Securely booting a computer from a device trusted by the user.

The method enables secure booting from a user-trusted entity by transferring boot and operating system loaders to the computer's memory without storage on the hard drive, using encryption drivers and keys stored on the trusted entity to prevent unauthorized access, addressing vulnerabilities in existing systems.

DE112016000576B4Active Publication Date: 2026-11-19INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS MACHINE CORPORATION
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Patent Information

Application Number
DE112016000576
Authority / Receiving Office
DE · DE
Patent Type
Patents
Current Assignee / Owner
Priority Date
2016-03-10
Filing Date
2016-03-10
Publication Date
2026-11-19
Estimated Expiration
2036-03-10

AI Technical Summary

Technical Problem

Existing computer booting systems are vulnerable to attackers who can manipulate the operating system loader to steal the password, allowing unauthorized access to encrypted data.

Method used

A method and system that allows a computer to boot from a user-trusted entity, transferring the boot loader and operating system loader to the computer's memory without storing it on the hard drive, and using encryption drivers to access encrypted data with keys stored on the trusted entity, preventing unauthorized access.

Benefits of technology

Ensures secure booting by preventing manipulation of the boot and operating system loaders, ensuring only genuine loaders are executed, and securing the encryption keys, thus reducing the risk of unauthorized access to encrypted data.

✦ Generated by Eureka AI based on patent content.

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Abstract

Method for enabling a computer (10) to be booted from a user-trusted entity (20), wherein: the computer (10) has a long-term storage unit (11) that stores operating system services (25) or OS services; and the user-trusted entity (20) is connectable to the computer (10) and stores: a boot loader (16a) that, after the user-trusted entity (20) connects to the computer (10), is detectable and executable by a firmware (122) of the computer; an OS loader (24a) for an operating system (112) or OS of the computer; and one or more encryption drivers (26a) for the OS designed to enable access to the OS and data stored in encrypted form on the data storage unit (11); wherein the user-trusted entity is designed toto prevent unauthorized access to, in each case: the boot loader; the one or more encryption drivers; and the OS loader, which are stored thereon, wherein the procedure, prior to connecting (S21) the user-trusted entity to the computer, comprises: analyzing (S11) the long-term storage unit to capture one or more of the following entities: a boot loader (16); an OS loader (24); and one or more encryption drivers (26), each of which reside unencrypted on the computer's long-term storage unit (11); and, after an authorization check (S11a) for the user-trusted entity, storing (S12) versions of the respective captured entities on the user-trusted entity, such as the boot loader (16a) and / or the OS loader (24a) and / or the one or more encryption drivers (26a).wherein the stored versions of the boot loader and / or the OS loader are reconfigured to cause, after the subsequent execution (S23, S27) of the boot loader and / or the OS loader, the boot configuration parameters of the OS loader to be reconfigured to allow the OS services to be started from the long-term storage unit on the computer, wherein the method preferably includes removing or disabling the boot loader and / or OS loader captured in the storage unit (11), wherein the method further includes: after connecting (S21) the user-trusted unit to the computer, allowing (S22) the boot loader (16a) to be captured by the firmware (122) for subsequent, at least partial, execution (S23) of the boot loader (16b) on the computer.to transfer (S25) the OS loader (24a) from the user-trusted unit to the computer by loading (S25) the OS loader into main memory (110) of the computer without storing any part of the loaded OS loader on the long-term storage unit (11) of the computer; and to execute (S27) the transferred OS loader (24b) at least partially on the computer (10) to cause (S29) the execution of one or more encryption drivers (26b) for the OS and a kernel (27) of the OS to start the OS services (25) and complete the boot process of the computer.
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Description

AREA OF INVENTION The invention relates generally to the field of methods for securely booting computers, and in particular to booting a computer from a trusted unit, such as a lightweight, protected storage unit. BACKGROUND OF THE INVENTION Today, more and more computer users are encrypting their hard drives (or, more generally, their long-term data storage devices) to ensure that, in the event of hard drive loss, the "finder" cannot access the user's data. Full disk encryption is ideal for preventing such a finder from accessing the data. However, common disk encryption solutions do not prevent someone with access to the computer from spying on the legitimate user's password. Systems using encrypted disks must be able to boot the computer from the hard drive. This is achieved by using an unencrypted operating system loader, which typically includes a boot loader. Otherwise, the BIOS (or initializing firmware) would be unable to decrypt the disk and thus boot. The boot loader or operating system loader then prompts the user for a password, which is used to unlock the encryption key. With this key, the encrypted contents of the hard drive can be decrypted, and the operating system can then be started. One problem that arises is that an attacker can manipulate the (plaintext-stored) OS loader to save a copy of the password (e.g., somewhere on the computer in plaintext, or, if available, send it to a server via the computer's network interface) the next time the user starts their computer. If the computer has been started with the compromised OS loader, the attacker can read the password from their location and gain access to the computer. Publication GB 2 508 892 A concerns a trusted user device connected to a host computer. The host computer is booted from the device. The computer's boot firmware detects that the device contains a bootable partition and loads the update software from the device into the computer's memory. The update software transfers an update for the software on the device from a network server to the computer and updates the software on the device. The update software can use the host computer's network interface if the device does not have its own network interface. The device can have secure and non-secure memory. The non-secure memory can be encrypted using a key stored in the secure memory. Document WO 2013 / 046 068 A1 describes a method for transferring an operating system image from a server to an untrusted user device via a data communication network. A trusted device, such as a USB flash drive, has tamper-proof storage containing bootloader logic for controlling the boot process of the user device, as well as security data. When the trusted device is connected to an untrusted user device, the user device is booted via the bootloader logic on the trusted device. Under the control of the bootloader logic, a connection to the server is established over the network, and the server is authenticated using the security data on the trusted device. An operating system boot image is then received from the server via this connection.The boot image is used to transfer an operating system image from the server to the user's device so that the operating system can be run on the user's device. Publication US 2011 / 0055540A1 relates to a system comprising: a system firmware for initializing the system hardware; an operating system loader (OS loader) for starting an operating system; and a pre-boot loader that functionally sits between the system firmware and the operating system loader, the pre-boot loader being configured to reduce system startup time by bypassing at least some of the functions of the operating system loader. BRIEF SUMMARY OF THE INVENTION The invention relates to a method according to claim 1, a method according to claim 12, a user-trusted unit according to claim 13, a computerized system according to claim 14, and a computer program product according to claim 15.A method enables a computer to be booted from a user-trusted entity, wherein: - the computer has a long-term storage unit that stores operating system services; and - the user-trusted entity is connectable to the computer and stores: - a boot loader that, after the user-trusted entity connects to the computer, is detectable and executable by firmware on the computer; - an operating system loader for an operating system of the computer; and - one or more encryption drivers for the operating system designed to enable access to the operating system and data stored encrypted on the data storage unit; - wherein the user-trusted entity is designed to prevent unauthorized access to, in each case: the boot loader; the one or more encryption drivers;and the OS loader stored therein, - the method comprising: - after connecting the user-trusted unit to the computer, allowing the firmware to capture the boot loader for subsequent, at least partial, execution of the boot loader on the computer to cause the OS loader to be transferred from the user-trusted unit to the computer by loading the OS loader into main memory of the computer without storing any part of the loaded OS loader on the computer's long-term storage device; and - executing the transferred OS loader, at least partially, on the computer to cause the execution of one or more encryption drivers for the OS and an OS kernel to start the OS services and complete the computer's boot process.; In embodiments, the method may include one or more of the following features: The boot loader and / or the OS loader are designed to cause, upon subsequent at least partial execution on the computer, the boot configuration parameters of the transferred OS loader to be reconfigured, for example, by storing boot configuration data to enable the OS services to be started from the long-term data storage unit. The procedure further includes: retrieving a key for encryption and / or decryption from the entity trusted by the user and providing the retrieved key to the one or more encryption drivers during their execution. The procedure further involves: prior to connecting the user-trusted entity to the computer: analyzing the long-term storage device to capture one or more of the following entities: a boot loader; an OS loader; and one or more encryption drivers, each residing unencrypted on the computer's long-term storage device;and, after an authorization check for the user-trusted entity, storing versions of the captured entities on the user-trusted entity as the boot loader and / or the OS loader and / or the one or more encryption drivers, wherein the stored versions of the boot loader and / or the OS loader are reconfigured to cause, after subsequent execution of the boot loader and / or the OS loader, the boot configuration parameters of the OS loader to be reconfigured to allow the OS services to be started from the long-term storage unit on the computer, and wherein the method preferably includes removing or disabling the boot loader and / or OS loader captured in the storage unit. The analyzed long-term data storage unit is unencrypted, the method further comprising, prior to connecting the user-trusted unit to the computer, storing one or more encryption drivers for the OS on the user-trusted unit, in addition to storing or as part of storing a newly configured version of the captured OS loader, preferably by adding the one or more encryption drivers of the OS loader, such that the version of the OS loader stored on the user-trusted unit contains the one or more encryption drivers. The procedure further includes: prior to connecting the user-trusted unit to the computer: generating at least one key for encrypting and decrypting the long-term data storage unit and storing the at least one generated key on the user-trusted unit; configuring one or more encryption drivers and the OS loader for them to cause the retrieval of the at least one generated key from the user-trusted unit before or during an execution of one or more encryption drivers, which is caused by the subsequent execution of the transferred OS loader; and encrypting the data storage unit with one of the at least one generated keys. The analyzed long-term data storage unit is encrypted, and the procedure further includes: before connecting the unit trusted by the user to the computer: retrieving at least one key for encrypting and decrypting the data storage unit from the computer;and storing the retrieved at least one key on the user-trusted entity or an entity accessible to the user-trusted entity, such as a smart card, and removing the retrieved at least one key from the computer, wherein storing versions of the captured entities includes storing versions of the one or more encryption drivers and the OS loader, the versions of which have been reconfigured to cause the key to be retrieved from the user-trusted entity before or during an execution of the one or more encryption drivers, which is caused by the subsequent execution of the transferred OS loader. The procedure further includes: before connecting the user-trusted entity to the computer and during the installation of the OS on the computer: configuring one or more encryption drivers and / or the OS loader so that the one or more configured encryption drivers and the OS loader can be stored on the user-trusted entity and are preferably able to cause the retrieval of the key from the user-trusted entity upon subsequent execution of the OS loader that was transferred to the computer. The procedure further includes: after the computer's boot process is complete: authorization verification for the user-trusted entity to allow a newly configured version of the boot loader and / or OS loader to be stored on the user-trusted entity. The procedure further includes: replacing the captured bootloader and / or the captured OS loader on the long-term data storage unit with a honeypot bootloader and / or a honeypot OS loader; and storing a copy of each of the honeypot bootloader and the honeypot OS loader on the unit trusted by the user. The bootloader is further designed such that, after the user-trusted unit is connected to the computer, the firmware detects the bootloader and then executes it, at least partially, on the computer to further: compare the honeypot bootloader and / or honeypot OS loader as stored on the computer (in place of the detected bootloader and / or OS loader) with the honeypot bootloader and / or honeypot OS loader as stored on the user-trusted unit; and if the compared versions do not differ, execute the transferred OS loader, at least partially, from the computer. The procedure further indicates: if the compared versions differ, notify that the compared versions differ. According to another aspect, the invention is embodied as a user-trusted unit designed to allow a computer to be booted from the unit, wherein the user-trusted unit is connectable to the computer and comprises: a boot loader program that, after the user-trusted unit is connected to the computer, is detectable and executable by the computer's firmware; an operating system loader or OS loader for an operating system or OS of the computer, and wherein: the user-trusted unit is further designed to prevent any unauthorized user from modifying the boot loader and the OS loader stored therein; and the boot loader and the OS loader, on the other hand, are configured to enable the implementation of all method steps according to embodiments. A computer program product enables a computer to be booted from a unit trusted by the user, wherein the computer program product comprises a computer-readable storage medium with computer-readable program code embodied thereon, preferably consisting of several modules, wherein the computer-readable program code is configured to implement all steps of the method according to the present embodiments. Units, systems and procedures are described below using non-restrictive examples and with reference to the accompanying drawings. Brief description of some views of the drawings Fig. 1 schematically represents a computerized system suitable for implementing one or more process steps involved in embodiments; Fig. 2 schematically illustrates selected components of a user-trusted unit involved in embodiments and configured to implement process steps as in embodiments; and Figs. 3, 4, 5, 6, 7 to 8 represent flowcharts illustrating problem-oriented, top-level process steps according to embodiments. DETAILED DESCRIPTION OF THE INVENTION With reference to Fig. 1, Fig. 2 to Fig. 3, an aspect of the invention is first described which relates to a method that enables a computer 10 to be booted securely from a user-trusted unit 20 (hereinafter referred to as UTD, user trusted device). The assumed technical context is as follows: the computer 10 includes, in particular, a long-term data storage unit 11, which is typically a hard disk drive (or HDD), solid-state memory, or any other suitable mass storage device. For illustrative purposes, the long-term data storage unit is assumed below to be an HDD without limitation of generality. The HDD stores operating system services 25, or OS services. The UTD 20 is connectable to the computer 10 and stores, in particular: a boot loader 16a and an operating system loader (hereinafter referred to as the OS loader) 24a, as well as one or more encryption drivers 26a. The boot loader 16a is configured to be discoverable and executable by firmware 122 (e.g., the BIOS) of the computer after the UTD 20 is connected to the computer 10.The OS loader 24a is designed to load the computer's OS 112, whereas the encryption drivers 26a are designed to allow access to this OS as well as other data (e.g., user data such as documents, files, or applications) that are stored encrypted on the HDD 11. The aforementioned UTD is a "user-trusted" entity in the sense that it is designed to prevent unauthorized access to (for each) the bootloader, encryption drivers, and OS loader stored on it. As discussed in more detail below, other features can be provided to further secure it. Essentially, the present procedures revolve around the following two main steps: First, after the UTD connects to the computer (S21), the firmware (S22) detects the bootloader program (S22), thereby initiating its execution (S23). This execution takes place, at least partially, within the computer. That is, the execution of the bootloader can occur either only within the computer or simultaneously within the UTD and the computer. For this purpose, contents (S23) of the bootloader program can be transferred to the computer's main memory (S24a). The execution of the bootloader program then transfers the OS loader (S25) from the UTD to the computer by loading the OS loader into the computer's main memory (S25). However, this transfer does not store any part of the loaded OS loader on the hard drive (HDD) (S21). Secondly, the transferred OS loader 24b is executed at least partially on computer 10, S27, which in turn causes the encryption drivers 26b and a kernel 27 of the OS to be executed, S29, to start the OS services 25 and complete the booting process. In certain embodiments and beyond the OS services, the computer's hard disk drive (HDD) can also store other OS components, such as one or more of the OS kernel; OS libraries; additional encryption drivers; an initial version of the OS loader; or even more OS application programs. Some of these components may also be stored elsewhere; they do not necessarily have to be stored on the HDD. However, they should be available to the computer in a timely manner and as required for booting. Thus, the OS kernel, libraries, and encryption drivers can initially be stored anywhere, provided they are transferred to the computer in a timely manner for booting (such components are loaded into main memory via a normal boot process). The concepts of OS services, OS kernel, libraries, and encryption drivers are well-known. OS services are services provided by an operating system that can be used by application programs. These include system libraries, daemons on Unix systems, and system services on Windows systems. Encryption drivers can be thought of as decryption / encryption modules designed to allow the OS access to encrypted data stored on the hard drive. Regarding OS loader versus boot loader: When a computer is powered on or restarted, a firmware component (usually the basic input / output system or BIOS) typically performs some initial tests and then transfers control to the master boot set (MBR), where the boot loader is usually located. Among other things, the MBR contains executable code that functions as a loader for an installed operating system. This MBR code is usually referenced as the boot loader. For UEFI (Unified Extensible Firmware Interface) firmware, the boot loader is usually stored as a file in the EFI (Extensible Firmware Interface) system partition, which is executed by the UEFI firmware. Therefore, in the context of the invention, the boot loader is executable code that performs some operations necessary to load the OS into memory. The OS loader is also commonly referred to as executable code involved in loading the OS into memory. It's worth noting that software literature doesn't always clearly distinguish between these two concepts. For example, Windows documentation sometimes implicitly considers the boot loader to be part of the OS loader. However, in the present context, the boot loader, during an initial phase of the boot process, precedes the OS loader in its role of transferring the OS loader into the computer's main memory. That is, it's a piece of code that, once executed, causes the OS loader to be transferred for its subsequent execution. The OS loader can be considered a pre-boot environment (not to be confused with the so-called PXE (Pre-boot Extension Environment) environment). This means the OS loader is code that, when executed, is capable of loading drivers and the kernel and, if necessary, initializing the hardware, for example, for Windows operating systems. Both the boot loader and the OS loader are executable code, for example, in binary form, and each participates in the boot process. For example, the OS loader in Windows operating systems is designed to load all drivers of type SERVICE_BOOT_START before transferring control to the kernel. By indicating that a key for encryption of this type is stored on the UTD, the kernel can, in turn, use this driver to access the encrypted HDD on the computer. Furthermore, the system partition in Windows contains the OS loader, which, in this context, can be stored as such on the UTD, as discussed below in relation to the setup phase. As another example, the so-called GRUB bootloader (a set of files) on Linux operating systems loads the Linux kernel and the initrd filesystem, i.e., a temporary root filesystem, into main memory, from where the Linux kernel can then load the encryption driver(s). Here, the initrd filesystem can be considered part of the OS loader. In this context, the initrd filesystem may initially reside on the UTD (Unified Disk Utility) and then be transferred to the computer. It is important to note that, even in this context, the initrd filesystem contains executable code, which is transferred by the (GRUB) bootloader. It should be noted that the OS services stored on the computer are preferably not stored on the UTD. In this regard, it should be emphasized that all the methods presented here involve an external OS loader, which is executed to start OS services stored on the computer, not on an external device. Therefore, the methods presented here differ significantly from solutions that involve booting a computer from an external device, such as a USB drive, containing a complete OS or its essential components. Likewise, OS libraries are also preferably not stored on the UTD, but rather on the computer. However, and despite many variations considered herein, the boot loader and the OS loader are preferably not stored on the computer (at least not at the beginning of the boot process).This is intended to prevent anyone from modifying the bootloader or the OS loader, and to prevent the user from unintentionally booting the computer without UTD, which could lead to a malicious user gaining access to the encryption key. As explained in detail below (with reference to the setup phase), the OS loader version 24a located on the UTD is typically derived from an OS loader version 24 that is typically initially stored on the computer. In this respect, a distinction should be made between: version 24 as initially stored on the computer, version 24a stored on the UTD, and version 24b (or components thereof) of the boot loader that is later transferred to the PC. A similar reference scheme is adopted for boot loader versions 16, 16a, 16b and encryption driver versions 26, 26a, 26b. It should be noted, however, that in this context, the boot loader version 16a stored on the UTD is typically not identical to the initial version 16.Instead, it will likely need to be modified to allow the computer to boot from its own HDD, despite the fact that bootloader version 16a is stored on the UTD (which normally results in automatic parameter changes that would otherwise instruct the computer to boot from the UTD, as discussed in more detail below). Furthermore, the version of the bootloader stored on the UTD may be modified to include an encryption and decryption driver. For example, when using Windows, this can be achieved by updating the Boot Configuration Data (BCD) memory. The BCD memory is stored on the Windows system partition along with other OS loader components. When using Linux systems, this can be achieved by setting up the root unit used by the OS and updating the boot configuration in GRUB.The conf file and / or possibly the original initrd file system will be updated, depending on the Linux distribution. Embodiments of the aforementioned method are illustrated in Figs. 3, 4, 5, 6, 7 to 8; they enable a secure booting of a computer even in situations where an attacker or malware manipulates the computer's HDD 11, noting that the boot loader and the OS loader are otherwise typically located unencrypted and modifiable on the HDD in order to start the boot process. It should be noted that the OS loader 24b (i.e., the version transferred to main memory 110) cannot be executed simultaneously with an original version 24 of it stored on the computer's hard drive. Therefore, the present concept, which relies on an external boot loader and OS loader, ensures that only a genuine OS loader is transferred to main memory for execution, thus reducing the risk of manipulation. The loaded OS loader 24b may still be designed to interact with additional or complementary modules of the UTD, with the modules being able to be executed partially or completely within the UTD, provided the latter has processing capabilities. In some embodiments, one or both of the boot loader and OS loader may be designed, upon subsequent execution (S23, S27), to cause the computer to reconfigure the boot configuration parameters (e.g., the BCD memory) of the transferred OS loader to allow the OS services to be started from HDD 11. However, this function is better implemented in the boot loader, since a simple reconfiguration of the OS loader's boot parameters (by the boot loader) may be sufficient to achieve this. An operating system, such as Windows, can likely force the BCD and OS services to be stored on the same storage unit. In such a case, a solution is needed for the OS services to be started from the HDD, even if the OS loader has been transferred from the UTD. As can be seen, this can be achieved by reconfiguring boot parameters, such as those stored in the BCD. In some variations, a unit driver can be implemented that emulates the OS loader and subsequent OS services as a single storage unit. This unit driver can be configured to redirect accesses to the bootloader and OS loader to blocks in the UTD (Under-The-Device Disk) and to redirect accesses to the OS partition to the HDD (Hard Disk Disk). However, such variations are more complex to implement and should preferably only be used if the bootloader and / or OS loader do not support the previous option. So far, and although the aforementioned embodiments call encryption drivers stored on the UTD, nothing has been said about the encryption / decryption key that would likely be involved to further secure the process. Usually, a single key is used for encryption / decryption. However, multiple keys could be used, e.g., one for decryption and one for encryption. Strictly speaking, only a single key for decryption would be needed if no subsequent encryption is required (unlikely). For the sake of simplicity, however, a single encryption / decryption key can be assumed. This key is preferably stored on the UTD. In this respect, and as shown in Fig.As illustrated in Figure 3, embodiments may further include steps for: retrieving, S276, an encryption key EK and / or a decryption key DK from the UTD; and providing the retrieved key to the encryption drivers during their execution, S29. In other words, the OS loader or the encryption drivers can, while running, proceed to retrieve the encryption / decryption key. In particular, the encryption drivers can handle retrieving the required key and, if necessary, accessing the retrieved key later in their execution. Preferably, retrieving the key requires a password phrase from the user to unlock the key stored on the unit. In variants, the boot loader may be configured to perform this task, provided the OS allows it.However, the OS may not allow this, hence the interest in being able to do this via the encryption drivers. As mentioned, this key is preferably stored on the UTD. In some variations, the key could reside on a different external storage medium, distinct from the UTTD itself. It could also be provided by the user upon request via the computer's keyboard. Since some implementations require a UTD, it is extremely convenient to allow users to boot the computer using a single UTD. The UTD itself can still retrieve the key from an external or supplementary medium, such as a smart card. An additional password is preferably required in case the computer and the UTD are lost or stolen. This password is preferably entered via the computer, but can also be entered on the UTD itself if the latter has the necessary user interfaces. The latter scenario is particularly preferred if the same UTD is used to unlock several different computers. To support unlocking multiple different computers, the boot loader stored on the UTD can manage a list of profiles, one for each computer, indexed by one or more unique identifiers of the computer, such as the computer's CPUID or the hardware MAC address from one of its network interface cards. Next, the setup phase, S10, will be explained in more detail with reference to Figs. 4, 6 to 8. First, with reference to Fig. 4, Fig. 6 and Fig. 8, embodiments of the present method may further include, during setup, S10 (i.e., before connecting, S21, the UTD to the computer to boot the latter), steps S11 and S12, wherein: step S11 includes analyzing the HDD to detect one or more of the following entities: a boot loader 16; an OS loader 24; and one or more encryption drivers, each located unencrypted on the computer's HDD 11; and step S12 includes storing (after authorization check, S11a, for the UTD) versions of the one or more detected entities on the UTD, each as a boot loader 16a and / or OS loader 24a and / or the one or more encryption drivers 26a.As previously discussed, the stored versions of the boot loader and / or the OS loader are reconfigured appropriately to cause, after subsequent execution, S23, S27, of the boot loader and / or the OS loader, the boot configuration parameters of the OS loader to be reconfigured so that the OS services can be started from the computer's HDD. This allows the boot loader and / or the OS loader captured on HDD 11 to be preferably removed or disabled, S15. As can be seen, it is simpler to program the boot loader to reconfigure the OS loader's boot parameters than to modify the OS loader itself. If the OS loader is already reconfigured during the setup phase, there is obviously no need for the boot loader to reconfigure it, for example, by reconfiguring the BCD memory during subsequent execution (S23) on the computer. The boot loader could still be designed to cause the boot parameters to be reconfigured ab initio during step S23.It should be noted that it is still more advantageous to modify the boot parameters at the beginning of the boot process, because if the layout of the long-term storage unit changes between setup and booting, the latest changes can be detected by the boot loader and / or the OS loader, allowing for a more relevant update of the boot parameters. In most likely implementations, reconfiguration will be necessary either during setup or at the start of the boot process. Without this reconfiguration, the bootloader and / or OS loaders will "naturally" search for OS services stored on the UTD (in Windows implementations), since they are stored on the UTD. More generally, this reconfiguration is performed to prevent the bootloader and / or OS loader from attempting to load the OS from the UTD (Windows), or from loading unit drivers required to access the UTD as part of the OS loader (Linux). The reconfiguration can, for example, initiate: (i) an analysis of the root unit of the OS loader and the encryption driver, and, if necessary, (ii) a boot from the UTD to modify the bootloader and / or the OS loader. The underlying idea is to make the changes on the UTD itself when the system setup should not or cannot be altered (i.e., the cryptroot). Since the UTD may have a processor, this might even be preferred to minimize changes to the OS services. The newly configured versions can be reconfigured either by the computer before saving to the UTD or by the UTD itself. Steps S11 and S12 (setup phase) are performed as early as possible, if necessary, to install the OS loader on the UTD, i.e., before a malicious user has an opportunity to manipulate the OS loader, which is located unencrypted on the computer's HDD. It should be noted that the computer must authenticate itself to the UTD in order to copy a version of the OS loader it contains. This authentication is likely performed in one of the following ways: (i) The computer sends a code to the UTD, provided by the user via the computer's keyboard; (ii) The user authenticates directly to the UTD; (iii) Upon delivery to the UTD, the unit initially accepts any OS loader. However, once an initial OS loader has been saved, any subsequent modification requires authentication; (iv) After the user has authenticated to the UTD once from the computer, a token is stored on the computer, which allows authentication to be performed automatically. This token is preferably stored in the encrypted section of the HDD. After copying the bootloader / OS loader to the UTD, these are preferably removed from the HDD or disabled to prevent the user from unintentionally booting the computer from the bootloader and OS loader that are still stored on the HDD, because otherwise a malicious user would still be able to manipulate the bootloader / OS loader stored on the HDD. In some versions, the boot loader can be replaced by a modified version that prompts the user to boot the computer only in combination with a UTD (User-Device Boot Document). This prevents the computer from appearing to have any installed operating system removed, thus avoiding unintentional OS installation and data deletion. To configure the UTD to boot the currently installed OS, it's necessary to identify how the currently booted system was configured. This means modifying some boot parameters. On Windows systems, this information is stored in the BCD memory, i.e., by updating the device input in the Windows boot loader's section. On Linux systems, this information is stored in the GRUB configuration file at / boot / grub / grub.conf as part of the kernel boot parameters. This configuration file lists the kernel to use, the initrd file to use (which contains all boot configuration scripts), the device drivers, and the kernel boot parameters to use. All these files contribute to loading the operating system. Modifications to the initrd file may also be required, depending on the Linux distribution.In Linux, GRUB, initrd, and to some extent the kernel form the Linux OS loader. Note that the following scenarios may be assumed: 1. The computer's HDD is not yet encrypted with a full disk encryption solution. Therefore, it must be encrypted and the UTD configured. This situation is discussed in Section 1 below and illustrated in Figure 4. 2. The computer's HDD has already been encrypted with a full disk encryption solution, as discussed in Section 2 below. 3. The UTD unit is configured during OS installation, and the HDD is encrypted at the same time, as described in Section 3. 1. The computer's HDD is not yet encrypted. This assumes that the computer's hard drive (HDD) has not yet been encrypted with a full disk encryption solution, so it must be encrypted and the UTD configured. Data storage encryption can be achieved using any suitable encryption type. After encryption, the entire contents of the HDD are encrypted, except for the bootloader and the OS loader. The HDD can also remain unencrypted (in an unlikely scenario). However, leaving the HDD unencrypted would be of limited use, as an attacker could gain access to the entire disk contents without even needing to manipulate the bootloader or the OS loader. If the HDD to be analyzed, S11, is unencrypted, encryption drivers can be stored on the UTD during the setup phase, S10, S12, in addition to (or as part of) storing the newly configured version(s) of the captured OS loader, as illustrated in Fig. 4 or Fig. 6. This can be achieved by adding the encryption drivers to the captured OS loader, so that the version of the OS loader stored on the UTD includes the encryption drivers. The concept in this case is that a full disk encryption solution has not yet been installed on the computer, and therefore no encryption drivers are present, or if present, they are not enabled. In this case, the encryption drivers can be added and / or enabled. As described below, the hard drive can be encrypted to provide a full disk encryption solution. However, the OS loader typically does not have an encryption driver. Thus, no encryption driver is loaded during the OS boot process, and the OS cannot use one. It is therefore convenient to store encryption drivers on the UTD (Unified Disk Drive). Once the OS is loaded, the drivers are eventually used by the OS as needed to complete the boot process (such drivers later allow the OS loader to decrypt and use the HDD).The encryption drivers could otherwise be available from another source, e.g. another UTD or server, but this would be less practical. However, if Windows uses BitLocker, support is already included in the OS loader itself. Therefore, no separate encryption driver is necessary when the UTD is used in combination with BitLocker (since the latter is already part of the OS loader). Referring to Fig. 6, the encryption / decryption key can also be generated during the setup phase (step S11b). The generated key can then be stored in the UTD, S11c. Subsequently, the encryption drivers and the OS loader can be configured, S11d, to retrieve the generated key from the UTD at a later time, S276 (before or during the execution, S29, of the encryption drivers, which in turn is triggered by the execution, S27, of the transferred OS loader 24b). Finally, the encryption, S11e, of the HDD can be performed using the generated key. Encryption is preferably performed directly after key generation, i.e., before or concurrently with saving the generated keys to the trusted device. This is advantageous when the hard drive has not yet been encrypted and full disk encryption and the UTD (Unified Disk Device) are desired. The concept shown in Figure 6 allows for disk encryption and simultaneous UTD initialization. Therefore, it is not necessary to perform full disk encryption first and then UTD setup. However, such a solution may require knowledge of the internal workings of the OS loader and the specific full disk encryption technology to be used. Windows offers several implementation options. Either the disk encryption and decryption driver recognizes the UTD and retrieves the keys directly from it (optionally by requesting a password from the user, see above). Depending on how the keys are stored on the UTD, the Windows boot manager "bootmgr", which is aware of BitLocker encryption, can alternatively be modified to retrieve the keys from the UTD, or it can be replaced by a compatible one that also retrieves the keys from the UTD. To ensure that the password phrase and key can be obtained from the UTD, the cryptroot subsystem must be updated in Linux Ubuntu 14.04. 2. The computer's hard drive has already been encrypted. Referring again to Fig. 4, it is assumed that the HDD to be analyzed, S11, is already encrypted, e.g., the computer's HDD has already been encrypted with a full disk encryption driver. In this case, embodiments of the present methods may further include (during setup, i.e., before connection, S21) steps for: retrieving, S16, the key from the computer; and storing, S17, the retrieved key on the UTD or an entity accessible to the UTD, such as a smart card. The key can then be removed from the computer. The versions of the encryption drivers and the OS loader stored in step S12 may, in this case, be reconfigured to (later) cause the key to be retrieved from the UTD, i.e., before or during execution step S29. Depending on the full disk encryption solution and its configuration, the key can be retrieved from the computer, for example from a version of the OS loader as originally managed by the computer, or from an external storage device (which differs from the present UTD). The aforementioned concept allows the retrieved key to be secured. This also means that the OS bootloader may need to be updated so that it knows where such a key is located and how to access the relocated key. If a PGP desktop is used, the OS bootloader must be updated. If BitLocker is used, only the bootloader needs to be updated if the encryption / decryption key needs to be protected with a password. Finally, it should be noted that the UTD typically does not contain an OS kernel, encryption drivers, or application programs for the OS during setup. However, in some variants, some of these components may be stored on the unit as part of a setup program. Therefore, if the UTD is used (like a USB flash drive), such a setup program can be used to install / update the full disk encryption solution used on the computer. 3. The UTD is configured during OS installation while simultaneously encrypting the DSD. The assumed context is that the UTD unit is configured during the installation of the operating system, and the HDD is encrypted at the same time (it is assumed that the HDD is "empty"). In such a case, and with reference to Fig. 7, embodiments of the present methods may further include, during the setup phase, S10, and during the installation of the OS on the computer, a step to configure the encryption drivers and / or the OS loader so that the newly configured versions can be stored on the UTD, S12. Again, in this case, the newly configured components should preferably allow the key to be retrieved from the UTD after execution, S27, of the OS loader (after it has been transferred to the computer), S276. The concept is that it should be possible to specify that the computer should use a UTD when the OS is first installed. In short, the UTD is still configured essentially the same way as discussed in the previous sections. However, a preferred option here is to store the boot loader, OS loader, and encryption drivers directly on the UTD during OS installation, which is configured to boot from the HDD, instead of writing the boot loader and OS loader to the HDD (as is typical during OS installation). Finally, and for each of the three options considered above, after saving the OS loader / encryption drivers to the UTD, direct booting from the HDD can be disabled, step S15, by placing another boot loader (not to be confused with boot loaders 16, 16a, 16b) in the MBR or similar of the HDD, prompting the user to use the UTD. The following section discusses another aspect with reference to Fig. 5, which concerns (legitimate) updates to the OS loader and / or the boot loader. Updates can generally be performed on the UTD via an authorization check (S32) to allow a newly configured version of the bootloader (16a) and / or the OS loader (24a) to be stored on the UTD (S34). For this purpose, it may be necessary to modify OS service installation files during the setup phase, which are required to generate and / or reconfigure the bootloader and / or the OS loader. These installation files are stored on the HDD. Encryption driver updates can be performed in a similar manner.This concept ensures that whenever the OS on the target computer is updated, and whenever updates need to be applied to any of the bootloader, OS loader, or encryption drivers, these updates are applied to the bootloader, OS loader, and encryption drivers stored on the UTD. Since the OS loader on Windows systems, for example, knows that the OS was loaded from another unit, this also applies to the Windows operating system, and therefore, if the Windows operating system needs to update any components of the OS loader, it can do so. Regarding the modification of OS service installation files on Linux systems: For the OS to install a new OS loader, the toolchain used to generate the initrd file must be updated. This initrd file may have been modified to access the keys from the UTD, as discussed earlier (above in Section 1). Therefore, it must be ensured that these modifications are retained when a new OS loader is generated. In Linux, this is achieved, for example, by updating the initramsfs tools in Ubuntu Linux or the dracut tools in Red Hat Linux by updating the cryptroot script, which receives the password for decrypting the HDD. Modifying the installation files will not always be necessary. For example, in Windows, modifying the installation files is not necessary if full disk encryption / decryption is implemented via a disk encryption / decryption driver, i.e., a filter driver that sits between the actual disk driver and the OS file system driver. This information is part of the BCD configuration and would not be overwritten by any other modification. If a new update needs to be saved to the UTD after the boot process is complete, the computer can authenticate to the UTD, create an updated boot loader and / or updated OS loader, and save them to the UTD. The boot loader and OS loader can then be reconfigured as previously discussed to potentially retrieve encryption keys from the UTD and, by reconfiguring boot parameters, allow the OS loader to complete the boot process from the HDD. In some versions, the boot loader and the OS loader can be modified and reconfigured during an update process on the UTD itself, or partly on the computer and partly on the UTD, in particular to be able to retrieve encryption keys (e.g. from the UTD) and to allow the OS loader to complete the boot process from the HDD by reconfiguring boot parameters. The following section discusses another class of embodiments with reference to Fig. 8, which concerns the possible provision of a honeypot bootloader and / or a honeypot OS loader. Essentially, this involves replacing the bootloader and / or OS loader captured in step S11 with honeypot equivalents on the HDD, S15a. A copy of these honeypot equivalents is stored on the UTD, S15b. For example, a honeypot OS loader would be displayed to the user as a login screen similar to that of the actual OS loader on the UTD when the user is prompted for a password. However, the honeypot version would be non-functional; password verification, for example, would always fail, regardless of the password provided. Thus, to a malicious user unfamiliar with the computer's detailed configuration, the machine appears as a normal computer requiring a password. If a malicious user then attempts to modify the honeypot bootloader, it's possible to detect the tampering and alert the legitimate user to the attempted intrusion. The honeypot bootloader / OS loader should preferably be almost identical to a valid bootloader and OS loader, except that password verification always fails, e.g. by storing faulty data in the password verification entries, so that a malicious user cannot identify this honeypot bootloader as such. Meanwhile, the true bootloader 16a stored in the UTD can be provided with additional functionality, for example, to cause the true honeypot components stored on the UTD to be compared with their counterparts stored on the HDD. Furthermore, the bootloader 16a can be designed such that when the user-trusted unit is connected to the computer, the firmware 122 detects the bootloader 16a and then executes it, at least partially, on the computer to additionally cause the honeypot components stored on the computer, S15a, to be compared with the honeypot components stored on the UTD, S24. If the compared versions do not differ, S241, the transferred OS loader 24b can be executed normally, S27, i.e., as previously described. If the compared versions differ, a user or any relevant component of the system (or associated with it) could be notified accordingly, S242. In fact, many possible actions can be considered after the notification, S242. For example, the OS loader stored in the UTD can still be loaded into main memory for execution. The user could still be prompted to copy the modified honeypot bootloader and OS loader for further investigation. Furthermore, if the compared versions differ, it may be desirable to save the contents of the honeypot components to the HDD again so that they appear genuine the next time someone attempts to manipulate the computer. Referring again to Fig. 2, the invention can also be embodied, according to another aspect, as a UTD as described above. Basically, the UTD 20 is designed to allow a computer 10 to boot from it. The UTD is connectable to the computer and includes a bootloader 16a and an OS loader 24a, as discussed above. The UTD is further designed to prevent an unauthorized user from modifying either of these bootloaders and OS loaders. Possible embodiments of the user-trusted unit 20 are discussed in detail below. To implement the present procedures, various types of trusted units can be considered. First, the unit trusted by the user 20 should be sufficiently portable to allow for easy and convenient connection to the computer 10; that is, it is preferably a handheld unit. It is typically a company-owned or personal secure unit, meaning a unit owned and controlled by a company or user, such as a USB unit, preferably a USB flash drive (a data storage unit containing flash memory in addition to an integrated Universal Serial Bus (USB) interface), a mobile phone, or a PDA used only by that user or owned and controlled by the company for which that user works. This unit typically weighs less than 200 g.Due to the rather limited requirements regarding user interfaces, memory and processing capability of Unit 20, Unit 20 should preferably weigh less than 60 g and more preferably less than 40 g. The user-trusted unit 20 can be provided with a processing means (and / or data processing means, i.e., a CPU) 211, such as a cryptoprocessor, connected to a memory that generally includes persistent memory 214 and possibly also non-persistent memory (not explicitly shown, but the non-persistent memory can be considered part of the processing means 211). However, non-persistent memory and a processor are not mandatory for implementing the essential steps described in the previous section. Although a processor is not strictly necessary, implementing the authorization check mechanism and managing the state parameters (regardless of whether the unit is modifiable) is easier using a processor or microcontroller.However, non-persistent memory and a processor may be required in cases where the boot loader and the OS loader run simultaneously on the PC and the UTD, or when additional functionality is required, such as additional checks involving the BIOS. In the present context, the persistent memory 214 specifically stores computerized procedures 217, interacting with other components stored on the unit 20 (where the components may be executable modules or code 16a, 24a, data 220, or keys 213) or other peripheral components 218 necessary for operating the unit 20.In particular, the computerized methods 217 can interact with the processing means 211 to trigger the transmission and execution of the bootloader program 16, the latter being intended to be executed by the processing means 105, 211 of the computer 10 and / or the unit 20. The bootloader program 16 and the OS loader program 24a can each be considered as a single module provided with various functions and as executable on the unit and / or the computer, or as complex modules with various functions. They can also be considered as forming components of the computerized methods 217. Preferably, the bootloader and OS loader, which reside on the user-trusted unit, should occupy as little memory as possible. For example, some implementations have been successfully tested that use less than 128 MB (for Windows) or 32 MB (for Linux) for the bootloader and OS loader, the size being primarily determined by the size of the OS loader, which depends on the operating system. Additionally, the user-trusted unit should provide sufficient memory to store the data 200, which can typically occupy up to 64 kB, for example, when verifying BIOS trustworthiness through these modules. This excludes memory needed to store OS 112 components or UTD components designed to retrieve such OS components from the network. The connection interface 212 to the PC 10 can, for example, have the following types: - Universal Serial Bus or USB; - External Small Computer System Interface or SCSI; - External Serial Advanced Technology Attachment or SATA; - Firewire; or - Thunderbolt. More generally, this could be any current or future connection (wired or wireless) that allows the computer 10 to boot from the external unit 20. Furthermore, the same interface 212 could also allow the unit 20 trusted by a user to exchange data with any external unit, such as a video projector, a printer, or any other output device. If necessary, the secure unit 20 has a card reader for reading user information stored on a memory card (e.g., non-secure RAM) or a smart card. Such data, such as user information stored on the card, can be used for various purposes. In particular, a trusted connection can be established between a user (or more precisely, the unit 20) and a third party, such as the server 30, via the host 10 using this data. Alternatively, the user information can be stored directly on the secure unit. Furthermore, standard user interfaces (such as control buttons and a display) can be provided to allow user interaction.In particular, such a trusted indicator on the secure unit 20 can be used to obtain user assurances regarding the environment in which they are currently located. In this way, a user can, for example, confirm without restriction to requests from server 30 that they are not in a public space such as an internet café when computer 10 is started. Likewise, and as illustrated in Fig. 1: the invention can also be embodied as a computerized system 100 comprising a UTD 20 and a computer 10 with which the UTD can be connected, just as discussed previously. Fig. 1 represents a general computerized system 100 suitable for implementing process steps involved in embodiments of the invention. It should be clear that the methods described herein are largely non-interactive and automated by means of computerized systems such as servers or embedded systems. In exemplary embodiments, the methods described herein can be implemented in a (partially) interactive or non-interactive system. These methods can also be implemented, at least partially, in software, firmware, hardware, or combinations thereof. In exemplary embodiments, the methods described herein are implemented, at least partially, as executable programs (e.g., as part of a bootloader program) and are executed, at least partially, by a special-purpose or general-purpose digital computer 10, such as a PC, a workstation, a minicomputer, or a mainframe computer. The most general system 100 therefore includes a general-purpose computer, e.g., a PC 10. In exemplary embodiments, the computer 10, with respect to its hardware architecture as shown in Fig. 1, comprises a processor 105, a main memory 110 connected to a main memory controller 115, and one or more input and / or output (I / O) units (or peripheral units) 20, 145 connected in a data exchange link via a local input / output controller 135. Furthermore, the input / output controller 135 can be, but is not limited to, one or more buses or other wired or wireless connections as known in the field. The input / output controller 135 can include additional elements to enable data exchange, which have been omitted for simplicity, such as controllers, buffer memory (cache memory), drivers, repeaters, and receivers.Furthermore, the local interface may contain address, control, and / or data connections to enable appropriate data transfers between the aforementioned components. As described herein, the I / O units 20, 145 may generally contain any generalized cryptographic card or smart card known in the field. One or more of these units may be user-trusted units 20, as previously discussed. The processor 105 is a hardware unit for executing software, in particular software stored in main memory 110. The processor 105 can be any custom-made or commercially available processor, a central processing unit (CPU), an auxiliary processor among several processors belonging to the computer 10, a semiconductor-based microprocessor (in the form of a microchip or a chipset), a macroprocessor, or generally any unit for executing software instructions. The main memory 110 typically contains volatile memory elements (e.g., random access memory (RAM, such as DRAM, SRAM, SDRAM, etc.) and possibly non-volatile (persistent) memory elements (e.g., ROM, erasable programmable read-only memory (EPROM), electronically erasable programmable read-only memory (EEPROM), programmable read-only memory (PROM), tape, CD-ROM, disk, floppy disk, plug-in module, cassette, or the like, etc.). Furthermore, the main memory 110 may contain or be associated with electronic, magnetic, optical, and / or other types of storage media. It should be noted that the main memory 110 may have a distributed architecture in which various components may be located remotely but are accessible from the processor 105. Memory segments may be allocated to specific purposes, for example, to...to be installed as a RAM disk to hold components of the boot loader and / or the OS loader as executable modules (including processor instruction modules) for subsequent execution on the computer 10. During operation, software / program code, for example, software / program code to be transferred to memory 110, can contain one or more separate programs, each containing a list of executable instructions for implementing logical functions. In the example of Fig. 1, memory 110 can be loaded with instructions to allow computer 10 to start and complete the boot process from the user-trusted unit 20. Components to be loaded into RAM 110 can include various application components, operating system image components, and preferably also hardware component drivers. RAM 110 can thus be brought into a state suitable for executing an OS 112. The novel methods discussed here can nevertheless operate, at least partially, "before" any OS component is fully loaded on the host 10. At least some of these steps operate at a different level, closer to the hardware, thereby affecting the normal behavior of the computer 10. After (and in the event of) execution, OS 112 essentially controls the execution of application programs and provides scheduling, input / output control, file and data management, memory management, communication control, and related services. At least some of the procedures described herein may be in the form of a source program, an executable program (object code), a script, or any other entity containing a set of instructions to be executed. In the case of a source program, the program must be translated by a compiler, assembler, interpreter, or the like, which may reside in the memory(s) of Unit 20 and / or Host 10. Furthermore, the procedures may be written in an object-oriented programming language, which has classes of data and procedures, or in a procedural programming language, which has routines, subroutines, and / or functions. In all cases, the novel procedures discussed herein are designed to operate flawlessly in conjunction with the firmware, if required, and, if necessary, with the CPU 11 of the Unit. In exemplary embodiments, a conventional keyboard 150 and a mouse 155 can be connected to the input / output controller 135. Other I / O units 145 can include, for example, a printer, a scanner, a microphone, and the like. Finally, the I / O units 20, 145 can also include, but are not limited to, units that transmit both inputs and outputs, for example, to a network interface card (NIC) or a modulator / demodulator (for accessing other files, units, systems, or a network), a radio frequency (RF) or other transmitter / receiver, a telephone interface, a bridge, a router, and the like. As otherwise stated in the previous section, the I / O units 20, 145 can include any generalized cryptographic card or smart card known in the field.System 100 may further include a display controller 125 connected to a display 130. In exemplary embodiments, System 100 may also include a network interface 124 for connecting to a network 165. The network 165 may be an IP-based network for data exchange between Computer 10 and any external server, client, etc., via a broadband connection. The network 165 sends and receives data between Computer 10 and external systems, e.g., a server 30. In exemplary embodiments, the network 165 may be a managed IP network administered by a service provider. The network 165 may be implemented wirelessly, e.g., using wireless protocols and technologies such as WLAN, WiMAX, etc.Network 165 can also be a packet-switched network such as a local area network, a wide area network, a high-speed network, an internet network, or any other similar type of network environment. Network 165 can be a fixed wireless network, a wireless local area network (LAN), a wireless wide area network (WAN), a personal area network (PAN), a virtual private network (VPN), an intranet, or any other suitable network system, and includes equipment for receiving and transmitting signals. If the computer is a PC, workstation, smart unit, or similar device, the software in the memory may also include a basic input / output system (BIOS) or any similar initialization software. The BIOS is a set of essential software routines that initialize and test hardware during startup. It is also generally capable of booting an operating system and facilitating data transfer between hardware components. The BIOS is typically stored in ROM so that it can be executed when the computer is powered on. For the purpose of implementing procedures as described herein, the BIOS can be used, in particular, to initiate and complete the boot process and possibly to initiate data exchange over a network. More generally, however, any suitable firmware or interface to firmware (i.e., a combination of persistent memory and program code and data stored therein that operates "below" OS 112 in the software stack) can be used for this purpose. Typically, this is the BIOS. Examples of suitable firmware or interfaces to it include the so-called Extensible Firmware Interface (EFI) BIOS or the Unified Extensible Firmware Interface (UEFI). The latter is a specification that defines a software interface between the operating system and the platform firmware.UEFI is designed to replace the BIOS firmware interface, which is present in all computers compatible with IBM PCs today. In practice, UEFI provides the same and even more functionality than a conventional PC BIOS and can also be used. More generally, any initialization firmware that runs under the operating system in the software stack can potentially be suitable for implementing the present invention. When computer 10 is running, processor 105 is configured to execute the software stored in memory 110, transfer data to and from memory 110, and generally control computer 10 operations according to the software. The procedures described herein are read by processor 105, possibly cached in processor 105, or, typically, partially read by processor 105, and then executed. The sections of the procedures described herein that can be implemented in software may be stored on any computer-readable medium for use with, or in conjunction with, any computer system or procedure. Finally, the invention can also be embodied as a computer program product to enable a computer to be booted from a UTD, wherein the computer program product comprises a computer-readable storage medium with a computer-readable program code embodied thereon, which preferably consists of several modules, wherein the computer-readable program code is configured to implement the process steps described herein. The present invention may be a system, a method, and / or a computer program product. The computer program product may include a computer-readable storage medium (or storage media) containing computer-readable program code to induce a processor to execute aspects of the present invention. The computer-readable storage medium can be a concrete unit capable of retaining and storing instructions for use by an instruction execution unit. For example, a computer-readable storage medium can be, but is not limited to, an electronic storage unit, a magnetic storage unit, an optical storage unit, an electromagnetic storage unit, a semiconductor storage unit, or any suitable combination thereof.A non-exhaustive list of more specific examples of computer-readable storage media includes the following: a portable computer floppy disk, a hard disk, random access memory (RAM), read-only memory (ROM), erasable programmable read-only memory (EPROM or flash memory), static working memory (SRAM), a portable CD-ROM, a DVD drive (DVD), a memory stick, a floppy disk, a mechanically encrypted unit such as punched cards or raised structures in a groove with instructions recorded thereon, and any suitable combination of the foregoing. A computer-readable storage medium, as used herein, need not be designed as transitory signals per se, such as radio waves or other freely propagating electromagnetic waves, electromagnetic waves propagating through a waveguide or other transmission media (e.g.,Light pulses passing through an optical fiber cable) or electrical signals transmitted through a wire. The computer-readable program instructions described herein can be downloaded to respective data processing units from a computer-readable storage medium or to an external computer or storage device via a network, such as the internet, a local area network, a wide area network, and / or a wireless network. The network may include copper transmission lines, fiber optic cables, wireless transmission, routers, firewalls, switches, gateway computers, and / or edge servers. A network adapter card or network interface in each data processing unit receives computer-readable program instructions from the network and forwards the computer-readable program instructions for storage on a computer-readable storage medium within the respective data processing unit. Computer-readable program instructions for performing operations of the present invention can be assembly instructions, instruction set architecture (ISA) instructions, machine instructions, machine-dependent instructions, microcode, firmware instructions, state setting data, or other source code or object code written in any combination of one or more programming languages, including Smalltalk, C++, or the like, and conventional procedural programming languages ​​such as the programming language "C" or similar programming languages. The computer-readable program instructions can be executed entirely on the user's computer, partially on the user's computer as a standalone software package, partially on the user's computer and partially on a remote computer, or entirely on the remote computer or server.In the latter scenario, the remotely located computer can be connected to the user's computer via any type of network, including a local area network (LAN) or a wide area network (WAN), or the connection can be established to an external computer (for example, via the internet using an internet service provider). In some embodiments, electronic circuits, including, for example, programmable logic circuits, field-programmable gate arrays (FPGAs), or programmable logic arrays (PLAs), can execute the computer-readable program instructions using state information from the computer-readable program instructions to personalize the electronic circuit in order to implement aspects of the present invention. Aspects of the present invention are described herein with reference to illustrations of the flowchart and / or block diagrams of processes, devices (systems), and computer program products according to embodiments of the invention. It is understood that each block in the illustrations of flowcharts and / or block diagrams, and combinations of blocks in the illustrations of flowcharts and / or block diagrams, can be implemented by computer-readable program instructions. These computer-readable program instructions can be provided to a processor of a general-purpose computer, a special-purpose computer, or other devices that process programmable data to create a machine such that the instructions executed through the processor of the computer or other devices that process programmable data create means for carrying out the functions / actions specified in the flowchart and / or block or blocks of the block diagram.These computer-readable program instructions can also be stored in a computer-readable storage medium capable of controlling a computer, programmable data processing device and / or other units to function in a particular manner, such that the computer-readable storage medium with the instructions stored therein constitutes a manufactured item, including instructions that implement the function / action specified in the flow chart and / or the block or blocks of the block diagram. The computer-readable program instructions can also be loaded onto a computer, other programmable data processing device, or other unit to cause the execution of a series of operations on the computer, other programmable device, or other unit to produce a computer-implemented process, such that the instructions executed on the computer, other programmable device, or other unit implement the functions / actions specified in the flowchart and / or block(s) of the block diagram. The flowchart and block diagrams in the figures illustrate the architecture, functionality, and operation of possible implementations of systems, processes, and computer program products according to various embodiments of the present invention. In this respect, each block in the flowchart or block diagrams can represent a module, segment, or section of instructions comprising one or more executable instructions for implementing the specified logical function(s). In some alternative implementations, the functions specified in the block may occur out of the order shown in the figures. For example, two blocks shown consecutively may actually be executed essentially in parallel, or the blocks may sometimes be executed in reverse order, depending on the functionality involved.It is also noted that each block of the block diagrams and / or illustration of the flowchart and combinations of blocks in the block diagrams and / or illustration of the flowchart can be implemented by special systems based on hardware that perform the specified functions or actions, or execute combinations of special hardware and computer instructions. Although the present invention has been described with reference to a limited number of embodiments, variants, and the accompanying drawings, it should be clear to a person skilled in the art that various modifications can be made and equivalents substituted without altering the scope of protection of the present invention. In particular, a feature (in relation to unit or process) that has been cited or shown in a drawing in a particular embodiment or variant can be combined with another feature in a different embodiment, variant, or drawing without altering the scope of protection of the present invention. Accordingly, various combinations of the features described in relation to the aforementioned embodiments or variants can be considered that remain within the scope of protection of the claims in the Annex.Furthermore, many minor modifications can be made to adapt a particular situation or material to the teachings of the present invention without deviating from its scope of protection. The present invention is therefore not intended to be limited to the specific embodiments disclosed, but rather to encompass all embodiments that fall within the scope of protection of the claims in the appendix. Finally, many variants other than those explicitly discussed above can be considered. For example, a component described herein as executable code may in fact comprise both executable code and non-executable data, such as strings intended to be displayed to the user.

Claims

Method for enabling a computer (10) to be booted from a user-trusted entity (20), wherein: the computer (10) has a long-term storage unit (11) that stores operating system services (25) or OS services; and the user-trusted entity (20) is connectable to the computer (10) and stores: a boot loader (16a) that, after the user-trusted entity (20) connects to the computer (10), is detectable and executable by a firmware (122) of the computer; an OS loader (24a) for an operating system (112) or OS of the computer; and one or more encryption drivers (26a) for the OS designed to enable access to the OS and data stored in encrypted form on the data storage unit (11); wherein the user-trusted entity is designed toto prevent unauthorized access to, in each case: the boot loader; the one or more encryption drivers; and the OS loader, which are stored thereon, wherein the procedure, prior to connecting (S21) the user-trusted entity to the computer, comprises: analyzing (S11) the long-term storage unit to capture one or more of the following entities: a boot loader (16); an OS loader (24); and one or more encryption drivers (26), each of which reside unencrypted on the computer's long-term storage unit (11); and, after an authorization check (S11a) for the user-trusted entity, storing (S12) versions of the respective captured entities on the user-trusted entity, such as the boot loader (16a) and / or the OS loader (24a) and / or the one or more encryption drivers (26a).wherein the stored versions of the boot loader and / or the OS loader are reconfigured to cause, after the subsequent execution (S23, S27) of the boot loader and / or the OS loader, the boot configuration parameters of the OS loader to be reconfigured to allow the OS services to be started from the long-term storage unit on the computer, wherein the method preferably includes removing or disabling the boot loader and / or OS loader captured in the storage unit (11), wherein the method further includes: after connecting (S21) the user-trusted unit to the computer, allowing (S22) the boot loader (16a) to be captured by the firmware (122) for subsequent, at least partial, execution (S23) of the boot loader (16b) on the computer.to transfer (S25) the OS loader (24a) from the user-trusted unit to the computer by loading (S25) the OS loader into main memory (110) of the computer without storing any part of the loaded OS loader on the long-term storage unit (11) of the computer; and to execute (S27) the transferred OS loader (24b) at least partially on the computer (10) to cause (S29) the execution of one or more encryption drivers (26b) for the OS and a kernel (27) of the OS to start the OS services (25) and complete the boot process of the computer. Method according to claim 1, wherein the boot loader program and / or the OS loader program are designed to cause, upon subsequent at least partial execution (S23, S27) on the computer, the boot configuration parameters of the transferred OS loader program to be reconfigured, for example as a memory of the boot configuration data to enable the OS services to be started from the long-term data storage unit (11). Method according to claim 1 or 2, further comprising: retrieving (S276) a key for encryption (EK) and / or decryption (DK) from the entity trusted by the user and providing the retrieved key to the one or more encryption drivers during their execution (S29). A method according to any one of claims 1 to 3, wherein the analyzed (S11) long-term data storage unit is unencrypted, the method further comprising, prior to connecting (S21) the user-trusted unit to the computer, storing (S12) one or more encryption drivers for the OS on the user-trusted unit, in addition to storing or as part of storing a newly configured version of the captured OS loader, and preferably by adding the one or more encryption drivers of the OS loader, such that the version of the OS loader stored on the user-trusted unit contains the one or more encryption drivers. The method of claim 4 further comprising, prior to the connection (S21) of the user-trusted unit with the computer: generating (S11b) of at least one key for encrypting (EK) and decrypting (DK) the long-term data storage unit and storing (S11c) the at least one generated key on the user-trusted unit; configuring (S11d) the one or more encryption drivers and the OS loader for them to cause the retrieval (S276) of the at least one generated key from the user-trusted unit before or during an execution (S29) of the one or more encryption drivers, which is caused by the subsequent execution (S27) of the transferred OS loader (24b); and encrypting (S11e) the data storage unit with one of the at least one generated key. A method according to any one of claims 1 to 3, wherein the long-term data storage unit being analyzed is encrypted, the method further comprising, prior to connecting (S21) the user-trusted unit to the computer: retrieving (S16) at least one key for encrypting and decrypting the data storage unit from the computer and storing (S17) the retrieved at least one key on the user-trusted unit or an entity accessible to the user-trusted unit, such as a smart card, and removing the retrieved at least one key from the computer, and wherein storing (S12) versions of the captured entities comprises storing versions of the one or more encryption drivers and the OS loader, the versions of which have been reconfigured.to cause the retrieval of the key from the entity trusted by the user before or during an execution (S29) of one or more encryption drivers, which is caused by the subsequent execution (S27) of the transferred OS loader (24b). The method according to claims 1 to 3, wherein the method further comprises, prior to connecting (S21) the user-trusted entity to the computer during the installation (S10) of the OS on the computer: configuring one or more encryption drivers and / or the OS loader such that the one or more configured encryption drivers and the OS loader can be stored (S12) on the user-trusted entity and are preferably able to cause the retrieval (S276) of the key from the user-trusted entity during the subsequent execution (S27) of the OS loader (24b) that has been transferred to the computer. Method according to any one of claims 1 to 7, further comprising, after completion of the computer boot process: authorization verification (S32) for the user-trusted unit to allow a newly configured version of the boot loader (16a) and / or the OS loader (24a) to be stored on the user-trusted unit (S34). Method according to any one of the preceding claims 1 to 3, further comprising: replacing (S15a) the captured bootloader and / or the captured OS loader on the long-term data storage unit with a honeypot bootloader and / or a honeypot OS loader; and storing (S15b) a copy of each of the honeypot bootloader and the honeypot OS loader on the unit trusted by the user. The method of claim 9, wherein the bootloader (16a) is further configured such that, after the user-trusted unit is connected to the computer, the bootloader (16a) is detected by the firmware (122) and subsequently executed at least partially on the computer to further: a comparison (S24) of the honeypot bootloader and / or the honeypot OS loader as stored on the computer in place of the respective detected bootloader and / or OS loader (S15a), with the respective honeypot bootloader and / or honeypot OS loader stored on the user-trusted unit; and if the compared versions do not differ (S241), at least partial execution (S27) of the transferred OS loader (24b) from the computer (10). Method according to claim 10, further comprising: if the compared versions differ, notify (S242) that the compared versions differ. Method for enabling a computer (10) to be booted from a user-trusted entity (20), wherein: the computer (10) has a long-term storage unit (11) that stores operating system services (25) or OS services; and the user-trusted entity (20) is connectable to the computer (10) and stores: a boot loader (16a) that, after the user-trusted entity (20) connects to the computer (10), is detectable and executable by a firmware (122) of the computer; an OS loader (24a) for an operating system (112) or OS of the computer; and one or more encryption drivers (26a) for the OS designed to enable access to the OS and data stored in encrypted form on the data storage unit (11); wherein the user-trusted entity is designed toto prevent unauthorized access to, in each case: the bootloader; the one or more encryption drivers; and the OS loader stored thereon, the procedure comprising, prior to connecting (S21) the user-trusted entity to the computer: analyzing (S11) the long-term storage unit to capture one or more of the following entities: a bootloader (16); an OS loader (24); and one or more encryption drivers (26), each of which is unencrypted on the computer's long-term storage unit (11); replacing (S15a) the captured bootloader and / or the captured OS loader on the long-term storage unit with a honeypot bootloader and / or a honeypot OS loader; and storing (S15b) a copy of each of the honeypot bootloader and the honeypot OS loader on the user-trusted entity,wherein the method further comprises: after the connection (S21) of the user-trusted entity to the computer, allowing (S22) the bootloader (16a) to be captured by the firmware (122) for subsequent, at least partial, execution (S23) of the bootloader (16b) on the computer to cause a transfer (S25) of the OS loader (24a) from the user-trusted entity to the computer by loading (S25) the OS loader into main memory (110) of the computer without storing any part of the loaded OS loader on the long-term storage device (11) of the computer, wherein the OS loader (24a) is transferred from the user-trusted entity to the computer when the honeypot bootloader and / or the honeypot OS loader,as they are stored on the computer in place of the respective captured boot loader and / or captured OS loader (S15a), do not differ from the respective honeypot boot loader and / or honeypot OS loader stored on the unit trusted by the user (S241); and execute (S27) the transferred OS loader (24b) at least partially on the computer (10) to cause the execution (S29) of one or more encryption drivers (26b) for the OS and a kernel (27) of the OS to start the OS services (25) and complete the boot process of the computer. A user-trusted unit (20) designed to enable a computer (10) to boot from the unit, wherein the user-trusted unit is connectable to the computer and comprises: a boot loader (16a) that, after the user-trusted unit (20) is connected to the computer (10), is detectable and executable by a firmware (122) of the computer; an operating system loader (24a) or OS loader for an operating system (112) or OS of the computer; and wherein: the user-trusted unit is designed to prevent an unauthorized user from modifying the boot loader and the OS loader stored thereon; and the boot loader (16a) and the OS loader (24a), on the other hand, are configured to enable the implementation of all steps of the method according to claims 1 to 3 or 12. Computerized system (100) comprising the user-trusted unit (20) according to claim 13 and the computer (10) with which the user-trusted unit can be connected. Computer program product to enable a computer to be booted from a unit trusted by the user, wherein the computer program product comprises a computer-readable storage medium with a computer-readable program code embodied thereon, preferably consisting of several modules, wherein the computer-readable program code is configured to implement all steps of the method according to any one of claims 1 to 12.

Citation Information

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