Communication method and communication device, transmitter, receiver, computer readable storage medium and program product

Abstract

The embodiment of the application provides a communication method and a communication device, a sending end, a receiving end, a computer readable storage medium and a program product, the method comprising: sending a beacon frame, the beacon frame has started a security protection mechanism, and the beacon frame comprises a timestamp field and a timestamp copy field; wherein part or all information of the timestamp field is copied to the timestamp copy field. Since part or all information of the timestamp field is copied to the timestamp copy field, the security protection mechanism is also checked for the timestamp field, so that the timestamp field of the beacon frame is also protected by the security protection mechanism, the risk that the timestamp field of the beacon frame is attacked and tampered is reduced, and the robustness and security of the beacon frame in the transmission process are improved.

Description

Technical Field

[0001] This application relates to the field of communication technology, specifically to a communication method and device, a transmitter, a receiver, a computer-readable storage medium, and a program product. Background Technology

[0002] In an 802.11 network, beacon frames, periodically sent by the access point (AP), carry important network management information, including: network broadcast: Beacon frames are periodically sent by the AP to announce the existence of the wireless network to surrounding devices; time synchronization: Beacon frames contain timestamps to help connected devices synchronize their time with the AP; network parameter transmission: Beacon frames carry basic network information, such as Service Set Identifier (SSID), supported speeds, encryption methods, etc.

[0003] In an 802.11 network, a beacon frame sent by an access point (AP) is a broadcast packet, and the information it contains is carried in the beacon frame payload. Because the beacon frame needs to be received and parsed by different devices (including those connected to the AP and those not connected), it is not encrypted. However, to ensure that the beacon frame is not tampered with or forged during transmission, the 802.11 protocol introduces a security protection mechanism for beacon frames.

[0004] Currently, the security and robustness of the beacon frame security protection mechanism still need to be improved. Summary of the Invention

[0005] In view of this, embodiments of this application provide a communication method and communication device, a transmitting end, a receiving end, a computer-readable storage medium, and a program product, which can protect the timestamp field of the beacon frame with a security protection mechanism, reduce the risk of the timestamp field of the beacon frame being attacked and tampered with, and thus improve the robustness and security of the beacon frame during transmission.

[0006] To achieve the above objectives, the embodiments of this application provide the following technical solutions.

[0007] In a first aspect, embodiments of this application provide a communication method, comprising: sending a beacon frame, wherein the beacon frame has a security protection mechanism enabled, and the beacon frame includes a timestamp field and a timestamp copy field; wherein some or all of the information in the timestamp field is copied to the timestamp copy field.

[0008] Optionally, the beacon frame further includes a Message Integrity Check Element Management (MME) field, which includes a Beacon Integrity Packet Sequence Number (BIPN) field and / or a key identifier field; the timestamp replication field satisfies one or more of the following: the timestamp replication field reuses at least a portion of the BIPN field; the timestamp replication field reuses at least a portion of the key identifier field.

[0009] Optionally, the timestamp field has a length of 64 bits; the timestamp copy field reuses at least a portion of the BIPN field, satisfying one or more of the following: the timestamp copy field reuses the BIPN field; the timestamp copy field reuses 48 bits of the BIPN field; bits 12 to 59 of the timestamp field are copied to the BIPN field; bits 12 to 59 of the timestamp field are arranged in the BIPN field in order from most significant bit to least significant bit; bits 12 to 59 of the timestamp field are arranged in the BIPN field in order from least significant bit to most significant bit.

[0010] Optionally, the timestamp field has a length of 64 bits; the timestamp copy field reuses at least a portion of the key identifier field, satisfying one or more of the following: the timestamp copy field reuses a reserved field in the key identifier field; the timestamp copy field reuses 4 bits of the reserved field in the key identifier field; bits 60 to 63 of the timestamp field are copied to the reserved field, arranged in order from most significant bit to least significant bit; bits 60 to 63 of the timestamp field are copied to the reserved field, arranged in order from least significant bit to most significant bit.

[0011] Optionally, the security protection mechanism includes replay attack protection; wherein, the information in the BIPN field is used as the PN value for replay attack protection.

[0012] Optionally, the timestamp replication field satisfies one or more of the following: the timestamp replication field contains all the information of the timestamp field; the timestamp replication field is located in the payload field of the beacon frame; the timestamp replication field is a newly added field.

[0013] Optionally, the security protection mechanism includes protecting the integrity of the beacon frame through a message integrity check (MIC); wherein the check field of the MIC includes the timestamp copy field.

[0014] Secondly, embodiments of this application provide a communication method, including: receiving a beacon frame, wherein the beacon frame has a security protection mechanism enabled, and the beacon frame includes a timestamp field and a timestamp copy field, wherein some or all of the information in the timestamp field is copied to the timestamp copy field; and processing the beacon frame.

[0015] Optionally, the beacon frame is processed, including one or more of the following: comparing the information in the timestamp copy field with the corresponding information in the timestamp field; and discarding the beacon frame in response to a comparison result that is not completely identical.

[0016] Optionally, the beacon frame further includes an MME field, which includes a BIPN field and / or a key identifier field; the timestamp replication field satisfies one or more of the following: the timestamp replication field reuses at least a portion of the BIPN field; the timestamp replication field reuses at least a portion of the key identifier field.

[0017] Optionally, the timestamp field has a length of 64 bits; the timestamp copy field reuses at least a portion of the BIPN field, satisfying one or more of the following: the timestamp copy field reuses all of the BIPN field; the timestamp copy field reuses 48 bits of the BIPN field; bits 12 to 59 of the timestamp field are copied to the BIPN field; bits 12 to 59 of the timestamp field are arranged in the BIPN field in order from most significant bit to least significant bit; bits 12 to 59 of the timestamp field are arranged in the BIPN field in order from least significant bit to most significant bit.

[0018] Optionally, the timestamp field has a length of 64 bits; the timestamp copy field reuses at least a portion of the key identifier field, satisfying one or more of the following: the timestamp copy field reuses a reserved field in the key identifier field; the timestamp copy field reuses 4 bits of the reserved field in the key identifier field; bits 60 to 63 of the timestamp field are copied to the reserved field, arranged in order from most significant bit to least significant bit; bits 60 to 63 of the timestamp field are copied to the reserved field, arranged in order from least significant bit to most significant bit.

[0019] Optionally, the security protection mechanism includes replay attack protection, wherein the timestamp replication field reuses at least a portion of the BIPN field; and the beacon frame is processed, including one or more of the following: comparing the value in the reused BIPN field with a locally maintained replay count; discarding the beacon frame in response to the value in the reused BIPN field not being greater than the replay count; and updating the replay count to the value in the BIPN field in response to the value in the reused BIPN field being greater than the replay count.

[0020] Optionally, the security protection mechanism includes protecting the integrity of the beacon frame through a MIC; processing the beacon frame includes performing MIC processing on the beacon frame, wherein the inspection field of the MIC includes the timestamp copy field.

[0021] Optionally, the inspection field of the MIC may further include: the timestamp field, and the timestamp field is processed as all zeros.

[0022] Thirdly, embodiments of this application provide a communication device, including: a transmitting module for transmitting a beacon frame, wherein the beacon frame has a security protection mechanism enabled, and the beacon frame includes a timestamp field and a timestamp copy field; wherein some or all of the information in the timestamp field is copied to the timestamp copy field.

[0023] Fourthly, embodiments of this application provide a communication device, comprising: a receiving module for receiving a beacon frame, wherein the beacon frame has a security protection mechanism enabled and the beacon frame includes a timestamp field and a timestamp copy field, wherein some or all of the information in the timestamp field is copied to the timestamp copy field; and a processing module for processing the beacon frame.

[0024] Fifthly, embodiments of this application also provide a transmitting end, including a memory and a processor, wherein the memory stores a computer program that can run on the processor, and the processor executes the steps of the communication method provided in the first aspect when running the computer program.

[0025] In a sixth aspect, embodiments of this application also provide a computer-readable storage medium having a computer program stored thereon, wherein when the computer program is run by a processor, the communication method provided in the first aspect is executed, or the communication method provided in the second aspect is executed.

[0026] In a seventh aspect, embodiments of this application also provide a computer program product, including a computer program / instruction, which, when executed by a processor, implements the steps of the communication method provided in the first aspect, or implements the steps of the communication method provided in the second aspect.

[0027] Eighthly, embodiments of this application also provide a chip (or communication device) storing a computer program, which, when executed by the chip, causes the communication method provided in the first or second aspect to be executed.

[0028] Ninthly, embodiments of this application provide a chip module on which a computer program is stored, such that when the computer program is executed by the chip module, the communication method provided in the first or second aspect is executed.

[0029] In a tenth aspect, embodiments of this application provide a communication system, the communication system including means for performing the method provided in the first aspect and means for performing the method provided in the second aspect.

[0030] Compared with the prior art, the technical solution of the embodiments of the present invention has the following beneficial effects:

[0031] In this embodiment of the invention, the sending end sends a beacon frame. The beacon frame has a security protection mechanism enabled. The beacon frame includes a timestamp field and a timestamp copy field. Some or all of the information in the timestamp field is copied to the timestamp copy field. When the security protection mechanism is checked on the timestamp copy field, since some or all of the information in the timestamp field is copied to the timestamp copy field, it is equivalent to checking the timestamp field itself. This ensures that the timestamp field of the beacon frame is also protected by the security protection mechanism, reducing the risk of the timestamp field of the beacon frame being attacked and tampered with, thereby improving the robustness and security of the beacon frame during transmission. Attached Figure Description

[0032] To more clearly illustrate the technical solutions in the embodiments of this application or the prior art, the drawings used in the description of the embodiments or the prior art will be briefly introduced below. Obviously, the drawings described below are only embodiments of this application. For those skilled in the art, other drawings can be obtained based on the provided drawings without creative effort.

[0033] Figure 1 A schematic diagram of the frame structure of a beacon frame is shown;

[0034] Figure 2 This is a flowchart of a communication method according to an embodiment of the present invention;

[0035] Figure 3 This is a schematic diagram of the frame structure of a beacon frame in an embodiment of the present invention;

[0036] Figure 4 This is a schematic diagram of the frame structure of another beacon frame in an embodiment of the present invention;

[0037] Figure 5This is a flowchart of another communication method in an embodiment of the present invention;

[0038] Figure 6 This is a schematic diagram of the structure of a communication device according to an embodiment of the present invention;

[0039] Figure 7 This is a schematic diagram of the structure of another communication device in an embodiment of the present invention;

[0040] Figure 8 This is a schematic diagram of the hardware structure of a communication device according to an embodiment of this application. Detailed Implementation

[0041] The technical solutions of the embodiments of this application will be clearly and completely described below with reference to the accompanying drawings. Obviously, the described embodiments are only some embodiments of this application, and not all embodiments. Based on the embodiments of this application, all other embodiments obtained by those skilled in the art without creative effort are within the scope of protection of this application.

[0042] The communication systems applicable to the embodiments of this invention include, but are not limited to, third-generation (3G), LTE, fourth-generation (4G), fifth-generation (5G), NR, and future evolution systems or multiple converged communication systems. The 5G system can be a non-standalone (NSA) 5G system or a standalone (SA) 5G system. The solutions of the embodiments of this invention can also be applied to various new communication systems in the future, such as 6G and 7G.

[0043] This application mainly relates to communication between WIFI devices (such as WIFI sender and WIFI receiver).

[0044] The WIFI device can be a terminal device (or a terminal) that supports WIFI functionality. In this embodiment of the invention, the terminal can refer to various forms of user equipment (UE), access terminal, user unit, user station, mobile station, mobile station (MS), remote station, remote terminal, mobile device, user terminal, terminal equipment, wireless communication device, user agent, or user device that supports WIFI functionality. The terminal can also be a cellular phone, cordless phone, Session Initiation Protocol (SIP) phone, Wireless Local Loop (WLL) station, Personal Digital Assistant (PDA), handheld device with wireless communication functionality, computing device, or other processing device connected to a wireless modem, in-vehicle device, wearable device, a terminal in a future 5G network, or a terminal in a future evolved Public Land Mobile Network (PLMN), etc. This embodiment of the invention does not limit the scope of the terminal.

[0045] The communication systems to which the method provided in this embodiment of the invention can be applied may include access points (APs) and / or stations (STAs). For example, this embodiment of the invention can be applied to scenarios of communication or sensing between APs and STAs, between APs, or between STAs in WIFI, and this embodiment of the invention is not limited thereto. Optionally, an AP can communicate or sense with a single STA, or an AP can communicate or sense with multiple STAs simultaneously. Specifically, communication or sensing between an AP and multiple STAs can be further divided into downlink transmission where the AP simultaneously sends signals to multiple STAs, and uplink transmission where multiple STAs send signals to the AP. The communication between APs and STAs, between APs, or between STAs can support WLAN communication protocols, which may include protocols of the IEEE 802.11 series, such as applicable to the 802.11bn standard, and of course, also applicable to standards after 802.11bn.

[0046] An access point is a device with wireless communication capabilities, supporting communication or sensing using the WLAN protocol. It has the function of communicating or sensing with other devices (such as stations or other access points) in the WLAN network, and can also communicate or sense with other devices. Alternatively, an access point acts as a bridge connecting wired and wireless networks, its main function being to connect various wireless network clients together and then connect the wireless network to the Ethernet. In a WLAN system, an access point can be called an Access Point Station (AP STA). This wireless communication device can be a complete device, or a chip or processing system installed in a complete device. Devices with these chips or processing systems can implement the methods and functions of the embodiments of the present invention under the control of the chip or processing system. In the embodiments of the present invention, the AP is a device that provides services to the STA and can support 802.11 series protocols or subsequent protocols. For example, an access point can be an access point for terminals (such as mobile phones) to enter a wired (or wireless) network, mainly deployed in homes, buildings, and parks, with a typical coverage radius of tens to hundreds of meters; of course, it can also be deployed outdoors. For example, an AP can be a communication server, router, switch, bridge, or other communication entity; an AP can include various forms of macro base stations, micro base stations, relay stations, etc. Of course, an AP can also be the chip and processing system in these various forms of devices, thereby realizing the methods and functions of the embodiments of the present invention.

[0047] A station is a device with wireless communication capabilities, supporting communication or sensing using the WLAN protocol, and having the ability to communicate or sense other stations or access points in a WLAN network. In a WLAN system, a station can be called a non-access point station (non-AP STA). For example, an STA is any user communication device that allows a user to communicate or sense with an AP and thus communicate with the WLAN. This wireless communication device can be a complete device, or it can be a chip or processing system installed in a complete device. Devices with these chips or processing systems can implement the methods and functions of the embodiments of the present invention under the control of the chip or processing system. For example, a station can be a wireless communication chip, a wireless sensor, or a wireless communication terminal, and can also be referred to as a user. Furthermore, a station can be a mobile phone supporting Wi-Fi communication, a tablet computer supporting Wi-Fi communication, a set-top box supporting Wi-Fi communication, a smart TV supporting Wi-Fi communication, a smart wearable device supporting Wi-Fi communication, an in-vehicle communication device supporting Wi-Fi communication, and a computer supporting Wi-Fi communication, etc.

[0048] Figure 1 A schematic diagram of the frame structure of a beacon frame is shown.

[0049] In the current beacon frame security protection mechanism, in order to achieve message integrity protection and replay protection, a security-related field (i.e., the MME field) has been added to the beacon frame. The MME field carries security-related fields such as the Beacon Integrity Packet Number (BIPN) field and the Key ID field. The Message Integrity Check (MIC) is generated from the key in the Key ID field, the Media Access Control (MAC) header information, and the BIPN field information.

[0050] This shows that during the MIC calculation and generation process, the timestamp field information carried in the beacon frame payload is treated as 0. That is, no matter what the actual value of the timestamp field is, it is treated as 0 when calculating the MIC. This means that the timestamp field of the current beacon frame is not protected by message integrity checks, making the timestamp field vulnerable to attacks or tampering during transmission. This affects the robustness and security of the beacon frame during transmission, and the STA device cannot identify the attack or tampering, which also affects the stability of the STA device.

[0051] To address this technical problem, in this embodiment of the invention, the sending end transmits a beacon frame with a security protection mechanism enabled. The beacon frame includes a timestamp field and a timestamp copy field, and some or all of the information in the timestamp field is copied to the timestamp copy field. When the security protection mechanism checks the timestamp copy field, since some or all of the information in the timestamp field is copied to the timestamp copy field, it is equivalent to also checking the timestamp field with the security protection mechanism. This ensures that the timestamp field of the beacon frame is also protected by the security protection mechanism, reducing the risk of the timestamp field of the beacon frame being attacked and tampered with, thereby improving the robustness and security of the beacon frame during transmission.

[0052] To make the above-mentioned objectives, features and beneficial effects of the present invention more apparent and understandable, specific embodiments of the present invention will be described in detail below with reference to the accompanying drawings.

[0053] Reference Figures 2 to 4 , Figure 2 This is a flowchart illustrating the steps of a communication method according to an embodiment of the present invention. Figure 3 This is a schematic diagram of the frame structure of a beacon frame according to an embodiment of the present invention. Figure 4 This is a schematic diagram of the frame structure of another beacon frame in an embodiment of the present invention, wherein the communication method is used at the sending end.

[0054] The transmitting end may include an access point (AP) and other suitable communication devices capable of transmitting beacon frames.

[0055] The following explanation uses the example of an AP as the transmitter and a STA as the receiver, but it is not limited to this.

[0056] Reference Figures 3 to 4 Step S1: Send a beacon frame. The beacon frame has a security protection mechanism enabled and contains a timestamp field and a timestamp copy field. Some or all of the information in the timestamp field is copied to the timestamp copy field.

[0057] Specifically, beacon frames are periodically sent by the access point (AP) to broadcast the presence of the wireless network to surrounding wireless devices (such as STAs) and to provide basic network information and management parameters.

[0058] Enabling security protection mechanisms on beacon frames can prevent the risk of beacon frames being tampered with or replayed during transmission. At the same time, it can also ensure that the new security protection mechanisms are compatible with existing devices and protocols, and provide room for the expansion of security functions.

[0059] The timestamp field is used to keep the access point and STA synchronized in time and to detect the connection status between the access point and STA.

[0060] The timestamp copy field copies part or all of the information from the timestamp field.

[0061] It should be noted that when some or all of the information in the timestamp field is copied to the timestamp copy field, the security protection mechanism check on the timestamp copy field is equivalent to the security protection mechanism check on the timestamp field as well. This means that the timestamp field of the beacon frame is also protected by the security protection mechanism, reducing the risk of the timestamp field of the beacon frame being attacked and tampered with, thereby improving the robustness and security of the beacon frame during transmission.

[0062] In some embodiments, the timestamp field is 64 bits long.

[0063] Specifically, the timestamp field carried in the beacon frame is a 64-bit value, representing a time value in microseconds, meaning it can express a range from 0 to (2π). 64 -1) microsecond.

[0064] In some embodiments, the beacon frame further includes a Message Integrity Check Element Management (MME) field, which includes a Beacon Integrity Packet Sequence Number (BIPN) field and / or a Key Identifier field.

[0065] Specifically, the Management MIC Element (MME) field carries critical security-related fields to enhance the security of beacon frames and prevent them from being compromised, tampered with, or subjected to replay attacks. After the STA receives a beacon frame, it recalculates the MIC using the same Beacon Integrity Group Temporal Key (BIGTK) and compares it with the MIC carried in the beacon frame. If they match, the beacon frame is considered to have not been tampered with; otherwise, the beacon frame is discarded.

[0066] In some embodiments, the MME field includes a Beacon Integrity Packet Number (BIPN) field and / or a key identifier field.

[0067] Specifically, BIPN is used to provide a unique sequence number in the beacon frame to identify the order of each signal frame and prevent signal frames from being replayed.

[0068] Specifically, the Key ID field is used to identify the key (such as BIGTK) used by the beacon frame.

[0069] Specifically, the key identifier field is used to indicate the index of a key. For example, multiple different secure links can be established between a STA and an AP, each with its own key for different types of frames. Typically, the keys under a secure link have a unified key index allocation mechanism, meaning that the corresponding key can be found simply by using this key identifier.

[0070] In some embodiments, the timestamp replication field reuses at least a portion of the BIPN field.

[0071] In some embodiments, the timestamp replication field reuses at least a portion of the key identification field.

[0072] Specifically, reuse here refers to the following: the timestamp replication field and the BIPN field sharing the same data resources; or, the timestamp replication field and the key identifier field sharing a portion of the data resources.

[0073] Since the timestamp copy field is a copy of part or all of the information in the timestamp field, it means that part of the BIPN field is the same as part or all of the information in the timestamp field. Accordingly, when the security protection mechanism is checked on the BIPN field, it is equivalent to checking the security protection mechanism on the timestamp field as well, so that the timestamp field of the beacon frame is also protected by the security protection mechanism.

[0074] Since the timestamp copy field replicates part or all of the information in the timestamp field, it means that part of the key identifier field is the same as part or all of the information in the timestamp field. Accordingly, when the key identifier field is checked for security protection mechanisms, it is equivalent to also checking the timestamp field for security protection mechanisms, thus making the timestamp field protected by security protection mechanisms.

[0075] In some embodiments, the timestamp copy field reuses at least a portion of the BIPN field, satisfying one or more of the following: the timestamp copy field reuses the BIPN field; the timestamp copy field reuses 48 bits of the BIPN field; bits 12 to 59 of the timestamp field are copied to the BIPN field; bits 12 to 59 of the timestamp field are arranged in the BIPN field in order from most significant bit to least significant bit; and bits 12 to 59 of the timestamp field are arranged in the BIPN field in order from least significant bit to most significant bit.

[0076] Specifically, the BIPN field is 8 bytes. By reusing 48 bits of the BIPN field, the BIPN field also has 12 bits of information unique to this field.

[0077] In some embodiments, the timestamp copy field reuses at least a portion of the key identifier field, satisfying one or more of the following: the timestamp copy field reuses a reserved field in the key identifier field; the timestamp copy field reuses 4 bits of the reserved field in the key identifier field; bits 60 to 63 of the timestamp field are copied to the reserved field, arranged in order from most significant bit to least significant bit; and bits 60 to 63 of the timestamp field are copied to the reserved field, arranged in order from least significant bit to most significant bit.

[0078] Specifically, the key identifier field is 2 bytes, of which 12 bits are used to identify the key used by the beacon frame, and the remaining 4 bits are used as a reserved field in the key identifier field. By copying Bits 60 to 63 of the timestamp field into the reserved field, more information of the timestamp field can be placed in the MME field, thereby maximizing the protection of the timestamp field information by the security protection mechanism.

[0079] In some embodiments, the protection mechanism includes replay attack protection; wherein, information in the BIPN field is used as the PN value for replay attack protection.

[0080] Specifically, in some embodiments of the replay attack protection method, the sending end can generate a new and strictly incrementing PN value for each beacon frame, and then fill the corresponding PN value into the beacon frame to be transmitted. This PN value is protected by the MIC of the beacon frame. In other words, if the PN value is tampered with during the transmission of the beacon frame, the receiving end can detect the tampering by checking the MIC value.

[0081] In the replay attack protection method of the present invention, by copying part of the timestamp information to the BIPN field, and then using the information in the BIPN field as the PN value for replay attack protection, the incremental characteristic of the timestamp information can be utilized to reuse the timestamp information as a strictly incremental PN value. This not only realizes the replay attack protection function, but also substantially performs MIC verification on the timestamp information, thereby making the timestamp field also protected by the replay attack protection method.

[0082] In some embodiments, the security protection mechanism includes protecting the integrity of the beacon frame through a message integrity check (MIC); wherein the check field of the MIC includes a timestamp replication field.

[0083] Specifically, the beacon frame is appended with a MIC checksum generated based on the BIGTK key. The MIC checksum is calculated using the Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) algorithm to ensure the integrity of the beacon frame.

[0084] In some embodiments, the BIGTK key is generated by the AP and distributed to the STA via a secure handshake protocol, ensuring the security of the BIGTK key during transmission and preventing the key from being stolen or tampered with.

[0085] In some embodiments, the secure handshake protocol includes the four-way handshake protocol of Wi-Fi Protected Access 2 (WPA2).

[0086] In some embodiments, the timestamp replication field may also satisfy one or more of the following: the timestamp replication field contains all the information of the timestamp field; the timestamp replication field is located in the payload field of the beacon frame; the timestamp replication field is a newly added field.

[0087] It should be noted that the payload field of the beacon frame includes partial information from the MAC header field, a timestamp field, and an MME field. Furthermore, the MIC checksum is calculated and generated from the payload field information of the beacon frame. Therefore, by adding a new field to the payload field, which includes all the information from the timestamp field, when performing a MIC message integrity check on the payload field, it is equivalent to performing a MIC message integrity check on all the information in the timestamp field. This protects the timestamp field of the beacon frame with a security protection mechanism, reducing the risk of the timestamp field of the beacon frame being attacked and tampered with, thereby improving the robustness and security of the beacon frame during transmission.

[0088] Specifically, the newly added timestamp copy field will not affect the parsing of non-new fields (i.e., existing fields) by existing devices. In other words, the new security protection mechanism in this invention is compatible with currently existing devices.

[0089] Reference Figure 5 , Figure 5 This is a flowchart of another communication method in an embodiment of the present invention. The communication method can be used at the receiving end.

[0090] In some embodiments, the receiver may be a STA, or other device capable of receiving beacon frames.

[0091] Execution step S11: Receive a beacon frame, the beacon frame has a security protection mechanism enabled, and the beacon frame contains a timestamp field and a timestamp copy field, wherein some or all of the information in the timestamp field is copied to the timestamp copy field.

[0092] Specifically, the STA is used to receive beacon frames sent by the AP.

[0093] Enabling security protection mechanisms on beacon frames can prevent the risk of beacon frames being tampered with or replayed during transmission. At the same time, it can also ensure that the new security protection mechanisms are compatible with existing devices and protocols, and provide room for the expansion of security functions.

[0094] The timestamp field is used to keep the access point and STA synchronized in time and to detect the connection status between the access point and STA.

[0095] The timestamp copy field copies part or all of the information from the timestamp field.

[0096] It should be noted that when some or all of the information in the timestamp field is copied to the timestamp copy field, the security protection mechanism check on the timestamp copy field is equivalent to the security protection mechanism check on the timestamp field as well. This means that the timestamp field of the beacon frame is also protected by the security protection mechanism, reducing the risk of the timestamp field of the beacon frame being attacked and tampered with, thereby improving the robustness and security of the beacon frame during transmission.

[0097] In some embodiments, the timestamp field is 64 bits long.

[0098] Specifically, the timestamp field carried in the beacon frame is a 64-bit value, representing a time value in microseconds, meaning it can express a range from 0 to (2π). 64 -1) microsecond.

[0099] In some embodiments, the beacon frame further includes a Message Integrity Check Element Management (MME) field, which includes a Beacon Integrity Packet Sequence Number (BIPN) field and / or a Key Identifier field.

[0100] Specifically, the Management MIC Element (MME) field carries critical security-related fields to enhance the security of beacon frames and prevent them from being compromised, tampered with, or subjected to replay attacks. After the STA receives the beacon frame, it recalculates the MIC using the same BIGTK key and compares it with the MIC carried in the beacon frame. If they match, the beacon frame is considered to have not been tampered with; otherwise, the beacon frame is discarded.

[0101] In some embodiments, the MME field includes a Beacon Integrity Packet Number (BIPN) field and / or a key identifier field.

[0102] In some embodiments, the MME field may include one or more of the following: Element ID (1 Byte), Length (1 Byte), Key ID (2 Bytes), BIPN (6 Bytes), and MIC (8 Bytes or 16 Bytes).

[0103] In one specific embodiment, the key identifier field is 2 bytes, but only the first 12 bits are used, with the remaining 4 bits reserved; the BIPN uses 6 bytes; and the MIC information is 8 or 16 bytes depending on the security mechanism used.

[0104] Specifically, BIPN is used to provide a unique sequence number in the beacon frame to identify the order of each signal frame and prevent signal frames from being replayed.

[0105] Specifically, the key identifier field is used to identify the key (such as BIGTK) used by the beacon frame.

[0106] In some embodiments, the timestamp replication field reuses at least a portion of the BIPN field.

[0107] In some embodiments, the timestamp replication field reuses at least a portion of the key identification field.

[0108] Specifically, reuse here refers to the following: the timestamp replication field and the BIPN field sharing the same data resources; or, the timestamp replication field and the key identifier field sharing a portion of the data resources.

[0109] Since the timestamp copy field is a copy of part or all of the information in the timestamp field, it means that part of the BIPN field is the same as part or all of the information in the timestamp field. Accordingly, when the security protection mechanism is checked on the BIPN field, it is equivalent to checking the security protection mechanism on the timestamp field as well, so that the timestamp field of the beacon frame is also protected by the security protection mechanism.

[0110] Since the timestamp copy field replicates part or all of the information in the timestamp field, it means that part of the key identifier field is the same as part or all of the information in the timestamp field. Accordingly, when the key identifier field is checked for security protection mechanisms, it is equivalent to also checking the timestamp field for security protection mechanisms, thus making the timestamp field protected by security protection mechanisms.

[0111] In some embodiments, the timestamp copy field reuses at least a portion of the BIPN field, satisfying one or more of the following: the timestamp copy field reuses the BIPN field; the timestamp copy field reuses 48 bits of the BIPN field; bits 12 to 59 of the timestamp field are copied to the BIPN field; bits 12 to 59 of the timestamp field are arranged in the BIPN field in order from most significant bit to least significant bit; and bits 12 to 59 of the timestamp field are arranged in the BIPN field in order from least significant bit to most significant bit.

[0112] Specifically, the BIPN field is 8 bytes. By reusing 48 bits of the BIPN field, the BIPN field also has 12 bits of information unique to this field.

[0113] In some embodiments, the timestamp copy field reuses at least a portion of the key identifier field, satisfying one or more of the following: the timestamp copy field reuses a reserved field in the key identifier field; the timestamp copy field reuses 4 bits of the reserved field in the key identifier field; bits 60 to 63 of the timestamp field are copied to the reserved field, arranged in order from most significant bit to least significant bit; and bits 60 to 63 of the timestamp field are copied to the reserved field, arranged in order from least significant bit to most significant bit.

[0114] Specifically, the key identifier field is 2 bytes, of which 12 bits are used to identify the key used by the beacon frame, and the remaining 4 bits are used as a reserved field in the key identifier field. By copying Bits 60 to 63 of the timestamp field into the reserved field, more information of the timestamp field can be placed in the MME field, thereby maximizing the protection of the timestamp field information by the security protection mechanism.

[0115] Step S12: Process the beacon frame.

[0116] Specifically, by processing beacon frames, it is possible to determine whether the beacon frame has been tampered with or attacked. If it has been tampered with or attacked, the beacon frame is discarded, thereby ensuring the robustness and security of the STA.

[0117] In some embodiments, processing the beacon frame includes one or more of the following: comparing the information in the timestamp copy field with the corresponding information in the timestamp field; and discarding the beacon frame in response to a comparison result that is not completely identical.

[0118] In some embodiments, the step of comparing the information in the timestamp copy field with the corresponding information in the timestamp field includes: comparing the 13th to 60th bits (i.e., Bit12 to Bit59), a total of 48 bits, of the least significant bit (LSB) of the timestamp field to see if they are the same as the BIPN field in the MME field; if they are different, the beacon frame is discarded.

[0119] In some embodiments, the step of comparing the information in the timestamp copy field with the corresponding information in the timestamp field includes: comparing the 61st to 64th bits (i.e., Bit60 to Bit63), a total of 4 bits, of the least significant bit (LSB) of the timestamp field with the values ​​of the 4 reserved bits in the key identifier field of the MME field; if they are different, the beacon frame is discarded.

[0120] In some embodiments, the security protection mechanism includes replay attack protection, wherein the timestamp replication field reuses at least a portion of the BIPN field; and the beacon frame is processed by one or more of the following: comparing the value in the reused BIPN field with a locally maintained replay count; discarding the beacon frame in response to the value in the reused BIPN field not being greater than the replay count; and updating the replay count to the value in the BIPN field in response to the value in the reused BIPN field being greater than the replay count.

[0121] In some embodiments of the replay attack protection method, the receiving end can parse the received beacon frame, extract the value from the BIPN field, and then compare it with a locally maintained replay counter value. If the value in the BIPN field carried in the beacon frame is not greater than the locally maintained replay counter, the beacon frame is discarded; if the value in the BIPN field carried in the beacon frame is greater than the locally maintained replay counter, the replay counter is updated to the value in the BIPN field, and the beacon frame is processed again.

[0122] In some embodiments, the security protection mechanism includes protecting the integrity of the beacon frame through a MIC; processing the beacon frame includes performing MIC processing on the beacon frame, wherein the inspection field of the MIC includes the timestamp copy field.

[0123] Specifically, after receiving a beacon frame, the STA recalculates the MIC checksum using the same BIGTK key and compares it with the MIC checksum carried in the beacon frame. If they match, the beacon frame is considered to have not been tampered with; otherwise, the beacon frame is discarded.

[0124] In some embodiments, the inspection field of the MIC further includes the timestamp field, and the timestamp field is processed as all zeros.

[0125] Specifically, regardless of the actual value of the timestamp field, it is treated as 0 when calculating the MIC checksum.

[0126] related Figure 5 For more information on the other communication method shown, please refer to the preceding text and... Figures 2 to 4 The relevant descriptions will not be repeated here.

[0127] Reference Figure 6 , Figure 6 This is a schematic diagram of a communication device according to an embodiment of the present invention. The communication device may include:

[0128] The sending module 100 is used to send a beacon frame, the beacon frame having an enabled security protection mechanism, and the beacon frame containing a timestamp field and a timestamp copy field; wherein, some or all of the information in the timestamp field is copied to the timestamp copy field.

[0129] about Figure 6 For more information on the working principle, operation method, and beneficial effects of the communication device shown, please refer to the preceding text and... Figures 2 to 4 The specific details will not be repeated here.

[0130] Reference Figure 7 , Figure 7 This is a schematic diagram of another communication device according to an embodiment of the present invention. The communication device may include:

[0131] The receiving module 200 is used to receive a beacon frame, wherein the beacon frame has a security protection mechanism enabled, and the beacon frame contains a timestamp field and a timestamp copy field, wherein some or all of the information in the timestamp field is copied to the timestamp copy field;

[0132] The processing module 201 is used to process the beacon frame.

[0133] about Figure 7 For more information on the working principle, operation method, and beneficial effects of the communication device shown, please refer to the preceding text and... Figure 5 The specific details will not be elaborated here.

[0134] In practice, Figures 6 to 7 The communication device shown may correspond to a chip with communication function in a communication device; or to a communication device including a chip or chip module with communication function, or to a communication device.

[0135] This application embodiment also provides a transmitting end, including a memory and a processor, wherein the memory stores a computer program that can run on the processor, and the processor executes the steps of the above-described communication method when running the computer program.

[0136] This application embodiment also provides a receiving end, including a memory and a processor, wherein the memory stores a computer program that can run on the processor, and the processor executes the steps of the above-described communication method when running the computer program.

[0137] Reference Figure 8 , Figure 8 This is a schematic diagram of the hardware structure of a communication device according to an embodiment of this application.

[0138] The communication device may be a WIFI device, such as a STA or an AP.

[0139] Figure 8 The terminal shown includes a memory 301, a processor 302, and a transceiver 303. The processor 302 is coupled to the memory 301 and the transceiver 303. The memory 301 can be located inside or outside the terminal. The memory 301, processor 302, and transceiver 303 can be connected via a communication bus. The transceiver 303 is used to communicate with other devices or communication networks.

[0140] Optionally, the transceiver 303 can be a transmitter. The memory 301 stores a computer program that can run on the processor 302, and when the processor 302 runs the computer program, the transceiver 303 performs the steps in the communication method provided in the above embodiments.

[0141] This application also provides a computer-readable storage medium storing a computer program thereon. When the computer program is run by a computer, the aforementioned communication method is executed. The storage medium may include read-only memory (ROM), random access memory (RAM), a magnetic disk, or an optical disk, etc. The storage medium may also include non-volatile memory or non-transitory memory, etc.

[0142] This application also provides a computer program product, including a computer program / instructions, which, when executed by a processor, implement the steps of the above-described communication method.

[0143] It should be understood that in the embodiments of this application, the processor can be a central processing unit (CPU), but it can also be other general-purpose processors, digital signal processors (DSPs), application-specific integrated circuits (ASICs), field-programmable gate arrays (FPGAs), or other programmable logic devices, discrete gate or transistor logic devices, discrete hardware components, etc. The general-purpose processor can be a microprocessor or any conventional processor.

[0144] It should also be understood that the memory in the embodiments of this application can be volatile memory or non-volatile memory, or may include both volatile and non-volatile memory. Non-volatile memory can be ROM, programmable read-only memory (PROM), erasable programmable read-only memory (EPROM), electrically erasable programmable read-only memory (EEPROM), or flash memory. Volatile memory can be random access memory (RAM), which is used as an external cache. By way of example, but not limitation, many forms of RAM are available, such as static RAM (SRAM), dynamic random access memory (DRAM), synchronous dynamic random access memory (SDRAM), double data rate synchronous dynamic random access memory (DDR SDRAM), enhanced synchronous dynamic random access memory (ESDRAM), synchronous linked dynamic random access memory (SLDRAM), and direct rambus RAM (DR RAM).

[0145] The above embodiments can be implemented, in whole or in part, by software, hardware, firmware, or any other combination thereof. When implemented using software, the above embodiments can be implemented, in whole or in part, as a computer program product. The computer program product includes one or more computer instructions or computer programs. When the computer instructions or computer program are loaded or executed on a computer, all or part of the processes or functions described in the embodiments of this application are generated. The computer can be a general-purpose computer, a special-purpose computer, a computer network, or other programmable device. The computer program can be stored in a computer-readable storage medium or transferred from one computer-readable storage medium to another. For example, the computer program can be transferred from one website, computer, server, or data center to another website, computer, server, or data center via wired or wireless means.

[0146] Accordingly, embodiments of this application also provide a chip (or communication device) that stores a computer program, which, when executed by the chip, causes the communication method provided by the first or second aspect to be executed.

[0147] Accordingly, embodiments of this application provide a chip module on which a computer program is stored. When the computer program is executed by the chip module, the communication method provided by the first or second aspect is executed.

[0148] Accordingly, embodiments of this application provide a communication system, the communication system including means for performing the method provided in the first aspect and means for performing the method provided in the second aspect.

[0149] While the embodiments disclosed above are described in this application, this application is not limited thereto. Any person skilled in the art can make various modifications and alterations without departing from the spirit and scope of this application; therefore, the scope of protection of this application should be determined by the scope defined in the claims.

Claims

1. A communication method, characterized in that, include: Send a beacon frame, the beacon frame having a security protection mechanism enabled, and the beacon frame containing a timestamp field and a timestamp replication field; Wherein, some or all of the information in the timestamp field is copied to the timestamp copy field.

2. The communication method according to claim 1, characterized in that, The beacon frame also includes a Message Integrity Check Element Management (MME) field, which includes a Beacon Integrity Packet Sequence Number (BIPN) field and / or a Key Identifier field. The timestamp replication field satisfies one or more of the following: The timestamp replication field reuses at least a portion of the BIPN field; The timestamp replication field reuses at least a portion of the key identifier field.

3. The communication method according to claim 2, characterized in that, The length of the timestamp field is 64 bits; The timestamp replication field reuses at least a portion of the BIPN field, satisfying one or more of the following: The timestamp replication field reuses the BIPN field; The timestamp replication field reuses 48 bits of the BIPN field; Bits 12 to 59 of the timestamp field are copied to the BIPN field; Bits 12 to 59 in the timestamp field are arranged in the BIPN field in descending order of their most significant digits. Bits 12 to 59 of the timestamp field are arranged in the BIPN field in ascending order from least significant bit to most significant bit.

4. The communication method according to claim 2, characterized in that, The length of the timestamp field is 64 bits; The timestamp replication field reuses at least a portion of the key identifier field, satisfying one or more of the following: The timestamp replication field reuses a reserved field from the key identifier field; The timestamp replication field reuses 4 bits of the reserved field in the key identifier field; Bits 60 to 63 of the timestamp field are copied to the reserved field and arranged in order from most significant bit to least significant bit. Bits 60 to 63 of the timestamp field are copied to the reserved field and arranged in ascending order from least significant bit to most significant bit.

5. The communication method according to claim 2, characterized in that, The security protection mechanism includes replay attack protection; Specifically, the information in the BIPN field is used as the PN value for replay attack protection.

6. The communication method according to claim 1, characterized in that, The timestamp replication field satisfies one or more of the following: The timestamp replication field contains all the information of the timestamp field; The timestamp replication field is located in the payload field of the beacon frame; The timestamp copy field is a newly added field.

7. The communication method according to claim 1, characterized in that, The security protection mechanism includes protecting the integrity of the beacon frame through a message integrity check (MIC); The inspection field of the MIC includes the timestamp replication field.

8. A communication method, characterized in that, include: A beacon frame is received, the beacon frame has a security protection mechanism enabled, and the beacon frame contains a timestamp field and a timestamp copy field, wherein some or all of the information in the timestamp field is copied to the timestamp copy field; The beacon frame is processed.

9. The communication method according to claim 8, characterized in that, Processing the beacon frame includes one or more of the following: Compare the information in the timestamp copy field with the corresponding information in the timestamp field; If the comparison result is not completely identical, the beacon frame is discarded.

10. The communication method according to claim 8, characterized in that, The beacon frame also includes an MME field, which includes a BIPN field and / or a key identifier field; The timestamp replication field satisfies one or more of the following: The timestamp replication field reuses at least a portion of the BIPN field; The timestamp replication field reuses at least a portion of the key identifier field.

11. The communication method according to claim 10, characterized in that, The security protection mechanism includes replay attack protection, wherein the timestamp copy field reuses at least a portion of the BIPN field; Processing the beacon frame includes one or more of the following: The value in the BIPN field to be reused is compared with the replay count maintained locally; If the value in the reused BIPN field is not greater than the replay count, the beacon frame is discarded; if the value in the reused BIPN field is greater than the replay count, the replay count is updated to the value in the BIPN field.

12. The communication method according to claim 8, characterized in that, The security protection mechanism includes protecting the integrity of the beacon frame through the MIC; Processing the beacon frame includes: The beacon frame is processed by MIC, and the inspection field of the MIC includes the timestamp copy field.

13. The communication method according to claim 12, characterized in that, The MIC's inspection fields also include: The timestamp field is configured to contain all zeros.

14. A communication device, characterized in that, include: A sending module is used to send beacon frames, which have a security protection mechanism enabled and contain a timestamp field and a timestamp replication field. Wherein, some or all of the information in the timestamp field is copied to the timestamp copy field.

15. A communication device, characterized in that, include: A receiving module is used to receive a beacon frame, wherein the beacon frame has a security protection mechanism enabled, and the beacon frame contains a timestamp field and a timestamp copy field, wherein some or all of the information in the timestamp field is copied to the timestamp copy field; The processing module is used to process the beacon frames.

16. A transmitting end, comprising a memory and a processor, wherein the memory stores a computer program executable on the processor, characterized in that, When the processor runs the computer program, it performs the steps of the communication method according to any one of claims 1 to 7.

17. A receiving end, comprising a memory and a processor, wherein the memory stores a computer program executable on the processor, characterized in that, When the processor runs the computer program, it performs the steps of the communication method according to any one of claims 8 to 13.

18. A computer-readable storage medium having a computer program stored thereon, characterized in that, When the computer program is executed by the processor, it causes the communication method according to any one of claims 1 to 7 to be executed, or causes the communication method according to any one of claims 8 to 13 to be executed; And / or, A computer program product, comprising a computer program / instructions, characterized in that, When executed by a processor, the computer program / instruction implements the steps of the communication method according to any one of claims 1 to 7, or implements the steps of the communication method according to any one of claims 8 to 13.

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