A permission token ring-based cold chain logistics data boundary right method and system

Abstract

The application discloses a cold chain logistics data right boundary method and system based on a permission token ring, belongs to the technical field of data circulation safety, and is used for solving the technical problems of right expression and ciphertext objects being separated from each other, business rules and password execution being disconnected from each other, and dynamic access scene adaptation being insufficient in a cold chain logistics multi-subject cross-trust domain data circulation scene. The method comprises the following steps: performing field division on logistics data objects to obtain a plurality of field groups; generating right metadata according to the right attribution basis and the participant subject identifier of each field group; generating an access strategy based on the right metadata; generating a root token according to the right metadata, an ODRL root strategy, an access strategy and field group ciphertext; in response to a data access trigger event, deriving a child token based on the root token; checking the access subject according to the child token, and releasing the key of the corresponding field group after the check is passed, thereby completing local decryption of the corresponding field group.

Description

Technical Field

[0001] This invention relates to the field of data circulation security technology, and in particular to a method and system for data boundary rights in cold chain logistics based on a permission token ring. Background Technology

[0002] Cold chain logistics is a typical multi-entity collaborative scenario. The entire lifecycle of cold chain goods involves multiple stakeholders, including cargo owners, carriers, warehousing providers, logistics platforms, insurance institutions, regulatory authorities, and auditing firms. Data needs to continuously flow across enterprises, scenarios, and trust domains. Cold chain data governance cannot merely meet the basic requirements of being recordable and transmissible; it must also achieve continuous controllability, boundary-based openness, fine granularity, and traceable accountability.

[0003] Existing technologies have developed multiple technical paths for data rights demarcation and access control, but these demarcation schemes have the following drawbacks: First, the expression of ownership and the encrypted object are separated. After data flows across entities, the ownership and rights boundaries at the field level cannot be continuously preserved with the encrypted data. The recipient finds it difficult to trace the source of the data's rights and the boundaries of authorization, which can easily lead to ownership confusion and unauthorized use. Second, business rules and cryptographic execution are disconnected. Business rules described by policy languages ​​such as Open Digital Rights Language (ODRL) cannot be automatically mapped to decryption control conditions. Rule execution relies on manual or program verification at the application layer, which poses a risk of being bypassed and makes it difficult to ensure the mandatory implementation of business rules. Third, the adaptability to dynamic access scenarios is insufficient. In scenarios such as abnormal temperature claims, temporary regulatory checks, and post-audit reviews, the access subjects cannot be fully predicted when the data is released. Initial static authorization cannot cover the dynamic access needs of all scenarios, resulting in insufficient authorization flexibility. Fourth, audit evidence storage lacks a closed loop. On-chain records only remain at the behavioral level and cannot form a complete evidence chain, making it difficult to support post-event compliance evidence collection and liability determination. Summary of the Invention

[0004] This invention provides a data boundary method and system for cold chain logistics based on a permissioned token ring, which addresses the following technical problems: In the data flow scenario of multiple entities and cross-trust domains in cold chain logistics, ownership expression and encrypted objects are separated, business rules and password execution are disconnected, and the adaptability to dynamic access scenarios is insufficient, making it impossible to achieve continuous data boundary at the field level.

[0005] The embodiments of the present invention adopt the following technical solutions: On one hand, embodiments of the present invention provide a method for delimiting cold chain logistics data based on a permission token ring. The method includes: encapsulating cold chain logistics data into a logistics data object, and dividing the logistics data object into fields to obtain multiple field groups. Based on the ownership basis and participating entity identifier of each field group, generate ownership metadata associated with the logistics data object; Based on the confirmed metadata and preset business rules, an ODRL root policy is generated, and the ODRL root policy is mapped to a field group to generate one or more ECC-CPABE access policies. The plaintext of each field group is encrypted using a symmetric encryption algorithm to obtain the ciphertext of the field group. Based on the ownership confirmation metadata, the ODRL root policy, the ECC-CPABE access policy, and the field group ciphertext, a root token bound to the logistics data object is generated and stored on the blockchain. In response to a data access trigger event, a sub-token is derived based on the root token; the access subject is verified according to the sub-token, and the key of the corresponding field group is released after the verification is successful, thus completing the partial decryption of the corresponding field group.

[0006] In one feasible implementation, cold chain logistics data is encapsulated into a logistics data object, and the logistics data object is divided into multiple field groups, specifically including: Acquire the cold chain logistics data that needs to be stored, construct the cold chain logistics data into a logistics data object according to preset fields, and generate a unique object identifier for the logistics data object; wherein, the preset fields include at least: waybill number, order number, goods type, origin and destination, loading time, arrival time, transportation trajectory and inbound / outbound events; Based on the sensitivity level, business purpose, and typical access subject range of each preset field, the fields in the logistics data object are divided into multiple field groups; among them, the divided field groups include at least: basic logistics group, tracking event group, cold chain sensing group, claims processing group, audit evidence group, and contact privacy group.

[0007] In one feasible implementation, ownership metadata associated with the logistics data object is generated based on the ownership basis of each field group and the identifier of the participating entity, specifically including: Obtain the ownership basis and participating entities for each field in each field group, and obtain the entity identifier of the participating entities; wherein, the participating entities include at least the cargo owner, carrier, warehousing party, auditor, regulator, insurer, and the minimum necessary entity; Based on the ownership basis and the identification of the participating entities, the ownership metadata of each field group is generated and summarized into the ownership metadata of the logistics data object; wherein, the ownership metadata includes at least: object identifier, ownership entity identifier, current holding entity identifier, contributing entity identifier, summary of the basis for rights and digital signature.

[0008] In one feasible implementation, an ODRL root policy is generated based on the rights confirmation metadata and preset business rules. The ODRL root policy is then mapped to field groups to generate one or more ECC-CPABE access policies, specifically including: The ODRL root policy is generated by describing the rights confirmation metadata and the preset business usage rules using the Open Digital Rights Language (ODRL); wherein the ODRL root policy is of type Offer or Set. The ODRL root policy is mapped to each field group to generate one or more field group-level ECC-CPABE access policies; wherein the ECC-CPABE access policy includes one or more of the following attributes: subject role, organization type, region, order number, batch number, case number, audit stage, time range, and purpose.

[0009] In one feasible implementation, the plaintext of each field group is encrypted separately using a symmetric encryption algorithm to obtain the ciphertext of the field group, specifically including: The plaintext content of each field group is symmetrically encrypted using a symmetric encryption algorithm. The key used in the encrypted field group is encrypted and encapsulated using the ECC-CPABE hybrid encryption method; Extract cryptographically executable decryption conditions from the preset ODRL rules, and convert the decryption conditions into attribute expressions that can be recognized by the ECC-CPABE hybrid encryption algorithm; wherein, the decryption conditions include at least the subject role, purpose, region, case number, and time window.

[0010] In one feasible implementation, in response to a data access triggering event, deriving a child token based on the root token specifically includes: Upon receiving a user's data access request, a data access trigger event is generated, and the access subject information is extracted; Based on the access subject information, a corresponding sub-token is derived from the root token; wherein, the sub-token contains the access subject identifier, the range of allowed field groups, access constraints, and the corresponding ECC-CPABE access policy; the sub-ODRL policy in the sub-token is of type Agreement, and references the parent policy identifier through the inheritFrom attribute; The sub-token supports pre-authorization mode, event-triggered mode, and application approval mode.

[0011] In one feasible implementation, the access subject is verified based on the sub-token. Upon successful verification, the key for the corresponding field group is released, and partial decryption of the corresponding field group is completed. Specifically, this includes: Based on the access subject identifier in the sub-token, obtain the access subject's identity credential; wherein, the access subject's identity credential includes a decentralized identifier (DID) and a verifiable credential (VC); The identity credentials of the access subject are verified; wherein the verification items for the identity credentials include at least: verification of the identifier resolution and verification method, verification of the signature validity, verification of the credential validity period, and verification of the credential revocation / suspension status; Based on the allowed field group range, access constraints, and corresponding ECC-CPABE access policies in the sub-token, verify the matching relationship between the root token rule constraints, the valid status of the sub-token, and the ECC-CPABE access policies. After all verifications pass, the symmetric encryption key for the corresponding field group is released, completing the partial decryption of the field group.

[0012] In one feasible implementation, after verifying the access subject based on the sub-token, releasing the key of the corresponding field group after successful verification, and completing the partial decryption of the corresponding field group, the method further includes: The token issuance information, access verification results, decryption execution information, and permission expiration events are written into the blockchain audit ledger to form an audit evidence chain. The blockchain audit ledger is a consortium blockchain, and the plaintext of the field group and the plaintext key of the field group are not stored on the blockchain. The audit evidence chain specifically includes the following data: root token digest, sub-token digest, ownership confirmation metadata digest, field ciphertext reference digest, access conclusion, access purpose, field group range, and digital signature.

[0013] On the other hand, embodiments of the present invention also provide a cold chain logistics data boundary rights system based on a permissioned token ring, the system comprising: The field grouping module is used to encapsulate cold chain logistics data into logistics data objects and divide the logistics data objects into multiple field groups. The rights confirmation module is used to generate rights confirmation metadata associated with the logistics data object based on the ownership basis of each field group and the identifier of the participating entity; The strategy generation module is used to generate an ODRL root policy based on the rights confirmation metadata and preset business rules, and to map the ODRL root policy to field groups to generate one or more ECC-CPABE access policies. The encryption and evidence storage module is used to encrypt the plaintext of each field group using a symmetric encryption algorithm to obtain the ciphertext of the field group; and to generate a root token bound to the logistics data object and store it on the blockchain based on the rights confirmation metadata, the ODRL root policy, the ECC-CPABE access policy and the ciphertext of the field group. The access verification module is used to respond to a data access trigger event, derive a sub-token based on the root token, verify the access subject according to the sub-token, and release the key of the corresponding field group after the verification is successful, thus completing the partial decryption of the corresponding field group.

[0014] In one feasible implementation, the system further includes: The audit module is used to write token issuance information, access verification results, decryption execution information, and permission expiration events into the blockchain audit ledger to form an audit evidence chain. The blockchain audit ledger is a consortium blockchain, and the plaintext of the field group and the plaintext key of the field group are not stored on the blockchain. The audit evidence chain specifically includes the following data: root token digest, sub-token digest, ownership confirmation metadata digest, field ciphertext reference digest, access conclusion, access purpose, field group range, and digital signature.

[0015] Compared with the prior art, the cold chain logistics data boundary rights method and system based on the permission token ring provided by the embodiments of the present invention has the following beneficial effects: This invention clarifies the ownership, holding, and contribution rights of each field group and the basis of those rights through independent ownership metadata. It also encapsulates the ownership summary, ODRL root policy, and ciphertext reference into a root token, enabling the ciphertext to be traced back to a clear source of rights and global boundary rules throughout its entire lifecycle of cross-subject and cross-scenario data transfer. This fundamentally solves the problems of lost ownership information and blurred boundaries during data transfer.

[0016] Meanwhile, cold chain logistics data is divided into multiple independent field groups according to sensitivity level, business attributes, and access scope. Each field group is encrypted with an independent symmetric key and has an independent access policy and authorization rules. During access, only the decryption key of the field group within the authorized scope is released, realizing on-demand disclosure and minimum availability. While meeting the needs of business collaboration and supervision, it minimizes the exposure of sensitive data, especially suitable for the hierarchical protection needs of personal privacy, temperature control sensor data, and claims information in the cold chain.

[0017] Finally, this invention writes the summary information of the entire lifecycle events, such as root token issuance, sub-token issuance, access verification, decryption execution, and token revocation / expiration, into the consortium blockchain, forming a continuous chain of evidence that includes object identifier, token level, policy reference, field range, access subject, access conclusion, timestamp, and digital signature. At the same time, only the summary and evidence information are stored on the chain, without uploading plaintext data and keys, which balances audit traceability and data confidentiality, and can directly support regulatory verification, dispute evidence collection, and liability determination. Attached Figure Description

[0018] To more clearly illustrate the technical solutions in the embodiments of the present invention or the prior art, the drawings used in the description of the embodiments or the prior art will be briefly introduced below. Obviously, the drawings described below are only some embodiments recorded in the present invention. For those skilled in the art, other drawings can be obtained based on these drawings without creative effort. In the drawings: Figure 1 A flowchart of a cold chain logistics data boundary rights method based on a permission token ring provided in an embodiment of the present invention; Figure 2 This is a schematic diagram of the structure of a cold chain logistics data boundary rights method system based on a permission token ring, provided in an embodiment of the present invention. Detailed Implementation

[0019] To enable those skilled in the art to better understand the technical solutions of this invention, the technical solutions of the embodiments of this invention will be clearly and completely described below with reference to the accompanying drawings. Obviously, the described embodiments are only some embodiments of this invention, and not all embodiments. Based on the embodiments of this specification, all other embodiments obtained by those skilled in the art without creative effort should fall within the scope of protection of this invention.

[0020] This invention provides a method for defining data boundaries in cold chain logistics based on a permissioned token ring, such as... Figure 1 As shown, the data boundary rights method for cold chain logistics based on the permission token ring specifically includes steps S101-S106: S101. Encapsulate cold chain logistics data into logistics data objects, and divide the logistics data objects into fields to obtain multiple field groups.

[0021] Specifically, the cold chain logistics data that needs to be stored is first obtained, and the cold chain logistics data is constructed into a logistics data object according to the preset fields, and a unique object identifier is generated for the logistics data object; among them, the preset fields include at least: waybill number, order number, goods type, origin and destination, loading time, arrival time, transportation trajectory and inbound and outbound events.

[0022] Furthermore, based on the sensitivity level, business purpose, and typical access subject range of each preset field, the fields in the logistics data object are divided into multiple field groups; among them, the divided field groups include at least: basic logistics group, tracking event group, cold chain sensing group, claims processing group, audit evidence group, and contact privacy group.

[0023] This invention divides cold chain logistics data into multiple independent field groups according to sensitivity level, business attributes, and access scope. Each field group is encrypted with an independent symmetric key and has a corresponding independent access policy and authorization rules. During access, only the decryption key of the field group within the authorized scope is released, realizing on-demand disclosure and minimum availability. While meeting the needs of business collaboration and supervision, it minimizes the exposure scope of sensitive data, and is particularly suitable for the hierarchical protection needs of personal privacy, temperature control sensor data, and claims information in the cold chain.

[0024] In one embodiment, LDO-001 is a logistics data object corresponding to all transportation data of a shipment of temperature-controlled goods from the shipping warehouse to the cold storage and then to the store. Its original fields may include: waybill number, order number, goods type, origin and destination, loading / arrival time, GPS trajectory, warehouse entry and exit events, sensor device identifier, temperature and humidity sequence, anomaly alarm, claim case number, driver contact information, carrier signature information, audit signature information, etc. Then, according to the sensitivity level, business purpose and typical access subject scope of each field, the fields in LDO-001 are divided into multiple field groups. Table 1 shows a specific division example.

[0025] Table 1. Example of field grouping

[0026] S102. Generate ownership metadata associated with the logistics data object based on the ownership basis and the identification of the participating entities in each field group.

[0027] Specifically, obtain the ownership basis and participating entities for each field in each field group, and obtain the entity identifier of the participating entities; among them, the participating entities include at least the cargo owner, carrier, warehousing party, auditor, regulator, insurer, and the minimum necessary entity.

[0028] Furthermore, based on the basis of ownership and the identifier of the participating entity, the ownership metadata of each field group is generated and summarized into ownership metadata of the logistics data object; among which, the ownership metadata includes at least: object identifier, ownership entity identifier, current holding entity identifier, contributing entity identifier, summary of the basis of rights and digital signature.

[0029] As a feasible implementation method, the subject identifier is represented by DID and verifiable credential VC. The DID document can carry the verification method, declaration method and key negotiation information, and the VC can express the validity period and status, which are used for subsequent sub-token derivation and access verification.

[0030] S103. Generate ODRL root policy based on the rights confirmation metadata and preset business rules, and map the ODRL root policy to the field group to generate one or more ECC-CPABE access policies.

[0031] Specifically, the ODRL root policy is generated by describing the rights confirmation metadata and the preset business usage rules through the Open Digital Rights Language (ODRL); the ODRL root policy is of type Offer or Set.

[0032] Furthermore, the ODRL root policy is mapped to each field group to generate one or more field group-level ECC-CPABE access policies; wherein, the ECC-CPABE access policy includes one or more of the following attributes: subject role, organization type, region, order number, batch number, case number, audit stage, time range, and purpose.

[0033] As a feasible implementation method, this invention preferably models the ODRL root policy in the root token as an Offer type or a Set type. Specifically, the ODRL Offer root policy refers to proposing permission conditions, indicating that the data owner proposes overall usage rules but has not yet authorized specific entities. The ODRL Offer root policy is proposed by the assigner, but does not directly grant permissions to unknown entities. If only the set of rules needs to be expressed without emphasizing the assigner, the Set policy can also be used. The ECC-CPABE access policy is a Ciphertext-Policy ABE (CP-ABE) scheme that optimizes the underlying operations using Elliptic Curve Cryptography (ECC). Its core access policy is still a logical expression embedded in the ciphertext; data can only be restored when the decryptor's attribute set satisfies this logic.

[0034] S104. Encrypt the plaintext of each field group using a symmetric encryption algorithm to obtain the ciphertext of the field group.

[0035] Specifically, the plaintext content of each field group is symmetrically encrypted using a symmetric encryption algorithm. The key used to encrypt the field group is then encrypted and encapsulated using a hybrid ECC-CPABE encryption method.

[0036] Furthermore, decryption conditions that can be executed cryptographically are extracted from the preset ODRL rules, and the decryption conditions are converted into attribute expressions that can be recognized by the ECC-CPABE hybrid encryption algorithm; wherein, the decryption conditions include at least the subject role, purpose, region, case number and time window.

[0037] As a feasible implementation method, this invention does not directly encrypt large volumes of raw data in plaintext for cryptographic execution. Instead, it employs a hybrid approach of field group symmetric encryption and field group key encapsulation. The computational overhead of the ciphertext policy attribute-based encryption (CP-ABE) algorithm increases with the complexity of the access policy, while cold chain event data, temperature curves, sensor records, and attachment logs are often quite large. Therefore, this invention uses symmetric algorithms such as AES-GCM to efficiently generate field group ciphertext, while ECC-CPABE is only responsible for encapsulating the field group key and binding the decryption conditions to the attribute expressions mapped from the ODRL rules. This binding involves first extracting the cryptographically executable conditions from the ODRL rules, such as subject role, purpose, region, case number, and time window, and then converting them into attribute expressions that ECC-CPABE can recognize.

[0038] S105. Based on the ownership metadata, ODRL root policy, ECC-CPABE access policy, and field group ciphertext, generate a root token bound to the logistics data object and store it on the blockchain.

[0039] S106. In response to the data access trigger event, derive a sub-token based on the root token; verify the access subject according to the sub-token, and release the key of the corresponding field group after the verification is successful, thus completing the partial decryption of the corresponding field group.

[0040] Specifically, upon receiving a user's data access request, a data access trigger event is generated, and the access subject information is extracted. Based on the access subject information, a corresponding sub-token is derived from the root token; the sub-token contains the access subject identifier, the range of allowed field groups, access constraints, and the corresponding ECC-CPABE access policy; the sub-ODRL policy in the sub-token is of type Agreement, and references the parent policy identifier through the inheritFrom attribute.

[0041] As a feasible implementation method, sub-tokens support pre-authorization mode, event-triggered mode, and application approval mode. Pre-authorization mode refers to issuing sub-tokens in advance to known entities such as carriers and warehouse operators according to a predetermined business plan before the cold chain transportation process begins. Event-triggered mode refers to automatically generating corresponding sub-tokens based on the event context when the system detects events such as temperature exceeding limits, cargo damage alarms, claims filing, or regulatory inspections. Application approval mode refers to issuing sub-tokens with restricted access scope after verifying the DID / VC and root token boundaries of an access request submitted by an external auditor or third-party service provider.

[0042] In a sub-token, the ODRL sub-policy is preferably modeled as an Agreement type, indicating that the authorizer has granted access rights to a specific subject. The subject must be both an authorizer and an authorized party, and can inherit rules from the parent policy through the inheritFrom function.

[0043] Further, based on the access subject identifier in the sub-token, the access subject's identity credentials are obtained; wherein, the access subject's identity credentials include a decentralized identifier (DID) and a verifiable credential (VC). The access subject's identity credentials are verified; wherein, the verification items for the identity credentials include at least: identifier resolution and verification method verification, signature validity verification, credential validity period verification, and credential revocation / suspension status verification.

[0044] Furthermore, based on the allowed field group range, access constraints, and corresponding ECC-CPABE access policies in the sub-token, the matching relationship between the root token rule constraints, the sub-token validity status, and the ECC-CPABE access policies is verified. After all verifications pass, the symmetric encryption key for the corresponding field group is released, completing the partial decryption of the field group.

[0045] As a feasible implementation method, this invention preferably uses DID as the subject identifier and VC / VP as the access qualification certificate for identity and status verification. The DID document can express the verification method, authentication, declaration, and key negotiation materials; the VC can express the issuer, holder identification, and validity period. Therefore, this invention refines the "existing subject" into a truly verifiable subject capable of parsing the DID, verifying its signature relationship, checking its VC status (unrevoked / unsuspended), and satisfying the role and context attributes required by the sub-token. This makes the sub-token a concrete access credential, not just a post-audit label. An "existing subject" refers to a subject identifier that simply appears in the system, such as a userId or DID string. It only indicates that someone claims to be this subject, but does not prove that the subject is genuine and trustworthy. This paper further refines it into a truly verifiable subject, which must be able to parse the DID, verify the signature, check the validity and revocation status of the VC credential, and satisfy the context attributes such as role, purpose, region, and case number required by the sub-token. In this way, the sub-token is not bound to a simple subject name, but to an access subject verified by identity, qualifications, and status, serving as a true access credential, not just a label in the audit record.

[0046] Furthermore, token issuance information, access verification results, decryption execution information, and permission expiration events are written into the blockchain audit ledger to form an audit evidence chain. The blockchain audit ledger is a consortium blockchain, and the plaintext of the field group and its key are not stored on the blockchain. The audit evidence chain specifically includes the following data: root token digest, child token digest, authorization metadata digest, field encrypted reference digest, access conclusion, access purpose, field group range, and digital signature.

[0047] As a feasible implementation method, in on-chain auditing, the consortium blockchain only records summaries, citations, and evidence, without recording plaintext content and plaintext keys. The blockchain is described as an append-only, tamper-resistant ledger of evidence, emphasizing its more accurate properties as tamper-evident and tamper-resistant, rather than absolutely immutable. Accordingly, this invention writes the root token digest, child token digest, ownership metadata digest, field ciphertext citation digest, access conclusion, purpose, field group range, and signature onto the chain to obtain a continuous chain of evidence; simultaneously, it leverages the integrity and non-repudiation of digital signatures to enhance post-event accountability.

[0048] In addition, embodiments of the present invention also provide a cold chain logistics data boundary rights system based on a permissioned token ring, such as... Figure 2 As shown, the cold chain logistics data boundary rights system 200 based on the permission token ring specifically includes: The field grouping module 210 is used to encapsulate cold chain logistics data into logistics data objects and divide the logistics data objects into fields to obtain multiple field groups. The rights confirmation module 220 is used to generate rights confirmation metadata associated with the logistics data object based on the rights ownership basis and the identification of the participating entities in each field group; The strategy generation module 230 is used to generate an ODRL root policy based on the rights confirmation metadata and preset business rules, and to map the ODRL root policy to a field group to generate one or more ECC-CPABE access policies. The encryption and evidence storage module 240 is used to encrypt the plaintext of each field group using a symmetric encryption algorithm to obtain the ciphertext of the field group; and to generate a root token bound to the logistics data object and store it on the blockchain based on the rights confirmation metadata, the ODRL root policy, the ECC-CPABE access policy and the ciphertext of the field group. The access verification module 250 is used to respond to a data access trigger event, derive a sub-token based on the root token, verify the access subject according to the sub-token, and release the key of the corresponding field group after the verification is successful, thereby completing the partial decryption of the corresponding field group.

[0049] As a feasible implementation, the system further includes: an audit module, used to write token issuance information, access verification results, decryption execution information, and permission expiration events into the blockchain audit ledger to form an audit evidence chain; wherein, the blockchain audit ledger is a consortium blockchain, and the plaintext of the field group and the plaintext key of the field group are not stored on the blockchain; the audit evidence chain specifically includes the following data: root token digest, sub-token digest, authorization metadata digest, field ciphertext reference digest, access conclusion, access purpose, field group range, and digital signature.

[0050] The various embodiments in this invention are described in a progressive manner. Similar or identical parts between embodiments can be referred to mutually. Each embodiment focuses on describing the differences from other embodiments. In particular, the embodiments of apparatus, devices, and non-volatile computer storage media are basically similar to the method embodiments, so the descriptions are relatively simple; relevant parts can be referred to the descriptions of the method embodiments.

[0051] The foregoing has described specific embodiments of the present invention. Furthermore, the processes depicted in the drawings do not necessarily require a specific or sequential order to achieve the desired results. In some embodiments, multitasking and parallel processing are possible or may be advantageous.

[0052] The above description is merely an embodiment of the present invention and is not intended to limit the present invention. For those skilled in the art, various modifications and variations can be made to the embodiments of the present invention. Any modifications, equivalent substitutions, improvements, etc., made within the spirit and principle of the embodiments of the present invention should be included within the protection scope of the present invention.

Claims

1. A data delimitation method for cold chain logistics based on a permissioned token ring, characterized in that, The method includes: Cold chain logistics data is encapsulated into logistics data objects, and the logistics data objects are divided into fields to obtain multiple field groups; Based on the ownership basis and participating entity identifier of each field group, generate ownership metadata associated with the logistics data object; Based on the confirmed metadata and preset business rules, an ODRL root policy is generated, and the ODRL root policy is mapped to a field group to generate one or more ECC-CPABE access policies. The plaintext of each field group is encrypted using a symmetric encryption algorithm to obtain the ciphertext of the field group. Based on the ownership confirmation metadata, the ODRL root policy, the ECC-CPABE access policy, and the field group ciphertext, a root token bound to the logistics data object is generated and stored on the blockchain. In response to a data access trigger event, a sub-token is derived based on the root token; the access subject is verified according to the sub-token, and the key of the corresponding field group is released after the verification is successful, thus completing the partial decryption of the corresponding field group.

2. The cold chain logistics data boundary method based on a permissioned token ring according to claim 1, characterized in that, Cold chain logistics data is encapsulated into logistics data objects, and these logistics data objects are then divided into multiple field groups, specifically including: Acquire the cold chain logistics data that needs to be stored, construct the cold chain logistics data into a logistics data object according to preset fields, and generate a unique object identifier for the logistics data object; wherein, the preset fields include at least: waybill number, order number, goods type, origin and destination, loading time, arrival time, transportation trajectory and inbound / outbound events; Based on the sensitivity level, business purpose, and typical access subject range of each preset field, the fields in the logistics data object are divided into multiple field groups; among them, the divided field groups include at least: basic logistics group, tracking event group, cold chain sensing group, claims processing group, audit evidence group, and contact privacy group.

3. The cold chain logistics data boundary method based on a permissioned token ring according to claim 2, characterized in that, Based on the ownership criteria and participating entity identifiers of each field group, ownership metadata associated with the logistics data object is generated, specifically including: Obtain the ownership basis and participating entities for each field in each field group, and obtain the entity identifier of the participating entities; wherein, the participating entities include at least the cargo owner, carrier, warehousing party, auditor, regulator, insurer, and the minimum necessary entity; Based on the ownership basis and the identification of the participating entities, the ownership metadata of each field group is generated and summarized into the ownership metadata of the logistics data object; wherein, the ownership metadata includes at least: object identifier, ownership entity identifier, current holding entity identifier, contributing entity identifier, summary of the basis for rights and digital signature.

4. The cold chain logistics data boundary method based on a permissioned token ring according to claim 1, characterized in that, Based on the aforementioned rights confirmation metadata and preset business rules, an ODRL root policy is generated. This ODRL root policy is then mapped to field groups to generate one or more ECC-CPABE access policies, specifically including: The ODRL root policy is generated by describing the rights confirmation metadata and the preset business usage rules using the Open Digital Rights Language (ODRL); wherein the ODRL root policy is of type Offer or Set. The ODRL root policy is mapped to each field group to generate one or more field group-level ECC-CPABE access policies; wherein the ECC-CPABE access policy includes one or more of the following attributes: subject role, organization type, region, order number, batch number, case number, audit stage, time range, and purpose.

5. The cold chain logistics data boundary method based on a permissioned token ring according to claim 1, characterized in that, The plaintext of each field group is encrypted using a symmetric encryption algorithm to obtain the ciphertext of the field group, specifically including: The plaintext content of each field group is symmetrically encrypted using a symmetric encryption algorithm. The key used in the encrypted field group is encrypted and encapsulated using the ECC-CPABE hybrid encryption method; Extract cryptographically executable decryption conditions from the preset ODRL rules, and convert the decryption conditions into attribute expressions that can be recognized by the ECC-CPABE hybrid encryption algorithm; wherein, the decryption conditions include at least the subject role, purpose, region, case number, and time window.

6. The cold chain logistics data boundary method based on a permissioned token ring according to claim 1, characterized in that, In response to a data access trigger event, child tokens are derived based on the root token, specifically including: Upon receiving a user's data access request, a data access trigger event is generated, and the access subject information is extracted; Based on the access subject information, a corresponding sub-token is derived from the root token; wherein, the sub-token contains the access subject identifier, the range of allowed field groups, access constraints, and the corresponding ECC-CPABE access policy; the sub-ODRL policy in the sub-token is of type Agreement, and references the parent policy identifier through the inheritFrom attribute; The sub-token supports pre-authorization mode, event-triggered mode, and application approval mode.

7. A method for defining data boundaries in cold chain logistics based on a permissioned token ring according to claim 6, characterized in that, The access subject is verified based on the sub-token. Upon successful verification, the key for the corresponding field group is released, and partial decryption of the corresponding field group is completed, specifically including: Based on the access subject identifier in the sub-token, obtain the access subject's identity credential; wherein, the access subject's identity credential includes a decentralized identifier (DID) and a verifiable credential (VC); The identity credentials of the access subject are verified; wherein the verification items for the identity credentials include at least: verification of the identifier resolution and verification method, verification of the signature validity, verification of the credential validity period, and verification of the credential revocation / suspension status; Based on the allowed field group range, access constraints, and corresponding ECC-CPABE access policies in the sub-token, verify the matching relationship between the root token rule constraints, the valid status of the sub-token, and the ECC-CPABE access policies. After all verifications pass, the symmetric encryption key for the corresponding field group is released, completing the partial decryption of the field group.

8. A method for defining data boundaries in cold chain logistics based on a permissioned token ring according to claim 1, characterized in that, After verifying the access subject based on the sub-token, releasing the key of the corresponding field group after successful verification, and completing the partial decryption of the corresponding field group, the method further includes: The token issuance information, access verification results, decryption execution information, and permission expiration events are written into the blockchain audit ledger to form an audit evidence chain. The blockchain audit ledger is a consortium blockchain, and the plaintext of the field group and the plaintext key of the field group are not stored on the blockchain. The audit evidence chain specifically includes the following data: root token digest, sub-token digest, ownership confirmation metadata digest, field ciphertext reference digest, access conclusion, access purpose, field group range, and digital signature.

9. A cold chain logistics data boundary rights system based on a permissioned token ring, characterized in that, The system includes: The field grouping module is used to encapsulate cold chain logistics data into logistics data objects and divide the logistics data objects into multiple field groups. The rights confirmation module is used to generate rights confirmation metadata associated with the logistics data object based on the ownership basis of each field group and the identifier of the participating entity; The strategy generation module is used to generate an ODRL root policy based on the rights confirmation metadata and preset business rules, and to map the ODRL root policy to field groups to generate one or more ECC-CPABE access policies. The encryption and evidence storage module is used to encrypt the plaintext of each field group using a symmetric encryption algorithm to obtain the ciphertext of the field group; and to generate a root token bound to the logistics data object and store it on the blockchain based on the rights confirmation metadata, the ODRL root policy, the ECC-CPABE access policy and the ciphertext of the field group. The access verification module is used to respond to a data access trigger event, derive a sub-token based on the root token, verify the access subject according to the sub-token, and release the key of the corresponding field group after the verification is successful, thus completing the partial decryption of the corresponding field group.

10. A cold chain logistics data boundary rights system based on a permissioned token ring according to claim 9, characterized in that, The system also includes: The audit module is used to write token issuance information, access verification results, decryption execution information, and permission expiration events into the blockchain audit ledger to form an audit evidence chain; The blockchain audit ledger is a consortium blockchain, and the plaintext of the field group and the plaintext key of the field group are not stored on the blockchain. The audit evidence chain specifically includes the following data: root token digest, sub-token digest, ownership confirmation metadata digest, field ciphertext reference digest, access conclusion, access purpose, field group range, and digital signature.

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