Communication method and apparatus

Abstract

The application provides a communication method and device, relates to the field of communication, and aims to guarantee the end-to-end communication security between a terminal and each network element, thereby meeting the more flexible security requirement of a network. The method comprises the following steps: generating a first key for a first network element in a first network according to the key of a first anchor point and the information of the first network element, generating a second key for a second network element in the first network according to the key of the first anchor point and the information of the second network element, and sending the first key and the second key to the first network element and the second network element respectively. The key of the first anchor point is generated according to the key associated with a first terminal.

Description

Technical Field

[0001] This application relates to the field of communications, and more particularly to a communication method and apparatus. Background Technology

[0002] In the current non-access stratum (NAS) protocol, the user equipment (UE) typically only establishes end-to-end NAS protection with the access and mobility management function (AMF). That is, after the UE transmits the NAS message to the AMF, the AMF first decrypts and verifies the integrity of the NAS, and then forwards the message parsed from the NAS message to the corresponding network element through the service interface.

[0003] However, this end-to-end NAS protection may not meet the more flexible security needs of future networks. Summary of the Invention

[0004] This application provides a communication method and apparatus to ensure end-to-end communication security between the terminal and various network elements, thereby meeting the network's more flexible security requirements.

[0005] To achieve the above objectives, this application adopts the following technical solution:

[0006] In a first aspect, a communication method is provided, applied to a first anchor point, comprising: generating a first key for a first network element based on a key of the first anchor point and information of a first network element in a first network; generating a second key for a second network element based on the key of the first anchor point and information of a second network element in the first network; and sending the first key and the second key to the first network element and the second network element respectively. The key of the first anchor point is generated based on a key associated with a first terminal.

[0007] Therefore, when the first terminal has communication needs with multiple network elements (such as the first network element and the second network element), the first anchor point can generate a first key for the first network element based on the first anchor point's key and the information of the first network element, and generate a second key for the second network element based on the first anchor point's key and the information of the second network element. In this way, the communication between the first terminal and multiple network elements can be protected by the corresponding keys. For example, the communication between the first terminal and the first network element can be protected by the first key, and the communication between the first terminal and the second network element can be protected by the second key, so as to ensure the end-to-end communication security between the terminal and each network element, thereby meeting the network's more flexible security needs.

[0008] In one possible design, before generating a first key for the first network element based on the key of the first anchor point and the information of the first network element, and before generating a second key for the second network element based on the key of the first anchor point and the information of the second network element, the method further includes: determining the first network element and the second network element that need to serve the first terminal; and determining that the security protection method used for communication between the first terminal and the first network element and between the first terminal and the second network element is distributed security protection, so as to avoid wasting network overhead by deriving keys for unrelated network elements.

[0009] Optionally, determining the first network element and the second network element that need to serve the first terminal includes: receiving service information from the first terminal, and determining the first network element and the second network element that need to serve the first terminal based on the service information, so as to avoid wasting network overhead by deriving keys for network elements that do not need to provide services. The service information indicates the network elements that the first terminal expects or supports, or the service information indicates the services that the first terminal needs to obtain.

[0010] Furthermore, the service information indicates the service that the first terminal needs to obtain, i.e., the intent of the first terminal. Therefore, determining the first and second network elements that need to serve the first terminal based on the service information can include: sending service information to the analysis network element and receiving result information returned by the analysis network element regarding the service information, whereby the result information indicates the first and second network elements as the network elements providing the service that the first terminal needs to obtain. In this way, compared to the first anchor point automatically determining the network elements that need to serve the first terminal based on the first terminal's intent, the processing overhead of the first anchor point can be reduced, and operational efficiency can be improved.

[0011] Optionally, the method further includes: sending information about the first network element and information about the second network element to the first terminal, so that the terminal can also deduce the corresponding key for security protection of subsequent communications.

[0012] Optionally, the method further includes: determining, based on service information, a third network element in the second network that needs to serve the first terminal, and sending information about the third network element to both the second network and the first terminal. For example, the second network could be a visited network of the first terminal, thus eliminating the need for an anchor point in the visited network to determine the network element in the second network that needs to serve the first terminal, thereby reducing the overhead of the second network. Additionally, security can be established between the first terminal and its home network (i.e., the home network) to prevent information from being leaked or tampered with in the visited location (i.e., the visited network).

[0013] Optionally, before determining that the security protection method used for communication between the first terminal and the first network element, and between the first terminal and the second network element, is distributed security protection, the method further includes: determining that the security protection method used for communication between the first terminal and multiple network elements in the same network is distributed security protection. Therefore, determining that the security protection method used for communication between the first terminal and the first network element, and between the first terminal and the second network element, is distributed security protection includes: in response to the fact that the security protection method used for communication between the first terminal and multiple network elements in the same network is distributed security protection, determining that the security protection method used for communication between the first terminal and the first network element, and between the first terminal and the second network element, is distributed security protection, to avoid wasting network overhead by deriving keys for irrelevant network elements.

[0014] Furthermore, determining that the security protection method used for communication between the first terminal and multiple network elements in the same network is distributed security protection includes: receiving security capability information of the first terminal, and determining, based on the security capability information, that the security protection method used for communication between the first terminal and multiple network elements in the same network is distributed security protection. The security capability information indicates that the first terminal supports distributed security protection for communication with multiple network elements in the same network. Therefore, the method further includes: sending protection mode indication information to the first terminal, the protection mode indication information indicating that the security protection method used for communication between the first terminal and multiple network elements in the same network is distributed security protection, so that the terminal side can align the security protection method with the network side, avoiding security protection failure due to misalignment.

[0015] Furthermore, the first terminal supports communication with multiple network elements in the same network using at least one security protection method, including distributed security protection. Based on security capability information, determining that the security protection method used for communication between the first terminal and multiple network elements in the same network is distributed security protection includes: selecting distributed security protection from at least one security protection method to avoid additional communication overhead caused by determination by other network elements; or, based on security capability information, determining that the security protection method used for communication between the first terminal and multiple network elements in the same network is distributed security protection includes: sending the security capability information of the first terminal to the data management network element serving the first terminal, and receiving information returned by the data management network element, whereby the returned information indicates that the security protection method used for communication between the first terminal and multiple network elements in the same network is distributed security protection. This avoids the processing overhead caused by the first anchor point determining the security protection method itself, and improves the operating efficiency of the first anchor point.

[0016] Furthermore, when the first terminal roams to the second network, the method also includes: sending protection mode indication information to the second network so that the anchor point in the visited network (or the second network) can also align the security protection mode with the first terminal, so as to avoid security protection failure due to misalignment of security protection modes.

[0017] Furthermore, determining that the security protection method used for communication between the first terminal and multiple network elements in the same network is distributed security protection includes: receiving protection method indication information from the first terminal. This information indicates that the security protection method used for communication between the first terminal and multiple network elements in the same network is distributed security protection. In other words, the first terminal can determine the security protection method itself and instruct the network side, thus reducing the processing complexity and overhead on the network side. Alternatively, if the first anchor point belongs to the first network, which is the first terminal's home network, and the first terminal roams to the second network, determining that the security protection method used for communication between the first terminal and multiple network elements in the same network is distributed security protection includes: receiving protection method indication information from the second network. That is, if the anchor point in the visited network (second network) selects the security protection method, the anchor point in the visited network must also send protection method indication information to the anchor point in the home network (first anchor point), informing it of the security protection method. This ensures that the first anchor point can align its security protection method with that of the first terminal, avoiding security protection failure due to misalignment.

[0018] In one possible design, the method further includes: receiving an authentication request message, the authentication request message being used to request authentication of a first terminal; and triggering the first network to authenticate the first terminal in response to the authentication request message. Thus, generating a first key for a first network element based on the key of a first anchor point and information of a first network element in the first network, and generating a second key for a second network element based on the key of the first anchor point and information of a second network element in the first network, includes: generating a first key for the first network element based on the key of the first anchor point and information of the first network element in the first network, and generating a second key for the second network element based on the key of the first anchor point and information of the second network element in the first network, in response to successful authentication of the first terminal by the first network. That is, the first anchor point only generates the key associated with the network element if the first terminal's authentication is successful; otherwise, if the first terminal's authentication fails, the first anchor point does not generate the key associated with the network element to avoid redundant overhead.

[0019] Optionally, the method further includes: when the first network is triggered to authenticate the first terminal, generating a key identifier of the first anchor point associated with the key of the first anchor point, and sending the key identifier of the first anchor point to the first terminal, so as to indicate the key of the first anchor point through the key identifier of the first anchor point, so as to avoid incorrect key usage.

[0020] Furthermore, the key identifier of the first anchor point includes at least one of the following: information about the first anchor point, or the identifier of the first network. For example, the information about the first anchor point includes at least one of the following: the identifier of the first anchor point, the name of the first anchor point, the type of the first anchor point, or information indicating the services that the first anchor point can provide, so as to distinguish the keys associated with the first anchor point and other network elements through the above information.

[0021] Optionally, if the first terminal roams to the second network, the method further includes: when the first network is triggered to authenticate the first terminal, generating a key for the second anchor point based on the key of the first anchor point, and sending the key of the second anchor point to the second anchor point, so as to generate keys for network elements in the second network through the key of the second anchor point, thereby providing security protection for the communication between the first terminal and the network elements in the second network.

[0022] Optionally, the method further includes: generating a key identifier for a second anchor point and sending the key identifier to the second anchor point when the first network is triggered to authenticate the first terminal. In this way, the second anchor point does not need to generate its own key identifier, which can reduce the overhead of the second anchor point.

[0023] Furthermore, the key identifier of the second anchor point includes at least one of the following: information about the second anchor point, or an identifier of the second network. For example, the information about the second anchor point includes at least one of the following: an identifier of the second anchor point, a name of the second anchor point, a type of the second anchor point, or information indicating the services that the second anchor point can provide, so as to distinguish the keys associated with the second anchor point and other network elements through the above information.

[0024] In one possible design, the method further includes: receiving authentication indication information from a second network; the authentication indication information indicates that the second network has successfully authenticated the first terminal. Therefore, generating a first key for the first network element based on the key of the first anchor point and information of the first network element in the first network, and generating a second key for the second network element based on the key of the first anchor point and information of the second network element in the first network, includes: in response to the second network successfully authenticating the first terminal, generating a first key for the first network element based on the key of the first anchor point and information of the first network element in the first network, and generating a second key for the second network element based on the key of the first anchor point and information of the second network element in the first network. That is, the first anchor point only generates the key associated with the network element if the first terminal's authentication is successful; otherwise, if the first terminal's authentication fails, the first anchor point does not generate the key associated with the network element to avoid redundant overhead.

[0025] Optionally, the method further includes receiving a key from the first anchor point of the second network.

[0026] Optionally, the method further includes: in response to the second network's successful authentication of the first terminal, generating a key identifier of the first anchor point associated with the key of the first anchor point, and sending the key identifier of the first anchor point to the first terminal; or, the method further includes: receiving the key of the first anchor point and the key identifier of the first anchor point from the second network, associating the key of the first anchor point with the key identifier of the first anchor point, and sending the key identifier of the first anchor point to the first terminal.

[0027] Furthermore, the key identifier of the first anchor point includes at least one of the following: information about the first anchor point, or an identifier of the first network. For example, the information about the first anchor point includes at least one of the following: an identifier of the first anchor point, a name of the first anchor point, a type of the first anchor point, or information indicating the services that the first anchor point can provide.

[0028] In one possible design, before generating a first key for the first network element based on the key of the first anchor point and the information of the first network element, and before generating a second key for the second network element based on the key of the first anchor point and the information of the second network element, the method further includes: receiving a first key request from the first network element, the first key request including information of the first network element; and may also receive a second key request from the second network element, the second key request including information of the second network element. It can be seen that in this case, the first anchor point does not need to pre-generate the key associated with the network element, but rather generates it on demand according to the needs of the first terminal, thus avoiding the generation of irrelevant redundant keys.

[0029] Optionally, the first key request further includes a key identifier. Before generating a first key for the first network element based on the key of the first anchor point and the information of the first network element, and before generating a second key for the second network element based on the key of the first anchor point and the information of the second network element, the method further includes: determining that the key identifier is associated with the key of the first anchor point, so that the first anchor point can use the key of the first anchor point to generate the corresponding key, thereby avoiding key generation errors.

[0030] In one possible design, the information of the first network element includes at least one of the following: the identifier of the first network element, the name of the first network element, the type of the first network element, or information about the services that the first network element can provide; the information of the second network element includes at least one of the following: the identifier of the second network element, the name of the second network element, the type of the second network element, or information about the services that the second network element can provide, so as to distinguish the keys associated with the first network element and the second network element through the above information and avoid key usage errors.

[0031] In one possible design, the method further includes: determining a first key identifier associated with a first key and a second key identifier associated with a second key, and sending the first key identifier and the second key identifier to a first network element and a second network element, respectively. This eliminates the need for the first and second network elements to generate their own key identifiers, reducing their overhead.

[0032] Optionally, the first key identifier includes at least one of the following: information of the first network element or the identifier of the first network, and the second key identifier includes at least one of the following: information of the second network element or the identifier of the first network, so as to distinguish the keys associated with the first network element and the second network element through the above information and avoid key usage errors.

[0033] Secondly, a communication method is provided, applied to a first terminal or a chip of the first terminal, comprising: determining that the first terminal needs to be served by a first network element and a second network element in a first network; when the security protection mode for communication between the first terminal and the first network element and between the first terminal and the second network element is distributed security protection, generating a first key associated with the first network element based on the key of the first anchor point and the information of the first network element, and generating a second key associated with the second network element based on the key of the first anchor point and the information of the second network element, wherein the key of the first anchor point is generated based on the key associated with the first terminal.

[0034] In one possible design, the method further includes: sending service information of the first terminal, and receiving information of the first network element and the second network element returned in response to the service information. Determining that the first terminal needs to be served by the first network element and the second network element in the first network includes: in response to receiving the information of the first network element and the second network element, determining that the first terminal needs to be served by the first network element and the second network element.

[0035] It should be understood that service information can indicate the service that the first terminal needs to obtain. The service that the first terminal needs to obtain can be understood as the first terminal's intention. That is, the first terminal does not need to know which network elements should provide its service; it only needs to provide its own intention, thereby reducing the processing overhead of the first terminal and facilitating energy saving. Alternatively, service information can indicate the network elements that the first terminal expects, so that the network side can directly determine the corresponding network elements, thereby improving the processing efficiency of the network side. Or, service information can indicate the network elements supported by the first terminal, so that the network side can flexibly select suitable network elements to provide services to the first terminal.

[0036] Optionally, sending service information of the first terminal includes: sending service information to a routing network element in the network accessed by the first terminal; receiving information from the first network element and information from the second network element includes: receiving information from the routing network element regarding the service information and information from the first network element and information from the second network element returned by the routing network element.

[0037] Furthermore, when the first terminal is roaming in the visited network, it sends the first terminal's service information to the routing network element in the network accessed by the first terminal, including: sending service information and routing indication information to the routing network element. The routing indication information indicates whether the information sent by the terminal passes through the anchor point in the visited network during the routing process.

[0038] Optionally, sending the service information of the first terminal includes: obtaining the address of the anchor point in the home network of the first terminal, and sending the service information of the first terminal to the anchor point in the home network according to the address.

[0039] One possible design approach also includes:

[0040] The first terminal determines that the security protection method used for communication between the first terminal and the first network element, as well as between the first terminal and the second network element, is distributed security protection.

[0041] Optionally, the first terminal determines that the security protection method used for communication between the first terminal and the first network element, and between the first terminal and the second network element, is distributed security protection, including: determining that the security protection method used for communication between the first terminal and multiple network elements in the same network is distributed security protection; and in response to the security protection method used for communication between the first terminal and multiple network elements in the same network being distributed security protection, determining that the security protection method used for communication between the first terminal and the first network element, and between the first terminal and the second network element, is distributed security protection.

[0042] Furthermore, before determining that the security protection method used for communication between the first terminal and multiple network elements in the same network is distributed security protection, the method further includes: sending security capability information of the first terminal, and receiving protection method indication information returned in response to the security capability information. The protection method indication information indicates that the security protection method used for communication between the first terminal and multiple network elements in the same network is distributed security protection. The security capability information indicates that the first terminal supports distributed security protection for communication with multiple network elements in the same network.

[0043] For example, sending security capability information of the first terminal includes: sending security capability information to routing network elements in the network accessed by the first terminal; receiving protection mode indication information returned by the routing network elements in response to the security capability information includes: receiving protection mode indication information returned by the routing network elements in response to the security capability information.

[0044] Furthermore, when the first terminal is roaming in the visited network, it sends the first terminal's service information to the routing network element in the network accessed by the first terminal, including: sending protection mode indication information and routing indication information to the routing network element. The routing indication information indicates whether the information sent by the terminal passes through the anchor point in the visited network during the routing process.

[0045] Furthermore, sending the security capability information of the first terminal includes: obtaining the address of the anchor point in the home network of the first terminal, and sending the security capability information to the anchor point in the home network based on the address of the anchor point in the home network.

[0046] Furthermore, if it is determined that the security protection method used for communication between the first terminal and multiple network elements in the same network is distributed security protection, the method further includes: sending protection method indication information, wherein the protection method indication information indicates that the security protection method used for communication between the first terminal and multiple network elements in the same network is distributed security protection.

[0047] In one possible design, the method further includes: receiving a key identifier of the first anchor point from the first anchor point, and associating the key identifier of the first anchor point with the key of the first anchor point.

[0048] Optionally, the key identifier of the first anchor point includes at least one of the following: information about the first anchor point, or information about the first network.

[0049] Optionally, the method further includes: sending a first service request to a first network element and sending a second service request to a second network element, wherein the first service request is used to request the first network element to provide services to the first terminal, and the second service request is used to request the second network element to provide services to the first terminal, and both the first service request and the second service request include a key identifier of the first anchor point.

[0050] In one possible design, the method further includes: receiving a first key identifier and a second key identifier, associating the first key identifier with a first key, and associating the second key identifier with a second key.

[0051] Optionally, receiving the first key identifier and the second key identifier includes: receiving the first key identifier and the second key identifier from the first anchor point; or, receiving the first key identifier from the first network element and receiving the second key identifier from the second network element.

[0052] Furthermore, the technical effects of the method described in the second aspect can be found in the relevant description of the method described in the first aspect, and will not be repeated here.

[0053] Thirdly, a communication device is provided. This communication device is used to perform the communication method described in either the first or second aspect.

[0054] In this application, the communication device described in the third aspect can be a terminal device or a network device, or a chip (system) or other component or assembly, or a device containing the terminal device or network device. The aforementioned chip (system) or other component or assembly can all be disposed within the terminal device or network device.

[0055] It should be understood that the communication apparatus described in the third aspect includes modules, units, or means that implement the communication method described in either the first or second aspect. These modules, units, or means can be implemented in hardware, software, or by hardware executing corresponding software. The hardware or software includes one or more modules or units for performing the functions involved in the aforementioned communication method.

[0056] Fourthly, a communication device is provided. The communication device includes a processor configured to execute the communication method described in any possible implementation of the first or second aspect.

[0057] In one possible design, the communication device described in the fourth aspect may further include a transceiver. This transceiver may be a transceiver circuit or an interface circuit. The transceiver can be used for communication between the communication device described in the fourth aspect and other communication devices.

[0058] In one possible design, the communication device described in the fourth aspect may further include a memory. This memory may be integrated with the processor or disposed separately. The memory may be used to store computer programs and / or data related to the communication method described in either the first or second aspect.

[0059] In this application, the communication device described in the fourth aspect can be a terminal device or a network device, or a chip (system) or other component or assembly, or a device containing the terminal device or network device. The aforementioned chip (system) or other component or assembly can all be disposed within the terminal device or network device. For example, when the communication device performs the method described in the first aspect, the communication device can be a network device; when the communication device performs the method described in the second aspect, the communication device can be a terminal device.

[0060] Fifthly, a communication device is provided. The communication device includes a processor coupled to a memory, the processor executing a computer program stored in the memory, such that the communication device performs the communication method described in any possible implementation of the first or second aspect.

[0061] In one possible design, the communication device described in the fifth aspect may further include a transceiver. This transceiver may be a transceiver circuit or an interface circuit. The transceiver can be used for communication between the communication device described in the fifth aspect and other communication devices.

[0062] In this application, the communication device described in the fifth aspect can be a terminal device or a network device, or a chip (system) or other component or assembly, or a device containing the terminal device or network device. The aforementioned chip (system) or other component or assembly can all be disposed within the terminal device or network device. For example, when the communication device performs the method described in the first aspect, the communication device can be a network device; when the communication device performs the method described in the second aspect, the communication device can be a terminal device.

[0063] A sixth aspect provides a communication device, comprising: a processor and a memory; the memory being used to store a computer program, which, when executed by the processor, causes the communication device to perform the communication method described in either the first or second aspect.

[0064] In one possible design, the communication device described in the sixth aspect may further include a transceiver. This transceiver may be a transceiver circuit or an interface circuit. The transceiver can be used for communication between the communication device described in the sixth aspect and other communication devices.

[0065] In this application, the communication device described in the sixth aspect can be a terminal device or a network device, or a chip (system) or other component or assembly, or a device containing the terminal device or network device. The aforementioned chip (system) or other component or assembly can all be disposed within the terminal device or network device. For example, when the communication device performs the method described in the first aspect, the communication device can be a network device; when the communication device performs the method described in the second aspect, the communication device can be a terminal device.

[0066] A seventh aspect provides a communication device comprising: a processor; the processor being configured to be coupled to a memory, and after reading a computer program from the memory, to execute a communication method as described in any implementation of the first or second aspect according to the computer program.

[0067] In one possible design, the communication device described in the seventh aspect may further include a transceiver. This transceiver may be a transceiver circuit or an interface circuit. The transceiver can be used for communication between the communication device described in the seventh aspect and other communication devices.

[0068] In this application, the communication device described in the seventh aspect can be a terminal device or a network device, or a chip (system) or other component or assembly, or a device containing the terminal device or network device. The aforementioned chip (system) or other component or assembly can all be disposed within the terminal device or network device. For example, when the communication device performs the method described in the first aspect, the communication device can be a network device; when the communication device performs the method described in the second aspect, the communication device can be a terminal device.

[0069] Eighthly, a processor is provided. The processor is configured to execute the communication method described in any possible implementation of the first or second aspect.

[0070] A ninth aspect provides a communication system. The communication system includes at least one of the following: a first anchor point for performing the method described in the first aspect, or a first terminal for performing the method described in the second aspect.

[0071] A tenth aspect provides a computer-readable storage medium comprising a computer program or instructions that, when executed, cause the communication method described in any possible implementation of the first or second aspect above to be performed.

[0072] Eleventhly, a computer program product is provided, comprising: a computer program or instructions that, when executed, cause the communication method described in any possible implementation of the first or second aspect above to be performed.

[0073] Furthermore, the technical effects of the aforementioned communication devices and systems can be referenced from the technical effects of the aforementioned communication methods, and will not be elaborated further. Attached Figure Description

[0074] Figure 1 A schematic diagram of the NAS protection process;

[0075] Figure 2 A diagram of the certification process. Figure 1 ;

[0076] Figure 3 A diagram of the certification process. Figure 2 ;

[0077] Figure 4 This is a flowchart illustrating the process of NAS SMC.

[0078] Figure 5 This is a schematic diagram of a centralized NAS architecture;

[0079] Figure 6 This is a schematic diagram of a distributed NAS architecture;

[0080] Figure 7 A schematic diagram of the architecture of a communication system provided in this application Figure 1 ;

[0081] Figure 8 A schematic diagram of the architecture of a communication system provided in this application Figure 2 ;

[0082] Figure 9 A schematic diagram of a key architecture for a communication system provided in this application Figure 1 ;

[0083] Figure 10 A schematic diagram of a key architecture for a communication system provided in this application Figure 2 ;

[0084] Figure 11 A schematic diagram of a key architecture for a communication system provided in this application Figure 3 ;

[0085] Figure 12 A schematic diagram of a key architecture for a communication system provided in this application Figure 4 ;

[0086] Figure 13 A flowchart illustrating a communication method provided in this application Figure 1 ;

[0087] Figure 14 A flowchart illustrating a communication method provided in this application Figure 2 ;

[0088] Figure 15 A flowchart illustrating a communication method provided in this application Figure 3 ;

[0089] Figure 16 A flowchart illustrating a communication method provided in this application Figure 4 ;

[0090] Figure 17 A flowchart illustrating a communication method provided in this application Figure 5 ;

[0091] Figure 18 A flowchart illustrating a communication method provided in this application Figure 6 ;

[0092] Figure 19 A flowchart illustrating a communication method provided in this application Figure 7 ;

[0093] Figure 20 A schematic diagram of the structure of a communication device provided in this application Figure 1 ;

[0094] Figure 21 A schematic diagram of the structure of a communication device provided in this application Figure 2 . Detailed Implementation

[0095] The technical solutions of this application embodiment can be applied to various communication systems, such as Wi-Fi wireless network systems, vehicle-to-everything (V2X) communication systems, device-to-device (D2D) communication systems, vehicle-to-everything (V2X) communication systems, fourth-generation (4G) mobile communication systems, such as long-term evolution (LTE) systems, worldwide interoperability for microwave access (WiMAX) communication systems, fifth-generation (5G) mobile communication systems, such as new radio (NR) systems, and future communication systems.

[0096] The technical solutions of this application embodiment can be applied to various communication systems, such as Wi-Fi wireless network systems, vehicle-to-everything (V2X) communication systems, device-to-device (D2D) communication systems, vehicle-to-everything (V2X) communication systems, fourth-generation (4G) mobile communication systems, such as long-term evolution (LTE) systems, worldwide interoperability for microwave access (WiMAX) communication systems, fifth-generation (5G) mobile communication systems, such as new radio (NR) systems, and future communication systems.

[0097] The technical terms and related technical solutions in this application will be described below with reference to the accompanying drawings.

[0098] 1. NAS Protocol:

[0099] The NAS protocol is a protocol used in 5G networks to manage and control signaling between the UE and the AMF (Active Signalling Controller) of the core network. The main functions of the NAS protocol include:

[0100] 1) Mobility Management: Responsible for UE registration, deregistration, location updates, and handover.

[0101] 2) Session Management: Manages the establishment, modification, and release of protocol data unit (PDU) sessions.

[0102] 3) Security features: including authentication, encryption and integrity protection, i.e. NAS.

[0103] 4) Identity Management: Handles temporary and permanent identifiers for UEs.

[0104] 5) Connection Management: Manages the connection state between the UE and the network (such as idle state and connected state), i.e., connection management state. There are two connection management (CM) states in the NAS protocol: one is CM-IDLE, which indicates that the UE has no signaling connection with the network, and the other is CM-CONNECTED, which indicates that the UE has a signaling connection with the network.

[0105] It should be understood that the difference between the NAS protocol and the access stratum (AS) protocol is that the NAS protocol runs on top of the AS protocol. The AS protocol is responsible for the communication between the UE and the radio access network (RAN), that is, it provides security protection for the communication between the UE and the RAN. The NAS protocol is responsible for the communication between the UE and the AMF, that is, it provides security protection for the communication between the UE and the AMF, which can be called NAS protection.

[0106] 2. Certification Process:

[0107] like Figure 1 As shown, the current process for establishing NAS protection in a 5G network includes the UE sending an initial NAS message and triggering authentication (S101), master authentication (S102), and NAS security negotiation and enabling security protection (S103-S104).

[0108] For S101, the UE first sends an initial NAS message (such as a registration request message) to the AMF, carrying the UE's subscription concealed identifier (SUCI) or globally unique temporary identity (5G-GUTI), the security capabilities supported by the UE, and the 5G key set identifier (ngKSI). SUCI is an encrypted and protected subscription permanent identifier (SUPI). 5G-GUTI is a temporary identifier that maps to SUPI. The AMF, security anchor function (SEAF), and UE all maintain the mapping between 5G-GUTI and SUPI. SEAF is typically deployed in conjunction with the AMF. The security capabilities supported by the UE include whether it supports Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) encryption protection (or confidentiality protection) and whether it supports AES integrity protection. ngKSI is used to index the key used for NAS protection.

[0109] For S102, the main authentication typically includes either the 5G AKA authentication process or the EAP AKA authentication process, as follows: Figure 2 as well as Figure 3 As shown.

[0110] like Figure 2 As shown, the specific certification process for 5G AKA is as follows:

[0111] S201, SEAF sends a UE authentication request message (Nausf_UEAuthentication_Authenticate Request) to the authentication server function (AUSF). Correspondingly, AUSF receives the UE authentication request message from SEAF.

[0112] The UE authentication request message is used to request AUSF to perform the authentication process. The UE authentication request message may include: SUCI or SUPI, and the service network name (SN-name).

[0113] Upon receiving the N1 message, SEAF can determine that the 5G-GUTI is valid and that the UE needs to be re-authenticated. Therefore, SEAF should include SUPI in the UE authentication request message; otherwise, it should include SUCI.

[0114] In step S202, AUSF sends a UE authentication get request message (Nudm_UEAuthentication_Get Request) to the unified data management function (UDM). Correspondingly, the UDM receives the UE authentication get request message from AUSF.

[0115] The UE Authentication Acquisition Request message is used to request the UDM to generate an authentication vector for subsequent authentication. The UE Authentication Acquisition Request message may include: SUCI or SUPI, and the serving network name.

[0116] Upon receiving the UE authentication request message, the AUSF can verify the serving network name, for example, by comparing the serving network name carried in the UE authentication request message with the expected serving network name. If the serving network name carried in the UE authentication request message matches the expected serving network name, the AUSF determines that the SEAF is authorized to use the serving network name and sends a UE authentication request message to the UDM. If the serving network name carried in the UE authentication request message does not match the expected serving network name, the AUSF determines that the SEAF is not authorized to use the serving network name, the process ends, and a message is sent to the SEAF indicating that the serving network is not authorized.

[0117] S203, UDM selects the authentication method.

[0118] If the UE authentication request message carries a SUCI, the UDM can invoke the subscription identifier de-concealing function (SIDF) to parse the SUCI and obtain the SUPI. Alternatively, the UDM can invoke the authentication credential repository and processing function (ARPF) to select the authentication method supported in the subscribed user data based on the SUPI. In this process, the UDM / ARPF determines the 5G authentication and key agreement (AKA) mechanism.

[0119] S204, UDM generates authentication vectors.

[0120] UDM / ARPF can generate authentication vectors corresponding to the 5G AKA mechanism, such as the 5G home environment authentication vector (5G HE AV). The authentication vector can include: a random number (RAND), an authentication token (AUTN), XRES*, and KAUSF. RAND and AUTN are used for UE authentication of the network. XRES* can be used for AUSF authentication of the UE. KAUSF can be used to protect information sent to the UE and can also be used for key derivation to obtain keys for subsequent communication, such as KAMF. XRES* and KAUSF can be derived from the root key and RAND.

[0121] Specifically, UDM / ARPF can generate several parameters, including: Message Authentication Code (MAC), Expected Response (XRES), Encryption Key (CK), Integrity Key (IK), and Anonymity Key (AK). MAC is calculated from the Sequence Number (SQN), RAND, AMF, and root key using algorithm f1. XRES is calculated from RAND and root key using algorithm f2. CK is calculated from root key and RAND using algorithm f3. IK is calculated from root key and RAND using algorithm f4. AK is calculated from root key and RAND using algorithm f5. Based on this, UDM / ARPF can obtain AUTN, which consists of: AK XORed with SQN (SQN XORed with AK) concatenated with AMF and MAC {AUTN = SQN ⊕ AK || AMF || MAC}. UDM / ARPF can deduce XRES* from XRES and RAND, using parameters such as the service network name, the length of the service network name, and the length of RAND. UDM / ARPF can also deduce KAUSF from IK and CK. At this point, all the parameters contained in the authentication vector have been deduced, thus generating the authentication vector.

[0122] S205, UDM sends a UE authentication obtained response (Nudm_UEAuthentication_Get Response) message to AUSF. Correspondingly, AUSF receives the UE authentication obtained response message from UDM.

[0123] The UE authentication acquisition response message is a response message to the aforementioned UE authentication acquisition request message. The UE authentication acquisition response message may include: an authentication vector and indication information, whereby the indication information indicates that the authentication vector is used for 5G AKA. Optionally, if the UE authentication acquisition request message carries a SUCI, the UE authentication acquisition response message may also include: a SUPI.

[0124] S206, AUSF storage XRES*, derivation HXRES* and KSEAF.

[0125] After receiving the UE authentication response message, the AUSF can store XRES*, or XRES* and SUPI, for subsequent authentication. The AUSF can deduce HXRES* from XRES*, which can be used by the SEAF to authenticate the UE. The AUSF can also deduce KSEAF from KAUSF, which can be used for SEAF key deduction to obtain KAMF.

[0126] S207, AUSF sends a UE authentication response (Nausf_UEAuthentication_AuthenticateResponse) message to SEAF. Correspondingly, SEAF receives the UE authentication response message from AUSF.

[0127] In S207, the UE authentication response message is a response message to the UE authentication request message in S201. The UE authentication response message may include an authentication vector, such as the 5G serving environment authentication vector (5G SE AV). The authentication vector may include RAND, AUTN, and HXRES*. That is, AUSF replaces XRES* in the authentication vector with HXRES* and removes KAUSF from the authentication vector to obtain the authentication vector.

[0128] S208, SEAF sends an authentication request message to UE. Correspondingly, UE receives the authentication request message from SEAF.

[0129] The authentication request message can be a NAS message used to request UE authentication of the network. The authentication request message may include: RAND, AUTN, 5G key set identifier (ngKSI), and anti-bidding down between architectures (ABBA) parameters. The ngKSI can be determined by SEAF and used by the UE and AMF to identify KAMF and part of the native security context. The ABBA parameters can be determined by SEAF and used to deduce KAMF.

[0130] S209, UE derivation RES*.

[0131] RES* is used to authenticate the UE.

[0132] The UE can include mobile equipment (ME) and a universal subscriber identity module (USIM). Upon receiving the authentication request message, the USIM verifies the AUTN using RAND and its own root key. If the USIM fails to verify the AUTN, it indicates that the UE's network authentication has failed, and the process ends. If the USIM successfully verifies the AUTN, it indicates that the UE's network authentication has succeeded. Based on this, the USIM can use the root key and RAND to deduce RES, CK, and IK, and send RES, CK, and IK to the ME. The ME can deduce KAUSF based on CK and IK, and then deduce KSEAF based on KAUSF. The ME can also deduce RES* based on RES, and then execute S210.

[0133] S210, the UE sends an authentication response message to the SEAF. Correspondingly, the SEAF receives the authentication response message from the UE.

[0134] The authentication response message can be a NAS message, used to respond to the authentication request message described above. The authentication response message may include: RES*.

[0135] S211, SEAF certified UE.

[0136] After receiving the authentication response message, SEAF can deduce HRES* from RES* and compare HRES* with the previously obtained HXRES*. If HRES* and HXRES* do not match, it means that the UE authentication has failed and the authentication process ends. If HRES* and HXRES* match, it means that the UE authentication has passed, or in other words, the service network considers the authentication to be successful, and then executes S213.

[0137] S212, SEAF sends a UE authentication request message to AUSF. Correspondingly, AUSF receives the UE authentication request message from SEAF.

[0138] The UE authentication request message is used to request UE authentication. The UE authentication request message may include: RES*.

[0139] S213, AUSF certified UE.

[0140] After receiving the UE authentication request message, the AUSF compares RES* with the previously stored XRES*. If RES* and XRES* do not match, it indicates that UE authentication has failed, and the process ends. If RES* and XRES* match, it indicates that UE authentication has succeeded, or in other words, from the perspective of the home network, authentication is considered successful, and then S214 is executed. The AUSF can also determine the stored KAUSF based on the local network operator's policy.

[0141] S214, AUSF sends a UE authentication response message to SEAF. Correspondingly, SEAF receives the UE authentication response message from AUSF.

[0142] In S214, the UE authentication response message is a response message to the UE authentication request message in S212, used to indicate that the UE authentication has been successful. The UE authentication response message may include: KSEAF. Optionally, if the UE authentication request message carries SUCI, the UE authentication response message may also include: SUPI. Upon receiving the UE authentication response message, SEAF can deduce KAMF based on KSEAF, the ABBA parameters, and SUPI, and send ngKSI and KAMF to AMF.

[0143] If the UE authentication request message carries SUCI, meaning SUCI is used for this authentication, then SEAF should only provide ngKSI and KAMF to AMF after receiving the UE authentication response message, i.e., the UE authentication response message containing SUPI, so that the serving network will not provide communication services to the UE before that.

[0144] In addition, after successful authentication, the UE can also deduce the KAMF based on the KSEAF, ABBA parameters, and SUPI. At this point, both the UE and AMF have obtained the same key, namely the KAMF. Both parties can use this key to further deduce the encryption key and / or integrity protection key, and use the deduced key to securely protect the information between the UE and AMF, ensuring communication security.

[0145] like Figure 3 As shown, the certification process for EAP AKA is as follows:

[0146] S301, SEAF sends a UE authentication request message to AUSF. Correspondingly, AUSF receives the UE authentication request message from SEAF.

[0147] S302, AUSF sends a UE authentication request message to UDM. Correspondingly, UDM receives the UE authentication request message from AUSF.

[0148] The specific implementation principles of S301-S302 are similar to those of S201-S202 above, and can be understood by reference, so they will not be repeated here.

[0149] S303, UDM selects the authentication method.

[0150] If the UE authentication request message carries a SUCI, the UDM can call the SIDF to parse the SUCI and obtain the SUPI. Alternatively, the UDM can call the ARPF to select the authentication method supported in the subscribed user data based on the SUPI. In this process, the UDM / ARPF determines the selection of the 'Extensible Authentication Protocol (EAP)-AKA' mechanism.

[0151] S304, UDM generates authentication vectors.

[0152] UDM / ARPF can generate authentication vectors corresponding to the EAP-AKA mechanism, such as the transformed authentication vector AV'. Authentication vectors can include RAND, AUTN, XRES, and CK' and IK'. The specific implementation principles of RAND, AUTN, and XRES can be found in the relevant descriptions in S405 above, and will not be repeated here. CK' and IK' can be derived from the root key and RAND. For example, UDM / ARPF derives CK and IK, and then derives CK' and IK' from CK and IK. The specific implementation principles of CK and IK can be found in the relevant descriptions in S405 above, and will not be repeated here.

[0153] S305, UDM sends a UE authentication obtained response message to AUSF. Correspondingly, AUSF receives the UE authentication obtained response message from UDM.

[0154] The UE authentication obtained response message is used to respond to the aforementioned UE authentication obtained request message. The UE authentication obtained response message may include: an authentication vector and indication information, the indication information indicating that the authentication vector is used for EAP-AKA'. Optionally, if the UE authentication obtained request message carries SUCI, the UE authentication obtained response message may also include: SUPI.

[0155] S306, AUSF sends a UE authentication response message to SEAF. Correspondingly, SEAF receives the UE authentication response message from AUSF.

[0156] In S306, the UE authentication response message is used to respond to the UE authentication request message in S301. The UE authentication response message may include: an EAP-Request message and an AKA'-Challenge message. The EAP-Request message and AKA'-Challenge message can be determined based on the response message obtained from UE authentication, and the message includes RAND and AUTN.

[0157] S307, SEAF sends an authentication request message to UE. Correspondingly, UE receives the authentication request message from SEAF.

[0158] The authentication request message can be a NAS message used to request UE authentication of the network. The authentication request message can include an EAP request message / AKA' challenge message. That is, after receiving the UE authentication response message, the SEAF can further encapsulate the EAP request message / AKA' challenge message from the UE authentication response message into an authentication request message to transparently transmit the EAP request message / AKA' challenge message to the UE. In addition, the SEAF's authentication request message can also include ngKSI and ABBA parameters. The specific implementation principles of ngKSI and ABBA parameters are similar to those described in S409 above, and can be referred to for understanding; they will not be repeated here. Furthermore, during the EAP-AKA' authentication process, the ngKSI value and ABBA parameter sent by the SEAF to the UE cannot be changed.

[0159] S308, UE simulation RES.

[0160] RES is used to authenticate the UE.

[0161] The UE can include the ME and the USIM. After receiving the authentication request message, the USIM can verify the AUTN using the RAND and its own root key. If the USIM fails to verify the AUTN, it indicates that the UE's network authentication has failed, and the authentication process ends. If the USIM successfully verifies the AUTN, it indicates that the UE's network authentication has succeeded. Based on this, the USIM can use the root key and RAND to deduce RES, as well as CK and IK, and send RES, CK, and IK to the ME. The ME can deduce CK' and IK' based on CK and IK.

[0162] S309, the UE sends an authentication response message to the SEAF. Correspondingly, the SEAF receives the authentication response message from the UE.

[0163] The authentication response message can be a NAS message, used to respond to the authentication request message mentioned above. The authentication response message may include: an EAP response message / AKA challenge message. The EAP response message / AKA challenge message may include: RES.

[0164] S310, SEAF sends a UE authentication request message to AUSF. Correspondingly, AUSF receives the UE authentication request message from SEAF.

[0165] The UE authentication request message is used to request UE authentication. The UE authentication request message may include an EAP response message and an AKA' challenge message. That is, after receiving the authentication response message, the SEAF can further encapsulate the EAP response message and AKA' challenge message from the authentication response message into the UE authentication request message, and then transmit the EAP response message and AKA' challenge message to the AUSF.

[0166] S311, AUSF certified UE.

[0167] After receiving the UE authentication request message, AUSF compares the RES in the EAP response message / AKA' challenge message with the locally stored XRES. If RES and XRES do not match, it indicates that UE authentication has failed, and the authentication process ends. If RES and XRES match, it indicates that UE authentication has succeeded, and then S312 is executed.

[0168] S312, AUSF sends a UE authentication response message to SEAF. Correspondingly, SEAF receives the UE authentication response message from AUSF.

[0169] In S312, the UE authentication response message is a response message to the UE authentication request message. The UE authentication response message may include: an EAP success message to indicate successful authentication, and may also include: KSEAF. Optionally, if the UE authentication request message carries SUCI, the UE authentication response message may also include: SUPI. It can be understood that after the AUSF confirms successful authentication, it can deduce the EMSK based on CK' and IK', and determine KSEAF based on the EMSK. Specifically, the AUSF determines the first 256 bits of the EMSK as KAUSF, and then deduces KSEAF based on KAUSF. Correspondingly, after receiving the UE authentication response message, the SEAF can deduce KAMF based on KSEAF, ABBA parameters, and SUPI, and send ngKSI and KAMF to the AMF.

[0170] It should be noted that if the UE authentication request message carries SUCI, i.e. SUCI is used for authentication, then SEAF should only provide ngKSI and KAMF to AMF after receiving the UE authentication response message, i.e., the UE authentication response message containing SUPI, so that the serving network will not provide communication services to the UE before that.

[0171] S313, SEAF sends an N1 message to UE. Correspondingly, UE receives the N1 message from SEAF.

[0172] The N1 message may include: an EAP success message, ngKSI, and ABBA parameters. Thus, after successful authentication, the UE can deduce the KAMF based on the KSEAF, ABBA parameters, and SUPI. At this point, both the UE and AMF have obtained the same key, the KAMF. Both parties can use this key to further deduce the encryption key and / or integrity protection key, and use the deduced key to securely protect the information between the UE and AMF, ensuring secure communication.

[0173] As can be seen, in the master authentication process, after the master authentication is successful (i.e., S214 or S312), SEAF(AMF) receives the master authentication success message, obtains the UE's identity SUPI, and also obtains the key KSEAF. In addition, SEAF(AMF) can also obtain the key index ngKSI.

[0174] like Figure 4 As shown, the specific process for NAS security negotiation and enabling security protection for S103-S104 above is as follows:

[0175] S401, AMF indexes the UE's security context based on SUPI and ngKSI, and enables integrity protection.

[0176] S402, AMF sends a NAS security mode command message to UE.

[0177] The NAS security mode command message carries the ngKSI and information indicating the encryption algorithm and integrity protection algorithm selected by the AMF, such as the identifiers of the encryption algorithm and integrity protection algorithm. The NAS security mode command message also carries a Message Authentication Code (MAC), denoted as MAC#1. MAC#1 can be obtained through the UE's security context by verifying the integrity protection of the entire NAS security mode command message (including the identifiers of the encryption algorithm and integrity protection algorithm).

[0178] S403, AMF enables uplink decryption.

[0179] In S404, the UE indexes the security context of the UE based on the ngKSI received in S402 and its own SUPI, and performs integrity verification.

[0180] The UE can use its security context to calculate the message verification code (MAC#2) for the entire NAS security mode command message received from S402, and verify whether MAC#1 and MAC#2 are consistent. If they are consistent, the integrity verification is successful; otherwise, the verification fails. The UE also verifies whether the UE security capabilities sent by the AMF are the same as the UE security capabilities stored in the UE. If all verifications are successful, the UE enables uplink encryption, downlink decryption, and integrity protection.

[0181] S405, the UE sends a NAS security mode complete message to the AMF;

[0182] The UE can use its security context to encrypt and protect the integrity of NAS security mode completion messages, which can indicate whether the integrity verification of S404 was successful or failed.

[0183] S406, AMF enables downlink encryption.

[0184] AMF decrypts and verifies the integrity of messages completed in NAS security mode. If the verification is successful, AMF enables downlink encryption.

[0185] It should be understood that NAS security negotiation and enabling security protection can also be referred to as NAS protection enabling, NAS protection activation, or NAS security activation.

[0186] Based on the above process, it can be seen that the current NAS protocol in 5G networks is a centralized NAS protocol, meaning that the UE only establishes end-to-end NAS protection with the AMF. For example... Figure 5 As shown, NAS messages transmitted between the UE and AMF can be encrypted and / or protected for integrity through the NAS protocol. After the UE transmits the NAS message to the AMF, the AMF first decrypts and verifies the integrity protection of the NAS message before forwarding the message to the corresponding network element. For example, if the message is a PDU session creation message, which is encapsulated in a NAS message, the AMF first parses the PDU session creation message from the NAS message and then forwards it to the session management function (SMF).

[0187] In future networks, a distributed architecture may be adopted, where the UE and each network function (NF) transmit NAS messages separately. For example, ... Figure 6As shown, the UE first sends the NAS message to the RAN device, and then the RAN device sends the NAS message to the network function used for signaling distribution (or signaling routing) in the network. The network function then forwards the NAS message to other corresponding network functions. For example, NAS message #1 is forwarded to the corresponding network function #1, NAS message #2 is forwarded to the corresponding network function #2, NAS message #i is forwarded to the corresponding network function #i, etc. In this case, how to improve the communication security between the UE and each network function is a problem currently under research.

[0188] To address the aforementioned technical problems, this application proposes the following technical solutions. The technical solutions in this application will now be described in conjunction with the accompanying drawings.

[0189] This application will present various aspects, embodiments, or features relating to systems that may include multiple devices, components, modules, etc. It should be understood and appreciated that individual systems may include additional devices, components, modules, etc., and / or may not include all the devices, components, modules, etc. discussed in conjunction with the accompanying drawings. Furthermore, combinations of these approaches are also possible.

[0190] Furthermore, in the embodiments of this application, words such as "exemplarily" and "for example" are used to indicate that something is an example, illustration, or description. Any embodiment or design that is described as an "example" in this application should not be construed as being better or more advantageous than other embodiments or designs. Rather, the use of the word "example" is intended to present the concept in a specific manner.

[0191] First, in this application, "for indicating" can include both direct and indirect indication. When describing "information" for indicating A, it can include whether the information directly indicates A or indirectly indicates A, but does not necessarily mean that the information carries A.

[0192] The information indicated by a given piece of information is called the information to be indicated. In the specific implementation process, there are many ways to indicate the information to be indicated, such as, but not limited to, directly indicating the information to be indicated, such as the information to be indicated itself or its index. It can also be indirectly indicated by indicating other information, where there is a relationship between the other information and the information to be indicated. It can also indicate only a part of the information to be indicated, while the other parts are known or pre-agreed upon. For example, the indication of specific information can be achieved by using a pre-agreed (e.g., protocol-defined) arrangement of various pieces of information, thereby reducing the indication overhead to some extent. At the same time, common parts of various pieces of information can be identified and indicated uniformly to reduce the indication overhead caused by individually indicating the same information.

[0193] Furthermore, the specific indication method can also be any existing indication method, such as, but not limited to, the above-mentioned indication methods and their various combinations. Specific details of various indication methods can be found in existing technologies, and will not be repeated here. As described above, for example, when multiple pieces of information of the same type need to be indicated, the indication methods for different pieces of information may differ. In the specific implementation process, the required indication method can be selected according to specific needs. This application embodiment does not limit the selected indication method; therefore, the indication methods involved in this application embodiment should be understood to cover various methods that enable the party to be indicated to obtain the information to be indicated.

[0194] Second, in the embodiments shown below, the first, second, and various numerical designations are merely distinctions for descriptive convenience and are not intended to limit the scope of the embodiments of this application. For example, to distinguish different indication information.

[0195] Third, "pre-set," "predefined," or "pre-configured" can be achieved by pre-saving corresponding codes, tables, or other means of indicating relevant information in the device (e.g., including terminal devices and network devices), or by pre-defining them in a protocol. This application does not limit the specific implementation method. "Saving" can refer to saving in one or more memories. These memories can be separate installations or integrated into the encoder, decoder, processor, or communication device. Alternatively, some memories can be separately installed, while others are integrated into the decoder, processor, or communication device. The type of memory can be any form of storage medium, and this application does not specifically limit this.

[0196] Fourth, the “protocol” involved in the embodiments of this application may refer to standard protocols in the field of communication, such as 3GPP’s LTE protocols (such as technical specification (TS) 36, i.e., the TS36 series of technical specifications), NR protocols (such as the TS38 series of technical specifications), and related protocols applied to future communication systems. This application does not limit this.

[0197] The network architecture and business scenarios described in the embodiments of this application are for the purpose of more clearly illustrating the technical solutions of the embodiments of this application, and do not constitute a limitation on the technical solutions provided in the embodiments of this application. As those skilled in the art will know, with the evolution of network architecture and the emergence of new business scenarios, the technical solutions provided in the embodiments of this application are also applicable to similar technical problems.

[0198] To facilitate understanding of the embodiments of this application, let's first take... Figure 7 The communication system illustrated herein is used as an example to illustrate a communication system applicable to embodiments of this application. For example, Figure 7 This is a schematic diagram of the architecture of a communication system to which the method provided in the embodiments of this application applies.

[0199] like Figure 7 As shown, the communication system mainly includes: a first terminal, a first anchor point, and multiple network elements.

[0200] The first terminal is a terminal device with wireless transceiver capabilities.

[0201] For example, the first terminal can also be called user equipment (UE), mobile station, mobile terminal, etc. Terminal equipment can be widely used in various scenarios, such as D2D, V2X communication, machine-to-machine communication, Internet of Things (IoT), virtual reality, augmented reality, industrial control, autonomous driving, telemedicine, smart grids, smart furniture, smart offices, smart wearables, smart transportation, smart cities, etc. Terminals can be mobile phones, tablets, computers with wireless transceiver capabilities, wearable devices, vehicles, airplanes, ships, robots, robotic arms, smart home devices, etc. The first terminal can access (or register or attach to) a network. This first network can be an operator network, such as a public land mobile network (PLMN), or it can be a newly defined network in the future, such as a distributed subnet, without specific limitations. Taking PLMN as an example, in non-roaming scenarios, the network accessed by the first terminal is the home network of the first terminal, such as the home public land mobile network (HPLMN); in roaming scenarios, the network accessed by the first terminal is the visited network of the first terminal, such as the visited public land mobile network (HPLMN).

[0202] The first anchor point can provide security services to the first terminal, such as authentication, key derivation and distribution.

[0203] For example, the first anchor point can be a security anchor function (SEAF) or an authentication server function (AUSF), or it can be a newly defined network element, such as the next-generation security anchor function (ngSeF). Of course, this application does not limit the naming of the first anchor point; any network element / entity / agent that can be used to implement security-related functions can be understood as the first anchor point in this application. The first anchor point can be deployed independently or co-located with other network elements, such as co-located with the task control function (TCF) or the access and mobility management function (AMF). The first anchor point is deployed in a network, such as the first network, meaning the first anchor point is an anchor point within the first network. At this point, if the first network is the home network of the first terminal, the first anchor point can also be called the security anchor point of HPLMN, such as HPLMN_ngSeF. If the first network is the visited network of the first terminal, the first anchor point can also be called the security anchor point of VPLMN, such as VPLMN_ngSeF.

[0204] Multiple network elements can be network elements in the first network that can provide services to the first terminal.

[0205] It should be understood that the services provided by multiple network elements to the first terminal are different from the services provided by the first anchor point. In other words, multiple network elements can be understood as other network elements in the network besides the first anchor point that can serve the first terminal.

[0206] For example, multiple network elements may include a first network element and a second network element.

[0207] The first network element and the second network element can be network elements of different types / functions. For example, the first network element can be a network element responsible for access and mobility management, such as an AMF or a newly defined network element in the future, that is, it can be used to provide access and mobility management services for the first terminal; the second network element can be a network element responsible for session management, such as an SMF or a newly defined network element in the future, that is, it can be used to provide session management services for the first terminal. Alternatively, the first network element and the second network element can also be different network elements of the same type / function, such as the first network element and the second network element being two AMFs, or the first network element and the second network element being two SMFs. It should be understood that the above uses AMF and SMF as examples, but is not a specific limitation. For example, it can also be a policy control function (PCF), a network data analytics function (NWDAF), or a newly defined network element in the future, etc.

[0208] It should be understood that multiple network elements can include even more network elements. This application embodiment uses the first network element and the second network element as examples. In addition, network elements can also be referred to as network functions (NF), network entities, etc., without specific limitations.

[0209] like Figure 8 As shown, the communication system can adopt a distributed architecture, meaning the first terminal can perform end-to-end NAS communication with each network element through the RAN and routing network elements (optional), such as communicating with the first anchor point, the first network element, and the second network element. To this end, the first anchor point can use the key architecture described in this embodiment to perform key derivation. This not only derives or obtains the NAS key used by the first anchor point itself, but also derives the NAS keys used by each network element and sends them to the corresponding network element. This allows for end-to-end security protection of the communication between the first terminal and each network element through these NAS keys.

[0210] The key architecture in the embodiments of this application is described below.

[0211] like Figure 9 One possible key architecture is shown, such as Figure 9 As shown, taking the UE as the first terminal, ngSeF as the first anchor point, and NF as the network element as an example, the key architecture mainly includes three layers of keys. The first layer of keys is the long-term key of the UE stored in the data management network element. The second layer of keys are the anchor keys of HPLMN_ngSeF and VPLMN_ngSeF stored respectively. The third layer of keys is the key between the UE and the NF (i.e., other NFs besides ngSeF) stored in HPLMN and VPLMN respectively.

[0212] The relationship between the Layer 1 and Layer 2 keys is as follows: The Data Management Function (DMF) derives the HPLMN_ngSeF key (the anchor key of the HPLMN) based on the UE's long-term key and sends it to HPLMN_ngSeF. HPLMN_ngSeF derives the VPLMN_ngSeF key (the anchor key of the VPLMN) based on the HPLMN_ngSeF key and sends it to VPLMN_ngSeF. The relationship between the Layer 2 and Layer 3 keys is as follows: HPLMN_ngSeF derives the keys of other network elements (NFs) in the HPLMN based on the HPLMN_ngSeF key and sends them to those NFs. Each NF uses the received key to derive a NAS key for security protection of its NAS communication with the UE. The same applies to VPLMN_ngSeF. Under this key architecture, the UE (including USIM and ME) and its network peers can generate the same keys based on the same key architecture and use the generated keys to protect message interactions between the UE and the peer.

[0213] It should be understood that the data management network element is mainly responsible for functions such as transmitting the UE's subscription data / configuration parameters, subscribing to updates of the UE's subscription data / configuration parameters, and discovering roaming-state data management services. The data management network element can be a DMF. The embodiments of this application do not limit the naming of the DMF. Any network element / agent / entity that can implement one or more of the above functions can be a DMF. For example, the DMF can be a UDM, or a network element newly defined in the future.

[0214] Furthermore, Figure 10 A more detailed key architecture is shown, such as Figure 10 As shown, the key architecture includes the following keys: K, CK, IK, CK', IK', K ngSeF_HPLMN 、Kng SeF_VPLMN K NFi_HPLMN K NFi_VPLMN K NFi_NASint_HPLMN K NFi_NASenc_HPLMN K NFi_AEAD_HPLMN K NFi_NASint_VPLMN K NFi_NASenc_VPLMN K NFi_AEAD_VPLMN K gNB It should be noted that the key architecture described above is merely an example. Understandably, some key layers may become negligible due to future network architecture adjustments or other design considerations. For instance, the network side and the UE may not generate CK and IK.

[0215] It should be understood that during the key derivation process, both the network side and the UE will derive the aforementioned key separately, which will be described below.

[0216] Key derivation on the network side:

[0217] 1)K ngSeF_HPLMN :

[0218] K ngSeF_HPLMN The key for HPLMN_ngSeF can also be called the anchor key of HPLMN. The anchor key of HPLMN means that other keys in HPLMN are usually based on K. ngSeF_HPLMN This was deduced.

[0219] In the UE authentication process, if EAP AKA' is used for authentication, then the DMF needs to derive CK,IK from K, then derive CK',IK' from CK,IK, and finally derive K from CK',IK'. ngSeF_HPLMN If the certification uses xG AKA, then the DMF needs to derive CK and IK from K, and directly derive K from CK and IK. ngSeF_HPLMN xG can represent a generation, such as 5G or future generations. For example, ... Figure 10 and Figure 11 As shown, if authentication uses xG AKA, then the DMF takes the service network name (SN name), SQN⊕AK, and CK, IK as inputs to the key derivation functions (KDF) to derive K. ngSeF_HPLMN For details, please refer to the relevant introduction in TS33.501A.2, which will not be repeated here. If the authentication adopts EAP AKA', then the DMF will use CK', IK' and RFC5448 parameters as inputs to the KDF to derive K. ngSeF_HPLMN For details, please refer to the relevant introduction in TS 33.501 6.1.3.1, which will not be repeated here. DMF will derive K. ngSeF_HPLMN Send to HPLMN_ngSeF.

[0220] It should be understood that CK,IK and CK',IK' mentioned above are merely examples, and others can be replaced with any other possible keys, such as replacing them with a single key to perform their function, or replacing them with multiple keys to perform their function, without any specific restrictions.

[0221] 2)Kng SeF_VPLMN :

[0222] K ngSeF_VPLMN The key for VPLMN_ngSeF can also be called the anchor key of VPLMN. The anchor key of VPLMN means that other keys in VPLMN are usually based on K. ngSeF_VPLMN This was deduced.

[0223] If the UE is roaming in the VPLMN, then the DMF derives K. ngSeF_HPLMN In the case of DMF from K ngSeF_HPLMN Derivation of K ngSeF_VPLMN For example, such as Figure 10 and Figure 11 As shown, DMF will K ngSeF_HPLMN And parameters such as the service network name are used as inputs to KDF to derive K. ngSeF_VPLMN For details, please refer to the relevant introduction in TS 33.501A.6, which will not be repeated here. DMF will derive K. ngSeF_VPLMN Send to VPLMN_ngSeF.

[0224] 3)K NFi_HPLMN :

[0225] K NFi_HPLMN This is the key associated with the NFi of the HPLMMN, also known as the NAS anchor key associated with the NFi. It indicates that the NAS key used to securely protect the communication between the NFi and the UE needs to be based on this key. NFi_HPLMN This was deduced.

[0226] K NFi_HPLMN By K ngSeF_HPLMN It is deduced. For example... Figure 10 and Figure 11 As shown, VPLMN_ngSeF can K ngSeF_HPLMN Using parameters such as information from NFi as input to KDF, K is derived. NFi_HPLMN Specifically, it could be K NFi_HPLMN =KDF(S,K ngSeF_HPLMNS = FC||P0||L0||P1||L1||P2||L2; FC is 0x6D, or any other fixed number, without specific restrictions; P0 is the UE's International Mobile Subscriber Identity (IMSI), NAI, GCI, or GLI, network access identifier (NAI), global cable identifier (GCI), or global line identifier (GLI). L0 is the length value of P0, P1 is the ABBA parameter, L1 is the length value of P1, P2 is the NFi information, and L2 is the length value of P2. The NFi information can indicate the NFi or the service provided by the NFi, such as including at least one of the following: service type, service name, NFi type, NFi name, or NFi ID.

[0227] It should be understood that P2 and L2 are mainly used for key isolation, and the keys used to implement different NFs are also different.

[0228] It should also be understood that if NFi is HPLMN_ngSeF, then K NFi_HPLMN It can also be K ngSeF_HPLMN That is, the HPLMN anchor key and the NAS anchor key are the same key. In this case, the HPLMN_ngSeF NAS key can be directly obtained from K. ngSeF_HPLMN We obtain it without needing to deduce it again. Or, K NFi_HPLMN It can also be K ngSeF_HPLMN This can be deduced.

[0229] 4)K NFi_VPLMN :

[0230] K NFi_VPLMN This is the key associated with the VPLMN's NFi, also known as the NAS anchor key associated with that NFi. It indicates that the NAS key used for secure communication between the NFi and the UE needs to be based on this key. NFi_HPLMN This was deduced.

[0231] K NFi_VPLMN By K ngSeF_VPLMN It is deduced. For example... Figure 10 and Figure 11 As shown, VPLMN_ngSeF can K ngSeF_HPLMN Using parameters such as information from NFi as input to KDF, K is derived.NFi_VPLMN Specifically, it could be K NFi_HPLMN =KDF(S,K ngSeF_HPLMN ), where S = FC||P0||L0||P1||L1||P2||L2, and the specific implementation is the same as the above K. NFi_HPLMN Similarly, you can refer to this for understanding, and I will not go into details here.

[0232] 5)K NFi_NASint_HPLMN K NFi_NASenc_HPLMN K NFi_AEAD_HPLMN :

[0233] K NFi_NASint_HPLMN K NFi_NASenc_HPLMN K NFi_AEAD_HPLMN The NAS key associated with the NFi of HPLMN.

[0234] Among them, K NFi_NASint_HPLMN This is the NAS integrity protection key associated with the NFi of the HPLMMN, used for integrity protection of communication (or NAS communication) between the UE and the NFi. NFi_NASenc_HPLMN K is the NAS confidentiality protection key associated with the NFi of the HPLMMN, used to protect the confidentiality of communication between the UE and the NFi. NFi_AEAD_HPLMN The NAS confidentiality and integrity protection key associated with the NFi of HPLMMN, namely K NFi_AEAD_HPLMN It is used not only for confidentiality protection of communication between UE and NFi, but also for integrity protection of communication between UE and NFi.

[0235] K NFi_NASint_HPLMN K NFi_NASenc_HPLMN and K NFi_AEAD_HPLMN All by K NFi_HPLMN This can be deduced.

[0236] For example, such as Figure 10 and Figure 11 As shown, HPLMN's NFi will K NFi_HPLMN The algorithm type distinguishers ID (Alg-ID) and the algorithm identifier of AEAD (N-NAS-AEAD-alg) are used as inputs to KDF to derive K. NFi_NASint_HPLMN Understandably, K NFi_NASenc_HPLMN The deduction method and K NFi_NASint_HPLMN This is consistent; please refer to the relevant introduction in TS 33.501A.8, which will not be repeated here. Furthermore, K... NFi_AEAD_HPLMN The specific deduction method can be compared with K. NFi_NASint_HPLMNSimilarly, the difference is that in the input of KDF, the values ​​of the parameters in the algorithm type distinguisher (Alg) can be different. For example, the value of N-NAS-AEAD-alg can be set to 0x07, the value of N-RRC-AEAD-alg can be set to 0x08, and the value of N-UP-AEAD-alg can be set to 0x09.

[0237] 6)K NFi_NASint_VPLMN K NFi_NASenc_VPLMN K NFi_AEAD_VPLMN :

[0238] K NFi_NASint_VPLMN K NFi_NASenc_VPLMN K NFi_AEAD_VPLMN The NAS key associated with the VPLMN's NFi.

[0239] Among them, K NFi_NASint_VPLMN K is the NAS integrity protection key associated with the NFi of the VPLMN. NFi_NASenc_VPLMN K is the NAS confidentiality protection key associated with the NFi of the VPLMN. NFi_AEAD_VPLMN The NAS confidentiality and integrity protection key associated with the NFi of the VPLMN is implemented in the same way as the K mentioned above. NFi_NASint_HPLMN K NFi_NASenc_HPLMN K NFi_AEAD_HPLMN Similarly, you can refer to this for understanding, and I will not go into details here.

[0240] It should be understood that K gNB K is the AS key for the RAN that the UE accesses. If the UE roams to the VPLMN, that is, the UE accesses the VPLMN through the RAN in the VPLMN, then K gNB Can be made by Kng SeF_VPLMN It is deduced that, for example, from Kng SeF_VPLMN K is derived gNB And NH. If the UE is not roaming, that is, the UE accesses the HPLMMN through the RAN in the HPLMMN, then K gNB Can be made by Kng SeF_HPLMN It is deduced that, for example, from Kng SeF_HPLMN K is derived gNB and NH, K gNB For specific derivation methods, please refer to the relevant introductions in TS 33.501A.9 and A.10, which will not be repeated here.

[0241] UE key derivation:

[0242] like Figure 10 and Figure 12As shown, USIM stores K. In the authentication process, USIM derives CK and IK from K and sends them to ME. ME receives CK and IK from USIM. For EAP AKA', USIM derives CK' and IK' from CK and IK, and then derives K from CK' and IK'. ngSeF_HPLMN For xG AKA, USIM directly derives K from CK and IK. ngSeF_HPLMN After that, USIM then went from K ngSeF_HPLMN The deduction yielded Kng SeF_VPLMN K NFi_HPLMN K NFi_VPLMN K NFi_NASint_HPLMN K NFi_NASenc_HPLMN K NFi_AEAD_HPLMN K NFi_NASint_VPLMN K NFi_NASenc_VPLMN K NFi_AEAD_VPLMN K gNB The specific deduction method is the same as that of the network side mentioned above. You can refer to the relevant introduction of the network side mentioned above, and it will not be repeated here.

[0243] It should be understood that the above key architecture takes roaming scenarios into account. If roaming scenarios are not considered, i.e., if there is no restriction on whether the PLMN is a VPLMN or an HPLMN, then among the multiple keys included in the above key architecture, K ngSeF_HPLMN and Kng SeF_VPLMN It can be expressed as K ngSeF K NFi_HPLMN and K NFi_VPLMN It can be expressed as K NFi K NFi_NASint_HPLMN and K NFi_NASint_VPLMN It can be expressed as K NFi_NASint K NFi_NASenc_HPLMN and K NFi_NASenc_VPLMN It can be expressed as K NFi_NASenc K NFi_AEAD_HPLMN and K NFi_AEAD_VPLMN It can be expressed as K NFi_AEAD .

[0244] In this embodiment of the application, since each NF can have its own associated NAS anchor key, that is, there can be multiple NAS anchor keys, each NAS anchor key can be indicated by a corresponding key identifier to distinguish each NAS anchor key.

[0245] For example, a key identifier may include at least one of the following: information about a network element, or information about the network to which the network element resides, to distinguish the NAS anchor key of the network element from those of other network elements. The information about the network element may include at least one of the following: the identifier of the network element, the name of the network element, the type of the network element, or information indicating the services that the network element can provide, such as the name and / or type of the service. The information about the network to which the network element resides may be the identifier and / or name of the network.

[0246] Specifically, the key identifier can be a key set identifier (KSI), which can be a next-generation key set identifier (ngKSI) or any other possible name, without specific limitations. In this case, the information of the aforementioned network element and / or the network to which the network element belongs can be newly added information in the KSI. For example, some exemplary structures of the KSI can be shown in Table 1 or Table 2 below.

[0247] Table 1

[0248]

[0249] As shown in Table 1, the NAS key set identifier (IEI) indicates that its cell is a KSI. The type of security context (TSC) is a 1-bit cell, which is a marker of the security context, used to indicate whether the security context is a native security context or a mapped security context. The NAS key set identifier indicates the latest security context. The network element information is carried in one of the above octets, namely octet2, which includes 1 byte, or 8 bits. Each network element's information can have a corresponding number, such as the number corresponding to the network element's identifier, or the network element's identifier number (NF ID index), or the number corresponding to the network element's type, or the network element's type number (NF type index), or the number corresponding to the service type, or the service type number (service type index), etc. Different numbers correspond to different network element information. Therefore, the 8 bits in octet2 can indicate this number, such as number 1 indicating ngSeF information, number 2 indicating SMF information, number 3 indicating AMF information, etc.

[0250] Of course, the number can be replaced with other information, such as a random number. This random number can be generated based on a random number generation seed. For example, the anchor point can be generated sequentially based on the random number generation seed, according to the order in which NAS anchor point keys are generated for each network element, to generate random numbers indicating the information of each network element. Alternatively, each network element has a corresponding random number generation seed, and the anchor point can generate random numbers indicating the information of that network element based on the random number generation seed corresponding to that network element.

[0251] It should be understood that using numbers or random numbers to indicate network element information is only one example, and network element information can also be directly carried in KSI.

[0252] It should also be understood that the above example uses 8 bits to carry the information of a network element, but this is not a limitation. More or fewer bits can also be used, such as 2 octets or 16 bits.

[0253] Table 2

[0254]

[0255] As shown in Table 2, the NAS key set identifier cell indicator, TSC, NAS key set identifier, and network element information can be found in the relevant descriptions in Table 1 above. The difference is that the network element information is carried in 7 bits, which will not be repeated here. The PLMN indicator can be a 1-bit cell, used to indicate whether the network element belongs to the terminal's home network or a visited network element. For example, a value of 1 indicates that the network element belongs to HPLMN, and a value of 0 indicates that the network element belongs to VPLMN.

[0256] It should be understood that the above example uses the key identifier as KSI, but it is not a limitation. For example, the KSI can be reused without enhancement, including the NAS key set identifier cell indicator, TSC and NAS key set identifier mentioned above. The key identifier can be information independent of the KSI, that is, it can be considered not to be included in the KSI. In this case, the key identifier and KSI need to be sent together during communication.

[0257] The following will combine Figures 13-19 The method embodiments are used to specifically introduce the interaction between the first terminal and the first anchor point in the communication system and the deduction of the key.

[0258] Figure 13 This is a flowchart illustrating the communication method. Figure 1 The communication method mainly involves the interaction between the first terminal and the first anchor point in the above-mentioned communication system, as well as the interaction between the first anchor point and the first network element and the second network element.

[0259] like Figure 13 As shown, the specific flow of this communication method is as follows:

[0260] S1301, the first anchor point generates a first key for the first network element based on the key of the first anchor point and the information of the first network element in the first network, and generates a second key for the second network element based on the key of the first anchor point and the information of the second network element in the first network.

[0261] S1302, the first anchor point sends the first key and the second key to the first network element and the second network element respectively.

[0262] The key for the first anchor point can be generated based on the key associated with the first terminal.

[0263] For example, the key for the first anchor point could be K as described above. ngSeF If the first network is the home network of the first terminal, then the key of the first anchor point can specifically be K as described above. ngSeF_HPLMN If the first network is the visited network of the first terminal, then the key of the first anchor point can specifically be K as described above. ngSeF_VPLMN Since the key of the first anchor point is mainly used to generate the key associated with network elements in the first network, it can also be understood as the anchor key of the first network. The key associated with the first terminal can be the long-term key of the first terminal, such as K mentioned above, or it can be an intermediate key, such as CK,IK or CK',IK' mentioned above, without specific restrictions. In addition, how to generate the key of the first anchor point based on the key associated with the first terminal can be referred to the relevant introduction below, which will not be repeated here.

[0264] The information of the first network element may include at least one of the following: the identifier of the first network element, the name of the first network element, the type of the first network element, or information about the services that the first network element can provide. For example, information about the services that the first network element can provide may include the type of the service and / or the name of the service. It should be understood that the information of the first network element can also be referenced in the relevant introduction to NFi information above, and will not be repeated here. Similarly, the information of the second network element may include at least one of the following: the identifier of the second network element, the name of the second network element, the type of the second network element, or information about the services that the second network element can provide. For example, information about the services that the second network element can provide may include the type of the service and / or the name of the service. It should be understood that the information of the second network element can also be referenced in the relevant introduction to NFi information above, and will not be repeated here.

[0265] The first key and the second key are keys at the network element level.

[0266] The first key can be the key associated with the first network element, or the anchor key associated with the first network element. This means that the NAS key used to securely protect the communication between the first network element and the first terminal must be derived from the first key. For example, assuming i = 1, i.e., the first network element is NF1, the first key could be the aforementioned K. NF1 If the first network is the home network of the first terminal, then the first key can specifically be the K mentioned above. NF1_HPLMN If the first network is the visited network of the first terminal, then the first key can specifically be the K mentioned above. NF1_VPLMN Similarly, the second key can be the key associated with the second network element, or the anchor key associated with the second network element. This means that the NAS key used for secure communication between the second network element and the first terminal needs to be derived from the second key. For example, assuming i = 2, i.e., the second network element is NF2, the second key can be the K mentioned above. NF2 If the first network is the home network of the first terminal, then the second key can specifically be the K mentioned above.NF2_HPLMN If the first network is the visited network of the first terminal, then the second key can specifically be the K mentioned above. NF2_VPLMN .

[0267] In this application embodiment, the first anchor point generates the first key and the second key in two main ways:

[0268] Method 1: The first anchor point can independently determine the first network element and the second network element that can provide services to the first terminal, and the security protection method used for communication between the first terminal and the first network element and between the first terminal and the second network element is distributed security protection, thereby generating a first key and a second key for the first network element and the second network element respectively.

[0269] Method 2: The first network element and the second network element actively request a key from the first anchor point. Based on the requests from the first network element and the second network element, the first anchor point generates a first key and a second key for the first network element and the second network element, respectively.

[0270] The following sections will introduce S1302-S1302 using these two methods respectively.

[0271] Method 1:

[0272] Prior to S1301, the method may include: S1310-S1360.

[0273] S1310, the first terminal sends the service information of the first terminal.

[0274] Service information can be displayed in different ways, and the content displayed in each way is different. These will be introduced separately below.

[0275] 1) Service information can indicate the services / businesses that the first terminal needs or wants to obtain.

[0276] The services / services that a first terminal needs or desires can be understood as the first terminal's intent; that is, service information can indicate the first terminal's intent. For example, if the first terminal's intent is to access the network, the network elements in the network break this down into the first terminal needing to obtain registration and session services, and allocate the network elements required to complete these services. In this case, the service information can include a description of the services / services that the first terminal needs or desires, or a description of its intent, so that the network side can determine which network elements need to provide these services / services based on this description. In other words, the first terminal does not need to know which network elements need to provide its services; it only needs to provide its intent, thereby reducing the first terminal's processing overhead and facilitating energy conservation.

[0277] 2) Service information can indicate the network element that the first terminal expects, or in other words, which network elements the first terminal expects to provide services.

[0278] For example, service information may include information about the network elements desired by the first terminal, such as at least one of the types, names, or identifiers of these network elements, i.e., explicitly indicating the network elements. Alternatively, it may include the types and / or names of services that each of these network elements can provide. In this case, since services correspond to network elements, the type and / or name of each service may also implicitly indicate which type of network element should provide the service, i.e., implicitly indicating the network element. In other words, if the first terminal can determine which network elements should provide the service or service it wants to obtain, the first terminal can inform the network side of this network element information so that the network side can directly determine the corresponding network element, thereby improving the processing efficiency of the network side.

[0279] To make it easier to understand, let's illustrate with an example:

[0280] The first terminal determines that the service it wants to complete is registration, or in other words, it wants to obtain the registration service provided by the network side. The first terminal can determine that the network elements required to complete the registration service include network storage network elements, access and mobility management network elements, and anchor points. Network storage network elements can be network repository functions (NRFs), or newly defined network elements in the future, such as management network functions (Man NFs), or any network element capable of network function discovery can be understood as a network storage network element in this embodiment. Access and mobility management network elements can be AMFs, or newly defined network elements in the future, such as NAS management functions (NMFs) in distributed subnets, or any network element capable of access and mobility management can be understood as an access and mobility management network element in this embodiment. Therefore, the service information can include: the type of network storage network element, such as Man NF type; the type of access and mobility management network element, such as AMF type; and the type of anchor point, such as ngSeFtype. Alternatively, service information may also include: the types of services that network storage elements can provide, such as network element discovery service types; the types of services that access and mobility management elements can provide, such as access and mobility management service types; and the types of services that anchor points can provide, such as authentication service types.

[0281] 3) Service information can indicate which network elements the first terminal supports, or in other words, which network elements the first terminal supports and which services they provide.

[0282] For example, service information may include information about the network elements supported by the first terminal, such as at least one of the types, names, or identifiers of these network elements, to explicitly indicate the network elements. Alternatively, it may include the types and / or names of the services that each of these network elements can provide, to implicitly indicate the network elements. In other words, if the first terminal is unsure what service it wants to perform, or what service it wants the network side to provide, and also unsure which network elements it wants to access their services, the first terminal can report information about all the network elements it supports to the network side, so that the network side can flexibly select suitable network elements to provide services to the first terminal.

[0283] It should be understood that if the first terminal supports all types of network elements on the network side, the information of the network elements supported by the first terminal can be a field. If the content of this field is set to "all", it means that the first terminal supports all types of network elements on the network side.

[0284] In this embodiment of the application, when the first terminal sends service information to the network side, it can first send it to the routing network element and then the routing network element routes it to the corresponding network element, or it can directly send it to the corresponding network element. These will be described separately below.

[0285] In one possible approach, the first terminal can send service information to the routing network elements in the network to which the first terminal is connected.

[0286] In non-roaming scenarios, the network accessed by the first terminal is its home network, therefore the routing network elements are also network elements within that home network. In roaming scenarios, the network accessed by the first terminal is its visited network, therefore the routing network elements are also network elements within that visited network.

[0287] Routing network elements are primarily responsible for distributing information / messages / signaling from terminals, constructing and maintaining the network topology of the network element, and establishing binding relationships between terminals and various network elements. For example, a routing network element can be a signaling distribution function (SDF). Of course, the embodiments of this application do not limit the naming of routing network elements; any network element / agent / entity that implements the functions of the above-mentioned routing network element can be understood as a routing network element. Routing network elements may be deployed independently or co-located with other network elements / devices, such as with the RAN, or with mission control network elements, or with access and mobility management network elements, without specific limitations.

[0288] For example, the first terminal can pre-configure or obtain the addresses of routing network elements in the first network, such as the Internet Protocol (IP) address or fully qualified domain name (FQDN) of the routing network element. Therefore, the first terminal can send a first message carrying service information to the routing network element based on its address. In this case, the first message can be an initial message, i.e., the first message sent by the first terminal to the first network, such as an authentication request message, specifically a UE authentication request message or any other message that may be named. Alternatively, the first message can also be any other possible message, such as a registration request message, without specific limitations. Furthermore, the first message also carries other information, such as the identifier of the first terminal, such as a subscription concealed identifier (SUPI).

[0289] Optionally, for roaming scenarios, i.e., when the first terminal is roaming on a visiting network, the first terminal can send service information and routing instruction information to the routing network element.

[0290] Routing indication information can indicate whether the information sent by the terminal passes through the anchor point in the visited network during the routing process. For example, the routing indication information is 1 bit. If 1 indicates that the information sent by the terminal passes through the anchor point in the visited network during the routing process, that is, the information is not a non-end-to-end transmission, and must first be sent to the anchor point in the visited network and then routed to the terminal's home network by that anchor point; if 0 indicates that the information sent by the terminal does not pass through the anchor point in the visited network during the routing process, that is, the information is a end-to-end transmission, and is directly routed to the terminal's home network by the routing network element.

[0291] It should be understood that routing indication information and service information can be sent together, such as both being included in the first message, or they can be sent separately, such as the routing indication information being carried separately in other messages besides the first message. There are no specific restrictions. For ease of understanding, the following explanation will use the example of both routing indication information and service information being included in the first message.

[0292] It should also be understood that "routing indication information" is an example name and not a limitation. It can also be expressed as "end-to-end indication information," "end-to-end routing indication information," etc. Any information that can achieve the function of the aforementioned routing indication information can be understood as routing indication information. Furthermore, routing indication information is optional information in roaming scenarios. If the first terminal does not send routing indication information, the routing network element can execute routing according to its local policy.

[0293] For routing network elements:

[0294] In non-roaming scenarios, since routing information may not be involved, routing network elements can execute routing according to local policies.

[0295] For example, a routing element can receive service information and execute the routing of that information according to local policies. For instance, a local policy might instruct that terminal information be routed to an anchor point in the home network by default. In this case, the routing element can directly send the service information to the anchor point in the home network based on the local policy, such as forwarding the first message to the anchor point in the home network.

[0296] In roaming scenarios, routing network elements may receive routing indication information. If no routing indication information is received, the routing network element can execute routing according to the local policy. If routing indication information is received, the routing network element can execute routing according to the routing indication information. These will be described separately below.

[0297] If a routing element receives service information but not routing instructions, it can still route the service information according to its local policy. If the local policy instructs that the terminal's information be routed to an anchor point in the home network, the routing element can also send the service information directly to the anchor point in the home network, such as forwarding the first message to the anchor point in the home network. If the local policy instructs that the terminal's information be routed to an anchor point in the visited network, the routing element can send the service information to the anchor point in the visited network, such as sending the first message to the anchor point in the visited network, which then forwards the first message to the anchor point in the home network.

[0298] If a routing element receives both service information and routing indication information, it can execute the routing of the service information according to the routing indication information. For example, if the routing indication information instructs the information sent by the terminal not to pass through the anchor point in the visited network during routing, the routing element can send the service information directly to the anchor point in the home network, such as sending the first message directly to the anchor point in the home network, or deleting the routing indication information from the first message before sending it directly to the anchor point in the home network. Alternatively, if the routing indication information instructs the information sent by the terminal to pass through the anchor point in the visited network during routing, the routing element can send the service information to the anchor point in the visited network, such as sending the first message to the anchor point in the visited network, or deleting the routing indication information from the first message before sending it to the anchor point in the visited network. Then, the anchor point in the visited network will send the service information to the anchor point in the home network. For example, an anchor in the visited network can directly send the received first message to the anchor in the home network, or if the first message contains routing information, the anchor in the visited network can first delete the routing information in the received first message and then send the first message to the anchor in the home network.

[0299] It should be understood that the message type or name may change during the routing process. For example, if the first message sent by the first terminal is a registration request message, the access and mobility management network elements can receive the registration request message during routing. They can encapsulate the content of the registration request message into an authentication request message and then send the authentication request message. In this case, the anchor point in the home network receives the authentication request message. Of course, the first terminal can also directly send an authentication request message, which will be routed to the anchor point in the home network.

[0300] In another possible approach, the first terminal can directly send service information to the anchor point in its home network.

[0301] The first terminal can obtain the address of the anchor point in the home network.

[0302] For example, the address of the anchor point in the home network can also be pre-configured locally on the first terminal, and the first terminal can directly obtain the anchor point address from its local machine. Or,

[0303] For example, the address of the anchor point in the home network is not pre-configured locally on the first terminal. The first terminal can request a network storage element to discover the anchor point in the home network, such as by sending an address request message to the network storage element. The address request message can carry an address indication and an authentication service indication. The address indication indicates that the requested address is that of a network element, and the authentication service indication indicates that the requested discovery is of a network element that provides authentication services. In this case, for roaming scenarios, the first terminal can first send an address request message to the network storage element in the visited network, which will then forward the address request message to the network storage element in the home network. For non-roaming scenarios, the first terminal can directly send an address request message to the network storage element in the home network. Thus, the network storage element in the home network can determine the anchor point in the home network based on the authentication service indication and send the address of that anchor point based on the address indication. In this case, for roaming scenarios, the network storage element in the home network can send the address of that anchor point to the network storage element in the visited network, which will then forward the address of that anchor point to the first terminal. In non-roaming scenarios, network storage elements in the home network can directly send the address of the anchor point to the first terminal.

[0304] Therefore, the first terminal can send service information to the anchor point based on the address of the anchor point in its home network, such as sending a first message carrying service information to the anchor point.

[0305] S1320, the first anchor point determines the first network element and the second network element that need to serve the first terminal.

[0306] The first anchor point belongs to the first network. In non-roaming scenarios, the first network is the home network of the first terminal, and the first anchor point is an anchor point belonging to that home network, i.e., an anchor point within the aforementioned home network. In roaming scenarios, if the first network is the home network of the first terminal, then the first anchor point is also an anchor point within that home network; if the first network is the visited network of the first terminal, then the first anchor point belongs to the visited network, i.e., an anchor point within the aforementioned visited network. For ease of understanding, the following uses non-roaming and roaming scenarios as examples to explain how the first anchor point handles service information.

[0307] 1) Non-roaming scenes:

[0308] The first anchor point can receive service information, such as service information from routing network elements or the first terminal, and determine the first and second network elements that need to serve the first terminal based on the service information, so as to avoid wasting network overhead by deriving keys for network elements that do not need to provide services. It should be understood that since the content indicated by the service information may be different, the corresponding way in which the first anchor point determines the first and second network elements that need to serve the first terminal will also be different, as detailed below.

[0309] If the service information indicates the service / service that the first terminal needs or desires to obtain, i.e., the intent of the first terminal, then the first anchor point can send the service information to the analysis network element. The analysis network element is mainly responsible for intent resolution, service orchestration, and service management. It can be a task control function (TCF) network element, or other named network elements. Any network element / agent / entity capable of implementing the above functions of an analysis network element can be considered an analysis network element. The analysis network element may be deployed independently or co-located with other network elements, such as with access and mobility management network elements. Based on the service information, the analysis network element can determine the network elements that can fulfill the intent of the first terminal; that is, the services provided by these network elements can fulfill the intent of the first terminal. Therefore, these network elements are the network elements that need to serve the first terminal, including the first network element and the second network element. Thus, the analysis network element can return result information to the first anchor point, which can receive the result information returned by the analysis network element for the service information. This result information can indicate the network elements that need to serve the first terminal.

[0310] For ease of explanation, the term "network element that needs to serve the first terminal" will be abbreviated as "serving network element" in the following text.

[0311] It should be understood that the above method analyzes network elements to determine the serving network element, which reduces the processing overhead of the first anchor point and improves operational efficiency. Of course, the first anchor point can also determine the serving network element itself based on the intent of the first terminal to reduce communication overhead.

[0312] If the service information indicates the network element desired by the first terminal, then the first anchor point can determine the network element desired by the first terminal as the serving network element, including the first network element and the second network element.

[0313] If the service information indicates the network elements supported by the first terminal, the first anchor point can determine multiple network elements that need to serve the first terminal from among the network elements supported by the first terminal. For example, the first anchor point can obtain the historical service information of the first terminal, which can indicate which network elements have provided services to the first terminal in the past. The first anchor point can obtain this historical service information from the data management network element, which can be a UDM or the aforementioned DMF, without specific restrictions. In this way, the first anchor point can determine the network elements that have provided services to the first terminal from among the network elements supported by the first terminal as serving network elements, including the first network element and the second network element. Of course, the first anchor point can also disregard the historical service information of the first terminal, such as determining all network elements supported by the first terminal as serving network elements.

[0314] When a serving network element is identified, the first anchor point can obtain information about that network element, including at least one of the following for each element: the element's identifier, name, type, or information about the services it can provide, including information about the first and second network elements. For example, the first anchor point can obtain information about these network elements from local configuration or from other network elements that store their information (such as network storage network elements).

[0315] Therefore, the first anchor point can also send service network element information to the first terminal, allowing the terminal to deduce the corresponding key for security protection of subsequent communications. For example, if the first anchor point receives service information from a routing network element, it can send the service network element information to the routing network element, which then forwards it to the first terminal. If the first anchor point receives service information from the first terminal, it can directly send the service network element information to the first terminal. Correspondingly, the first terminal can receive information from the first network element and the second network element returned in response to the service information, such as information from the routing network element or the first anchor point, including information from both the first and second network elements.

[0316] It should be understood that, for non-roaming scenarios, the serving network element can be understood as the serving network element in the home network, that is, the serving network element in the first network.

[0317] It should be understood that the information of the serving network element can be sent to the first terminal through a single message, or the first anchor point can reuse messages from the first terminal's authentication process to transmit the information of the serving network element to the first terminal, without specific restrictions. The authentication process of the first terminal can be referred to in the relevant introduction below, and will not be repeated here.

[0318] It should also be understood that, in cases where the service information indicates the network element desired by the first terminal, since the service network element determined by the first anchor point is usually the network element desired by the first terminal, the first anchor point may also choose not to send the service network element information to the first terminal.

[0319] 2) Roaming Scene:

[0320] For roaming scenarios, taking the home network or visited network of the first terminal as an example, we will introduce two cases.

[0321] Scenario 1:

[0322] The first network is the hometown network, the first anchor point is the anchor point in the hometown network, and the visited network can be referred to as the second network.

[0323] The first anchor point can receive service information, such as service information from the first terminal or anchor points in the second network, and determine the first network element and the second network element in the first network that need to serve the first terminal based on the service information. It should be understood that since the content indicated by the service information may be different, the way the first anchor point determines the first network element and the second network element in the first network that need to serve the first terminal will also be different, as detailed below.

[0324] If the service information indicates a service / service that the first terminal needs or wishes to obtain, the first anchor point can send the service information and information indicating the first network, such as the identifier and / or name of the first network, to the analysis network element. Based on the service information and the information indicating the first network, the analysis network element can determine the network elements in the first network that can fulfill the first terminal's intent. That is, the services provided by these network elements can fulfill the first terminal's intent; therefore, these network elements are the network elements in the first network that provide the service that the first terminal needs to obtain, i.e., the service network elements in the first network, including the first network element and the second network element. Thus, the analysis network element can return result information to the first anchor point, and the first anchor point can receive the result information returned by the analysis network element regarding the service information. This result information can indicate the service network elements in the first network.

[0325] If the service information indicates the network element desired by the first terminal, the first anchor point can determine the serving network element in the first network from the network elements desired by the first terminal, including the first network element and the second network element.

[0326] If the service information indicates the network elements supported by the first terminal, the first anchor point can determine multiple network elements in the first network that need to serve the first terminal from among the network elements supported by the first terminal. For example, the first anchor point can obtain the historical service information of the first terminal, which can indicate which network elements have provided services to the first terminal. For example, the first anchor point can obtain this historical service information from the data management network element serving the first terminal. In this way, the first anchor point can determine the network elements that have provided services to the first terminal and belong to the first network from among the network elements supported by the first terminal as serving network elements in the first network, including the first network element and the second network element. Of course, the first anchor point can also disregard the historical service information of the first terminal, such as determining all network elements belonging to the first network from among the network elements supported by the first terminal as serving network elements.

[0327] When the first anchor point identifies the serving network elements in the first network, it can also obtain information about those serving network elements, including at least one of the following for each element: the element's identifier, name, type, or information about the services it can provide, including information about the first and second network elements. For example, the first anchor point can obtain this information from locally configured network elements or from other network elements that store their information. Therefore, the first anchor point can also send information about the serving network elements in the first network, as well as information indicating the first network, to the first terminal, so that the terminal can deduce the corresponding key for secure communication. For example, if the first anchor point receives service information from an anchor point in the second network, it can send information indicating the first network and information about the serving network elements in the first network to the anchor point in the second network, so that this information can be forwarded to the first terminal through the anchor point and routing network elements in the second network. If the first anchor point receives service information from the first terminal, it can directly send information indicating the first network and information about the serving network elements in the first network to the first terminal.

[0328] It should be understood that information about service elements in the first network can be sent to the first terminal via separate messages, or the first anchor point can reuse messages from the first terminal's authentication process to transmit information about service elements in the first network to the first terminal, without specific restrictions. The authentication process of the first terminal can be referred to in the relevant introduction below, and will not be repeated here.

[0329] Optionally, the first network element can also determine the serving network element in the second network, including the third network element, based on the service information. The specific principle is similar to determining the serving network element in the first network, and can be understood by referring to it. The difference is that if the first network element requests the analysis network element to analyze the intent of the first terminal, the first network element must also provide information instructing the second network so that the analysis network element can determine the network element in the second network that provides the service required by the first terminal, i.e., the serving network element in the second network, rather than network elements in other networks. When the first anchor point determines the serving network element in the second network, it can also obtain information about the serving network element in the second network. The specific principle is similar to obtaining information about the serving network element in the first network as described above, and can be understood by referring to it, and will not be elaborated further here.

[0330] Therefore, the first anchor point can send information about the service network elements in the second network to the second network and the first terminal. For example, the first anchor point can send information about the service network elements in the second network to the anchor points in the second network. Furthermore, the first anchor point can also send information about the service network elements in the second network and information indicating the second network to the first terminal, so that the terminal can also deduce the corresponding key for security protection of subsequent communications. Additionally, security can be established between the first terminal and the home network (i.e., the home network) to prevent information from being leaked or tampered with in the visited network. For example, if the first anchor point receives service information from the anchor points in the second network, the first anchor point can send information indicating the service network elements in the second network and information indicating the second network to the anchor points in the second network, so that this information can be forwarded to the first terminal through the anchor points and routing network elements in the second network. If the first anchor point receives service information from the first terminal, the first anchor point can directly send information about the service network elements in the second network and information indicating the second network to the first terminal. This eliminates the need for the anchor points in the second network to determine the service network elements in the second network, reducing the overhead of the second network.

[0331] Scenario 2:

[0332] The first network is the visiting network, the first anchor point is the anchor point in the visiting network, and the home network can be referred to as the second network.

[0333] If the service information route does not pass through the anchor point in the first network (i.e., the first anchor point), the service network element in the first network can be determined by the anchor point in the second network. The specific principle can be found in the relevant description of Case 1 above, and will not be repeated here. Alternatively, if the service information route does not pass through the first anchor point, the anchor point in the second network, after receiving the service information, can also forward the service information to the first anchor point, which can then determine the service network element in the first network based on the service information. The specific principle can be found in the relevant description of Case 1 above, and will not be repeated here. Of course, if the service information route passes through the first anchor point, the first anchor point can determine the service network element in the first network based on the service information received during the routing process. The specific principle can also be found in the relevant description of Case 1 above, and will not be repeated here. If the first anchor point determines the service network element in the first network, it can also send information indicating the first network and information about the service network element to the first terminal. The specific principle can also be found in the relevant description of Case 1 above, and will not be repeated here.

[0334] Optionally, the first anchor point can also determine the serving network elements in the second network, including the third network element, based on the service information, and send the serving network elements in the second network to the first terminal and the second network. The specific principle can also be referred to Case 1 above, and will not be repeated here. In this way, it is not necessary to determine the serving network elements in the second network without the anchor point in the second network, thereby reducing the processing overhead of the anchor point in the second network and improving the operating efficiency.

[0335] It should be understood that in S1310-S1320, S1310 is optional. The first terminal may also not report service information. For example, the first terminal may still send the first message, but the first message does not carry service information. In this case, the first anchor point may respond to receiving the first message and identify the network element that has provided services to the first terminal as the service network element.

[0336] It should also be understood that, unless otherwise specified, the service network element mentioned below refers to the service network element in the first network.

[0337] S1330, the first terminal determines that the first terminal needs to be served by the first network element and the second network element in the first network.

[0338] The first terminal can determine which network elements it needs to serve based on the information sent by the network to it in S1320. If the network also sends information indicating the network in S1320, such as the information indicating the first network and / or the information indicating the second network, the first terminal can also determine which network elements in that network need to serve it based on the information indicating the network. Taking the first network element and the second network element as examples, the first terminal can determine, in response to receiving information from the first network element and the second network element, that it needs to serve both the first network element and the second network element.

[0339] S1340, the first terminal sends the security capability information of the first terminal.

[0340] Security capability information can indicate that the first terminal supports at least one security protection method for communication with multiple network elements in the same network, referred to as the security protection method supported by the first terminal. The security protection method supported by the first terminal may include at least one of the following: centralized security protection, distributed security protection, or hybrid security protection, that is, the first terminal may support only centralized security protection, only distributed security protection, only hybrid security protection, simultaneously support centralized and distributed security protection, simultaneously support centralized and hybrid security protection, simultaneously support distributed and hybrid security protection, and simultaneously support centralized, distributed, and hybrid security protection.

[0341] 1) Centralized security protection can provide security protection only for communication between a terminal and a single network element (such as an AMF) within the same network. Communication between the terminal and other network elements within the same network reuses the connection between the terminal and the anchor network element, which then forwards the communication to the other network elements. It should be understood that centralized security protection is merely an exemplary designation, and it can also be replaced with terms such as centralized NAS security protection, centralized NAS, or any other possible designation without specific limitations.

[0342] 2) Distributed security protection can provide separate security protection for communications between a terminal and multiple network elements within the same network. For example, if multiple network elements in the same network include NF1, NF2, and NF3, then the communication between the terminal and NF1, NF2, and NF3 can be protected separately. It should be understood that "distributed security protection" is merely an exemplary designation; it can also be replaced with terms like "distributed NAS security protection," "distributed NAS," or any other possible designation without specific limitations.

[0343] 3) Hybrid security protection is a combination of centralized and hybrid security protection. For example, for some services, such as authentication services, communication between the terminal and the network elements participating in the authentication service uses centralized security protection. This means that only the communication between the terminal and one of these network elements (such as the AMF) is securely protected. Communication between the terminal and other network elements multiplexes the connection between the terminal and that network element, which then forwards the connection to the other network elements. For other services, such as computing services, communication between the terminal and the network elements participating in the computing service uses distributed security protection. This means that communication between the terminal and each of these network elements is securely protected. It should be understood that "hybrid security protection" is merely an exemplary designation; it can also be replaced with "hybrid NAS security protection," "hybrid NAS," or any other possible designation without specific limitations.

[0344] For ease of understanding, this application will use at least one of the above-mentioned security protection methods, including distributed security protection, as an example for illustration.

[0345] In this embodiment of the application, when the first terminal sends security capability information to the network side, it can first send it to the routing network element and then the routing network element routes it to the corresponding network element, or it can directly send it to the corresponding network element. These will be described separately below.

[0346] In one possible approach, the first terminal can send security capability information to the routing network elements in the network to which the first terminal is connected.

[0347] The network accessed by the first terminal can be referred to in the relevant description in S1310 above, and will not be repeated here.

[0348] For example, the first terminal can pre-configure or obtain the addresses of routing network elements in the first network. Therefore, the first terminal can send a second message carrying security capability information to the routing network element based on its address. The second message can be any possible message without specific restrictions. Furthermore, the second message also carries other information, such as the identifier of the first terminal.

[0349] Optionally, for roaming scenarios, i.e., when the first terminal is roaming on a visited network, the first terminal can send security capability information and routing indication information to the routing network element. The routing indication information can be referred to in the relevant description in S1310 above, and will not be repeated here. It should be understood that the routing indication information and security capability information can be sent together, such as both being carried in the first message, or the routing indication information and security capability information can be sent separately, such as the routing indication information being carried separately in other messages besides the first message; no specific restrictions are imposed. For ease of understanding, the following description uses the example of both routing indication information and security capability information being carried in the first message.

[0350] For routing network elements, when they receive security capability information, the way they send the security capability information is similar to the way the routing network elements send service information, as described above. Please refer to the relevant introduction in S1310 above, and it will not be repeated here.

[0351] In another possible approach, the first terminal can directly send security capability information to the anchor point in its home network.

[0352] The first terminal can obtain the address of the anchor point in its home network. The specific method for obtaining this address can be found in the relevant description in S1310 above, and will not be repeated here. Therefore, the first terminal can send security capability information to the anchor point based on its address in the home network, such as sending a second message carrying security capability information to the anchor point.

[0353] It should be understood that S1310 and S1340 can also be executed together, that is, the first message and the second message are the same message, which includes both service information and security capability information, and optionally, routing indication information. Of course, if S1310 and S1340 are executed separately, the execution order of S1310-S1330 and S1340-S1360 is not limited in this embodiment.

[0354] For ease of understanding, the following text will use the example of the first and second messages being the same message.

[0355] S1350, the first anchor point determines that the security protection method used for communication between the first terminal and the first network element, as well as between the first terminal and the second network element, is distributed security protection.

[0356] Since the first network can be either the home network of the first terminal or the visited network of the first terminal, for ease of understanding, the following will use non-roaming and roaming scenarios as examples to introduce how the first anchor point handles security capability information.

[0357] 1) Non-roaming scenes:

[0358] The first anchor point can receive security capability information, such as security capability information from routing network elements or the first terminal, and determine, based on the security capability information, that the security protection method used for communication between the first terminal and multiple network elements in the same network is distributed security protection.

[0359] In one possible approach, the first anchor point can be determined independently using distributed security protection to avoid additional communication overhead caused by other network elements determining it.

[0360] For example, the first anchor point can determine from at least one security protection method that the communication between the first terminal and multiple network elements in the same network uses distributed security protection. The first anchor point can locally configure the priority of the security protection methods, such as distributed security protection, hybrid security protection, and centralized security protection in descending order of priority. Therefore, the first anchor point can select the highest-priority security protection method among the at least one security protection method. In other words, if at least one security protection method includes distributed security protection, the first anchor point determines that the communication between the first terminal and multiple network elements in the same network uses distributed security protection based on priority. If at least one security protection method does not include distributed security protection but includes hybrid security protection, the first anchor point determines that the communication between the first terminal and multiple network elements in the same network uses hybrid security protection based on priority. In this case, since hybrid security protection includes distributed security protection, it can also be understood that the communication between the first terminal and multiple network elements in the same network uses distributed security protection.

[0361] In another possible approach, the first anchor point sends security capability information to other network elements, which then select a security protection method and instruct the first anchor point. This avoids the processing overhead caused by the first anchor point determining the security protection method itself, and improves the operating efficiency of the first anchor point.

[0362] For example, the first anchor point can send security capability information to the data management network element serving the first terminal. This security capability information can be carried in a separate message, or the first anchor point can reuse a message from the first terminal's authentication process to pass the security capability information to the data management network element. Upon receiving the security capability information, the data management network element can also determine, based on this information, that the security protection method used for communication between the first terminal and multiple network elements in the same network is distributed security protection. The specific principle is similar to that of the first anchor point described above and can be understood by referring to it; it will not be elaborated further here. The data management network element can return corresponding information to the first anchor point, such as information indicating that the security protection method used for communication between the first terminal and multiple network elements in the same network is distributed security protection. In this case, the data management network element can also pass this information to the first anchor point through a separate message or by reusing a message from the first terminal's authentication process. Correspondingly, the first anchor point can receive the information returned by the data management network element to confirm that the security protection method used for communication between the first terminal and multiple network elements in the same network is distributed security protection.

[0363] When the first anchor point determines the security protection method, it can also send protection method indication information to the first terminal to ensure that the terminal side aligns the security protection method with the network side, thus preventing security protection failure due to misalignment. If the security protection method is distributed security protection, the indication information can indicate distributed security protection, meaning it indicates that the security protection method used for communication between the first terminal and multiple network elements in the same network is distributed security protection. Alternatively, if the security protection method is hybrid security protection, the indication information can indicate hybrid security protection, implicitly indicating that the security protection method used for communication between the first terminal and multiple network elements in the same network is distributed security protection. For example, if the first anchor point receives security capability information from a routing network element, it can send protection method indication information to the routing network element, which will then forward the information to the first terminal. If the first anchor point receives security capability information from the first terminal, it can directly send the indication information to the first terminal. Correspondingly, the first terminal can receive protection mode indication information returned regarding security capability information, such as protection mode indication information from a routing network element or the first anchor point. When the first terminal receives the protection mode indication information, if it does not immediately generate a key associated with the network element, the first terminal can also save the protection mode indication information locally for later triggering the generation of the key associated with the network element.

[0364] It should be understood that the protection mode indication information can be sent to the first terminal in a separate message, or the protection mode indication information can be carried in the same message as the information of the aforementioned serving network element. For ease of understanding, the following description will use the example of the protection mode indication information being carried in the same message as the information of the serving network element.

[0365] 2) Roaming Scene:

[0366] For roaming scenarios, taking the home network or visited network of the first terminal as an example, we will introduce two cases.

[0367] Situation A:

[0368] The first network is the hometown network, the first anchor point is the anchor point in the hometown network, and the visited network can be referred to as the second network.

[0369] The first anchor point can receive security capability information, such as security capability information from the first terminal or the anchor point in the second network. Based on this security capability information, it determines that the security protection method used for communication between the first terminal and multiple network elements in the same network is distributed security protection, and sends protection method indication information to the first terminal. The specific principle is similar to that of the first anchor point in the non-roaming scenario mentioned above, which can be understood by reference and will not be elaborated here.

[0370] In roaming scenarios, the second network is a separate network; that is, when the first terminal roams to the second network element, the first anchor point can also send protection mode indication information to the second network, i.e., send protection mode indication information to the anchor points in the second network. In this case, the protection mode indication information can be sent to the anchor points in the second network through a separate message, or, if the anchor points in the second network participate in the authentication process of the first terminal, the protection mode indication information can also reuse the authentication process messages of the first terminal to be passed to the anchor points in the second network.

[0371] In other words, in roaming scenarios, if the anchor point in the second network does not select a security protection method, such as when security capability information cannot be routed to the anchor point in the second network, or even if it is routed to the anchor point in the second network but the anchor point in the second network only forwards the security capability information without selecting a security protection method based on the security capability information, then the anchor point in the first network, after determining the security protection method, must also send a protection method indication message to the anchor point in the second network to inform the anchor point in the second network of the security protection method. This is so that the anchor point in the second network can also align the security protection method with the first terminal, avoiding security protection failure due to misalignment of security protection methods.

[0372] Of course, if the security capability information can be routed to the anchor point in the second network, the anchor point in the second network can also determine, based on the security capability information, that the security protection method used for communication between the first terminal and multiple network elements in the same network is distributed security protection, and send protection method indication information to the first terminal and the anchor point in the first network (i.e., the first anchor point). This protection method indication information can be sent to the anchor point in the second network via a separate message, or if the anchor point in the second network participates in the authentication process of the first terminal, the protection method indication information can also reuse the authentication process message of the first terminal to be passed to the anchor point in the second network. Correspondingly, both the first terminal and the first anchor point can receive protection method indication information from the second network, such as receiving protection method indication information from the anchor point in the second network.

[0373] In other words, if the anchor point in the second network selects the security protection method, the anchor point in the second network must also send protection method indication information to the first terminal and the anchor point in the first network, so that the anchor point in the first network can align the security protection method with the first terminal and avoid security protection failure due to misalignment of security protection methods.

[0374] Situation B:

[0375] The first network is the visiting network, the first anchor point is the anchor point in the visiting network, and the home network can be referred to as the second network.

[0376] At this point, the first anchor point determines the security protection method and sends protection method instruction information, similar to situation A above. This can be understood by reference and will not be elaborated further here.

[0377] It should be understood that the above scenarios A-B are all based on the first terminal reporting security capability information, but are not intended as limitations. The first terminal can also directly select a security protection method, such as distributed security protection or hybrid security protection, and instruct the network side, which can reduce the processing complexity and overhead of the network side.

[0378] For example, the first terminal can send protection mode indication information to indicate that the security protection mode used for communication between the first terminal and multiple network elements in the same network is distributed security protection, that is, the security capability information is replaced by the protection mode indication information. In this case, the routing method of the protection mode indication information is similar to that of the security capability information described above, and can be understood accordingly without further explanation. Correspondingly, the first anchor point can receive the protection mode indication information from the first terminal. If the first anchor point is an anchor point in the visited network, it also sends the protection mode indication information to the anchor point in the home network. If the first anchor point is an anchor point in the home network, and the protection mode indication information cannot be routed to the anchor point in the visited network, the first anchor point, after receiving the protection mode indication information, must also send the protection mode indication information to the anchor point in the visited network.

[0379] It should be understood that in roaming scenarios, when anchor points in the first network and the second network receive protection mode indication information, if they do not immediately generate a key associated with the network element, they can first save the protection mode indication information locally along with the identifier of the first terminal, in order to trigger the generation of the key associated with the network element later. The identifier of the first terminal can be SUCI, or a subscription permanent identifier (SUPI) obtained by resolving SUCI, without specific restrictions.

[0380] It should also be understood that S1340-S1350 are optional steps. If the network can default to using distributed security protection or hybrid security protection, then the first terminal and the first anchor point can use the security protection method required by the network by default.

[0381] In response to the fact that the security protection method used for communication between the first terminal and multiple network elements in the same network is distributed security protection, the first anchor point determines that the security protection method used for communication between the first terminal and the first network element, as well as between the first terminal and the second network element, is distributed security protection, in order to avoid wasting network overhead by deriving keys for irrelevant network elements. As described in S1340-S1350 above, the first anchor point can determine to use distributed security protection itself, or the protection method indication information can indicate to use distributed security protection, or it can default to using distributed security protection according to network requirements. These scenarios will be described in detail below.

[0382] 1) The first anchor point can determine that the communication between the first terminal and multiple network elements in the same network adopts distributed security protection. In this case, all serving network elements in S1320 are subject to distributed security protection. In response to the first anchor point determining that the communication between the first terminal and multiple network elements in the same network adopts distributed security protection, the first anchor point can also determine that the communication between the first terminal and each serving network element adopts distributed security protection. Since the serving network elements include the first network element and the second network element, this means that the communication between the first terminal and the first network element, as well as between the first terminal and the second network element, adopts distributed security protection.

[0383] 2) The protection mode indication information indicates that the communication between the first terminal and multiple network elements in the same network adopts distributed security protection. In this case, all serving network elements in S1320 are applicable to distributed security protection. In response to the received protection mode indication information or the pre-saved protection mode indication information indicating the adoption of distributed security protection, the first anchor point can determine that the communication between the first terminal and each serving network element adopts distributed security protection. Since the serving network element includes the first network element and the second network element, it means that the communication between the first terminal and the first network element, as well as between the first terminal and the second network element, adopts distributed security protection.

[0384] 3) The network default requires distributed security protection for communication between the terminal and multiple network elements in the same network. In this case, all serving network elements in S1320 are subject to distributed security protection. For example, in response to the network default requirement to use distributed security protection, the first anchor point can determine that the communication between the first terminal and each serving network element uses distributed security protection. Since the serving network element includes the first network element and the second network element, this means that the communication between the first terminal and the first network element, as well as between the first terminal and the second network element, uses distributed security protection.

[0385] 4) If the first anchor point determines that the communication between the first terminal and multiple network elements in the same network adopts hybrid security protection, then the first anchor point also needs to determine from the serving network elements in S1320 which network elements are suitable for distributed security protection. For example, in response to the first anchor point determining that the communication between the first terminal and multiple network elements in the same network adopts hybrid security protection, the first anchor point can determine from the serving network elements which are suitable for distributed security protection, including the first network element and the second network element, that is, the communication between the first terminal and the first network element, and between the first terminal and the second network element, adopts distributed security protection.

[0386] 5) If the protection mode indication information indicates that the communication between the first terminal and multiple network elements in the same network adopts hybrid security protection, the first anchor point also needs to determine from the serving network elements in S1320 which network elements are suitable for distributed security protection. For example, in response to the received protection mode indication information or the pre-saved protection mode indication information indicating that hybrid security protection is adopted, the first anchor point can determine from the serving network elements which are suitable for distributed security protection, including the first network element and the second network element, that is, the communication between the first terminal and the first network element, and between the first terminal and the second network element, adopts distributed security protection.

[0387] 6) If the network defaults to requiring hybrid security protection for communication between the terminal and multiple network elements within the same network, the first anchor point also needs to determine from the serving network elements in S1320 which network elements are suitable for distributed security protection. For example, in response to the network default requirement to use hybrid security protection, the first anchor point can determine from the serving network elements which are suitable for distributed security protection, including the first network element and the second network element. This means that communication between the first terminal and the first network element, as well as between the first terminal and the second network element, uses distributed security protection.

[0388] It should be understood that for network elements suitable for distributed security protection in hybrid security protection, when the first anchor point sends information about that network element (such as the information about the first network element and the second network element mentioned above) to the first terminal, it can also send a distributed security protection indication associated with that network element information to indicate that the network element is suitable for distributed security protection. Of course, if the first terminal can use the same processing logic as the network side to determine the network elements suitable for distributed security protection on its own, then the first anchor point may not need to send a distributed security protection indication.

[0389] S1360, the first terminal determines that the security protection method used for communication between the first terminal and the first network element, as well as between the first terminal and the second network element, is distributed security protection.

[0390] The first terminal can determine that the security protection method used for communication between the first terminal and multiple network elements in the same network is distributed security protection. The specific principle is similar to the first anchor point in S1350 above, which can be understood by reference and will not be repeated here. Since in S1330 the first terminal also determines that the first terminal needs to be served by the first network element and the second network element in the first network, in response to the fact that the security protection method used for communication between the first terminal and multiple network elements in the same network is distributed security protection, the security protection method used for communication between the first terminal and the first network element and between the first terminal and the second network element is determined to be distributed security protection. The specific principle is also similar to the first anchor point in S1350 above, which can be understood by reference and will not be repeated here.

[0391] As you can understand, the above steps, through S1310-S1360, introduced how the first anchor point and the first terminal determine the first network element and the second network element. The following sections will provide a detailed introduction to S1301-S1302. For ease of understanding, the following sections will also use the example of the first anchor point belonging to either the home network or the visited network to illustrate two scenarios.

[0392] 1) The first network is the hometown network, and the first anchor point belongs to the hometown network.

[0393] The first anchor point can receive authentication request messages, which are used to request authentication of the first terminal. This authentication request message can be the first message mentioned above; the specific routing process can be found in the relevant description of S1310 above, and will not be repeated here. In response to the authentication request message, the first anchor point can trigger the first network to authenticate the first terminal. For example, the first anchor point can send an authentication acquisition request message to the data management network element to trigger the first network to authenticate the first terminal. The authentication acquisition request message can be a UE authentication acquisition request message, or it can be replaced with any other possible named message, or it can be a newly defined message in the future. Any message that can be used to trigger network authentication of the terminal can be understood as an authentication acquisition request message. Therefore, the data management network element can initiate the authentication process of the first terminal, such as returning an authentication acquisition response message to the first anchor point, such as a UE authentication acquisition response message or any other possible named message. Then, the first anchor point continues the authentication process of the first terminal. This authentication process can be xG AKA, as detailed above. Figure 2 The relevant information, or it could be EAP AKA, can be found above. Figure 3 The relevant information will not be repeated here.

[0394] In response to the successful authentication of the first terminal by the first network, and given that the security protection method used for communication between the first terminal and the first network element, as well as between the first terminal and the second network element, is distributed security protection, the first anchor point can generate a first key for the first network element based on the first anchor point's key and the information of the first network element. Alternatively, it can be referred to as the first key associated with the first network element, or the NAS anchor point key associated with the first network element. For details, please refer to the above-mentioned K. NFi_HPLMN The relevant introduction will not be repeated here. Furthermore, the first anchor point can also generate a second key for the second network element based on the key of the first anchor point and the information of the second network element. In other words, it can be called the second key associated with the second network element, or the NAS anchor point key associated with the second network element. For details, please refer to the above-mentioned K. NFi_HPLMN The relevant information will not be repeated here.

[0395] Therefore, the first anchor point can send a first key to the first network element. For example, the first anchor point can send a message carrying the first key and the identifier of the first terminal to the first network element; this message can be any possible message exchanged between the first network element and the first anchor point. Furthermore, the first anchor point can also send a second key to the second network element. For example, the first anchor point can send a message carrying the second key and the identifier of the first terminal to the second network element; this message can be any possible message exchanged between the second network element and the first anchor point.

[0396] Correspondingly, upon receiving the first key, the first network element can also generate a NAS key associated with the first network element based on the first key, which is used to securely protect the communication between the first network element and the first terminal. For example, the NAS key may include K. NFi_NASint and K NFi_NASenc or including K NFi_AEAD For details, please refer to the above introduction to NAS keys; they will not be repeated here. Similarly, upon receiving the second key, the second network element can also generate a NAS key associated with itself to secure communication between the second network element and the first terminal. For details, please refer to the above introduction to NAS keys; they will not be repeated here. Furthermore, the first anchor point can also generate a NAS anchor point key associated with itself based on its own key and information, and then generate a NAS key associated with itself to secure communication between the first anchor point and the first terminal. For details, please refer to the above introduction to NAS keys; they will not be repeated here.

[0397] If the first terminal roams to the second network, the first anchor point can generate the key of the second anchor point based on the key of the first anchor point, in addition to triggering the authentication of the first terminal by the first network.

[0398] For example, upon receiving an authentication response message, the first anchor point can generate a key for the second anchor point based on its own key. This second anchor point key can then be used to generate keys for network elements in the second network, thereby providing security protection for communication between the first terminal and network elements in the second network. For instance, the second anchor point could be VPLMN_ngSeF as described above, and the key for the second anchor point could be Kng as described above. SeF_VPLMN For details, please refer to the above Kng. SeF_VPLMN The relevant information will not be repeated here.

[0399] The first anchor point can also send the second anchor point's key to the second anchor point. For example, the transmission of the second anchor point's key can reuse the authentication response message, such as the UE authentication response message or any other message that can be named. Accordingly, the second anchor point can obtain the second anchor point's key from the authentication response message and then send an authentication request message to the first terminal. In addition, the second anchor point can also store the first terminal's identifier, the first anchor point's key identifier, and the association between the first anchor point's key and the first anchor point. Of course, the first anchor point can also send the first terminal's identifier and the second anchor point's key to the second anchor point in a separate message; the naming of the specific message is not limited.

[0400] It should be understood that the above-mentioned timing for generating the key of the second anchor point is only an example and is not intended as a limitation. For example, the key of the second anchor point can also be generated at any possible time during the authentication process of the first terminal, or it can also be generated when the first network successfully authenticates the first terminal.

[0401] Correspondingly, upon receiving the first key, the second anchor point can also generate a NAS anchor point key associated with the second anchor point based on the second anchor point's key and the information of the second anchor point, and generate a NAS key associated with the second anchor point based on the NAS anchor point key, in order to provide security protection for the communication between the second anchor point and the first terminal. For details, please refer to the relevant introduction of NAS keys mentioned above, which will not be repeated here.

[0402] It should be understood that, in order to indicate the generated NAS anchor key, the first anchor can also generate a key identifier, which will be described in detail below.

[0403] When the first network is triggered to authenticate the first terminal, the first anchor point can generate a key identifier associated with the first anchor point's key and send the key identifier to the first terminal to indicate the key of the first anchor point, so as to avoid incorrect key usage.

[0404] The key identifier of the first anchor point includes at least one of the following: information of the first anchor point, or the identifier of the first network. The information of the first anchor point may include at least one of the following: the identifier of the first anchor point, the name of the first anchor point, the type of the first anchor point, or information indicating the services that the first anchor point can provide, so as to distinguish the keys associated with the first anchor point and other network elements through the above information. For details, please refer to the relevant introduction of the network element information in the above key identifier, which will not be repeated here.

[0405] For example, when the first anchor point receives an authentication response message from the data management network element, it can generate its own key identifier and save the identifier of the first terminal, the key identifier of the first anchor point, and the key association of the first anchor point. For instance, in a non-roaming scenario, the first anchor point can send an authentication request message or any other message with a possible name to the first terminal, without specific restrictions. This authentication request message may include the key identifier of the first anchor point and the identifier of the first terminal. In a roaming scenario, if the first terminal roams to a second network, the first anchor point can send an authentication request message to the second anchor point. This authentication request message may include the key identifier of the first anchor point and the identifier of the first terminal. Therefore, the second anchor point can obtain the key identifier of the first anchor point and the identifier of the first terminal from the authentication request message and then include them in an authentication request message before sending it to the first terminal.

[0406] If the first terminal roams to the second network, the first anchor point can generate the key of the second anchor point based on the key of the first anchor point, in addition to triggering the authentication of the first terminal by the first network.

[0407] For example, upon receiving an authentication response message, the first anchor point can generate a key for the second anchor point based on its own key. This second anchor point key can then be used to generate keys for network elements in the second network, thereby providing security protection for communication between the first terminal and network elements in the second network. For instance, the second anchor point could be VPLMN_ngSeF as described above, and the key for the second anchor point could be Kng as described above. SeF_VPLMN For details, please refer to the above Kng. SeF_VPLMN The relevant information will not be repeated here.

[0408] The first anchor point can also send the second anchor point's key to the second anchor point. For example, the second anchor point's key can be carried in the authentication response message sent to the first terminal. Accordingly, the second anchor point can obtain the second anchor point's key from the authentication response message and then send an authentication request message to the first terminal. Furthermore, the second anchor point can also store the first terminal's identifier, the first anchor point's key identifier, and the association between the first anchor point and its key. Of course, the first anchor point can also send the first terminal's identifier and the second anchor point's key to the second anchor point in a separate message; the naming of the specific message is not limited.

[0409] It should be understood that the above-mentioned timing for generating the key of the second anchor point is only an example and is not intended as a limitation. For example, the key of the second anchor point can also be generated at any possible time during the authentication process of the first terminal, or it can also be generated when the first network successfully authenticates the first terminal.

[0410] Optionally, the first anchor point generates a key identifier for the second anchor point when the first network triggers authentication of the first terminal.

[0411] For example, upon receiving an authentication response message, the first anchor point generates a key identifier for the second anchor point.

[0412] The key identifier of the second anchor point includes at least one of the following: information about the second anchor point or the identifier of the second network. The information about the second anchor point may include at least one of the following: the identifier of the second anchor point, the name of the second anchor point, the type of the second anchor point, or information indicating the services that the second anchor point can provide, so as to distinguish the keys associated with the second anchor point and other network elements through the above information. For details, please refer to the relevant introduction of the network element information in the above key identifier, which will not be repeated here.

[0413] The first anchor point can also send the second anchor point's key identifier to the second anchor point. This eliminates the need for the second anchor point to generate its own key identifier, reducing its overhead. For example, the second anchor point's key identifier and key can be sent together in the same message. Alternatively, the first anchor point can send the first terminal's identifier and the second anchor point's key identifier to the second anchor point in a separate message; the message naming is not restricted. Correspondingly, the second anchor point can associate and store the first terminal's identifier, the second anchor point's key identifier, and the second anchor point's key.

[0414] It should be understood that the above-mentioned timing for generating the key identifier of the second anchor point is only an example and is not intended as a limitation. For example, the key identifier of the second anchor point can also be generated at any possible time during the authentication process of the first terminal, or it can also be generated when the first network successfully authenticates the first terminal.

[0415] It should also be understood that the generation of the key identifier for the second anchor point by the first anchor point is optional. The second anchor point can also generate its own key identifier. For example, when the second anchor point receives a message carrying its own key, if it determines that the message does not contain the key identifier for the second anchor point, it will trigger the second anchor point to generate its own key identifier. Alternatively, when the second anchor point receives the key, it can start a timer. If the timer expires without receiving the key identifier, the second anchor point will generate its own key identifier. Alternatively, the protocol can predefine that the first anchor point does not generate the key identifier for the second anchor point, and the second anchor point generates its own key identifier.

[0416] The second anchor point also needs to send its key identifier to the first terminal.

[0417] For example, the second anchor point can reuse messages from the authentication process of the first terminal, such as an authentication request message or any other possible message, and send the identifier of the first terminal and the key identifier of the second anchor point to the first terminal in the message. Alternatively, the second anchor point can also send the identifier of the first terminal and the key identifier of the second anchor point to the first terminal in a separate message, and there are no restrictions on the naming of the specific message.

[0418] Optionally, the first anchor point may also determine the first key identifier associated with the first key and the second key identifier associated with the second key, and send the first key identifier and the second key identifier to the first network element and the second network element respectively.

[0419] The first key identifier may include at least one of the following: information of the first network element or the identifier of the first network. The second key identifier may include at least one of the following: information of the second network element or the identifier of the first network. The key is used to distinguish the key associated with the first network element and the second network element through the above information, so as to avoid incorrect key usage. For the specific principle, please refer to the relevant introduction of the network element information in the above key identifier, which will not be repeated here.

[0420] For example, the first anchor point can generate a first key identifier based on the information of the first network element and send the first key identifier to the first network element. This eliminates the need for the first network element to generate its own key identifier, reducing its overhead. For instance, the first key identifier and the aforementioned first key can be carried together in the same message and transmitted to the first network element. Alternatively, the first anchor point can send the identifier of the first terminal and the first key identifier to the second anchor point in a separate message; the naming of this message is not restricted. Correspondingly, the first network element can associate and store the identifier of the first terminal, the first key, and the first key identifier together.

[0421] Similarly, the first anchor point can generate a second key identifier based on the information of the second network element and send the second key identifier to the second network element. This eliminates the need for the second network element to generate its own key identifier, reducing its overhead. For example, the second key identifier and the aforementioned second key can be carried in the same message and transmitted together to the second network element. Alternatively, the first anchor point can send the first terminal's identifier and the second key identifier to the second anchor point in a separate message; the message naming is not restricted. Correspondingly, the second network element can associate and store the first terminal's identifier, the second key, and the second key identifier together.

[0422] In addition, the first anchor point can also send the first key identifier and the second key identifier to the first terminal.

[0423] It should be understood that the generation of the first key identifier and the second key identifier by the first anchor point is optional; they can also be generated by the first network element and the second network element themselves. For example, taking the first network element as an example, when the first network element receives a message carrying the first key, if it determines that the message does not contain the first key identifier, it triggers the first network element to generate the first key identifier itself. Alternatively, when the first network element receives the first key, it starts a timer; if the timer expires without receiving the first key identifier, the first anchor point generates the first key identifier itself. Alternatively, the protocol can predefine that the first anchor point does not generate the key identifier for the first network element, and the first network element generates the first key identifier itself.

[0424] It should also be understood that the information of the first network element required for the first network element to generate the first key identifier can be sent to the first network element by the first anchor point, or it can be determined by the first network element itself. Similarly, the information of the second network element required for the second network element to generate the second key identifier can be sent to the second network element by the first anchor point, or it can be determined by the second network element itself.

[0425] If the first anchor point does not send the first key identifier to the first terminal, the first network element can still send the first key identifier to the first terminal. For example, the first network element can include the first terminal's identifier and the first key identifier in the same message and then send that message to the first terminal. This message can be any possible message exchanged between the first terminal and the first network element, such as a message in a NAS security mode command (NAS SMC) procedure. Similarly, if the first anchor point does not send the second key identifier to the first terminal, the second network element can also send the second key identifier to the first terminal. For example, the second network element can include the first terminal's identifier and the second key identifier in the same message and then send that message to the first terminal. This message can be any possible message exchanged between the first terminal and the second network element, such as a message in a NAS SMC procedure.

[0426] 2) The first network is the visiting network, the first anchor point belongs to the visiting network, and the hometown network is the second network.

[0427] Since the authentication of the first terminal is triggered by the anchor point in the second network (see the above introduction on the first anchor point belonging to the home network for details, which will not be repeated here), once the second network completes the authentication of the first terminal, the anchor point in the second network can send an indication message to the first anchor point to indicate whether the authentication of the first terminal by the second network has passed or failed.

[0428] For example, the first anchor point can receive authentication indication information from the second network, which instructs the second network to authenticate the first terminal. This authentication indication information can be carried within messages in the first terminal's authentication process, such as authentication response messages, UE authentication response messages, or any other potentially named messages, without specific limitations. Alternatively, if the first anchor point does not participate in the first terminal's authentication process, the anchor point in the second network can also send the authentication indication information to the first anchor point via an additional message. Furthermore, the first anchor point can also receive a key from the first anchor point in the second network. This key can be carried in the same message as the authentication indication information, or the anchor point in the second network can send the first anchor point's key separately via a separate message.

[0429] In response to the successful authentication of the first terminal by the second network, and given that the communication between the first terminal and the first network element, as well as between the first terminal and the second network element, employs distributed security protection, the first anchor point can generate a first key for the first network element based on its own key and the information of the first network element, and generate a second key for the second network element based on its own key and the information of the second network element. For details, please refer to the above-mentioned K. NFi_HPLMN The relevant information will not be repeated here.

[0430] Therefore, the first anchor point can send a first key to the first network element. For example, the first anchor point can send a message carrying the first key and the identifier of the first terminal to the first network element; this message can be any possible message exchanged between the first network element and the first anchor point. Furthermore, the first anchor point can also send a second key to the second network element. For example, the first anchor point can send a message carrying the second key and the identifier of the first terminal to the second network element; this message can be any possible message exchanged between the second network element and the first anchor point.

[0431] It can be seen that the first anchor point generates the key associated with the network element only if the first terminal's authentication is successful. Conversely, if the first terminal's authentication fails, the first anchor point does not generate the key associated with the network element to avoid redundant overhead.

[0432] Optionally, in response to the second network's successful authentication of the first terminal, the first anchor point can also generate a key identifier associated with its own key. This could involve generating a key identifier for the first anchor point and associating and saving the first terminal's identifier, the first anchor point's key, and the key identifier. The specific principle can be found in the aforementioned description of the second anchor point, and will not be repeated here. Alternatively, the first anchor point can also receive a key identifier from the second network and associate the first anchor point's key with its key identifier. The specific principle can also be found in the aforementioned description of the second anchor point, and will not be repeated here. Furthermore, the first anchor point can also send its key identifier to the first terminal. The specific principle can also be found in the aforementioned description of the second anchor point, and will not be repeated here.

[0433] Optionally, the first anchor point can also determine the first key identifier associated with the first key and the second key identifier associated with the second key, and send the first key identifier and the second key identifier to the first network element and the second network element respectively. For the specific principle, please refer to the relevant introduction of the first anchor point belonging to the home network mentioned above, which will not be repeated here.

[0434] The above describes how the first anchor point generates and sends the key and key identifier. The following describes how the first terminal generates and associates the key.

[0435] When the security protection method used for communication between the first terminal and the first network element, and between the first terminal and the second network element, is distributed security protection, the first terminal can generate a first key associated with the first network element based on the key of the first anchor point and the information of the first network element, and generate a second key associated with the second network element based on the key of the first anchor point and the information of the second network element.

[0436] For example, if the first terminal's authentication network is successful, it can first generate a key for a first anchor point. Then, based on the key for the first anchor point and the information of the first network element, the first terminal can generate a first key associated with the first network element, and based on the key for the first anchor point and the information of the second network element, it can generate a second key associated with the second network element.

[0437] Furthermore, the first terminal can also generate a NAS key associated with the first network element based on the first key, which is used to provide security protection for the communication between the first network element and the first terminal. For example, the NAS key may include K. NFi_NASint and K NFi_NASenc or including K NFi_AEADFor details, please refer to the above introduction to NAS keys, which will not be repeated here. The first terminal can also generate a NAS key associated with the second network element based on the second key, used to securely protect the communication between the second network element and the first terminal. For details, please refer to the above introduction to NAS keys, which will not be repeated here. The first terminal can also generate a NAS anchor key associated with the first anchor point based on the key and information of the first anchor point, and generate a NAS key associated with the first anchor point based on this NAS anchor key, used to securely protect the communication between the first anchor point and the first terminal. For details, please refer to the above introduction to NAS keys, which will not be repeated here. In this case, the information of the first anchor point can be provided to the first terminal by the first anchor point, or pre-configured locally on the first terminal.

[0438] It should be understood that the embodiments of this application do not limit the timing of the first terminal generating the key. For example, the first terminal may generate the key of the first anchor point first, and then generate the first key and the second key after the first terminal's authentication is completed, such as when the network authentication of the first terminal is passed.

[0439] The first terminal can also receive a key identifier from the first anchor point. For example, the first terminal can receive a message carrying the first terminal's identifier and the first anchor point's key identifier. Thus, the first terminal can also associate the first anchor point's key identifier with the first anchor point's key, such as associating and saving the first terminal's identifier, the first anchor point's key, and the first anchor point's key identifier together. The first terminal can also receive a first key identifier and a second key identifier, and associate the first key identifier with the first key, and associate the second key identifier with the second key. For example, the first terminal can receive a first key identifier and a second key identifier from the first anchor point, or the first terminal can also receive a first key identifier from a first network element, and a second key identifier from a second network element. Thus, the first terminal can associate and save the first terminal's identifier, the first key, and the first key identifier together, and associate and save the first terminal's identifier, the second key, and the second key identifier together.

[0440] Optionally, when the first terminal roams to the second network, the first terminal can also generate a key for the second anchor point based on the key of the first anchor point. The specific principle can be found in the above description of the reception of the first anchor point, and will not be repeated here. The first terminal can also generate a NAS anchor point key associated with the second anchor point based on the key of the second anchor point and the information of the second anchor point, and generate a NAS key associated with the second anchor point based on this NAS anchor point key, to provide security protection for the communication between the second anchor point and the first terminal. For details, please refer to the above description of NAS keys, and will not be repeated here. In this case, the information of the second anchor point can be provided to the first terminal by the second anchor point, or pre-configured locally on the first terminal. Furthermore, if the first terminal receives a key identifier of the second anchor point, such as a message carrying the identifier of the first terminal and the key identifier of the second anchor point, the first terminal can also associate and save the identifier of the first terminal, the key of the second anchor point, and the key identifier of the first anchor point.

[0441] It should be understood that the above example uses the generation of a key identifier on the network side, but it is not a limitation. For example, the key identifier can also be generated by the first terminal and sent to the network. For instance, the first terminal can generate a key identifier for the first anchor point and send it to the first anchor point. The first terminal can also generate a first key identifier and a second key identifier and send them to the first network element and the second network element, respectively. Optionally, if the first terminal roams to the second network, the first terminal can also generate a key identifier for the second anchor point and send it to the second anchor point.

[0442] The above is an introduction to Method 1. The following section introduces Method 2, which is the case where the network element actively requests the key.

[0443] Method 2:

[0444] In Method 2, since the first terminal can determine which network elements need to provide services, the initial message sent by the first terminal to the network (such as the first message mentioned above) may not carry service information or security capability information. Thus, since the first anchor point may not know which network elements need to provide services or whether distributed security protection is required, in the authentication process of the first terminal, the first anchor point can generate only its own key, without generating keys for other network elements. In this case, the key generation and key identifier transmission are similar to those in Method 1 and can be understood accordingly, so they will not be elaborated further here. In other words, in this process, the first terminal can generate the key of the first anchor point and obtain the key identifier of the first anchor point associated with that key.

[0445] Then, the first terminal and the first network execute S1300a-S1300d.

[0446] S1300a, the first terminal sends a first service request to the first network element.

[0447] The first service request may request the first network element to provide services to the first terminal, including the identifier of the first terminal and the key identifier of the first anchor point.

[0448] For example, the first terminal can determine the services that need to be provided by the first network element based on its local business needs, and determine that the security protection method for communication between the first terminal and the first network element is distributed security protection. Therefore, the first terminal can send a first service request to the first network element based on its address. It should be understood that there are multiple ways for the first terminal to obtain the address of the first network element. For example, the address of the first network element can be pre-configured locally on the first terminal, or the first terminal can request the network storage network element to send and provide the address of the first network element. The specific principle is similar to that of the first terminal obtaining the address of the first anchor point, and can be understood by referring to this explanation; it will not be elaborated further here.

[0449] S1300b, the first network element sends a first key request to the first anchor point, and the first anchor point receives the first key request from the first network element.

[0450] The first key request can request the first anchor point to provide the key associated with the first network element.

[0451] For example, the first key request may include the identifier of the first terminal and the key identifier of the first anchor point, and optionally, it may also include information about the first network element.

[0452] Specifically, upon receiving a first service request, the first network element can send a first key request to the first anchor point. For example, the first network element can obtain the identifier of the first terminal and the key identifier of the first anchor point from the first service request, and include the identifier of the first terminal, the key identifier of the first anchor point, and the information of the first network element in the first key request, then send the first key request to the first anchor point. Correspondingly, the first anchor point can receive the first key request from the first network element. Thus, the first network element can determine that the key identifier carried in the first key request is associated with the key of the first anchor point, so that the first anchor point can use the key of the first anchor point to generate the corresponding key, avoiding key generation errors. For example, the first network element can use the key identifier of the first anchor point and the identifier of the first terminal carried in the first key request to index the key of the first anchor point, and generate a first key for the first network element based on the key of the first anchor point and the information of the first network element, and then send the first key to the first network element. The specific principle is similar to method 1 above, and can be understood by referring to it; it will not be elaborated further here.

[0453] S1300c, the first terminal sends a second service request to the second network element.

[0454] The second service request is used to request the second network element to provide services to the first terminal, such as including the key identifier of the first anchor point and the identifier of the first terminal. The specific principle is similar to the first service request mentioned above, which can be referred to for understanding, and will not be repeated here.

[0455] S1300d, the second network element sends a second key request to the first anchor point, and the first anchor point receives the second key request from the second network element.

[0456] For example, the first key request may include the identifier of the first terminal and the key identifier of the first anchor point, and optionally, it may also include information about the first network element.

[0457] Specifically, upon receiving a second service request, the second network element can send a second key request to the first anchor point. For example, the second network element can obtain the identifier of the first terminal and the key identifier of the first anchor point from the second service request, incorporate the identifier of the first terminal, the key identifier of the first anchor point, and the information of the second network element into the second key request, and then send the second key request to the first anchor point. Correspondingly, the first anchor point can receive the first key request from the second network element. Thus, the first network element can determine that the key identifier carried in the second key request is associated with the key of the first anchor point. For example, the first network element can use the key identifier of the first anchor point and the identifier of the first terminal carried in the second key request to index the key of the first anchor point, and generate a second key for the second network element based on the key of the first anchor point and the information of the second network element, and then send the second key to the second network element. The specific principle is similar to method 1 above and can be understood by reference; it will not be elaborated further.

[0458] As can be seen, in Method 2, the first anchor point does not need to generate the key associated with the network element in advance, but is generated on demand according to the needs of the first terminal, so as to avoid generating irrelevant redundant keys.

[0459] It should be understood that in Method 2, the information of the first network element required by the first terminal to generate the first key can be provided to the first terminal by the first network element. For example, when the first network element receives a first service request, it can send its information to the first terminal, or the information of the first network element can be pre-configured locally on the first terminal. Similarly, the information of the second network element required by the first terminal to generate the second key can be provided to the first terminal by the second network element. For example, when the second network element receives a second service request, it can send its information to the second terminal, or the information of the second network element can be pre-configured locally on the first terminal.

[0460] Therefore, the security protection method adopted for communication between the first terminal and the first network element and between the first terminal and the second network element is distributed security protection. The first terminal can generate a first key associated with the first network element based on the key of the first anchor point and the information of the first network element, and generate a second key associated with the second network element based on the key of the first anchor point and the information of the second network element. The specific principle is similar to the above method 1, which can be referred to for understanding, and will not be repeated here.

[0461] It should be understood that the embodiments of this application do not limit the execution order of S1300a-S1300b and S1300c-S1300d.

[0462] It should also be understood that in Method 2, the first anchor point can also generate a first key identifier and a second key identifier, and send them to the first network element and the second network element respectively. Alternatively, the first network element can generate the first key identifier itself, and the second network element can generate the second key identifier itself. The specific principle is similar to that of Method 1 above, and can be understood by referring to it, so it will not be repeated here. In addition, the first key identifier can also be sent to the first terminal by the first network element or the first anchor point, and the second key identifier can also be sent to the first terminal by the second network element or the first anchor point. Alternatively, the first key identifier and the second key identifier can also be generated by the first terminal itself and sent to the first network element and the second network element respectively. The specific principle is also similar to that of Method 1 above, and can be understood by referring to it, so it will not be repeated here.

[0463] It should also be understood that the above Figure 13 The illustrated process uses the generation of the first and second keys as an example, but it is not a limitation. If there is only one serving network element, such as the first network element, the second network element, or the first anchor point, then... Figure 13 In the process shown, the first anchor point and the first terminal may also generate only the key associated with the service network element.

[0464] In summary, when the first terminal has communication needs with multiple network elements (such as the first network element and the second network element), the first anchor point can generate a first key for the first network element based on the first anchor point's key and the information of the first network element, and generate a second key for the second network element based on the first anchor point's key and the information of the second network element. In this way, the communication between the first terminal and multiple network elements can be protected by the corresponding keys. For example, the communication between the first terminal and the first network element can be protected by the first key, and the communication between the first terminal and the second network element can be protected by the second key, so as to ensure the end-to-end communication security between the terminal and each network element, thereby meeting the network's more flexible security requirements.

[0465] The following is combined with Figures 14-19 This section describes the specific process of this communication method in various scenarios.

[0466] Figure 14This is a flowchart illustrating the communication method. Figure 2 This mainly involves the interaction between UE (such as the first terminal mentioned above), SDF (such as the routing network element mentioned above), VPLMN_ngSeF (such as the second anchor point mentioned above), HPLMN_ngSeF (such as the first anchor point mentioned above, i.e., the case where the first anchor point belongs to the home network), NF1 (such as the first or second network element mentioned above), NF2 (such as the third network element mentioned above) and DMF (such as the data management network element mentioned above).

[0467] Figure 14 The process shown mainly involves the roaming scenario in Method 1 above, with VPLMN_ngSeF participating in authentication, as detailed below:

[0468] S1401, the UE sends an N1 message to the SDF.

[0469] The N1 message may include an authentication request message.

[0470] The authentication request message may include the UE's identifier, such as SUPI or SUCI. The authentication request message may also include at least one of the following: service information, security capability information, or routing indication information. For details, please refer to the relevant descriptions in S1310 and S1340 above, which will not be repeated here. Furthermore, the security capability information can also be replaced with protection mode indication information for ease of understanding; the following explanation uses security capability information as an example.

[0471] It should be understood that the authentication request message can also be replaced with other messages, such as the registration request message.

[0472] S1402, SDF sends an N1 message to VPLMN_ngSeF.

[0473] Routing indication information indicates whether information sent by the terminal passes through an anchor point in the visited network during the routing process. In other words, it indicates whether the information / message sent by the UE passes through the ngSeF in the VPLMN during the routing process. For ease of understanding, let's take the example where the routing indication information indicates passing through the ngSeF in the VPLMN. Alternatively, if the authentication request message does not include routing indication information, then let's take the example where the SDF selects to pass through the ngSeF in the VPLMN according to its local policy.

[0474] It should be understood that if the authentication request message includes routing indication information, the SDF can first delete the routing indication information from the authentication request message when sending the authentication request message to VPLMN_ngSeF, and then send the N1 message to VPLMN_ngSeF to avoid sending redundant information. Alternatively, the SDF can forward the N1 message directly to VPLMN_ngSeF without processing it.

[0475] It should also be understood that S1402 can refer to the relevant introduction of the above routing network elements, which will not be repeated here.

[0476] S1403, VPLMN_ngSeF sends an authentication request message to HPLM_ngSeF.

[0477] If the security protection method is determined by VPLMN_ngSeF, VPLMN_ngSeF can determine whether distributed security protection or hybrid security protection is used for communication between the UE and multiple network elements in the same network based on the security capability information in the received authentication request message. It then replaces the security capability information in the authentication request message with protection method indication information to instruct the UE to use distributed security protection or hybrid security protection for communication between the UE and multiple network elements in the same network. Finally, it sends an authentication request message to HPLMN_ngSeF.

[0478] If the security protection method is not determined by VPLMN_ngSeF, then VPLMN_ngSeF can directly forward the authentication request message to HPLMN_ngSeF.

[0479] VPLMN_ngSeF can also determine the network elements belonging to the VPLMN and serving the UE based on the service information in the received authentication request message, and obtain information about these network elements from the MAN NF. Furthermore, when VPLMN_ngSeF determines the security protection method, if distributed security protection is used for communication between the UE and multiple network elements in the same network, then VPLMN_ngSeF determines that distributed security protection is used for communication between the UE and the network elements belonging to the VPLMN and serving the UE. If hybrid security protection is used for communication between the UE and multiple network elements in the same network, then VPLMN_ngSeF determines the network elements whose communication with the UE uses distributed security protection from among the network elements belonging to the VPLMN and serving the UE.

[0480] It should be understood that if the authentication request message is replaced by another message, such as a registration request message, then VPLMN_ngSeF will also receive a registration request message. In this case, VPLMN_ngSeF will not directly forward the registration request message, but will instead send an authentication request message to HPLMN_ngSeF.

[0481] It should be understood that S1403 can also refer to the relevant introduction of visiting anchor points in the network in the roaming scenario in S1310-S1360 above, and will not be repeated here.

[0482] S1404, HPLMN_ngSeF sends a UE authentication request message to the DMF.

[0483] The UE authentication request message may include the UE's identifier and the UE's serving network name, such as the name of the VPLMN.

[0484] If the security protection method is determined by HPLMN_ngSeF, then HPLMN_ngSeF can determine whether distributed security protection or hybrid security protection is used for communication between the UE and multiple network elements in the same network, based on the security capability information. If neither VPLMN_ngSeF nor HPLMN_ngSeF determines the security protection method, then HPLMN_ngSeF can carry the security capability information into the UE authentication request message so that the DMF can determine the security protection method.

[0485] HPLMN_ngSeF can also determine the network elements belonging to the HPLMN that need to serve the UE based on the service information in the received authentication request message, and obtain information about these network elements from the MAN NF. When HPLMN_ngSeF determines the security protection method, if distributed security protection is used for communication between the UE and multiple network elements in the same network, HPLMN_ngSeF can determine that distributed security protection is used for communication between the UE and the network elements belonging to the HPLMN that need to serve the UE. If hybrid security protection is used for communication between the UE and multiple network elements in the same network, HPLMN_ngSeF determines the network elements whose communication with the UE uses distributed security protection from among the network elements belonging to the HPLMN that need to serve the UE.

[0486] Optionally, when the security protection method is determined by VPLMN_ngSeF or HPLM_ngSeF, HPLM_ngSeF can also carry the protection method indication information to the UE authentication request message, so that the DMF can determine whether a new key deduction method is needed to deduce the NAS anchor key of the HPLMN based on the adoption of distributed security protection. Alternatively, if HPLMN_ngSeF does not provide the protection method indication information to the DMF, the DMF can use the existing key deduction method to deduce the NAS anchor key of the HPLMN. For details, please refer to the relevant introduction in S1405, which will not be repeated here.

[0487] If neither VPLMN_ngSeF nor HPLM_ngSeF determines the security protection method, HPLM_ngSeF can also carry the security capability information to the UE authentication request message to allow the DMF to determine the security protection method.

[0488] It should be understood that S1404 can also refer to the relevant introduction of anchor points in the home network in the roaming scenario in S1310-S1360 above, and will not be repeated here.

[0489] S1405, DMF generates authentication vector.

[0490] For information on generating authentication vectors using DMF, please refer to the relevant introductions to S204 or S304 mentioned above; further details will not be provided here.

[0491] In S1405, if neither VPLMN_ngSeF nor HPLM_ngSeF determines the security protection method, the DMF can determine whether distributed security protection or hybrid security protection is used for communication between the UE and multiple network elements in the same network, based on the security capability information. If the security protection method is determined by VPLMN_ngSeF or HPLM_ngSeF, the DMF can receive protection method indication information. If the protection method indication information indicates the use of distributed security protection, the DMF can deduce the key associated with HPLM_ngSeF based on the information from HPLM_ngSeF, i.e., deduce K. ngSeF_HPLMN The input parameters can include the information of HPLMN_ngSeF and the length of the HPLMN_ngSeF information. The information of HPLMN_ngSeF is the same as the information of NFi mentioned above, which can be understood by referring to it and will not be repeated here. If the DMF does not receive the protection mode indication information, the DMF can use the existing method to deduce K. ngSeF_HPLMN Specifically, it can also be referred to as K above. ngSeF_HPLMN The relevant information will not be repeated here.

[0492] It should be understood that the DMF can also refer to the relevant introduction of S1350 above when determining the safety protection method, and will not be repeated here.

[0493] S1406, DMF sends a UE authentication response message to HPLMN_ngSeF.

[0494] The UE authentication response message may include an authentication vector, as detailed in the descriptions in S205 or S305 above, and will not be repeated here. Furthermore, the UE authentication response message may also include K... ngSeF_HPLMN .

[0495] If the security protection method is determined by the DMF, the DMF can also carry the protection method indication information into the UE authentication response message.

[0496] S1407, HPLMN_ngSeF generates ngKSI ngSeF_HPLMN .

[0497] ngKSI ngSeF_HPLMN The key index of the first anchor point mentioned above is described in the relevant introduction to the key index above, and will not be repeated here.

[0498] S1408, HPLMN_ngSeF sends a UE authentication response message to VPLMN_ngSeF.

[0499] The UE authentication response message may include an authentication vector, as detailed in the relevant sections of S207 or S306 above, and will not be repeated here. The UE authentication response message may also include ngKSI. ngSeF_HPLMN .

[0500] Optionally, the UE authentication response message may include information about network elements belonging to the HPLMN and serving the UE, such as information about these network elements and the identifier of the HPLM associated with this information. It should be understood that if the HPLMN_ngSeF does not determine the security protection method itself, but receives protection method indication information from the DMF or VPLMN_ngSeF, then if the protection method indication information indicates hybrid security protection, the HPLMN_ngSeF also needs to determine which network elements belonging to the HPLMN and serving the UE use distributed security protection for communication with the UE. Therefore, in S1408, the HPLMN_ngSeF may also carry an indication element in the UE authentication response message to indicate which network elements belonging to the HPLMN and serving the UE use distributed security protection for communication with the UE. This indication element can reuse the protection method indication information or may be other elements. If the information of a certain network element in the UE authentication response message is associated with this indication element, it indicates that the communication between that network element and the UE uses distributed security protection. For hybrid security protection, if the UE can use the same mechanism as the network side to determine which network elements communicate with the UE using distributed security protection, then HPLMN_ngSeF does not need to carry the indication information element in the UE authentication response message.

[0501] It should be understood that the UE authentication response message may not include information about the network element belonging to the HPLMN and needing to serve the UE. This information will be sent to the UE by the network element itself later. For details, please refer to the relevant introduction below.

[0502] If the security protection method is not determined by VPLMN_ngSeF, the UE authentication response message may also include protection method indication information. For example, HPLMN_ngSeF can generate protection method indication information based on the security protection method determined by HPLMN_ngSeF in S1404, or receive protection method indication information from DMF in S1406 and carry the protection method indication information into the UE authentication response message.

[0503] It should also be understood that S1408 can refer to the relevant introduction in S1320-S1330 regarding the first anchor point belonging to the home network, which will not be repeated here.

[0504] S1409, VPLMN_ngSeF generates ngKSI ngSeF_VPLMN .

[0505] ngKSI ngSeF_VPLMN The key index for the second anchor point mentioned above is described in the relevant introduction to the key index above, and will not be repeated here.

[0506] S1410, VPLMN_ngSeF sends an authentication request message to the UE.

[0507] Authentication request messages can be used to request UE authentication of the network, including parameters such as RAND, AUTN, and ABBA. These parameters are detailed above and will not be repeated here. Authentication request messages may also include ngKSI. ngSeF_HPLMN and ngKSI ngSeF_VPLMN .

[0508] The authentication request message may also include information about network elements belonging to the HPLMN and serving the UE. Optionally, if the protection mode indication information indicates hybrid security protection, it may also include indication information elements to indicate which network elements belonging to the HPLMN and serving the UE use distributed security protection for communication with the UE. That is, if the UE authentication response message includes information about network elements belonging to the HPLMN and serving the UE, VPLMN_ngSeF can obtain this information from the UE authentication response message and carry it into the authentication request message.

[0509] Optionally, the authentication request message may also include information about network elements belonging to the VPLMN and serving the UE, such as information about these network elements and the identifier of the VPLMN associated with this information. It should be understood that if the VPLMN_ngSeF does not determine the security protection method itself, but receives protection method indication information from the HPLMN_ngSeF, then if the protection method indication information indicates hybrid security protection, the VPLMN_ngSeF also needs to determine which network elements belonging to the VPLMN and serving the UE use distributed security protection for communication with the UE. Therefore, in S1410, the VPLMN_ngSeF may also carry indication information elements in the authentication request message to indicate which network elements belonging to the VPLMN and serving the UE use distributed security protection for communication with the UE. The specific implementation is similar to the above and can be understood by referring to it; it will not be repeated here. Furthermore, for hybrid security protection, if the UE can use the same mechanism as the network side to determine which network elements communicate with the UE using distributed security protection, then VPLMN_ngSeF does not need to carry indication information elements in the authentication request message.

[0510] In addition, the authentication request message may not include information about the network element that belongs to the VPLMN and needs to serve the UE. This information can be sent to the UE by the network element itself later. Please refer to the relevant introduction below for details.

[0511] It should be understood that S1410 can also refer to the relevant introduction of the first anchor point belonging to the visited network in S1320-S1330, which will not be repeated here.

[0512] It should also be understood that the process shown in S1403-S1410 above, where VPLMN_ngSeF and HPLMN_ngSeF each determine the network elements serving the UE in their respective networks, is only one example. For example, VPLMN_ngSeF can also determine, based on service information, the network elements belonging to the HPLMN that need to serve the UE and the network elements belonging to the VPLMN that need to serve the UE, and send the information of the network elements belonging to the HPLMN that need to serve the UE to VPLMN_ngSeF through an authentication request message. If VPLMN_ngSeF also determines the security protection method, then, if the protection method indication information indicates hybrid security protection, VPLMN_ngSeF can optionally also carry indication information elements in the authentication request message to indicate which network elements belonging to the HPLMN that need to serve the UE use distributed security protection for communication with the UE. For example, the DMF can also determine, based on service information, which network elements belong to the HPLMN and need to serve the UE, and which network elements belong to the VPLMN and need to serve the UE. It then sends the information of these network elements, along with the information of the network elements belonging to the HPLMN and needing to serve the UE, to the HPLMN_ngSeF via a UE authentication response message. The HPLMN_ngSeF then sends the information of the network elements belonging to the VPLMN and needing to serve the UE to the VPLMN_ngSeF via a UE authentication response message. If the DMF also determines the security protection method, and the protection method indication information indicates hybrid security protection, optionally, the DMF can also carry indication information elements in the UE authentication response message to indicate which network elements in the HPLMN and among the network elements belonging to the VPLMN and needing to serve the UE use distributed security protection for communication with the UE. In other words, any network element among the VPLMN_ngSeF, HPLMN_ngSeF, and the DMF can determine which network elements in the VPLMN and / or HPLMN serve the UE; these will not be listed individually here.

[0513] Afterwards, the UE and network continue the authentication process, the specific process of which is the same as described above. Figure 2 or Figure 3 The process shown is similar, such as Figure 2 or Figure 3 In this context, SEAF can be understood as VPLMN_ngSeF. Figure 2 or Figure 3 In this context, AUSF can be understood as HPLMN_ngSeF; please refer to this for further understanding, as it will not be elaborated upon here. During the authentication process, HPLMN_ngSeF can generate K... ngSeF_HPLMN and the UE's identifier, K ngSeF_HPLMN and ngKSI ngSeF_HPLMN Save as associated.

[0514] S1411, HPLMN_ngSeF according to K ngSeF_HPLMN Generate K using information from NF1. NF1 .

[0515] NF1 is a network element belonging to the HPLMN and required to serve the UE.

[0516] K NF1 This is the NAS anchor key for NF1, such as the first key or the second key mentioned above. If the network authentication of the UE is successful, such as when HPLMN_ngSeF sends a message to the UE via VPLMN_ngSeF to indicate that the network authentication of the UE is successful, HPLMN_ngSeF can generate K. ngSeF_HPLMN Then according to K ngSeF_HPLMN Generate K NF1 For details, please refer to the relevant introductions to the first key or the second key mentioned above, which will not be repeated here.

[0517] Optionally, HPLMN_ngSeF can also generate ngKSI. NF1 ngKSI NF1 The key identifier for NF1 is, as described above, the first key identifier or the second key identifier.

[0518] S1412, HPLMN_ngSeF sends a NAS SMC establishment request message to NF1.

[0519] In S1412, the NAS SMC request message can include the UE's identifier, K... NF1 Optionally, it also includes ngKSI NF1 And information about NF1. If NF1 does not receive ngKSI NF1 Then NF1 can generate ngKSI on its own. NF1 And also the UE's identifier, K NF1 and ngKSI NF1 Save as associated.

[0520] S1413, NF1 sends a NAS SMC message to the UE.

[0521] The NAS SMC message in S1413 may include the UE's identifier and ngKSI. NF1.

[0522] If S1408 and S1410 do not provide the network elements belonging to the HPLMN and needing to serve the UE to the UE, the NAS SMC message in S1413 may also include information about NF1.

[0523] For UE, UE can generate K ngSeF_HPLMN UE identifier, K ngSeF_HPLMN and ngKSI ngSeF_HPLMN Associated storage. UE can also save based on K. ngSeF_HPLMN Generate K using information from NF1. NF1 and the UE's identifier, K NF1 and ngKSI NF1 Save as associated.

[0524] S1414, HPLMN_ngSeF sends K to VPLMN_ngSeF ngSeF_VPLMN .

[0525] In response to generating K ngSeF_HPLMN HPLMN_ngSeF according to K ngSeF_HPLMN, Generate K ngSeF_VPLMN and send K to VPLMN_ngSeF ngSeF_VPLMN .

[0526] S1415, VPLMN_ngSeF according to K ngSeF_VPLMN Based on the information from NF2, generate K. NF2 .

[0527] NF2 is a network element belonging to VPLMN and needs to serve UE.

[0528] K NF2 This is the NAS anchor key for NF2, as described in the third key above. If the network authentication UE passes, VPLMN_ngSeF can be determined based on K. ngSeF_VPLMN Generate K NF1 For details, please refer to the relevant introduction of the third key mentioned above, which will not be repeated here.

[0529] Optionally, VPLMN_ngSeF can also generate ngKSI NF2 ngKSI NF2 This is the key identifier for NF2.

[0530] S1416, VPLMN_ngSeF sends a NAS SMC establishment request message to NF2.

[0531] In S1416, the NAS SMC request message can include the UE's identifier, K... NF2 Optionally, it also includes ngKSINF2 And information about NF2. If NF2 does not receive ngKSI NF2 Then NF2 can generate ngKSI on its own. NF2 NF2 can transmit the UE's identifier, K... NF2 and ngKSI NF2 Save as an association, or in other words, establish a mapping.

[0532] S1417, NF2 sends a NAS SMC message to the UE.

[0533] The NAS SMC message in S1417 may include the UE's identifier and ngKSI. NF2 .

[0534] If S1410 does not provide the network elements belonging to the VPLMN and needing to serve the UE to the UE, the NASSMC message in S1417 may also include NF2 information. For the UE, the UE can generate K... ngSeF_VPLMN UE identifier, K ngSeF_VPLMN and ngKSI ngSeF_VPLMN This involves associating and saving data, or establishing a mapping relationship. The UE can also rely on K... ngSeF_VPLMN Based on the information from NF2, generate K. NF2 and the UE's identifier, K NF2 and ngKSI NF2 Save as an association, or in other words, establish a mapping relationship.

[0535] It should be understood that the execution order between S1411-S1413 and S1414-S1417 is not restricted.

[0536] It should also be understood that S1411-S1417 can also refer to the relevant introductions of S1301-S1302 above, and will not be repeated here.

[0537] Figure 15 This is a flowchart illustrating the communication method. Figure 3 This mainly involves the interaction between UE (such as the first terminal mentioned above), SDF (such as the routing network element mentioned above), VPLMN_ngSeF (such as the second anchor point mentioned above), HPLMN_ngSeF (such as the first anchor point mentioned above, i.e., the case where the first anchor point belongs to the home network), NF1 (such as the first or second network element mentioned above), NF2 (such as the third network element mentioned above) and DMF (such as the data management network element mentioned above).

[0538] Figure 15 The process shown mainly involves the roaming scenario in Method 1 above, and VPLMN_ngSeF does not participate in authentication, as detailed below:

[0539] S1500a, the UE sends an address request message to the MAN NF of the VPLMN.

[0540] In S1500b, the MAN NF of the VPLMN sends an address request message to the MAN NF of the HPLMN.

[0541] The address request message is used to request the address of ngSeF in HPLMN.

[0542] In S1500c, the MAN NF of HPLMN sends an address response message to the MAN NF of VPLMN.

[0543] In S1500d, the VPLMN's MAN NF sends an address response message to the UE.

[0544] The address response message may include the address of HPLMN_ngSeF.

[0545] It should be understood that the above S1500a-S1500d can refer to the relevant introduction on obtaining the address of the anchor point in the home network by the first terminal, and will not be repeated here.

[0546] S1501, the UE sends an authentication request message to HPLMN_ngSeF.

[0547] The UE sends an authentication request message to HPLMN_ngSeF based on the address of HPLMN_ngSeF.

[0548] The authentication request message may include the UE's identifier, such as SUPI or SUCI. The authentication request message may also include at least one of the following: service information or security capability information, as detailed in S1310 and S1340 above, and will not be repeated here. Furthermore, the security capability information can be replaced with protection mode indication information for easier understanding; the following explanation uses security capability information as an example.

[0549] S1502, HPLMN_ngSeF sends a UE authentication request message to the DMF.

[0550] The UE authentication request message may include the UE's identifier and the UE's serving network name, such as the VPLMN name. The VPLMN name can be obtained by parsing the UE's identifier (such as SUCI) in the authentication request message using HPLMN_ngSeF.

[0551] In S1502, HPLMN_ngSeF can determine the security protection method and the network element that belongs to HPLMN and needs to serve the UE. Alternatively, HPLMN_ngSeF may not determine the security protection method, which will be determined by the subsequent DMF. The specific implementation is similar to S1404 above, which can be referred to for understanding and will not be repeated here.

[0552] Optionally, HPLMN_ngSeF can also determine, based on service information, the network elements belonging to the VPLMN and serving the UE, and obtain information about these network elements from the MAN NF. If HPLMN_ngSeF determines the security protection method, and the security protection method is hybrid security protection, then HPLMN_ngSeF can also determine which network elements belonging to the VPLMN and serving the UE use distributed security protection for communication with the UE.

[0553] S1503, DMF generates authentication vector.

[0554] For information on generating authentication vectors using DMF, please refer to the relevant introductions to S204 or S304 mentioned above; further details will not be provided here.

[0555] In S1503, if HPLMN_ngSeF is uncertain about the security protection method, DMF can determine whether the communication between the UE and multiple network elements in the same network adopts distributed security protection or hybrid security protection based on the security capability information. The specific implementation is similar to S1405 above, which can be referred to for understanding, and will not be repeated here.

[0556] S1504, DMF sends a UE authentication response message to HPLMN_ngSeF.

[0557] The UE authentication response message may include an authentication vector, as detailed in the descriptions in S205 or S305 above, and will not be repeated here. Furthermore, the UE authentication response message may also include K... ngSeF_HPLMN If the security protection method is determined by the DMF, the DMF can also carry the protection method indication information into the UE authentication response message.

[0558] Optionally, if HPLMN_ngSeF does not determine the network elements belonging to the VPLMN and needing to serve the UE, the DMF can also determine the network elements belonging to the VPLMN and needing to serve the UE based on the service information, obtain the information of these network elements from the MAN NF, and carry this information into the UE authentication acquisition response message. If the DMF determines the security protection method, optionally, for the security protection method being hybrid security protection, the DMF can also determine which network elements belonging to the VPLMN and needing to serve the UE use distributed security protection for communication with the UE. In this case, the DMF can also associate the information of the network elements in the VPLMN that use distributed security protection for communication with the UE with the indication information element in the UE authentication acquisition response message to indicate that these network elements are network elements whose communication with the UE uses distributed security protection.

[0559] Of course, if the DMF determines the security protection method, but the DMF does not determine which network elements belonging to the VPLMN and serving the UE use distributed security protection for communication with the UE, then HPLMN_ngSeF can also determine which network elements belonging to the VPLMN and serving the UE use distributed security protection for communication with the UE.

[0560] S1505, HPLMN_ngSeF generates ngKSI ngSeF_HPLMN .

[0561] ngKSI ngSeF_HPLMN The key index of the first anchor point mentioned above is described in the relevant introduction to the key index above, and will not be repeated here.

[0562] S1506, HPLMN_ngSeF sends an authentication request message to the UE.

[0563] The authentication request message may include an authentication vector, as detailed in S207 or S306 above, and will not be repeated here. The authentication request message may also include ngKSI. ngSeF_HPLMN The protection method indication information is similar to that in S1408 above, and can be understood by referring to it. It will not be repeated here.

[0564] Optionally, the authentication request message may include information about network elements belonging to the HPLMN and needing to serve the UE, such as information about these network elements and the identifier of the HPLMN associated with this information. The specific implementation is similar to S1408 above and can be understood by reference; it will not be repeated here. Optionally, if the DMF or HPLMN_ngSeF determines that a network element belongs to the VPLMN and needs to serve the UE, the authentication request message may also include information about the network element belonging to the VPLMN and needing to serve the UE. The specific implementation is similar to S1408 above and can be understood by reference; it will not be repeated here.

[0565] Afterwards, the UE and network continue the authentication process, the specific process of which is the same as described above. Figure 2 or Figure 3 The process shown is similar; in this case, HPLMN_ngSeF can be understood as... Figure 2 or Figure 3 The functionality of SEAF+AUSF is included. During the authentication process, HPLMN_ngSeF can generate a K... ngSeF_HPLMN and the UE's identifier, K ngSeF_HPLMN and ngKSI ngSeF_HPLMN Save as associated.

[0566] S1507, HPLMN_ngSeF according to K ngSeF_HPLMN Generate K using information from NF1. NF1 .

[0567] S1508, HPLMN_ngSeF sends a NAS SMC establishment request message to NF1.

[0568] S1509, NF1 sends a NAS SMC message to the UE.

[0569] It should be understood that S1507-S1509 can also refer to the relevant introductions of S1411-S1413 mentioned above.

[0570] S1510, HPLMN_ngSeF sends a key information synchronization message to VPLMN_ngSeF.

[0571] The key information synchronization message may include the UE's identifier, K... ngSeF_VPLMN Protection method indication information.

[0572] Since HPLMN_ngSeF can determine whether the UE is roaming based on the name of the aforementioned VPLMN, it responds to the generation of K ngSeF_HPLMN HPLMN_ngSeF can also be based on K ngSeF_HPLMN, Generate K ngSeF_VPLMN And it is carried in the key information synchronization message. K ngSeF_HPLMN You can also refer to the relevant introduction to the key identifier of the first anchor point above, K ngSeF_VPLMN You can also refer to the relevant introduction of the key identifier of the second anchor point mentioned above, which will not be repeated here.

[0573] Optionally, if the DMF or HPLMN_ngSeF determines that a network element belongs to the VPLMN and needs to serve the UE, the key information synchronization message may also include information about the network element belonging to the VPLMN and needing to serve the UE. For hybrid security protection, optionally, HPLMN_ngSeF may also associate information about network elements in the VPLMN whose communication with the UE uses distributed security protection with indication information elements in the key information synchronization message, to indicate that these network elements are network elements whose communication with the UE uses distributed security protection. If neither the DMF nor HPLMN_ngSeF determines that a network element belongs to the VPLMN and needs to serve the UE, the key information synchronization message may include service information, that is, HPLMN_ngSeF may carry the previously obtained service information into the key information synchronization message.

[0574] It should be understood that the key information synchronization message is an example name, and it can also be replaced with a security message synchronization message, or any other possible message, without specific restrictions.

[0575] For VPLMN_ngSeF, if the key information synchronization message includes service information, VPLMN_ngSeF can determine the network elements in the VPLMN that need to serve the UE based on the service information and obtain information about these network elements from the MAN NF. In this case, if the protection mode indication information indicates hybrid security protection, VPLMN_ngSeF can also determine which network elements belonging to the VPLMN and needing to serve the UE use distributed security protection for communication with the UE. If the key information synchronization message includes information about the network elements in the VPLMN that need to serve the UE, VPLMN_ngSeF can determine the network elements in the VPLMN that need to serve the UE accordingly. In this case, if the protection mode indication information indicates hybrid security protection, and the key information synchronization message does not indicate which network elements belonging to the VPLMN and needing to serve the UE use distributed security protection for communication with the UE, VPLMN_ngSeF can still determine which network elements belonging to the VPLMN and needing to serve the UE use distributed security protection for communication with the UE.

[0576] VPLMN_ngSeF can also generate ngKSI ngSeF_HPLMN and ngKSI ngSeF_HPLMN Send it to the UE. Also, VPLMN_ngSeF can send the UE's identifier, K... ngSeF_VPLMN and ngKSI ngSeF_VPLMN Save as associated.

[0577] Optionally, VPLMN_ngSeF can also send information about the network elements in the VPLMN that need to serve the UE to the UE. In this case, for hybrid security protection, VPLMN_ngSeF can also indicate to the UE which network elements belonging to the VPLMN and needing to serve the UE use distributed security protection for communication with the UE. The specific implementation can be similar to the content carried in the message in S1408, which can be referred to for understanding, and will not be elaborated here.

[0578] S1511, VPLMN_ngSeF according to K ngSeF_VPLMN Based on the information from NF2, generate K. NF2 .

[0579] S1512, VPLMN_ngSeF sends a NAS SMC establishment request message to NF2.

[0580] S1513, NF2 sends a NAS SMC message to the UE.

[0581] It should be understood that S1511-S1513 can be referred to the relevant introductions of S1415-S1417 above, and will not be repeated here.

[0582] It should be understood that there is no restriction on the execution order between S1510-S1513 and S1507-S1509.

[0583] Figure 16 This is a flowchart illustrating the communication method. Figure 4 This mainly involves the interaction between UE (such as the first terminal mentioned above), ngSeF (such as the first anchor point mentioned above, i.e., the case where the first anchor point belongs to the home network), NF1 (such as the first network element or the second network element mentioned above) and DMF (such as the data management network element mentioned above).

[0584] Figure 16 The process shown mainly involves the non-roaming scenario in Method 1 above, as detailed below:

[0585] S1600a, the UE sends an address request message to the MAN NF.

[0586] The address request message is used to request the address of ngSeF.

[0587] S1600b, MAN NF sends an address response message to UE.

[0588] The address response message may include the address of HPLMN_ngSeF.

[0589] It should be understood that the above S1600a-S1600b are similar to the above first terminal obtaining the address of the anchor point in the home network. The difference is that the transmission of the address request message and the address response message does not require the anchor point in the visited network to participate. Other details can be understood by referring to this, and will not be repeated here.

[0590] S1601, the UE sends an authentication request message to ngSeF.

[0591] The UE sends an authentication request message to ngSeF based on the address of ngSeF.

[0592] The authentication request message may include the UE's identifier, such as SUPI or SUCI. The authentication request message may also include at least one of the following: service information or security capability information, as detailed in S1310 and S1340 above, and will not be repeated here. Furthermore, the security capability information can be replaced with protection mode indication information for easier understanding; the following explanation uses security capability information as an example.

[0593] It should be understood that S1600a-S1600b are optional. If S1600a-S1600b are not executed, then in S1601, the UE can also send an N1 message (including an authentication request message) to the SDF, and the SDF will send an authentication request message to the ngSeF.

[0594] S1602, ngSeF sends a UE authentication request message to DMF.

[0595] The UE authentication request message may include the UE's identifier and the UE's serving network name, such as the name of the HPLMN. The name of the HPLMN can be obtained by ngSeF parsing the UE's identifier (such as SUCI) in the authentication request message.

[0596] In S1602, ngSeF can determine the security protection method and the network element that belongs to HPLMN and needs to serve the UE. Alternatively, ngSeF may not determine the security protection method, and the DMF will determine the security protection method later. The specific implementation is similar to S1404 above, which can be referred to for understanding, and will not be repeated here.

[0597] S1603, DMF generates authentication vector.

[0598] For information on generating authentication vectors using DMF, please refer to the relevant introductions to S204 or S304 mentioned above; further details will not be provided here.

[0599] In S1603, if ngSeF is unsure of the security protection method, DMF can determine whether distributed security protection or hybrid security protection is used for communication between the UE and multiple network elements in the same network based on the security capability information. The specific implementation is similar to S1405 above, which can be referred to for understanding, and will not be repeated here.

[0600] S1604, DMF sends a UE authentication response message to ngSeF.

[0601] The UE authentication response message may include an authentication vector, as detailed in the descriptions in S205 or S305 above, and will not be repeated here. Furthermore, the UE authentication response message may also include K... ngSeF If the security protection method is determined by the DMF, the DMF can also carry the protection method indication information into the UE authentication response message.

[0602] S1605, ngSeF generates ngKSI ngSeF .

[0603] ngKSI ngSeF The key index of the first anchor point mentioned above is described in the relevant introduction to the key index above, and will not be repeated here.

[0604] S1606, ngSeF sends an authentication request message to the UE.

[0605] The authentication request message may include an authentication vector, as detailed in S207 or S306 above, and will not be repeated here. The authentication request message may also include ngKSI. ngSeF The protection method indication information is implemented similarly to S1408 above, and can be understood by referring to it; it will not be repeated here. Optionally, the authentication request message may include information about the network element belonging to the HPLMN and needing to serve the UE. The implementation is similar to S1506 above, and can be understood by referring to it; it will not be repeated here.

[0606] Afterwards, the UE and network continue the authentication process, the specific process of which is the same as described above. Figure 2 or Figure 3 The process shown is similar; in this case, ngSeF can be understood as... Figure 2 or Figure 3 The SEAF+AUSF functionality in the Chinese authentication process. During the authentication process, ngSeF can generate a K... ngSeF and the UE's identifier, K ngSeF and ngKSI ngSeF Save as associated.

[0607] S1607,ngSeF according to K ngSeF Generate K using information from NF1. NF1 .

[0608] S1608, ngSeF sends a NAS SMC establishment request message to NF1.

[0609] S1609, NF1 sends a NAS SMC message to the UE.

[0610] It should be understood that S1607-S1609 can also refer to the relevant introductions of S1411-S1413 mentioned above.

[0611] Figure 17 This is a flowchart illustrating the communication method. Figure 5 This mainly involves the interaction between UE (such as the first terminal mentioned above), SDF (such as the routing network element mentioned above), VPLMN_ngSeF (such as the second anchor point mentioned above), HPLMN_ngSeF (such as the first anchor point mentioned above, i.e., the case where the first anchor point belongs to the home network), NF1 (such as the first or second network element mentioned above), NF2 (such as the third network element mentioned above) and DMF (such as the data management network element mentioned above).

[0612] Figure 17 The process shown mainly involves the roaming scenario in method 2 above, with VPLMN_ngSeF participating in authentication, as detailed below:

[0613] S1701, the UE sends an N1 message to the SDF.

[0614] The N1 message may include an authentication request message.

[0615] The authentication request message may include the UE's identifier, such as SUPI or SUCI. Optionally, the authentication request message may include security capability information, as detailed in the relevant description in S1340 above, and will not be repeated here. Unlike S1401 above, in S1701, the authentication request message may not include security capability information and service information.

[0616] S1702, SDF sends an N1 message to VPLMN_ngSeF.

[0617] It should be understood that S1702 can also refer to the relevant introduction of S1402 above.

[0618] S1703, VPLMN_ngSeF sends an authentication request message to HPLM_ngSeF.

[0619] It should be understood that S1703 is similar to S1403 above, but the difference is that in S1703, VPLMN_ngSeF may not be sure which network element needs to serve the UE, or the security protection method. Other aspects can be understood by referring to this.

[0620] S1704, HPLMN_ngSeF sends a UE authentication request message to the DMF.

[0621] The UE authentication request message may include the UE's identifier and the UE's serving network name, such as the name of the VPLMN.

[0622] It should be understood that, similar to S1404 above, but with the difference that in S1704, HPLMN_ngSeF may not be certain about the network element that needs to serve the UE, or the security protection method. Other aspects can be understood by referring to this.

[0623] S1705, DMF generates authentication vector.

[0624] For information on generating authentication vectors using DMF, please refer to the relevant introductions to S204 or S304 mentioned above; further details will not be provided here.

[0625] In S1705, the DMF can, by default, deduce the key associated with HPLMN_ngSeF based on the information from HPLMN_ngSeF, i.e., deduce K. ngSeF_HPLMN The input parameters can include information about HPLMN_ngSeF and the length of that information. Alternatively, DMF can also use the existing method to derive K by default. ngSeF_HPLMN Specifically, it can also be referred to as K above. ngSeF_HPLMN The relevant details will not be repeated here. It should be understood that in S1705, the DMF may not be certain about the network elements that need to serve the UE, or the security protection method.

[0626] S1706, DMF sends a UE authentication response message to HPLMN_ngSeF.

[0627] The UE authentication response message may include an authentication vector, as detailed in the descriptions in S205 or S305 above, and will not be repeated here. Furthermore, the UE authentication response message may also include K... ngSeF_HPLMN .

[0628] S1707, HPLMN_ngSeF generates ngKSI ngSeF_HPLMN .

[0629] HPLMN_ngSeF can use the existing method to generate ngKSI by default. ngSeF_HPLMN Alternatively, HPLMN_ngSeF can also generate ngKSI using the default method described in this application embodiment. ngSeF_HPLMN ngKSI ngSeF_HPLMN For information regarding HPLMN_ngSeF, please refer to the relevant introduction to the key index above, which will not be repeated here.

[0630] S1708, HPLMN_ngSeF sends a UE authentication response message to VPLMN_ngSeF.

[0631] The UE authentication response message may include an authentication vector, as detailed in the relevant sections of S207 or S306 above, and will not be repeated here. The UE authentication response message may also include ngKSI. ngSeF_HPLMN .

[0632] It should be understood that S1708 is similar to S1408 above, but the difference is that the UE authentication response message may not include information about the network elements that need to serve the UE, or it may not include protection mode indication. Other aspects can be understood by referring to this.

[0633] S1709, VPLMN_ngSeF generates ngKSI ngSeF_VPLMN .

[0634] VPLMN_ngSeF can use the existing method to generate ngKSI by default. ngSeF_VPLMN Alternatively, VPLMN_ngSeF can also generate ngKSI using the default method described in this application embodiment. ngSeF_VPLMN ngKSI ngSeF_VPLMN For information regarding VPLMN_ngSeF, please refer to the relevant introduction to the key index above, which will not be repeated here.

[0635] S1710, VPLMN_ngSeF sends an authentication request message to the UE.

[0636] Authentication request messages can be used to request UE authentication of the network, including parameters such as RAND, AUTN, and ABBA. These parameters are detailed above and will not be repeated here. Authentication request messages may also include ngKSI. ngSeF_HPLMN and ngKSI ngSeF_VPLMN .

[0637] It should be understood that S1710 is similar to S1410 above, but the difference is that the authentication request message may not include information about the network elements that need to serve the UE, or it may not include protection mode indication information. Other details can be understood by referring to this.

[0638] Afterwards, the UE and network continue the authentication process, the specific process of which is the same as described above. Figure 2 or Figure 3 The process shown is similar, such as Figure 2 or Figure 3 In this context, SEAF can be understood as VPLMN_ngSeF. Figure 2 or Figure 3In this context, AUSF can be understood as HPLMN_ngSeF; please refer to this for further understanding, as it will not be elaborated upon here. During the authentication process, HPLMN_ngSeF can generate K... ngSeF_HPLMN and the UE's identifier, K ngSeF_HPLMN and ngKSI ngSeF_HPLMN Save as associated.

[0639] S1711a, the UE sends a service request message #1 to NF1 in the HPLMN.

[0640] Service request message #1 can request NF1 to provide services to the UE, including the UE's identifier and ngKSI. ngSeF_HPLMN For details, please refer to the relevant introduction of the first service request above, which will not be repeated here.

[0641] S1711b, NF1 sends a key request message #1 to HPLMN_ngSeF.

[0642] Key Request Message #1 can request NF1 to provide the UE with an associated key, such as the UE's identifier and ngKSI. ngSeF_HPLMN Optionally, it may also include NF1 information, for details of which can be found in the above introduction to the first key request, and will not be repeated here.

[0643] S1712, HPLMN_ngSeF according to K ngSeF_HPLMN Generate K using information from NF1. NF1 .

[0644] HPLMN_ngSeF uses the UE's identifier and ngKSI from key request message #1. ngSeF_HPLMN Index to K ngSeF_HPLMN Therefore, based on K ngSeF_HPLMN Generate K using information from NF1. NF1 If key request message #1 does not include information about NF1, HPLMN_ngSeF can also obtain information about NF1 from MAN NF.

[0645] Optionally, HPLMN_ngSeF can also generate ngKSI. NF1 ngKSI NF1 The key identifier for NF1 is, as described above, the first key identifier or the second key identifier.

[0646] S1713a, HPLMN_ngSeF sends key response message #1 to NF1.

[0647] Key response message #1 may include K NF1 Optionally, it may also include ngKSI NF1And / or information about NF1, for example, if NF1 does not provide information about NF1, and HPLMN_ngSeF does not generate ngKSI. NF1 Then HPLMN_ngSeF can also carry the information obtained from NF1 into the key response message #1, which is used to generate ngKSI from NF1. NF1 .

[0648] For NF1, if NF1 does not receive ngKSI NF1 Then NF1 can generate ngKSI on its own. NF1 NF1 can transmit the UE's identifier, K... NF1 and ngKSI NF1 Save as associated.

[0649] S1713b, NF1 sends service response message #1 to the UE.

[0650] Service response message #1 may include ngKSI NF1 Optionally, it may also include NF1 information.

[0651] For UE, UE can generate K ngSeF_HPLMN UE identifier, K ngSeF_HPLMN and ngKSI ngSeF_HPLMN Associated storage. UE can also save based on K. ngSeF_HPLMN Generate K using information from NF1. NF1 and the UE's identifier, K NF1 and ngKSI NF1 Associated storage. The information of NF1 can be obtained by the UE itself, or sent to the UE by NF1 through service response message #1, without specific restrictions.

[0652] It should be understood that the above-mentioned S1711a-S1713a can also refer to the relevant introduction of S1300a-S1300b, and will not be repeated here.

[0653] S1714, HPLMN_ngSeF sends K to VPLMN_ngSeF ngSeF_VPLMN .

[0654] In response to generating K ngSeF_HPLMN HPLMN_ngSeF according to K ngSeF_HPLMN, Generate K ngSeF_VPLMN and send K to VPLMN_ngSeF ngSeF_VPLMN VPLMN_ngSeF can generate ngKSI. ngSeF_VPLMN and the UE's identifier, ngKSI ngSeF_VPLMN and K ngSeF_VPLMN Save as associated.

[0655] S1715a7, the UE sends a service request message #2 to NF1 in the VPLMN.

[0656] Service request message #2 can request NF2 to provide services to the UE, including the UE's identifier and ngKSI. ngSeF_VPLMN For details, please refer to the relevant introduction of the second service request mentioned above, which will not be repeated here.

[0657] S1715b, NF1 sends a key request message #2 to VPLMN_ngSeF.

[0658] Key Request Message #2 can request NF2 to provide the UE with an associated key, such as the UE's identifier and ngKSI. ngSeF_VPLMN Optionally, it may also include NF2 information, for details of which can be found in the above introduction to the second key request, and will not be repeated here.

[0659] S1716, VPLMN_ngSeF according to K ngSeF_VPLMN Based on the information from NF2, generate K. NF2 .

[0660] VPLMN_ngSeF uses the UE's identifier and ngKSI from key request message #2. ngSeF_VPLMN Index to K ngSeF_VPLMN Therefore, based on K ngSeF_VPLMN Based on the information from NF2, generate K. NF2 If key request message #2 does not include information about NF2, then VPLMN_ngSeF can also obtain information about NF2 from MAN NF.

[0661] Optionally, VPLMN_ngSeF can also generate ngKSI NF2 ngKSI NF2 This is the key identifier for NF1.

[0662] S1717a, VPLMN_ngSeF sends key response message #2 to NF2.

[0663] Key response message #2 may include K NF2 Optionally, it may also include ngKSI NF2 And / or NF2 information, for example, if NF2 does not provide NF2 information and VPLMN_ngSeF does not generate ngKSI. NF2 Then VPLMN_ngSeF can also carry the information obtained from NF2 into the key response message #2, which is used to generate ngK from NF2. SINF2 .

[0664] If NF2 does not receive ngKSINF2 Then NF2 can generate ngKSI on its own. NF2 NF2 can transmit the UE's identifier, K... NF2 and ngKSI NF2 Save as associated.

[0665] S1717b, NF2 sends service response message #2 to the UE.

[0666] Service response message #2 may include ngKSI NF2 Optionally, it may also include NF2 information.

[0667] UE can generate K ngSeF_VPLMN UE identifier, K ngSeF_VPLMN and ngKSI ngSeF_VPLMN Associated storage. UE can also save based on K. ngSeF_VPLMN Based on the information from NF2, generate K. NF2 and the UE's identifier, K NF2 and ngKSI NF2 Associated storage. The information in NF2 can be obtained by the UE itself or sent to the UE by NF2, without specific restrictions.

[0668] It should be understood that S1714-S1717b can also refer to the relevant introductions of S1300c-S1300d mentioned above, and will not be repeated here.

[0669] It should also be understood that the execution order between S1711a-S1713b and S1714-S1717b is not restricted.

[0670] Figure 18 This is a flowchart illustrating the communication method. Figure 6 This mainly involves the interaction between UE (such as the first terminal mentioned above), SDF (such as the routing network element mentioned above), VPLMN_ngSeF (such as the second anchor point mentioned above), HPLMN_ngSeF (such as the first anchor point mentioned above, i.e., the case where the first anchor point belongs to the home network), NF1 (such as the first or second network element mentioned above), NF2 (such as the third network element mentioned above) and DMF (such as the data management network element mentioned above).

[0671] Figure 18 The process shown mainly involves the roaming scenario in method 2 above, and VPLMN_ngSeF does not participate in authentication, as detailed below:

[0672] S1800a, the UE sends an address request message to the MAN NF of the VPLMN.

[0673] In S1800b, the MAN NF of the VPLMN sends an address request message to the MAN NF of the HPLMN.

[0674] The address request message is used to request the address of ngSeF in HPLMN.

[0675] In S1800c, the MAN NF of HPLMN sends an address response message to the MAN NF of VPLMN.

[0676] In S1800d, the VPLMN's MAN NF sends an address response message to the UE.

[0677] The address response message may include the address of HPLMN_ngSeF.

[0678] It should be understood that the above S1800a-S1800d can refer to the relevant introduction on obtaining the address of the anchor point in the home network by the first terminal, and will not be repeated here.

[0679] S1801, the UE sends an authentication request message to HPLMN_ngSeF.

[0680] The UE sends an authentication request message to HPLMN_ngSeF based on the address of HPLMN_ngSeF.

[0681] The authentication request message may include the UE's identifier, such as SUPI or SUCI. Unlike S1501 above, the authentication request message in S1801 may not include service information and security capability information.

[0682] S1802, HPLMN_ngSeF sends a UE authentication request message to the DMF.

[0683] The UE authentication request message may include the UE's identifier and the UE's serving network name, such as the VPLMN name. The VPLMN name can be obtained by parsing the UE's identifier (such as SUCI) in the authentication request message using HPLMN_ngSeF.

[0684] It should be understood that S1802 is similar to S1502 above, but the difference is that in S1802, HPLMN_ngSeF may not be sure which network element needs to serve the UE, or the security protection method. Other aspects can be understood by referring to this.

[0685] S1803, DMF generates authentication vector.

[0686] For information on generating authentication vectors using DMF, please refer to the relevant introductions to S204 or S304 mentioned above; further details will not be provided here.

[0687] In S1803, the DMF can, by default, deduce the key associated with HPLMN_ngSeF based on the information from HPLMN_ngSeF, i.e., deduce K.ngSeF_HPLMN The input parameters can include information about HPLMN_ngSeF and the length of that information. Alternatively, DMF can also use the existing method to derive K by default. ngSeF_HPLMN Specifically, it can also be referred to as K above. ngSeF_HPLMN The relevant details will not be repeated here. It should be understood that in S1803, the DMF may not be certain about the network elements that need to serve the UE, or the security protection method.

[0688] S1804, DMF sends a UE authentication response message to HPLMN_ngSeF.

[0689] The UE authentication response message may include an authentication vector, as detailed in the descriptions in S205 or S305 above, and will not be repeated here. Furthermore, the UE authentication response message may also include K... ngSeF_HPLMN .

[0690] S1805, HPLMN_ngSeF generates ngKSI ngSeF_HPLMN .

[0691] HPLMN_ngSeF can use the existing method to generate ngKSI by default. ngSeF_HPLMN Alternatively, HPLMN_ngSeF can also generate ngKSI using the default method described in this application embodiment. ngSeF_HPLMN ngKSI ngSeF_HPLMN For information regarding HPLMN_ngSeF, please refer to the relevant introduction to the key index above, which will not be repeated here.

[0692] S1806, HPLMN_ngSeF sends an authentication request message to the UE.

[0693] The authentication request message may include an authentication vector, as detailed in S207 or S306 above, and will not be repeated here. The authentication request message may also include ngKSI. ngSeF_HPLMN It should be understood that S1806 is similar to S1506 above, except that the authentication request message may not include information about the network elements that need to serve the UE, or it may not include protection mode indication information. Other details can be understood by referring to this explanation.

[0694] Afterwards, the UE and network continue the authentication process, the specific process of which is the same as described above. Figure 2 or Figure 3 The process shown is similar; in this case, HPLMN_ngSeF can be understood as... Figure 2 or Figure 3 The functionality of SEAF+AUSF is included. During the authentication process, HPLMN_ngSeF can generate a K... ngSeF_HPLMN and the UE's identifier, KngSeF_HPLMN and ngKSI ngSeF_HPLMN Save as associated.

[0695] S1807a, the UE sends a service request message #1 to NF1 in the HPLMN.

[0696] S1807b, NF1 sends a key request message #1 to HPLMN_ngSeF.

[0697] S1808, HPLMN_ngSeF according to K ngSeF_HPLMN Generate K using information from NF1. NF1 .

[0698] S1809a, HPLMN_ngSeF sends key response message #1 to NF1.

[0699] S1809b, NF1 sends service response message #1 to the UE.

[0700] It should be understood that S1807a-S1809b can be referred to the relevant introductions of S1711a-S1713b mentioned above, and will not be repeated here.

[0701] S1810, HPLMN_ngSeF sends a key information synchronization message to VPLMN_ngSeF.

[0702] The key information synchronization message may include the UE's identifier and K. ngSeF_VPLMN .

[0703] It should be understood that S1810 is similar to S1510 above. The difference is that in S1810, the key information synchronization message may not include protection mode indication information, and may not include information about network elements that need to serve the UE. Other details can be understood by referring to this.

[0704] S1811a, the UE sends a service request message #2 to NF1 in the VPLMN.

[0705] S1811b, NF1 sends a key request message #2 to VPLMN_ngSeF.

[0706] S1812, VPLMN_ngSeF according to K ngSeF_VPLMN Based on the information from NF2, generate K. NF2 .

[0707] S1813a, VPLMN_ngSeF sends key response message #2 to NF2.

[0708] S1813b, NF2 sends service response message #2 to the UE.

[0709] It should be understood that S1811a-S1813b can be referred to the relevant introductions of S1716a-S1718b mentioned above, and will not be repeated here.

[0710] It should also be understood that there is no restriction on the execution order between S1810-S1813b and S1807a-S1809b.

[0711] Figure 19 This is a flowchart illustrating the communication method. Figure 7 This mainly involves the interaction between UE (such as the first terminal mentioned above), ngSeF (such as the first anchor point mentioned above, i.e., the case where the first anchor point belongs to the home network), NF1 (such as the first network element or the second network element mentioned above) and DMF (such as the data management network element mentioned above).

[0712] Figure 19 The process shown mainly involves the non-roaming scenarios in method 2 above, as detailed below:

[0713] S1900a, the UE sends an address request message to the MAN NF.

[0714] The address request message is used to request the address of ngSeF.

[0715] S1900b, MAN NF sends an address response message to UE.

[0716] The address response message can include the address of ngSeF.

[0717] It should be understood that the above S1900a-S1900b are similar to the above first terminal obtaining the address of the anchor point in the home network. The difference is that the transmission of the address request message and the address response message does not require the anchor point in the visited network to participate. Other details can be understood by referring to this, and will not be repeated here.

[0718] S1901, the UE sends an authentication request message to ngSeF.

[0719] The UE sends an authentication request message to ngSeF based on the address of ngSeF.

[0720] The authentication request message may include the UE's identifier, such as SUPI or SUCI. Unlike S1901 described above, in S1901, the authentication request message may not include security capability information and service information.

[0721] It should be understood that S1900a-S1900b are optional. If S1900a-S1900b are not executed, then in S1901, the UE can also send an N1 message (including an authentication request message) to the SDF, and the SDF will send an authentication request message to the ngSeF.

[0722] S1902, ngSeF sends a UE authentication request message to DMF.

[0723] The UE authentication request message may include the UE's identifier and the UE's serving network name, such as the name of the HPLMN. The name of the HPLMN can be obtained by ngSeF parsing the UE's identifier (such as SUCI) in the authentication request message.

[0724] It should be understood that S1902 is similar to S1602 above. The difference is that in S1902, ngSeF may not be sure of the network element that needs to serve the UE, or the security protection method. Other aspects can be understood by referring to this.

[0725] S1903, DMF generates authentication vector.

[0726] For information on generating authentication vectors using DMF, please refer to the relevant introductions to S204 or S304 mentioned above; further details will not be provided here.

[0727] It should be understood that S1903 is similar to S1603 above. The difference is that in S1903, the DMF may not be sure which network element needs to serve the UE, or the security protection method. Other aspects can be understood by referring to this.

[0728] S1904, DMF sends a UE authentication response message to ngSeF.

[0729] The UE authentication response message may include an authentication vector, as detailed in the descriptions in S205 or S305 above, and will not be repeated here. Furthermore, the UE authentication response message may also include K... ngSeF .

[0730] S1905, ngSeF generates ngKSI ngSeF .

[0731] ngSeF can use the existing method to generate ngKSI by default. ngSeF Alternatively, ngSeF can generate ngKSI using the default method described in the embodiments of this application. ngSeF ngKSI ngSeF For information regarding ngSeF, please refer to the relevant introduction to the key index above, which will not be repeated here.

[0732] S1906, ngSeF sends an authentication request message to the UE.

[0733] The authentication request message may include an authentication vector, which can be referred to in the relevant introductions of S207 or S306 above, and will not be repeated here.

[0734] The authentication request message may also include ngKSI ngSeF .

[0735] It should be understood that S1906 is similar to S1606 above, but the difference is that the authentication request message may not include information about the network elements that need to serve the UE, or it may not include the protection method indication. Other details can be understood by referring to this.

[0736] Afterwards, the UE and network continue the authentication process, the specific process of which is the same as described above. Figure 2 or Figure 3 The process shown is similar; in this case, ngSeF can be understood as... Figure 2 or Figure 3 The SEAF+AUSF functionality in the Chinese authentication process. During the authentication process, ngSeF can generate a K... ngSeF and the UE's identifier, K ngSeF and ngKSI ngSeF Save as associated.

[0737] S1907a, the UE sends a service request message #1 to NF1 in the HPLMN.

[0738] S1907b, NF1 sends a key request message #1 to ngSeF.

[0739] S1908,ngSeF according to K ngSeF Generate K using information from NF1. NF1 .

[0740] S1909a, ngSeF sends key response message #1 to NF1.

[0741] S1909b, NF1 sends service response message #1 to the UE.

[0742] It should be understood that S1907a-S1909b can be referred to the relevant introductions of S1711a-S1713b mentioned above, and will not be repeated here.

[0743] The above combination Figures 13-19 The communication method provided in the embodiments of this application is described in detail below. Figure 20 and Figure 21 This document describes in detail the communication apparatus used to perform the communication method provided in the embodiments of this application.

[0744] For example, Figure 20 This is a schematic diagram of the structure of the communication device provided in the embodiments of this application. Figure 1 .like Figure 20 As shown, the communication device 2000 includes a processing module 2001 and a transceiver module 2002. For ease of explanation, Figure 20 Only the main components of the communication device are shown.

[0745] In some embodiments, the communication device 2000 may be adapted to Figure 4 In the communication system shown, the execution Figures 13-19 The function of the first anchor point in the communication method shown.

[0746] The transceiver module 2002 is used to perform the transceiver function of the first anchor point.

[0747] Processing module 2001 is used to perform functions of the first anchor point other than sending and receiving functions.

[0748] Optionally, the communication device 2000 may also include a storage module. Figure 10 (Not shown in the image), this storage module stores programs or instructions. When the processing module 2001 executes the program or instructions, it enables the communication device 2000 to perform... Figures 13-19 The function of the first network element in the communication method shown. It should be understood that the processing module 2001 involved in the communication device 2000 can be implemented by a processor or processor-related circuit components, and can be a processor or processing unit; the transceiver module 2002 can be implemented by a transceiver or transceiver-related circuit components, and can be a transceiver or transceiver unit.

[0749] Furthermore, the communication device 2000 can be a network device, a chip (system) or other component or assembly disposed within a network device, or a device containing the network device; this application embodiment does not limit this. The technical effects of the communication device 2000 can be referred to separately. Figures 13-19 The technical effects of any of the communication methods shown in the examples are not elaborated here.

[0750] In other embodiments, the communication device 2000 may be adapted to Figure 4 The communication system shown is executed Figures 13-19 The function of the first terminal in the communication method shown.

[0751] The transceiver module 2002 is used to perform the transceiver functions of the first terminal.

[0752] The processing module 2001 is used to perform functions of the first terminal other than the sending and receiving functions.

[0753] Optionally, the communication device 2000 may also include a storage module. Figure 10 (Not shown in the image), this storage module stores programs or instructions. When the processing module 2001 executes the program or instructions, it enables the communication device 2000 to perform... Figures 13-19The function of the first terminal in the communication method shown. It should be understood that the processing module 2001 involved in the communication device 2000 can be implemented by a processor or processor-related circuit components, and can be a processor or processing unit; the transceiver module 2002 can be implemented by a transceiver or transceiver-related circuit components, and can be a transceiver or transceiver unit.

[0754] Furthermore, the communication device 2000 can be a terminal device, a chip (system) or other component or assembly disposed in the terminal device, or a device containing the terminal device; this application embodiment does not limit this. The technical effects of the communication device 2000 can be referred to separately. Figures 13-19 The technical effects of any of the communication methods shown in the examples are not elaborated here.

[0755] Figure 21 Schematic diagram of the communication device provided in the embodiments of this application Figure 2 For example, the communication device can be a terminal, or a chip (system) or other component or assembly that can be set in the terminal. Figure 21 As shown, the communication device 2100 may include a processor 2101. Optionally, the communication device 2100 may also include a memory 2102 and / or a transceiver 2103. The processor 2101 is coupled to the memory 2102 and the transceiver 2103, for example, they may be connected via a communication bus.

[0756] The following is combined with Figure 21 A detailed description of each component of the communication device 2100 is provided below:

[0757] The processor 2101 is the control center of the communication device 2100. It can be a single processor or a collective term for multiple processing elements. For example, the processor 2101 can be one or more central processing units (CPUs), application-specific integrated circuits (ASICs), or one or more integrated circuits configured to implement the embodiments of this application, such as one or more digital signal processors (DSPs), or one or more field-programmable gate arrays (FPGAs).

[0758] Optionally, the processor 2101 can perform various functions of the communication device 2100 by running or executing software programs stored in the memory 2102 and calling data stored in the memory 2102, such as performing the above-mentioned functions. Figures 13-19 The communication method shown.

[0759] In a specific implementation, as one example, the processor 2101 may include one or more CPUs, for example... Figure 21 CPU0 and CPU1 are shown in the diagram.

[0760] In a specific implementation, as one example, the communication device 2100 may also include multiple processors, for example... Figure 21 The processors 2101 and 2104 shown are illustrated. Each of these processors can be a single-core processor or a multi-core processor. Here, "processor" can refer to one or more devices, circuits, and / or processing cores used to process data (e.g., computer program instructions).

[0761] The memory 2102 is used to store the software program that executes the solution of this application, and is controlled by the processor 2101 to execute it. The specific implementation method can be referred to the above method embodiment, and will not be repeated here.

[0762] Optionally, the memory 2102 may be a read-only memory (ROM) or other type of static storage device capable of storing static information and instructions, random access memory (RAM) or other type of dynamic storage device capable of storing information and instructions, or electrically erasable programmable read-only memory (EEPROM), compact disc read-only memory (CD-ROM) or other optical disc storage, optical disc storage (including compressed optical discs, laser discs, optical discs, digital universal optical discs, Blu-ray discs, etc.), magnetic disk storage media or other magnetic storage devices, or any other medium capable of carrying or storing desired program code in the form of instructions or data structures and accessible by a computer, but not limited thereto. The memory 2102 may be integrated with the processor 2101 or exist independently, and may be connected via the interface circuit of the communication device 2100. Figure 21 (Not shown in the image) is coupled to processor 2101, and this embodiment does not specifically limit this.

[0763] Transceiver 2103 is used for communication with other communication devices. For example, if communication device 2100 is a terminal, transceiver 2103 can be used to communicate with a network device or with another terminal device. As another example, if communication device 2100 is a network device, transceiver 2103 can be used to communicate with a terminal or with another network device.

[0764] Optionally, transceiver 2103 may include a receiver and a transmitter. Figure 21 (Not shown separately). The receiver is used to implement the receiving function, and the transmitter is used to implement the sending function.

[0765] Optionally, the transceiver 2103 can be integrated with the processor 2101, or it can exist independently and be connected via the interface circuit of the communication device 2100. Figure 21 (Not shown in the image) is coupled to processor 2101, and this embodiment does not specifically limit this.

[0766] Understandable Figure 21 The structure of the communication device 2100 shown does not constitute a limitation on the communication device. Actual communication devices may include more or fewer components than shown, or combine certain components, or have different component arrangements.

[0767] Furthermore, the technical effects of the communication device 2100 can be referred to the technical effects of the method described in the above method embodiments, and will not be repeated here.

[0768] It should be understood that the processor in the embodiments of this application can be a central processing unit (CPU), or it can be other general-purpose processors, digital signal processors (DSPs), application-specific integrated circuits (ASICs), field-programmable gate arrays (FPGAs), or other programmable logic devices, discrete gate or transistor logic devices, discrete hardware components, etc. The general-purpose processor can be a microprocessor or any conventional processor.

[0769] It should also be understood that the memory in the embodiments of this application can be volatile memory or non-volatile memory, or may include both volatile and non-volatile memory. The non-volatile memory can be read-only memory (ROM), programmable read-only memory (PROM), erasable programmable read-only memory (EPROM), electrically erasable programmable read-only memory (EEPROM), or flash memory. The volatile memory can be random access memory (RAM), which is used as an external cache. By way of example, but not limitation, many forms of random access memory (RAM) are available, such as static RAM (SRAM), dynamic RAM (DRAM), synchronous DRAM (SDRAM), double data rate synchronous DRAM (DDR SDRAM), enhanced synchronous DRAM (ESDRAM), synchronous linked DRAM (SLDRAM), and direct rambus RAM (DR RAM).

[0770] The above embodiments can be implemented, in whole or in part, by software, hardware (such as circuits), firmware, or any other combination thereof. When implemented using software, the above embodiments can be implemented, in whole or in part, as a computer program product. The computer program product includes one or more computer instructions or computer programs. When the computer instructions or computer program are loaded or executed on a computer, all or part of the processes or functions described in the embodiments of this application are generated. The computer can be a general-purpose computer, a special-purpose computer, a computer network, or other programmable device. The computer instructions can be stored in a computer-readable storage medium or transmitted from one computer-readable storage medium to another. For example, the computer instructions can be transmitted from one website, computer, server, or data center to another website, computer, server, or data center via wired (e.g., infrared, wireless, microwave, etc.) means. The computer-readable storage medium can be any available medium that a computer can access or a data storage device such as a server or data center that includes one or more sets of available media. The available medium can be a magnetic medium (e.g., floppy disk, hard disk, magnetic tape), an optical medium (e.g., DVD), or a semiconductor medium. A semiconductor medium can be a solid-state drive.

[0771] It should be understood that the term "and / or" in this article is merely a description of the relationship between related objects, indicating that three relationships can exist. For example, A and / or B can represent: A existing alone, A and B existing simultaneously, or B existing alone. A and B can be singular or plural. Additionally, the character " / " in this article generally indicates an "or" relationship between the preceding and following related objects, but it can also represent an "and / or" relationship. Please refer to the context for a more accurate understanding.

[0772] In this application, "at least one" means one or more, and "more than one" means two or more. "At least one of the following" or similar expressions refer to any combination of these items, including any combination of single or multiple items. For example, at least one of a, b, or c can mean: a, b, c, ab, ac, bc, or abc, where a, b, and c can be single or multiple.

[0773] It should be understood that in the various embodiments of this application, the order of the above-mentioned processes does not imply the order of execution. The execution order of each process should be determined by its function and internal logic, and should not constitute any limitation on the implementation process of the embodiments of this application.

[0774] Those skilled in the art will recognize that the units and algorithm steps of the various examples described in conjunction with the embodiments disclosed herein can be implemented in electronic hardware, or a combin...

Claims

1. A communication method, characterized in that, Applied to the first anchor point, including: Based on the key of the first anchor point and the information of the first network element in the first network, a first key is generated for the first network element, and based on the key of the first anchor point and the information of the second network element in the first network, a second key is generated for the second network element. The key of the first anchor point is generated based on the key associated with the first terminal. The first key and the second key are sent to the first network element and the second network element, respectively.

2. The method according to claim 1, characterized in that, Before generating a first key for the first network element based on the key of the first anchor point and the information of the first network element, and before generating a second key for the second network element based on the key of the first anchor point and the information of the second network element, the method further includes: Determine the first network element and the second network element that need to serve the first terminal; and, The security protection method used for communication between the first terminal and the first network element, as well as between the first terminal and the second network element, is determined to be distributed security protection.

3. The method according to claim 2, characterized in that, The determination of the first network element and the second network element that need to serve the first terminal includes: Receive service information from the first terminal, wherein the service information indicates the network elements that the first terminal expects or supports, or the service information indicates the services that the first terminal needs to obtain. Based on the service information, the first network element and the second network element that need to serve the first terminal are determined.

4. The method according to claim 3, characterized in that, The method further includes: The information of the first network element and the information of the second network element are sent to the first terminal.

5. The method according to any one of claims 2-4, characterized in that, Before determining that the security protection method used for communication between the first terminal and the first network element, and between the first terminal and the second network element, is distributed security protection, the method further includes: It is determined that the security protection method used for communication between the first terminal and multiple network elements in the same network is distributed security protection; The determination that the security protection method used for communication between the first terminal and the first network element and the second network element is distributed security protection includes: In response to the fact that the security protection method used for communication between the first terminal and multiple network elements in the same network is distributed security protection, it is determined that the security protection method used for communication between the first terminal and the first network element, as well as between the first terminal and the second network element, is distributed security protection.

6. The method according to claim 5, characterized in that, The determination that the security protection method used for communication between the first terminal and multiple network elements in the same network is distributed security protection includes: The security capability information of the first terminal is received, wherein the security capability information indicates that the first terminal supports distributed security protection for communication with multiple network elements in the same network. Based on the security capability information, it is determined that the security protection method used for communication between the first terminal and multiple network elements in the same network is distributed security protection. The method further includes: The protection mode indication information is sent to the first terminal, and the protection mode indication information indicates that the security protection mode used for communication between the first terminal and multiple network elements in the same network is distributed security protection.

7. The method according to claim 6, characterized in that, The first terminal supports communication with multiple network elements in the same network using at least one security protection method, wherein the at least one security protection method includes distributed security protection. Determining that the security protection method used for communication between the first terminal and multiple network elements in the same network is distributed security protection, based on the security capability information, includes: From the at least one security protection method, it is determined that the security protection method used for communication between the first terminal and multiple network elements in the same network is distributed security protection; or, The step of determining, based on the security capability information, that the security protection method used for communication between the first terminal and multiple network elements in the same network is distributed security protection includes: Send the security capability information of the first terminal to the data management network element serving the first terminal; The system receives information returned by the data management network element, which indicates that the security protection method used for communication between the first terminal and multiple network elements in the same network is distributed security protection.

8. The method according to any one of claims 2-7, characterized in that, The method further includes: Receive an authentication request message, the authentication request message being used to request authentication of the first terminal; In response to the authentication request message, the first network is triggered to authenticate the first terminal; The step of generating a first key for the first network element based on the key of the first anchor point and the information of the first network element in the first network, and generating a second key for the second network element based on the key of the first anchor point and the information of the second network element in the first network, includes: In response to the first network's successful authentication of the first terminal, a first key is generated for the first network element based on the key of the first anchor point and the information of the first network element in the first network, and a second key is generated for the second network element based on the key of the first anchor point and the information of the second network element in the first network.

9. The method according to claim 8, characterized in that, The method further includes: When the first network is triggered to authenticate the first terminal, a key identifier of the first anchor point associated with the key of the first anchor point is generated, and the key identifier of the first anchor point is sent to the first terminal.

10. The method according to claim 9, characterized in that, The key identifier of the first anchor point includes at least one of the following: information about the first anchor point, or the identifier of the first network.

11. The method according to any one of claims 8-10, characterized in that, If the first terminal roams to the second network, the method further includes: When the first network is triggered to authenticate the first terminal, the key of the second anchor point is generated based on the key of the first anchor point. The key of the second anchor point is used to generate keys for network elements in the second network. Send the key of the second anchor point to the second anchor point.

12. The method according to claim 11, characterized in that, The method further includes: When the first network is triggered to authenticate the first terminal, a key identifier for the second anchor point is generated and sent to the second anchor point.

13. The method according to claim 12, characterized in that, The key identifier of the second anchor point includes at least one of the following: information about the second anchor point, or the identifier of the second network.

14. The method according to any one of claims 2-7, characterized in that, The method further includes: Receive authentication indication information from the second network; The authentication indication information indicates that the second network has successfully authenticated the first terminal; The step of generating a first key for the first network element based on the key of the first anchor point and the information of the first network element in the first network, and generating a second key for the second network element based on the key of the first anchor point and the information of the second network element in the first network, includes: In response to the second network's successful authentication of the first terminal, a first key is generated for the first network element based on the key of the first anchor point and the information of the first network element in the first network, and a second key is generated for the second network element based on the key of the first anchor point and the information of the second network element in the first network.

15. The method according to claim 14, characterized in that, The method further includes: Receive the key from the first anchor point of the second network.

16. The method according to claim 15, characterized in that, The method further includes: In response to the second network's successful authentication of the first terminal, a key identifier of the first anchor point associated with the key of the first anchor point is generated, and the key identifier of the first anchor point is sent to the first terminal; Alternatively, the method may further include: Receive the key identifier from the first anchor point of the second network; Associate the key of the first anchor point with the key identifier of the first anchor point, and send the key identifier of the first anchor point to the first terminal.

17. The method according to claim 16, characterized in that, The key identifier of the first anchor point includes at least one of the following: information about the first anchor point, or the identifier of the first network.

18. The method according to claim 1, characterized in that, Before generating a first key for the first network element based on the key of the first anchor point and the information of the first network element, and before generating a second key for the second network element based on the key of the first anchor point and the information of the second network element, the method further includes: Receive a first key request from the first network element, the first key request including information about the first network element; and Receive a second key request from the second network element, the second key request including information about the second network element.

19. The method according to claim 18, characterized in that, The first key request further includes a key identifier. Before generating a first key for the first network element based on the key of the first anchor point and the information of the first network element, and before generating a second key for the second network element based on the key of the first anchor point and the information of the second network element, the method further includes: Determine the association between the key identifier and the key of the first anchor point.

20. The method according to any one of claims 1-19, characterized in that, The information of the first network element includes at least one of the following: the identifier of the first network element, the name of the first network element, the type of the first network element, or information about the services that the first network element can provide; the information of the second network element includes at least one of the following: the identifier of the second network element, the name of the second network element, the type of the second network element, or information about the services that the second network element can provide.

21. The method according to any one of claims 1-20, characterized in that, The method further includes: Determine the first key identifier associated with the first key and the second key identifier associated with the second key; The first key identifier and the second key identifier are sent to the first network element and the second network element, respectively.

22. The method according to claim 21, characterized in that, The first key identifier includes at least one of the following: information of the first network element, or the identifier of the first network; the second key identifier includes at least one of the following: information of the second network element, or the identifier of the first network.

23. A communication method, characterized in that, Chips used in or applied to a first terminal include: It is determined that the first terminal needs to be served by the first network element and the second network element in the first network; When the security protection method used for communication between the first terminal and the first network element, and between the first terminal and the second network element, is distributed security protection, a first key associated with the first network element is generated based on the key of the first anchor point and the information of the first network element, and a second key associated with the second network element is generated based on the key of the first anchor point and the information of the second network element. The key of the first anchor point is generated based on the key associated with the first terminal.

24. The method according to claim 23, characterized in that, The method further includes: Send service information of the first terminal, wherein the service information indicates the network elements that the first terminal expects or supports, or the service information indicates the services that the first terminal needs to obtain; Receive information from the first network element and information from the second network element in response to the service information; The step of determining that the first terminal needs to be served by a first network element and a second network element in the first network includes: In response to receiving information from the first network element and information from the second network element, it is determined that the first terminal needs to be served by the first network element and the second network element.

25. The method according to claim 24, characterized in that, The step of sending the service information of the first terminal includes: The service information is sent to the routing network element in the network accessed by the first terminal. The receiving of information from the first network element and information from the second network element includes: Receive the information of the first network element and the information of the second network element returned by the routing network element in response to the service information.

26. The method according to claim 24, characterized in that, The step of sending the service information of the first terminal includes: Obtain the address of the anchor point in the home network of the first terminal; Based on the address, the service information of the first terminal is sent to the anchor point in the home network.

27. The method according to any one of claims 23-26, characterized in that, The method further includes: The first terminal determines that the security protection method used for communication between the first terminal and the first network element, as well as between the first terminal and the second network element, is distributed security protection.

28. The method according to claim 27, characterized in that, Before determining that the security protection method used for communication between the first terminal and multiple network elements in the same network is distributed security protection, the method further includes: Send the security capability information of the first terminal, wherein the security capability information indicates that the first terminal supports distributed security protection for communication with multiple network elements in the same network. The system receives protection mode indication information returned in response to the security capability information. The protection mode indication information indicates that the security protection mode used for communication between the first terminal and multiple network elements in the same network is distributed security protection.

29. The method according to any one of claims 23-28, characterized in that, The method further includes: Receive the key identifier of the first anchor point from the first anchor point; Associate the key identifier of the first anchor point with the key of the first anchor point.

30. The method according to claim 29, characterized in that, The method further includes: A first service request is sent to the first network element, and a second service request is sent to the second network element. The first service request is used to request the first network element to provide services to the first terminal, and the second service request is used to request the second network element to provide services to the first terminal. Both the first service request and the second service request include the key identifier of the first anchor point.

31. The method according to any one of claims 23-30, characterized in that, The method further includes: Receive the first key identifier and the second key identifier; Associate the first key identifier with the first key, and associate the second key identifier with the second key.

32. A communication device, characterized in that, The communication device includes a model for performing the method as described in any one of claims 1-31.

33. A communication device, characterized in that, include: Processor and memory; The memory is used to store computer instructions that, when executed by the processor, cause the communication device to perform the method as described in any one of claims 1-31.

34. The communication device according to claim 33, characterized in that, The communication device is a chip.

35. A computer-readable storage medium, characterized in that, The computer-readable storage medium includes a computer program or instructions that, when executed, cause the method described in any one of claims 1-31 to be performed.

36. A computer program product, characterized in that, The computer program product includes: a computer program or instructions that, when run, cause the method described in any one of claims 1-31 to be performed.

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