A tag offline integrity authentication method and system based on multi-successor pointer in COTS RFID system

Abstract

This application relates to the technical field of radio frequency identification (RFID) security authentication, and in particular to a tag offline integrity authentication method and system based on multiple successor pointers in a COTS RFID system. The method includes: generating a corresponding access password based on the tag's EPC information and the recipient's identity; extracting a short EPC substring for tag addressing from the EPC information; selecting a hub tag and its associated successor tags from tags in a preset order, writing the short EPC substring corresponding to the successor tag into the associated hub tag, constructing a multiple successor authentication chain, and writing a start flag into the starting hub tag of the multiple successor authentication chain; when receiving goods, locating the starting hub tag of the multiple successor authentication chain based on the start flag corresponding to the current recipient, and performing access authentication starting from the starting hub tag according to the access password to obtain the authentication result. This reduces initialization and authentication overhead while improving authentication accuracy.

Description

Technical Field

[0001] This application relates to the technical field of radio frequency identification security authentication, and in particular to a method and system for offline tag integrity authentication in a COTS RFID system based on multiple successor pointers. Background Technology

[0002] Radio Frequency Identification (RFID) technology has been widely applied in logistics, supply chain management, warehousing and inventory management, retail management, and industrial manufacturing. A typical RFID system consists of a reader and RFID tags attached to items. The reader communicates with the tag via radio frequency signals, and the tag responds to the reader's requests via backscattering. Compared to traditional barcode technology, RFID technology offers advantages such as non-line-of-sight identification, batch reading, and high automation, making it suitable for large-scale item tracking and supply chain handover.

[0003] In real-world supply chain scenarios, suppliers typically entrust goods tagged with RFID to third-party logistics providers or open transportation environments for transport. Upon arrival, the recipient needs to quickly verify that the arriving tags are authentic, complete, and have not been replaced. Due to the potential lack of a stable backend database connection during transportation, the recipient often needs to complete the integrity authentication of the arriving tags offline. In this scenario, RFID tags are vulnerable to security threats such as theft, replacement, cloning, and counterfeiting. Attackers can read the EPC (Engineering Processing Capacity) of legitimate tags, create cloned tags carrying the same EPC, and then insert the counterfeit tags into the supply chain or replace the original tags, making traditional methods relying solely on EPC matching ineffective in identifying counterfeiting.

[0004] Existing RFID anti-counterfeiting authentication technologies include offline integrity authentication methods based on hash chains, which can perform sequential authentication of tags without continuous connection to the backend database, and have good offline applicability. Specifically, assuming tag b is a successor tag a, and tag c is a successor tag b, then the complete identifier or encrypted identifier of b is stored in a, and the complete identifier or encrypted identifier of c is stored in b.

[0005] However, existing single-successor chain authentication methods still have two significant shortcomings: First, the initialization and authentication overhead is high. Existing single successor chain structures typically require each tag to store the complete or encrypted identifier of its direct successor tag, which means that the supplier needs to write successor information to a large number of tags one by one during the initialization phase; during the authentication phase, the reader also needs to frequently perform read and select operations and perform a lot of complete EPC matching, resulting in a large air interface communication overhead.

[0006] Second, the authentication chain structure is fragile. In a single-chain authentication structure, if a tag at the beginning is forged, replaced, or missing, the reader may not be able to obtain the authentication path for subsequent tags, resulting in a large number of subsequent legitimate tags being judged as authentication failure tags, thus making the authentication results inaccurate. Summary of the Invention

[0007] Therefore, it is necessary to provide a tag offline integrity authentication method and system based on multiple successor pointers in a COTS RFID system to address the above-mentioned technical problems, which can reduce initialization and authentication overhead while improving authentication accuracy.

[0008] Firstly, this application provides a tag offline integrity authentication method in a COTS RFID system based on multiple successor pointers, including: Obtain the EPC information and recipient identification of the COTS RFID tag to be authenticated, and generate the corresponding access password based on the EPC information and recipient identification; Extract the short EPC substring for tag addressing from the EPC information; Select a hub tag and its associated successor tag from the COTS RFID tags to be authenticated in a preset order. Write the EPC short substring corresponding to the successor tag into the user storage area of ​​the associated hub tag to construct a multi-successor authentication chain. Write a start flag into the starting hub tag of the multi-successor authentication chain. The start flag is generated based on the receiver's identity. Upon receiving goods, the starting hub label of the multi-subsequent authentication chain is located based on the starting marker corresponding to the current recipient. Then, based on the access password, the labels in the multi-subsequent authentication chain are accessed and authenticated starting from the starting hub label to obtain the authentication results of each label.

[0009] In one embodiment, a corresponding access password is generated based on the EPC information and the recipient's identity identifier, as shown in the following formula: ap i =Trunc m (H(ti⊕ID R )) Among them, ap i The password is for access; ti is the tag t. i EPC information; IDR is the recipient's identity identifier; H(·) represents the hash function shared by the supplier and the recipient; Trunc m (·) indicates that m bits of the hash output are extracted.

[0010] In one embodiment, extracting the short EPC substring for tag addressing from the EPC information includes: A mathematical model is constructed to establish the relationship between the collision probability and the size of the interfering tags and the length of the EPC short substring in the identification environment; the collision probability represents the probability that there are identical EPC short substrings among the interfering tags. The length of the EPC short substring is determined based on a mathematical model and the storage capacity of the COTS RFID tag user area; after determining the length of the EPC short substring, the collision probability should be less than or equal to the preset maximum allowable collision probability. Based on the determined length of the EPC short substring, extract the corresponding length of the EPC short substring from the preset position in the EPC information.

[0011] In one embodiment, a hub tag and its associated successor tag are selected from a preset order of COTS RFID tags to be authenticated to construct a multi-successor authentication chain, including: The COTS RFID tags to be certified are divided into multiple certification blocks according to a preset arrangement order; In each authentication block, select at least one hub label and at most p successor labels associated with the hub label, and use the first hub label of the first authentication block as the starting hub label to construct a multi-successor authentication chain; Among them, the number of successor tags p and the length of the EPC short substring l satisfy the tag user storage area capacity constraint: ; Where Mu represents the available capacity of the tag user storage area; |meta| represents the length of the starting flag; |meta| represents the length of the necessary control information.

[0012] In one embodiment, access authentication of tags in a multi-subsequent authentication chain, starting from the initial hub tag, is performed based on an access password, including: Generate the access password corresponding to the hub tag based on the EPC information of the hub tag and the current recipient's identity; If the access password verification fails or the hub label does not respond, the hub label will be marked as a suspected forged label or an authentication failure label. When the access password verification is successful, the short substring of the successor tag EPC is read from the hub tag user storage area, and the successor tag is located based on the read short substring of the successor tag EPC. The access password corresponding to the successor tag is generated according to the EPC information of the successor tag and the current recipient's identity. When the access password corresponding to the successor tag is successfully verified, the successor tag is confirmed to have passed integrity authentication. When the access password corresponding to the successor tag fails to verify, has no response, or is inconsistent with the expected authentication chain structure, the successor tag is determined to be a suspected forged tag or an authentication failed tag.

[0013] In one embodiment, selecting a hub tag and its associated successor tag from a preset order of COTS RFID tags to be authenticated to construct a multi-successor authentication chain further includes: The COTS RFID tags to be certified are divided into multiple independent certification groups according to a preset arrangement order; For each independent authentication group, each independent authentication group is divided into multiple authentication blocks. In each authentication block, at least one hub label and at most p successor labels associated with the hub label are selected. The first hub label of the first authentication block is used as the starting hub label to construct the sub-multiple successor authentication chain corresponding to each independent authentication group. The sub-multiple successor authentication chains are sorted according to the independent authentication grouping order to obtain the multiple successor authentication chains; Among them, the number of successor tags p and the length of the EPC short substring l satisfy the tag user storage area capacity constraint: ; Where Mu represents the available capacity of the tag user storage area; |meta| represents the length of the starting flag; |meta| represents the length of the necessary control information.

[0014] In one embodiment, the starting hub label of the multiple successor authentication chain is located based on the starting flag corresponding to the current recipient, and access authentication is performed on the labels in the multiple successor authentication chain starting from the starting hub label based on the access password, including: The starting hub label of each sub-multiple successor authentication chain is located based on the starting flag corresponding to the current receiver, and each sub-multiple successor authentication chain is authenticated separately. The authentication process includes: Generate the access password corresponding to the hub tag based on the EPC information of the hub tag and the current recipient's identity; If the access password verification fails or the hub label does not respond, the hub label will be marked as a suspected forged label or an authentication failure label. When the access password verification is successful, the short substring of the successor tag EPC is read from the hub tag user storage area, and the successor tag is located based on the read short substring of the successor tag EPC. The access password corresponding to the successor tag is generated according to the EPC information of the successor tag and the current recipient's identity. When the access password corresponding to the successor tag is successfully verified, the successor tag is confirmed to have passed integrity authentication. When the access password corresponding to the successor tag fails to verify, has no response, or is inconsistent with the expected authentication chain structure, the successor tag is determined to be a suspected forged tag or an authentication failed tag.

[0015] Secondly, this application also provides a tag offline integrity authentication system based on multiple successor pointers in a COTS RFID system, including: The access password generation module is used to obtain the EPC information and the recipient's identity identifier of the COTS RFID tag to be authenticated, and generate the corresponding access password based on the EPC information and the recipient's identity identifier. The short substring generation module is used to extract short EPC substrings for tag addressing from EPC information; The authentication chain construction module is used to select a hub tag and a successor tag associated with the hub tag from the COTS RFID tags to be authenticated in a preset order, write the EPC short substring corresponding to the successor tag into the user storage area of ​​the associated hub tag, construct a multi-successor authentication chain, and write a start flag into the starting hub tag of the multi-successor authentication chain; the start flag is generated according to the receiver's identity identifier. The authentication module is used to locate the starting hub label of the multiple successor authentication chain according to the starting flag corresponding to the current recipient when receiving goods, and to access and authenticate the labels in the multiple successor authentication chain starting from the starting hub label according to the access password, so as to obtain the authentication results of each label.

[0016] Thirdly, this application also provides a computer device. The computer device includes a memory and a processor, the memory storing a computer program, and the processor executing the computer program to perform the following steps: Obtain the EPC information and recipient identification of the COTS RFID tag to be authenticated, and generate the corresponding access password based on the EPC information and recipient identification; Extract the short EPC substring for tag addressing from the EPC information; Select a hub tag and its associated successor tag from the COTS RFID tags to be authenticated in a preset order. Write the EPC short substring corresponding to the successor tag into the user storage area of ​​the associated hub tag to construct a multi-successor authentication chain. Write a start flag into the starting hub tag of the multi-successor authentication chain. The start flag is generated based on the receiver's identity. Upon receiving goods, the starting hub label of the multi-subsequent authentication chain is located based on the starting marker corresponding to the current recipient. Then, based on the access password, the labels in the multi-subsequent authentication chain are accessed and authenticated starting from the starting hub label to obtain the authentication results of each label.

[0017] Fourthly, this application also provides a computer-readable storage medium. The computer-readable storage medium stores a computer program thereon, which, when executed by a processor, performs the following steps: Obtain the EPC information and recipient identification of the COTS RFID tag to be authenticated, and generate the corresponding access password based on the EPC information and recipient identification; Extract the short EPC substring for tag addressing from the EPC information; Select a hub tag and its associated successor tag from the COTS RFID tags to be authenticated in a preset order. Write the EPC short substring corresponding to the successor tag into the user storage area of ​​the associated hub tag to construct a multi-successor authentication chain. Write a start flag into the starting hub tag of the multi-successor authentication chain. The start flag is generated based on the receiver's identity. Upon receiving goods, the starting hub label of the multi-subsequent authentication chain is located based on the starting marker corresponding to the current recipient. Then, based on the access password, the labels in the multi-subsequent authentication chain are accessed and authenticated starting from the starting hub label to obtain the authentication results of each label.

[0018] This application employs the aforementioned tag offline integrity authentication method and system in a COTS RFID system based on multiple successor pointers, which has the following beneficial effects: 1. Using a multi-successor authentication chain as the core solution, during the supplier initialization phase, high-entropy short substrings in the tag EPC are used as addressing identifiers for successor tags. The short EPC substrings of multiple successor tags are collectively written into the user storage area of ​​a single hub tag, enabling one hub tag to index multiple successor tags. Therefore, the supplier does not need to write the complete successor identifier for each tag individually, and the receiver can obtain the addressing information of multiple successor tags in a single read during the authentication phase, thereby reducing the air interface communication overhead during initialization and authentication. Simultaneously, since only some hub tags handle successor addressing information, compared to the traditional single-successor chain structure, the impact of some tag anomalies on the subsequent authentication process can be reduced to some extent, improving authentication accuracy.

[0019] 2. The set of tags to be authenticated is divided into multiple independent authentication groups, and a header label (starting hub label) and a closed authentication chain are set in each group. The receiver can initiate the authentication process from multiple header labels separately. When a forged tag appears in a group or the authentication chain is broken, the failure only affects the group in question and will not block the authentication process of other groups. By aggregating the authentication results of each group, the receiver can more accurately estimate the number of forged tags and distinguish between localized and large-scale forgery attacks, which helps improve the accuracy of authentication. Attached Figure Description

[0020] Figure 1 This is a flowchart illustrating a tag offline integrity authentication method in a COTS RFID system based on multiple successor pointers, as shown in one embodiment. Figure 2 This is a schematic diagram of a COTS RFID hardware test platform in one embodiment; Figure 3 This is a schematic diagram illustrating the initialization delay of different methods in one embodiment; Figure 4This is a schematic diagram illustrating the authentication latency of different methods in one embodiment; Figure 5 This is a schematic diagram comparing the authentication accuracy of different methods in one embodiment.

[0021] Reference numerals: 1. Antenna; 2. Reader / writer; 3. Host computer; 4. Tag group. Detailed Implementation

[0022] To make the objectives, technical solutions, and advantages of this application clearer, the following detailed description is provided in conjunction with the accompanying drawings and embodiments. It should be understood that the specific embodiments described herein are merely illustrative and not intended to limit the scope of this application.

[0023] Existing RFID anti-counterfeiting authentication technologies include offline integrity authentication methods based on hash chains, which can perform sequential authentication of tags without continuous connection to the backend database, and have good offline applicability. Specifically, assuming tag b is a successor tag a, and tag c is a successor tag b, then the complete identifier or encrypted identifier of b is stored in a, and the complete identifier or encrypted identifier of c is stored in b.

[0024] However, existing single-successor chain authentication methods still have two significant shortcomings: First, the initialization and authentication overhead is high. Existing single successor chain structures typically require each tag to store the complete or encrypted identifier of its direct successor tag, which means that the supplier needs to write successor information to a large number of tags one by one during the initialization phase; during the authentication phase, the reader also needs to frequently perform read and select operations and perform a lot of complete EPC matching, resulting in a large air interface communication overhead.

[0025] Second, the authentication chain structure is fragile. In a single-chain authentication structure, if a tag at the beginning is forged, replaced, or missing, the reader may not be able to obtain the authentication path for subsequent tags, resulting in a large number of subsequent legitimate tags being judged as authentication failure tags, thus making the authentication results inaccurate.

[0026] This application proposes a tag offline integrity authentication method and system based on multiple successor pointers in a COTS RFID system. The method uses a multi-successor authentication chain as its core scheme. During the supplier initialization phase, a high-entropy short substring from the tag's EPC is used as the addressing identifier for successor tags. The short substrings of multiple successor tags' EPCs are collectively written into the user storage area of ​​a single hub tag, enabling one hub tag to index multiple successor tags. Therefore, the supplier does not need to write a complete successor identifier for each tag individually, and the receiver can obtain the addressing information of multiple successor tags in a single read during the authentication phase, thereby reducing the air interface communication overhead during initialization and authentication. Furthermore, since only some hub tags handle successor addressing information, compared to the traditional single-successor chain structure, the impact of some tag anomalies on the subsequent authentication process can be reduced to some extent, improving the accuracy of authentication.

[0027] Furthermore, this application utilizes the SELECT command in the EPC C1G2 standard to achieve short substring mask matching, filters target tags using the POINTER, LENGTH, and MASK parameters, and employs an Access Password mechanism for tag access authentication, enabling the receiver to complete offline integrity verification without relying on a real-time backend database. Since all the above operations are based on C1G2 standard commands, this method does not require modification of commercial passive RFID tag hardware and has good practical deployment feasibility.

[0028] This application also provides a multi-header grouping extension scheme, which divides the set of tags to be authenticated into multiple independent authentication groups, and sets a header label (starting hub label) and a closed authentication chain in each group. The receiver can initiate the authentication process from multiple header labels separately. When a forged tag appears in a group or the authentication chain is interrupted, the failure only affects the group in question and will not block the authentication process of other groups. By aggregating the authentication results of each group, the receiver can more accurately estimate the number of forged tags and distinguish between local forgery attacks and large-scale forgery attacks, which helps to improve the accuracy of authentication.

[0029] This application provides a tag offline integrity authentication method for COTS RFID systems based on multiple successor pointers. This method can be applied to supply chain logistics, warehousing handover, retail receiving, and other scenarios requiring offline integrity authentication of RFID tags in goods. The COTS RFID tag can be a passive RFID tag conforming to the EPC Class-1 Generation-2 standard, and the RFID reader / writer can be a commercially available off-the-shelf RFID reader / writer conforming to the EPC Class-1 Generation-2 standard. The RFID reader / writer communicates with the COTS RFID tag via radio frequency and completes operations such as tag positioning, authentication chain information reading, authentication information writing, and access authentication through standard SELECT, READ, WRITE commands, and Access control mechanisms. This application does not require additional cryptographic hardware for the COTS RFID tag.

[0030] For ease of explanation, the set of COTS RFID tags to be certified (where COTS stands for Commercial Off-The-Shelf) is defined as follows: S={t1,t2,…,t i ,...,t n} Among them, t i This represents the i-th COTS RFID tag, tag t. i It has the corresponding EPC information.

[0031] This application defines: IDR as the receiver's identity identifier; H(·) as a hash function pre-shared between the supplier and the receiver; st i For from the tag t i The short EPC substring extracted from the EPC information; ap i For the label t i The corresponding access password; p is the maximum number of successor tags associated with a hub tag; f is the start flag; a hub tag refers to a tag in the user storage area that stores one or more successor tag EPC short substrings; a successor tag refers to a tag whose EPC short substring is written to the target storage area of ​​the corresponding hub tag and can be located based on the EPC short substring (the EPC short substring is used to filter tags later through the POINTER, LENGTH and MASK parameters of the SELECT command); the starting hub tag is the hub tag used as the authentication entry point in a multi-successor authentication chain.

[0032] Firstly, based on the above, this application provides a tag offline integrity authentication method in a COTS RFID system based on multiple successor pointers, including: S100: Obtain the EPC information and recipient identification of the COTS RFID tag to be authenticated, and generate the corresponding access password based on the EPC information and recipient identification.

[0033] Obtain the EPC information of each tag in the COTS RFID tag set to be authenticated, and obtain the current recipient's identity identifier (IDR). Generate a corresponding access password (ap) based on the EPC information of each tag and the recipient's identity identifier. i .

[0034] In one embodiment, a corresponding access password (ap) is generated based on the EPC information and the recipient's identity. i The formula is as follows: ap i =Trunc m (H(ti⊕ID R )) Among them, ap i The password is for access; ti is the tag t. i EPC information; IDR is the recipient's identity identifier; H(·) represents the hash function shared by the supplier and the recipient; Trunc m (·) indicates that m bits of the hash output are extracted.

[0035] In one specific embodiment, the Access Password field of the C1G2 standard label is 32 bits, so a corresponding access password can be set. i for: ap i =Trunc 32 (H(ti⊕ID R )) Among them, ap i The password is for access; ti is the tag t. i EPC information; IDR is the recipient's identity identifier; H(·) represents the hash function shared by the supplier and the recipient; Trunc 32 (·) indicates that the hash output is truncated to 32 bits, which is the 32-bit access password. The generated 32-bit access password will be written to the Access Password field of the label.

[0036] Furthermore, after the access password is written, a locking operation can be performed on the corresponding storage area to reduce the possibility of attackers modifying the tag authentication data during transportation.

[0037] In this embodiment, since the access password is related to both the tag EPC information and the recipient's identity, even if an attacker obtains the EPC information of a certain tag, it will be difficult to directly obtain the corresponding access password without the corresponding recipient's identity and the shared hash function.

[0038] S200: Extract the short EPC substring for tag addressing from the EPC information.

[0039] In one embodiment, extracting EPC short substrings for tag addressing from EPC information includes: constructing a mathematical model between the collision probability and the size of interfering tags in the identification environment and the length of the EPC short substring; the collision probability represents the probability that the same EPC short substring exists among the interfering tags; determining the length of the EPC short substring based on the mathematical model and the capacity of the COTS RFID tag user storage area; wherein, after determining the length of the EPC short substring, the collision probability should be less than or equal to a preset maximum allowable collision probability; and extracting an EPC short substring of the corresponding length from a preset position in the EPC information based on the determined EPC short substring length.

[0040] Preferably, the aforementioned preset position is located in a high-entropy field of the EPC, such as the serial number field.

[0041] When determining the length of the EPC short substring, this application performs collision probability analysis on EPC short substrings of different lengths based on the number of interfering tags that may exist simultaneously in the tag identification environment and the preset maximum allowable collision probability, so as to make the EPC short substring of the target tag have a low collision probability with the EPC short substring of the environmental interference tags.

[0042] For each label t i The supplier extracts a short substring of length l, st, from the high-entropy field of its EPC. i Assuming the selected EPC fields are approximately uniformly distributed, the probability that any environmental interference tag has the same l-bit EPC short substring as the target tag is: When u environmental interference tags are identified in the environment, the probability Pu of the target tag's EPC short substring not colliding with any of the environmental interference tags can be expressed as:

[0043] Accordingly, the probability Pc of the target tag's short EPC substring colliding with at least one environmental interference tag can be expressed as:

[0044] As can be seen from the above relationship, when the number of environmental interference tags u is fixed, the larger the length l of the EPC short substring, the lower the probability of short substring collision, and the higher the reliability of tag screening based on the short substring. Conversely, although shortening the length of the EPC short substring can store more addressing information of subsequent tags in the limited user storage space, it will increase the probability that different tags have the same EPC short substring.

[0045] Furthermore, the maximum permissible collision probability can be set according to the specific application's requirements for the reliability of short substring addressing. Using the upper bound of the union, the collision probability of short substrings satisfies:

[0046] Therefore, when the collision probability of a short substring is required to be no greater than the preset maximum allowed collision probability... When the length l of the short EPC substring is chosen, it can be an integer that satisfies the following formula:

[0047] When the collision probability of the short substring determined according to the above relationship is not higher than the preset maximum allowed collision probability, it can be considered that the current EPC short substring length meets the addressing reliability requirements of the corresponding application scenario; when the collision probability of the short substring is higher than the preset maximum allowed collision probability, the collision probability can be reduced by increasing the length of the EPC short substring, reducing the number of successor tags associated with a single hub tag, adjusting the extraction position of the EPC short substring, or rearranging the tag authentication order.

[0048] In one specific embodiment, 96 bits of user storage space are allocated for the successor addressing information of a hub tag. When a hub tag is associated with p=3 successor tags, each successor tag can be allocated a 32-bit EPC short substring, i.e., l=32. Considering that there are at most u=10 in the environment... 5 If there are 1 interference label, the collision probability of the corresponding short substring is approximately 1. That is, the non-collision probability is about 0.9999767, thus maintaining a high reliability of short substring addressing.

[0049] As an example of parameter selection, the maximum permissible collision probability can be set to Under the aforementioned environmental interference tag scale, the collision probability corresponding to p=3 and l=32 is lower than the preset threshold, thus meeting the reliability requirements of this embodiment.

[0050] If the number of successor tags associated with a hub tag is further increased to p=4, under the same 96-bit successor addressing information storage space, the length of the EPC short substring that can be allocated to each successor tag is reduced to l=24 bits. At this point, when u=10... 5 When the short substring has a collision probability of approximately This is higher than the maximum permissible collision probability of 10 in the example above. -3 .

[0051] Therefore, given a fixed storage space for available successor addressing information, there is a mutually restrictive relationship between the number of successor tags p and the length of the EPC short substring l: increasing the number of successor tags p allows a single hub tag to index more successor tags, thereby reducing the number of hub tags and the corresponding air interface read / write operations. However, it also reduces the length of the EPC short substring l allocated to each successor tag, thus increasing the probability of short substring collisions. Considering storage efficiency, air interface interaction overhead, and short substring addressing reliability, this embodiment adopts p=3 and l=32 as a preferred parameter configuration.

[0052] When a conflict is detected between two or more EPC short strings, the conflict can be resolved by adjusting the extraction position of the EPC short string, increasing the length of the EPC short string, reducing the number of subsequent tags associated with the hub tag, rearranging the tag authentication order, or combining at least one of the following methods:

[0053] In this embodiment, the short EPC substring is not used as the complete identity information of the tag, but as the addressing information of the subsequent tag, so that the subsequent tag can be located without storing the complete EPC information in the hub tag.

[0054] S300: Select a hub tag and a successor tag associated with the hub tag from the COTS RFID tags to be authenticated in a preset order, write the EPC short substring corresponding to the successor tag into the user storage area of ​​the associated hub tag, construct a multi-successor authentication chain, and write a start flag into the starting hub tag of the multi-successor authentication chain; the start flag is generated according to the receiver's identity identifier.

[0055] S400, when receiving goods, locates the starting hub label of the multiple successor authentication chain according to the starting mark corresponding to the current recipient, and performs access authentication on the labels in the multiple successor authentication chain starting from the starting hub label according to the access password, and obtains the authentication results of each label.

[0056] In one embodiment, selecting a hub tag and its associated successor tags from a preset order of COTS RFID tags to be certified to construct a multiple successor certification chain includes: dividing the preset order of COTS RFID tags to be certified into multiple certification blocks; selecting at least one hub tag and p successor tags associated with the hub tag in each certification block, and using the first hub tag of the first certification block as the starting hub tag to construct a multiple successor certification chain.

[0057] Among them, the number of successor tags p and the length of the EPC short substring l satisfy the tag user storage area capacity constraint: ; Where Mu represents the available capacity of the tag user storage area; |meta| represents the length of the starting flag; |meta| represents the length of the necessary control information.

[0058] Before shipment, the supplier uses an RFID reader to read each tag t in the set of tags S to be shipped. i The system collects EPC information and establishes a label authentication order, i.e., a preset arrangement order. This authentication order can be determined based on the inventory order, the item packing order, the database registration order, or a random arrangement order.

[0059] The tag set is divided into multiple authentication blocks according to the authentication order, and a hub tag is selected from each authentication block. For the hub tag t i The supplier writes at most p short substrings of successor tags into the user storage area of ​​the hub tag.

[0060] When the label to be certified is in t1, t2, ..., t i ,...,t n When arranging the tags such that each hub tag can be associated with a maximum of 3 successor tags, t1 can be used as the first hub tag, and t2, t3, and t4 can be used as the successor tags associated with the first hub tag; t5 can be used as the next hub tag, and t6, t7, and t8 can be used as the successor tags associated with the next hub tag, and so on.

[0061] Write the EPC short substring corresponding to the successor label into the target storage area of ​​the associated hub label. For example, for hub label t1, its target storage area can be written with st2, st3, and st4, thereby establishing a multiple successor relationship t1→{t2,t3,t4}; where st2, st3, and st4 are the EPC short substrings of labels t2, t3, and t4, respectively.

[0062] In the subsequent authentication process, multiple successor tags can be located based on the multiple EPC short substrings stored in the hub tag, so that a hub tag can be associated with multiple successor tags.

[0063] This solution uses a multi-successor authentication chain as its core. During the supplier's initialization phase, high-entropy short substrings from the tag's EPC (Engineering Process Control) are used as addressing identifiers for successor tags. The short EPC substrings of multiple successor tags are then collectively written into the user storage area of ​​a single hub tag, allowing one hub tag to index multiple successor tags. This eliminates the need for the supplier to write complete successor identifiers for each tag individually, and the receiver can obtain the addressing information of multiple successor tags in a single read during the authentication phase, thus reducing air interface communication overhead during initialization and authentication. Furthermore, since only a portion of the hub tags handle successor addressing information, compared to the traditional single-successor chain structure, the impact of some tag anomalies on subsequent authentication processes can be reduced to some extent, improving authentication accuracy.

[0064] In this application, when the number of remaining tags is less than p, the EPC short substring of the actual remaining successor tags or the EPC short substring of the starting tag used to close the authentication chain is written to the hub tag. That is, the EPC short substring of the starting tag can be stored in the last hub tag to form a closed chain.

[0065] Unlike the traditional single successor chain structure where each tag needs to be written with a successor identifier, this application can also write multiple successor tags' EPC short substrings only in some hub tags, so that other intermediate tags do not need to store chained successor information, thereby reducing the number of writes during the initialization phase.

[0066] For the starting hub label of the authentication chain, the supplier also writes a starting flag f. The starting flag f is generated by the receiver's identity identifier IDR, for example, f=H(IDR) or f is a bit string obtained by truncating H(IDR) to a preset length. The receiver can locate the authentication chain entry point through this starting flag during the offline authentication phase.

[0067] In one embodiment, access authentication is performed on tags in a multi-subsequent authentication chain starting from the initial hub tag based on the access password. This includes: generating an access password corresponding to the hub tag based on the EPC information of the hub tag and the current recipient's identity; marking the hub tag as a suspected forged tag or an authentication failure tag if the access password verification fails or the hub tag does not respond; reading the short EPC substring of the successor tag from the hub tag's user storage area if the access password verification succeeds, locating the successor tag based on the read EPC substring, and generating an access password corresponding to the successor tag based on the EPC information of the successor tag and the current recipient's identity; confirming that the successor tag has passed integrity authentication if the access password corresponding to the successor tag is successfully verified; and determining that the successor tag is a suspected forged tag or an authentication failure tag if the access password verification fails, there is no response, or it is inconsistent with the expected authentication chain structure.

[0068] Upon arrival of the goods, the recipient performs offline authentication using an RFID reader / writer without a real-time connection to a backend database. A corresponding start tag is generated based on the recipient's current identity. The RFID tags within the authentication area are then filtered using the SELECT command of the EPC Class-1 Generation-2 standard, selecting starter tags carrying the specified start tag. The SELECT command can be used to perform matching by specifying the storage area, POINTER, LENGTH, and MASK parameters.

[0069] Since different recipients can correspond to different recipient identity identifiers, different recipients can generate different starting markers, thereby enabling the location of the starting hub label of the corresponding multi-successor authentication chain based on the current recipient identity identifier.

[0070] The authentication process in this application begins with the initial hub label and continues until all hub labels and their corresponding successor labels are authenticated, i.e., all label authentication is complete. During the receiver's offline authentication phase, the receiver first generates an initial flag f based on the IDR and then filters the initial hub labels carrying this flag using the C1G2 standard SELECT command. After reading or obtaining the initial hub label EPC, the receiver calculates the corresponding access password api and attempts to put the label into a secure state through the Access control mechanism. If the label cannot enter a secure state or does not respond effectively to the specified SELECT command, the receiver marks it as a suspected forged label or an authentication failure label and records the link interruption location.

[0071] After successful hub tag authentication, the receiver reads multiple successor tag EPC short substrings stored in the hub tag's user storage area. For each short substring, the receiver constructs a SELECT command, setting POINTER to the starting position of the short substring in the EPC, LENGTH to 1, and MASK to the corresponding short substring, thereby filtering the corresponding successor tags. After locating the successor tag, the receiver calculates its access password and performs Access verification. If the verification is successful, the tag is confirmed to have passed integrity authentication; if the verification fails, there is no response, or the structure is inconsistent with the expected authentication chain, the tag is determined to be a suspected forged tag or an authentication failed tag.

[0072] By using a single hub label to store short EPC substrings of multiple successor labels, the number of labels whose successor information is written during the initialization phase is reduced. At the same time, during the authentication phase, the addressing information of multiple successor labels can be obtained by reading once, which reduces frequent reading and full EPC matching operations and improves offline authentication efficiency.

[0073] To further improve robustness against chain truncation attacks, this application also provides a multi-head grouping expansion method. In one embodiment, selecting a hub tag and its associated successor tags from a preset order of COTS RFID tags to be authenticated to construct a multi-successor authentication chain further includes: dividing the preset order of COTS RFID tags to be authenticated into multiple independent authentication groups; for each independent authentication group, dividing each independent authentication group into multiple authentication blocks; selecting at least one hub tag and p associated successor tags in each authentication block; and using the first hub tag of the first authentication block as the starting hub tag to construct a sub-multi-successor authentication chain corresponding to each independent authentication group; and sorting the sub-multi-successor authentication chains according to the order of the independent authentication groups to obtain a multi-successor authentication chain.

[0074] Among them, the number of successor tags p and the length of the EPC short substring l satisfy the tag user storage area capacity constraint:

[0075] Where Mu represents the available capacity of the tag user storage area; |meta| represents the length of the starting flag; |meta| represents the length of the necessary control information.

[0076] The supplier divides the set of tags to be certified, S, into q independent certification groups G1, G2, ..., G... k ,...,G q Each authentication group G k Each group is assigned a header label (i.e., the starting hub label), and the supplier writes a start flag f into each header label. Each group employs a multi-successor authentication chain structure, meaning each hub label stores at most p short EPC substrings of successor labels. The hub label at the end of each group stores the short EPC substring of the group's starting hub label, forming a closed chain within the group or defining the group boundary.

[0077] During receiver authentication, all header tags are first located using the start flag f, and then the authentication chain is traversed for each group. If a forged tag appears in a group, causing the authentication chain to break, the authentication failure only affects that group. For other groups, the receiver can still continue authentication from the corresponding header tag. In this way, the receiver can count the number of failed and successful authentication tags based on the authentication results of each group, thus more accurately approximating the actual number of forged tags and avoiding widespread misjudgments caused by a single forged tag in a single-chain structure.

[0078] In one embodiment, the starting hub label of the multiple successor authentication chain is located based on the starting flag corresponding to the current recipient, and access authentication is performed on the labels in the multiple successor authentication chain starting from the starting hub label based on the access password, including: The starting hub label of each sub-multiple successor authentication chain is located based on the starting flag corresponding to the current receiver, and each sub-multiple successor authentication chain is authenticated separately. The authentication process includes: Generate the access password corresponding to the hub tag based on the EPC information of the hub tag and the current recipient's identity; If the access password verification fails or the hub label does not respond, the hub label will be marked as a suspected forged label or an authentication failure label. When the access password verification is successful, the short substring of the successor tag EPC is read from the hub tag user storage area, and the successor tag is located based on the read short substring of the successor tag EPC. The access password corresponding to the successor tag is generated according to the EPC information of the successor tag and the current recipient's identity. When the access password corresponding to the successor tag is successfully verified, the successor tag is confirmed to have passed integrity authentication. When the access password corresponding to the successor tag fails to verify, has no response, or is inconsistent with the expected authentication chain structure, the successor tag is determined to be a suspected forged tag or an authentication failed tag.

[0079] The set of tags to be authenticated is divided into multiple independent authentication groups, and a header label (starting hub label) and a closed authentication chain are set in each group. The receiver can initiate the authentication process from multiple header labels separately. When a forged tag appears in a group or the authentication chain is broken, the failure only affects the group in question and will not block the authentication process of other groups. By aggregating the authentication results of each group, the receiver can more accurately estimate the number of forged tags and distinguish between localized and large-scale forgery attacks, which helps improve the accuracy of authentication.

[0080] like Figure 2 As shown, this application constructs a COTS RFID hardware testing platform based on commercially available off-the-shelf equipment. This testing platform uses an Impinj R420 RFID reader and a 900 MHz Laird polarized antenna, and C1G2-compatible passive RFID tags as the objects to be authenticated. Reader 2 is connected to a host computer 3 via Ethernet. The authentication program is implemented based on Octane SDK.NET and is used to control reader 2 to perform tag inventory, SELECT filtering, READ / WRITE operations, and Access authentication processes. During the experiment, the RFID tags were placed approximately 1.2m directly in front of the antenna, arranged according to a set rule to maintain consistency in the reading and writing environment under different experimental conditions. Figure 2 The diagram shows the actual RFID antenna 1, reader 2, host computer 3, tag deployment area, and the test distance between the antenna and the tag. Figure 2 In the middle, there are 6 label groups 4 arranged horizontally and 5 label groups 4 arranged vertically, forming a label array of 30 label groups 4; each label group 4 contains 10 labels, and the total number of labels is 300.

[0081] On the aforementioned real hardware testing platform, the performance of the multi-successor authentication method and multi-head grouping extension method of this application were verified and compared with the traditional single-successor chain authentication method. Evaluation metrics included initialization time, authentication time, number of successfully authenticated tags, and the relationship between the number of failed authentication tags and the actual number of forged tags.

[0082] The SecAuth protocol mentioned in the accompanying drawings is an RFID tag integrity authentication protocol based on secure identity. This protocol generates a secure identity based on the tag's EPC information and the recipient's identity, and writes it to the tag's protected storage area. During the authentication phase, the recipient sequentially reads and verifies the secure identity of each tag to determine whether the tag has been replaced or counterfeited. Because all tags need to be initialized and authenticated individually, the communication and storage access overhead increases with the number of tags.

[0083] The KTAuth protocol mentioned in the accompanying drawings is an RFID integrity authentication protocol based on key tags and authentication chains. This protocol selects a subset of key tags from all tags and constructs an authentication chain in a predetermined order. Each key tag stores its own security identity and the encrypted identifier of the next key tag. The receiver verifies key tags one by one, starting from the initial key tag in the authentication chain, and locates the next key tag based on the subsequent information stored in the current key tag. This allows for integrity authentication of a large set of tags using a smaller number of key tags, reducing overall initialization and authentication overhead.

[0084] like Figure 3 As shown, the initialization latency of each authentication method increases with the number of tags. Among them, the multi-successor authentication method MSAuth of this application exhibits lower initialization latency across different tag sizes, significantly lower than the traditional single-successor chain authentication method. The main reason for this is that the traditional single-successor authentication structure requires writing successor tag information for a large number of tags separately, while MSAuth centrally writes the EPC short substrings of multiple successor tags into the user storage area of ​​a hub tag, enabling multiple successor addressing information to be initialized with fewer write operations, thereby reducing the number of over-the-air writes.

[0085] The multi-header block extension method MHAuth incurs additional initialization overhead compared to MSAuth because it requires setting header labels and writing start flags for multiple authentication blocks; this additional overhead increases with the number of blocks q. However, experimental results show that its initialization latency is still significantly lower than that of the traditional single-successor chain authentication method. Therefore, this application can maintain low initialization overhead while preserving the robustness of multi-header blocks.

[0086] like Figure 4As shown, the authentication latency of each method generally increases linearly with the number of tags to be authenticated. The MSAuth method of this application maintains a low authentication latency across different tag sizes. This is because MSAuth stores multiple successor tag EPC short substrings in the successfully authenticated hub tag. The receiver can obtain the addressing information of multiple successor tags with a single read operation and use the C1G2 standard SELECT command to match and filter the corresponding short substrings, thereby reducing the communication overhead caused by reading successor information tag by tag and repeatedly performing complete EPC matching.

[0087] MHAuth adds multiple independent authentication packets on top of MSAuth, thus requiring additional header tag location and processing. This increases authentication latency compared to MSAuth, and incurs additional overhead as the number of packets (q) increases. However, all MHAuth configurations still maintain good authentication efficiency. This result demonstrates that the multi-header packet extension trades limited authentication time overhead for authentication chain failure isolation capabilities.

[0088] like Figure 5 As shown, the ratio of the number of failed authentication tags to the actual number of forged tags is used as an indicator to measure the accuracy of the forgery scale estimation. The closer the ratio is to 1, the closer the number of failed authentication tags is to the actual number of forged tags. Traditional single-chain authentication methods exhibit a significant cascading authentication failure phenomenon when the number of forged tags is small. One forged tag may cause multiple subsequent legitimate tags to fail to complete authentication, thus the number of failed authentication tags is significantly greater than the actual number of forged tags.

[0089] Because MSAuth uses only a portion of the hub tags to handle subsequent addressing information, it reduces the impact of forged tags on the subsequent authentication process compared to traditional single-chain structures. Furthermore, MHAuth divides the set of tags to be authenticated into multiple independent authentication groups, confining any chain break within the corresponding group. When a forged tag appears in one group, other groups can still complete authentication independently, thus further narrowing the gap between the number of failed authentication tags and the actual number of forged tags.

[0090] Experimental results also show that as the number of authentication packets (q) increases, the ratio between the number of failed authentication tags and the actual number of forged tags decreases overall, indicating that increasing the number of independent authentication packets can enhance the chain truncation fault isolation capability and improve the accuracy of estimating the scale of forged tags. Meanwhile, combined with... Figure 3 and Figure 4 It can be seen that increasing q will bring certain initialization and authentication overhead. Therefore, in actual deployment, the appropriate number of groups can be selected according to the authentication efficiency and robustness requirements.

[0091] Secondly, this application also provides a tag offline integrity authentication system based on multiple successor pointers in a COTS RFID system, including: The access password generation module is used to obtain the EPC information and the recipient's identity identifier of the COTS RFID tag to be authenticated, and generate the corresponding access password based on the EPC information and the recipient's identity identifier. The short substring generation module is used to extract short EPC substrings for tag addressing from EPC information; The authentication chain construction module is used to select a hub tag and its associated successor tag from a preset order of COTS RFID tags to be authenticated, write the EPC short substring corresponding to the successor tag into the user storage area of ​​the associated hub tag, construct a multiple successor authentication chain, and write a start flag into the starting hub tag of the multiple successor authentication chain; wherein, the multiple successor authentication chain includes multiple hub tags, and the user storage area of ​​each hub tag stores the EPC short substring of the associated successor tag; the start flag is generated according to the receiver's identity identifier; The authentication module is used to locate the starting hub label of the multiple successor authentication chain according to the starting flag corresponding to the current recipient when receiving goods, and to access and authenticate the labels in the multiple successor authentication chain starting from the starting hub label according to the access password, so as to obtain the authentication results of each label.

[0092] In one embodiment, a computer device is provided, including a memory and a processor, wherein the memory stores a computer program, and the processor executes the computer program to implement the steps in the above-described method embodiments.

[0093] In one embodiment, a computer-readable storage medium is provided having a computer program stored thereon, which, when executed by a processor, implements the steps in the above method embodiments.

[0094] In one embodiment, a computer program product is provided, including a computer program that, when executed by a processor, implements the steps in the above method embodiments.

[0095] It should be noted that the user information (including but not limited to user device information, user personal information, etc.) and data (including but not limited to data used for analysis, data stored, data displayed, etc.) involved in this application are all information and data authorized by the user or fully authorized by all parties.

[0096] Those skilled in the art will understand that all or part of the processes in the above embodiments can be implemented by a computer program instructing related hardware. The computer program can be stored in a non-volatile computer-readable storage medium. When executed, the computer program can include the processes of the embodiments described above. Any references to memory, databases, or other media used in the embodiments provided in this application can include at least one of non-volatile and volatile memory. Non-volatile memory can include read-only memory (ROM), magnetic tape, floppy disk, flash memory, optical memory, high-density embedded non-volatile memory, resistive random access memory (ReRAM), magnetic random access memory (MRAM), ferroelectric random access memory (FRAM), phase change memory (PCM), graphene memory, etc. Volatile memory can include random access memory (RAM) or external cache memory, etc. By way of illustration and not limitation, RAM can take many forms, such as Static Random Access Memory (SRAM) or Dynamic Random Access Memory (DRAM). The databases involved in the embodiments provided in this application may include at least one type of relational database and non-relational database. Non-relational databases may include, but are not limited to, blockchain-based distributed databases. The processors involved in the embodiments provided in this application may be general-purpose processors, central processing units, graphics processing units, digital signal processors, programmable logic devices, quantum computing-based data processing logic devices, etc., and are not limited to these.

[0097] The technical features of the above embodiments can be combined in any way. For the sake of brevity, not all possible combinations of the technical features in the above embodiments are described. However, as long as there is no contradiction in the combination of these technical features, they should be considered to be within the scope of this specification.

[0098] The embodiments described above are merely illustrative of several implementation methods of this application, and while the descriptions are specific and detailed, they should not be construed as limiting the scope of this patent application. It should be noted that those skilled in the art can make various modifications and improvements without departing from the concept of this application, and these all fall within the protection scope of this application. Therefore, the protection scope of this application should be determined by the appended claims.

Claims

1. A tag offline integrity authentication method in a COTS RFID system based on multiple successor pointers, characterized in that, include: Obtain the EPC information and recipient identification of the COTS RFID tag to be authenticated, and generate the corresponding access password based on the EPC information and recipient identification; Extract the short EPC substring for tag addressing from the EPC information; Select a hub tag and its associated successor tag from the COTS RFID tags to be authenticated in a preset order. Write the EPC short substring corresponding to the successor tag into the user storage area of ​​the associated hub tag to construct a multi-successor authentication chain. Write a start flag into the starting hub tag of the multi-successor authentication chain. The start flag is generated based on the receiver's identity. Upon receiving goods, the starting hub label of the multi-subsequent authentication chain is located based on the starting marker corresponding to the current recipient. Then, based on the access password, the labels in the multi-subsequent authentication chain are accessed and authenticated starting from the starting hub label to obtain the authentication results of each label.

2. The method according to claim 1, characterized in that, The corresponding access password is generated based on the EPC information and the recipient's identity, using the following formula: app i =Trunk m (H(ti⊕ID R )) Among them, ap i The password is for access; ti is the tag t. i EPC information; IDR is the recipient's identity identifier; H(·) represents the hash function shared by the supplier and the recipient; Trunc m (·) indicates that m bits of the hash output are extracted.

3. The method according to claim 1, characterized in that, Extract the short EPC substring for tag addressing from the EPC information, including: A mathematical model is constructed to establish the relationship between the collision probability and the size of the interfering tags and the length of the EPC short substring in the identification environment; the collision probability represents the probability that there are identical EPC short substrings among the interfering tags. The length of the EPC short substring is determined based on a mathematical model and the storage capacity of the COTS RFID tag user area; after determining the length of the EPC short substring, the collision probability should be less than or equal to the preset maximum allowable collision probability. Based on the determined length of the EPC short substring, extract the corresponding length of the EPC short substring from the preset position in the EPC information.

4. The method according to claim 1, characterized in that, From a pre-arranged list of COTS RFID tags to be authenticated, select a hub tag and its associated successor tags to construct a multi-successor authentication chain, including: The COTS RFID tags to be certified are divided into multiple certification blocks according to a preset arrangement order; In each authentication block, select at least one hub label and at most p successor labels associated with the hub label, and use the first hub label of the first authentication block as the starting hub label to construct a multi-successor authentication chain; Among them, the number of successor tags p and the length of the EPC short substring l satisfy the tag user storage area capacity constraint: ; Where Mu represents the available capacity of the tag user storage area; |meta| represents the length of the starting flag; |meta| represents the length of the necessary control information.

5. The method according to claim 4, characterized in that, Access authentication is performed on tags in a multi-successor authentication chain, starting from the initial hub tag, based on the access password. This includes: Generate the access password corresponding to the hub tag based on the EPC information of the hub tag and the current recipient's identity; If the access password verification fails or the hub label does not respond, the hub label will be marked as a suspected forged label or an authentication failure label. When the access password verification is successful, the short substring of the successor tag EPC is read from the hub tag user storage area, and the successor tag is located based on the read short substring of the successor tag EPC. The access password corresponding to the successor tag is generated according to the EPC information of the successor tag and the current recipient's identity. When the access password corresponding to the successor tag is successfully verified, the successor tag is confirmed to have passed integrity authentication. When the access password corresponding to the successor tag fails to verify, has no response, or is inconsistent with the expected authentication chain structure, the successor tag is determined to be a suspected forged tag or an authentication failed tag.

6. The method according to claim 4, characterized in that, From a pre-arranged list of COTS RFID tags to be authenticated, a hub tag and its associated successor tags are selected to construct a multi-successor authentication chain, which also includes: The COTS RFID tags to be certified are divided into multiple independent certification groups according to a preset arrangement order; For each independent authentication group, each independent authentication group is divided into multiple authentication blocks. In each authentication block, at least one hub label and at most p successor labels associated with the hub label are selected. The first hub label of the first authentication block is used as the starting hub label to construct the sub-multiple successor authentication chain corresponding to each independent authentication group. The sub-multiple successor authentication chains are sorted according to the independent authentication grouping order to obtain the multiple successor authentication chains; Among them, the number of successor tags p and the length of the EPC short substring l satisfy the tag user storage area capacity constraint: ; Where Mu represents the available capacity of the tag user storage area; |meta| represents the length of the starting flag; |meta| represents the length of the necessary control information.

7. The method according to claim 6, characterized in that, The starting hub label of the multi-successor authentication chain is located based on the starting flag corresponding to the current recipient, and access authentication is performed on the labels in the multi-successor authentication chain starting from the starting hub label based on the access password, including: The starting hub label of each sub-multiple successor authentication chain is located based on the starting flag corresponding to the current receiver, and each sub-multiple successor authentication chain is authenticated separately. The authentication process includes: Generate the access password corresponding to the hub tag based on the EPC information of the hub tag and the current recipient's identity; If the access password verification fails or the hub label does not respond, the hub label will be marked as a suspected forged label or an authentication failure label. When the access password verification is successful, the short substring of the successor tag EPC is read from the hub tag user storage area, and the successor tag is located based on the read short substring of the successor tag EPC. The access password corresponding to the successor tag is generated according to the EPC information of the successor tag and the current recipient's identity. When the access password corresponding to the successor tag is successfully verified, the successor tag is confirmed to have passed integrity authentication. When the access password corresponding to the successor tag fails to verify, has no response, or is inconsistent with the expected authentication chain structure, the successor tag is determined to be a suspected forged tag or an authentication failed tag.

8. A tag offline integrity authentication system in a COTS RFID system based on multiple successor pointers, characterized in that, include: The access password generation module is used to obtain the EPC information and the recipient's identity identifier of the COTS RFID tag to be authenticated, and generate the corresponding access password based on the EPC information and the recipient's identity identifier. The short substring generation module is used to extract short EPC substrings for tag addressing from EPC information; The authentication chain construction module is used to select a hub tag and its associated successor tag from a preset order of COTS RFID tags to be authenticated, write the EPC short substring corresponding to the successor tag into the user storage area of ​​the associated hub tag, construct a multiple successor authentication chain, and write a start flag into the starting hub tag of the multiple successor authentication chain; wherein, the multiple successor authentication chain includes multiple hub tags, and the user storage area of ​​each hub tag stores the EPC short substring of the associated successor tag; the start flag is generated according to the receiver's identity identifier; The authentication module is used to locate the starting hub label of the multiple successor authentication chain according to the starting flag corresponding to the current recipient when receiving goods, and to access and authenticate the labels in the multiple successor authentication chain starting from the starting hub label according to the access password, so as to obtain the authentication results of each label.

9. A computer device comprising a memory and a processor, wherein the memory stores a computer program, characterized in that, When the processor executes the computer program, it implements the steps of the method according to any one of claims 1 to 7.

10. A computer-readable storage medium having a computer program stored thereon, characterized in that, When the computer program is executed by a processor, it implements the steps of the method according to any one of claims 1 to 7.

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