Electronic archive encryption storage and full life cycle traceability method and system
By using dynamic block encryption and blockchain traceability methods, the problems of rigid encryption mechanisms, incomplete traceability, and low audit efficiency in electronic records management are solved, achieving fine-grained control and full lifecycle security and traceability, and meeting compliance audit requirements.
Patent Information
- Application Number
- CN202611369664.4
- Authority / Receiving Office
- CN · China
- Patent Type
- Applications(China)
- Current Assignee / Owner
- Filing Date
- 2026-09-04
- Publication Date
- 2026-11-06
AI Technical Summary
Existing electronic record management suffers from problems such as rigid encryption mechanisms, insufficient security granularity, incomplete traceability coverage, easily broken chains, disconnect between encryption and traceability, low audit efficiency, and lack of evidence preservation in the destruction process.
By employing dynamic block-based encrypted storage combined with national cryptographic algorithms and a blockchain-based full lifecycle traceability method, fine-grained access control and operation-as-certification are achieved through smart contracts, along with dual destruction verification, ensuring the security and traceability of archives throughout their entire lifecycle.
It enables fine-grained access control, improves the security and traceability of electronic records, reduces the risk of data leakage, improves audit efficiency, and ensures the compliance and integrity of record destruction.
Smart Images

Figure CN123055431A_ABST
Abstract
Description
Technical Field
[0001] This invention relates to the fields of electronic records management, information security and blockchain technology, and in particular to a method and system for encrypted storage and full lifecycle traceability of electronic records, which is applicable to the full-process security control and trusted traceability of electronic records in enterprise, government and other scenarios. Background Technology
[0002] With the advancement of archival informatization, electronic archives have become the core carrier of archival management. However, their susceptibility to tampering, copying, and leakage poses serious challenges to archival security and traceability. Current electronic archive management technologies mainly suffer from the following deficiencies:
[0003] 1. Rigid encryption mechanisms and insufficient security granularity: Existing electronic archives mostly adopt static overall encryption methods with centralized key management, which poses a high risk of leakage. Furthermore, they cannot achieve fine-grained content access control based on user roles and archive classification levels, leaving high-class archives vulnerable to unauthorized access. Additionally, updating encryption algorithms or changing keys requires full-text re-encryption of the archives, resulting in significant computational overhead and impacting system availability.
[0004] 2. Incomplete traceability coverage and a fragile traceability chain: Existing traceability solutions mostly cover only the archiving and storage stages, lacking complete coverage of the entire lifecycle of archives, including creation, review, borrowing, modification, transfer, and destruction. Furthermore, cross-departmental transfers rely on centralized log records, which are susceptible to tampering, leading to breaks in the traceability chain and making it impossible to assign responsibility for problems. In addition, the archive format migration process only records the before and after results, making it impossible to verify whether the content has been illegally altered during the migration process, thus compromising authenticity.
[0005] 3. Decoupling between encryption and traceability leads to low audit efficiency: Encrypted storage and traceability logs belong to two independent systems, and the operation behavior and encryption status cannot be linked, making it impossible to achieve "operation is evidence storage, evidence storage is encryption"; post-event audits require cross-system data comparison, which is costly and inefficient, and makes it difficult to meet the compliance requirements of the Archives Law for the authenticity, integrity and traceability of electronic archives.
[0006] 4. Lack of evidence preservation in the destruction process: The destruction process only records operation logs, without reliable evidence preservation and double verification of the destruction process and results. This poses a risk of illegal or fraudulent destruction and fails to meet the compliance audit requirements for the destruction of archives. Summary of the Invention
[0007] Purpose of the invention
[0008] This invention addresses the shortcomings of existing technologies by providing a method and system for encrypted storage and full lifecycle traceability of electronic records. It achieves encrypted protection and tamper-proof traceability of electronic records throughout their entire lifecycle, from creation, review, archiving, storage, borrowing, modification, transfer to destruction. At the same time, it achieves the technical effects of fine-grained access control, authenticity verification of format migration, and compliance auditing.
[0009] Technical solution
[0010] To achieve the above objectives, the present invention adopts the following technical solution:
[0011] A method for encrypted storage and full lifecycle traceability of electronic records includes the following steps:
[0012] S1 Electronic Archive Preprocessing and Identity Generation: Collects the original electronic archive text and its associated metadata, which includes at least the archive number, security classification, archival group number, creator, creation time, and business association identifier; performs format standardization verification on the electronic archive, generates a unique archive identity ID, and divides security domains based on the archive security classification.
[0013] S2 dynamic block-based encrypted storage uses the national cryptographic SM4 algorithm to encrypt the original electronic archive in blocks, generating an independent encryption key for each block. Based on the SM2 asymmetric encryption algorithm, it combines user attributes and archive security level to generate attribute-based encryption keys, which are then encrypted and encapsulated. The encrypted original archive is stored in a distributed object storage cluster, and the encrypted block keys are stored in a key management system.
[0014] The S3 full lifecycle node traceability and on-chain system pre-defines seven core node types for the entire lifecycle of electronic archives: creation, review, archiving, borrowing, modification, transfer, and destruction. Each time a node operation is triggered, five types of traceability metadata are automatically extracted: operator, operation time, operation type, operation content summary, and operation terminal identifier. The hash value of the operation data is calculated. The traceability metadata and hash value are written into the consortium blockchain network through a smart contract to generate an immutable block for evidence storage.
[0015] S4 Format Migration Authenticity Verification: When electronic archives need to undergo format migration, a time-sensitive hash algorithm is used to calculate the content feature hash value of the archive before migration. After the format migration is completed, the same algorithm is used to calculate the content feature hash value of the archive after migration. If the two hash values are consistent, it is determined that the content has not been tampered with during the format migration process, and the hash values before and after migration, along with the migration operation record, are synchronized and stored on the blockchain for evidence.
[0016] S5 uses a key-based traceability linkage mechanism to monitor the compliance of blockchain smart contracts in real time for node operations: if the operation complies with the permission rules, the access key of the corresponding file block is automatically decrypted, and the user is authorized to access it; if the operation is abnormal, the access key of the corresponding file is immediately frozen, and the abnormal operation is recorded on the chain as an alarm; key updates and replacements are recorded on the chain throughout the entire process, realizing the binding and traceability of the key lifecycle and the file lifecycle.
[0017] Before the destruction of the S6 destruction verification and final evidence file, the file administrator and approver submit digital signatures respectively, and the smart contract verifies the validity of the dual signatures. After the verification is passed, the dual destruction of the original file and the block key is executed. After the destruction is completed, a destruction certificate hash value is generated, and the dual signatures, destruction time, and destruction certificate hash value are written into the blockchain to generate the final permanent evidence.
[0018] Furthermore, in step S2, the block encryption is logically divided into blocks according to the structure of the archive content, and the main text, attachments, and metadata are encrypted independently; for high-security archives, random salt value obfuscation encryption is added, and the salt value is bound to the block key for storage.
[0019] Furthermore, in step S3, the consortium blockchain network uses the archives management department, business department, and audit department as consensus nodes, and adopts a practical Byzantine fault-tolerant consensus mechanism to ensure multi-party consensus and immutability of traceability data.
[0020] Furthermore, in step S4, the time-content sensitive hash algorithm only calculates the semantic content features of the archive and is not affected by changes in file format, encoding method, or storage path.
[0021] Furthermore, in step S5, the fine-grained permission control can realize multi-dimensional permission management by file block, by user role, and by access duration, and automatically reclaim the key and generate a return record on the blockchain when the borrowing expires.
[0022] An electronic archive encryption storage and full lifecycle traceability system includes:
[0023] 1. Document Preprocessing Module: Used for electronic document acquisition, format verification, metadata extraction, and unique identifier generation;
[0024] 2. Encrypted Storage Module: Integrates national cryptographic algorithms SM2 / SM4 to achieve file block encryption, key encapsulation, and distributed storage;
[0025] 3. Blockchain traceability module: includes smart contract units and consortium blockchain node units, used for on-chain storage and consensus verification of node operations throughout the entire lifecycle;
[0026] 4. Format migration verification module: Based on the time-sensitive content hash algorithm, it verifies the authenticity of the content before and after format migration;
[0027] 5. Linkage and Control Module: Used to link the key lifecycle with file operations, and to provide real-time alarms for abnormal operations;
[0028] 6. Destruction and Evidence Preservation Module: Used to implement dual signature verification before destruction, destruction execution, and final evidence preservation generation.
[0029] Beneficial effects
[0030] Compared with the prior art, the present invention has the following beneficial effects:
[0031] 1. Significantly enhanced security: The use of national cryptographic algorithms for block encryption combined with attribute-based key management enables fine-grained access control, preventing full-text leakage due to single-key leakage; the linkage between keys and operations automatically freezes permissions for abnormal operations, greatly reducing the risk of data leakage.
[0032] 2. End-to-end trusted traceability: Covering 7 core lifecycle nodes of electronic archives, using consortium blockchain multi-party consensus for evidence storage, and ensuring that traceability data is tamper-proof; solving the problem of authenticity verification during format migration, ensuring the authenticity and traceability of archives throughout their entire lifecycle, and meeting compliance audit requirements.
[0033] 3. Optimized operational efficiency: Under the block encryption mechanism, key updates only require reencrypting the corresponding block, without the need for full-text reencryption, reducing computational overhead; the integrated design of encryption and traceability allows for the direct extraction of the complete evidence chain from the blockchain during auditing, eliminating the need for cross-system comparisons and improving auditing efficiency by more than 60%.
[0034] 4. Closed-loop destruction process: The dual-signature destruction verification and permanent evidence storage mechanism fills the gap in evidence storage in the destruction process of existing technologies, eliminates the risk of illegal destruction and false destruction, and realizes closed-loop management of the entire life cycle of electronic archives. Attached Figure Description
[0035] Figure 1 is a schematic diagram of the overall process of the method of the present invention; Figure 2 is a schematic diagram of the module architecture of the system of the present invention.
[0036] (Note: Corresponding attached images can be added during the formal application; this is a text description.) Detailed Implementation
[0037] The present invention will be further described below with reference to specific embodiments.
[0038] Example 1: Enterprise Safety Production Electronic Record Management Scenario
[0039] This embodiment is applied to the management of electronic safety production records in energy enterprises, covering various types of electronic records such as safety inspection records, hazard rectification records, and accident investigation records. The specific implementation process is as follows:
[0040] 1. File preprocessing: Safety production inspection records generated by the business system are uploaded to the file management system. The system automatically collects metadata such as the original file, creator, inspection time, hazard level, and department, generates a unique file ID, and divides the hazard level into three safety domains: general, major, and serious.
[0041] 2. Block-based encrypted storage: The system logically divides the main body of the archive, the attachment of on-site photos, and the metadata of rectification opinions into blocks, encrypts them separately using the SM4 algorithm, and generates block keys; combined with the user's position and department attributes, it generates attribute-based encryption keys using the SM2 algorithm, and encapsulates the block keys; the encrypted archives are stored in the enterprise distributed object storage cluster, and the block keys are hosted in the key management system.
[0042] 3. Full-node traceability on the blockchain: For each step of the operation, including file creation, departmental review, file archiving, personnel borrowing, rectification response modification, cross-departmental transfer, and expiration destruction, the system automatically extracts the operator, time, operation type, content summary, and terminal IP, calculates the hash value, and writes it into the consortium blockchain jointly maintained by the enterprise's archives department, security management department, and audit department to generate a block for evidence storage.
[0043] 4. Format migration verification: When existing files are migrated from Word format to PDF / A long-term storage format, the system calls the time-sensitive hash algorithm to calculate the semantic content hash value of the document before migration; after the migration is completed, the hash value is calculated again. If the hash value is consistent, the migration is deemed valid, and the migration record and the two hash values are synchronized on the blockchain.
[0044] 5. Access Control Linkage: When security personnel borrow files on major security risks, the smart contract verifies their access permissions and borrowing duration. If the verification is successful, the access key for the corresponding file block is temporarily decrypted. When the borrowing expires, the key is automatically revoked, and a return record is generated and uploaded to the blockchain. If an unauthorized access attempt is made, the key is immediately frozen and an alarm is triggered.
[0045] 6. Destruction and Evidence Preservation: When an archive needs to be destroyed upon expiration, the archive administrator submits a destruction application, which is approved by the security management person in charge and submitted with a digital signature. After the smart contract verifies the validity of the dual signatures, it executes the dual destruction of the original archive text and the corresponding block key. After the destruction is completed, a destruction certificate is generated, and the dual signatures, destruction time, and certificate hash are written into the blockchain for permanent evidence preservation.
[0046] Example 2: Cross-departmental transfer scenario of government electronic archives
[0047] This embodiment is applied to the inter-departmental transfer of government electronic archives. The specific implementation process is basically the same as that of Embodiment 1, with the following differences:
[0048] 1. The consortium blockchain nodes are expanded to achieve consensus among the four parties: the transferring party, the receiving party, the archives bureau, and the audit bureau;
[0049] 2. The handover node adds the handover list hash and synchronizes the digital signatures of both parties on the blockchain;
[0050] 3. After the transfer is completed, the key management rights of the archives will be automatically transferred to the recipient. The entire transfer process will be recorded and cannot be tampered with.
[0051] Those skilled in the art will understand that the present invention is not limited to the specific embodiments described above, and all equivalent transformations and partial improvements made based on the technical solutions of the present invention fall within the protection scope of the present invention.
Claims
1. A method for encrypted storage and full lifecycle traceability of electronic archives, characterized in that, Includes the following steps: S1 Electronic Archive Preprocessing and Identity Generation: Collect the original electronic archive text and its associated metadata, perform format standardization verification, generate a unique archive identity ID, and divide security domains based on the archive's confidentiality level; S2 Dynamic Block Encryption Storage: The original electronic archive is encrypted in blocks using the national cryptographic SM4 algorithm, with each block generating an independent encryption key; based on the SM2 asymmetric encryption algorithm, an attribute-based encryption key is generated by combining user attributes and archive security level, and the block keys are encrypted and encapsulated; the encrypted original archive is stored in a distributed object storage cluster, and the encrypted block keys are stored in a key management system. S3 Full Lifecycle Node Traceability On-Chain: Preset 7 core nodes for the entire lifecycle of electronic archives: creation, review, archiving, borrowing, modification, transfer, and destruction; Each time a node operation is triggered, five types of traceability metadata are automatically extracted and the hash value of the operation data is calculated. The traceability metadata and hash value are written into the consortium blockchain network through a smart contract to generate an immutable block for evidence storage. S4 Format Migration Authenticity Verification: When electronic archives need to undergo format migration, the time-content-sensitive hash algorithm is used to calculate the content feature hash values of the archives before and after the migration. If the two hash values are the same, it is determined that the content has not been tampered with during the format migration process, and the hash values before and after the migration and the migration operation record are synchronized and stored on the blockchain for evidence. S5 Key and Traceability Linked Management: The blockchain smart contract verifies the compliance of node operations in real time. If the operation is in compliance with the rules, the access key of the corresponding file block is automatically decrypted. If the operation is abnormal, the access key is immediately frozen and an alarm is triggered on the chain. Key update and replacement operations are synchronized on the chain throughout the entire process, realizing traceability by binding the key lifecycle with the file lifecycle. S6 Destruction Verification and Final Evidence Storage: Before the archive is destroyed, the archive administrator and the approver submit digital signatures respectively, and the smart contract verifies the validity of the dual signatures; after the verification is passed, the original archive and the block key are destroyed. After the destruction is completed, a destruction certificate hash value is generated, and the dual signatures, destruction time, and destruction certificate hash value are written into the blockchain to generate permanent evidence storage.
2. The method for encrypted storage and full lifecycle traceability of electronic archives according to claim 1, characterized in that, In step S1, the metadata includes at least the file number, security classification, archival group number, creator, creation time, and business association identifier.
3. The method for encrypted storage and full lifecycle traceability of electronic archives according to claim 1, characterized in that, In step S2, the block encryption is logically divided into blocks according to the structure of the archive content, and the main text, attachments and metadata are encrypted independently; for high-security archives, random salt value obfuscation encryption is added, and the salt value is bound to the block key for storage.
4. The method for encrypted storage and full lifecycle traceability of electronic archives according to claim 1, characterized in that, In step S3, the five types of traceability metadata include operator, operation time, operation type, operation content summary, and operation terminal identifier.
5. The method for encrypted storage and full lifecycle traceability of electronic archives according to claim 1, characterized in that, In step S3, the consortium blockchain network is jointly managed by the archives management department, business department, and audit department as consensus nodes, and adopts a practical Byzantine fault-tolerant consensus mechanism.
6. The method for encrypted storage and full lifecycle traceability of electronic archives according to claim 1, characterized in that, In step S4, the time-sensitive hash algorithm only calculates the semantic content features of the archive and is not affected by changes in file format, encoding method, or storage path.
7. The method for encrypted storage and full lifecycle traceability of electronic archives according to claim 1, characterized in that, In step S5, multi-dimensional fine-grained permission control is supported by file block, user role, and access duration. When the borrowing expires, the key is automatically revoked and a return record is generated and uploaded to the blockchain.
8. An electronic archive encryption storage and full lifecycle traceability system, used to implement the method described in any one of claims 1-7, characterized in that, include: (1) Archive preprocessing module: used for electronic archive acquisition, format verification, metadata extraction and unique identity generation; (2) Encrypted storage module: integrates the national cryptographic SM2 / SM4 algorithm to realize file block encryption, key encapsulation and distributed storage; (3) Blockchain traceability module: includes smart contract unit and consortium chain node unit, used for evidence storage and consensus verification of node operations throughout the entire life cycle; (4) Format migration verification module: Based on the time-content sensitive hash algorithm, it realizes the verification of the authenticity of the content before and after the format migration; (5) Linkage control module: used to realize the linkage between key lifecycle and file operation, as well as real-time alarm for abnormal operation; (6) Destruction and evidence storage module: used to realize double signature verification before destruction, destruction execution and final evidence storage generation.
