Communication method, communication device, sending end, receiving end, computer readable storage medium, computer program product

Abstract

Embodiments of the present application provide a communication method, a communication device, a sending end, a receiving end, a computer readable storage medium and a computer program product. The communication method comprises: sending a control frame, wherein the control frame has started a first security protection mechanism. The present application is beneficial to improving communication quality.

Description

Technical Field

[0001] This application relates to the field of communication technology, specifically to a communication method, communication device, transmitting end, receiving end, computer-readable storage medium, and computer program product. Background Technology

[0002] In the 802.11 protocol, regarding frame security protection mechanisms, only data frames and management frames currently have security protection mechanisms, while control frames do not.

[0003] Currently, in order to maintain compatibility with existing devices, the integrity of management frames is protected only by Message Integrity Check (MIC) in the control frames to prevent frames from being tampered with or replayed.

[0004] However, the specific details regarding the introduction of security protection mechanisms into existing control frames remain unclear. Summary of the Invention

[0005] In view of this, embodiments of this application provide a communication method, a communication device, a transmitting end, a receiving end, a computer-readable storage medium, and a computer program product, which are beneficial to improving communication quality.

[0006] To achieve the above objectives, the embodiments of this application provide the following technical solutions.

[0007] In a first aspect, embodiments of this application provide a communication method, including: sending a control frame, wherein the control frame has enabled a first security protection mechanism.

[0008] Optionally, the control frame includes a padding field that satisfies one or more of the following: the length of the padding field is variable; the control frame also includes a message integrity detection (MIC) field, with the padding field following the MIC field.

[0009] Optionally, the control frame includes an intermediate frame check sequence (FCS) field; the intermediate FCS field satisfies one or more of the following: the length of the intermediate FCS field is 4 bytes; the intermediate FCS field is used to check all bits in the control frame that are preceding the intermediate FCS field.

[0010] Optionally, the control frame satisfies one or more of the following: the control frame is a unicast control frame; the control frame type is a block acknowledgment request frame (BAR); the control frame also includes a packet sequence number (PN) field, with the intermediate FCS field following the PN field; the control frame also includes a MIC field, with the intermediate FCS field following the MIC field; the control frame also includes a padding field, with the intermediate FCS field preceding the padding field.

[0011] Optionally, the control frame satisfies one or more of the following: the control frame is a broadcast control frame; the type of the control frame is a multi-STA block acknowledgment frame carrying information for one or more different peers; the control frame contains one or more each association or service identification information field, with an intermediate FCS field located within a single association or service identification information field; each association or service identification information field contains a PN field, with the intermediate FCS field located within and after the PN field; each association or service identification information field contains a MIC field, with the intermediate FCS field located within and after the MIC field; the control frame also contains a padding field, with the intermediate FCS field located within and before the padding field.

[0012] Optionally, the control frame may also include an FCS field; the FCS field satisfies one or more of the following: the control frame includes a padding field, and the FCS field is located after the padding field; the FCS field is located in the last field of the control frame.

[0013] Optionally, the control frame includes a key identifier field; the key identifier field satisfies one or more of the following: the key identifier field is 2 bytes long; bits 0 to 11 in the key identifier field are valid values; bits 12 to 15 in the key identifier field are reserved fields.

[0014] Optionally, the control frame satisfies one or more of the following: the control frame is a unicast control frame; the control frame type is a block acknowledgment request frame (BAR); the control frame also includes a packet sequence number (PN) field, with the key identifier field preceding the PN field; the control frame also includes a MIC field, with the key identifier field preceding the MIC field.

[0015] Optionally, the control frame satisfies one or more of the following: the control frame is a broadcast control frame; the control frame type is a multi-STA block acknowledgment frame carrying information for one or more different peers; the value range of the key identifier field is 10 to 11; the control frame contains one or more each association or service identifier information fields, with the key identifier field located within a single each association or service identifier information field; each association or service identifier information field contains a PN field, with the key identifier field located within each association or service identifier information field and preceding the PN field; each association or service identifier information field contains a MIC field, with the key identifier field located within each association or service identifier information field and preceding the MIC field; the control frame also contains a padding field, with the key identifier field located within each association or service identifier information field and preceding the padding field.

[0016] Optionally, the control frame satisfies one or more of the following: the control frame is a broadcast control frame; the control frame type is a trigger frame carrying information for one or more different peers; the value range of the key identifier field is 10 to 11; the control frame contains one or more user information fields, with the key identifier field located within a single user information field; the control frame contains multiple user information fields, with the key identifier field and the PN field located in different user information fields; the user information field to which the key identifier field belongs is located before the user information field to which the PN field belongs; the control frame also contains a padding field, with the user information field located before the padding field.

[0017] Optionally, the control frame satisfies one or more of the following: only the key identifier field in the control frame contains key identifier information; the control frame contains a control field, but the control field does not contain key identifier information; the control frame contains a common field, but the common field does not contain key identifier information.

[0018] Optionally, the first security protection mechanism includes one or more of the following: protecting the integrity of control frames through the MIC; and protecting against replay attacks through the PN value.

[0019] Optionally, one or more of the following conditions must be met: the communication method is used for the AP in response to the control frame being a broadcast frame and / or a multicast frame; the communication method is used for the AP and / or the STA in response to the control frame being a unicast frame.

[0020] Secondly, embodiments of this application provide a communication method, including: receiving a control frame, wherein the control frame has enabled a first security protection mechanism; and processing the control frame.

[0021] Optionally, the control frame includes a padding field that satisfies one or more of the following: the length of the padding field is variable; the control frame also includes a MIC field, with the padding field following the MIC field.

[0022] Optionally, the control frame includes an intermediate frame verification sequence (FCS) field; processing the control frame includes performing FCS verification on all bits in the control frame preceding the intermediate FCS field.

[0023] Optionally, the intermediate FCS field satisfies one or more of the following: the length of the intermediate FCS field is 4 bytes; the intermediate FCS field is used to verify all bits in the control frame that are preceding the intermediate FCS field.

[0024] Optionally, the control frame satisfies one or more of the following: the control frame is a unicast control frame; the control frame type is a block acknowledgment request frame (BAR); the control frame also includes a packet sequence number (PN) field, with the intermediate FCS field following the PN field; the control frame also includes a MIC field, with the intermediate FCS field following the MIC field; the control frame also includes a padding field, with the intermediate FCS field preceding the padding field.

[0025] Optionally, the control frame satisfies one or more of the following: the control frame is a broadcast control frame; the type of the control frame is a multi-STA block acknowledgment frame carrying information for one or more different peers; the control frame contains one or more each association or service identification information field, with an intermediate FCS field located within a single association or service identification information field; each association or service identification information field contains a PN field, with the intermediate FCS field located within and after the PN field; each association or service identification information field contains a MIC field, with the intermediate FCS field located within and after the MIC field; the control frame also contains a padding field, with the intermediate FCS field located within and before the padding field.

[0026] Optionally, the control frame may also include an FCS field; the FCS field satisfies one or more of the following: the control frame includes a padding field, and the FCS field is located after the padding field; the FCS field is located in the last field of the control frame.

[0027] Optionally, the control frame includes a key identifier field, which satisfies one or more of the following: the key identifier field is 2 bytes long; bits 0 to 11 in the key identifier field are valid values; and bits 12 to 15 in the key identifier field are reserved fields.

[0028] Optionally, the control frame satisfies one or more of the following: the control frame is a unicast control frame; the control frame type is a block acknowledgment request frame (BAR); the control frame also includes a packet sequence number (PN) field, with the key identifier field preceding the PN field; the control frame also includes a MIC field, with the key identifier field preceding the MIC field.

[0029] Optionally, the control frame satisfies one or more of the following: the control frame is a broadcast control frame; the control frame type is a multi-STA block acknowledgment frame carrying information for one or more different peers; the value range of the key identifier field is 10 to 11; the control frame contains one or more each association or service identifier information fields, with the key identifier field located within a single each association or service identifier information field; each association or service identifier information field contains a PN field, with the key identifier field located within each association or service identifier information field and preceding the PN field; each association or service identifier information field contains a MIC field, with the key identifier field located within each association or service identifier information field and preceding the MIC field; the control frame also contains a padding field, with the key identifier field located within each association or service identifier information field and preceding the padding field.

[0030] Optionally, the control frame satisfies one or more of the following: the control frame is a broadcast control frame; the control frame type is a trigger frame carrying information for one or more different peers; the value range of the key identifier field is 10 to 11; the control frame contains one or more user information fields, with the key identifier field located within a single user information field; the control frame contains multiple user information fields, with the key identifier field and the PN field located in different user information fields; the user information field to which the key identifier field belongs is located before the user information field to which the PN field belongs; the control frame also contains a padding field, with the user information field located before the padding field.

[0031] Optionally, the control frame satisfies one or more of the following: only the key identifier field in the control frame contains key identifier information; the control frame contains a control field, but the control field does not contain key identifier information; the control frame contains a common field, but the common field does not contain key identifier information.

[0032] Optionally, the first security protection mechanism includes one or more of the following: protecting the integrity of control frames through the MIC; and protecting against replay attacks through the PN value.

[0033] Optionally, one or more of the following conditions must be met: in response to the control frame containing broadcast frames and / or multicast frames, the communication method is used for the STA; in response to the control frame containing only unicast frames, the communication method is used for the AP and / or STA.

[0034] Thirdly, embodiments of this application provide a communication method, including: sending a retransmission control frame, wherein the retransmission control frame has enabled a second security protection mechanism and includes a regenerated PN value and a MIC; wherein the MIC is calculated based on the regenerated PN value.

[0035] Optionally, the second security protection mechanism includes one or more of the following: protecting the integrity of retransmitted control frames through the MIC; and protecting against replay attacks through the PN value.

[0036] Fourthly, embodiments of this application provide a communication method, including: receiving a retransmission control frame, wherein the retransmission control frame has enabled a second security protection mechanism and includes a regenerated PN value and a MIC, wherein the MIC is calculated based on the regenerated PN value; and processing the retransmission control frame.

[0037] Optionally, the second security protection mechanism includes replay attack protection; processing the retransmission control frame includes one or more of the following: comparing the regenerated PN value with the locally maintained replay count; discarding the retransmission control frame in response to the regenerated PN value not being greater than the replay count; and updating the replay count to the regenerated PN value in response to the regenerated PN value being greater than the replay count.

[0038] Optionally, the second security protection mechanism includes protecting the integrity of the retransmission control frame through the MIC; processing the retransmission control frame, including: performing MIC processing on the retransmission control frame, wherein the MIC's check field contains a regenerated PN value.

[0039] Fifthly, embodiments of this application provide a communication device, including: a first transmitting module for transmitting control frames, wherein the control frames have enabled a first security protection mechanism.

[0040] In a sixth aspect, embodiments of this application provide a communication device, comprising: a first receiving module for receiving a control frame, wherein the control frame has enabled a first security protection mechanism; and a first processing module for processing the control frame.

[0041] In a seventh aspect, embodiments of this application provide a communication device, including: a second transmitting module, configured to transmit a retransmission control frame, wherein the retransmission control frame has enabled a second security protection mechanism and includes a regenerated PN value and a MIC; wherein the MIC is calculated based on the regenerated PN value.

[0042] Eighthly, embodiments of this application provide a communication device, comprising: a second receiving module for receiving a retransmission control frame, wherein the retransmission control frame has a second security protection mechanism enabled and includes a regenerated PN value and a MIC, wherein the MIC is calculated based on the regenerated PN value; and a second processing module for processing the retransmission control frame.

[0043] Ninthly, embodiments of this application provide a transmitting end, including a memory and a processor. The memory stores a computer program that can run on the processor. When the processor runs the computer program, it executes the steps of the communication method provided in the first aspect, or executes the steps of the communication method provided in the third aspect.

[0044] In a tenth aspect, embodiments of this application provide a receiving end, including a memory and a processor. The memory stores a computer program that can run on the processor. When the processor runs the computer program, it executes the steps of the communication method provided in the second aspect, or executes the steps of the communication method provided in the fourth aspect.

[0045] Eleventhly, embodiments of this application also provide a computer-readable storage medium storing a computer program thereon. When the computer program is executed by a processor, it causes the communication method provided in the first aspect, or the communication method provided in the second aspect, or the communication method provided in the third aspect, or the communication method provided in the fourth aspect to be executed. And / or, embodiments of this application provide a computer program product including a computer program / instruction that, when executed by a processor, implements the communication method provided in the first aspect, or implements the communication method in the second aspect, or implements the communication method in the third aspect, or implements the communication method in the fourth aspect.

[0046] In a twelfth aspect, embodiments of this application also provide a chip (or communication device) storing a computer program, which, when executed by the chip, causes the communication method provided in the first, second, third, or fourth aspects to be executed.

[0047] In a thirteenth aspect, embodiments of this application provide a chip module on which a computer program is stored. When the computer program is executed by the chip module, the communication method provided in the first, second, third, or fourth aspect is executed.

[0048] In a fourteenth aspect, embodiments of this application provide a communication system, the communication system including means for performing the method provided in the first aspect, means for performing the method provided in the second aspect, means for performing the method provided in the third aspect, and means for performing the method provided in the fourth aspect.

[0049] Compared with the prior art, the technical solution of the embodiments of the present invention has the following beneficial effects:

[0050] In this embodiment of the invention, a control frame is sent, and the control frame has enabled the first security protection mechanism, which is beneficial to improving communication efficiency and communication quality. Attached Figure Description

[0051] To more clearly illustrate the technical solutions in the embodiments of this application or the prior art, the drawings used in the description of the embodiments or the prior art will be briefly introduced below. Obviously, the drawings described below are only embodiments of this application. For those skilled in the art, other drawings can be obtained based on the provided drawings without creative effort.

[0052] Figures 1 to 3 This is a schematic diagram of the control frame structure in a communication method.

[0053] Figure 4 This is a flowchart of a communication method according to an embodiment of the present invention;

[0054] Figures 5 to 9 This is a schematic diagram of the control frame structure in a communication method according to an embodiment of the present invention;

[0055] Figure 10 This is a flowchart of another communication method in an embodiment of the present invention;

[0056] Figure 11 This is a flowchart of another communication method in an embodiment of the present invention;

[0057] Figure 12 This is a flowchart of another communication method in an embodiment of the present invention;

[0058] Figure 13 This is a schematic diagram of the structure of a communication device according to an embodiment of the present invention;

[0059] Figure 14 This is a schematic diagram of the structure of another communication device in an embodiment of the present invention;

[0060] Figure 15 This is a schematic diagram of the structure of another communication device in an embodiment of the present invention;

[0061] Figure 16 This is a schematic diagram of the structure of another communication device in an embodiment of the present invention;

[0062] Figure 17 This is a schematic diagram of the hardware structure of a communication device according to an embodiment of the present invention. Detailed Implementation

[0063] The technical solutions of the embodiments of this application will be clearly and completely described below with reference to the accompanying drawings. Obviously, the described embodiments are only some embodiments of this application, and not all embodiments. Based on the embodiments of this application, all other embodiments obtained by those skilled in the art without creative effort are within the scope of protection of this application.

[0064] The communication systems applicable to the embodiments of this application include, but are not limited to, third-generation (3G), LTE, fourth-generation (4G), fifth-generation (5G), NR, and future evolution systems or multiple converged communication systems. The 5G system can be a non-standalone (NSA) 5G system or a standalone (SA) 5G system. The solutions of the embodiments of this invention can also be applied to various new communication systems in the future, such as 6G and 7G.

[0065] This application relates primarily to communication between wireless network technology (WIFI) devices.

[0066] The WIFI device can be a terminal device (or a terminal) that supports WIFI functionality. In this embodiment of the invention, the terminal can refer to various forms of user equipment (UE), access terminal, user unit, user station, mobile station, mobile station (MS), remote station, remote terminal, mobile device, user terminal, terminal equipment, wireless communication device, user agent, or user device that supports WIFI functionality. The terminal can also be a cellular phone, cordless phone, Session Initiation Protocol (SIP) phone, Wireless Local Loop (WLL) station, Personal Digital Assistant (PDA), handheld device with wireless communication functionality, computing device, or other processing device connected to a wireless modem, in-vehicle device, wearable device, a terminal in a future 5G network, or a terminal in a future evolved Public Land Mobile Network (PLMN), etc. This embodiment of the invention does not limit the scope of the terminal.

[0067] The peer device can be a network device that supports WIFI or a terminal device that supports WIFI.

[0068] The network device in this application embodiment can also be called an access network device, for example, it can be a base station (BS) (also called a base station device). A network device is a device deployed in a radio access network (RAN) to provide wireless communication functions. For example, in second-generation (2G) networks, equipment providing base station functionality includes base transceiver stations (BTS); in 3G networks, it includes Node Bs; in 4G networks, it includes evolved Node Bs (eNBs); in wireless local area networks (WLANs), it is an access point (AP); in NR, it includes next-generation node base stations (gNBs) and further evolved Node Bs (ng-eNBs). The gNB communicates with the terminal using NR technology, while the ng-eNB communicates with the terminal using evolved Universal Terrestrial Radio Access (E-UTRA) technology. Both gNBs and ng-eNBs can connect to the 5G core network. The network equipment in this application embodiment also includes equipment providing base station functionality in future new communication systems.

[0069] As mentioned earlier, the 802.11 MAC protocol involves the Medium Access Control Protocol Data Unit (MPDU). The corresponding aggregate packet format is AMPDU. Currently, improving communication quality is difficult; this paper analyzes the reasons for this difficulty in improving communication quality using a specific communication method.

[0070] Figures 1 to 3 This is a schematic diagram of the control frame structure in a communication method.

[0071] For unicast control frame subtype Block Ack Req (BAR) frames, the BAR frame payload includes a 1-bit Protected Indication (Protected Ind), a 1-bit Key ID, a 6-byte Control Packet Number (Control PN), and a 16-byte Message Integrity Information (MIC) field. To allow the receiving end sufficient time to perform this additional security processing (i.e., MIC verification) when receiving a protected control frame, a variable-length padding field is added. Figure 1 As shown, the protected BAR frame is based on the original frame, using two reserved bits in the original Block Acknowledgment Request Control (BAR Control) field to indicate packet protection and key identification, and adding PN / MIC / Padding fields after the original Block Acknowledgment Request Information (BAR Information) field.

[0072] For broadcast control frame subtypes, a Multi-STA Block Ack (M-STA BA) frame carries information about one or more different peer users, such as... Figure 2 As shown, in the original unprotected M-STA BA frame, the payload can carry multiple Per AID TID Info fields. Each Per Association Identifier (Traffic Identifier Information, Per AID TIDInfo) field is distinguished by its Association Identifier (AID) subfield. In the protected M-STA BA frame, based on the original frame, two reserved bits from the original Block Acknowledgment Control (BA Control) field are used for packet protection indication and key identification indication. Each Per Association Identifier (Traffic Identifier Information) field, with a specially specified Association Identifier subfield value, carries the PN / MIC / Padding values ​​respectively.

[0073] The control frame subtype for broadcast carries trigger frames targeting one or more different peer user information. For example... Figure 3As shown, in the original unprotected trigger frame, the payload can carry multiple User Information (User Info) fields, which are distinguished by their associated identifier subfields. In the protected trigger frame, based on the original frame, two reserved bits from the original Common field are used for packet protection indication and key identification. Each associated or service identifier field, with a specially specified associated identifier subfield value, carries the PN / MIC value. Furthermore, due to the length limitation of user information fields, two user information fields are needed to carry the complete 6-byte PN value, and six user information fields are needed to carry the complete 16-byte MIC value (the first five user information fields each carry 3 bytes of MIC information, and the last user information field carries 1 byte of MIC information).

[0074] However, as mentioned above, the key identifier uses only one bit, which is incompatible with the 2-byte key identifier used in the current data frame and management frame. Moreover, the padding field introduced to increase the processing time of the receiver is located before the FCS field of the entire packet. In some actual receiving processes, security-related processing is only performed after the FCS field is decrypted and the FCS verification of the packet is completed, thus rendering the padding field ineffective. Furthermore, in the security protection of general data frames or management frames, when there is a retransmission of data frames or management frames, the entire frame is not re-processed for security (e.g., re-added MIC value, etc.). Correspondingly, in the security protection of control frames, there is no security processing involved when control frames are retransmitted.

[0075] To address the aforementioned technical problems, embodiments of this application provide a communication method, referencing... Figure 4 The diagram shows a flowchart of a communication method according to an embodiment of the present invention.

[0076] In this embodiment, the communication method includes the following basic steps:

[0077] Step S1: Send a control frame. The control frame has enabled the first security protection mechanism.

[0078] Sending a control frame, which has enabled the first security protection mechanism, is beneficial for improving communication efficiency and quality.

[0079] To make the above-mentioned objectives, features and beneficial effects of the present invention more apparent and understandable, specific embodiments of the present invention will be described in detail below with reference to the accompanying drawings.

[0080] Figures 5 to 9 This is a schematic diagram of the control frame structure in a communication method according to an embodiment of the present invention.

[0081] The communication method in this embodiment is suitable for the sending end.

[0082] Execution step S1: Send a control frame. The control frame has enabled the first security protection mechanism.

[0083] Control frames are used to coordinate physical layer operations in wireless communication, such as Request to Send (RTS), Clear to Send (CTS), and Acknowledge (ACK).

[0084] In this embodiment, the first security protection mechanism includes one or more of the following: protecting the integrity of the control frame through the MIC; and protecting against replay attacks through the PN value.

[0085] Specifically, when a control frame is received, the MIC value of the received control frame is detected and verified against the MIC value of the sent control frame. If they match, the current control frame is received. If the MIC values ​​do not match, it indicates that the current frame has been tampered with and the current frame is discarded. Replay attack protection is performed through PN value to reduce the probability that the control frame is attacked and the content is repeatedly attacked.

[0086] In this embodiment, a control frame is sent, and the control frame has enabled the first security protection mechanism, which is beneficial to improving communication efficiency and communication quality.

[0087] In this embodiment, the communication method satisfies one or more of the following: in response to the control frame containing broadcast frames and / or multicast frames, the communication method is used for the AP; in response to the control frame containing only unicast frames, the communication method is used for the AP and / or STA.

[0088] When the control frame contains a broadcast frame and / or a multicast frame, this embodiment is applicable to communication or sensing scenarios in WIFI where the AP acts as the transmitter. The AP can support WLAN communication protocols, which can include protocols of the IEEE 802.11 series, such as the 802.11bn standard, and of course, also applicable to standards after 802.11bn.

[0089] When the control frame contains only unicast frames, this embodiment is applicable to scenarios where the AP and / or STA act as transmitters for communication or sensing in WIFI, and this embodiment is not limited thereto. Optionally, the AP can communicate or sense with a single STA, or the AP can communicate or sense with multiple STAs simultaneously. Specifically, communication or sensing between the AP and multiple STAs can be further divided into downlink transmission where the AP simultaneously sends signals to multiple STAs, and uplink transmission where multiple STAs send signals to the AP. The communication protocols between the AP and STA, between APs, or between STAs can support WLAN communication protocols, which may include protocols from the IEEE 802.11 series, such as those applicable to the 802.11bn standard, and also applicable to standards after 802.11bn.

[0090] An access point (AP) is a device with wireless communication capabilities that supports communication or sensing using WLAN protocols. It has the ability to communicate or sense other devices (such as stations or other access points) in a WLAN network, and can also communicate or sense other devices. Alternatively, an access point acts as a bridge connecting wired and wireless networks, primarily connecting various wireless network clients together and then connecting the wireless network to an Ethernet network. In a WLAN system, an access point can be called an access point station (AP STA). This wireless communication device can be a complete device or a chip or processing system installed within a complete device. Devices with these chips or processing systems can implement the methods and functions of the embodiments of this invention under the control of the chip or processing system. In the embodiments of this invention, the AP is a device that provides services to the STA and can support 802.11 series protocols or subsequent protocols. For example, an access point can be an access point for terminals (such as mobile phones) to enter a wired (or wireless) network, mainly deployed in homes, buildings, and parks, with a typical coverage radius of tens to hundreds of meters; it can also be deployed outdoors. For example, an AP can be a communication server, router, switch, bridge, or other communication entity; an AP can include various forms of macro base stations, micro base stations, relay stations, etc. Of course, an AP can also be the chip and processing system in these various forms of devices, thereby realizing the methods and functions of the embodiments of the present invention.

[0091] A station (STA) is a device with wireless communication capabilities, supporting communication or sensing using the WLAN protocol, and having the ability to communicate or sense other stations or access points in a WLAN network. In a WLAN system, a station can be called a non-access point station (non-AP STA). For example, an STA is any user communication device that allows a user to communicate or sense with an AP and thus communicate with the WLAN. This device with wireless communication capabilities can be a complete device, or it can be a chip or processing system installed in a complete device. Devices with these chips or processing systems installed can implement the methods and functions of the embodiments of the present invention under the control of the chip or processing system. For example, a station can be a wireless communication chip, a wireless sensor, or a wireless communication terminal, and can also be called a user. Furthermore, a station can be a mobile phone supporting Wi-Fi communication, a tablet computer supporting Wi-Fi communication, a set-top box supporting Wi-Fi communication, a smart TV supporting Wi-Fi communication, a smart wearable device supporting Wi-Fi communication, an in-vehicle communication device supporting Wi-Fi communication, and a computer supporting Wi-Fi communication, etc.

[0092] In this embodiment, the control frame includes a padding field.

[0093] The padding field is used to increase the receiver's processing time, providing time for the receiver to perform security-related processing.

[0094] In this embodiment, the length of the padding field is variable.

[0095] Specifically, the length of the padding field is set based on the actual needs of the receiving end's security-related processing time.

[0096] In this embodiment, the control frame also includes a Message Integrity Detection (MIC) field, with the padding field following the MIC field.

[0097] Specifically, the padding field is used to provide time for the receiving end to perform message integrity checks. Thus, the padding field is located after the MIC field, so that when the receiving end receives a protected control frame, it has enough time to perform this additional MIC verification process.

[0098] In this embodiment, the control frame includes the Intermediate Frame Check Sequence (FCS) field.

[0099] The intermediate FCS field is used to detect whether errors have occurred during data transmission.

[0100] It should be noted that in this embodiment, the intermediate FCS field is also called the intermediate Cyclic Redundancy Check (CRC) field.

[0101] As an example, in this embodiment, the length of the intermediate FCS field is 4 bytes.

[0102] In this embodiment, the intermediate FCS field is used to verify all bits in the control frame that are located before the intermediate FCS field (e.g., ...). Figure 5 As shown, but not limited to Figure 5 (The frame structure shown).

[0103] Specifically, the sending end calculates the intermediate FCS in the frame header and data portion before the intermediate FCS field and appends it near the end. When the receiving end receives the control frame, it recalculates the intermediate FCS for all bits before the intermediate FCS field in the control frame using the same method. If the calculation result matches the received intermediate FCS, the data transmission is considered correct; otherwise, an error is considered to have occurred during data transmission.

[0104] Reference Figure 5 , Figure 5 This is a schematic diagram of a unicast control frame. The following is a detailed description of an embodiment where the control frame is a unicast control frame.

[0105] In some embodiments, the control frame type is a Block Acknowledgment Request Frame (BAR).

[0106] Unicast is a "one-to-one" communication mode, meaning that each control frame is sent only to the designated receiver. Unicast frames usually require acknowledgment from the receiver to ensure the reliability of data transmission. Therefore, the sender sends a BAR frame to request the receiver to acknowledge the block.

[0107] In some embodiments, the control frame also includes a packet sequence number (PN) field, with the intermediate FCS field following the PN field.

[0108] The PN field is used for replay attack detection, and the intermediate FCS field is located after the PN field. Correspondingly, the intermediate FCS field is used to verify the PN field.

[0109] In some embodiments, the control frame also includes a MIC field, with the intermediate FCS field following the MIC field.

[0110] The MIC field is used for message integrity checks. The intermediate FCS field is located after the PN field, and correspondingly, the intermediate FCS field is used to verify the MIC field.

[0111] In some embodiments, the control frame also includes a padding field, with the intermediate FCS field preceding the padding field.

[0112] The padding field is used to increase the processing time of the receiving end. In some actual receiving processes, security-related processing is only performed after the FCS field of the packet has been decrypted and the FCS verification of the packet has been completed. In this embodiment, the intermediate FCS field is located before the padding field. Therefore, the intermediate FCS field is verified before the padding field is received. Thus, the padding field can provide sufficient time for security-related processing.

[0113] Reference Figure 6 , Figure 6 This is a schematic diagram of a broadcast control frame. The following is a detailed description of an embodiment where the control frame is a broadcast control frame.

[0114] In some embodiments, the control frame is a multi-STA block acknowledgment frame carrying information for one or more different peers.

[0115] Broadcast frames are a "one-to-many" communication mode, in which one sender sends control frames to multiple receivers. They use multi-STA block acknowledgment frames, and multiple data frames can be acknowledged with a single acknowledgment frame. This efficiently acknowledges the data reception status of multiple receivers, reduces the number of acknowledgment frames, improves channel utilization, and is suitable for multi-user scenarios.

[0116] In some embodiments, the control frame includes one or more Per AID or Service Identifier (Per AID TIDInfo) fields, with the intermediate FCS field located within a single Per AID or Service Identifier field.

[0117] Each association or service identification information field is used to identify and manage the association relationship and service flow of the receiving end, ensuring the reliability and efficiency of data transmission. The corresponding intermediate FCS field is located in each individual association or service identification information field.

[0118] As an example, in some specific embodiments, each association or business identification information field is distinguished by its AID subfield, with the intermediate FCS field located in each association or business identification information field carrying a specially specified AID value.

[0119] In some embodiments, each association or service identification information field includes a PN field, and an intermediate FCS field is located in each association or service identification information field and follows the PN field.

[0120] The PN field is used for replay attack detection, and the intermediate FCS field is located after the PN field. Correspondingly, the intermediate FCS field is used to verify the PN field.

[0121] In some embodiments, each association or service identification information field includes a MIC field, and an intermediate FCS field is located in each association or service identification information field and follows the MIC field.

[0122] The MIC field is used for message integrity checks. The intermediate FCS field is located after the PN field, and correspondingly, the intermediate FCS field is used to verify the MIC field.

[0123] In some embodiments, the control frame also includes a padding field, with the intermediate FCS field located within each associated or service identification information field and preceding the padding field.

[0124] The padding field is used to increase the processing time of the receiving end. In some actual receiving processes, security-related processing is only performed after the FCS field of the packet is decrypted and the FCS verification is completed. In this embodiment, the intermediate FCS field is located in each associated or service identification information field and is located before the padding field. Therefore, the intermediate FCS field completes the intermediate FCS verification before the padding field is received. Thus, the padding field can provide sufficient time for security-related processing.

[0125] Specifically, in some specific embodiments, the fill field is located in each associated or business identification information field after each associated or business identification information field that includes the PN field, the MIC field, and the intermediate FCS field.

[0126] In some embodiments, the control frame also includes an FCS field.

[0127] The FCS field is used to detect whether errors have occurred during data transmission.

[0128] It should be noted that in some specific embodiments, the FCS field is also called the CRC field.

[0129] In some embodiments, the control frame includes a padding field, and the FCS field is located after the padding field.

[0130] If an intermediate FCS field has already been validated before the field is filled in, then the FCS field is located after the field to be filled in. This will not affect the time provided by the field to be filled in for the security-related processing at the receiving end.

[0131] In some embodiments, the FCS field is located at the end of the control frame.

[0132] The FCS field is located at the end of the control frame. This allows for verification using the intermediate FCS field, and then the FCS field can be used to verify all preceding bits at the end. This helps to further improve the accuracy of the verification and thus improve the communication quality.

[0133] In some embodiments, the control frame includes a key ID field.

[0134] Specifically, the Key ID field is used to identify the key used by the beacon frame.

[0135] Specifically, the key identifier field is used to indicate the index of a key. For example, multiple different secure links can be established between a STA and an AP, each with its own key for different types of frames. Typically, the keys under a secure link have a unified key index allocation mechanism, which generally means that the corresponding key can be found simply by using this key identifier.

[0136] In some embodiments, the key identifier field is 2 bytes long.

[0137] The key identifier field is 2 bytes long, which is compatible with the 2-byte key identifier used in the current data frame or management frame, thus improving the compatibility of control frames.

[0138] Specifically, in some embodiments, Bits 0 to 11 in the key identifier field are valid values; Bits 12 to 15 in the key identifier field are reserved fields.

[0139] Reference Figure 7 , Figure 7 This is a schematic diagram of a unicast control frame. The following is a detailed description of an embodiment where the control frame is a unicast control frame.

[0140] In some embodiments, the control frame type is a Block Acknowledgment Request Frame (BAR).

[0141] Unicast is a "one-to-one" communication mode, meaning that each control frame is sent only to the designated receiver. Unicast frames usually require acknowledgment from the receiver to ensure the reliability of data transmission. Therefore, the sender sends a BAR frame to request the receiver to acknowledge the block.

[0142] In some embodiments, the control frame also includes a packet sequence number (PN) field, with a key identifier field preceding the PN field.

[0143] The PN field is used for replay attack detection. Before verifying the PN value, the receiver needs to know which key to use. Therefore, placing the key identifier field before the PN field helps ensure that the receiver has determined the correct key before processing the PN field.

[0144] In some embodiments, the control frame also includes a MIC field, with the key identifier field preceding the MIC field.

[0145] The MIC field is used for message integrity checks. Before verifying the MIC value, the receiver needs to know which key to use. Therefore, placing the key identifier field before the MIC field helps ensure that the receiver has determined the correct key before processing the MIC field.

[0146] Reference Figure 8 , Figure 8 This is a schematic diagram of a broadcast control frame. The following is a detailed description of an embodiment where the control frame is a broadcast control frame.

[0147] In some embodiments, the control frame is a multi-STA block acknowledgment frame carrying information for one or more different peers.

[0148] Broadcast frames are a "one-to-many" communication mode, in which one sender sends control frames to multiple receivers. They use multi-STA block acknowledgment frames, and multiple data frames can be acknowledged with a single acknowledgment frame. This efficiently acknowledges the data reception status of multiple receivers, reduces the number of acknowledgment frames, improves channel utilization, and is suitable for multi-user scenarios.

[0149] In some embodiments, the key identifier field has a value range of 10 to 11.

[0150] The key identifier field has a value range of 10 to 11, which conforms to the value range specified in the current protocol.

[0151] In some embodiments, the control frame includes one or more each association or service identification information fields, with the key identification field located within a single each association or service identification information field.

[0152] Each association or service identification information field is used to identify and manage the association relationship and service flow of the receiving end, ensuring the reliability and efficiency of data transmission. The corresponding key identification field is located in a single association or service identification information field.

[0153] In some embodiments, each association or service identification information field includes a PN field, and a key identification field is located in each association or service identification information field and precedes the PN field.

[0154] The PN field is used for replay attack detection. Before verifying the PN value, the receiver needs to know which key to use. Therefore, placing the key identifier field before the PN field helps ensure that the receiver has determined the correct key before processing the PN field.

[0155] In some embodiments, each association or service identification information field includes a MIC field, and a key identification field is located in each association or service identification information field and precedes the MIC field.

[0156] The MIC field is used for message integrity checks. Before verifying the MIC value, the receiver needs to know which key to use. Therefore, placing the key identifier field before the MIC field helps ensure that the receiver has determined the correct key before processing the MIC field.

[0157] In some embodiments, the control frame also includes a padding field, with the key identifier field located within each associated or service identifier field and preceding the padding field.

[0158] The padding field is used to increase the processing time at the receiving end. The key identifier field is located in each associated or business identifier information field and before the padding field, so that the padding field can provide sufficient time for security-related processing (e.g., MIC value verification).

[0159] Reference Figure 9 , Figure 9 This is a schematic diagram of another type of broadcast control frame. The following is a detailed description of an embodiment where the control frame is a broadcast control frame.

[0160] In some embodiments, the control frame is a trigger frame carrying information for one or more different peers.

[0161] Trigger frames are used to coordinate and schedule data transmission in multi-user scenarios.

[0162] In some embodiments, the key identifier field has a value range of 10 to 11.

[0163] The key identifier field has a value range of 10 to 11, which conforms to the value range specified in the current protocol.

[0164] In some embodiments, the control frame includes one or more user info fields, with the key identifier field located within a single user info field.

[0165] The user information field indicates resource allocation and scheduling information for multiple users, while the corresponding key identification field is located in a single associated or business identification information field.

[0166] In some embodiments, the control frame contains multiple user information fields, with the key identifier field and the PN field located in different user information fields.

[0167] The key identifier field and the PN field differ significantly in function and purpose, thus the key identifier field and the PN field are located in different user information fields.

[0168] In some embodiments, the user information field to which the key identifier field belongs is located before the user information field to which the PN field belongs.

[0169] The PN field is used for replay attack detection. Before verifying the PN value, the receiving end needs to know which key to use. Therefore, the user information field to which the key identifier field belongs is located before the user information field to which the PN field belongs. This helps ensure that the receiving end has determined the correct key before processing the PN field.

[0170] In some embodiments, the control frame also includes a padding field, with the user information field preceding the padding field.

[0171] The padding field is used to increase the processing time at the receiving end. The user information field is placed before the padding field, so that the padding field can provide sufficient time for security-related processing (such as PN value verification).

[0172] In some embodiments, only the key identifier field in the control frame contains key identifier information.

[0173] Only the key identifier field in the control frame contains key identifier information; other parts do not need to carry additional key identifier fields, reducing unnecessary data transmission and improving communication efficiency.

[0174] Accordingly, in some specific embodiments, when the control frame contains a control field, the control field does not contain key identification information; when the control frame contains a common field, the common field does not contain key identification information.

[0175] Figure 10 This is a flowchart of another communication method in an embodiment of the present invention.

[0176] The communication method in this embodiment is suitable for the receiving end.

[0177] Execution step S21: Receive control frame, the control frame has enabled the first security protection mechanism.

[0178] Control frames are used to coordinate physical layer operations in wireless communication, such as Request to Send (RTS), Clear to Send (CTS), and Acknowledge (ACK).

[0179] In this embodiment, the first security protection mechanism includes one or more of the following: protecting the integrity of the control frame through the MIC; and protecting against replay attacks through the PN value.

[0180] Specifically, when a control frame is received, the MIC value of the received control frame is detected and compared with the MIC value of the sent control frame. If they match, the current control frame is received. If the MIC values ​​do not match, it indicates that the current frame has been tampered with and the current frame is discarded. Replay attack protection is performed through PN value to reduce the probability of the control frame being repeatedly attacked.

[0181] In this embodiment, a control frame is received, and the control frame has enabled the first security protection mechanism, which is beneficial to improving communication efficiency and communication quality.

[0182] In this embodiment, the communication method satisfies one or more of the following: in response to the control frame containing broadcast frames and / or multicast frames, the communication method is used for STA; in response to the control frame containing only unicast frames, the communication method is used for AP and / or STA.

[0183] When the control frame contains a broadcast frame and / or a multicast frame, this embodiment is applicable to communication or sensing scenarios in WIFI where the STA acts as the receiver. The STA can support WLAN communication protocols, which may include protocols of the IEEE 802.11 series, such as the 802.11bn standard, and of course, also applicable to standards after 802.11bn.

[0184] When the control frame contains only unicast frames, this embodiment is applicable to scenarios where the AP and / or STA in WIFI communicate or sense as receivers, and this embodiment of the invention is not limited thereto. Optionally, the AP can communicate or sense with a single STA, or the AP can communicate or sense with multiple STAs simultaneously. Specifically, communication or sensing between the AP and multiple STAs can be further divided into downlink transmission where the AP sends signals to multiple STAs simultaneously, and uplink transmission where multiple STAs send signals to the AP. The communication protocols between the AP and STA, between APs, or between STAs can support WLAN communication protocols, which may include protocols of the IEEE 802.11 series, such as those applicable to the 802.11bn standard, and of course, also applicable to standards after 802.11bn.

[0185] For a detailed explanation of AP and STA, please refer to the aforementioned embodiments, which will not be repeated here.

[0186] In this embodiment, the control frame includes a padding field.

[0187] The padding field is used to increase the receiver's processing time, providing time for the receiver to perform security-related processing.

[0188] In this embodiment, the length of the padding field is variable.

[0189] Specifically, the length of the padding field is set based on the actual needs of the receiving end's security-related processing time.

[0190] In this embodiment, the control frame also includes a Message Integrity Detection (MIC) field, with the padding field following the MIC field.

[0191] Specifically, the padding field is used to provide time for the receiving end to perform message integrity checks. Thus, the padding field is located after the MIC field, so that when the receiving end receives a protected control frame, it has enough time to perform this additional MIC verification process.

[0192] In this embodiment, the control frame includes the Intermediate Frame Check Sequence (FCS) field.

[0193] The intermediate FCS field is used to detect whether errors have occurred during data transmission.

[0194] It should be noted that in this embodiment, the intermediate FCS field is also called the intermediate CRC field.

[0195] As an example, in this embodiment, the length of the intermediate FCS field is 4 bytes.

[0196] In this embodiment, the intermediate FCS field is used to verify all bits in the control frame that are located before the intermediate FCS field.

[0197] Specifically, the sending end calculates the intermediate FCS in the frame header and data portion before the intermediate FCS field and appends it near the end. When the receiving end receives the control frame, it recalculates the intermediate FCS for all bits before the intermediate FCS field in the control frame using the same method. If the calculation result matches the received intermediate FCS, the data transmission is considered correct; otherwise, an error is considered to have occurred during data transmission.

[0198] The following is a detailed description of an embodiment where the control frame is a unicast control frame.

[0199] In some embodiments, the control frame type is a Block Acknowledgment Request Frame (BAR).

[0200] Unicast is a "one-to-one" communication mode, meaning that each control frame is sent only to the designated receiver. Unicast frames usually require acknowledgment from the receiver to ensure the reliability of data transmission. Therefore, the sender sends a BAR frame to request the receiver to acknowledge the block.

[0201] In some embodiments, the control frame also includes a packet sequence number (PN) field, with the intermediate FCS field following the PN field.

[0202] The PN field is used for replay attack detection, and the intermediate FCS field is located after the PN field. Correspondingly, the intermediate FCS field is used to verify the PN field.

[0203] In some embodiments, the control frame also includes a MIC field, with the intermediate FCS field following the MIC field.

[0204] The MIC field is used for message integrity checks. The intermediate FCS field is located after the PN field, and correspondingly, the intermediate FCS field is used to verify the MIC field.

[0205] In some embodiments, the control frame also includes a padding field, with the intermediate FCS field preceding the padding field.

[0206] The padding field is used to increase the processing time of the receiving end. In some actual receiving processes, security-related processing is only performed after the FCS field of the packet has been decrypted and the FCS verification of the packet has been completed. In this embodiment, the intermediate FCS field is located before the padding field. Therefore, the intermediate FCS field is verified before the padding field is received. Thus, the padding field can provide sufficient time for security-related processing.

[0207] The following is a detailed description of an example where the control frame is a broadcast control frame.

[0208] In some embodiments, the control frame is a multi-STA block acknowledgment frame carrying information for one or more different peers.

[0209] Broadcast frames are a "one-to-many" communication mode, in which one sender sends control frames to multiple receivers. They use multi-STA block acknowledgment frames, and multiple data frames can be acknowledged with a single acknowledgment frame. This efficiently acknowledges the data reception status of multiple receivers, reduces the number of acknowledgment frames, improves channel utilization, and is suitable for multi-user scenarios.

[0210] In some embodiments, the control frame includes one or more Per AID or Service Identifier (Per AID TIDInfo) fields, with the intermediate FCS field located within a single Per AID or Service Identifier field.

[0211] Each association or service identification information field is used to identify and manage the association relationship and service flow of the receiving end, ensuring the reliability and efficiency of data transmission. The corresponding intermediate FCS field is located in each individual association or service identification information field.

[0212] As an example, in some specific embodiments, each association or business identification information field is distinguished by its AID subfield, with the intermediate FCS field located in each association or business identification information field carrying a specially specified AID value.

[0213] In some embodiments, each association or service identification information field includes a PN field, and an intermediate FCS field is located in each association or service identification information field and follows the PN field.

[0214] The PN field is used for replay attack detection, and the intermediate FCS field is located after the PN field. Correspondingly, the intermediate FCS field is used to verify the PN field.

[0215] In some embodiments, each association or service identification information field includes a MIC field, and an intermediate FCS field is located in each association or service identification information field and follows the MIC field.

[0216] The MIC field is used for message integrity checks. The intermediate FCS field is located after the PN field, and correspondingly, the intermediate FCS field is used to verify the MIC field.

[0217] In some embodiments, the control frame also includes a padding field, with the intermediate FCS field located within each associated or service identification information field and preceding the padding field.

[0218] The padding field is used to increase the processing time of the receiving end. In some actual receiving processes, security-related processing is only performed after the FCS field of the packet is decrypted and the FCS verification is completed. In this embodiment, the intermediate FCS field is located in each associated or service identification information field and is located before the padding field. Therefore, the intermediate FCS field completes the intermediate FCS verification before the padding field is received. Thus, the padding field can provide sufficient time for security-related processing.

[0219] Specifically, in some embodiments, the fill field is located in each associated or business identification information field after each associated or business identification information field that includes the PN field, the MIC field, and the intermediate FCS field.

[0220] In some embodiments, the control frame also includes an FCS field.

[0221] The FCS field is used to detect whether errors have occurred during data transmission.

[0222] It should be noted that in some specific embodiments, the FCS field is also called the CRC field.

[0223] In some embodiments, the control frame includes a padding field, and the FCS field is located after the padding field.

[0224] If an intermediate FCS field has already been validated before the field is filled in, then the FCS field is located after the field to be filled in. This will not affect the time provided by the field to be filled in for the security-related processing at the receiving end.

[0225] In some embodiments, the FCS field is located at the end of the control frame.

[0226] The FCS field is located at the end of the control frame. This allows for verification using the intermediate FCS field, and then the FCS field can be used to verify all preceding bits at the end. This helps to further improve the accuracy of the verification and thus improve the communication quality.

[0227] In some embodiments, the control frame includes a key identification field.

[0228] Specifically, the key identifier field is used to identify the key used by the beacon frame.

[0229] Specifically, the key identifier field is used to indicate the index of a key. For example, multiple different secure links can be established between a STA and an AP, each with its own key for different types of frames. Typically, the keys under a secure link have a unified key indexing and allocation mechanism, meaning that the corresponding key can be found simply by using this key identifier.

[0230] In some embodiments, the key identifier field is 2 bytes long.

[0231] The key identifier field is 2 bytes long, which is compatible with the 2-byte key identifier used in the current data frame or management frame, thus improving the compatibility of control frames.

[0232] Specifically, in some embodiments, Bits 0 to 11 in the key identifier field are valid values; Bits 12 to 15 in the key identifier field are reserved fields.

[0233] The following is a detailed description of an embodiment where the control frame is a unicast control frame.

[0234] In some embodiments, the control frame type is a Block Acknowledgment Request Frame (BAR).

[0235] Unicast is a "one-to-one" communication mode, meaning that each control frame is sent only to the designated receiver. Unicast frames usually require acknowledgment from the receiver to ensure the reliability of data transmission. Therefore, the sender sends a BAR frame to request the receiver to acknowledge the block.

[0236] In some embodiments, the control frame also includes a packet sequence number (PN) field, with a key identifier field preceding the PN field.

[0237] The PN field is used for replay attack detection. Before verifying the PN value, the receiver needs to know which key to use. Therefore, placing the key identifier field before the PN field helps ensure that the receiver has determined the correct key before processing the PN field.

[0238] In some embodiments, the control frame also includes a MIC field, with the key identifier field preceding the MIC field.

[0239] The MIC field is used for message integrity checks. Before verifying the MIC value, the receiver needs to know which key to use. Therefore, placing the key identifier field before the MIC field helps ensure that the receiver has determined the correct key before processing the MIC field.

[0240] The following is a detailed description of an example where the control frame is a broadcast control frame.

[0241] In some embodiments, the control frame is a multi-STA block acknowledgment frame carrying information for one or more different peers.

[0242] Broadcast frames are a "one-to-many" communication mode, in which one sender sends control frames to multiple receivers. They use multi-STA block acknowledgment frames, and multiple data frames can be acknowledged with a single acknowledgment frame. This efficiently acknowledges the data reception status of multiple receivers, reduces the number of acknowledgment frames, improves channel utilization, and is suitable for multi-user scenarios.

[0243] In some embodiments, the key identifier field has a value range of 10 to 11.

[0244] The key identifier field has a value range of 10 to 11, which conforms to the value range specified in the current protocol.

[0245] In some embodiments, the control frame includes one or more each association or service identification information fields, with the key identification field located within a single each association or service identification information field.

[0246] Each association or service identification information field is used to identify and manage the association relationship and service flow of the receiving end, ensuring the reliability and efficiency of data transmission. The corresponding key identification field is located in a single association or service identification information field.

[0247] In some embodiments, each association or service identification information field includes a PN field, and a key identification field is located in each association or service identification information field and precedes the PN field.

[0248] The PN field is used for replay attack detection. Before verifying the PN value, the receiver needs to know which key to use. Therefore, placing the key identifier field before the PN field helps ensure that the receiver has determined the correct key before processing the PN field.

[0249] In some embodiments, each association or service identification information field includes a MIC field, and a key identification field is located in each association or service identification information field and precedes the MIC field.

[0250] The MIC field is used for message integrity checks. Before verifying the MIC value, the receiver needs to know which key to use. Therefore, placing the key identifier field before the MIC field helps ensure that the receiver has determined the correct key before processing the MIC field.

[0251] In some embodiments, the control frame also includes a padding field, with the key identifier field located within each associated or service identifier field and preceding the padding field.

[0252] The padding field is used to increase the processing time at the receiving end. The key identifier field is located in each associated or business identifier information field and before the padding field, so that the padding field can provide sufficient time for security-related processing (e.g., MIC value verification).

[0253] The following is a detailed description of an example where the control frame is a broadcast control frame.

[0254] In some embodiments, the control frame is a trigger frame carrying information for one or more different peers.

[0255] Trigger frames are used to coordinate and schedule data transmission in multi-user scenarios.

[0256] In some embodiments, the key identifier field has a value range of 10 to 11.

[0257] The key identifier field has a value range of 10 to 11, which conforms to the value range specified in the current protocol.

[0258] In some embodiments, the control frame includes one or more user info fields, with the key identifier field located within a single user info field.

[0259] The user information field indicates resource allocation and scheduling information for multiple users, while the corresponding key identification field is located in a single associated or business identification information field.

[0260] In some embodiments, the control frame contains multiple user information fields, with the key identifier field and the PN field located in different user information fields.

[0261] The key identifier field and the PN field differ significantly in function and purpose, thus the key identifier field and the PN field are located in different user information fields.

[0262] In some embodiments, the user information field to which the key identifier field belongs is located before the user information field to which the PN field belongs.

[0263] The PN field is used for replay attack detection. Before verifying the PN value, the receiving end needs to know which key to use. Therefore, the user information field to which the key identifier field belongs is located before the user information field to which the PN field belongs. This helps ensure that the receiving end has determined the correct key before processing the PN field.

[0264] In some embodiments, the control frame also includes a padding field, with the user information field preceding the padding field.

[0265] The padding field is used to increase the processing time at the receiving end. The user information field is placed before the padding field, so that the padding field can provide sufficient time for security-related processing (such as PN value verification).

[0266] In some embodiments, only the key identifier field in the control frame contains key identifier information.

[0267] Only the key identifier field in the control frame contains key identifier information; other parts do not need to carry additional key identifier fields, reducing unnecessary data transmission and improving communication efficiency.

[0268] Accordingly, in some specific embodiments, when the control frame contains a control field, the control field does not contain key identification information; when the control frame contains a common field, the common field does not contain key identification information.

[0269] Step S22: Process the control frame.

[0270] In some embodiments, processing the control frame includes performing an FCS check on all bits in the control frame preceding the middle FCS field.

[0271] FCS check is performed on all bits in the control frame before the middle FCS field to detect whether any errors occurred in the data before the FCS field during transmission.

[0272] Figure 11 This is a flowchart of another communication method in an embodiment of the present invention.

[0273] The communication method in this embodiment is suitable for the sending end.

[0274] Execution step S31: Send a retransmission control frame. The retransmission control frame has enabled the second security protection mechanism and contains the regenerated PN value and MIC; wherein, the MIC is calculated based on the regenerated PN value.

[0275] The retransmission control frame is sent based on the retransmission mechanism to improve the reliability and efficiency of transmission and ensure that the data can be transmitted to the receiving end correctly and completely. The retransmission control frame has enabled the second security protection mechanism and contains the regenerated PN value and MIC, so that the retransmission control frame is also protected by security.

[0276] Specifically, the MIC value of each retransmission control frame is calculated based on the PN value. The corresponding regenerated PN value is then filled into the retransmission control frame to be sent. This PN value is protected by the MIC value corresponding to the retransmission control frame. That is, if the PN value is tampered with, the receiving end can detect the tampering by verifying the MIC value.

[0277] In this embodiment, the second security protection mechanism includes one or more of the following: protecting the integrity of retransmitted control frames through the MIC; and protecting against replay attacks through the PN value.

[0278] Specifically, upon receiving a retransmission control frame, the regenerated PN and MIC values ​​of the received retransmission control frame are detected and verified against the PN and MIC values ​​of the sent retransmission control frame. If they match, the current retransmission control frame is received. If the PN values ​​do not match, it indicates that the current retransmission control frame has been subjected to a replay attack, and the current retransmission control frame is discarded. If the MIC values ​​do not match, it indicates that the current retransmission control frame has been tampered with, and the current retransmission control frame is discarded.

[0279] Figure 12 This is a flowchart of another communication method in an embodiment of the present invention.

[0280] The communication method in this embodiment is suitable for the receiving end.

[0281] Execution step S41: Receive retransmission control frame. The retransmission control frame has enabled the second security protection mechanism and contains the regenerated PN value and MIC. The MIC is calculated based on the regenerated PN value.

[0282] The retransmission control frame is received based on the retransmission mechanism to improve the reliability and efficiency of transmission and ensure that the data can be transmitted to the receiving end correctly and completely. The retransmission control frame has enabled the second security protection mechanism and contains the regenerated PN value and MIC, so that the retransmission control frame is also protected by security.

[0283] Specifically, the MIC value of each retransmission control frame is calculated based on the PN value. The corresponding regenerated PN value is then filled into the retransmission control frame to be sent. This PN value is protected by the MIC value corresponding to the retransmission control frame. That is, if the PN value is tampered with, the receiving end can detect the tampering by verifying the MIC value.

[0284] In this embodiment, the second security protection mechanism includes replay attack protection.

[0285] Replay attack protection is based on PN value detection.

[0286] In this embodiment, the second security protection mechanism includes protecting the integrity of retransmitted control frames through the MIC.

[0287] Specifically, upon receiving a retransmission control frame, the regenerated PN and MIC values ​​of the received retransmission control frame are detected and verified against the PN and MIC values ​​of the sent retransmission control frame. If they match, the current retransmission control frame is received. If the PN values ​​do not match, it indicates that the current retransmission control frame has been subjected to a replay attack, and the current retransmission control frame is discarded. If the MIC values ​​do not match, it indicates that the current retransmission control frame has been tampered with, and the current retransmission control frame is discarded.

[0288] Step S42: Process the retransmitted control frame.

[0289] The retransmitted control frames are processed to obtain data information.

[0290] In this embodiment, the retransmission control frame is processed by one or more of the following: comparing the regenerated PN value with the locally maintained replay count; discarding the retransmission control frame in response to the regenerated PN value not being greater than the replay count; and updating the replay count to the regenerated PN value in response to the regenerated PN value being greater than the replay count.

[0291] The regenerated PN value is compared with the locally maintained replay count. If the regenerated PN value is not greater than the replay count, it indicates that the receiver detects the PN value and jumps back to the PN value of the already received frame. This indicates that a frame has been sent repeatedly, and a replay attack is suspected. Therefore, the retransmitted control frame is discarded. If the regenerated PN value is greater than the replay count, it indicates that the communication is normal and no replay attack has occurred. Therefore, the replay count is updated to the regenerated PN value.

[0292] In this embodiment, the retransmission control frame is processed by performing MIC processing on the retransmission control frame, and the MIC check field contains the regenerated PN value.

[0293] The retransmission control frame is processed by MIC. If the MIC value does not match, it indicates that the current retransmission control frame has been tampered with, and the current retransmission control frame is discarded. If the MIC value matches, it indicates that the current retransmission control frame is communicating normally and has not been tampered with, and the current retransmission control frame is received.

[0294] Figure 13 This is a schematic diagram of the structure of a communication device according to an embodiment of the present invention.

[0295] refer to Figure 13 The communication device 50 includes: a first transmitting module 401, used to transmit control frames, wherein the control frames have enabled a first security protection mechanism.

[0296] about Figure 13 For more information on the working principle, operation method, and beneficial effects of the communication device shown, please refer to the preceding text and... Figures 4 to 9The specific details will not be repeated here.

[0297] Figure 14 This is a schematic diagram of the structure of another communication device in an embodiment of the present invention.

[0298] refer to Figure 14 The communication device 60 includes: a first receiving module 601 for receiving control frames, wherein the control frames have enabled a first security protection mechanism; and a first processing module 602 for processing the control frames.

[0299] about Figure 14 For more information on the working principle, operation method, and beneficial effects of the communication device shown, please refer to the preceding text and... Figure 10 The specific details will not be repeated here.

[0300] Figure 15 This is a schematic diagram of the structure of another communication device in an embodiment of the present invention.

[0301] refer to Figure 15 The communication device 70 includes: a second transmitting module 701, used to transmit a retransmission control frame, wherein the retransmission control frame has enabled a second security protection mechanism and contains a regenerated PN value and a MIC: wherein the MIC is calculated based on the regenerated PN value.

[0302] about Figure 15 For more information on the working principle, operation method, and beneficial effects of the communication device shown, please refer to the preceding text and... Figure 11 The specific details will not be repeated here.

[0303] Figure 16 This is a schematic diagram of the structure of another communication device in an embodiment of the present invention.

[0304] refer to Figure 16 The communication device 80 includes: a second receiving module 801, used to receive a retransmission control frame, the retransmission control frame having enabled the second security protection mechanism and containing a regenerated PN value and MIC, wherein the MIC is calculated based on the regenerated PN value; and a second processing module 802, used to process the retransmission control frame.

[0305] about Figure 16 For more information on the working principle, operation method, and beneficial effects of the communication device shown, please refer to the preceding text and... Figure 12 The specific details will not be repeated here.

[0306] In practice, Figures 13 to 16 The communication device may correspond to a chip with communication function in a communication device; or to a communication device that includes a chip or chip module with communication function, or to a communication device.

[0307] This application also provides a transmitting end, including a memory and a processor. The memory stores a computer program that can run on the processor. When the processor runs the computer program, it executes the steps of the communication method described above.

[0308] This application also provides a receiving end, including a memory and a processor. The memory stores a computer program that can run on the processor. When the processor runs the computer program, it executes the steps of the communication method described above.

[0309] This application also provides a computer-readable storage medium storing a computer program thereon. When the computer program is run by a computer, the aforementioned communication method is executed. The storage medium may include read-only memory (ROM), random access memory (RAM), a magnetic disk, or an optical disk, etc. The storage medium may also include non-volatile memory or non-transitory memory, etc.

[0310] Figure 17 This is a schematic diagram of the hardware structure of a communication device according to an embodiment of this application.

[0311] The communication device can be a WIFI device, such as a STA or an AP.

[0312] Figure 17 The terminal shown includes a memory 131, a processor 132, and a transceiver 133. The processor 132 is coupled to the memory 131 and the transceiver 133. The memory 131 can be located inside or outside the terminal. The memory 131, processor 132, and transceiver 133 can be connected via a communication bus. The transceiver 133 is used to communicate with other devices or communication networks.

[0313] Optionally, the transceiver 133 can be a transmitter. The memory 131 stores a computer program that can run on the processor 132, and when the processor 132 runs the computer program, the transceiver 133 performs the steps in the communication method provided in the above embodiments.

[0314] This application also provides a computer program product, including a computer program / instructions, which, when executed by a processor, implement the steps of the above-described communication method.

[0315] It should be understood that in the embodiments of this application, the processor can be a central processing unit (CPU), but it can also be other general-purpose processors, digital signal processors (DSPs), application-specific integrated circuits (ASICs), field-programmable gate arrays (FPGAs), or other programmable logic devices, discrete gate or transistor logic devices, discrete hardware components, etc. The general-purpose processor can be a microprocessor or any conventional processor.

[0316] It should also be understood that the memory in the embodiments of this application can be volatile memory or non-volatile memory, or may include both volatile and non-volatile memory. Non-volatile memory can be ROM, programmable read-only memory (PROM), erasable programmable read-only memory (EPROM), electrically erasable programmable read-only memory (EEPROM), or flash memory. Volatile memory can be random access memory (RAM), which is used as an external cache. By way of example, but not limitation, many forms of RAM are available, such as static RAM (SRAM), dynamic random access memory (DRAM), synchronous dynamic random access memory (SDRAM), double data rate synchronous dynamic random access memory (DDR SDRAM), enhanced synchronous dynamic random access memory (ESDRAM), synchronous linked dynamic random access memory (SLDRAM), and direct rambus RAM (DR RAM).

[0317] The above embodiments can be implemented, in whole or in part, by software, hardware, firmware, or any other combination thereof. When implemented using software, the above embodiments can be implemented, in whole or in part, as a computer program product. A computer program product includes one or more computer instructions or computer programs. When the computer instructions or computer programs are loaded or executed on a computer, all or part of the processes or functions according to the embodiments of this application are generated. The computer can be a general-purpose computer, a special-purpose computer, a computer network, or other programmable device. The computer program can be stored in a computer-readable storage medium or transferred from one computer-readable storage medium to another. For example, a computer program can be transferred from one website, computer, server, or data center to another website, computer, server, or data center via wired or wireless means.

[0318] While the embodiments disclosed above are described in this application, this application is not limited thereto. Any person skilled in the art can make various modifications and alterations without departing from the spirit and scope of this application; therefore, the scope of protection of this application should be determined by the scope defined in the claims.

Claims

1. A communication method, characterized in that, include: A control frame is sent, which indicates that the first security protection mechanism has been activated.

2. The communication method according to claim 1, characterized in that, The control frame includes a padding field, which satisfies one or more of the following: The length of the fill field is variable; The control frame also includes a Message Integrity Detection (MIC) field, and the padding field is located after the MIC field.

3. The communication method according to claim 1, characterized in that, The control frame includes the Intermediate Frame Verification Sequence (FCS) field. The intermediate FCS field satisfies one or more of the following: The length of the intermediate FCS field is 4 bytes; The intermediate FCS field is used to verify all bits in the control frame that are located before the intermediate FCS field.

4. The communication method according to claim 3, characterized in that, The control frame satisfies one or more of the following: The control frame is a unicast control frame; The control frame is of type Block Acknowledgment Request Frame (BAR). The control frame also includes a packet sequence number (PN) field, and the intermediate FCS field is located after the PN field; The control frame also includes a MIC field, with the intermediate FCS field following the MIC field; the control frame also includes a padding field, with the intermediate FCS field preceding the padding field.

5. The communication method according to claim 3, characterized in that, The control frame satisfies one or more of the following: The control frame is a broadcast control frame; The control frame is a multi-STA block acknowledgment frame carrying information for one or more different peers; the control frame contains one or more each association or service identification information fields, and the intermediate FCS field is located in a single each association or service identification information field; Each of the association or service identification information fields includes a PN field, and the intermediate FCS field is located in each of the association or service identification information fields and is located after the PN field; Each of the association or service identification information fields includes a MIC field, and the intermediate FCS field is located in each of the association or service identification information fields and is located after the MIC field; The control frame also includes a padding field, wherein the intermediate FCS field is located within each associated or service identification information field and precedes the padding field.

6. The communication method according to claim 3, characterized in that, The control frame also includes an FCS field; The FCS field satisfies one or more of the following: The control frame includes a padding field, and the FCS field is located after the padding field; The FCS field is located at the end of the control frame.

7. The communication method according to claim 1, characterized in that, The control frame includes a key identifier field; The key identifier field satisfies one or more of the following: The key identifier field is 2 bytes in length; Bits 0 to 11 in the key identifier field are valid values; Bits 12 to 15 of the key identifier field are reserved.

8. The communication method according to claim 7, characterized in that, The control frame satisfies one or more of the following: The control frame is a unicast control frame; The control frame is of type Block Acknowledgment Request Frame (BAR). The control frame also includes a packet sequence number (PN) field, and the key identifier field is located before the PN field; The control frame also includes a MIC field, with the key identifier field preceding the MIC field.

9. The communication method according to claim 7, characterized in that, The control frame satisfies one or more of the following: The control frame is a broadcast control frame; The control frame is a multi-STA block acknowledgment frame carrying information for one or more different peers. The value range of the key identifier field is 10 to 11; The control frame includes one or more each association or service identification information fields, and the key identification field is located in a single each association or service identification information field; Each association or service identification information field includes a PN field, and the key identification field is located in each association or service identification information field and precedes the PN field; Each association or service identification information field includes a MIC field, and the key identification field is located in each association or service identification information field and precedes the MIC field; The control frame also includes a padding field, wherein the key identifier field is located within each associated or service identifier field and precedes the padding field.

10. The communication method according to claim 7, characterized in that, The control frame satisfies one or more of the following: The control frame is a broadcast control frame; The control frame is a trigger frame carrying information for one or more different peers; The value range of the key identifier field is 10 to 11; The control frame contains one or more user information fields, and the key identifier field is located in a single user information field; The control frame contains multiple user information fields, and the key identifier field and PN field are located in different user information fields; The user information field to which the key identifier field belongs is located before the user information field to which the PN field belongs; The control frame also includes a padding field, with the user information field preceding the padding field.

11. The communication method according to claim 7, characterized in that, The control frame satisfies one or more of the following: Only the key identifier field in the control frame contains key identifier information; The control frame contains a control field, which does not contain key identification information; The control frame contains a common field, which does not contain key identification information.

12. The communication method according to claim 1, characterized in that, The first security protection mechanism includes one or more of the following: The integrity of the control frames is protected by the MIC; Protection against replay attacks is provided using the PN value.

13. The communication method according to claim 1, characterized in that, Meet one or more of the following: In response to the control frame being a broadcast frame and / or a multicast frame, the communication method is used for the AP; In response to the control frame being a unicast frame, the communication method is used for the AP and / or STA.

14. A communication method, characterized in that, include: A control frame is received, and the control frame indicates that the first security protection mechanism has been activated. The control frame is processed.

15. The communication method according to claim 14, characterized in that, The control frame includes the Intermediate Frame Verification Sequence (FCS) field. Processing the control frame includes: FCS verification is performed on all bits in the control frame that are located before the intermediate FCS field.

16. The communication method according to claim 14, characterized in that, The first security protection mechanism includes one or more of the following: The integrity of the control frames is protected by the MIC; Protection against replay attacks is provided using the PN value.

17. A communication method, characterized in that, include: Send a retransmission control frame, wherein the retransmission control frame has enabled the second security protection mechanism and contains the regenerated PN value and MIC; The MIC is calculated based on the regenerated PN value.

18. The communication method according to claim 17, characterized in that, The second security protection mechanism includes one or more of the following: The integrity of the retransmission control frame is protected by the MIC; Protection against replay attacks is provided using the PN value.

19. A communication method, characterized in that, include: Receive a retransmission control frame, wherein the retransmission control frame has enabled the second security protection mechanism and contains a regenerated PN value and MIC, wherein the MIC is calculated based on the regenerated PN value; The retransmission control frame is processed.

20. The communication method according to claim 19, characterized in that, The second security protection mechanism includes replay attack protection; Processing the retransmission control frame includes one or more of the following: The regenerated PN value is compared with the locally maintained replay count; If the regenerated PN value is not greater than the replay count, the retransmission control frame is discarded. If the regenerated PN value is greater than the replay count, the replay count is updated to the regenerated PN value.

21. The communication method according to claim 19, characterized in that, The second security protection mechanism includes protecting the integrity of the retransmission control frame via the MIC; Processing the retransmission control frame includes: The retransmission control frame is processed by MIC, and the check field of the MIC contains the regenerated PN value.

22. A communication device, characterized in that, include: The first sending module is used to send control frames, which have enabled the first security protection mechanism.

23. A communication device, characterized in that, include: The first receiving module is used to receive control frames, wherein the control frames have enabled the first security protection mechanism. The first processing module is used to process the control frame.

24. A communication device, characterized in that, include: The second sending module is used to send a retransmission control frame, wherein the retransmission control frame has enabled the second security protection mechanism and contains a regenerated PN value and MIC. The MIC is calculated based on the regenerated PN value.

25. A communication device, characterized in that, include: The second receiving module is used to receive retransmission control frames, wherein the retransmission control frames have enabled the second security protection mechanism and contain regenerated PN values ​​and MICs, wherein the MICs are calculated based on the regenerated PN values. The second processing module is used to process the retransmission control frame.

26. A transmitting end, comprising a memory and a processor, wherein the memory stores a computer program executable on the processor, characterized in that, When the processor runs the computer program, it performs the steps of the communication method according to any one of claims 1 to 13, or performs the steps of the communication method according to claim 17 or 18.

27. A receiving end, comprising a memory and a processor, wherein the memory stores a computer program executable on the processor, characterized in that, When the processor runs the computer program, it performs the steps of the communication method according to any one of claims 14 to 16, or performs the steps of the communication method according to any one of claims 19 to 21.

28. A computer-readable storage medium having a computer program stored thereon, characterized in that, When the computer program is executed by the processor, it causes the communication method according to any one of claims 1 to 13 to be executed, or causes the communication method according to any one of claims 14 to 16 to be executed, or causes the communication method according to claims 17 or 18 to be executed, or causes the communication method according to any one of claims 19 to 21 to be executed. And / or, A computer program product, comprising a computer program / instructions, characterized in that, When executed by a processor, the computer program / instruction implements the steps of the communication method according to any one of claims 1 to 13, or the steps of the communication method according to any one of claims 14 to 16, or the steps of the communication method according to claims 17 or 18, or the steps of the communication method according to any one of claims 19 to 21.

Images