A multi-party data privacy aggregation method in a vehicle internet

Abstract

The application relates to a multi-party data secret aggregation method in Internet of Vehicles, and relates to a multi-party data secret aggregation method in Internet of Vehicles. In order to solve the problems that the existing secret data aggregation has high calculation overhead, many communication rounds and both cannot be considered, the application is based on a threshold NTRU encryption algorithm and a new coding method, and a multi-party data secret aggregation protocol suitable for Internet of Vehicles is provided. Further, aiming at the cheating behaviors that may be implemented by malicious participants, a fraud prevention protocol is designed, which can detect and prevent the submission of false data in the key link. The two protocols can calculate the statistical indicators (total number, sum, average, maximum, minimum, median, variance and standard deviation) of the multi-party vehicle data at one time, and support on-demand output of partial results. Through simulation examples, it is proved that the protocol can resist n-1 conspiracy attacks. Performance analysis and experimental tests show that the protocol is superior to the existing scheme in calculation and communication efficiency, and is especially suitable for the high dynamics and real-time requirements of Internet of Vehicles.

Description

Technical Field

[0001] This invention relates to a method for secure aggregation of multi-party data in the Internet of Vehicles. Background Technology

[0002] The Internet of Vehicles (IoV) enables functions such as traffic flow optimization, collision warning, and route planning through real-time communication between vehicles (V2V) and between vehicles and infrastructure (V2I). In this process, vehicles need to share multi-dimensional information such as location, speed, and sensor data. However, if raw data is directly transmitted to a central server or third-party platform, it may lead to user privacy leaks. For example, trajectory data could be used to infer the owner's identity or lifestyle, posing significant security risks. Therefore, how to effectively aggregate multi-party vehicle data while protecting data privacy has become a key challenge in the field of IoV.

[0003] Secure Multi-Party Computation (MPC) provides a theoretical framework for addressing the aforementioned problems, allowing multiple parties to collaboratively compute an objective function without disclosing their individual data. In recent years, MPC technology has been gradually applied to connected vehicle (V2V) scenarios, such as privacy-preserving traffic flow statistics and collaborative perception. However, existing solutions largely focus on calculating single statistical indicators (such as summation or extreme values), which is insufficient to meet the V2V's need for multi-dimensional data analysis. Furthermore, the dynamic topology of V2V and the resource-constrained vehicle terminals place higher demands on the real-time performance and computational overhead of protocols.

[0004] The development of MPC began in the 1980s, based on the pioneering theories of Professor Yao Qizhi, and gradually expanded to include technologies such as secret sharing and obfuscated circuits. After optimization and practical exploration from the 1990s to the 2000s, the computational efficiency of MPC gradually improved, and it entered the practical application stage in the 2010s, being widely used in finance, healthcare, and other fields [6-8]. In recent years, the combination of MPC technology with other privacy protection technologies has further improved its performance and scalability, promoting its application in scenarios such as big data and joint machine learning.

[0005] In recent years, many scholars have conducted research on confidential data aggregation and achieved some results. However, current solutions generally suffer from high computational, communication and storage overhead, making them unsuitable for vehicle-to-everything (V2X) networks. Summary of the Invention

[0006] This invention aims to address the problems of high computational overhead, numerous communication rounds, and the inability to simultaneously achieve both in existing confidential data aggregation methods.

[0007] A method for secure aggregation of multi-party data in vehicle-to-everything (V2X) networks, employing a threshold-based NTRU encryption system, allows each participant to obtain parameters. and public key Participants Obtain the sub-secrets respectively ;NTRU encryption system for large prime numbers, It is a prime number; the confidential aggregation method includes: (1) Each of their own data sets Encoded as dimensional vector ;where a and b Participants Agreed set The range of values; (2) Select random polynomials respectively and apply the threshold NTRU encryption system to The elements in Encrypt And thus obtain Participants Separately ciphertext vectors Send to ; (3) All of constitute a ciphertext matrix , ciphertext vector Corresponding to The Order; command , calculate Announcement ; (4) Record The columns from left to right are respectively the first... List, Columns, ... Columns, Participants Calculate separately ; ; (5) Select each a random polynomial Using a threshold NTRU encryption system Encryption ,Then Construct ciphertext vectors respectively , ; (6) All of constitute a ciphertext matrix , ciphertext vector Corresponding to The OK; ; (7) All participants Using their respective sub-secrets joint against Each element in Decryption is performed; ultimately, all participants receive the plaintext data. ; (8) according to elements in and the corresponding random polynomial selected in step (5) To calculate your own data In the ascending union set The first appearance of the position in the middle ; (9) , In a number of encrypted elements, if , , , ; ; (10) ; ; Calculate and publish , and / or ; (11) All participants Using their respective sub-secrets joint against , and / or , and / or After decryption, each participant ultimately obtains the corresponding plaintext data.

[0008] (11) All participants Using their respective sub-secrets joint against , and / or , and / or After decryption, each participant ultimately obtains the corresponding plaintext data.

[0009] Furthermore, the method also includes: In step (10) Also calculated and published , Participants in step (11) Also to Decrypt to obtain the corresponding plaintext data; if 1, Separately ,if , Separately .

[0010] (12) Calculate separately ; According to respectively and its own data set The various data in calculate , The number of elements contained; Each Send to participants ; (13) ; (14) .

[0011] A method for secure aggregation of multi-party data in vehicle-to-everything (V2X) networks, employing a threshold-based NTRU encryption system, allows each participant to obtain parameters. and public key Participants Obtain the sub-secrets respectively ;NTRU encryption system for large prime numbers, and It is a prime number; the confidential aggregation method includes: (1) Each of their own data sets Encoded as dimensional vector ; in the middle, a and b are Participants Agreed set The range of values; (2) Select random polynomials respectively And use the threshold NTRU encryption system to The elements in Encrypt And thus we obtain... ; Calculate separately Participants Separately ciphertext vectors Send to , ; (3) Using public key verify If the verification is successful, continue. This represents the modulo operation. This is the highest power term of the polynomial in threshold NTRU encryption; All of constitute a ciphertext matrix , ciphertext vector Corresponding to The Order; command , calculate , announcement and ; (4) Record The columns from left to right are respectively the first... : , , (5) Select each a random polynomial Using a threshold NTRU encryption system Encryption , Construct ciphertext vectors respectively , ,make ; ; (6) All of constitute a ciphertext matrix , ciphertext vector Corresponding The OK; To other participants Announcement ; (7) All participants Using their respective sub-secrets joint against Each element in Decryption is performed; ultimately, all participants receive the plaintext data. and plaintext matrix ; (8) according to elements in and the corresponding random polynomial selected in step (5) To calculate your own data In the ascending union set The first appearance of the position in the middle ; Data Possession The position is from ; (9) Construct one respectively dimensional vector , In a number of encrypted elements, if ; ,in For encryption Or the random polynomial chosen when encrypting "0"; Each Send to participants ; (10) Using public key verify If the verification is successful, proceed. All of constitute a ciphertext matrix , ciphertext vector Corresponding to The OK; Construct a vector , Calculate and publish ; ; (11) Verify separately If the verification is successful, continue. ; All participants Using their respective sub-secrets joint against ,as well as and / or After decryption, each participant ultimately obtains the corresponding plaintext data.

[0012] Furthermore, the method also includes: In step (11) Also calculated and published , Participants Also to Decrypt to obtain the corresponding plaintext data; if Separately .

[0013] (12) Calculate separately According to respectively and its own data set The various data in calculate for The number of elements contained; Each Send to participants ; (13) ; (14) .

[0014] Beneficial effects: This invention addresses the issues of computational overhead and the number of communication rounds, significantly reducing the number of communication rounds while maintaining low computational overhead. Furthermore, this invention offers high privacy and security, particularly the scheme of Protocol 2. The ciphertext obtained after encrypting the private data of each participant can only be decrypted jointly by all participants. Even if all members of the member set collude, they cannot decrypt any of the ciphertext generated during protocol execution, demonstrating the high security of this invention. Moreover, this invention can aggregate all confidential computational content as needed. Attached Figure Description

[0015] Figure 1 This is a simulation diagram of Protocol 1 of the present invention.

[0016] Figure 2 This is a simulation diagram of Protocol 2 of the present invention.

[0017] Figure 3 This is a graph showing the trend of the protocol's runtime as m changes.

[0018] Figure 4 The graph shows the trend of communication delay time of the protocol as a function of m.

[0019] Figure 5 This is a graph showing the trend of the protocol's runtime as n changes.

[0020] Figure 6This is a graph showing the communication delay time of the protocol as a function of n.

[0021] Figure 7 This is a graph showing the trend of the protocol's runtime as a function of c.

[0022] Figure 8 The graph shows the trend of communication delay time of the protocol as a function of c. Detailed Implementation

[0023] This invention proposes two efficient multi-party data confidentiality aggregation protocols for the Internet of Vehicles (IoV) scenario. Based on the threshold NTRU encryption algorithm, the protocols support one-time calculation of all statistics (Count, Sum, Avg, etc.) of vehicle data, while reducing communication complexity through encoding optimization. To address potential malicious nodes in IoV environments (such as those falsifying traffic data or engaging in collusive attacks), an anti-spoofing protocol is further designed to ensure the verifiability of data submissions. Theoretical proofs and experiments demonstrate that the protocols of this invention significantly improve the efficiency and robustness of data aggregation in the IoV environment while ensuring privacy and security.

[0024] The main contributions of this invention are as follows: (1) This invention is designed for the Internet of Vehicles scenario. It combines the threshold NTRU encryption algorithm and a novel coding method to propose a protocol that can keep the data of multiple participants confidential at one time, including counting, summing, average, maximum, minimum, median, variance and standard deviation (hereinafter referred to as the multi-party data confidential aggregation protocol in the Internet of Vehicles). With slight modifications, it can also output only one or several results.

[0025] (2) In response to the potential malicious nodes in the Internet of Vehicles (such as forged traffic data or collusive attacks), the above protocol has been optimized and a deception-resistant protocol (hereinafter referred to as the anti-deception multi-party data confidentiality aggregation protocol) has been proposed, which can detect or prevent participants from engaging in deceptive behavior at key stages.

[0026] (3) Correctness analysis and security verification were performed on the two protocols mentioned above, and both protocols are resistant to collusion attacks. Through performance analysis, experimental testing, and comparison with existing related solutions, the high efficiency of the two protocols of this invention was verified. Under the premise of ensuring privacy and security, the protocols of this invention significantly improve the efficiency and robustness of data aggregation in the Internet of Vehicles environment.

[0027] The following detailed description is based on specific embodiments. Before proceeding with the detailed description, the knowledge involved in this invention will be explained.

[0028] Threshold NTRU Encryption: The NTRU encryption algorithm is considered strongly related to the shortest vector problem on a computational lattice. It is resistant to quantum attacks and is fast and highly secure. The document "Threshold NTRU Public-Key Encryption Scheme" presents one such scheme. In this scheme, an authorized subset of participants can decrypt the ciphertext, while an unauthorized subset cannot.

[0029] Symbol explanation: Represents a polynomial for dimensional vector .

[0030] Or * indicates general scalar multiplication or multiplication between polynomials. This refers to the multiplication of a vector and a matrix.

[0031] System public parameters: ,in For large prime numbers, It is a prime number. .

[0032] Three modular operations will be used in the encryption and decryption process. , and .in The result refers to taking the polynomial The corresponding bivariate polynomial.

[0033] Private key share distribution process: remember As a trusted password distributor, let the number of participants be . Authorization subset The steps for distributing private key shares are as follows: (1) Selecting group secrets and Calculate the group's public key: .

[0034] (2) Random selection ,in It can be concluded that... 3D matrix, and ,calculate .in , A linear combination of vectors in the vectors.

[0035] (3) Parameters public, and Keep it a secret, keep the child a secret Distributed to participants As its private key share, .

[0036] In the vector space secret sharing scheme It is assumed to be a pre-determined, publicly known mapping. Participant The corresponding public vector; the trusted allocator first selects the group's private key. The first component of the secret vector Then randomly select ,structure Then calculate And secretly distributed to the participants Therefore, in public mapping Once the access structure is determined, Participant The share of the private key. The basis for the child's secrecy lies in several elements of the authorized set. Through coefficients Linear combination recovers the group private key That is, by .

[0037] Encryption: Plaintext The number of times does not exceed A bivariate polynomial, randomly selected no more than 10 times Bivariate polynomial Calculate the ciphertext: .

[0038] Threshold decryption process: (1) In the authorized subset Participants calculate: .

[0039] (2) The members will each calculate Send to the specified plaintext generator .

[0040] (3) In the ring of integers Calculations are performed on the above: .

[0041] (4) calculate ,Will Placed Between, let: .

[0042] (5) calculate Then Placed Between them, there is ciphertext The corresponding plaintext is .

[0043] Semi-honest model and security proof: In a secure multi-party computation protocol under a semi-honest model, participants strictly adhere to each step of the protocol, do not provide false information, do not interrupt the execution of the protocol, and do not collude with other participants to attack the protocol. However, they will record publicly available information in the protocol in order to attempt to deduce information about other participants.

[0044] In secure multi-party computation protocols under a semi-honest model, simulation paradigms are widely accepted methods for proving security. This invention primarily employs simulation paradigms to prove the security of the protocol, specifically demonstrating that the output of the actual protocol execution is indistinguishable from the output of the ideal protocol execution. The simulation paradigm proof model is described below.

[0045] Assume participants Each has a private dataset .

[0046] (1) Let set , It is a probabilistic polynomial time function. For the purpose of secrecy The agreement.

[0047] (2) Execution At that time, I recorded The resulting information sequence is: ,in express The selected random value, express The obtained number One piece of information, express The result obtained.

[0048] (3) Let the set of participants be... ,remember

[0049] Theorem 1 for If for each participant set Existing probabilistic multinomial-time algorithm , so that: , So Confidential computation function . ( (This refers to calculations that are indistinguishable). Specific implementation method one: This embodiment is a method for secure aggregation of multi-party data in the Internet of Vehicles, which is a method for secure aggregation of multi-party data under a semi-honest model.

[0051] Problem description: Participants Each has a data set , of The number of elements contained in Duplicate data is allowed. The participants want to confidentially collaborate on data aggregation operations to calculate the total number of data entries from all participants. ,and ,average value Maximum value Minimum value , median ,variance and standard deviation After the joint computation is completed, each participant can see the results of each computation but cannot access the private data of other participants.

[0052] This invention proposes a solution: (1) Participants Agree on a set , Let be a non-negative integer, such that the data sets of each participant are... All data satisfy For all participants The joint dataset, The data set is sorted in ascending order (if the data...) Repeatedly appearing in Next, this is required indivual The sorting positions are sequentially increasing, occupying a total of Different locations; if multiple participants have data So, the data The sorting position depends on the participants order Increasing.

[0053] (2) : (1) in for All distinct elements in the set, and satisfying The number of times it appears in the text.

[0054] (3) Each participant according to and the complete series Construct a dimensional vector : (2) Among them, if , The subscript 's' represents the variable that satisfies the condition, used to indicate... The elements in; if , ; And so on, if .

[0055] (4) The vectors of all participants constitute a 1-th order matrix , vector Corresponding to The OK:

[0056] (5) Record The columns from left to right are respectively the first... List, Columns, ... Columns, Participants According to respectively Data in ,matrix Equations (3) and (4) are used to calculate In the set The first appearance of the character is in the middle. :

[0057] So Data Possession The position is from arrive .

[0058] calculate :

[0059] (6) Order ,gather Each participant, according to , and one's own The various data in Construct a dimensional vector : (5) In the middle, order If it exists Make Then let Otherwise, This can be represented as...

[0060] (7) The vectors of all participants Composition 1 1-th order matrix , vector Corresponding to The OK:

[0061] Then according to Construct a dimensional vector ,in , .

[0062] (8) According to , calculate

[0063] calculate

[0064] calculate

[0065] calculate

[0066] calculate : (6) (9) Each participant According to respectively and its own data set The various data in Perform the following calculations: (7) in The number of elements contained.

[0067] (10) Calculate ,according to , calculate

[0068] calculate

[0069] Proposition 1: Equations (3) and (4) can correctly calculate the elements of each participant. In the joint data set The ascending sort position in the sequence.

[0070] Proof: Let The columns from left to right are respectively the first... List, . for The dataset is sorted in ascending order. The combined dataset... Rewritten as :

[0071] in For elements Intense number, for a certain , .

[0072] Based on the matrix The way of constructing vectors The sum of all components is Not greater than The sum of the multiplicity of all elements, i.e. .

[0073] (1) Suppose a certain data .when hour, The smallest sorting position in is that is, vector Add 1 to the sum of all components; when The smallest data in the array, and its smallest sorted position is... Therefore, the first equations of (3) and (4) are correct.

[0074] (2) Use mathematical induction to prove the second equation of (3) and the second equation of (4).

[0075] Let a certain data Record the participants Data sets China Data The multiplicity is . The smallest sorting position in is That is, vector The sum of all components Add 1 to the multiplicity in the middle, that is The first component in the column is added From the 2nd to The sum of each component plus 1; when At that time, The smallest sorted position is Add 1 to the multiplicity in the middle, that is The first in the list Add 1 to each component.

[0076] Let a certain data Record the participants Data sets The multiplicity of the data is . hour, The smallest sorting position in is That is, vector The sum of all components is added separately Add 1 to the multiplicity in the middle, that is Before the middle of the column The sum of the components From the first in the column The sum of the components; when At that time, The smallest sorted position is Multiplicity in The sum plus 1, that is From the first in the column To the The sum of the components plus 1.

[0077] Therefore, the second equations of both equations (3) and (4) are correct.

[0078] Proposition 1 is proved.

[0079] Proposition 2: That is correct.

[0080] Proof: According to the encoding rules of equation (2), if ,make Right now The sum of the multiplicity of all elements, that is The sum of the multiplicity of all elements in the set, and The sum of the multiplicity of all elements in the set is . The number of elements in the array.

[0081] Regardless of the participants Is the largest element in the list equal to...? The last component The value is always , can represent The number of elements in the array.

[0082] All participants The last component Add The joint dataset can then be obtained. The total number of data in the data.

[0083] Proposition 2 is proved.

[0084] Example 1 Have a data set Corresponding , Have a data set corresponding , Have a data set Corresponding .Pick .

[0085] (1) Construct a 10-dimensional vector according to equation (2) respectively, and combine the three vectors into a single vector. 1-th order matrix :

[0086] (2) Calculate your own set according to equations (3) and (4) respectively. all elements In the union set The position of ascending sort in As shown in Table 1.

[0087] Table 1 shows the ascending order of each participant's data in the combined set.

[0088] (3) Let ,gather . Construct a 17-dimensional vector according to equation (5) respectively, and combine the three vectors into a single vector. 1-th order matrix :

[0089] but , , , , , .

[0090] (4) Calculate according to equation (7) respectively , , .

[0091] (5) Calculation , , .

[0092] Based on the above problem description and solutions, and combined with the threshold NTRU encryption system, a multi-party confidential data aggregation protocol under a semi-honest model is designed. The simulation diagram of Protocol 1 is shown below. Figure 1 As shown, the specific protocol 1 (multi-party confidential data aggregation protocol under the semi-honest model) is as follows: Input: Participants Private data collection ( The amount of data contained in it.

[0093] Output: Calculation .

[0094] Preparation phase: Run the threshold NTRU encryption system, and each participant obtains the parameters. and public key Participants Obtain the sub-secrets respectively .

[0095] (1) Each of them sets their own data according to equation (2). Encode into a vector :

[0096] (2) Select random polynomials respectively And use the threshold NTRU encryption system to The elements in Encryption is performed to obtain The encryption process is shown in equations (8) and (9): (8) (9) in, , This indicates that the NTRU encryption system with a threshold is used for encryption operations. Separately ciphertext vectors Send to .

[0097] (3) All of constitute a ciphertext matrix , ciphertext vector Corresponding to The OK:

[0098] ①Calculation The ciphertext: make , calculate Announcement .

[0099] (4) Record The columns from left to right are respectively the first... List, Columns, ... Columns, Participants Based on the matrix respectively Equations (10) and (11) are used to calculate : (10) (11) (5) Select each a random polynomial Using a threshold NTRU encryption system Encryption ,Then According to respectively Construct a ciphertext vector using equation (12). : (12) in, ,if ,make ; ,make .

[0100] Each Send to .

[0101] (6) All of constitute a ciphertext matrix , ciphertext vector Corresponding to The OK:

[0102] To other participants Announcement .

[0103] (7) Decryption: All participants Using their respective sub-secrets joint against Each element in Decryption is then performed. Ultimately, all participants receive the plaintext data. and plaintext matrix .

[0104]

[0105] (8) according to elements in and the corresponding random polynomial selected in step (5) above To calculate your own data In the ascending union set The first appearance of the position in the middle : (13) So Data Possession The position is from arrive .

[0106] Each will be constructed according to equation (14). dimensional vector : (14) Of all elements, let , ,⋯, ;make , .

[0107] Each Send to participants .

[0108] (10) All of constitute a ciphertext matrix , ciphertext vector Corresponding to The OK:

[0109] Construct a vector ,in, .

[0110] Perform the following calculations: ②Calculation The ciphertext:

[0111] ③Calculation The ciphertext:

[0112] ④ Calculation The ciphertext:

[0113] ⑤ Calculation The ciphertext: (15) Announcement , , .

[0114] (11) Decryption: All participants Using their respective sub-secrets joint against , , Decryption is then performed. Ultimately, all participants receive the plaintext data. , , .

[0115] ⑥ Calculation : if , Separately ;if , Separately .

[0116] : Separately .

[0117] (12) According to respectively and its own data set The various data in Perform the following calculations: (16) in , The number of elements contained. Each Send to participants .

[0118] (13) to other participants .

[0119] (14) Perform separately: ⑧ Calculation :

[0120] ⑨ Calculation :

[0121] Agreement 1 is now complete.

[0122] Security proof: The following uses a simulation example method, that is, by constructing a simulator, to prove the security of Protocol 1 of this invention.

[0123] Proposition 3: Protocol 1 of this invention can securely compute data from multiple participants without disclosing their privacy data. , Able to resist The participants conspired to launch the attack.

[0124] Proof: Based on the different computations performed by the participants in Protocol 1, the participants are divided into... The following proves... Your privacy data is secure under Agreement 1.

[0125] First, let's prove the security of [the device / component]. It is only necessary to prove private data For the maximum number of conspirators As long as it's safe, that's fine. (Note:) The data set is For sets Construct a simulator . Construct a threshold NTRU encryption system and simulate the execution process of Protocol 1, as follows: (1) Accepting input information back (This represents the output result after executing Protocol 1 of this invention), randomly selected. And it satisfies:

[0126] (2) Based on equation (2), the data sets of each participant are... The encoding is: :

[0127] (3) Using a threshold NTRU encryption system to encode vectors , Each element in the vector is encrypted, and the encrypted vector is represented as follows: The encryption process is as follows:

[0128]

[0129] in, .

[0130] (4) All of constitute a ciphertext matrix :

[0131] (5) Based on the matrix respectively Calculated in the following ways :

[0132]

[0133] (6) Select each a random polynomial Using a threshold NTRU encryption system Encryption ,Then According to each participant Constructing ciphertext vectors :

[0134] in, ,if ,make ;if ,make .

[0135] (7) All of constitute a ciphertext matrix :

[0136] (8) calculate Then use all the sub-secrets Each element in Decryption is performed to obtain plaintext data. and plaintext matrix ,make ,

[0137]

[0138] (9) according to elements in and the corresponding random polynomial selected in step (6) above To calculate the data of each participant In the ascending union set The first appearance of the position in the middle :

[0139] So Data Possession The position is from .

[0140] (10) Construct separately dimensional vector :

[0141] Among them, let , ,⋯, ;make , .

[0142] (11) All of constitute a ciphertext matrix :

[0143] Then Construct vector , ,in, . according to calculate , , Calculate according to the following formula :

[0144] (12) Utilizing all sub-secrets , , Decryption is performed to obtain plaintext data. .if , make ;if , make . .

[0145] (13) According to respectively and data sets The various data in Perform the following calculations:

[0146] in The number of elements contained.

[0147] (14) calculate , respectively .

[0148] remember This indicates that the present invention is based on protocol 1. This represents the sequence of information obtained during the execution of Protocol 1. It exists:

[0149] remember Indicates in The information sequence obtained during the simulation execution of Protocol 1, This represents the output result after the simulation ends. It exists:

[0150] Protocol 1 of this invention employs a threshold NTRU encryption system with semantic security. The ciphertext obtained after encrypting the private data of each participant can only be decrypted jointly by all participants. Even if all members of the member set collude together, they cannot decrypt any of the ciphertext generated during the protocol execution process. Therefore... ( This refers to the fact that the two are indistinguishable in calculation. Because... , It is calculated in the ciphertext state by applying the additive homomorphism of the threshold NTRU encryption system. It is random and It is semantically safe, therefore , Because of a certain participant For other participants, there are multiple unknowns. The result is obtained by summing, therefore other participants only have plaintext information. Cannot push Data sets The various data in ,and ,therefore And because Therefore, we have:

[0151] therefore, The privacy data is secure in Protocol 1 of this invention.

[0152] Secondly, for Prove its security: Due to the various participants , The computations performed in Protocol 1 are the same, and the participants are equal, so it is only necessary to prove the identity of one of the participants. private data For the largest set of conspirators (denoted as ) As long as it's safe, that's fine. , The data set is For sets Construct a simulator , Construct a threshold NTRU encryption system. Accepting input information Then, randomly select And it satisfies:

[0153] in, This indicates the output result after executing Protocol 1 of this invention.

[0154] The process of simulating Protocol 1 is omitted.

[0155] remember This indicates that the present invention is based on protocol 1. This represents the sequence of information obtained during the execution of Protocol 1. It exists:

[0156] remember Indicates in The information sequence obtained during the simulation execution of Protocol 1, This represents the output result after the simulation ends. It exists:

[0157] The security analysis is the same, and there is... , , , , And because Therefore, we have:

[0158] therefore, Privacy data is also secure in Protocol 1 of this invention.

[0159] Proposition 3 is proved. Specific Implementation Method Two: This embodiment is a method for secure aggregation of multi-party data in the Internet of Vehicles, which is a method for secure aggregation of multi-party data that prevents deception.

[0161] The above proof demonstrates that Protocol 1 is secure under the semi-honest model. However, its security is threatened when participants fail to follow its execution rules and engage in deceptive behavior at critical junctures. The following analysis addresses potential deceptive behaviors in key aspects of Protocol 1 and provides solutions.

[0162] Analysis of deceptive behavior: (1) Participants may provide incorrect ciphertext. In step (2) of Protocol 1, participants It is possible that the threshold NTRU encryption algorithm was not used and the vector was not correctly encrypted. Provide fake ciphertext vectors In step (9) of protocol 1, the participants Data may not be encrypted correctly. Provide fake ciphertext vectors .

[0163] (2) Participants may provide incorrect calculation results. In step (3) of Agreement 1, participants The correct ciphertext may not have been released. In step (10) of protocol 1, the participants The correct information may not have been published. , , In step (13) of protocol 1, the participants The correct information may not have been published. .

[0164] This invention proposes a solution: (1) Verify the ciphertext provided by the participant. In steps (3) and (4) of Protocol 1, the participant is made to... Can be

[0165] ciphertext vector sent Verify its correctness. Can be ciphertext vector The correctness is verified; in steps (10) and (11) of protocol 1, the participants are made to... Can be ciphertext vector sent Verify the correctness. Can be ciphertext vector Verify the correctness of the result.

[0166] (2) Verify the correctness of the calculation results. In steps (3) and (4) of Protocol 1, Disclose to other participants Afterwards, other participants can verify the calculation results individually. Whether the calculation is correct; in steps (10) and (11) of Protocol 1, Publish the calculation results to other participants Afterwards, other participants can verify separately. Is it correct? And then find out the correct answer. , , In steps (13) and (14) of Protocol 1, The calculations were published directly to other participants. The data used Other participants can calculate separately. Thus, the correct calculation is obtained. .

[0167] The simulation diagram of Protocol 2 is as follows Figure 2 As shown, the specific Protocol 2 (Anti-fraud Multi-Party Confidential Data Aggregation Protocol) is as follows: Input: Participants Private data collection , ( express The amount of data contained in it.

[0168] Output: Calculation .

[0169] Preparation phase: Run the threshold NTRU encryption system, and each participant obtains the parameters. and public key Participants Obtain the sub-secrets respectively .

[0170] (1) Each of them sets their own data according to equation (2). Encode into a vector :

[0171] (2) Select random polynomials respectively And use the threshold NTRU encryption system to The elements in Encryption is performed to obtain The encryption process is as follows:

[0172]

[0173] in, , , This indicates that a threshold NTRU encryption system is used for encryption operations. For encryption The random polynomial selected at that time. Calculate according to the following method (17) : (17) Each Send to .

[0174] (3) Using public key Verify whether equation (18) is true: (18) If the verification passes, the protocol continues to be executed; otherwise, the protocol is terminated. All of constitute a ciphertext matrix , ciphertext vector Corresponding to The OK:

[0175] ①Calculation The ciphertext: make , calculate Announcement , .

[0176] (4) Verify whether equations (19) and (20) hold true respectively: (19) (20) If the verification passes, the protocol continues; otherwise, the protocol terminates. The columns from left to right are respectively the first... List, Columns, ... Columns, Participants Based on the matrix respectively Calculate with the following formula :

[0177]

[0178] (5) Select each a random polynomial Using a threshold NTRU encryption system Encryption ,Then According to respectively Construct a ciphertext vector :

[0179] in, , ,make ; ,make .

[0180] Each Send to .

[0181] (6) All of constitute a ciphertext matrix , ciphertext vector Corresponding to The OK:

[0182] To other participants Announcement .

[0183] (7) Decryption: All participants Using their respective sub-secrets joint against Each element in Decryption is then performed. Ultimately, all participants receive the plaintext data. and plaintext matrix .

[0184]

[0185] (8) elements in The corresponding random polynomial selected in step (5) above To calculate your own data In the ascending union set The first appearance of the position in the middle :

[0186] So Data Possession The position is from .

[0187] (9) Construct one respectively dimensional vector :

[0188] Of all elements, let , ,⋯, ;make , .

[0189] Calculate according to the following method (21) : (twenty one) in For encryption Or encrypted The random polynomial selected at that time. Each Send to participants .

[0190] (10) Using public key Verify whether equation (22) is true: (twenty two) If the verification passes, the protocol continues to be executed; otherwise, the protocol is terminated. All of constitute a ciphertext matrix , ciphertext vector Corresponding to The OK:

[0191] Construct a vector , ,in, , . To other participants Announcement .

[0192] (11) Verify whether equations (23) and (24) hold true. : (twenty three) (twenty four) If the verification passes, the protocol continues to execute; otherwise, the protocol terminates.

[0193] according to Perform the following calculations:

[0194] Deciphering: All participants use their respective sub-secrets joint against , Decryption is performed. Ultimately, all participants receive the plaintext data. .

[0195] ⑥ Calculation : if , Separately ;if , Separately .

[0196] ⑦ Calculation : Separately .

[0197] (12) According to respectively and its own data set The various data in Perform the following calculations:

[0198] in , for The number of elements contained. Each Send to participants .

[0199] (13) Construct vector to other participants Announcement .

[0200] (14) According to respectively calculate ,and then: ⑧ Calculation :

[0201] ⑨ Calculation :

[0202] Agreement 2 is now complete.

[0203] Security verification: The following uses a simulation example method, that is, by constructing a simulator, to demonstrate the security of Protocol 2 of this invention.

[0204] Proposition 4: Protocol 2 of this invention can securely compute data from multiple participants without disclosing their privacy data. , Able to resist The participants conspired to launch the attack.

[0205] Proof: Similar to the proof of Protocol 1, participants are divided into groups based on the different computations they perform in Protocol 2. The following proves... , Your privacy data is secure under Agreement 2.

[0206] First of all, Prove its security: It is only necessary to prove private data For the largest set of conspirators (denoted as ) As long as it's safe, that's fine. , The data set is For sets Construct a simulator , Construct a threshold NTRU encryption system. Accepting input information back (This represents the output result after executing protocol 2 of this invention), randomly selected. And it satisfies:

[0207] The process of simulating Protocol 2 is omitted.

[0208] remember express The information sequence obtained during the simulation execution of Protocol 2, This represents the output result after the simulation ends. It exists: ,

[0209] remember This indicates that the present invention is Protocol 2. This represents the sequence of information obtained during the execution of Protocol 2. This represents the output result after executing protocol 2 of this invention. It exists: ,

[0210] Protocol 2 of this invention employs a threshold NTRU encryption system with semantic security. The ciphertext obtained after encrypting the private data of each participant can only be decrypted jointly by all participants, even if it is a set of members. Even if all members conspire together, they cannot decrypt any of the ciphertext generated during the execution of the protocol. ( This refers to the fact that the two are indistinguishable in calculation; due to , It is calculated in the ciphertext state by applying the additive homomorphism of the threshold NTRU encryption system. It is random and It is semantically safe, therefore , , ;because and It is calculated by each participant selecting a different random polynomial. Unable to obtain participants' private data, and due to computation The modulo operation is used, therefore it cannot be determined by... The calculation formula yields the participants' private data, therefore Because of a certain participant of For other participants, there are multiple unknowns. The result is obtained by summing, therefore other participants only have plaintext information. Cannot push Data sets The various data in ,and , And because Therefore, we have:

[0211] therefore, The privacy data is secure under Protocol 2 of this invention.

[0212] Secondly, for Prove its security: Due to the various participants The computations performed in Protocol 2 are the same, and the participants are equal, so it is only necessary to prove the identity of one of the participants. private data For the largest set of conspirators (denoted as ) As long as it's safe, that's fine. The data set is For sets Construct a simulator , Construct a threshold NTRU encryption system. Accepting input information Then, randomly select And it satisfies:

[0213] in, This indicates the output result after executing Protocol 2 of this invention.

[0214] The process of simulating Protocol 2 is omitted.

[0215] make This indicates that the present invention is Protocol 2. This represents the sequence of information obtained during the execution of Protocol 2. It exists: ,

[0216] remember In the simulator The information sequence obtained during the simulation execution of Protocol 2, This represents the output result after the simulation ends. It exists: ,

[0217] Compared with the above The security analysis is the same, and there is... , And because Therefore, we have:

[0218] therefore, , The privacy data is secure under Protocol 2 of this invention.

[0219] Proposition 4 is proved.

[0220] Example: To verify the multi-party confidential data aggregation effect of the present invention, it is compared with "Efficient FunctionQueryable and Privacy Preserving Data Aggregation Scheme in Smart Grid" (referred to as reference

[16] ), "FESDA: Fog-enabled secure data aggregation in smart grid IoTnetwork" (referred to as reference

[17] ), "FPDA: Fault-tolerant and privacy-enhanced data aggregation scheme in fog-assisted smart grid" (referred to as reference

[18] ), "Enabling efficient and privacy-preserving aggregation communication and function query for fog computing-based smart grid" (referred to as reference

[19] ) and "Secure multi-partysummation protocols: Are they secure enough under collusion?" (referred to as reference

[20] ). The computational efficiency and communication efficiency of the protocol of the present invention are compared by computational complexity analysis and communication complexity analysis; the computational efficiency and communication efficiency of the protocol of the present invention are verified by simulation experiments.

[0221] In the following text, the symbol The complete collection The power, the symbol Indicates the number of participants. This represents the total amount of data from all participants.

[0222] (1) Computational complexity analysis: The HSS protocol in reference

[16] uses a threshold Paillier encryption system to implement multi-party confidential summation computation under a semi-honest model, with a computational complexity of O(n). Protocol 2 in reference

[17] utilizes a threshold elliptic curve cryptosystem to implement a protocol for one-time confidential computation of the maximum and minimum values, with a computational complexity of O(n). Protocol 2 in reference

[18] utilizes a threshold ElGamal cryptosystem to design a secure computation protocol for calculating the maximum (minimum) value that can resist active attacks, with a computational complexity of O(n). Protocol 1 in reference

[19] utilizes the threshold Lifted ElGamal cryptosystem to design a secure computation protocol for the range (sum of extreme values) of multiple data parties, with a computational complexity of O(n). Reference

[20] uses the threshold ElGamal encryption algorithm to achieve secure computation of simultaneously solving the maximum and minimum values, which requires a total of The second-order exponentiation operation has a computational complexity of O(n). ,in These represent the minimum and maximum values ​​in the entire set, respectively. The position in the middle.

[0223] Protocols 1 and 2 of this invention employ a threshold NTRU encryption system, which can securely count, sum, average, maximum, minimum, median, variance, and standard deviation of participant data. Each participant has multiple pieces of private data, requiring no third-party participant (TP), and decryption requires collaboration among all participants.

[0224] In step (2) of protocol 1, each participant Encryption required All participants need to encrypt In step (3) of protocol 1, the participants Addition homomorphic operations are required times; in step (4) of protocol 1, each participant The "1" needs to be encrypted. Then perform addition homomorphic operations. Second-rate( Perform addition homomorphic operations (times), all participants need to encrypt. Then perform addition homomorphic operations. Next; in step (5) of Agreement 1, each participant Each needs to be encrypted. Then perform addition homomorphic operations. Next, all participants need to encrypt. Then perform addition homomorphic operations. Next; in step (7) of protocol 1, all participants need to perform joint decryption. Next; in step (9) of Agreement 1, each participant Encryption required Next, all participants need to encrypt. Next; in step (10) of Agreement 1, the participants Addition homomorphic operations are required. In step (11) of protocol 1, all participants need to jointly decrypt 4 times. In summary, the total number of modular multiplication and addition homomorphic operations in protocol 1 of this invention is... The computational complexity is [time] times. .in The number of elements contained.

[0225] In step (2) of protocol 2, each participant Encryption required Second-rate ,calculate This time, all participants need to encrypt a total of [number] times. Next, calculate Next; in step (3) of Agreement 2, the participants Verification required Next, perform the addition homomorphic operation. Next; in step (4) of Agreement 2, the participants Each needs to be verified This requires verification once. Each participant The "1" needs to be encrypted. Then perform addition homomorphic operations. Second-rate( Perform addition homomorphic operations (times), all participants need to encrypt. Then perform addition homomorphic operations. Next; in step (5) of Agreement 2, each participant Each needs to be encrypted. Then perform addition homomorphic operations. Next, all participants need to encrypt. Then perform addition homomorphic operations. Next; in step (7) of protocol 2, all participants need to perform joint decryption. Next; in step (9) of Agreement 2, each participant Encryption required Next, calculate This time, all participants need to encrypt a total of [number] times. Next, calculate Next; in step (10) of Agreement 2, the participants Verification required Next, perform the addition homomorphic operation. Next; in step (11) of Agreement 2, the participants Each needs to be verified This requires verification once. Next, participants Each operation requires two addition homomorphic operations, and all participants need to perform addition homomorphic operations. This requires all participants to jointly decrypt 4 times. In summary, the total number of modular multiplication, addition homomorphic operations, and verification calculations in Protocol 2 of this invention is... The computational complexity is [time] times. .in , The number of elements contained.

[0226] (2) Analysis of the number of communication rounds: The following analysis of the number of communication rounds in the protocol determines the communication complexity of the protocol.

[0227] The HSS protocol in reference

[16] requires a total of 5 rounds of communication. Protocol 2 in reference

[17] requires a total of 5 rounds of communication. Round communication, in which These represent the minimum and maximum values ​​in the entire set, respectively. The position in the middle. Protocol 2 in reference

[18] requires a total of Round-robin communication. Protocol 1 in reference

[19] requires a total of rounds of communication. Round-robin communication. The protocol in reference

[20] requires a total of Round-robin communication.

[0228] In the preparation phase of Protocol 1 of this invention, the distribution of system parameters, public keys, and sub-secrets requires round-robin communication; in step (2) of Protocol 1, participants Each of them will send its own ciphertext vector Send to Need to be done Round-robin communication; in step (3) of protocol 1, participants To other participants Announcement Need to be done Round-robin communication; in step (5) of protocol 1, participants Each It needs to be done. Round-robin communication; in step (6) of protocol 1, participants To other participants Need to be done Round-robin communication; in step (7) of protocol 1, all participants Joint decryption Need to be done Round-robin communication; in step (9) of protocol 1, participants Each Send to participants Need to be done Round-robin communication; in step (10) of protocol 1, participants To other participants Announcement Need to be done Round-robin communication; in step (11) of protocol 1, all participants Need to be done Round-robin communication; in step (12) of protocol 1, participants Send to participants Need to be done Round communication; in step (13) of protocol 1 To other participants Need to be done Round communication. In summary, Protocol 1 of this invention requires a total of 11 rounds of communication.

[0229] In the preparation phase of Protocol 2 of this invention, the distribution of system parameters, public keys, and sub-secrets requires round-robin communication; in step (2) of Protocol 2, participants Round communication; in step (5) of protocol 2, participants Round-robin communication is required; in step (6) of protocol 2, the participants... To other participants Announcement Need to be done Round-robin communication; in step (7) of protocol 2, all participants Need to be done Round communication; in step (9) of protocol 2, participants Each Send to participants Need to be done Round communication; in step (10) of protocol 2, participants To other participants Need to be done Round communication; in step (11) of protocol 2, all participants Joint decryption Need to be done Round-robin communication; in step (12) of protocol 2, participants Each Send to participants Need to be done Round communication; in step (13) of protocol 1 To other participants Announcement Need to be done Round communication. In summary, Protocol 2 of this invention requires a total of 11 rounds of communication.

[0230] Tables 2 and 3 present a performance comparison between Protocol 1 and Protocol 2 of this invention and related solutions. Table 2 shows that, in terms of computational complexity, Protocol 1 and Protocol 2 of this invention have linear computational complexity, which is lower than that of existing related protocols, demonstrating high computational efficiency. The computational complexity analysis reveals that, since Protocol 2 of this invention is designed for anti-spoofing scenarios, it adds the computational step of verifying the ciphertext, resulting in higher computational complexity than Protocol 1 under the semi-honest model. In terms of communication complexity, Protocol 1 and Protocol 2 of this invention have constant communication complexity, which is lower than that of existing related protocols. Overall, Protocol 1 and Protocol 2 of this invention exhibit low computational and communication complexity and high computational and communication efficiency.

[0231] Table 2 Protocol Performance Comparison 1

[0232] Table 3 Protocol Performance Comparison 2

[0233] To verify the efficiency of Protocol 1 and Protocol 2 of the present invention, simulation experiments were conducted on Protocol 1 and Protocol 2 of the present invention using the Python 3.10.6 programming language on the PyCharm 2021.3.3 platform, and the results were compared with related solutions.

[0234] Experimental environment: The computer configuration is Windows 11 64-bit system, Intel(R) Core(TM) i5-8400 CPU @ 2.80GHz, 16GB RAM. The communication bandwidth is 100Mbps.

[0235] Experimental parameter settings: In the experiment, the key length of the threshold Paillier, threshold ElGamal, threshold LiftedElGamal, threshold elliptic curve and threshold NTRU encryption algorithms was 512 bits, and the length of the random polynomial was 64 bits.

[0236] Experiment 1: With a certain number of participants And the total amount of data from all participants At a certain time (assuming) ), simulating the present invention protocol 1, protocol 2 and existing related protocols (assuming The execution time and communication latency of the entire set momentum The trend of change. 1000 experiments were conducted, and the average value of the results was taken. The experimental results are as follows: Figure 3 and Figure 4 As shown.

[0237] from Figure 3 From this, we can conclude that, At a certain time, the execution time of Protocol 1 and Protocol 2 of this invention varies with... The increase shows a linear growth trend, but the growth rate is low. In the same... Under the given conditions, the execution time of Protocol 1 and Protocol 2 of this invention is lower than that of existing related protocols, and the overall execution efficiency is higher. Since Protocol 2 of this invention is designed for anti-spoofing scenarios and includes an additional verification step, its execution time is longer than that of Protocol 1. Figure 4 It can be seen from this that, At a certain time, the communication delay time between Protocol 1 and Protocol 2 of this invention varies with... The communication latency increases linearly with the increase in latency, and the overall communication latency is relatively low, with a slow growth rate and high communication efficiency. Under the same conditions... Under the given conditions, the communication latency of Protocol 1 and Protocol 2 of this invention is lower than that of related protocols, while the communication latency of Protocol 2 of this invention is higher than that of Protocol 1 of this invention. In reality, the latency may vary between different networks.

[0238] Experiment 2: In the complete set And the total amount of data from all participants At a certain time (assuming) ), simulating the present invention protocol 1, protocol 2 and existing related protocols (assuming The execution time and communication latency of () vary with the number of participants. The trend of change. 1000 experiments were conducted, and the average value of the results was taken. The experimental results are as follows: Figure 5 and Figure 6 As shown.

[0239] from Figure 5 From this, we can conclude that, At a given time, the execution time of Protocol 1 and Protocol 2 of this invention exhibits a linear growth trend with increasing , but the growth rate is relatively low. Under the same , Under certain conditions, the execution time of Protocol 1 of this invention is shorter than that of existing protocols, resulting in higher execution efficiency. The execution time of Protocol 2 of this invention is longer than that of Protocol 1. From... Figure 6 It can be seen from this that, At a certain time, the communication delay time between Protocol 1 and Protocol 2 of this invention varies with... The communication latency increases linearly with the increase in latency, resulting in a generally low communication latency, a low growth rate, and high communication efficiency. Under the same conditions... Under certain conditions, the communication latency of Protocol 1 and Protocol 2 of this invention is lower than that of existing related protocols, while the communication latency of Protocol 2 of this invention is higher than that of Protocol 1. In reality, the latency may vary between different networks.

[0240] Experiment 3: With a certain number of participants At a certain time (assuming) The simulation of the execution time and communication latency of Protocol 1 and Protocol 2 of this invention varies with the total amount of participant data. The trend of change. 1000 experiments were conducted, and the average value of the results was taken. The experimental results are as follows: Figure 7 and Figure 8 As shown.

[0241] from Figure 7 From this, we can conclude that, At a certain time, the execution time of Protocol 1 and Protocol 2 of this invention varies with... The increase in [something] shows a linear growth trend, but the growth rate is low, and the overall execution time is short. Because Protocol 2 of this invention adds a verification step, therefore, in the same [something]... Under certain conditions, the execution time of Protocol 2 of this invention is longer than that of Protocol 1 of this invention. From Figure 8 It can be seen from this that, At a given time, the communication delay time of Protocol 1 and Protocol 2 of this invention exhibits a linear growth trend with increasing latency, resulting in generally low latency, slow growth, and high communication efficiency. Under the same conditions... Under the given conditions, the communication latency of Protocol 2 of this invention is slightly higher than that of Protocol 1 of this invention. In practice, the latency may vary between different networks.

[0242] This invention may have other embodiments. Without departing from the spirit and essence of this invention, those skilled in the art can make various corresponding changes and modifications according to this invention, but these corresponding changes and modifications should all fall within the protection scope of the appended claims.

Claims

1. A method for secure aggregation of multi-party data in a vehicle-to-everything (V2X) network, characterized in that: The threshold NTRU encryption system is run, and each participant obtains parameters. , , and public key Participants Obtain the sub-secrets respectively NTRU encryption system For large prime numbers, and It is a prime number; The confidential aggregation method includes: (1) Each of their own data sets Encoded as dimensional vector Where a and b are Participants Agreed set The range of values; (2) Select random polynomials respectively and apply the threshold NTRU encryption system to The elements in Encrypt And thus obtain , , Participants Separately ciphertext vectors Send to , ; (3) All of constitute a ciphertext matrix , ciphertext vector Corresponding to The Order; command , calculate Announcement and ; (4) Record The columns from left to right are respectively the first... List, Columns, ... Columns, Participants Calculate separately : （10）； （11）； (5) Select each a random polynomial Using a threshold NTRU encryption system Encryption ,Then Construct ciphertext vectors respectively ,if ,make , ;if ,make Each Send to ; (6) All of constitute a ciphertext matrix , ciphertext vector Corresponding to The OK; To other participants Announcement ; (7) All participants Using their respective sub-secrets joint against and Each element in Decryption is performed; ultimately, all participants receive the plaintext data. and plaintext matrix ; (8) according to elements in and the corresponding random polynomial selected in step (5) To calculate your own data In the ascending union set The first appearance of the position in the middle ; Data Possession The position is from arrive ; (9) Construct one respectively dimensional vector In c encrypted elements, if , , ,⋯, ;otherwise Each Send to participants ; (10) All of constitute a ciphertext matrix , ciphertext vector Corresponding to The OK; Construct a vector ,in , ; Calculate and publish , and / or , and / or ; (11) All participants Using their respective sub-secrets joint against , and / or , and / or After decryption, each participant ultimately obtains the corresponding plaintext data.

2. The method for secure aggregation of multi-party data in a vehicle network according to claim 1, characterized in that: The method further includes: In step (10) Also calculated and published , Participants in step (11) Also to Decrypt to obtain the corresponding plaintext data; if , Separately ;if , Separately .

3. The method for secure aggregation of multi-party data in a vehicle network according to claim 2, characterized in that: The method further includes: (12) Calculate separately ; According to respectively and its own data set The various data in calculate , , , for The number of elements contained; Each Send to participants ; (13) calculate to other participants Announcement ; (14) calculate and .

4. A method for secure aggregation of multi-party data in a vehicle network according to any one of claims 1 to 3, characterized in that: Each of their own data sets Encode as a vector The process includes: participants Data sets Represented as = ,in for All distinct elements in the set. And satisfy , for exist The number of times it appears in; The subscript 's' is used to indicate The elements in the array, denoted by the subscript s, represent variables that satisfy the condition. ,make ;if ,make ;if ,make And so on, if ,make ; and then the encoded vector is obtained. .

5. A method for secure aggregation of multi-party data in a vehicle network according to claim 4, characterized in that: Select random polynomials respectively and apply the threshold NTRU encryption system to The elements in Encryption ,in This indicates that a threshold NTRU encryption system is used for encryption operations. For use Encryption Select a random polynomial, This represents the modulo operation. This is the highest power term of the polynomial in threshold NTRU encryption.

6. A method for secure aggregation of multi-party data in a vehicle-to-everything (V2X) network, characterized in that: The threshold NTRU encryption system is run, and each participant obtains parameters. , , and public key Participants Obtain the sub-secrets respectively NTRU encryption system For large prime numbers, and It is a prime number; The confidential aggregation method includes: (1) Each of their own data sets Encoded as dimensional vector ; in the middle, a and b are Participants Agreed set The range of values; (2) Select random polynomials respectively And use the threshold NTRU encryption system to The elements in Encrypt And thus obtain , , ; Calculate separately Participants Separately ciphertext vectors Send to , ; (3) Using public key verify If the verification is successful, continue. This represents the modulo operation. This is the highest power term of the polynomial in threshold NTRU encryption; All of constitute a ciphertext matrix , ciphertext vector Corresponding to The Order; command , calculate Announcement and ; (4) Record The columns from left to right are respectively the first... List, Columns, ... Columns, Participants Calculate separately : ， ， (5) Select each a random polynomial Using a threshold NTRU encryption system Encryption ,Then Construct ciphertext vectors respectively ,if ,make , ;if ,make Each Send to ; (6) All of constitute a ciphertext matrix , ciphertext vector Corresponding to The OK; To other participants Announcement ; (7) All participants Using their respective sub-secrets joint against and Each element in Decryption is performed; ultimately, all participants receive the plaintext data. and plaintext matrix ; (8) according to elements in and the corresponding random polynomial selected in step (5) To calculate your own data In the ascending union set The first appearance of the position in the middle ; Data Possession The position is from arrive ; (9) Construct one respectively dimensional vector In c encrypted elements, if , , ,⋯, ;otherwise Calculate separately ,in For encryption Or the random polynomial chosen when encrypting "0"; Each Send to participants ; (10) Using public key verify If the verification is successful, proceed. All of constitute a ciphertext matrix , ciphertext vector Corresponding to The OK; Construct a vector ,in , ; Calculate and publish ; To other participants Announcement and ; (11) Verify separately and If the verification is successful, continue. and / or ; All participants Using their respective sub-secrets joint against ,as well as and / or After decryption, each participant ultimately obtains the corresponding plaintext data.

7. A method for secure aggregation of multi-party data in a vehicle network according to claim 6, characterized in that: The method further includes: In step (11) Also calculated and published , Participants Also to Decrypt to obtain the corresponding plaintext data; if , Separately ;if , Separately .

8. A method for secure aggregation of multi-party data in a vehicle network according to claim 7, characterized in that: The method further includes: (12) Calculate separately ; According to respectively and its own data set The various data in calculate , , , for The number of elements contained; Each Send to participants ; (13) calculate to other participants Announcement ; (14) calculate and .

9. A method for secure aggregation of multi-party data in a vehicle network according to any one of claims 6 to 8, characterized in that: Each of their own data sets Encode as a vector The process includes: participants Data sets Represented as = ,in for All distinct elements in the set. And satisfy , for exist The number of times it appears in; The subscript 's' is used to indicate The elements in the array, denoted by the subscript s, represent variables that satisfy the condition. ,make ;if ,make ;if ,make And so on, if ,make ; and then the encoded vector is obtained. .

10. A method for secure aggregation of multi-party data in a vehicle network according to claim 9, characterized in that: Select random polynomials respectively and apply the threshold NTRU encryption system to The elements in Encryption ,in This indicates that a threshold NTRU encryption system is used for encryption operations. For use Encryption Select a random polynomial, This represents the modulo operation. This is the highest power term of the polynomial in threshold NTRU encryption.

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