Security algorithm management in a communication network environment

Abstract

Techniques for security algorithm management are disclosed. For example, a method includes receiving, at a data sending entity associated with a communication network, one or more data packets for transmission to a data receiving entity associated with the communication network, applying, at the data sending entity, one or more security algorithms to the one or more data packets, where the applying of the one or more security algorithms further comprises applying encryption to the one or more data packets and applying integrity protection to the one or more data packets in response to the encryption, and sending, from the data sending entity to the data receiving entity, the one or more data packets in response to the applying of the one or more security algorithms to the one or more data packets.

Description

Technical Field

[0001] This field generally relates to communication networks, and more specifically, but not exclusively, to security management in such communication networks. Background Technology

[0002] The descriptions in this section can help facilitate a better understanding of aspects of the invention. Therefore, the statements in this section should be read in this light and should not be construed as an admission of what is or is not in the prior art.

[0003] Fourth-generation (4G) wireless mobile communication technology, also known as Long Term Evolution (LTE) technology, is designed to provide high-capacity mobile multimedia with high data rates, particularly for human interaction. Next-generation or fifth-generation (5G) technology is designed not only for human-machine interaction but also for machine-type communication in so-called Internet of Things (IoT) networks.

[0004] While 5G networks are designed to enable large-scale IoT services (e.g., a very large number of limited-capacity devices) and mission-critical IoT services (e.g., requiring high reliability), they also support improvements to traditional mobile communication services in the form of enhanced mobile broadband (eMBB) services, providing improved wireless internet access for mobile devices.

[0005] In the example communication system, a user equipment such as a mobile terminal (subscriber) (a 5G UE in a 5G network, or more broadly, a UE) communicates with a base station or access point of the access network (referred to as a 5G AN in a 5G network) via an air interface. Illustratively, the access point (e.g., a gNB) is part of the access network of the communication system.

[0006] For example, in 5G networks, the access network referred to as 5G AN is described in 5G Technical Specification (TS) 23.501 entitled "Technical Specification Group Services and System Aspects; System Architecture for the 5G System" and TS 23.502 entitled "Technical Specification Group Services and System Aspects; Procedures for the 5G System (5GS)," the disclosures of which are incorporated herein by reference in their entirety. Typically, an access point (e.g., gNB) provides the UE with access to the core network (CN or 5GC), and the core network then provides the UE with access to other UEs and / or data networks such as packet data networks (e.g., the Internet).

[0007] TS 23.501 further defines the 5G Service-Based Architecture (SBA), which models services as network functions (NFs) that communicate with each other using a Representational State Transition Application Programming Interface (Restful API).

[0008] In addition, the 5G technical specification (TS) 33.501, entitled “Technical Specification Group Services and System Aspects; Security Architecture and Procedures for the 5G System,” further describes the security management details associated with 5G networks, the entire contents of which are incorporated herein by reference.

[0009] Security management is a critical consideration in any communication system. However, the ongoing efforts to improve the architecture and protocols associated with 5G networks to enhance network efficiency and / or subscriber convenience can present significant challenges to security management related to user equipment. For example, implementing updated security algorithms in existing equipment and networks presents a technical challenge. Summary of the Invention

[0010] The illustrative embodiments provide techniques for managing security algorithms in a communication network environment.

[0011] In one illustrative embodiment, from the perspective of a data sending entity, a method includes: receiving one or more data packets at a data sending entity associated with a communication network for transmission to a data receiving entity associated with the communication network. The method includes applying one or more security algorithms to the one or more data packets at the data sending entity, wherein the application of the one or more security algorithms further includes: applying encryption to the one or more data packets and applying integrity protection to the one or more data packets in response to the encryption. The method includes: sending the one or more data packets from the data sending entity to the data receiving entity in response to the application of the one or more security algorithms to the one or more data packets.

[0012] In another illustrative embodiment, from the perspective of a data receiving entity, the method includes: receiving one or more data packets from a data sending entity associated with a communication network at a data receiving entity associated with the communication network. The method includes, at the data receiving entity, applying one or more security algorithms to the one or more data packets, wherein the application of the one or more security algorithms further includes: applying integrity verification to the one or more data packets, and decrypting the one or more data packets in response to the integrity verification.

[0013] Further illustrative embodiments are provided in the form of a non-transitory computer-readable storage medium, wherein executable program code is embodied, which, when executed by a processor, causes the processor to perform the above-described steps. Additionally, further illustrative embodiments include an apparatus having a processor and a memory configured to perform the above-described steps.

[0014] Advantageously, illustrative embodiments provide techniques for implementing management within security algorithms in the context of packet-switched security, such as, but not limited to, encryption and integrity protection features usable in accordance with the Packet Data Convergence Protocol (PDCP). For example, in one or more illustrative embodiments, encryption is performed before integrity protection at the data sending entity, while integrity verification is performed before decryption at the data receiving entity. Other illustrative embodiments enable the selection of message authentication codes of extended lengths (e.g., 32-bit, 64-bit, and longer).

[0015] These and other features and advantages of the embodiments described herein will become more apparent from the accompanying drawings and the following detailed description. Attached Figure Description

[0016] Figure 1 A communication system that can be implemented with one or more illustrative embodiments is shown.

[0017] Figure 2User equipment and network nodes that can be used to implement one or more illustrative embodiments are shown.

[0018] Figure 3 A process for managing security algorithms is illustrated according to an illustrative embodiment.

[0019] Figure 4 A process for security algorithm management is illustrated according to another illustrative embodiment.

[0020] Figure 5-11 A data packet format associated with security algorithm management is illustrated according to one or more illustrative embodiments.

[0021] Figure 12 The image shows a message authentication code field associated with security algorithm management according to one or more illustrative embodiments. Detailed Implementation

[0022] This document will illustrate embodiments in conjunction with example communication systems and associated techniques for security management within those systems. However, it should be understood that the scope of the claims is not limited to the specific types of communication systems and / or processes disclosed. Embodiments can be implemented in a variety of other types of communication systems using alternative processes and operations. For example, although illustrated in the context of wireless cellular systems utilizing 3GPP system elements such as 3GPP Next Generation Systems (5G), the disclosed embodiments can be readily applied to a variety of other types of communication systems, such as 6G communication systems.

[0023] According to an illustrative embodiment implemented in a 5G communication system environment, one or more 3GPP technical specifications (TS) and technical reports (TR) can provide further descriptions of network elements / functions and / or operations that can interact with various parts of the technical solutions of the present invention (e.g., 3GPP TS 23.501, TS 23.502 and TS 33.501 above).

[0024] Other 3GPP TS / TR documents may provide additional details that a person skilled in the art would recognize, such as TS 24.501 entitled "Technical Specification Group Core Network and Terminals; Non-Access-Stratum (NAS) Protocol for 5G System (5GS); Stage 3"; TS 38.323 entitled "Technical Specification Group Radio Access Network; NR; Packet Data Convergence Protocol (PDCP) specification"; TS 38.331 entitled "Technical Specification Group Radio Access Network; NR; Radio Resource Control (RRC) Protocol Specification"; and TS 38.331 entitled "Technical Specification Group Services and System Aspects; Specification of the 3GPP confidentiality and Integrity". Algorithms UEA2 & UIA2; Document 1: UEA2 and UIA2 specifications (Technical Specification Group Services and Systems Aspects; 3GPP Confidentiality and Integrity Algorithms UEA2 and UIA2 Specifications; Document 1: UEA2 and UIA2 Specifications) TS 35.215; TS 35.221 entitled “Technical Specification Group Services and System Aspects; Specification of the 3GPP confidentiality and integrity Algorithms EEA3 & EIA3; Document 1: EEA3 and EIA3 specifications”; and TR 33.841 “Technical Specification Group Services and Systems Aspects; Security aspects; Study on the Support of 256-bit Algorithms for 5G”; the public information of the above documents is incorporated herein by reference in its entirety.

[0025] It should be noted that 3GPP TS / TR documents are non-limiting examples of communication network standards (e.g., specifications, procedures, reports, requirements, recommendations, etc.). However, while the embodiments are well-suited to 3GPP standards related to 5G, they are not necessarily intended to be limited to any particular standard.

[0026] It should be understood that in some illustrative embodiments, the term 5G network and similar terms (e.g., 5G system, 5G communication system, 5G environment, 5G communication environment, etc.) may be understood to include all or part of the access network and all or part of the core network. However, without loss of generality, the term 5G network and similar terms may sometimes be used interchangeably with the term 5GC network and similar terms herein, as any distinction will be understood by those skilled in the art.

[0027] Before describing the illustrative embodiments, the following will be... Figure 1 and Figure 2 A general description of some of the key components of a 5G network within the context of [the context].

[0028] Figure 1 A communication system 100 implementing illustrative embodiments is shown. It should be understood that the elements shown in the communication system 100 are intended to represent some of the main functions provided within the system, such as control plane functions, user plane functions, etc. Therefore, Figure 1The blocks shown refer to specific elements providing some of these main functions in a 5G network. However, some or all of the represented main functions can be implemented using other network elements. Furthermore, it should be understood that... Figure 1 Not all the functions of the 5G network are depicted here. Instead, at least some functions are shown to facilitate the description of illustrative embodiments. Subsequent figures may depict additional elements / functions (i.e., network entities).

[0029] Therefore, as shown in the figure, the communication system 100 includes a user equipment (UE) 102 that communicates with an access point 104 via an air interface 103. It should be understood that the UE 102 may also communicate with 5GC networks other than gNBs using one or more other types of access points (e.g., access functions, networks, etc.). By way of example only, the access point 104 may be any 5G access network (gNB), an untrusted non-3GPP access network using non-3GPP interoperability (N3IWF), a trusted non-3GPP network using trusted non-3GPP gateway functionality (TNGF), or a wired access using wired access gateway functionality (W-AGF), or may correspond to a traditional access point (e.g., an eNB). Furthermore, the access point 104 may be a wireless local area network (WLAN) access point, as will be further illustrated in the illustrative embodiments described herein.

[0030] UE 102 may be a mobile station, and such a mobile station may include, by way of example, a mobile phone, a computer, an IoT device, or any other type of communication device. Therefore, the term "user equipment" as used herein is intended to be interpreted broadly to encompass a wide variety of mobile stations, subscriber stations, or more generally, communication devices, including combinations of devices such as data cards inserted into a laptop or other devices such as smartphones. Such communication devices are also intended to encompass devices commonly referred to as access terminals.

[0031] In one illustrative embodiment, UE 102 consists of a Universal Integrated Circuit Card (UICC) portion and a Mobile Equipment (ME) portion. The UICC is the user-related portion of the UE and includes at least one Universal Subscriber Identifier Module (USIM) and appropriate application software. The USIM securely stores a persistent subscription identifier and its associated key, which is used to uniquely identify the user and authenticate the subscriber for network access. The ME is the user-independent portion of the UE and includes Terminal Equipment (TE) functionality and various Mobile Terminal (MT) functions. Alternative illustrative embodiments may not use UICC-based authentication, such as a Non-Public (NPN) network.

[0032] It should be noted that in one example, the permanent subscription identifier is the International Mobile Subscriber Identifier (IMSI) unique to the UE. In one embodiment, the IMSI is fixed at 15 bits in length and consists of a 3-digit Mobile Country Code (MCC), a 3-digit Mobile Network Code (MNC), and a 9-digit Mobile Station Identifier (MSIN). In 5G communication systems, the IMSI is referred to as the Subscription Permanent Identifier (SUPI). When the IMSI is used as the SUPI, the MSIN provides the subscriber identification. Therefore, typically only the MSIN portion of the IMSI needs to be encrypted. The MNC and MCC portions of the IMSI provide routing information, which is used by the serving network to route to the correct home network. When the MSIN of the SUPI is encrypted, it is called the Subscription Hidden Identifier (SUCI). Another example of the SUPI is the use of the Network Access Identifier (NAI). NAIs are commonly used in IoT communications.

[0033] Illustratively, access point 104 is part of the radio access network or RAN of communication system 100. Such a radio access network may include, for example, a 5G system with multiple base stations. More generally, components of a radio access network may be considered as “radio access entities”.

[0034] Furthermore, in this illustrative embodiment, access point 104 is operatively coupled to access and mobility management function (AMF / SEAF) 106. In 5G networks, AMF / SEAF specifically supports mobility management (MM) and security anchor (SEAF) functions.

[0035] In this illustrative embodiment, the AMF / SEAF 106 is operatively coupled to other network functions 108 (e.g., using their services). As shown, some of these other network functions 108 include, but are not limited to, the Authentication Server Function (AUSF) and the Unified Data Management (UDM) function. These listed examples of network functions are typically implemented in the UE subscriber's home network, as further described below. It should be noted that in a 5GC network, the 4G functionality of the HSS (Home Subscriber Server) is split into AUSF, UDM, and Unified Data Repository (UDR, not explicitly shown) functions. Typically, the AUSF is responsible for authenticating the UE and providing any necessary encryption keys, while the UDR stores user data, and the UDM manages user data.

[0036] Other network functions 108 may include network functions that can act as service providers (NFp) and / or service consumers (NFc). It should be noted that any network function can be a service provider for one service and a service consumer for another. Furthermore, when the service provided includes data, the NFp providing the data is called a data provider, and the NFc requesting the data is called a data consumer. A data provider can also be an NF that generates data by modifying or otherwise processing data generated by another NF. It should be noted that, more generally, an NF can be considered a "network entity".

[0037] It should be noted that a UE (such as UE 102) typically subscribes to a so-called Home Public Land Mobile Network (HPLMN), in which some or all of functions 106 and 108 reside. Alternatively, a UE (such as UE 102) may receive services from an NPN in which these functions may reside. The HPLMN is also referred to as the Home Environment (HE). If the UE is roaming (not in the HPLMMN), it typically connects to a Visited Public Land Mobile Network (VPLMN, also known as the Visited Network), and the network currently providing services to the UE is also referred to as the Serving Network. In the roaming scenario, some of network functions 106 and 108 may reside in the VPLMN, in which case the functions in the VPLMN communicate with the functions in the HPLMMN as needed. However, in non-roaming scenarios, access and mobility management function 106, along with other network functions 108, reside in the same communication network (i.e., the HPLMMN). Unless otherwise stated, the embodiments described herein are not necessarily limited to which functions reside in which PLMN (i.e., the HPLMMN or the VPLMN).

[0038] Access point 104 is also operatively coupled (via one or more of functions 106 and / or 108) to a Session Management Function (SMF) 110, which is operatively coupled to a User Plane Function (UPF) 112. UPF 112 is operatively coupled to a packet data network, such as the Internet 114. It should be noted that the thicker solid line in this diagram represents the user plane (UP) of the communication network, while the thinner solid line represents the control plane (CP) of the communication network. It should be understood that... Figure 1 The network (e.g., the Internet) 114 in the diagram may additionally or alternatively represent other network infrastructure, including but not limited to cloud computing infrastructure and / or edge computing infrastructure. Further typical operation and functionality of such network elements are not described herein, as they are not the focus of this illustrative embodiment and can be found in the appropriate 3GPP 5G documentation. It should be noted that the functions shown in 106, 108, 110, and 112 are examples of network functions (NFs).

[0039] It should be understood that the system elements arranged in this particular manner are merely examples, and in other embodiments, additional or alternative elements of other types and arrangements may be used to implement the communication system. For example, in other embodiments, the communication system 100 may include other elements / functions not explicitly shown herein.

[0040] therefore, Figure 1 The arrangement shown is only one example configuration for a wireless cellular system, and many alternative configurations of system components can be used. For example, although in Figure 1 The embodiments shown depict only a single element or function, but this is merely for the sake of simplicity and clarity of description. The given alternative embodiments may, of course, include a much larger number of such system elements, as well as additional or alternative elements of the type typically associated with conventional system implementations.

[0041] In addition, it should be noted that although Figure 1 While system components are illustrated as single functional blocks, the various subnetworks constituting a 5G network are divided into so-called network slices. A network slice (network segmentation) is a logical network that provides specific network capabilities and characteristics to support a corresponding service type, optionally using Network Function Virtualization (NFV) technology over a common physical infrastructure. Using NFV, network slices are instantiated as needed for a given service, such as eMBB services, massive IoT services, and mission-critical IoT services. Therefore, when an instance of a network slice or function is created, that network slice or function is instantiated. In some embodiments, this involves installing or otherwise running the network slice or function on one or more host devices on the underlying physical infrastructure. UE 102 is configured to access one or more of these services via access point 104.

[0042] exist Figure 1 The diagram also shows user equipment 122 operatively coupled to user equipment 102 via side link 123. Side link 123 is a proximity-based cellular connection directly between two sets of user equipment (e.g., user equipment 102 and user equipment 122). More specifically, side link 123 enables direct communication between user equipment 102 and user equipment 122 without the need for access point 104 to participate in the transmission and reception of data traffic.

[0043] Figure 2 This is a block diagram illustrating the computational architecture of the various participants in a method according to an illustrative embodiment. More specifically, system 200 is shown as including user equipment (UE) 202 and multiple network nodes 204-1, ..., 204-N. For example, in the illustrative embodiment and referring back to reference Figure 1UE 202 may represent UE 102 or UE 122, while network nodes 204-1, ..., 204-N may represent access point 104 and functions 106 and 108 (i.e., network entities) and access point 104 (i.e., radio access entity). It should be understood that UE 202 and network nodes 204-1, ..., 204-N are configured to interact to provide the security management and other technologies described herein.

[0044] User equipment 202 includes a processor 212 coupled to memory 216 and interface circuitry 210. The processor 212 of user equipment 202 includes a security management processing module 214, which may be implemented at least partially as software executed by the processor. The security management processing module 214 performs security management as described in conjunction with the following figures and other parts of this document. The memory 216 of user equipment 202 includes a security management storage module 218, which stores data generated or otherwise used during security management operations.

[0045] Each of the network nodes (referred to herein individually or collectively as 204) includes a processor 222 (222-1, ..., 222-N) coupled to memories 226 (226-1, ..., 226-N) and interface circuitry 220 (220-1, ..., 220-N). Each processor 222 of each network node 204 includes a security management processing module 224 (224-1, ..., 224-N), which may be implemented at least partially in the form of software executed by the processor 222. The security management processing module 224 performs security management operations as described in conjunction with the following figures and other sections of this document. Each memory 226 of each network node 204 includes a security management storage module 228 (228-1, ..., 228-N) storing data generated or otherwise used during security management operations.

[0046] Processors 212 and 222 may include, for example, microprocessors (such as central processing units (CPUs)), application-specific integrated circuits (ASICs), digital signal processors (DSPs) or other types of processing devices, as well as portions or combinations of such elements.

[0047] Memory 216 and 226 can be used to store one or more software programs that are executed by corresponding processor 212 and 222 to implement at least a portion of the functions described herein. For example, security management operations and other functions, in conjunction with the following figures and other parts of this document, can be implemented in a simple and straightforward manner using software code executed by processor 212 and 222.

[0048] Therefore, one of the memories 216 and 226 can be considered as an example of what is more generally referred to herein as a computer program product or, more generally, a processor-readable storage medium embodying executable program code. Other examples of processor-readable storage media may include magnetic disks or other types of magnetic or optical media in any combination. Illustrative embodiments may include articles of manufacture containing such computer program products or other processor-readable storage media.

[0049] Furthermore, memories 216 and 226 may more specifically include, for example, electronic random access memory (RAM), such as static RAM (SRAM), dynamic RAM (DRAM), or other types of volatile or non-volatile electronic memory. The latter may include, for example, non-volatile memory, such as flash memory, magnetic RAM (MRAM), phase-change RAM (PC-RAM), or ferroelectric RAM (FRAM). As used herein, the term "memory" is intended to be understood broadly and may additionally or alternatively encompass, for example, read-only memory (ROM), disk-based memory, or other types of storage devices, and portions or combinations thereof.

[0050] Interface circuits 210 and 220 illustratively include transceivers or other communication hardware or firmware that allow associated system elements to communicate with each other in the manner described herein.

[0051] from Figure 2 It is evident that user equipment 202 and multiple network nodes 204 are configured to communicate with each other as security management participants via their respective interface circuits 210 and 220. This communication involves each participant sending data to and / or receiving data from one or more other participants. The term "data" as used herein is intended to be interpreted broadly to encompass any type of information that may be sent between participants, including but not limited to: identification data, key pairs, key indicators, tokens, secrets, security management messages, registration request / response messages and data, request / response messages, authentication request / response messages and data, metadata, control data, audio, video, multimedia, consent data, other messages, etc.

[0052] You should understand Figure 2 The specific arrangement of components shown is merely an example, and various alternative configurations may be used in other embodiments. For example, any given network element / function and / or access point may be configured to include additional or alternative components and support other communication protocols.

[0053] Other system components (such as access point 104, SMF110, and UPF112) can each be configured to include components such as processors, memory, and network interfaces. These components do not need to be implemented on separate, independent processing platforms, but can (for example) represent different functional parts of a single general-purpose processing platform.

[0054] More generally, Figure 2 It can be viewed as representing a processing device configured to provide corresponding security management functions and operatively coupled to each other in a communication system.

[0055] As mentioned above, 3GPP TS 23.501 defines the 5GC network architecture as a service-based architecture, such as a service-based architecture (SBA). This document recognizes that when deploying different NFs, there may be many situations where an NF may need to interact with entities outside the SBA-based 5GC network (e.g., including corresponding PLMNs, such as HPLMNs and VPLMNs). Therefore, as used herein, the term "internal" illustratively refers to operations and / or communications within the SBA-based 5GC network (e.g., SBA-based interfaces), while the term "external" illustratively refers to operations and / or communications outside the SBA-based 5GC network (non-SBA interfaces).

[0056] In view of the above general description of some characteristics of 5GC networks, the following will describe the problems of existing security methods in the context of security algorithm management, and the technical solutions proposed according to illustrative embodiments.

[0057] This paper recognizes that communication networks should be adaptable to access stratum (AS) and non-access stratum (NAS) procedures regarding enhanced key length security algorithms. For example, this paper recognizes that existing AS and NAS procedures should be extended to seamlessly support 256-bit algorithms. However, this paper further recognizes that the current 128-bit algorithms should still be supported, while 256-bit algorithms should be deployed at both the network and UE sides. However, global deployment could take several years to complete. During the deployment phase, both key length algorithms should coexist. However, this paper recognizes that there are many technical challenges associated with the transition to 256-bit algorithms.

[0058] To illustrate this point, one technical challenge is negotiating the security algorithm between the UE and the 5GC. For example, in such security algorithm selection scenarios, it is desirable to prevent downgrade attacks, where malicious attackers attempt to force the device to use a lower version (less secure) of the protocol, algorithm, etc., to more easily exploit security vulnerabilities in the lower version. Furthermore, if the long-term key's bit length is only 128 bits, it is desirable to determine which key length should be chosen.

[0059] Another technical challenge is the security risks associated with algorithms that select different key sizes between the UE and different secure endpoints in the network. Specifically, it may be desirable to ensure the same level of protection (i.e., encryption key length) for both AS and NAS security. Furthermore, it may be desirable to implement procedures in handover scenarios where the source and destination may not consistently support 256-bit security algorithms (applicable to both AS and NAS security). Similarly, it may be desirable to implement procedures in 5G non-standalone (NSA) deployments and interoperability scenarios.

[0060] As the technical challenges above demonstrate, adding support for 256-bit algorithms to 5G systems requires clarifying the interaction between enhanced security algorithms and traditional security algorithms to prevent security vulnerabilities.

[0061] The illustrative embodiments address the above and other technical challenges associated with secure algorithm selection by providing secure algorithm management techniques that enable support for longer key length algorithms (e.g., 256-bit algorithms) while continuing to support shorter, traditional key length algorithms (e.g., 128-bit algorithms). The secure algorithm management techniques described herein also enable support for Enhanced Message Authentication Code (MAC) functionality.

[0062] In some embodiments, security algorithm management techniques are described from the perspective of the Packet Data Convergence Protocol (PDCP). The PDCP for 5G systems is specified by TS 38.323 mentioned above and resides in the radio protocol stack of the 5G air interface above the Radio Link Control (RLC) layer. The PDCP provides its services to the Radio Resource Control (RRC) and upper layers of the user plane, such as Internet Protocol (IP) at the UE or relays at the base station. The following services are provided by the PDCP to the upper layers: (i) delivery of user plane data; (ii) delivery of control plane data; (iii) data compression; (iv) encryption; and (v) integrity protection.

[0063] More specifically, as will be discussed below Figure 3 and Figure 4As further illustrated in the context of this document, the illustrative embodiments provide two different orders for encryption and integrity protection. For the conventional path (e.g., 128-bit algorithm selection), the payload is protected for integrity first, followed by encryption; while for the combined algorithm path (e.g., 256-bit algorithm selection), the payload is protected for encryption first, followed by integrity protection. In some embodiments, the combined algorithm path is also referred to as the Authentication Encryption with Associated Data (AEAD) path. AEAD can encrypt and protect the plaintext for integrity in a combined operation, and can further protect the integrity of the additional (associated) data. In some examples, AEAD can be implemented according to Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) 256 (AES-256), which is a secure algorithm using a 256-bit key. This document recognizes that the PDCP layer should support both paths to ensure backward compatibility. Furthermore, as will be discussed below... Figures 5 to 12 As further illustrated in the context, the illustrative embodiments provide security algorithm management flows that support multiple MAC sizes, including 32-bit, 64-bit, and 128-bit MAC sizes.

[0064] Now for reference Figure 3 This document describes a process 300 for security algorithm management according to an illustrative embodiment. More specifically, process 300 illustrates a functional view of a PDCP layer including a PDCP transmitting entity 310 and a PDCP receiving entity 320 connected via a radio interface 330. For example, in some embodiments, the PDCP transmitting entity 310 may be a UE, while the PDCP receiving entity 320 may be a gNB or other type of RAN node. In other embodiments, the PDCP transmitting entity 310 may be a gNB (RAN node), while the PDCP receiving entity 320 may be a UE. Furthermore, in other embodiments, the PDCP transmitting entity 310 may be a first UE, while the PDCP receiving entity 320 may be a second UE (e.g., via sidelink coupling). Thus, each UE and each network node can be configured to be both the PDCP transmitting entity 310 and the PDCP receiving entity 320.

[0065] exist Figure 3 In the non-limiting example, it is assumed that the UE is PDCP transmitting entity 310, where in this instance, uplink data processed according to PDCP is sent to the RAN node acting as PDCP receiving entity 320. Furthermore, although in Figure 3The diagram illustrates a PDCP transmitting entity 310 and a PDCP receiving entity 320, but it should be understood that several PDCP entities can be defined for the UE and for the RAN nodes within the PDCP layer. Each PDCP entity is carrying data for a radio bearer (RB). Depending on the radio bearer carrying the data, the PDCP entity is associated with either the control plane or the user plane.

[0066] Therefore, as Figure 3 As shown, the PDCP transmitting entity 310 includes: a transmitting buffer module 311, which in particular performs sequence numbering; a header or uplink data compression module 312; a security algorithm management module 314, which applies one or more selected security algorithms, as further described below; a module 316 for adding PDCP headers; and a routing / copying module 318. As further shown, the PDCP receiving entity 320 includes: a module 322 for removing PDCP headers; a security algorithm management module 324, which applies one or more selected security algorithms, as further described below; a receiving buffer module 326, which in particular reorders data packets and discards copied packets; and a header or uplink data decompression module 328. In some embodiments, modules 311, 312, 316, 318, 322, 326, and 328 may be implemented consistent with the radio interface protocol architecture defined in TS 38.300 mentioned above. Similarly, in some embodiments, the conventional path portions of modules 314 and 324 may be implemented in accordance with the radio interface protocol architecture defined in TS 38.300 entitled "Technical Specification Group Radio Access Network; NR; NR and NG-RAN Overall Description; Stage 200", the disclosure of which is incorporated herein by reference in its entirety. The focus of this disclosure is on the secure algorithm management of the combined algorithm path of modules 314 and 324, as will be described in further detail below.

[0067] As shown in PDCP transmitting entity 310 for the combined algorithm path in module 314, packets associated with PDCP Service Data Units (SDUs) are first encrypted and then integrity protected (e.g., using a MAC procedure). This means that on the transmitter side, integrity protection is performed on ciphertext, not plaintext (as in conventional paths). Similarly, on the receiver side (i.e., the combined algorithm path in module 324), received packets are first integrity protected and then decrypted. For split bearers (e.g., ...), Figure 3 The architecture) and Dual Active Protocol Stack (DAPS) bearer (e.g., as described below) Figure 4 (In the architecture), routing is performed in PDCP sending entity 310.

[0068] It should be noted that a Protocol Data Unit (PDU) is a data packet exchanged between peer entities in the same layer. As mentioned above, an SDU is a packet passed from an upper layer to a lower layer. Therefore, for example, a PDU can be an SDU with an additional header or trailer that carries information required by the protocol of that layer.

[0069] The PDCP entity associated with a Data Radio Bearer (DRB) can be configured by the upper layer as described in TS 38.331 above to use header compression or uplink data compression (UDC). The PDCP entity associated with a Multicast Radio Bearer (MRB) can be configured by the upper layer as described in TS 38.331 above to use header compression. In some embodiments, Robust Header Compression Protocol (ROHC), Ethernet Header Compression Protocol (EHC), and UDC are supported. Each header compression protocol is configured independently for DRB / MRB.

[0070] In some embodiments, during the 5G Security Mode Command (SMC) procedure between the UE and the RAN node (e.g., gNB), a selection between a legacy algorithm and a combined algorithm (e.g., AEAD) is negotiated and completed. Therefore, the PDCP layer uses the same algorithm (e.g., legacy or AEAD) for both downlink and uplink data from PDCP transmitting entity 310 to PDCP receiving entity 320 (and vice versa). For Uu interface communication and NR (5G New Radio) sidelink communication, either AEAD or a legacy algorithm (encryption and integrity protection) is configured by the upper layer in the PDCP after the SMC procedure. Therefore, PDCP transmitting entity 310 and PDCP receiving entity 320 are configured to select between a legacy algorithm and a combined algorithm (e.g., AEAD) to be consistent with one or more security algorithms selected during the SMC procedure.

[0071] Now for reference Figure 4 The following describes a process 400 for security algorithm management according to another illustrative embodiment. More specifically, process 400 shows a functional view of the PDCP layer associated with the DAPS bearer. The PDCP layer in process 400 is the same as the PDCP layer in process 300, except that each PDCP entity in process 400 is configured for two radio bearer channels (e.g., DAPS configured). Each of the radio bearer channels of each PDCP entity has both the conventional path and the combined algorithm path as described above in process 300.

[0072] Therefore, as Figure 4 As shown in the figure, flow 400 illustrates a functional view of the PDCP layer, which includes a PDCP transmitting entity 410 and a PDCP receiving entity 420 connected via radio interface 430. The PDCP transmitting entity 410 includes: a transmitting buffer module 411, which in particular performs sequence numbering; a pair of header compression modules 412-1 and 412-2 (one for each of the two DAPS radio bearer channels); a security algorithm management module 414, which applies one or more selected security algorithms, as further described below; a module 416 for adding PDCP headers; and a routing module 418. As further shown in the figure, the PDCP receiving entity 420 includes: a module 422 for removing PDCP headers; a security algorithm management module 424, which applies one or more selected security algorithms, as further described below; a receiving buffer module 426, which in particular reorders data packets and discards duplicate packets; and a pair of header decompression modules 428-1 and 428-2 (one for each of the two DAPS radio bearer channels). In some embodiments, modules 411, 412-1, 412-2, 416, 418, 422, 426, 428-1, and 428-2 may be implemented in accordance with the radio interface protocol architecture defined in TS 38.300 mentioned above. Similarly, in some embodiments, the two legacy path portions in each of modules 414 and 424 may be implemented in accordance with the radio interface protocol architecture defined in TS 38.300 mentioned above.

[0073] The two combined algorithm path portions in each of modules 414 and 424 operate in the same manner as described above regarding modules 314 and 324 in process 300. That is, the packet associated with the PDCP SDU is first encrypted and then integrity protected (e.g., using a MAC procedure). This means that on the transmitter side, integrity protection is performed on the ciphertext, not the plaintext (as in a conventional path). Similarly, on the receiver side (i.e., the combined algorithm path of module 424), the received packet is first integrity protected and then decrypted.

[0074] As in Figure 3 As in process 300, in some embodiments, the PDCP entity in process 400 selects between security algorithm paths (e.g., conventional and AEAD) based on the SMC process.

[0075] The descriptions will now be referenced separately. Figure 3 and Figure 4 Further details on the encryption and decryption process for 300 and 400, as well as integrity protection and verification.

[0076] It should be understood that in some embodiments, the encryption function includes both encryption and decryption and is performed in the PDCP entity (e.g., PDCP entities 310, 320, 410, 420) when configured. For conventional (standalone) security algorithms in use, the encrypted data unit is MAC-I (see TS 38.323 mentioned above); while for combined algorithms in use, the data unit is first encrypted, and then the ciphertext is protected for integrity (e.g., Encrypt-then-MAC). This includes the data portion of the PDCP data PDU, but not the Service Data Adaptation Protocol (SDAP) header or the SDAP control PDU contained in the PDCP SDU. The encryption function does not apply to the PDCP control PDU.

[0077] For both downlink and uplink, in some embodiments, the encryption algorithms and keys to be used by the PDCP entity are configured by the upper layer, as described in TS 38.331 mentioned above, and the encryption methods are applied as specified in TS 33.501 mentioned above.

[0078] In some embodiments, encryption is activated / suspended / resumed by the upper layer. When security is activated and not suspended, encryption is applied to all PDCP data PDUs indicated by the upper layer for both downlink and uplink.

[0079] For DAPS bearers, in some embodiments, the PDCP entity performs encryption or decryption on the PDCP SDU based on which cell the PDCP SDU was sent to / received from, using an encryption algorithm and key configured for the source cell or the target cell.

[0080] For downlink and uplink encryption and decryption, in some embodiments, the parameters used for encryption by the PDCP entity are defined in TS 33.501 mentioned above and input to the encryption algorithm. Inputs to the encryption function include the COUNT value and DIRECTION (direction of transmission). Parameters provided by the upper layer for use by the PDCP entity include: (i) BEARER (e.g., defined as the radio bearer identifier in TS 33.501 mentioned above, and using the value RB-1 as in TS 38.331 mentioned above); and (ii) KEY (e.g., the encryption keys for the control plane and the user plane are KRRCenc and KUPenc, respectively).

[0081] For NR sidelink communication (e.g., UE-UE direct communication), in some embodiments, the encryption algorithms and keys to be used by the PDCP entity are configured by the upper layer, as specified in TS24.587 entitled "Technical Specification Group Core Network and Terminals; Vehicle-to-Everything (V2X) Services in 5G System (5GS); Stage 3", the disclosure of which is incorporated herein by reference in its entirety, and the encryption methods are applied as specified in TS 33.536 entitled "Technical Specification Group Services and System Aspects; Security Aspects of 3GPP Support for Advanced Vehicle-to-Everything (V2X) Services", the disclosure of which is incorporated herein by reference in its entirety.

[0082] In some embodiments, for NR sidelink communication, encryption is activated by the upper layer for the sidelink SRB (except SL-SRB0) and / or sidelink DRB of the PC5 unicast link, as specified in TS 38.331 mentioned above. SRB refers to the signaling radio bearer (channel) carrying control plane data. When security is activated for a sidelink SRB, encryption is applied to all PDCP data PDUs belonging to the sidelink SRB of that PC5 unicast link (except for those carrying direct security mode command messages as specified in TS 33.536 mentioned above). When security is activated for a sidelink DRB, encryption is applied to all PDCP data PDUs belonging to the sidelink DRB of the PC5 unicast link.

[0083] In some embodiments, for NR sidelink communication, encryption and decryption functions as specified in TS 33.536 mentioned above are applied, wherein the KEY (NRPEK), COUNT, BEARER (such as the LSB 5 bits of LCID as specified in TS38.321 entitled "Technical Specification Group Radio Access Network; NR; Medium Access Control (MAC) Protocol Specification", the disclosure of which is incorporated herein by reference in its entirety), and DIRECTION (whose value is set as specified in TS 33.536 mentioned above) are used as inputs.

[0084] In some embodiments, encryption and decryption are not applied to MRB and sidelink SRB4.

[0085] In some embodiments, the integrity protection function includes both integrity protection and integrity verification, and is performed in the PDCP entity (e.g., PDCP entities 310, 320, 410, 420) when configured. For conventional (standalone) algorithms in use, the data unit for integrity protection is the PDU header and the data portion of the PDU before encryption; while for combined algorithms in use, the data unit is first encrypted, and then the ciphertext is integrity protected (e.g., Encrypt-then-MAC). In some embodiments, the following integrity protection criteria are implemented: integrity protection is always applied to PDCP data PDUs of SRBs; integrity protection is applied to sidelink SRB1, SRB2, and SRB3; integrity protection is applied to PDCP data PDUs of DRBs configured with integrity protection (including sidelink DRBs for unicast); and integrity protection is not applied to PDCP control PDUs.

[0086] For both downlink and uplink, in some embodiments, the integrity protection algorithms and keys to be used by the PDCP entity are configured by the upper layer, as described in TS 38.331 mentioned above, and the integrity protection methods are applied as specified in TS 33.501 for NR and TS 33.401 for E-UTRA / EPC entitled “Technical Specification Group Services and System Aspects; 3GPP System Architecture Evolution (SAE); Security Architecture”, the disclosures of which are incorporated herein by reference in their entirety.

[0087] In some embodiments, the integrity protection function is activated / suspended / resumed by the upper layer. When security is activated and not suspended, the integrity protection function is applied to all PDUs, including the PDUs indicated by the upper layer for the downlink and uplink respectively, and their subsequent PDUs.

[0088] In some embodiments, since the RRC message activating the integrity protection function itself utilizes the configuration contained in the RRC message for integrity protection, the message is first decoded by the RRC before integrity protection verification is performed on the PDU that receives the message.

[0089] In some embodiments, since the PC5-S message that activates the integrity protection function itself is integrity protected using the configuration contained in the PC5-S message, the message is first decoded by the upper layer before integrity protection verification is performed on the PDU that receives the message.

[0090] For DAPS bearers, in some embodiments, the PDCP entity should perform integrity protection or verification on the PDCP SDU using an integrity protection algorithm and key configured for the source cell or the target cell, based on which cell the PDCP SDU was sent to / received from.

[0091] For downlink and uplink integrity protection and authentication, in some embodiments, the parameters used by the PDCP entity for integrity protection are defined in the aforementioned TS 33.501 or TS 33.401 and input to the integrity protection algorithm. Inputs to the integrity protection function include the COUNT value and DIRECTION (direction of transmission). Parameters provided by the upper layer for use by the PDCP entity include: (i) BEARER (defined as the radio bearer identifier in TS 33.501 or TS 33.401 mentioned above, and using the value RB-1 in TS 38.331 mentioned above); and (ii) KEY (the integrity protection keys for the control plane and user plane are KRRCint and KUPint, respectively).

[0092] In some embodiments, for NR sidelink communication, the integrity protection algorithm and key to be used by the PDCP entity are configured by the upper layer as described in TS 24.587 mentioned above, and the integrity protection method is applied as specified in TS 33.536 mentioned above.

[0093] In some embodiments, for NR sidelink communication, integrity protection is activated by the upper layer for the sidelink SRB and / or sidelink DRB of the PC5 unicast link, as described in TS 38.331 mentioned above. When security is activated for the sidelink SRB, integrity protection is applied to all PDUs, including the PDU belonging to the sidelink SRB of the PC5 unicast link and its subsequent PDUs. When security is activated for the sidelink DRB, integrity protection is applied to all PDUs, including the PDU belonging to the sidelink DRB of the PC5 unicast link and its subsequent PDUs.

[0094] In some embodiments, for SLRBs requiring integrity protection and verification, the parameters used by the PDCP entity for integrity protection are defined in TS 33.536 mentioned above and input into the integrity protection algorithm. Inputs to the integrity protection function include: KEY (NRPIK), COUNT, BEARER (the LSB5 bit of LCID as specified in TS 38.321 mentioned above), and DIRECTION (whose value is set as specified in TS 33.536 mentioned above).

[0095] During transmission, in some embodiments, the UE calculates the value of the MAC-I field, while during reception, it verifies the integrity of the PDCP data PDU by calculating the X-MAC (the calculated MAC-I) based on the input parameters specified above. If the calculated X-MAC corresponds to the received MAC-I, the integrity protection verification is successful.

[0096] In some embodiments, integrity protection and verification are not applied to MRB and sidelink SRB4.

[0097] Now for reference Figures 5 to 11 The document describes data packet formats associated with security algorithm management according to one or more illustrative embodiments, as will be further described below.

[0098] Figure 5 Data packet format 500 illustrates the format of a PDCP data PDU with a 12-bit PDCP sequence number (SN) and a 64-bit MAC-I. Format 500 is applicable to Signal Data Bearer (SRB).

[0099] Note that the MAC Reserved (MR) bit field, as used in the various packet data formats described in this article, can be set to indicate to the UE whether to use 32-bit MAC-I or 64-bit MAC-I.

[0100] Figure 6 Data packet format 600 illustrates the format of a PDCP data PDU with a 12-bit PDCP SN. Format 600 is applicable to UM DRB, AM DRB, UM MRB, and AM MRB. UM and AM refer to the data transmission mode, including unacknowledged mode and acknowledged mode (transparent mode or TM is a third data transmission mode).

[0101] Figure 7 Data packet format 700 illustrates the format of a PDCP data PDU with an 18-bit PDCP SN. Format 700 also applies to UM DRB, AM DRB, UM MRB, and AM MRB.

[0102] Figure 8 Data packet format 800 illustrates the format of a PDCP data PDU with a 12-bit PDCP SN. Format 800 is applicable to sidelink DRBs used for multicast and broadcast, applicable to sidelink SRB0, and applicable to sidelink SRB4. In some embodiments, there is no control PDU for SLRBs used for multicast and broadcast. Therefore, the D / C field is not present in the PDCP data PDU format for SLRBs used for multicast and broadcast. The SDU type is only applicable to sidelink DRBs.

[0103] Figure 9 Data packet format 900 illustrates the format of a PDCP data PDU with a 12-bit PDCP SN. Format 900 is applicable to sidelinks SRB1, SRB2, and SRB3 used for unicast.

[0104] Figure 10 Data packet format 1000 illustrates the format of a PDCP data PDU with a 12-bit PDCP SN. Format 1000 is suitable for side-link DRBs used for unicast.

[0105] Figure 11Data packet format 1100 illustrates the format of a PDCP data PDU with an 18-bit PDCP SN. Format 1100 is suitable for side-link DRBs used for unicast.

[0106] It should be noted that the MAC-I field in the above data packet format carries the message authentication code as specified in TS 38.323 mentioned above. In some embodiments, the MAC-I field is always present for the SRB of the Uu interface. If integrity protection is not configured, the MAC-I field still exists, but is filled with padding bits set to 0. For 256-bit support, the MAC-I field length can be configured to 32 bits or 64 bits. For sidelink SRB1, SRB2, and SRB3, the MAC-I field is present only if integrity protection is configured for sidelink SRB1, SRB2, and SRB3. For DRBs (including sidelink DRBs for unicast), the MAC-I field is present only if integrity protection is configured for the DRB.

[0107] Figure 12 A message authentication code field 1200 associated with security algorithm management is illustrated according to one or more illustrative embodiments. Field 1200 provides an indication in the MR bit field (MAC-I reserved) of whether to use a 32-bit MAC-I, a 64-bit MAC-I, or a larger MAC-I (e.g., a 128-bit MAC-I). Depending on the MAC-I extension support, the MR bit can be 1 or 2 bits. For example, if the MAC-I is 32-bit or 64-bit, only one bit can be used to represent the same value. In the case of a larger MAC-I extension, then, for example, 2 bits can be used for the MR.

[0108] As detailed herein, illustrative embodiments provide security algorithm management capabilities implemented within a user equipment (e.g., a UE) and one or more radio access entities (e.g., RAN nodes such as gNBs).

[0109] Therefore, from the perspective of a PDCP transmitting entity, an apparatus may include: at least one processor; and at least one memory storing instructions that, when executed by the at least one processor, cause the apparatus to at least: receive one or more data packets for transmission to a data receiving entity associated with a communication network; select one or more security algorithms to apply to the one or more data packets, wherein the selection is made between one or more first security algorithms configured with a first key length and one or more second security algorithms configured with a second key length; apply the selected one or more security algorithms to the one or more data packets; and, in response to applying the selected one or more security algorithms to the one or more data packets, transmit the one or more data packets to the data receiving entity.

[0110] In some embodiments, the selected one or more security algorithms may include integrity protection and encryption. Integrity protection may utilize a message authentication code of selectable length. One or more first security algorithms configured with a first key length may apply integrity protection and encryption in a first order, and one or more second security algorithms configured with a second key length may apply integrity protection and encryption in a second order, in the reverse of the first order. The first key length may include a 128-bit key length, and the second key length may include a 256-bit key length. The apparatus and data receiving entity may operate at the packet data convergence protocol layer of a communication network. The selection may be based on a security mode command flow. The apparatus may be part of a user equipment or a radio access network node.

[0111] Furthermore, a method may include: receiving, at a data sending entity associated with a communication network, one or more data packets for transmission to a data receiving entity associated with the communication network; at the data sending entity, selecting one or more security algorithms to be applied to the one or more data packets, wherein the selection is made between one or more first security algorithms configured with a first key length and one or more second security algorithms configured with a second key length; at the data sending entity, applying the selected one or more security algorithms to the one or more data packets; and in response to applying the selected one or more security algorithms to the one or more data packets, sending the one or more data packets from the data sending entity to the data receiving entity.

[0112] In another embodiment, a non-transitory computer-readable storage medium embodies executable program code that, when executed by a processor, causes the processor to perform the methods described above.

[0113] From the perspective of a PDCP transmitting entity, an apparatus may include: at least one processor; and at least one memory storing instructions that, when executed by the at least one processor, cause the apparatus to at least: receive one or more data packets from a data transmitting entity associated with a communication network; select one or more security algorithms to apply to the one or more data packets, wherein the selection is made between one or more first security algorithms configured with a first key length and one or more second security algorithms configured with a second key length, and wherein the selection corresponds to one or more security algorithms applied at the data transmitting entity; and apply the selected one or more security algorithms to the one or more data packets.

[0114] In some embodiments, the selected one or more security algorithms include integrity verification and decryption. Integrity verification may utilize a message authentication code of selectable length. One or more first security algorithms configured with a first key length may apply integrity verification and decryption in a first order, and one or more second security algorithms configured with a second key length may apply integrity verification and decryption in a second order, in reverse order of the first order. The first key length may include a 128-bit key length, and the second key length may include a 256-bit key length. The apparatus and data transmission entity may operate at the packet data convergence protocol layer of a communication network. Selection may be based on a security mode command flow. The apparatus may be part of a user equipment or a radio access network node.

[0115] Furthermore, a method may include: receiving one or more data packets from a data sending entity associated with a communication network at a data receiving entity associated with the communication network; at the data receiving entity, selecting one or more security algorithms to be applied to the one or more data packets, wherein the selection is made between one or more first security algorithms configured with a first key length and one or more second security algorithms configured with a second key length, and wherein the selection corresponds to the one or more security algorithms applied at the data sending entity; and at the data receiving entity, applying the selected one or more security algorithms to the one or more data packets.

[0116] In another embodiment, a non-transitory computer-readable storage medium embodies executable program code that, when executed by a processor, causes the processor to perform the methods described above.

[0117] In other embodiments, from the perspective of a PDCP transmitting entity, an apparatus may include: at least one processor; and at least one memory storing instructions that, when executed by the at least one processor, cause the apparatus to at least: receive one or more data packets for transmission to a data receiving entity associated with a communication network; apply one or more security algorithms to the one or more data packets, wherein the application of the one or more security algorithms further includes: applying encryption to the one or more data packets and applying integrity protection to the one or more data packets in response to encryption; and sending the one or more data packets to the data receiving entity in response to the application of the one or more security algorithms to the one or more data packets.

[0118] In one embodiment, integrity protection can utilize message authentication codes of selectable length. One or more security algorithms can be configured with a 256-bit key length. The device and data receiving entity can operate at the packet data convergence protocol layer of the communication network. The device can be part of a user equipment or a radio access network node.

[0119] Furthermore, a method may include: receiving, at a data sending entity associated with a communication network, one or more data packets for transmission to a data receiving entity associated with the communication network; at the data sending entity, applying one or more security algorithms to the one or more data packets, wherein the application of the one or more security algorithms further includes: applying encryption to the one or more data packets and applying integrity protection to the one or more data packets in response to the encryption; and sending the one or more data packets from the data sending entity to the data receiving entity in response to the application of the one or more security algorithms to the one or more data packets.

[0120] In another embodiment, a non-transitory computer-readable storage medium embodies executable program code that, when executed by a processor, causes the processor to perform the methods described above.

[0121] Furthermore, from the perspective of a PDCP receiving entity, an apparatus may include: at least one processor; and at least one memory storing instructions that, when executed by the at least one processor, cause the apparatus to at least: receive one or more data packets from a data sending entity associated with a communication network; and apply one or more security algorithms to the one or more data packets, wherein the application of the one or more security algorithms further includes: applying integrity verification to the one or more data packets, and applying decryption to the one or more data packets in response to integrity verification.

[0122] In some embodiments, integrity verification may utilize message authentication codes of selectable length. One or more security algorithms may be configured with a 256-bit key length. The apparatus and data transmission entity may operate at the packet data convergence protocol layer of the communication network. The apparatus may be part of a user equipment or a radio access network node.

[0123] Additionally, a method may include: receiving one or more data packets from a data sending entity associated with a communication network at a data receiving entity associated with the communication network; and applying one or more security algorithms to the one or more data packets at the data receiving entity, wherein the application of the one or more security algorithms further includes: applying integrity verification to the one or more data packets and decrypting the one or more data packets in response to the integrity verification.

[0124] In another embodiment, a non-transitory computer-readable storage medium embodies executable program code that, when executed by a processor, causes the processor to perform the methods described above.

[0125] As used herein, it should be understood that in some embodiments, the term "communication network" may include two or more separate communication networks. Furthermore, the specific processing operations and other system functions described herein in conjunction with the illustrations are presented by way of illustrative example only and should not be construed as limiting the scope of this disclosure in any way. Alternative embodiments may use other types of processing operations and messaging protocols. For example, in other embodiments, the order of steps may be changed, or certain steps may be performed at least partially concurrently with each other, rather than serially. Furthermore, one or more steps may be repeated periodically, or multiple instances of the method may be executed in parallel with each other.

[0126] It should be emphasized again that the various embodiments described herein are presented by way of illustrative example only and should not be construed as limiting the scope of the claims. For example, alternative embodiments may utilize different communication system configurations, user equipment configurations, base station configurations, provisioning and usage procedures, messaging protocols, and message formats than those described above in the context of the illustrative embodiments. These and many other alternative embodiments falling within the scope of the appended claims will be apparent to those skilled in the art.

Claims

1. An apparatus comprising: Components for receiving one or more data packets for transmission to a data receiving entity associated with a communication network; Components for applying one or more security algorithms to the one or more data packets, wherein the application of the one or more security algorithms further includes: applying encryption to the one or more data packets, and applying integrity protection to the one or more data packets in response to the encryption; as well as Components for sending the one or more data packets to the data receiving entity in response to the application of the one or more security algorithms to the one or more data packets.

2. The apparatus according to claim 1, wherein, The integrity protection utilizes a message authentication code with selectable length.

3. The apparatus according to claim 1, wherein, The one or more security algorithms are configured with a key length of 256 bits.

4. The apparatus according to claim 1, wherein, The device and the data receiving entity operate in the packet data convergence protocol layer of the communication network.

5. The apparatus according to claim 1, wherein, The device is part of a user equipment or a radio access network node.

6. A method comprising: At a data sending entity associated with a communication network, one or more data packets are received for transmission to a data receiving entity associated with the communication network. At the data sending entity, one or more security algorithms are applied to the one or more data packets, wherein the application of the one or more security algorithms further includes: applying encryption to the one or more data packets, and applying integrity protection to the one or more data packets in response to the encryption; as well as In response to the application of the one or more security algorithms to the one or more data packets, the one or more data packets are sent from the data sending entity to the data receiving entity.

7. An apparatus comprising: A component for receiving one or more data packets from a data sending entity associated with a communication network; as well as Components for applying one or more security algorithms to the one or more data packets, wherein the application of the one or more security algorithms further includes: applying integrity verification to the one or more data packets, and applying decryption to the one or more data packets in response to the integrity verification.

8. The apparatus according to claim 7, wherein, The integrity verification utilizes a message authentication code with selectable length.

9. The apparatus according to claim 7, wherein, The one or more security algorithms are configured to have a key length of 256 bits.

10. The apparatus according to claim 7, wherein, The device and the data sending entity operate in the packet data convergence protocol layer of the communication network.

11. The apparatus according to claim 7, wherein, The device is part of a user equipment or a radio access network node.

12. A method comprising: At a data receiving entity associated with a communication network, one or more data packets are received from a data sending entity associated with the communication network; as well as At the data receiving entity, one or more security algorithms are applied to the one or more data packets, wherein the application of the one or more security algorithms further includes: applying integrity verification to the one or more data packets, and applying decryption to the one or more data packets in response to the integrity verification.

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