, equipment operating temperature monitoring data, and equipment vibration monitoring data.

[0024] S112. Divide the power data to be transmitted into multiple power data units according to the service type. In a specific embodiment, based on the characteristics of power grid services, the power data is divided into three types of power data units: dispatch control data units, load management data units, and operation monitoring data units.

[0025] S113. Mark the security level of the divided power data units; Each power data unit is labeled with a power grid security level attribute. The security level labeling is based on the security protection requirements of the power monitoring system and the actual operational requirements of the power grid. The security level labeling for each power data unit is as follows: Data units for dispatch control are labeled as Level 1 security (the highest security level); data units for load management are labeled as Level 2 security (a medium security level); and data units for operation monitoring are labeled as Level 3 security (a normal security level).

[0026] The data units classified into three levels are as follows: Level 1 (Dispatch and Control) includes dispatch instructions, protection action instructions, stability control instructions, and remote operation instructions. This type of data directly controls the operating status of primary power grid equipment. If it is tampered with or intercepted, it will directly endanger the safe and stable operation of the power grid. Therefore, it is set to the highest security level. Level 2 (Load Management) includes load forecasting data, distributed energy dispatching data, AGC / AVC regulation instructions, and PMU synchronization phasor data. This type of data is used for power grid dispatching decisions and operating status perception. Tampering or interception will affect the correctness of dispatching decisions, but it does not directly control primary equipment. Therefore, it is set to the medium security level. Level 3 (Operation Monitoring) includes steady-state telemetry and teleindication data, power quality data, and equipment operating temperature / vibration monitoring data. This type of data is used for power grid operation status monitoring and trend analysis. It does not involve direct control operations. The real-time harm of tampering or interception is relatively low. Therefore, it is set to the ordinary security level.

[0027] It should be noted that after labeling each power data unit with its security level, a 3-bit security level tag field can be set in the message header of each power data unit to achieve a data-driven representation of the security level. The encoding rule is as follows: Level 1 security level is marked with binary "001", Level 2 security level is marked with "010", and Level 3 security level is marked with "011". This tag field can be read in subsequent quantum state preparation and used to differentiate the selection of quantum state encoding methods.

[0028] S12. Based on the security level of the labeled power data unit, prepare quantum state codes in a differentiated manner; The sending quantum communication device reads the 3-bit security level tag field set in S11 from the message header of the power data unit, and selects the corresponding quantum state encoding dimension based on the tag value. By feeding the power grid's security level forward to the preparation stage of the quantum state physical layer, the security level of the power data unit is quantum natively bound at the moment it is transmitted in quantum state form. That is, the higher the security level, the more quantum degrees of freedom are utilized in the encoding, and the more physical dimensions an eavesdropper needs to break through simultaneously.

[0029] Please see Figure 3 Based on the security level of each power data unit, taking a 3-bit security level label field set in the header of each power data unit message as an example, the specific differentiated preparation of quantum state encoding is as follows: (1) When the security level label is read as "001" (Level 1 security), the sending quantum communication device uses a three-dimensional joint encoding method of "decoy state + polarization state + phase state" to prepare the quantum state and obtain the quantum state encoding of the power data unit. Specifically, the three-dimensional joint encoding simultaneously modulates the following three quantum degrees of freedom on the same optical pulse: First degree of freedom (polarization state coding): The sender randomly selects horizontal polarization (H), vertical polarization (V), and diagonal polarization (H). ) or anti-angular polarization ( One of the four polarization states is used to polarize the key bits. This polarization state encoding method is consistent with the polarization encoding standard of the BB84 protocol; the second degree of freedom (phase state encoding): phase modulation is superimposed on the same optical pulse, and the sender randomly selects the phase value 0, ... , , One of the four phase states involves phase encoding of the same key bit. This phase modulation is achieved through a lithium niobate phase modulator placed in the optical path. This modulator changes the optical path under the influence of an electric field, thereby changing the phase of the output light. The third degree of freedom (decoy state encoding) involves superimposing decoy state modulation on the same optical pulse, with the sender randomly selecting the signal state intensity. (Average photon number approximately 0.8), decoy state intensity One of three light intensities—(average photon number approximately 0.2) or vacuum state intensity 0 (average photon number 0)—is used to detect whether an eavesdropper has launched a beam splitting attack (PNS attack).

[0030] The key information representation of three-dimensional joint encoding is as follows: for the same optical pulse, the bit values ​​independently encoded by each of the three degrees of freedom together constitute a composite key unit. If the bits independently encoded by each degree of freedom are... (polarization), (Phase) (Deceptive state), then the composite key information carried by the optical pulse is ( , , The light pulse contains 3 bits of information. To obtain the complete key information carried by the light pulse, an eavesdropper must make correct measurements in three degrees of freedom simultaneously, that is, they must simultaneously break through the three physical dimensions of polarization measurement, phase measurement, and light intensity measurement, which significantly increases the difficulty of eavesdropping.

[0031] Based on the key information jointly encoded in the three dimensions described above, when receiving data from a quantum communication device, the receiver randomly selects one of three measurement bases: polarization measurement base (measuring polarization state), phase measurement base (measuring phase state), and light intensity measurement base (measuring decoy state intensity). After comparing the basis vectors in the classical channel, the sender and receiver retain only the measurement results with consistent basis vectors. For the decoy state measurement results, both parties further compare the statistical distribution of light intensity; if the distribution is abnormal, a PNS attack is determined to exist.

[0032] In summary, in three-dimensional joint encoding, the three degrees of freedom are independent and do not interfere with each other. The quantum state of a single photon spans a three-dimensional tensor product space in Hilbert space. In the absence of knowledge of the encoding method, the eavesdropper must select the correct set of orthogonal bases in the three-dimensional tensor product space for measurement. According to the quantum no-cloning theorem and the uncertainty principle, any non-orthogonal measurement will inevitably introduce a disturbance, which will be detected by the bit error rate statistics of the communicating parties.

[0033] (2) When the security level label is read as "010" (Level 2 security), the sending quantum communication device uses a two-dimensional joint encoding method of "polarization state + phase state" to prepare the quantum state and obtain the quantum state encoding of the power data unit. Specifically, the two-dimensional joint encoding simultaneously modulates the following two quantum degrees of freedom on the same optical pulse: First degree of freedom (polarization state coding): Similar to three-dimensional joint coding, the sender randomly selects horizontal polarization (H), vertical polarization (V), and diagonal polarization (V). ) or anti-angular polarization ( One of the four polarization states is used to polarize the key bits. This polarization state encoding method is consistent with the polarization encoding standard of the BB84 protocol. The second degree of freedom (phase state encoding): similar to the three-dimensional joint encoding, phase modulation is superimposed on the same optical pulse, and the sender randomly selects the phase value 0, ... , , One of the four phase states involves phase encoding of the same key bit. This phase modulation is achieved by a lithium niobate phase modulator placed in the optical path. The modulator changes the optical path under the action of an electric field, thereby changing the phase of the output light.

[0034] This two-dimensional joint encoding does not include a decoy state dimension; each light pulse carries only (…). , The key information consists of 2 bits, requiring an eavesdropper to simultaneously compromise both polarization and phase physical dimensions. The receiving quantum communication device randomly selects either a polarization or phase measurement basis for measurement. Two-dimensional encoding reduces the decoy state measurement step compared to three-dimensional encoding, and its key generation rate is higher. However, it is less resistant to PNS attacks and is suitable for medium-security data not related to scheduling control.

[0035] (3) When the security level label is read as "011" (Level 3 security), the sending quantum communication device uses a single polarization state encoding method to prepare the quantum state (i.e., standard BB84 protocol encoding) to obtain the quantum state encoding of the power data unit. Specifically, the one-dimensional joint encoding utilizes only a single degree of freedom of polarization state, and the sending device randomly selects horizontal polarization (H), vertical polarization (V), and diagonal polarization (V). ) or anti-angular polarization ( One of the four polarization states is used to encode the key bits, with each optical pulse carrying 1 bit of key information. The receiver uses the standard measurement method of the BB84 protocol, randomly selecting one of two sets of conjugate bases for measurement.

[0036] This one-dimensional encoding has the highest key generation rate (without insertion loss due to additional modulation stages), but relies on a single physical degree of freedom to provide security, making it suitable for operational monitoring data that does not require high levels of security protection.

[0037] As shown in (1)-(3), the switching of the above three encoding methods is automatically completed by the security level analysis module of the quantum communication device of the sender. Specifically, the security level analysis module reads the 3-bit security level tag field from the message header of the power data unit; then calls the corresponding quantum state preparation submodule according to the tag value, that is, when the tag is "001", the three-dimensional joint encoding submodule is called (the polarization modulator, phase modulator, and decoy state modulator are turned on), when the tag is "010", the two-dimensional joint encoding submodule is called (the polarization modulator and phase modulator are turned on, and the decoy state modulator is turned off), and when the tag is "011", the one-dimensional encoding submodule is called (only the polarization modulator is turned on, and the phase modulator and decoy state modulator are turned off). Among them, the on / off control of each modulator is realized through digital control signals, and the switching time is on the order of nanoseconds, which does not affect the normal coding rate of the quantum key distribution system.

[0038] In summary, by feeding forward the power grid security level attributes to the quantum state preparation stage, a physical layer mapping mechanism of "security level to encoding dimension" is established. This enables "quantum native binding" of security level information at the physical layer. That is, the security attributes of the power data unit are encoded in the physical degrees of freedom of the quantum state at the moment it is converted into a quantum state for transmission. This allows high-security-level data to obtain higher-dimensional physical layer protection from the quantum state preparation stage. Eavesdroppers would need to break through all encoding dimensions simultaneously to obtain complete key information. At the same time, low-security-level data uses low-dimensional encoding, reducing system overhead and increasing the code generation rate. Thus, physical layer differentiated protection of security levels is achieved without reducing the overall system efficiency.

[0039] S2. Based on the quantum state encoding of differential preparation, a "parameter-key hybrid frame structure" is constructed, and a parameter redundancy transmission mechanism is introduced to obtain the dynamic key parameters in the parameter region; Based on the differentiated quantum state encoding in S1, the sending quantum communication device needs to transmit this quantum state encoding to the receiving device. To eliminate the security risks posed by privacy amplification parameters when transmitted through classical channels, a specialized "parameter-key hybrid frame structure" is constructed in the quantum state bit stream. All parameter information required for privacy amplification is embedded in the parameter region of the quantum state bit stream, and encryption protection and redundant transmission ensure the confidentiality and reliability of parameter transmission. Specifically: S21. Based on the quantum state encoding prepared by differentiation, a parameter-key hybrid frame structure is defined; wherein, the parameter-key hybrid frame structure includes: a frame synchronization header, a parameter area, a key area, and a check tail; In the quantum state bit stream prepared by S1, data is organized and transmitted according to a preset frame structure. The preset frame structure for each frame includes: a frame synchronization header, a parameter area, a key area, and a checksum tail.

[0040] It should be noted that the frame synchronization header is a fixed bit sequence. In one specific embodiment, the frame synchronization header is the hexadecimal number 0x5A5A5A5A (binary 01011010010110100101101001011010), with a length of 32 bits. This sequence has good autocorrelation properties. The receiver searches for this sequence by sliding through consecutive bits in the quantum state bit stream, and when a match is found, the start position of a frame is determined. The insertion and identification method of the frame synchronization header is similar to the frame synchronization mechanism in classical communication. Those skilled in the art can adjust the specific value and length of the synchronization header according to the actual channel conditions.

[0041] In one specific embodiment, the parameter area has a total length of 128 bits, and the fields it contains are shown in Table 1 below.

[0042] Table 1: Parameter Area Field Statistics Table

[0043] Based on Table 1 above, the policy ID is used to identify the type of privacy amplification policy currently adopted: 0001 represents a first-level hash policy, 0010 represents a second-level hybrid policy, and 0011 represents a third-level shift policy; the hash function number... When using a hash strategy, the specific function ID in the pre-defined hash function library is identified as having a value range of 0-255; the truncation position... This specifies the starting bit position from which valid key data is extracted from the initial key, and its value range is [value range missing]. Key length This specifies the length (in bits) of the final generated shared quantum key, and its value ranges from [value range missing]. Reserved fields are reserved for future expansion; the parameter area checksum performs a CRC-16 check on the first 112 bits of the parameter area, which is used by the receiver to verify the integrity of the parameter area.

[0044] The key area carries the original key data after error correction. The length of the key area is not fixed, but is determined by the "key length" parameter in the parameter area. "Parameters are specified dynamically. For example, when the key length..." When the value is 256, the key area length is 256 bits; when the key length is... When the value is 512, the key area length is 512 bits. The receiver first parses the parameter area to obtain the key length. The value, and then based on the key length. The value is read from the key area, which contains the initial key data of the corresponding length.

[0045] The check tail is a 16-bit quantum state fidelity check bit. After receiving the data of this frame, the receiver performs a hash operation on the key area data and compares the result with the check tail to verify whether the data of this frame has been tampered with or disturbed during the transmission of the quantum channel.

[0046] S22. Encrypt the parameter area of ​​the parameter-key hybrid frame structure, introduce a parameter redundancy transmission mechanism, and recover the parameter area information based on the large number decision. To prevent the parameter area defined in S21 from being intercepted and parsed by eavesdroppers during quantum channel transmission, the parameter area of ​​the parameter-key hybrid frame structure is encrypted for protection. Simultaneously, a parameter redundancy transmission mechanism is introduced to improve the reliability of parameter recovery. Specifically: S221. Based on the security level of the power grid data unit, generate an encryption key corresponding to the security level; For power data units with Level 1 security, the encryption key length is 256 bits; for power data units with Level 2 security, the encryption key length is 128 bits; and for power data units with Level 3 security, the encryption key length is 64 bits.

[0047] The specific value of the encryption key is derived from a shared random number seed generated by the sender and receiver through negotiation via the quantum channel during the initial quantum key distribution process. This seed is updated at the start of each session. Let the bit sequence of the encryption key be... It has a length of 128 bits.

[0048] S222. Based on the encryption key generated in S221, the parameter region is XORed bit by bit using a quantum one-time mask; Let the plaintext bit sequence in the parameter area be... The bit sequence of the encryption key generated by S221 is The encrypted parameter area ciphertext bit sequence satisfy: , , in, This represents a bitwise XOR operation. The receiver, upon receiving the ciphertext, uses the same encryption key. Decryption: .

[0049] Encrypting the parameter region using a quantum one-time mask ensures that any attempt by an eavesdropper to measure the encryption key or the quantum state of the ciphertext will inevitably introduce a disturbance, which will be detected by the bit error rate statistics of both communicating parties.

[0050] S223. Based on the parameter area encrypted by S222, considering the inherent transmission characteristics of the quantum channel, a parameter redundancy transmission mechanism is introduced, and the parameter area information is recovered based on the large number decision. After S222 encryption of the parameter area, considering the inherent noise and loss in the quantum channel during transmission, some bits in the parameter area may be flipped during transmission. To improve the reliability of parameter area information recovery, a parameter redundancy transmission mechanism is introduced.

[0051] In one specific embodiment, the parameter redundancy transmission mechanism refers to the repeated transmission of the complete 128-bit information of the same parameter area in three consecutive frames. That is, the parameter areas of the m-th frame, the (m+1)-th frame, and the (m+2)-th frame carry the exact same parameter information (but the encryption keys for each frame are different, which are three different keys generated in sequence in this session).

[0052] After receiving three consecutive frames, the receiver decrypts the parameter area of ​​each frame to obtain three plaintext parameter areas. , , For each bit position in the parameter region ( The receiver counts the bit value at this position in the three plaintext frames and makes the following large number decision: if at least two of the three frames have a bit value of 1 at this position, then the final value of this bit is determined to be 1; if at least two of the three frames have a bit value of 0 at this position, then the final value of this bit is determined to be 0; if the bit values ​​at this position in the three frames are all different (this extreme case is theoretically very unlikely, because there are only two possible values ​​in the three frames, and it is impossible for them to be different), then the current group of 3 frames is discarded, and the receiver waits for the next group of 3 frames to be received again.

[0053] By introducing a parameter redundancy transmission mechanism and performing large number decision, single-bit errors occurring in single-frame transmission (when only one of the three frames has an error in that bit) can be corrected, effectively resisting parameter errors caused by quantum channel noise and improving the reliability of parameter recovery.

[0054] In summary, based on the parameter-key hybrid frame structure, each frame independently carries complete parameter information (including policy ID, hash function number, etc.). , interception position Key length This parameter-key hybrid frame structure, which does not rely on external state storage or context information, possesses self-describing characteristics. That is, after successfully synchronizing to any frame, the receiver can completely parse the privacy amplification strategy type, specific algorithm parameters, and initial key data used by the current power data unit based solely on the information contained within that frame, without needing to query historical frame states or external configuration databases. Therefore, this self-describing characteristic of the parameter-key hybrid frame structure allows the receiver to join an ongoing key distribution process at any time without starting reception from the beginning of the session; when a frame is completely corrupted by noise during transmission, the receiver only needs to wait for the next frame to recover all parameter information, preventing the entire session from being interrupted due to the loss of a single frame; and it facilitates rapid parsing and forwarding of key data by relay nodes in multi-node relay scenarios in the power grid.

[0055] S23. Based on the parameter area information recovered from the large number decision in S22, the dynamic key parameters of the parameter area are obtained by parsing. After completing frame synchronization and parameter area information recovery in S223, the receiving quantum communication device extracts the specific values ​​of each parameter from the parameter area according to the bit position division defined in the specific embodiment in S21. Specifically: For the strategy ID (4 bits): Read bits 1-4 and convert them to decimal. A value of 1 corresponds to a level-one hash strategy; a value of 2 corresponds to a level-two mixed strategy; and a value of 3 corresponds to a level-three shift strategy. For the hash function number... (8 bits): Read bits 5-12 and convert them to an integer between 0 and 255, used to select the corresponding hash function from the preset hash function library. (For the truncation position...) (20 bits): Read bits 13-32 and convert them to... An integer between 1 and 2, specifying the starting bit position for extracting valid data from the initial key. For key lengths... (20 bits): Read bits 33-52 and convert them to... An integer between 1 and 2, specifying the length (in bits) of the final shared quantum key. For the parameter area checksum (16 bits): read bits 113-128 and compare it with the CRC-16 checksum calculated by the receiver. If they match, the parameter area is confirmed to be complete; if they do not match, discard the frame and wait for the next frame.

[0056] After the receiver extracts the specific values ​​of the above parameters, it will send the extracted specific parameter values ​​(i.e., the dynamic key parameters in the parameter area, including: policy ID, hash function number) to the receiver. , interception position and key length The initial key data read from the key area is then fed into the subsequent hierarchical privacy amplification strategy for specific privacy amplification.

[0057] S3. Based on the dynamic key parameters of the parameter area obtained by parsing and the initial key carried in the key area, combined with the real-time topology information of the power grid, determine the final dynamic key parameters; After completing the transmission and reception of the quantum state bit stream in S2, the quantum communication devices of the sender and receiver have shared the initial key (from the key area) and the dynamic key parameters obtained from the parsing in S23 (from the parameter area). Based on this, it is necessary to further verify and optimize the dynamic key parameters according to the real-time topology of the power grid.

[0058] S31. Based on the transmission path of the current power data unit, obtain a real-time topology snapshot of the power grid and determine the set of adjacent nodes; The sending quantum communication device acquires a real-time snapshot of the power grid topology at the current moment. The real-time topology snapshot includes the connection relationships of all quantum communication nodes in the power grid, the line status (operation / maintenance / fault), and the QKD device model and capability parameters of each node (supported encoding dimensions, key generation rate limit, hash function library version, etc.).

[0059] For the transmission path of the current power data unit, the sending quantum communication device extracts all the power grid nodes traversed by the path from a topology snapshot. For each node, it further identifies all its directly connected (i.e., within one hop range) neighboring nodes, forming a set of neighboring nodes. If the quantum channel state between the current node and a neighboring node is "normal", then the neighboring node is included in the set; if the quantum channel state is "interrupted" or "degraded" (e.g., bit error rate exceeds 10%), then the node is excluded.

[0060] S32. Based on a given set of neighboring nodes, calculate the comprehensive correlation index of each neighboring node; For the set of adjacent nodes Each node in The sending quantum communication device calculates its multi-dimensional comprehensive correlation index. The comprehensive correlation index It integrates four dimensions, and its calculation formula is as follows: , , In the formula, Indicates the current moment; For nodes exist A comprehensive correlation index for each moment; for Dynamic weighting coefficients for the correlation between security levels at any given time; For nodes Security level correlation, characterizing the node The degree of matching between the minimum security level of the current service being carried and the security level of this power data unit (if node) If no service exceeding the security level of this data unit is currently being carried, then... If node If the current security level being handled is higher than that of this data unit, then... If node If the current security level is lower than that of this data unit (e.g., the node only processes level 3 data, while this data unit is level 1), then... 。); for Dynamic weighting coefficients for the quantum state fitness at any given time; For nodes The quantum state fitness of a node is characterized by its quantum state fitness. The compatibility of the QKD device capabilities with the quantum state encoding dimension currently used in S1 (if the node If the QKD device supports the current encoding dimension, then If the device does not support the current encoding dimension but supports lower dimensions, then If the device does not support it at all, then 。); for The dynamic weighting coefficients of the topological dynamic stability at any given time; For nodes exist The topological dynamic stability at time t, characterizing the node Structural stability in the current power grid topology; For nodes Connection degree in the current topology snapshot (normalized to) (For intervals, the maximum connectivity degree is set to 10; values ​​exceeding 10 are counted as 1). For nodes The historical failure rate (i.e., the ratio of the number of times the node failed in the past 24 hours to the total uptime). For nodes The load margin (i.e., 1 minus the ratio of the current key generation rate to the maximum key generation rate limit). for Dynamic weighting coefficients for the success rate of historical key services at any given time; For nodes Historical key service success rate, characterizing the node The ratio of the number of successful key distributions to the total number of attempts in the past 24 hours, with a value ranging from [value missing]. .

[0061] Please refer to Table 2 below. In one specific embodiment, the weighting coefficients... , , as well as The weighting coefficients are dynamically determined based on the periodic updates of the statistical table.

[0062] Table 2: Weighting Coefficients , , as well as Periodic Update Statistics Table

[0063] The power grid's operating status is obtained in real time from the power grid security management platform by the sending quantum communication equipment. When the power grid's operating status changes, the weighting coefficients are updated accordingly, with an update cycle of seconds.

[0064] S33. Select candidate key nodes based on the comprehensive correlation index, and recursively expand along the topology path to obtain a set of key inputs arranged in the order of the transmission path. Neighbor node set calculated based on the sending quantum communication device Comprehensive correlation index of each node Value, based on comprehensive correlation index Sort the values ​​in descending order from highest to lowest. Select the top values ​​from the sorted results. 10 nodes were selected as candidate key nodes, among which The value is determined by the security level of the current power data unit. In a specific embodiment, the first-level security level is taken as... Level 2 security Level 3 security .

[0065] Starting with the selected candidate key nodes, the algorithm recursively expands along the topology path towards the receiver: For each selected node, its next-hop neighbor is determined, and the comprehensive correlation index of the next-hop node is calculated according to the calculation method in S32. Select The node with the highest value becomes the next key node. This expansion process is repeated until all nodes along the complete transmission path from the sender to the receiver of this power data unit are covered.

[0066] All key nodes selected during the expansion process are arranged in order of transmission path, and the node ID and comprehensive correlation index of each node are recorded. And each dimension component, forming a key input set. .

[0067] S34. Based on the key input set obtained in S33 and the dynamic key parameters of the parameter area obtained in S23, the final dynamic key parameters are determined through a pre-configured quantum key distribution model. S341. The sending and receiving quantum communication devices are pre-configured with the same quantum key distribution model. The quantum key distribution model is pre-trained as follows: A historical power grid transmission dataset is acquired, where each historical transmission data entry includes the security level of the data unit, the topological features of the transmission path, the quantum channel state, and the final dynamic key parameters. Based on the historical transmission dataset, a multi-layer neural network is used to train an initial model. The model inputs are the security level label, the topological feature vector, and the quantum channel state vector; the model output is the recommended key length. Hash function number and the interception position When the model's prediction accuracy on the validation set reaches 95% or higher, the model training is considered complete.

[0068] During quantum key distribution, the sending quantum communication device inputs the key set obtained in S33. The characteristic data is input into a pre-configured quantum key distribution model, and the model outputs the recommended dynamic key parameters for this distribution process, including the key length. Hash function number and the interception position .

[0069] The sender compares the model's output dynamic key parameters with the dynamic key parameters extracted from the parameter area in S23, item by item. If they match, the parameter is used directly; otherwise, the parameter with the higher security level (i.e., the key length) is selected. Longer hash function number (Corresponding to functions with higher security).

[0070] S342. While comparing the model's output dynamic key parameters with the dynamic key parameters extracted from the parameter area in S23, to ensure that the key length specified in the parameter area matches the actual carrying capacity of the initial key, the sender also reads the actual length of the initial key carried in the key area. (i.e., the total number of bits of the initial key carried in the key area of ​​the parameter-key hybrid frame structure), the actual length of the initial key. With key length Perform compatibility verification: If This indicates that the key length specified in the parameter area exceeds the actual length of the initial key. In this case, the key length should be adjusted accordingly. Automatically corrected to the actual length of the initial key. ;like Then the original key length is maintained. constant.

[0071] In summary, according to S341-S342, the sender transmits the finalized dynamic key parameters to the receiver via a classic channel in an anonymous digital encoding format for confirmation. The receiver uses the same pre-configured model and key input set. The dynamic key parameters are calculated independently and compared with the final dynamic key parameters sent by the sender. If they match, an acknowledgment signal is returned.

[0072] S4. Based on the determined final dynamic key parameters and the labeled power grid security level, execute the hierarchical privacy amplification strategy and its situation-driven hierarchical privacy amplification strategy hot switching. After the dynamic key parameters in S3 are confirmed, the quantum communication devices of the sender and receiver share the same initial key and dynamic key parameters. Based on this, a differentiated privacy amplification strategy is executed according to the grid security level indicated in S11, and lossless hot switching of strategies driven by security posture is supported. Specifically: S41. Introduce a tiered privacy amplification strategy, and select the corresponding privacy amplification strategy based on the labeled power grid security level and the determined final dynamic key parameters. Please refer to Table 3 below. The sending quantum communication device reads the 3-bit security level tag field in the header of the current power data unit message and combines it with the determined final dynamic key parameters (key length). Hash function number and the interception position Based on the tag value, the corresponding privacy amplification strategy is selected from the preset tiered privacy amplification strategy library.

[0073] Table 3: Comparison Table of Security Level Labels and Tiered Privacy Amplification Strategies

[0074] Based on Table 3 above, when the security level label is "001", the sending quantum communication device executes a two-factor enhanced hash strategy, that is, extracts the hash function number from the parameter area of ​​S2. , interception position and key length The parameters extracted from this parameter region are obtained entirely from the parameter region transmitted through the quantum channel, without any classical channel negotiation. The sender, according to... Select the corresponding general-purpose hash function from the pre-set hash function library (in this embodiment, the hash function library contains 256 hash functions with different security levels), and select the appropriate hash function from the initial key according to... The string is first truncated and used as input to the selected hash function to calculate the shared quantum key. The shared quantum key is then processed according to... Group them.

[0075] When the security level label is "010", the sending quantum communication device executes a hash + shift hybrid strategy, that is, extracts the function number from the parameter area of ​​S2. and interception position Key length Confirmation is achieved through anonymous negotiation over a classic channel. The sender, based on... Choose a hash function, based on the initial key. The string is truncated and used as input to a hash function to calculate the first intermediate key. A cyclic shift operation is then performed on the first intermediate key (the shift direction and number of shifts are negotiated via a classical channel) to obtain the final shared quantum key. Grouping.

[0076] When the security level label is "011", the sending quantum communication device executes a dynamic shift strategy. Only the key length is extracted from the parameter area of ​​S2. The shift algorithm number is confirmed through classical channel negotiation. A cyclic shift operation is performed using the initial key as input to obtain the shared quantum key, and then... Grouping.

[0077] S42. Obtain dynamic indicators of power grid security status during the execution of the hierarchical privacy amplification strategy. When the dynamic indicators of power grid security status undergo a threshold jump, perform lossless hot switching of the double buffer. During the execution of the privacy amplification strategy based on the power grid security level, the sending quantum communication equipment continuously monitors and obtains the following dynamic indicators: the real-time bit error rate change rate of the quantum channel (updated in milliseconds), the attack risk probability increment (updated in seconds, obtained through online identification of bit error distribution patterns), the power grid security event alarm level (updated by events, obtained from the power grid security management platform), and the remaining window of time for the current data unit (updated in milliseconds, determined by the countdown of the scheduling instruction execution).

[0078] When any of the above dynamic indicators exceeds a preset threshold (e.g., the real-time bit error rate suddenly increases from 1.2% to over 3.5%, or a power grid security event alarm is received), the sending quantum communication device executes a double-buffer lossless hot-switching privacy amplification strategy, including: (1) Security upgrade and switching: upgrade the current policy (upgrade from level 3 to level 2, and from level 2 to level 1). The parameters required for the new privacy amplification policy are re-extracted from the parameter region of the latest quantum frame in S2, without the need for classical channel negotiation; (2) Efficiency Degradation Switching: When the security situation returns to a stable state and the data timeliness window is tight, downgrade from Level 1 to Level 2 or from Level 2 to Level 3 to improve the key generation rate; and (3) Seamless switching between two buffers: The quantum communication device of the sender maintains two buffers. Buffer A is used for the execution of the current strategy, and buffer B is used for the pre-generation of the new strategy. At the switching time, the data in the two buffers are XORed bit by bit to achieve seamless connection, ensuring no frame loss and no interruption of the flow.

[0079] S5. Based on the transmission process of executing the hierarchical privacy amplification strategy, a three-level progressive self-healing decision chain driven by anomalies is set up. Please see Figure 4 Considering that during power data transmission, grid nodes may experience anomalies due to equipment failures, network attacks, fiber optic cable interruptions, etc., leading to key distribution interruptions or abnormal key parameters, a three-level progressive self-healing decision chain is further implemented in the S4 transmission process to achieve autonomous repair in abnormal scenarios. Specifically: S51. Real-time collection of key operational indicators of each node during the transmission of the hierarchical privacy amplification strategy, calculation of node parameter differences and identification of abnormal reference nodes. During the transmission process after the privacy amplification strategy of S4 is executed, the sending quantum communication device continuously collects key operational indicators of each node along the transmission path, including: key generation rate (within normal range). 1kbps), Bit error rate change rate (normal range) Optical power attenuation (normal range) -3dB), equipment temperature (normal range) In one specific embodiment, each node is configured to report the above-mentioned indicators to the sending quantum communication device every 100 milliseconds.

[0080] The sending quantum communication device compares the real-time key operating indicators of each node with preset normal ranges. When a certain node... When any key operational indicator exceeds the normal range, calculate the parameter difference value for that single node. :

[0081] In the formula, , , as well as These are the real-time values ​​of key operational indicators for each node: key generation rate, bit error rate change rate, optical power attenuation, and equipment temperature. , , as well as These are the median values ​​of the normal range for key operational indicators of each node: key generation rate, bit error rate change rate, optical power attenuation, and equipment temperature.

[0082] when At that time, the node Marked as an abnormal reference node.

[0083] S52. Set up a three-level progressive self-healing decision chain and trigger the self-healing decision chain based on the identified abnormal reference nodes. When node parameter differences At this time, a three-level progressive self-healing decision chain is triggered. Specifically: When node parameter differences Upon this, the first level of self-healing (local snapshot rollback within seconds) is triggered, that is: the sending quantum communication device queries the node from the local secure transmission graph cache. The most recent snapshot of the key parameters in a normal state (timestamp less than 10 seconds); and immediately roll back the key parameters in this snapshot to the abnormal node. At the same time, the receiver is notified to perform a synchronous rollback, and the expected recovery time is generally less than or equal to 500ms.

[0084] After the first level of self-healing is triggered, if no available snapshot or rollback is available... If the value is still greater than 0.2, then the system enters the second level of self-healing (dynamic topology reconstruction and key regeneration), which means that the sending quantum communication device obtains the latest real-time topology snapshot from the EMS and removes abnormal nodes. The alternative transmission path is then recalculated, with an expected recovery time of less than or equal to 3 seconds. If an alternative path exists, the process of full-process key regeneration (S3-S4) is triggered.

[0085] When the second level of self-healing is triggered, if there is no alternative path ( If the sending quantum communication device is a necessary bridging node, it enters the third level of self-healing (cross-domain collaborative takeover), which involves: the sending quantum communication device initiating a cross-domain key management collaborative takeover protocol. This protocol includes: the sending device generating a one-time quantum token containing the current data unit ID, security level label, remaining validity period, and a list of used key IDs; sending the quantum token to the QKD device (i.e., neighboring device) of the adjacent area control center via a quantum channel; after verifying the validity of the quantum token, the neighboring device creates a temporary virtual node for the sending device in its local key management system, allocates a temporary key pool quota, and establishes a temporary quantum tunnel from the sending device to the receiving device via the neighboring device; the neighboring device sends a takeover confirmation code to the sending device, and the sending device switches the data stream to the temporary quantum tunnel (i.e., switches the data stream); the sending device continuously monitors abnormal nodes. The state when When the system recovers and remains stable for more than 5 seconds, a Make-Before-Break smooth switchback is executed (the original tunnel is built first, and then the temporary tunnel is disconnected), and neighboring devices are notified to release temporary resources. Finally, the entire takeover process generates a management handover chain log. When the Make-Before-Break smooth switchback is executed after the abnormal node recovers, the expected recovery time is generally no more than 10 seconds.

[0086] If the third level of the three-level progressive self-healing decision chain fails, the sender will urgently downgrade the current power data unit, switch to the classic encrypted backup channel for transmission, and issue an alarm signal.

[0087] In addition, after completing any of the above self-healing levels, the sending quantum communication device automatically re-executes the integrity check, that is, calculates the hash value of the corrected shared quantum key and compares it with the hash value calculated by the receiver: if the hash values ​​match, the correction is confirmed to be successful and an updated secure transmission result is generated; if the hash values ​​do not match, it enters the next level of self-healing or triggers an emergency downgrade.

[0088] In summary, this invention patent application establishes a physical layer mapping mechanism of "security level - encoding dimension" by feeding forward the power grid security level attributes to the quantum state preparation stage. Specifically, the first-level security level uses a three-dimensional joint encoding of "decoy state + polarization state + phase state" (all three degrees of freedom must be compromised simultaneously), the second level uses a two-dimensional joint encoding of "polarization state + phase state," and the third level uses a one-dimensional encoding of a single polarization state (standard BB84). This enables "quantum native binding" of security level information at the physical layer. The higher the security level, the more physical dimensions an eavesdropper needs to compromise simultaneously, resulting in progressively differentiated security protection starting from the physical layer. This is achieved by actively constructing a frame synchronization header and a parameter area (including policy ID and hash function number) within the quantum state bitstream. , interception position Key length The system employs a complete frame structure including a key area, a checksum, and a parameter area. The parameter area uses quantum one-time mask encryption, which is tied to the security level. A parameter redundancy transmission mechanism is introduced, redundantly transmitting parameters across three consecutive frames. The receiver recovers the parameters using a large-number decision, ensuring each frame independently carries complete parameters (self-describing characteristic). This achieves 100% extraction of privacy-enhancing parameters from the quantum channel and zero classical channel negotiation. Combined with encryption and redundancy, this dual protection ensures the confidentiality, integrity, and reliability of the parameters. This is achieved through a four-dimensional comprehensive correlation index (including security level correlation). Quantum state fitness Topological dynamic stability and historical key service success rate The weighting coefficient is adjusted based on the power grid's operating status (normal operation / maintenance / attack alarm / disaster). , , , Dynamic adaptive evolution enables a comprehensive representation of node capabilities, with key node selection matched in real-time to the time-varying characteristics of the power grid topology. By establishing a three-tiered differentiated privacy amplification strategy and introducing a lossless hot-switching mechanism driven by security situation awareness, dynamic indicators such as real-time bit error rate change rate and attack risk probability increment are continuously monitored. When a threshold jump occurs, strategy upgrades or downgrades are executed, and seamless connection is achieved through dual-buffer XOR fusion. This transforms the privacy amplification strategy from a static configuration item into a dynamic adaptive control system, resolving the structural contradiction between security and efficiency in the coexistence of multi-level data in the power grid. Furthermore, by establishing a three-tiered progressive self-healing decision chain, with each tier advancing sequentially, failure at any level automatically leads to the next tier. Failure at the third level results in an emergency downgrade to the classic encrypted backup channel, achieving system engineering-level fault-tolerant design and self-healing control capabilities.

[0089] The above formulas are all dimensionless calculations. The formulas are derived from software simulations based on a large amount of collected data to obtain the most recent real-world results. The preset parameters in the formulas are set by those skilled in the art according to the actual situation.

[0090] The above embodiments can be implemented, in whole or in part, by software, hardware, firmware, or any other combination thereof. When implemented using software, the above embodiments can be implemented, in whole or in part, in the form of a computer program product.

[0091] Those skilled in the art will recognize that the modules and algorithm steps of the various examples described in conjunction with the embodiments disclosed herein can be implemented in electronic hardware, or a combination of computer software and electronic hardware. Whether these functions are implemented in hardware or software depends on the specific application and design constraints of the technical solution. Those skilled in the art can use different methods to implement the described functions for each specific application, but such implementation should not be considered beyond the scope of this application.

[0092] In addition, the functional modules in the various embodiments of this application can be integrated into one processing module, or each module can exist physically separately, or two or more modules can be integrated into one module.

[0093] The above description is merely a specific embodiment of this application, but the scope of protection of this application is not limited thereto. Any variations or substitutions that can be easily conceived by those skilled in the art within the scope of the technology disclosed in this application should be included within the scope of protection of this application. Therefore, the scope of protection of this application should be determined by the scope of the claims.

[0094] In conclusion, the above description is only a preferred embodiment of the present invention and is not intended to limit the present invention. Any modifications, equivalent substitutions, improvements, etc., made within the spirit and principles of the present invention should be included within the protection scope of the present invention.

Claims

1. A method for secure management and control of power grid data based on quantum key distribution, characterized in that, include: Acquire power data and label it with security levels, and prepare quantum state codes based on the differences in security levels; Based on quantum state coding, a parameter-key hybrid frame structure is constructed, and a parameter redundancy transmission mechanism is introduced to recover the dynamic key parameters in the parameter area based on large number decision. Based on the dynamic key parameters in the parameter area and the initial key in the key area, combined with the real-time topology information of the power grid, the final dynamic key parameters are determined. Based on the final dynamic key parameters and security level, a tiered privacy amplification strategy and its situation-driven hot switching are implemented.

2. The method for secure management and control of power grid data based on quantum key distribution according to claim 1, characterized in that, The acquisition of power data and labeling of security levels includes: Acquire power grid data and divide the power data into units according to business type; The security level of the divided power data units is labeled.

3. The method for secure management and control of power grid data based on quantum key distribution according to claim 1 or 2, characterized in that, The method involves constructing a parameter-key hybrid frame structure based on quantum state encoding and introducing a parameter redundancy propagation mechanism to recover the dynamic key parameters in the parameter region based on large number decision, including: Based on quantum state encoding prepared differently, a parameter-key hybrid frame structure is defined; wherein, the parameter-key hybrid frame structure includes: a frame synchronization header, a parameter area, a key area, and a check tail; The parameter area is encrypted, a parameter redundancy transmission mechanism is introduced, the parameter area information is recovered based on the large number decision, and the dynamic key parameters of the parameter area are obtained by parsing.

4. The method for secure management and control of power grid data based on quantum key distribution according to claim 3, characterized in that, The encryption of the parameter area, the introduction of a parameter redundancy transmission mechanism, and the recovery of the parameter area information based on a large number decision include: Based on the security level of the power data unit, generate an encryption key corresponding to the security level; Based on the generated encryption key, a quantum one-time mask is used to perform bit-by-bit XOR encryption on the parameter region; Based on the encrypted parameter area, considering the inherent transmission characteristics of the quantum channel, a parameter redundancy transmission mechanism is introduced, and the parameter area information is recovered based on the large number decision.

5. The method for secure management and control of power grid data based on quantum key distribution according to claim 1, characterized in that, The determination of the final dynamic key parameters based on the dynamic key parameters of the parameter area and the initial key of the key area, combined with real-time power grid topology information, includes: Based on the transmission path of the current power data unit, obtain a real-time topology snapshot of the power grid and determine the set of adjacent nodes; Based on a defined set of neighboring nodes, calculate the comprehensive correlation index of each neighboring node; Candidate key nodes are selected based on the comprehensive correlation index, and then recursively expanded along the topology path to obtain a set of key inputs arranged in the order of the transmission path. Based on the key input set and the dynamic key parameters in the parameter area, the final dynamic key parameters are obtained through a pre-configured quantum key distribution model and the initial key carried in the key area.

6. The method for secure management and control of power grid data based on quantum key distribution according to claim 5, characterized in that, The process of obtaining the final dynamic key parameters through a pre-configured quantum key distribution model and the initial key carried in the key region includes: Based on the key input set and the dynamic key parameters in the parameter area, the model dynamic key parameters are obtained through a pre-configured quantum key distribution model; Based on the model's dynamic key parameters, and combined with the actual length of the initial key carried in the key area of ​​the parameter-key hybrid frame structure, an adaptation check is performed, and the final dynamic key parameters are obtained by correction.

7. The method for secure management and control of power grid data based on quantum key distribution according to claim 1, characterized in that, The process of implementing a tiered privacy amplification strategy and its situation-driven hot switching based on the final dynamic key parameters and security level includes: A tiered privacy amplification strategy is introduced, and the corresponding privacy amplification strategy is selected based on the security level and the final dynamic key parameters. The system acquires dynamic indicators of power grid security status during the execution of the hierarchical privacy amplification strategy. When the dynamic indicators of power grid security status undergo a threshold jump, it performs a lossless hot switch with a double buffer.

8. The method for secure management and control of power grid data based on quantum key distribution according to claim 7, characterized in that, The execution of lossless hot switching with dual buffers includes: Security upgrades and switching are performed based on the current tiered privacy amplification strategy, efficiency upgrades and switching are performed based on the security posture and data timeliness window, and seamless switching is achieved through dual buffers.

9. The method for secure management and control of power grid data based on quantum key distribution according to claim 1, characterized in that, Also includes: Based on the transmission process implementing the hierarchical privacy amplification strategy, a three-level progressive self-healing decision chain driven by anomalies is set up.

10. The method for secure management and control of power grid data based on quantum key distribution according to claim 9, characterized in that, The transmission process based on the implementation of a tiered privacy amplification strategy sets up a three-level progressive self-healing decision chain driven by anomalies, including: Real-time collection of key operational metrics of each node during the transmission process of the hierarchical privacy amplification strategy, calculation of node parameter differences and identification of abnormal reference nodes; A three-level progressive self-healing decision chain is set up, and the self-healing decision chain is triggered based on the identified abnormal reference nodes.

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