Collaborative Early Threat Detection Using Sensor Sharing

Abstract

A method and apparatus for collaborative early threat detection. In some aspects, the apparatus detects one or more object data signals having data interfering with wireless resources utilized in the automated driving decision. The apparatus transmits a message to at least a second wireless device indicating the one or more object data signals having data interfering with wireless resources utilized in the automated driving decision. The one or more object data signals may correspond to an abnormally operating wireless device. The data of the abnormally operating wireless device may comprise unlikely data related to at least one characteristic of the abnormally operating wireless device.

Description

[Technical field]

[0001] CROSS-REFERENCE TO RELATED APPLICATIONS

[0001] This application claims the benefit of U.S. Non-Provisional Patent Application No. 17 / 327,429, filed May 21, 2021, entitled "COOPERATIVE EARLY THREAT DETECTION USING SENSOR SHARING," the entire contents of which are expressly incorporated by reference into this specification.

[0002] The present disclosure relates generally to communication systems, and more particularly, to arrangements for cooperative early threat detection. [Background technology]

[0003]

[0003] Wireless communication systems have been widely deployed to provide various telecommunication services, such as telephone, video, data, messaging, and broadcast. A typical wireless communication system may employ multiple access technologies capable of supporting communication with multiple users by sharing available system resources. Examples of such multiple access technologies include Code Division Multiple Access (CDMA) systems, Time Division Multiple Access (TDMA) systems, Frequency Division Multiple Access (FDMA) systems, Orthogonal Frequency Division Multiple Access (OFDMA) systems, Single Carrier Frequency Division Multiple Access (SC-FDMA) systems, and Time Division Synchronous Code Division Multiple Access (TD-SCDMA) systems.

[0004]

[0004] These multiple access technologies are being adopted in various telecommunication standards to provide common protocols that allow various wireless devices to communicate on a city, national, regional, or even global scale. An exemplary telecommunication standard is 5G New Radio (NR). 5G NR is part of the continuing mobile broadband evolution promulgated by the 3rd Generation Partnership Project (3GPP®) to meet new requirements related to latency, reliability, security, scalability (e.g., for the Internet of Things (IoT)), and other requirements. 5G NR includes services related to enhanced mobile broadband (eMBB), massive machine type communications (mMTC), and ultra-reliable low latency communications (URLLC). Some aspects of 5G NR may be based on the 4G Long Term Evolution (LTE®) standard. Aspects of wireless communication may comprise direct communication between devices, such as in V2X, V2V, and / or D2D communications. There is a need for further improvements in V2X, V2V, and / or D2D technologies that may also be applicable to other multiple access technologies and telecommunications standards that employ these technologies. Summary of the Invention

[0005]

[0005] The following presents a simplified summary of one or more aspects in order to provide a basic understanding of such aspects. This summary is not an exhaustive overview of all contemplated aspects, nor is it intended to identify key or critical elements of all aspects or to delineate the scope of any or all aspects. Its sole purpose is to present some concepts of one or more aspects in a simplified form as a prelude to the more detailed description that is presented later.

[0006]

[0006] In one aspect of the disclosure, a method, a computer-readable medium, and an apparatus are provided. The apparatus may be a device in a first wireless device. The device may be a processor and / or a modem in the first wireless device or the first wireless device itself. The apparatus detects a threat entity transmitting data that interferes with the transmission of a basic safety message (BSM). The apparatus transmits a message to a second wireless device indicating information related to a type of the threat entity.

[0007]

[0007] In one aspect of the disclosure, a method, a computer-readable medium, and an apparatus are provided. The apparatus may be a device in a second wireless device. The device may be a processor and / or modem in the second wireless device or the second wireless device itself. The apparatus receives a message from a first wireless device indicating a threat entity in a threat zone, where the threat entity transmits data that interferes with the transmission of a Basic Safety Message (BSM). The apparatus determines candidate resources among a set of candidate resources on which to transmit the BSM based at least in part on the message indicating information related to the threat entity from the first wireless device. The apparatus transmits the BSM on the determined candidate resources to at least a third wireless device.

[0008]

[0008] In one aspect of the disclosure, a method, a computer-readable medium, and an apparatus are provided. The apparatus may be a device in a first wireless device. The device may be a processor and / or modem in the first wireless device or the first wireless device itself. The apparatus detects a threat entity based on a data signal received from a threat entity in a threat zone, where the threat entity disrupts a wireless spectrum or resources utilized in a cooperative or automated driving decision. The apparatus transmits a message to at least one second wireless device indicating a threat entity in the threat zone.

[0009]

[0009] In one aspect of the disclosure, a method, a computer-readable medium, and an apparatus are provided. The apparatus may be a device in a second wireless device. The device may be a processor and / or modem in the second wireless device or the second wireless device itself. The apparatus receives a message indicating a threat entity in a threat zone, where the threat entity disrupts wireless spectrum or resources utilized in collaborative or autonomous driving decisions. In response to receiving the message, the apparatus initiates a mitigation action to avoid or mitigate contact with the threat entity.

[0010]

[0010] In one aspect of the present disclosure, a method, a computer-readable medium, and an apparatus are provided. The apparatus may be a device in a first wireless device. The device may be a processor and / or a modem in the first wireless device or the first wireless device itself. The apparatus detects one or more object data signals having data interfering with a wireless resource utilized in the autonomous driving decision. The apparatus transmits a message to at least a second wireless device indicating one or more object data signals having data interfering with a wireless resource utilized in the autonomous driving decision.

[0011]

[0011] In one aspect of the present disclosure, a method, a computer-readable medium, and an apparatus are provided. The apparatus may be a device in a second wireless device. The device may be a processor and / or modem in the second wireless device or the second wireless device itself. The apparatus receives a message from the first wireless device indicating one or more object data signals having data interfering with wireless resources utilized in the autonomous driving decision. In response to receiving the message, the apparatus initiates a mitigation action to avoid or mitigate contact with one or more object data signals interfering with the wireless resources utilized in the autonomous driving decision.

[0012]

[0012] To the accomplishment of the foregoing and related ends, the one or more aspects comprise the features hereinafter fully described and particularly pointed out in the claims. The following description and the annexed drawings set forth in detail certain illustrative features of the one or more aspects. These features are indicative, however, of but a few of the various ways in which the principles of the various aspects may be employed, and the description is intended to include all such aspects and their equivalents. [Brief description of the drawings]

[0013] [Figure 1]

[0013] FIG. 1 illustrates an example of a wireless communication system and access network. [Diagram 2]

[0014] FIG. 1 illustrates an example embodiment of a side link slot structure. [Diagram 3]

[0015] A diagram illustrating an example of a first device and a second device engaged in wireless communication, e.g., based on V2V, V2X, and / or device-to-device communication. [Figure 4]

[0016] FIG. 1 illustrates an example of devices involved in wireless communication, e.g., based on sidelink communication. [Figure 5A]

[0017] FIG. 1 illustrates an example of sensor-sharing for cooperative and automated driving systems. [Figure 5B] Diagram showing an example of sensor sharing for collaborative and autonomous driving systems. [Figure 5C] Diagram showing an example of sensor sharing for collaborative and autonomous driving systems. [Figure 5D] Diagram showing an example of sensor sharing for collaborative and autonomous driving systems. [Figure 6]

[0018] FIG. 1 illustrates an example of sensor sharing for collaborative and autonomous driving systems. [Figure 7]

[0019] FIG. 1 illustrates an example of sensor sharing for collaborative and autonomous driving systems. [Figure 8]

[0020] FIG. 1 illustrates an example of threat entity detection. [Figure 9]

[0021] FIG. 1 illustrates an example of threat entity detection. [Figure 10A]

[0022] FIG. 1 illustrates an example of threat entity detection and reporting. [Figure 10B] FIG. 1 illustrates an example of threat entity detection and reporting. [Figure 11]

[0023] FIG. 13 is a diagram showing an example of a sensor data sharing message structure. [Figure 12]

[0024] FIG. 13 is a diagram showing an example of a sensor data sharing message structure. [Figure 13]

[0025] FIG. 13 is a diagram showing an example of a detected object information element in a sensor data sharing message. [Figure 14]

[0026] FIG. 13 illustrates an example of parameters for detected objects in a sensor data sharing message. [Figure 15]

[0027] 1 is a call flow diagram of signaling between a first wireless device, a second wireless device, and a third wireless device. [Figure 16]

[0028] 1 is a flow chart of a method of wireless communication. [Figure 17]

[0029] FIG. 2 illustrates an example of a hardware implementation for an exemplary apparatus. [Figure 18]

[0030] 1 is a flow chart of a method of wireless communication. [Figure 19]

[0031] 1 is a flow chart of a method of wireless communication. [Figure 20]

[0032] FIG. 2 illustrates an example of a hardware implementation for an exemplary apparatus. [Figure 21]

[0033] 1 is a call flow diagram of signaling between a first wireless device, a second wireless device, and a third wireless device. [Figure 22]

[0034] 1 is a flow chart of a method of wireless communication. [Diagram 23]

[0035] 1 is a flow chart of a method of wireless communication. [Figure 24]

[0036] FIG. 2 illustrates an example of a hardware implementation for an exemplary apparatus. [Diagram 25]

[0037] 1 is a flow chart of a method of wireless communication. [Figure 26]

[0038] 1 is a flow chart of a method of wireless communication. [Figure 27]

[0039] FIG. 2 illustrates an example of a hardware implementation for an exemplary apparatus. [Figure 28]

[0040] 4 is a call flow diagram of signaling between a first wireless device and a second wireless device. [Figure 29]

[0041] 1 is a flow chart of a method of wireless communication. [Diagram 30]

[0042] FIG. 2 illustrates an example of a hardware implementation for an exemplary apparatus. [Diagram 31]

[0043] 1 is a flow chart of a method of wireless communication. [Diagram 32]

[0044] FIG. 2 illustrates an example of a hardware implementation for an exemplary apparatus. DETAILED DESCRIPTION OF THE PREFERRED EMBODIMENTS

[0014]

[0045] The detailed description of the embodiments of the invention described below with reference to the accompanying drawings illustrates various configurations and does not represent the only configurations in which the concepts described herein may be practiced. The detailed description of the embodiments of the invention includes specific details for providing a thorough understanding of the various concepts. However, it will be apparent to those skilled in the art that these concepts may be practiced without these specific details. In some instances, well-known structures and components are shown in block diagram form to avoid obscuring such concepts.

[0015]

[0046] Several aspects of a telecommunications system are now presented with respect to various apparatus and methods that are described in the detailed description that follows and illustrated in the accompanying drawings by various blocks, components, circuits, processes, algorithms, etc. (collectively referred to as "elements"). These elements may be implemented using electronic hardware, computer software, or any combination thereof. Whether such elements are implemented as hardware or software depends on the particular application and design constraints imposed on the overall system.

[0016]

[0047] As an example, an element, or any portion of an element, or any combination of elements, may be implemented as a "processing system" including one or more processors. Examples of processors include microprocessors, microcontrollers, graphics processing units (GPUs), central processing units (CPUs), application processors, digital signal processors (DSPs), reduced instruction set computing (RISC) processors, systems on chips (SoCs), baseband processors, field programmable gate arrays (FPGAs), programmable logic devices (PLDs), state machines, gate logic, discrete hardware circuits, and other suitable hardware configured to perform various functions described throughout this disclosure. One or more processors in a processing system may execute software. Software should be broadly construed to mean instructions, instruction sets, code, code segments, program code, programs, subprograms, software components, applications, software applications, software packages, routines, subroutines, objects, executable files, threads of execution, procedures, functions, and the like, regardless of whether referred to as software, firmware, middleware, microcode, hardware description language, or otherwise.

[0017]

[0048] Thus, in one or more exemplary embodiments, the functions described may be implemented in hardware, software, or any combination thereof. If implemented in software, the functions may be stored on a computer-readable medium or encoded as one or more instructions or codes on the computer-readable medium. Computer-readable media includes computer storage media. A storage medium may be any available medium that can be accessed by a computer. By way of example and not limitation, such computer-readable media may comprise random access memory (RAM), read-only memory (ROM), electrically erasable programmable ROM (EEPROM), optical disk storage, magnetic disk storage, other magnetic storage devices, combinations of the above types of computer-readable media, or any other medium that can be used to store computer-executable code in the form of instructions or data structures that can be accessed by a computer.

[0018]

[0049] 1 illustrates an example of a wireless communication system and access network 100. The wireless communication system (also referred to as a wireless wide area network (WWAN)) includes a base station 102, a UE 104, an evolved packet core (EPC) 160, and a core network (e.g., 5GC) 190. The base station 102 may include macro cells (high power cellular base stations) and / or small cells (low power cellular base stations). Macro cells include base stations. Small cells include femto cells, pico cells, and micro cells.

[0019]

[0050] A base station 102 configured for 4G LTE (collectively referred to as Evolved Universal Mobile Telecommunications System (UMTS) Terrestrial Radio Access Network (E-UTRAN)) may interface with the EPC 160 via a backhaul link 132 (e.g., an S1 interface). A base station 102 configured for NR (collectively referred to as Next Generation RAN (NG-RAN)) may interface with the core network 190 through a backhaul link 184. In addition to other functions, the base stations 102 may perform one or more of the following functions: forwarding of user data, radio channel encryption and decryption, integrity protection, header compression, mobility control functions (e.g., handover, dual connectivity), inter-cell interference coordination, connection setup and release, load balancing, distribution for non-access stratum (NAS) messages, NAS node selection, synchronization, radio access network (RAN) sharing, multimedia broadcast multicast service (MBMS), subscriber and equipment tracing, RAN information management (RIM), paging, positioning, and distribution of alert messages. The base stations 102 may communicate with each other directly or indirectly (e.g., via the EPC 160 or the core network 190) over the backhaul links 134 (e.g., X2 interface). The backhaul links 134 may be wired or wireless.

[0020]

[0051] The base stations 102 may wirelessly communicate with the UE 104. Each of the base stations 102 may provide communication coverage to a respective geographic coverage area 110. There may be overlapping geographic coverage areas 110. For example, a small cell 102' may have a coverage area 110' that overlaps with the coverage area 110 of one or more macro base stations 102. A network including both small cells and macro cells may be known as a heterogeneous network. A heterogeneous network may also include a home evolved Node B (eNB) (HeNB) that may serve a closed group known as a closed subscriber group (CSG). A communication link 120 between the base station 102 and the UE 104 may include uplink (UL) transmissions (also referred to as a reverse link) from the UE 104 to the base station 102, and / or downlink (DL) transmissions (also referred to as a forward link) from the base station 102 to the UE 104. The communication link 120 may use multiple-input multiple-output (MIMO) antenna techniques, including spatial multiplexing, beamforming, and / or transmit diversity. The communication link may be over one or more carriers. The base station 102 / UE 104 may use spectrum of up to Y MHz (e.g., 5, 10, 15, 20, 100, 400 MHz, etc.) bandwidth per carrier, allocated with carrier aggregation of up to Yx MHz (x component carriers) in total used for transmission in each direction. The carriers may be adjacent or non-adjacent to each other. The carrier allocation may be asymmetric with respect to DL and UL (e.g., more or fewer carriers may be allocated for DL ​​than for UL). The component carriers may include a primary component carrier and one or more secondary component carriers. The primary component carrier may be referred to as a primary cell (PCell), and the secondary component carrier may be referred to as a secondary cell (SCell).

[0021]

[0052] Several UEs 104 may communicate with each other using device-to-device (D2D) communication links 158. The D2D communication links 158 may use DL / UL WWAN spectrum. The D2D communication links 158 may use one or more sidelink channels, such as a physical sidelink broadcast channel (PSBCH), a physical sidelink discovery channel (PSDCH), a physical sidelink shared channel (PSSCH), and a physical sidelink control channel (PSCCH). The D2D communication may be via various wireless D2D communication systems, such as, for example, FlashLinQ, WiMedia, Bluetooth, ZigBee, Wi-Fi based on the IEEE 802.11 standard, LTE, or NR.

[0022]

[0053] The wireless communication system may further include a Wi-Fi access point (AP) 150 communicating with a Wi-Fi station (STA) 152 via a communication link 154 in the 5 GHz unlicensed frequency spectrum. When communicating in the unlicensed frequency spectrum, the STA 152 / AP 150 may perform clear channel assessment (CCA) prior to communicating to determine if a channel is available.

[0023]

[0054] The small cell 102' may operate in licensed and / or unlicensed frequency spectrums. When operating in the unlicensed frequency spectrum, the small cell 102' may employ NR and use the same 5 GHz unlicensed frequency spectrum used by the Wi-Fi AP 150. The small cell 102' employing NR in the unlicensed frequency spectrum may enhance coverage to and / or increase capacity of the access network.

[0024]

[0055] The base station 102, whether a small cell 102' or a large cell (e.g., a macro base station), may include an eNB, a gNodeB (gNB), or other type of base station. Some base stations, such as the gNB 180, may operate in the conventional sub-6 GHz spectrum, in millimeter wave (mmW) frequencies, and / or near-mmW frequencies in communication with the UE 104. When the gNB 180 operates in mmW or near-mmW frequencies, the gNB 180 may be referred to as an mmW base station. Extremely high frequency (EHF) is a part of RF in the electromagnetic spectrum. EHF has a range of 30 GHz to 300 GHz and a wavelength between 1 millimeter and 10 millimeters. Radio waves in this band may be referred to as millimeter waves. Near-mmW may extend down to frequencies of 3 GHz with a wavelength of 100 millimeters. The very high frequency (SHF) band, also called centimeter wave, extends between 3 GHz and 30 GHz. Communications using the mmW / near-mmW radio frequency bands have extremely high path loss and short range. The mmW base station 180 may utilize beamforming 182 with the UE 104 to compensate for the extremely high path loss and short range.

[0025]

[0056] Devices may use beamforming to transmit and receive communications. For example, FIG. 1 shows that the base station 180 may transmit a beamformed signal to the UE 104 in one or more transmit directions 182′. The UE 104 may receive the beamformed signal from the base station 180 in one or more receive directions 182″. The UE 104 may also transmit a beamformed signal to the base station 180 in one or more transmit directions. The base station 180 may receive a beamformed signal from the UE 104 in one or more receive directions. The base station 180 / UE 104 may perform beam training to determine the best receive direction and transmit direction for each of the base station 180 / UE 104. The transmit direction and receive direction for the base station 180 may be the same or different. The transmit direction and receive direction for the UE 104 may be the same or different. Although the beamformed signal is shown between the UE 104 and the base station 102 / 180, the beamforming aspects may similarly be applied for a UE 104 or RSU 107 to communicate with another UE 104 or RSU 107 based on sidelink communications such as V2X or D2D communications, etc.

[0026]

[0057] The EPC 160 may include a Mobility Management Entity (MME) 162, other MMEs 164, a Serving Gateway 166, a Multimedia Broadcast Multicast Service (MBMS) Gateway 168, a Broadcast Multicast Service Center (BM-SC) 170, and a Packet Data Network (PDN) Gateway 172. The MME 162 may be in communication with a Home Subscriber Server (HSS) 174. The MME 162 is a control node that handles signaling between the UE 104 and the EPC 160. In general, the MME 162 provides bearer and connection management. All user Internet Protocol (IP) packets are forwarded through the Serving Gateway 166, which is itself connected to the PDN Gateway 172. The PDN Gateway 172 provides IP address allocation for the UE as well as other functions. The PDN Gateway 172 and the BM-SC 170 are connected to the IP Services 176. The IP services 176 may include Internet, intranet, IP Multimedia Subsystem (IMS), PS streaming services, and / or other IP services. The BM-SC 170 may provide functionality for MBMS user service provisioning and delivery. The BM-SC 170 may act as an entry point for content provider MBMS transmissions, may be used to authorize and start MBMS bearer services in a Public Land Mobile Network (PLMN), and may be used to schedule MBMS transmissions. The MBMS Gateway 168 may be used to deliver MBMS traffic to base stations 102 that belong to a Multicast Broadcast Single Frequency Network (MBSFN) area that broadcasts a particular service, and may be responsible for session management (start / stop) and collecting eMBMS-related charging information.

[0027]

[0058] The core network 190 may include an access and mobility management function (AMF) 192, another AMF 193, a session management function (SMF) 194, and a user plane function (UPF) 195. The AMF 192 may be in communication with an integrated data management (UDM) 196. The AMF 192 is a control node that handles signaling between the UE 104 and the core network 190. Generally, the AMF 192 provides QoS flow and session management. All user Internet Protocol (IP) packets are forwarded through the UPF 195. The UPF 195 provides IP address allocation for the UE as well as other functions. The UPF 195 is connected to IP services 197. The IP services 197 may include the Internet, intranet, IP multimedia subsystem (IMS), PS streaming services, and / or other IP services.

[0028]

[0059] A base station may also be referred to as a gNB, Node B, evolved Node B (eNB), access point, base transceiver station, radio base station, radio transceiver, transceiver function, basic service set (BSS), enhanced service set (ESS), transmit / receive point (TRP), or some other suitable terminology. The base station 102 provides an access point to the EPC 160 or core network 190 for the UEs 104. Examples of the UEs 104 include cellular phones, smartphones, session initiation protocol (SIP) phones, laptops, personal digital assistants (PDAs), satellite radios, global positioning systems, multimedia devices, video devices, digital audio players (e.g., MP3 players), cameras, gaming consoles, tablets, smart devices, wearable devices, vehicles, electric meters, gas pumps, large or small kitchen appliances, healthcare devices, implants, sensors / actuators, displays, or any other similarly functional devices. Some of the UEs 104 may be referred to as IoT devices (e.g., parking meters, gas pumps, toasters, vehicles, heart monitors, etc.). The UE 104 may also be referred to as a station, mobile station, subscriber station, mobile unit, subscriber unit, wireless unit, remote unit, mobile device, wireless device, wireless communication device, remote device, mobile subscriber station, access terminal, mobile terminal, wireless terminal, remote terminal, handset, user agent, mobile client, client, or some other suitable terminology.

[0029]

[0060] Some wireless communication networks may include vehicle-based communication devices that may communicate from and / or with other devices, such as vehicle-to-vehicle (V2V), vehicle-to-infrastructure (V2I) (e.g., from the vehicle-based communication devices to road infrastructure nodes such as roadside units (RSUs)), vehicle-to-network (V2N) (e.g., from the vehicle-based communication devices to one or more network nodes such as base stations), cellular vehicle-to-anything (C-V2X), enhanced V2X (e-V2X), and / or combinations thereof, which may be collectively referred to as vehicle-to-anything (V2X) communications. Referring again to FIG. 1, in some aspects, a UE 104, e.g., a transmitting vehicular user equipment (VUE) or other UE, may be configured to transmit a message directly to another UE 104. The communication may be based on V2X communications or other D2D communications, such as Proximity Services (ProSe). Communications based on V2X and / or D2D communications may also be transmitted and received by other transmitting and receiving devices, such as a roadside unit (RSU) 107. Aspects of the communications may be based on PC5 or sidelink communications, for example, as described with respect to the example of FIG. 2. Although the following description may provide an example of V2X / D2D communications with respect to 5G NR, the concepts described herein may be applicable to other similar areas, such as LTE, LTE-A, CDMA, GSM, and other wireless technologies.

[0030]

[0061] Referring again to FIG. 1 , in some aspects, the UE 104 may be configured to share information of the detected threat entity with other wireless devices such that other wireless devices beyond the threat entity's zone may virtually sense the threat entity. For example, the UE 104 may comprise a detection component 198 configured to share information of the detected threat entity with other wireless devices such that other wireless devices beyond the threat entity's zone (e.g., 104′) may virtually sense the threat entity. In some aspects, the UE 104 may be configured to share information related to the detected threat entity with other wireless devices such that other wireless devices beyond the threat entity's threat zone may proactively take preventative measures. For example, the UE 104 may comprise a detection component 198 configured to share information related to the detected threat entity with other wireless devices such that other wireless devices beyond the threat entity's threat zone (e.g., UE 104′) may proactively take preventative measures. In some aspects, the UE 104 may be configured to share information related to the detected threat entity with other wireless devices. For example, the UE 104 may comprise a detection component 198 configured to share information related to detected threat entities with other wireless devices (eg, the UE 104').

[0031]

[0062] Referring again to FIG. 1, in some aspects, the UE 104′ may be configured to determine a subchannel for transmitting a BSM based on the virtual sensing of a threat entity. For example, the UE 104′ may comprise a BSM component 199 configured to determine a subchannel for transmitting a BSM based on the virtual sensing of a threat entity. In some aspects, the UE 104′ may be configured to initiate a mitigation action based on the virtual sensing of a threat entity detected by a first wireless device. For example, the UE 104′ may comprise a mitigation component 199 configured to initiate a mitigation action based on the virtual sensing of a threat entity detected by a first wireless device (e.g., 104). In some aspects, the UE 104′ may be configured to initiate a mitigation action in response to receiving a notification of a threat obstacle detected by a first wireless device while beyond a threat zone of the threat obstacle. For example, the UE 104′ may comprise a mitigation component 199 configured to initiate mitigation actions in response to receiving notification of a threat obstacle detected by a first wireless device (e.g., 104) while beyond the threat zone of the threat obstacle.

[0032]

[0063] FIG. 2 illustrates an example diagram 200 illustrating sidelink subframes within a frame structure that may be used for sidelink communications, e.g., between a UE 104, between a UE and an infrastructure, between a UE and an RSU, etc. The frame structure may be within an LTE frame structure. While the following description may focus on LTE, the concepts described herein may be applicable to other similar areas, such as 5G NR, LTE-A, CDMA, GSM, and other wireless technologies. This is only an example, and other wireless communication technologies may have different frame structures and / or different channels. A frame (10 ms) may be divided into 10 equally sized subframes (1 ms). Each subframe may include two slots. Each slot may include seven SC-FDMA symbols. For slot configuration 0, each slot may include 14 symbols, and for slot configuration 1, each slot may include seven symbols. Although diagram 200 illustrates a single RB subframe, sidelink communications may include multiple RBs.

[0033]

[0064] A resource grid may be used to represent the frame structure. Each time slot may include a physical resource block (RB) (also called PRB) that spans 12 consecutive subcarriers. The resource grid is divided into multiple resource elements (REs). The number of bits carried by each RE depends on the modulation scheme. As shown in FIG. 2, some of the REs may include a reference signal, such as a demodulation RS (DMRS). At least one symbol may be used for feedback, as described herein. Symbols before and / or after the feedback may be used for turnaround between receiving data and transmitting feedback. For example, another symbol at the end of the subframe may be used as a no transmit / receive guard symbol. This guard allows a device to switch, for example, from operating as a transmitting device to preparing to operate as a receiving device in a subsequent subframe. Data or control may be transmitted in the remaining REs as shown. For example, data may be carried in the PSSCH and control information may be carried in the PSCCH. The control information may comprise sidelink control information (SCI). The location of any of the reference signals, control, and data may differ from the example shown in FIG.

[0034]

[0065] 2 illustrates only one non-limiting example of a frame structure that may be used. The aspects described herein may be applied to communications using other different frame formats.

[0035]

[0066] 3 is a block diagram 300 of a first wireless communication device 310 in communication with a second wireless communication device 350, e.g., via V2V / V2X / other communication. The device 310 may comprise a receiving device, e.g., a transmitting device, in communication with the device 350. The communication may be based on a sidelink, e.g., the transmitting device 310 may comprise a UE, an RSU, etc. The receiving device may comprise a UE, an RSU, etc. The packets may be provided to a controller / processor 375 that implements Layer 3 and Layer 2 functions. Layer 3 includes a Radio Resource Control (RRC) layer, and Layer 2 includes a Packet Data Convergence Protocol (PDCP) layer, a Radio Link Control (RLC) layer, and a Medium Access Control (MAC) layer.

[0036]

[0067] The transmit (TX) processor 316 and receive (RX) processor 370 implement Layer 1 functions related to various signal processing functions. Layer 1, which includes the physical (PHY) layer, may include error detection on transport channels, forward error correction (FEC) coding / decoding of transport channels, interleaving, rate matching, mapping onto physical channels, modulation / demodulation of physical channels, and MIMO antenna processing. The TX processor 316 handles mapping to signal constellations based on various modulation schemes (e.g., binary phase shift keying (BPSK), quadrature phase shift keying (QPSK), M-phase shift keying (M-PSK), M-ary quadrature amplitude modulation (M-QAM)). The coded and modulated symbols may then be split into parallel streams. Each stream may then be mapped to an OFDM subcarrier, multiplexed with a reference signal (e.g., pilot) in the time domain and / or frequency domain, and then combined with each other using an inverse fast Fourier transform (IFFT) to generate a physical channel carrying a time-domain OFDM symbol stream. The OFDM stream is spatially precoded to generate multiple spatial streams. Channel estimates from a channel estimator 374 may be used to determine the coding and modulation scheme, as well as for spatial processing. The channel estimates may be derived from a reference signal and / or channel condition feedback transmitted by the device 350. Each spatial stream may then be provided to a different antenna 320 via a separate transmitter 318TX. Each transmitter 318TX may modulate an RF carrier with the respective spatial stream for transmission.

[0037]

[0068] In the device 350, each receiver 354RX receives a signal via its respective antenna 352. Each receiver 354RX recovers the information modulated onto the RF carrier and provides the information to a receive (RX) processor 356. The TX processor 368 and the RX processor 356 implement layer 1 functions related to various signal processing functions. The RX processor 356 may perform spatial processing on the information to recover any spatial streams destined for the device 350. If multiple spatial streams are destined for the device 350, they may be combined into a single OFDM symbol stream by the RX processor 356. The RX processor 356 then converts the OFDM symbol stream from the time domain to the frequency domain using a fast Fourier transform (FFT). The frequency domain signal comprises a separate OFDM symbol stream for each subcarrier of the OFDM signal. The symbols on each subcarrier and the reference signal are recovered and demodulated by determining the most likely signal constellation point transmitted by the device 310. These soft decisions may be based on channel estimates calculated by a channel estimator 358. The soft decisions are then decoded and deinterleaved to recover the data and control signals originally transmitted by the device 310 on the physical channel. The data and control signals are then provided to a controller / processor 359, which implements Layer 3 and Layer 2 functions.

[0038]

[0069] The controller / processor 359 may be associated with a memory 360 that stores program codes and data. The memory 360 may be referred to as a computer-readable medium. The controller / processor 359 may provide demultiplexing between transport and logical channels, packet reassembly, decryption, header decompression, and control signal processing. The controller / processor 359 is also responsible for error detection using an ACK and / or NACK protocol to support HARQ operations.

[0039]

[0070] Similar to the functions described with respect to transmission by the device 310, the controller / processor 359 may provide RRC layer functions related to system information (e.g., MIBs, SIBs) collection, RRC connection, and measurement reporting; PDCP layer functions related to header compression / decompression and security (encryption, decryption, integrity protection, integrity verification); RLC layer functions related to transfer of upper layer PDUs, error correction via ARQ, concatenation, segmentation, and reassembly of RLC SDUs, resegmentation of RLC data PDUs, and reordering of RLC data PDUs; and MAC layer functions related to mapping between logical channels and transport channels, multiplexing of MAC SDUs onto the TB, demultiplexing of MAC SDUs from the TB, scheduling information reporting, error correction via HARQ, priority handling, and logical channel prioritization.

[0040]

[0071] Channel estimates derived by the channel estimator 358 from a reference signal or feedback transmitted by the device 310 may be used by the TX processor 368 to select an appropriate coding and modulation scheme and to facilitate spatial processing. The spatial streams generated by the TX processor 368 may be provided to different antennas 352 via separate transmitters 354TX. Each transmitter 354TX may modulate an RF carrier with a respective spatial stream for transmission.

[0041]

[0072] Transmissions are processed in device 310 in a manner similar to that described with respect to the receiver functions in device 350. Each receiver 318RX receives a signal through its respective antenna 320. Each receiver 318RX recovers information modulated onto an RF carrier and provides the information to a RX processor 370.

[0042]

[0073] The controller / processor 375 may be associated with a memory 376 that stores program codes and data. The memory 376 may be referred to as a computer-readable medium. The controller / processor 375 provides demultiplexing between transport and logical channels, packet reassembly, decryption, header decompression, and control signal processing. The controller / processor 375 is also responsible for error detection using an ACK and / or NACK protocol to support HARQ operations.

[0043]

[0074] At least one of the TX processor 368, RX processor 356, or controller / processor 359 or the TX 316, RX processor 370, or controller / processor 375 of the device 350 may be configured to implement the aspects described with respect to 198 or 199 of FIG.

[0044]

[0075] FIG. 4 illustrates an example 400 of wireless communication between devices based on sidelink communication, such as V2X or other D2D communication. The communication may be based on a slot structure comprising aspects described with respect to FIG. 2. For example, the transmitting UE 402 may transmit a transmission 414 comprising a control channel and / or a corresponding data channel that may be received by, for example, the receiving UEs 404, 406, 408. At least one of the UEs may comprise an autonomous vehicle or an unmanned aerial vehicle. The control channel may include information for decoding the data channel and may also be used by the receiving device to avoid interference by refraining from transmitting on occupied resources during data transmission. The number of TTIs, as well as the RBs that will be occupied by the data transmission, may be indicated in a control message from the transmitting device. The UEs 402, 404, 406, 408 may each be capable of operating as a transmitting device in addition to operating as a receiving device. Thus, the UEs 406, 408 are shown as transmitting transmissions 416, 420. The transmissions 414, 416, 420 may be broadcast or multicast to nearby devices. For example, the UE 414 may transmit communications intended for reception by other UEs within range 401 of the UE 414. Additionally / alternatively, the RSU 407 may receive communications from and / or transmit communications to the UEs 402, 404, 406, 408.

[0045]

[0076] The UE 402, 404, 406, 408 or RSU 407 may include a detection component, similar to 198 described with respect to FIG. 1. The UE 402, 404, 406, 408 or RSU 407 may also include a BSM or mitigation component, similar to 199 described with respect to FIG.

[0046]

[0077] In wireless communication such as V2X communication, a V2X entity may implement sensor sharing with other V2X entities for collaborative and autonomous driving. For example, referring to diagram 500 of FIG. 5A, a host vehicle (HV) 502 may detect some items in its environment. For example, the HV 502 may detect the presence of a non-V2X entity (NV) 506. If a first remote vehicle (RV1) 504 or a roadside unit (RSU) 508 cannot detect the NV 506 by themselves, the HV 502 may notify other entities such as RV1 504 and / or RSU 508 about the presence of the NV 506. The HV 502 notifying RV1 504 and / or RSU 508 about the NV 506 is a sharing of sensor information. With reference to diagram 510 in FIG. 5B, HV 502 may detect a physical obstacle 512, such as a pothole, debris, or object, which may be an obstacle in the path of HV 502 and / or RV1 504 that has not yet been detected by RV1 504 and / or RSU 508. HV 502 may notify RV1 and / or RSU 508 of the obstacle 512 so that the obstacle 512 may be avoided. With reference to diagram 520 in FIG. 5C, HV 502 may detect the presence of a vulnerable road user (VRU) 522 and may share the detection of the VRU 522 with RV1 504 and RSU 508 in cases where RSU 508 and / or RV1 504 may not be able to detect the VRU 522. Referring to diagram 530 of FIG. 5D, when an HV detects a nearby entity (e.g., NV, VRU, obstacle), it may send a sensor data sharing message (SDSM) 532 to the RV and / or RSU to share the detection of the entity. The SDSM 532 may be a broadcast message such that any receiving device within the vicinity of the HV may receive the message. In some instances, the shared information may be relayed to other entities, such as the RV. For example, referring to diagram 600 of FIG. 6, the HV 602 may detect the presence of the NV 606 and / or the VRU 622.The HV 602 may broadcast an SDSM 610 to the RSU 608 to report the detection of the NV 606 and / or the VRU 622. The RSU 608 may relay the SDSM 610 received from the HV 602 to the remote vehicles so that the remote vehicles are aware of the presence of the NV 606 and / or the VRU 622. For example, the RSU 608 may transmit an SDSM 612 to the RV1 604, where the SDSM 612 includes information related to the detection of the NV 606 and / or the VRU 622. In some cases, the remote vehicles may be updated repeatedly. For example, referring to the diagram 700 of FIG. 7, the HV 702 may detect the NV1 706 and / or the NV2 708 and may share the presence of the NV1 706 and / or the NV2 708 with the RV 704. The HV 702 may transmit an SDSM 710 advertising the raw data collected by the HV 702. The RV 704 may send an SDSM 712 that may comprise a request to subscribe to the raw data advertised by the HV 702. In response, the HV may send a raw data exchange 714 to the RV 704. Information related to some objects may be included in the SDSM. For example, the SDSM may include information related to non-V2X vehicles, obstacles, or VRUs. These are objects that may be physically detected and may present physical obstacles or barriers to the path of the V2X vehicle. However, some objects may present risks to the collaborative and autonomous driving decisions of the V2X vehicle.

[0047]

[0078] In wireless communications such as C-V2X communications, C-V2X distributed scheduling schemes (e.g., Mode 4 for LTE-V2X or Mode 2 for NR-V2X) may utilize physical sensing for subchannel exclusion and not consider resources occupied by hidden nodes while making reservations. Persistent hidden jammers or Wi-Fi out of band (OOB) interferers may reduce successful packet reception, especially at the edge of the broadcast range, which may reduce the effective range of C-V2X communications. This may be exacerbated in urban vehicular ad hoc networks (VANETs) by the presence of close-range hidden nodes that may become invisible due to the presence of obstacles and / or buildings. Hidden nodes may disrupt or cause interference to resources utilized in autonomous driving decisions. Hidden nodes may not be malicious entities intentionally attempting to attack C-V2X safety applications. However, some hidden nodes may be malicious or threat entities and may present attacks in the form of denial of service (DoS) attacks, jamming, or even OOB interference that are unintentional and are known threats to C-V2X. These attacks from these entities, whether malicious or not, may significantly hinder the utility of C-V2X-enabled safety applications. If attacks from these entities are not detected in time and properly mitigated or avoided, such attacks may present an immediate danger to road users.

[0048]

[0079] Aspects provided herein provide an arrangement for collaborative early threat detection using sensor sharing. For example, a first wireless device may share information related to a detected threat entity with other wireless devices. In some aspects, the first wireless device may share information of the detected threat entity with other wireless devices such that other wireless devices beyond the threat entity's zone virtually sense the threat entity. In some aspects, the first wireless device may share information related to the detected threat entity with other wireless devices such that other wireless devices beyond the threat entity's threat zone may proactively take preventative measures.

[0049]

[0080] FIG. 8 is a diagram 800 illustrating an example of detection of a threat entity. In some instances, a victim vehicle (VV) 802 may be a V2X entity and may encounter a threat entity 804. The VV 802 may encounter the threat entity 804 while within a threat zone 806 of the threat entity 804. The VV 802 may detect the presence of the threat entity 804 as well as detect a characteristic of the threat entity 804. In some instances, the threat entity 804 may be in the form of a DoS attack, a jammer, a misbehaving vehicle, an out of band (OOB) interferer, a wide area network (WAN) jammer, or a global navigation satellite system (GNSS) jammer. The diagram 800 of FIG. 8 discloses one threat entity 804 that may pose a threat to the VV 802. However, in some aspects, a threat to the VV 802 may be posed by one or more threat entities. One or more threat entities may be stationary or mobile For example, a stationary threat entity may be located in a nearby building or outside a building near a street or intersection, while a mobile threat entity may comprise a vehicle.

[0050]

[0081] When the VV 802 detects a threat entity 804, the driver of the VV 802 may receive a notification and normal C-V2X operation may be stopped. When a threat entity 804 is detected, C-V2X operation may be stopped due to the threat entity 804 disrupting or interfering with wireless resources or spectrum used in collaborative and autonomous driving decisions. For example, safety features of C-V2X operation may be disrupted that may present a hazard to other road users. Thus, when a threat entity 804 is detected, transmission of basic safety messages (BSMs) may be stopped.

[0051]

[0082] The threat entity 804 may be a cyber threat and may be considered a new class of detected object in a manner similar to the detected NV, VRU, or physical obstacle in FIGS. 5A-7. Thus, the detection of the threat entity 804 may be encoded as an SDSM or cooperative perception message (CPM) due to it being a spectrum and / or security obstacle as opposed to a physical obstacle. The SDSM or CPM may be broadcast by the VV 802 to reach a remote vehicle (RV) 810 that is outside of the threat zone 806 of the threat entity 804. In some aspects, the VV 802 may broadcast the SDSM or CPM to the RV 810 via the PC5 link 812. The RV 810 may be within range of the sidelink transmission of the VV 802 to receive the SDSM or CPM via the PC5 link 812. In some aspects, the RV 816 may be beyond the sidelink transmission range of the VV 802. In such a case, the VV802 may broadcast the SDSM or CPM to a network entity (e.g., the RSU808) via the PC5 interface 814 so that the RSU808 may relay the SDSM or CPM to the RV816 and other RVs that are outside the threat zone 806 and / or beyond the sidelink transmission range of the VV802.

[0052]

[0083] After detection of the threat entity 804, the VV 802 may be configured to classify the type of the threat entity 804 as being at least one of a DoS attacker, an abnormally operating vehicle, a jammer, an OOB interferer, a WAN jammer, or a GNSS jammer. The VV 802 may classify the type of the threat entity 804 based on data received from the threat entity 804. The data received from the threat entity 804 may include data that does not match expected data of the wireless device. For example, the data may include erroneous or unlikely location data, or may include a value of the threat entity 804's speed or heading that is well beyond the actual speed or heading. The VV 802 may include a reliability value associated with the classification of the threat entity 804. In some aspects, the classification of the threat entity 804 may be based on a measured RSSI of the threat entity 804, such as across the entire bandwidth of the VV 802 (e.g., wideband) or across each subchannel (e.g., narrowband).

[0053]

[0084] In some aspects, a hierarchical data structure comprising a report of the characteristics of the threat entity 804 may be used to report the characteristics of the threat entity 804. In some instances, the report may include information related to the location, speed, orientation, or timestamp of the VV 802. Information related to the measured RSSI of the threat entity 804 at the VV 802 may be included in the report. For example, with reference to diagram 1100 of FIG. 11, the source data 1102 may include information related to the VV 802, while the detected object data 1104 may include information related to the detected threat entity 804. The detected object data 1104 may comprise common data related to the threats and may further comprise specific information 1106 related to a particular threat depending on whether the threat is an abnormally operating vehicle, a jammer, or an interferer. With reference to diagram 1200 of FIG. 12, detected object data 1202 may include physical obstacles 1204 (e.g., potholes, VRUs, non-V2X vehicles) and may also include detected objects 1206 that interfere with wireless resources or spectrum used in collaborative and autonomous driving decisions. For example, 1206 may include abnormally behaving vehicle data, jammer data, or interferer data. With reference to diagram 1300 of FIG. 13, top-level information element (IE) 1302 of a detected object may include a specific detected characteristic of the detected object. For example, data element 1304 may include non-V2X vehicle data, VRU data, physical obstacle data, while data element 1306 may include abnormally behaving vehicle data, detected jammer data, and detected interferer data, which are vehicle-specific detected characteristics. With reference to diagram 1400 of FIG. 14, an example of parameters 1402 of a detected object is provided. For example, parameters 1402 may include the location, speed, and orientation of the threat. In the case of a detected jammer or interferer, the parameters 1402 may include an RSSI value.In the case of a DoS attack, the parameters 1402 may include location, speed, or orientation. In some aspects, for example, in the case of a detected jammer or interferer, the parameters 1402 may further include a radius around where the threat may potentially be present. In some aspects, since jamming is typically wideband, an average measured RSSI across the entire C-V2X and / or NR bandwidth may be reported. In some aspects, for example, to classify OOB emissions and / or narrowband jamming, the RSSI of each subchannel averaged over a window may be included in the report in cases where the RSSI of a particular subchannel exceeds a threshold. In some aspects, for example, to classify DoS attacks and / or abnormally operating vehicles, the measured RSSI of the threat entity 804 in the VV 802 may not be significant, and thus the layer 2 (L2) address of the threat entity 804 may be included so that the RV (e.g., 810, 816) may pre-filter any received DoS packets at the modem layer. In some aspects, the VV 802 may report the detection of the threat entity 804 in cases where the threat entity 804 is detected over a preconfigured time interval. In some aspects, the VV 802 may combine the measured RSSI of the threat entity 804 with readings from the VV 802's other sensors (e.g., cameras, radar, lidar) to determine a measurement of the threat entity 804's location. In some aspects, the VV 802 may combine the measured RSSI of the threat entity 804 with V2I messages (e.g., map information) to determine a measurement of the threat entity 804's location. The VV 802 may include the measurement of the threat entity 804's location and an associated reliability value of the measurement of the threat entity 804's location in the report.

[0054]

[0085] In some aspects, the RV 816 may initiate mitigation actions in response to receiving an SDSM or CPM. The RV 816 may initiate mitigation actions to avoid or mitigate contact with a threat entity 804 in response to receiving an SDSM or CPM. The threat entity 804 may disrupt wireless spectrum or resources utilized in collaborative or autonomous driving decisions. In some aspects, the mitigation actions may comprise selecting an alternate route 820 to avoid the threat entity 804. For example, the RV 816 may have a scheduled or planned route 818 and may select an alternate route 820 to avoid the threat entity 804 in response to receiving an SDSM reporting the presence of the threat entity 804. The threat entity 804 may significantly degrade wireless spectrum or resources utilized in collaborative or autonomous driving decisions. Collaborative or autonomous driving decisions may require high reliability for safety. In some aspects, the RV 816 may decide to change its scheduled travel route or path 818 to one that is least affected by the detected threat entity or any threat entity. In the case where the RV 816 receives an SDSM indicating the threat entity 804 from the network entity 808 (e.g., a base station), the RV 816 may avoid or mitigate contact with the threat entity 804. An RV 816 moving away from the VV 802 may not be within range to directly receive an SDSM from the VV 802 via PC5, and thus the RV 816 receives a relayed SDSM from the network entity 808 (e.g., a base station) via the Uu link 814. An RV 816 moving away from the VV 802 may provide the RV 816 with sufficient time to prepare mitigation actions, such as, but not limited to, taking an alternate path 820 to avoid the threat entity 804, utilizing a more robust MCS, or virtually sensing the threat entity.In some aspects, the network entity 808 may comprise a cellular access point, such as, but not limited to, a base station or a multi-access edge computing (MEC) system that may be configured to provide detailed RF fingerprints of known threats (e.g., fixed), such as Wi-Fi access points at street intersections, and transmit them over Uu to a cloud endpoint, which may then transmit them to a second wireless device. In some instances, the RSU or MEC may obtain improved localization of the threat entity 804 over the VV 802, in part due to the RSU or MEC having higher computational resources and / or sensory inputs. In addition, the RSU or MEC may transmit messages reporting the threat entity 804 to the RV 816 over the PC5 and / or Uu interfaces.

[0055]

[0086] In some aspects, for example as shown in diagram 900 of FIG. 9 , VV1 902 may receive reports from other VVs (e.g., VV2 908 and / or VV3 908) reporting the same threat entity 904 to determine a measurement of the location of the threat entity 904. VV1 902 may include the measurement of the location of the threat entity 904 along with a reliability value associated with the measurement of the location of the threat entity 904 in the report sent to RV 910. VV2 908 and VV3 908 may also be within the threat zone 906 of the threat entity 904 such that VV2 908 and VV3 908 report the same threat entity to VV1 902. In some aspects, VV1 902 may combine reports from VV2 908 and VV3 908 with readings from other sensors of VV1 902 and the measured RSSI of the threat entity 904 to determine the estimated location of the threat entity 904.

[0056]

[0087] 10A-10B are diagrams 1000, 1050 illustrating an example of threat entity detection and reporting. For example, diagram 1000 is an example of a highway scenario, while diagram 1050 is an example of an urban scenario. In some aspects, the VV 1002 may report the detected threat entity 1004 to the RV 1008 so that the RV 1008, which may be beyond the threat zone 1006 of the threat entity 1004, may virtually sense the threat entity 1004. In some cases, such as the highway scenario of diagram 1000 of FIG. 10A, the RV 1008 may be beyond the threat zone 1006 of the threat entity 1004 based on distance. In some cases, such as the urban scenario of diagram 1050 in FIG. 10B, there may be a high-loss building 1016 between the RV 1008 and the threat entity 1004, and thus the RV 1008 may be beyond the threat zone of the threat entity 1004 by blocking the threat entity 1004's signal from reaching the location of the RV 1008.

[0057]

[0088] The RV 1008 may virtually sense the threat entity 1004 based on reports (e.g., SDSM 1012) received from the VV 1002 and determine one or more subchannels for transmitting the BSM based on virtually sensing the threat entity 1004. In some aspects, the VV 1002 may detect subchannels on which the BSM is communicated by the threat entity 1004 with an RSSI greater than an RSSI threshold. The VV 1002 may detect the presence of the threat entity 1004 and extract the relevant information. The relevant information may vary based on the threat entity 1004. In some aspects, a first subset of subchannels having an RSSI greater than an RSSI threshold may be detected based on an average of the RSSI of the subset of subchannels. In such aspects, the relevant information may correspond to a jammer device such that the threat entity 1004 is a jammer device. In some aspects, a subset of subchannels having an RSSI greater than the RSSI threshold may be detected for each subchannel in the subset of subchannels that is greater than the RSSI threshold over at least the RSSI window time length. In such aspects, the relevant information may correspond to an OOB interferer, such as the threat entity 1004 being an OOB interferer. The relevant information may be shared with the RV 1008 in the SDSM 1012.

[0058]

[0089] In some aspects, the RV 1008 may determine one or more subchannels of the set of subchannels over which to transmit the BSM 1014. The RV 1008 may determine one or more subchannels of the set of subchannels over which to transmit the BSM 1014 based at least in part on the SDSM 1012 indicating a first subset of subchannels. In some aspects, the determination of the subchannels of the set of subchannels based at least in part on the SDSM 1012 indicating a first subset of subchannels may be further based on whether additional messages indicating the first subset of subchannels are received from other wireless devices. For example, the RV 1008 may determine which subchannels are excluded for transmitting the BSM based on additional messages the RV 1008 receives from one or more other VVs reporting the threat entity. In cases where there are multiple VVs within a threat zone 1006 affected by a threat entity 1004 and the RV 1008 receives multiple messages from the VVs reporting the presence of the threat entity 1004, the receipt of multiple messages may indicate a reliable report of the presence of the threat entity 1004. In cases where there are multiple VVs within a threat zone 1006 affected by a threat entity 1004 and the RV 1008 receives one SDSM 1012 (or a minimal amount of messages that is much less than the number of multiple VVs) reporting the presence of the threat entity 1004, the receipt of one SDSM 1012 (or a minimal amount of messages that is much less than the number of multiple first wireless devices) may indicate an unreliable report. In such cases, the RV 1008 may transmit a BSM 1014, but if the source of the report (e.g., the SDSM) is unreliable, mitigation performed to enable scheduling of the BSM 1014 to avoid the threat entity may not be invoked. The RV 1008 may transmit a BSM 1014 on at least one determined sub-channel to at least the HV 1010.The transmitted BSM 1014 may be a broadcast message such that the transmitted BSM 1014 may be transmitted to and received by any wireless devices within the vicinity of the RV 1008. In some aspects, the BSM 1014 may be transmitted on two or more sub-channels.

[0059]

[0090] FIG. 15 illustrates an example communication flow 1500 between a first wireless device 1502, a second wireless device 1504, and a third wireless device 1506. The communication may be based on V2X, V2V, or D2D based communication from a transmitting device directly to a receiving device. The communication transmitted from the devices 1502, 1504 may be broadcast and received by multiple receiving devices within range of a particular transmitting device, as described with respect to FIG. 4. The first wireless device 1502 may correspond to a first UE, and the second wireless device 1504 may correspond to a second UE. The first wireless device 1502, the second wireless device 1504, and / or the third wireless device 1506 may correspond to a C-V2X entity. For example, in the context of FIG. 1, the first wireless device 1502 may correspond to at least a UE 104, and the second wireless device 1504 may correspond to at least a UE 104′. In another example, in the context of FIG. 3, the first wireless device 1502 may correspond to the device 350, and the second wireless device 1504 may correspond to the device 310.

[0060]

[0091] As shown at 1508, the first wireless device 1502 may detect a threat entity transmitting data that interferes with the transmission of the BSM. The first wireless device may detect the presence of the threat entity and extract relevant information related to the threat entity. The relevant information may vary based on the threat entity. In some aspects, the threat entity may comprise a DoS attacker, a jammer, an abnormally operating vehicle, an OOB interferer, a WAN jammer, or a GNSS jammer. The relevant information may be shared by the first wireless device with other wireless devices beyond the threat zone of the threat entity.

[0061]

[0092] As shown at 1510, the first wireless device 1502 may transmit a message indicating information related to a type of threat entity. The first wireless device may transmit a message indicating information related to a type of threat entity to at least a second wireless device. The second wireless device 1504 may receive the message from the first wireless device 1502. In some aspects, the information in the message may comprise a subset of sub-channels having a reference RSSI greater than an RSSI threshold. In some aspects, the subset of sub-channels having a reference RSSI greater than an RSSI threshold may be based on an average of the RSSI of the subset of sub-channels greater than the RSSI threshold over at least an RSSI window length of time. In some aspects, the subset of sub-channels having a reference RSSI greater than an RSSI threshold may be based on an average of the RSSI of each sub-channel in the subset of sub-channels greater than the RSSI threshold over at least an RSSI window length of time. The information in the message may further indicate at least one of an average RSSI over the subset of sub-channels, an average RSSI of each sub-channel in the subset of sub-channels, an RSSI threshold, an RSSI window time length, a location of a threat entity affecting the RSSI in at least one of the subset of sub-channels, or a location reliability radius associated with a threat entity affecting the RSSI in at least one of the subset of sub-channels, or a combination thereof. In some aspects, the transmitted message may be an SDSM, an I2V message, or a CPM. The transmitted message may be a broadcast message such that the transmitted message may be received by any wireless device within a vicinity of the first wireless device.

[0062]

[0093] As shown at 1512, the second wireless device 1504 may determine candidate resources of the set of candidate resources on which to transmit the BSM. The second wireless device 1504 may determine candidate resources of the set of candidate resources on which to transmit the BSM based at least in part on a message indicating information related to the threat entity from the first wireless device. In some aspects, the information in the message may comprise a subset of subchannels having an RSSI greater than an RSSI threshold. In some aspects, the subset of subchannels having an RSSI greater than an RSSI threshold may be based on an average of the RSSI of the subset of subchannels greater than the RSSI threshold over at least an RSSI window length of time. In some aspects, the subset of subchannels having an RSSI greater than the RSSI threshold may be based on an average of the RSSI of each subchannel in the subset of subchannels greater than the RSSI threshold over at least an RSSI window length of time. The information in the message may further indicate at least one of an average RSSI of the subset of subchannels, an average RSSI of each subchannel in the subset of subchannels, an RSSI threshold, an RSSI window time length, a location of a threat entity affecting the RSSI in at least one of the subset of subchannels, or a location reliability radius associated with a threat entity affecting the RSSI in at least one of the subset of subchannels, or a combination thereof. In some aspects, the candidate resource may comprise a candidate single-subframe resource (CSR), and the set of candidate resources may comprise a set of CSRs. A CSR may comprise one or more subchannels of the set of candidate resources. In some aspects, the determination of the candidate resource in the set of candidate resources may be further based on whether additional messages are received from other wireless devices indicating a threat entity with a threat zone as indicated in the message from the first wireless device.For example, the second wireless device may determine which candidate resources may be excluded for transmitting a BSM based on additional messages the second wireless device receives from one or more other wireless devices reporting the threat entity. In a case where there are multiple wireless devices (e.g., victim vehicles) within a zone affected by a threat entity and the second wireless device receives multiple messages from the multiple wireless devices (e.g., victim vehicles) reporting the presence of the threat entity, the receipt of the multiple messages may indicate a highly reliable report of the presence of the threat entity. In a case where there are multiple wireless devices (e.g., victim vehicles) within a zone affected by a threat entity and the second wireless device receives one message (or a minimum amount of messages that is much less than the number of multiple first wireless devices) reporting the presence of the threat entity, the receipt of one message (or a minimum amount of messages that is much less than the number of multiple wireless devices) may indicate an unreliable report. In such a case, the second wireless device may transmit a BSM, but mitigations made to enable scheduling of BSMs to avoid the threat entity may not be invoked if the source of the report (e.g., SDSM) is unreliable.

[0063]

[0094] In some aspects, to determine the candidate resources of the set of candidate resources for transmitting the BSM, the second wireless device 1504 may determine whether the set of candidate resources is LTE-V2X or NR-V2X. In the case where the candidate resources are LTE-V2X, the second wireless device 1504 may eliminate one or more candidate resources in the set of candidate resources based on a projected reference signal received power (RSRP) of each candidate resource in the set of candidate resources exceeding an RSRP threshold. The second wireless device 1504 may eliminate one or more candidate resources based on a projected RSRP exceeding an RSRP threshold to determine a first subset of candidate resources. In some aspects, the candidate resources may be eliminated based on the RSRP until a certain amount of candidate resources remains in the selection pool (e.g., the set of candidate resources). In some aspects, the certain amount may comprise twenty percent (20%) of the set of candidate resources. In some aspects, the certain amount may be greater than twenty percent (20%) of the set of candidate resources. In some aspects, the second wireless device may also filter out some of the CSRs based on its half-duplex operation.

[0064]

[0095] In some aspects, the second wireless device 1504 may rank the first subset of candidate resources based on a weighted RSSI ranking to obtain a second subset of candidate resources. The second subset of candidate resources may have the lowest weighted RSSI. The second subset of candidate resources may be a portion of the first subset of candidate resources. In some aspects, the weighted RSSI consists of physically sensed candidate resources and virtually sensed candidate resources. The physically sensed candidate resources may comprise candidate resources measured by the second wireless device within a sensing window. The virtually sensed candidate resources may comprise subchannels measured by the first wireless device and indicated in a message received by the second wireless device from the first wireless device. In some aspects, the virtually sensed candidate resources may be based on at least one of, or a combination of, the location of a threat entity affecting the RSSI of the candidate resource, a location reliability radius associated with the threat entity, a timestamp associated with a message received from the first wireless device, the speed of the second wireless device, the acceleration of the second wireless device, a heading of the second wireless device relative to the location of the threat entity, information related to road geometry, or a transmission requirement associated with the BSM. In some aspects, the weighted RSSI ranking may be based on the candidate resources remaining after elimination of candidate resources having RSRP above a threshold and the candidate resources remaining after elimination of candidate resources due to half-duplex operation.

[0065]

[0096] The second wireless device 1504 may rank the first subset of candidate resources based on the weighted RSSI ranking to obtain a second subset of candidate resources with the lowest weighted RSSI, such that candidate resources from the first subset with the highest weighted RSSI are excluded from the selection pool. Candidate resources of the first subset with the highest weighted RSSI may be excluded until a certain amount (e.g., 20%) of the resources remain in the selection pool. Candidate resources on which to transmit the BSM may be determined from the second subset of candidate resources. The ranking of the first subset of candidate resources may be based on a weighted RSSI that may be based on a measured RSSI of the first subset of subchannels indicated in a message from the first wireless device (e.g., virtually sensed) and may be based on a predicted RSSI of the candidate resources based on measurements by the second wireless device during a sensing window (e.g., physically sensed). The second wireless device may perform physical sensing by obtaining RSSI measurements of the candidate resources during the sensing window, and exclude the corresponding candidate resources from the selection pool if the value exceeds a threshold. The second wireless device may perform virtual sensing and exclude jammed or interfered resources (e.g., sub-channels) based on RSSI measurements reported in a message (e.g., SDSM message) received from the first wireless device (e.g., victim vehicle). The second wireless device may not detect the jammed or interfered resources (e.g., sub-channels) reported by the first wireless device and may utilize information in the message shared by the first wireless device (e.g., victim vehicle) to exclude such jammed or interfered sub-channels. Candidate resources among the first subset of candidate resources with the highest weighted RSSI may be excluded until a certain amount of resources remain in the selection pool. The weighted RSSI of candidate resource x may be determined based on the following formula:

[0066]

number

[0067] Here, RSSI x,phy is the physically sensed RSSI of candidate resource x, and SSI x,virt is the RSSI of the virtually sensed candidate resource x, with a value of α=1, and 0≦β≦1. The value of β may be set based on a level of protection against hidden threat nodes. The value of β may be based on at least one of the following: a location of a threat entity affecting the RSSI in at least one of the subsets of sub-channels, a location reliability radius associated with the threat entity affecting the RSSI in at least one of the subsets of sub-channels, a timestamp associated with a message received from the first wireless device, a speed of the second wireless device, an acceleration of the second wireless device, a heading of the second wireless device relative to the location of the threat entity, information related to road geometry (e.g., map information), or a transmission requirement associated with the BSM, or a combination thereof. For example, the value of β may be closer to 0 in cases where the second wireless device is traveling away from the threat entity, such that the average RSSI may be more dependent on the physically sensed candidate resource. In some aspects, the value of β may be closer to 1 in cases where the second wireless device may be closer to a threat entity such that the virtually sensed resources are taken into account in the average RSSI, thereby increasing protection against the threat entity.

[0068]

[0097] In some aspects, the second wireless device may select candidate resources from a second subset of candidate resources for transmission of the BSM.

[0069]

[0098] In the case where the candidate resource is NR-V2X, the second wireless device 1504 may exclude one or more virtually sensed candidate resources in the set of candidate resources. The second wireless device 1504 may exclude one or more virtually sensed candidate resources in the set of candidate resources having an RSSI exceeding a pre-filter threshold. The second wireless device may exclude one or more virtually sensed candidate resources having an RSSI exceeding a pre-filter threshold to obtain a filtered subset of candidate resources that does not exceed the pre-filter threshold. In some aspects, the one or more virtually sensed candidate resources may be measured by the first wireless device and indicated in a message received by the second wireless device from the first wireless device. For example, the first wireless device may physically sense one or more sub-channels that may be affected by a threat entity and may include such information in a message transmitted to the second wireless device so that the second wireless device virtually senses the one or more sub-channels. In some aspects, the virtually sensed candidate resources may be based on at least one of, or a combination of, a location of a threat entity affecting the RSSI of the subchannel, a location reliability radius associated with the threat entity, a timestamp associated with a message received from the first wireless device, a speed of the second wireless device, an acceleration of the second wireless device, a heading of the second wireless device relative to the location of the threat entity, information related to road geometry, or a transmission requirement associated with the BSM. The second wireless device may determine whether or not the second wireless device is within a certain threshold (e.g., Threshold). virt) from the pool of candidate resources. Virtually sensed resources with RSSI above a threshold may be omitted from the pool of candidate resources prior to RSRP-based exclusion being implemented. In some aspects, the second wireless device may pre-filter the virtually sensed candidate resources based on the virtually sensed RSSI measurements of one or more subchannels provided by the first wireless device until a certain amount of candidate resources remains available in the selection pool of candidate resources. In some aspects, the second wireless device may pre-filter the virtually sensed candidate resources until a certain amount of twenty percent (20%) of the resources remains available in the selection pool (e.g., a filtered subset). This certain amount of twenty percent is merely an example and is not limited to the examples provided herein. In some aspects, this certain amount may be greater than twenty percent (20%).

[0070]

[0099] In some aspects, the second wireless device 1504 may filter out candidate resources in the filtered subset of candidate resources that do not exceed a pre-filter threshold that exceeds the RSRP threshold to obtain a second subset of candidate resources that do not exceed the RSRP threshold. In some aspects, the second subset of candidate resources may comprise a pre-configured percentage of the total candidate resources in the selection pool that does not exceed the pre-filter threshold. In some aspects, the pre-filter threshold may be adjusted if the second subset of candidate resources comprises an amount of candidate resources that is less than a pre-configured percentage of the total candidate resources in the selection pool. The pre-filter threshold may be further adjusted until the second subset of candidate resources comprises a pre-configured percentage of the total candidate resources in the selection pool. In some aspects, the pre-configured percentage of the total candidate resources in the selection pool may comprise twenty percent (20%). In some aspects, the pre-configured percentage of the total candidate resources in the selection pool may comprise greater than twenty percent (20%). In some aspects, the RSRP threshold may be adjusted such that the second subset of candidate resources comprises a pre-configured percentage of the total candidate resources in the selection pool. The RSRP threshold may be adjusted in addition to or as an alternative to adjusting the pre-filter threshold.

[0071]

[0100] Candidate resources comprising at least one subchannel on which to transmit the BSM may be determined from the second subset of candidate resources. In some aspects, the second wireless device may eliminate some of the candidate resources based on its half-duplex operation prior to selecting the candidate resources for transmitting the BSM. virt ) may function in a manner similar to the β parameter discussed above. For example, a pre-filter threshold (e.g., Threshold virt) may be adjusted based on a level of protection for the virtually sensed resources. For example, if more protection for the virtually sensed resources is desired, the value of the pre-filter threshold may be reduced. Reducing the pre-filter threshold may filter out more of the virtually sensed resources. In some aspects, the pre-filter threshold may be based on at least one of a location of a threat entity affecting the RSSI in at least one of the subset of sub-channels, a location confidence radius associated with a threat entity affecting the RSSI in at least one of the subset of sub-channels, a timestamp associated with a message received from the first wireless device, a speed of the second wireless device, an acceleration of the second wireless device, a heading of the second wireless device relative to the location of the threat entity, information related to road geometry, or a transmission requirement associated with the BSM, or a combination thereof.

[0072]

[0101] In some aspects, a pre-filter threshold (e.g., Threshold virt Pre-filtering of virtually sensed resources based on RSRP-based exclusion may operate in conjunction with RSRP-based exclusion. For example, if RSRP-based exclusion less than a certain amount (e.g., 20%) of resources is available in the selection pool (e.g., the second subset of candidate resources), the second wireless device may adjust a threshold (e.g., Threshold) such that fewer resources are excluded and a certain amount (e.g., 20%) of resources is available in the selection pool (e.g., the second subset of candidate resources). virt ) value. This scheme may also be used to avoid persistent non-hidden (e.g., physically sensed) threat entities in the case of NR-V2X.

[0073]

[0102] In some aspects, the second wireless device 1504 may select candidate resources from the second subset of candidate resources for transmission of the BSM.

[0074]

[0103] As shown at 1514, the second wireless device 1504 may transmit a BSM on the determined candidate resources to at least the third wireless device 1506. The third wireless device 1506 may receive the BSM from the second wireless device 1504. The transmitted BSM may be a broadcast message such that the transmitted BSM may be transmitted to and received by any wireless devices within a vicinity of the second wireless device 1504. In some aspects, the BSM may be transmitted on the candidate resources, where the candidate resources may comprise one or more subchannels.

[0075]

[0104] 16 is a flowchart 1600 of a method of wireless communication. The method may be performed by a UE or a component of a UE (e.g., the UE 104, the apparatus 1702, and the cellular baseband processor 1704, which may include the memory 360 and may be the UE 350 in its entirety or a component of the UE 350, such as the TX processor 368, the RX processor 356, and / or the controller / processor 359). One or more of the illustrated operations may be optional, omitted, transposed, or coexistent. The method may enable a first wireless device to share information of a detected threat entity with other wireless devices such that the other wireless devices beyond the threat zone of the threat entity virtually sense the threat entity.

[0076]

[0105] At 1602, a first wireless device may detect a threat entity transmitting data that interferes with the transmission of the BSM. For example, 1602 may be implemented by a detection component 1740 of the apparatus 1702. The first wireless device may detect the presence of the threat entity and extract relevant information related to the threat entity. The relevant information may vary based on the threat entity. In some aspects, the threat entity may comprise a DoS attacker, a jammer, an abnormally operating vehicle, an OOB interferer, a WAN jammer, or a GNSS jammer. The relevant information may be shared by the first wireless device with other wireless devices beyond the threat zone of the threat entity.

[0077]

[0106] At 1604, the first wireless device may transmit a message indicating information related to a type of threat entity. For example, 1604 may be implemented by a message component 1742 of the apparatus 1702. The first wireless device may transmit a message indicating information related to a type of threat entity to at least a second wireless device. In some aspects, the information in the message may comprise a subset of sub-channels having a reference RSSI greater than an RSSI threshold. In some aspects, the subset of sub-channels having a reference RSSI greater than an RSSI threshold may be based on an average of the RSSI of the subset of sub-channels greater than the RSSI threshold over at least an RSSI window length of time. In some aspects, the subset of sub-channels having a reference RSSI greater than an RSSI threshold may be based on an average of the RSSI of each sub-channel in the subset of sub-channels greater than the RSSI threshold over at least an RSSI window length of time. The information in the message may further indicate at least one of an average RSSI over the subset of sub-channels, an average RSSI of each sub-channel in the subset of sub-channels, an RSSI threshold, an RSSI window time length, a location of a threat entity affecting the RSSI in at least one of the subset of sub-channels, or a location reliability radius associated with a threat entity affecting the RSSI in at least one of the subset of sub-channels, or a combination thereof. In some aspects, the transmitted message may be an SDSM, an I2V message, or a CPM. The transmitted message may be a broadcast message such that the transmitted message may be received by any wireless device within a vicinity of the first wireless device.

[0078]

[0107] 17 is a diagram 1700 illustrating an example of a hardware implementation for a device 1702. The device 1702 is a UE and includes a cellular baseband processor 1704 (also referred to as a modem) coupled to a cellular RF transceiver 1722 and one or more subscriber identity module (SIM) cards 1720, an application processor 1706 coupled to a secure digital (SD) card 1708 and a screen 1710, a Bluetooth module 1712, a wireless local area network (WLAN) module 1714, a GNSS module 1716, and a power source 1718. The GNSS module 1716 may comprise a variety of satellite positioning systems. For example, the GNSS module may correspond to Global Positioning System (GPS), Global Navigation Satellite System (GLONASS), Galileo, BeiDou Navigation Satellite System (BDS), Wide Area Augmentation System (WAAS), European Geostationary Navigation Overlay Service (EGNOS), GPS Aided Geo-Augmented Navigation (GAGAN), Multi-purpose Transport Satellite (MTSAT) Satellite Augmentation System (MSAS), Quasi-Zenith Satellite System (QZSS), or Navigation with Indian Constellations (NavIC). The cellular baseband processor 1704 communicates with the UE 104 and / or the BS 102 / 180 through the cellular RF transceiver 1722. The cellular baseband processor 1704 may include computer readable media / memory. The computer readable media / memory may be non-transitory. The cellular baseband processor 1704 is responsible for general processing, including the execution of software stored in the computer readable media / memory. The software, when executed by the cellular baseband processor 1704, causes the cellular baseband processor 1704 to perform the various functions described above. The computer-readable medium / memory may also be used to store data that is manipulated by the cellular baseband processor 1704 when executing the software.The cellular baseband processor 1704 further includes a receiving component 1730, a communications manager 1732, and a transmitting component 1734. The communications manager 1732 includes one or more of the illustrated components. The components in the communications manager 1732 may be stored in a computer-readable medium / memory and / or configured as hardware in the cellular baseband processor 1704. The cellular baseband processor 1704 may be a component of the UE 350 and may include the memory 360 and / or at least one of the TX processor 368, the RX processor 356, and the controller / processor 359. In one configuration, the apparatus 1702 may be a modem chip and may only include the baseband processor 1704, and in another configuration, the apparatus 1702 may be an entire UE (e.g., see 350 in FIG. 3) and may include the additional modules previously described for the apparatus 1702.

[0079]

[0108] The communications manager 1732 includes a detection component 1740 configured to detect a threat entity transmitting data that interferes with the transmission of a BSM, e.g., as described with respect to 1602 of FIGURE 16. The communications manager 1732 further includes a message component 1742 configured to transmit a message indicating information related to the type of threat entity, e.g., as described with respect to 1604 of FIGURE 16.

[0080]

[0109] The apparatus may include additional components that implement each of the blocks of the algorithm in the above-mentioned flowchart of Figure 16. Thus, each block in the above-mentioned flowchart of Figure 16 may be implemented by one component, and the apparatus may include one or more of those components. The components may be one or more hardware components specifically configured to perform the described process / algorithm, implemented by a processor configured to perform the described process / algorithm, stored in a computer-readable medium for implementation by a processor, or some combination thereof.

[0081]

[0110] In one configuration, the apparatus 1702, and in particular the cellular baseband processor 1704, includes means for detecting a threat entity transmitting data that interferes with the transmission of the BSM. The apparatus includes means for transmitting a message to a second wireless device indicating information related to the type of the threat entity. The aforementioned means may be one or more of the aforementioned components of the apparatus 1702 configured to perform the functions recited by the aforementioned means. As described above, the apparatus 1702 may include the TX processor 368, the RX processor 356, and the controller / processor 359. Thus, in one configuration, the aforementioned means may be the TX processor 368, the RX processor 356, and the controller / processor 359 configured to perform the functions recited by the aforementioned means.

[0082]

[0111] 18 is a flowchart 1800 of a method of wireless communication. The method may be performed by a UE or a component of a UE (e.g., the UE 104, the apparatus 2002, and the cellular baseband processor 2004, which may include the memory 360 and may be the UE 350 in its entirety or a component of the UE 350, such as the TX processor 368, the RX processor 356, and / or the controller / processor 359). One or more of the illustrated operations may be optional, omitted, transposed, or coexistent. The method may enable the second wireless device to determine candidate resources for transmitting a BSM based on virtually sensing a threat entity.

[0083]

[0112] At 1802, the second wireless device may receive a message indicating a threat entity within a threat zone. For example, 1802 may be implemented by the message component 2040 of the apparatus 2002. The threat entity may transmit data that interferes with the transmission of the BSM. The second wireless device may receive the message from the first wireless device. In some aspects, the message received from the first wireless device may comprise an SDSM, an I2V message, or a CPM. In some aspects, the threat entity may comprise a DoS attacker, a jammer, an abnormally operating vehicle, an OOB interferer, a WAN jammer, or a GNSS jammer.

[0084]

[0113] At 1804, the second wireless device may determine candidate resources of the set of candidate resources on which to transmit the BSM. For example, 1804 may be implemented by the determining component 2042 of the apparatus 2002. The second wireless device may determine candidate resources of the set of candidate resources on which to transmit the BSM based at least in part on a message indicating information related to the threat entity from the first wireless device. In some aspects, the information in the message may comprise a subset of subchannels having an RSSI greater than an RSSI threshold. In some aspects, the subset of subchannels having an RSSI greater than an RSSI threshold may be based on an average of the RSSI of the subset of subchannels greater than the RSSI threshold over at least an RSSI window length of time. In some aspects, the subset of subchannels having an RSSI greater than the RSSI threshold may be based on an average of the RSSI of each subchannel in the subset of subchannels greater than the RSSI threshold over at least an RSSI window length of time. The information in the message may further indicate at least one of an average RSSI of the subset of subchannels, an average RSSI of each subchannel in the subset of subchannels, an RSSI threshold, an RSSI window time length, a location of a threat entity affecting the RSSI in at least one of the subset of subchannels, or a location reliability radius associated with a threat entity affecting the RSSI in at least one of the subset of subchannels, or a combination thereof. In some aspects, the candidate resource may comprise a CSR and the set of candidate resources may comprise a set of CSRs. The CSR may comprise one or more subchannels of the set of candidate resources. In some aspects, the determination of the candidate resource in the set of candidate resources may be further based on whether additional messages are received from other wireless devices indicating a threat entity with a threat zone as indicated in the message from the first wireless device.For example, the second wireless device may determine which candidate resources may be excluded for transmitting a BSM based on additional messages the second wireless device receives from one or more other wireless devices reporting the threat entity. In a case where there are multiple wireless devices (e.g., victim vehicles) within a zone affected by a threat entity and the second wireless device receives multiple messages from the multiple wireless devices (e.g., victim vehicles) reporting the presence of the threat entity, the receipt of the multiple messages may indicate a highly reliable report of the presence of the threat entity. In a case where there are multiple wireless devices (e.g., victim vehicles) within a zone affected by a threat entity and the second wireless device receives one message (or a minimum amount of messages that is much less than the number of the multiple wireless devices) reporting the presence of the threat entity, the receipt of one message (or a minimum amount of messages that is much less than the number of the multiple wireless devices) may indicate an unreliable report. In such a case, the second wireless device may transmit a BSM, but if the source of the report (e.g., SDSM) is unreliable, mitigations made to enable scheduling of BSMs to avoid the threat entity may not be invoked.

[0085]

[0114] At 1806, the second wireless device may transmit a BSM on the determined candidate resources. For example, 1806 may be implemented by the BSM component 2044 of the apparatus 2002. The second wireless device may transmit a BSM on the determined candidate resources to at least a third wireless device. The transmitted BSM may be a broadcast message such that the transmitted BSM may be transmitted to and received by any wireless devices within a vicinity of the second wireless device. In some aspects, the BSM may be transmitted on the candidate resources, where the candidate resources may comprise one or more subchannels.

[0086]

[0115] 19 is a flowchart 1900 of a method of wireless communication. The method may be performed by a UE or a component of a UE (e.g., the UE 104, the apparatus 2002, and the cellular baseband processor 2004, which may include the memory 360 and may be the UE 350 in its entirety or a component of the UE 350, such as the TX processor 368, the RX processor 356, and / or the controller / processor 359). One or more of the illustrated operations may be optional, omitted, transposed, or coexistent. The method may enable the second wireless device to determine candidate resources for transmitting a BSM based on virtually sensing a threat entity.

[0087]

[0116] At 1902, the second wireless device may receive a message indicating a threat entity within a threat zone. For example, 1902 may be implemented by the message component 2040 of the apparatus 2002. The threat entity may transmit data that interferes with the transmission of the BSM. The second wireless device may receive the message from the first wireless device. In some aspects, the message received from the first wireless device may comprise an SDSM, an I2V message, or a CPM. In some aspects, the threat entity may comprise a DoS attacker, a jammer, an abnormally operating vehicle, an OOB interferer, a WAN jammer, or a GNSS jammer.

[0088]

[0117] At 1904, the second wireless device may determine candidate resources of the set of candidate resources on which to transmit the BSM. For example, 1904 may be implemented by the determining component 2042 of the apparatus 2002. The second wireless device may determine candidate resources of the set of candidate resources on which to transmit the BSM based at least in part on a message indicating information related to the threat entity from the first wireless device. In some aspects, the information in the message may comprise a subset of subchannels having an RSSI greater than an RSSI threshold. In some aspects, the subset of subchannels having an RSSI greater than an RSSI threshold may be based on an average of the RSSI of the subset of subchannels greater than the RSSI threshold over at least an RSSI window length of time. In some aspects, the subset of subchannels having an RSSI greater than the RSSI threshold may be based on an average of the RSSI of each subchannel in the subset of subchannels greater than the RSSI threshold over at least an RSSI window length of time. The information in the message may further indicate at least one of an average RSSI over the subset of subchannels, an average RSSI of each subchannel in the subset of subchannels, an RSSI threshold, an RSSI window time length, a location of a threat entity affecting the RSSI in at least one of the subset of subchannels, or a location reliability radius associated with a threat entity affecting the RSSI in at least one of the subset of subchannels, or a combination thereof. In some aspects, the candidate resource may comprise a CSR and the set of candidate resources may comprise a set of CSRs. The CSR may comprise one or more subchannels of the set of candidate resources. In some aspects, the determination of the candidate resource in the set of candidate resources may be further based on whether additional messages are received from other wireless devices indicating a threat entity with a threat zone as indicated in the message from the first wireless device.For example, the second wireless device may determine which candidate resources may be excluded for transmitting a BSM based on additional messages the second wireless device receives from one or more other wireless devices reporting the threat entity. In a case where there are multiple wireless devices (e.g., victim vehicles) within a zone affected by a threat entity and the second wireless device receives multiple messages from the multiple wireless devices (e.g., victim vehicles) reporting the presence of the threat entity, the receipt of the multiple messages may indicate a highly reliable report of the presence of the threat entity. In a case where there are multiple wireless devices (e.g., victim vehicles) within a zone affected by a threat entity and the second wireless device receives one message (or a minimum amount of messages that is much less than the number of the multiple wireless devices) reporting the presence of the threat entity, the receipt of one message (or a minimum amount of messages that is much less than the number of the multiple wireless devices) may indicate an unreliable report. In such a case, the second wireless device may transmit a BSM, but if the source of the report (e.g., SDSM) is unreliable, mitigations made to enable scheduling of BSMs to avoid the threat entity may not be invoked.

[0089]

[0118] In some aspects, to determine candidate resources among the set of candidate resources for transmitting the BSM, the second wireless device may determine whether the set of candidate resources is LTE-V2X or NR-V2X. In cases where the candidate resources are LTE-V2X, the second wireless device may eliminate one or more candidate resources in the set of candidate resources at 1908. For example, 1908 may be performed by the determining component 2042 of the apparatus 2002. The second wireless device may eliminate one or more candidate resources in the set of candidate resources based on a predicted RSRP of each candidate resource in the set of candidate resources exceeding an RSRP threshold. The second wireless device may eliminate one or more candidate resources based on a predicted RSRP exceeding an RSRP threshold to determine a first subset of candidate resources. In some aspects, candidate resources may be eliminated based on RSRP until a certain amount of candidate resources remain in the selection pool (e.g., the set of candidate resources). In some aspects, the certain amount may comprise twenty percent (20%) of the set of candidate resources. In some aspects, this amount may be greater than twenty percent (20%) of the set of candidate resources. In some aspects, the second wireless device may also exclude some of the CSRs based on its half-duplex operation.

[0090]

[0119] At 1910, the second wireless device may rank the first subset of candidate resources based on the weighted RSSI ranking. For example, 1910 may be implemented by the determining component 2042 of the apparatus 2002. The second wireless device may rank the first ranked subset of candidate resources based on the weighted RSSI ranking to obtain a second subset of candidate resources. The second subset of candidate resources may have the lowest weighted RSSI. The second subset of candidate resources may be a portion of the first subset of candidate resources. In some aspects, the weighted RSSI consists of physically sensed candidate resources and virtually sensed candidate resources. The physically sensed candidate resources may comprise candidate resources measured by the second wireless device within a sensing window. The virtually sensed candidate resources may comprise subchannels measured by the first wireless device and indicated in a message received by the second wireless device from the first wireless device. In some aspects, the virtually sensed candidate resources may be based on at least one of, or a combination of, the location of a threat entity affecting the RSSI of the candidate resource, a location reliability radius associated with the threat entity, a timestamp associated with a message received from the first wireless device, the speed of the second wireless device, the acceleration of the second wireless device, a heading of the second wireless device relative to the location of the threat entity, information related to road geometry, or a transmission requirement associated with the BSM. In some aspects, the weighted RSSI ranking may be based on the candidate resources remaining after elimination of candidate resources having RSRP above a threshold and the candidate resources remaining after elimination of candidate resources due to half-duplex operation.

[0091]

[0120] The second wireless device may rank the first ranked subset of candidate resources based on the weighted RSSI ranking to obtain a second subset of candidate resources with the lowest weighted RSSI, such that candidate resources from the first subset with the highest weighted RSSI are excluded from the selection pool. Candidate resources of the first subset with the highest weighted RSSI may be excluded until a certain amount (e.g., 20%) of the resources remain in the selection pool. Candidate resources on which to transmit the BSM may be determined from the second subset of candidate resources. The ranking of the first subset of candidate resources may be based on a weighted RSSI that may be based on a measured RSSI of the first subset of subchannels indicated in a message from the first wireless device (e.g., virtually sensed) and may be based on a predicted RSSI of the candidate resources based on measurements by the second wireless device during a sensing window (e.g., physically sensed). The second wireless device may perform physical sensing by obtaining RSSI measurements of the candidate resources during the sensing window, and exclude the corresponding candidate resources from the selection pool if the value exceeds a threshold. The second wireless device may perform virtual sensing and exclude jammed or interfered resources (e.g., sub-channels) based on RSSI measurements reported in a message (e.g., SDSM message) received from the first wireless device (e.g., victim vehicle). The second wireless device may not detect the jammed or interfered resources (e.g., sub-channels) reported by the first wireless device and may utilize information in the message shared by the first wireless device (e.g., victim vehicle) to exclude such jammed or interfered sub-channels. Candidate resources among the first subset of candidate resources with the highest weighted RSSI may be excluded until a certain amount of resources remain in the selection pool. The weighted RSSI of candidate resource x may be determined based on the following formula:

[0092]

number

[0093] Here, RSSI x,phy is the physically sensed RSSI of candidate resource x, and RSSI x,virt is the RSSI of the virtually sensed candidate resource x, with a value of α=1, and 0≦β≦1. The value of β may be set based on a level of protection against hidden threat nodes. The value of β may be based on at least one of the following: a location of a threat entity affecting the RSSI in at least one of the subsets of sub-channels, a location reliability radius associated with the threat entity affecting the RSSI in at least one of the subsets of sub-channels, a timestamp associated with a message received from the first wireless device, a speed of the second wireless device, an acceleration of the second wireless device, a heading of the second wireless device relative to the location of the threat entity, information related to road geometry (e.g., map information), or a transmission requirement associated with the BSM, or a combination thereof. For example, the value of β may be closer to 0 in cases where the second wireless device is traveling away from the threat entity, such that the average RSSI may be more dependent on the physically sensed candidate resource. In some aspects, the value of β may be closer to 1 in cases where the second wireless device may be closer to a threat entity such that the virtually sensed resources are taken into account in the average RSSI, thereby increasing protection against the threat entity.

[0094]

[0121] At 1912, the second wireless device may select candidate resources. For example, 1912 may be implemented by the determining component 2042 of the apparatus 2002. The second wireless device may select candidate resources from a second subset of candidate resources for transmission of the BSM.

[0095]

[0122] In the case where the candidate resource is NR-V2X, the second wireless device may exclude one or more virtually sensed candidate resources in the set of candidate resources at 1914. For example, 1914 may be implemented by the determining component 2042 of the apparatus 2002. The second wireless device may exclude one or more virtually sensed candidate resources in the set of candidate resources having an RSSI that exceeds a pre-filter threshold. The second wireless device may exclude one or more virtually sensed candidate resources having an RSSI that exceeds a pre-filter threshold to obtain a filtered subset of candidate resources that does not exceed the pre-filter threshold. In some aspects, the one or more virtually sensed candidate resources may be measured by the first wireless device and indicated in a message received by the second wireless device from the first wireless device. For example, the first wireless device may physically sense one or more sub-channels that may be affected by a threat entity and may include such information in a message transmitted to the second wireless device so that the second wireless device virtually senses the one or more sub-channels. In some aspects, the virtually sensed candidate resources may be based on at least one of, or a combination of, a location of a threat entity affecting the RSSI of the subchannel, a location reliability radius associated with the threat entity, a timestamp associated with a message received from the first wireless device, a speed of the second wireless device, an acceleration of the second wireless device, a heading of the second wireless device relative to the location of the threat entity, information related to road geometry, or a transmission requirement associated with the BSM. The second wireless device may determine whether or not the second wireless device is within a certain threshold (e.g., Threshold). virt) from the pool of candidate resources. Virtually sensed resources with RSSI above a threshold may be omitted from the pool of candidate resources prior to RSRP-based exclusion being implemented. In some aspects, the second wireless device may pre-filter the virtually sensed candidate resources based on the virtually sensed RSSI measurements of one or more subchannels provided by the first wireless device until a certain amount of candidate resources remains available in the selection pool of candidate resources. In some aspects, the second wireless device may pre-filter the virtually sensed candidate resources until a certain amount of twenty percent (20%) of the resources remains available in the selection pool (e.g., a filtered subset). This certain amount of twenty percent is merely an example and is not limited to the examples provided herein. In some aspects, this certain amount may be greater than twenty percent (20%).

[0096]

[0123] At 1916, the second wireless device may filter out candidate resources in the filtered subset of candidate resources. For example, 1916 may be implemented by the determining component 2042 of the apparatus 2002. The second wireless device may filter out candidate resources in the filtered subset of candidate resources that do not exceed a pre-filter threshold that exceeds the RSRP threshold. The second wireless device may filter out candidate resources in the filtered subset of candidate resources that do not exceed the pre-filter threshold but exceed the RSRP threshold to obtain a second subset of candidate resources that do not exceed the RSRP threshold. In some aspects, the second subset of candidate resources may comprise a pre-configured proportion of the total candidate resources in the selection pool that does not exceed the pre-filter threshold. In some aspects, the pre-filter threshold may be adjusted if the second subset of candidate resources comprises an amount of candidate resources that is less than a pre-configured proportion of the total candidate resources in the selection pool. The pre-filter threshold may be further adjusted until the second subset of candidate resources comprises a pre-configured proportion of the total candidate resources in the selection pool. In some aspects, the preconfigured percentage of the total candidate resources in the selection pool may comprise twenty percent (20%). In some aspects, the preconfigured percentage of the total candidate resources in the selection pool may comprise greater than twenty percent (20%). In some aspects, the RSRP threshold may be adjusted such that the second subset of candidate resources comprises a preconfigured percentage of the total candidate resources in the selection pool. The RSRP threshold may be adjusted in addition to or as an alternative to adjusting the prefilter threshold.

[0097]

[0124] Candidate resources comprising at least one subchannel on which to transmit the BSM may be determined from the second subset of candidate resources. In some aspects, the second wireless device may eliminate some of the candidate resources based on its half-duplex operation prior to selecting the candidate resources for transmitting the BSM. virt) may function in a manner similar to the β parameter discussed above. For example, a pre-filter threshold (e.g., Threshold virt ) may be adjusted based on a level of protection for the virtually sensed resources. For example, if more protection for the virtually sensed resources is desired, the value of the pre-filter threshold may be reduced. Reducing the pre-filter threshold may filter out more of the virtually sensed resources. In some aspects, the pre-filter threshold may be based on at least one of a location of a threat entity affecting the RSSI in at least one of the subset of sub-channels, a location confidence radius associated with a threat entity affecting the RSSI in at least one of the subset of sub-channels, a timestamp associated with a message received from the first wireless device, a speed of the second wireless device, an acceleration of the second wireless device, a heading of the second wireless device relative to the location of the threat entity, information related to road geometry, or a transmission requirement associated with the BSM, or a combination thereof.

[0098]

[0125] In some embodiments, a threshold value (e.g., Threshold virt Pre-filtering of virtually sensed resources based on RSRP-based exclusion may operate in conjunction with RSRP-based exclusion. For example, if RSRP-based exclusion less than a certain amount (e.g., 20%) of resources is available in the selection pool (e.g., the second subset of candidate resources), the second wireless device may adjust a threshold (e.g., Threshold) such that fewer resources are excluded and a certain amount (e.g., 20%) of resources is available in the selection pool (e.g., the second subset of candidate resources). virt ) value. This scheme may also be used to avoid persistent non-hidden (e.g., physically sensed) threat entities in the case of NR-V2X.

[0099]

[0126] At 1918, the second wireless device may select candidate resources. For example, 1918 may be performed by the determining component 2042 of the apparatus 2002. The second wireless device may select candidate resources from the second subset of candidate resources for transmission of the BSM.

[0100]

[0127] At 1906, the second wireless device may transmit a BSM on the determined candidate resources. For example, 1906 may be implemented by the BSM component 2044 of the apparatus 2002. The second wireless device may transmit a BSM on the determined candidate resources to at least a third wireless device. The transmitted BSM may be a broadcast message such that the transmitted BSM may be transmitted to and received by any wireless devices within a vicinity of the second wireless device. In some aspects, the BSM may be transmitted on the candidate resources, where the candidate resources may comprise one or more subchannels.

[0101]

[0128] 20 is a diagram 2000 illustrating an example of a hardware implementation for an apparatus 2002. The apparatus 2002 is a UE and includes a cellular baseband processor 2004 (also referred to as a modem) coupled to a cellular RF transceiver 2022 and one or more subscriber identity module (SIM) cards 2020, an application processor 2006 coupled to a secure digital (SD) card 2008 and a screen 2010, a Bluetooth module 2012, a wireless local area network (WLAN) module 2014, a GNSS module 2016, and a power source 2018. The GNSS module 2016 may comprise a variety of satellite positioning systems. For example, the GNSS module may correspond to Global Positioning System (GPS), Global Navigation Satellite System (GLONASS), Galileo, BeiDou Navigation Satellite System (BDS), Wide Area Augmentation System (WAAS), European Geostationary Navigation Overlay Service (EGNOS), GPS Aided Geo-Augmented Navigation (GAGAN), Multi-purpose Transport Satellite (MTSAT) Satellite Augmentation System (MSAS), Quasi-Zenith Satellite System (QZSS), or Navigation with Indian Constellations (NavIC). The cellular baseband processor 2004 communicates with the UE 104 and / or the BS 102 / 180 through the cellular RF transceiver 2022. The cellular baseband processor 2004 may include computer readable media / memory. The computer readable media / memory may be non-transitory. The cellular baseband processor 2004 is responsible for general processing, including the execution of software stored in the computer readable media / memory. The software, when executed by the cellular baseband processor 2004, causes the cellular baseband processor 2004 to perform the various functions described above. The computer-readable medium / memory may also be used to store data that is manipulated by the cellular baseband processor 2004 when executing the software.The cellular baseband processor 2004 further includes a receiving component 2030, a communications manager 2032, and a transmitting component 2034. The communications manager 2032 includes one or more of the illustrated components. The components in the communications manager 2032 may be stored in a computer-readable medium / memory and / or configured as hardware in the cellular baseband processor 2004. The cellular baseband processor 2004 may be a component of the UE 350 and may include the memory 360 and / or at least one of the TX processor 368, the RX processor 356, and the controller / processor 359. In one configuration, the apparatus 2002 may be a modem chip and may include only the baseband processor 2004, and in another configuration, the apparatus 2002 may be an entire UE (e.g., see 350 in FIG. 3) and may include the additional modules previously described for the apparatus 2002.

[0102]

[0129] The communications manager 2032 includes a message component 2040 configured to receive a message indicating a threat entity within a threat zone, e.g., as described with respect to 1802 of FIG. 18 or 1902 of FIG. 19. The communications manager 2032 further includes a determination component 2042 configured to determine candidate resources among a set of candidate resources on which to transmit a BSM, e.g., as described with respect to 1804 of FIG. 18 or 1904 of FIG. 19. The determination component 2042 may be configured to exclude one or more candidate resources in the set of candidate resources, e.g., as described with respect to 1908 of FIG. 19. The determination component 2042 may be configured to rank a first subset of the candidate resources based on a weighted RSSI ranking, e.g., as described with respect to 1910 of FIG. 19. The determination component 2042 may be configured to select a candidate resource, e.g., as described with respect to 1912 of FIG. 19. The determining component 2042 may be configured to exclude one or more virtually sensed candidate resources in the set of candidate resources, e.g., as described with respect to 1914 of Figure 19. The determining component 2042 may be configured to exclude candidate resources in the filtered subset of candidate resources, e.g., as described with respect to 1916 of Figure 19. The determining component 2042 may be configured to select the candidate resources, e.g., as described with respect to 1918 of Figure 19. The communications manager 2032 further includes a BSM component 2044 configured to transmit a BSM on the determined candidate resources, e.g., as described with respect to 1806 of Figure 18 or 1906 of Figure 19.

[0103]

[0130] The apparatus may include additional components that implement each of the blocks of the algorithms in the above-mentioned flowcharts of Figure 18 or Figure 19. Thus, each block in the above-mentioned flowcharts of Figure 18 or Figure 19 may be implemented by one component, and the apparatus may include one or more of those components. The components may be one or more hardware components specifically configured to perform the described process / algorithm, implemented by a processor configured to perform the described process / algorithm, stored in a computer-readable medium for implementation by a processor, or some combination thereof.

[0104]

[0131] In one configuration, the apparatus 2002, and in particular the cellular baseband processor 2004, includes means for receiving a message from a first wireless device indicating a threat entity within a threat zone. The threat entity transmits data that interferes with the transmission of the BSM. The apparatus includes means for determining candidate resources among a set of candidate resources on which to transmit the BSM based at least in part on the message indicating information related to the threat entity from the first wireless device. The apparatus includes means for transmitting the BSM on the determined candidate resources to at least a third wireless device. The apparatus further includes means for eliminating one or more candidate resources in the set of candidate resources based on a predicted RSRP of each candidate resource in the set of candidate resources exceeding an RSRP threshold to determine a first subset of candidate resources. The apparatus further includes means for ranking the first subset of candidate resources based on a weighted RSSI ranking to obtain a second subset of candidate resources with the lowest weighted RSSI. The second subset of candidate resources is a portion of the first subset of candidate resources. The apparatus further includes means for selecting a candidate resource from a second subset of candidate resources. The apparatus further includes means for filtering out one or more virtually sensed candidate resources in the set of candidate resources having an RSSI that exceeds the pre-filter threshold to obtain a filtered subset of candidate resources that does not exceed the pre-filter threshold. The apparatus further includes means for filtering out candidate resources in the filtered subset of candidate resources that do not exceed the pre-filter threshold that exceeds the RSRP threshold to obtain a second subset of candidate resources that does not exceed the RSRP threshold. The apparatus further includes means for selecting a candidate resource from the second subset of candidate resources. The aforementioned means may be one or more of the aforementioned components of the apparatus 2002 configured to perform the functions recited by the aforementioned means. As described above, the apparatus 2002 may include a TX processor 368, a RX processor 356, and a controller / processor 359.Thus, in one configuration, the aforementioned means may be the TX processor 368, the RX processor 356, and the controller / processor 359 configured to perform the functions recited by the aforementioned means.

[0105]

[0132] FIG. 21 illustrates an example communication flow 2100 between a first wireless device 2102, a second wireless device 2104, and a third wireless device 2106. The communication may be based on V2X, V2V, or D2D based communication from a transmitting device directly to a receiving device. The communication transmitted from the devices 2102, 2104, 2106 may be broadcast and received by multiple receiving devices within range of a particular transmitting device, as described with respect to FIG. 4. The first wireless device 2102 may correspond to a first UE, and the second wireless device 2104 may correspond to a second UE. The first wireless device 2102, the second wireless device 2104, and / or the third wireless device 2106 may correspond to a C-V2X entity. For example, in the context of FIG. 1, the first wireless device 2102 may correspond to at least a UE 104, and the second wireless device 2104 may correspond to at least a UE 104′. In another example, in the context of FIG. 3, the first wireless device 2102 may correspond to the device 350, and the second wireless device 2104 may correspond to the device 310.

[0106]

[0133] As shown at 2108, the first wireless device 2102 may detect a threat entity within a threat zone. The first wireless device 2102 may detect the threat entity based on a data signal received from the threat entity within the threat zone. The threat entity may disrupt wireless spectrum or resources utilized in collaborative or autonomous driving decisions. In some aspects, the data signal received from the threat entity may comprise data that is inconsistent with expected data of the wireless device. For example, the data signal may include data that is not realistic or expected for the wireless device. The data signal may indicate speed values ​​much higher than expected, location information that is meaningless or not within the vicinity of the first wireless device, or may include a high amount of data that overloads the first wireless device. The data signal may include other types of inconsistent or inaccurate data, such that the disclosure is not limited to the examples provided herein. In some aspects, the data signal may comprise data of a misbehaving wireless device. The data of the abnormally behaving wireless device comprises erroneous or implausible data relating to at least one characteristic of the abnormally behaving wireless device. In some aspects, a type of threat entity may be determined by the first wireless device based on the data signal received from the threat entity. The type of threat entity may comprise a DoS attacker, a jammer, an abnormally behaving vehicle, an OOB interferer, a WAN jammer, or a GNSS jammer.

[0107]

[0134] As shown in 2114, the first wireless device 2102 may transmit a message indicating a threat entity in the threat zone. The first wireless device 2102 may transmit a message indicating a threat entity in the threat zone to at least one second wireless device 2104. The second wireless device 2104 may receive a message indicating a threat entity in the threat zone from the first wireless device 2102. The detected threat entity may be considered a new class of detected object such that the message indicating the threat entity may be encoded as a sensor data sharing message (SDSM) or a joint perception message (CPM) due to the threat entity being a spectrum or security issue as opposed to a physical obstacle. The message may be broadcast to at least one second wireless device 2104 outside the threat zone as well as any other wireless devices in the vicinity of the first wireless device. The message may be broadcast to at least one second wireless device via sidelink communication (e.g., PC5). The second wireless device receiving the threat entity-indicating message from the first wireless device allows the second wireless device to virtually sense the threat entity that the second wireless device cannot detect due to the second wireless device being beyond the threat zone of the threat entity. In some aspects, for example in semi-persistent scheduling (SPS), the second wireless device may measure RSRP and / or RSSI of subchannels carrying data during the sensing window to make a reservation. If the measured RSRP / RSSI exceeds a threshold, the second wireless device may remove the CSR from a list of candidate CSRs. A CSR may comprise one or more subchannels. In addition, the second wireless device using the threat entity-indicating message from the first wireless device may remove jammed or interfered subchannels based on the RSSI measurements reported in the threat entity-indicating message from the first wireless device.This virtual sensing may improve the probability of reception of a message transmitted by the second wireless device, especially if the second wireless device may adhere to the SPS reservation for an extended period of time.

[0108]

[0135] In some aspects, the first wireless device 2102 may transmit a message (e.g., an SDSM) to a network entity (e.g., a base station) over the Uu link. In such cases, the network entity may relay the message from the first wireless device to other wireless devices outside the threat zone so that other wireless devices may proactively take preventative measures. In some aspects, the second wireless device may receive a message from the network entity indicating a threat entity. In such cases, the first wireless device physically detected the threat entity while within the threat zone of the threat entity. The first wireless device may transmit a message reporting the detected threat entity to the network entity to enable the network entity to relay the message to at least a second wireless device and other devices that are outside the threat zone and beyond the transmission range of the first wireless device that detected the threat entity. The message may be transmitted based on at least one of the number of reports of the threat entity received from at least one other wireless device, the severity of the threat entity, the distance separating the threat entity and the first wireless device, or the time for at least one second wireless device to approach the threat zone, or a combination thereof. The message may comprise a duty cycle of the threat entity's data signal. The information of the duty cycle of the threat entity's data signal may enable the second wireless device to take the threat entity's duty cycle into account when reserving / configuring its transmissions. In some aspects, the message may include a peak RSSI detection between antenna elements of the first wireless device that detected the threat entity. The first wireless device may be configured with a directional receive antenna array that may be configured to detect the angle of arrival of the threat entity's transmission, which may improve the determination of the threat entity's location and aid in the suppression of the threat zone included in the message.

[0109]

[0136] The messages may trigger mitigation actions in the second wireless devices to avoid or mitigate contact with the threat entity. The messages enable the at least one second wireless device to virtually sense the threat entity even though the second wireless device may not be within a threat zone of the threat entity to physically sense the threat entity.

[0110]

[0137] The message may comprise information relating to a characteristic of the threat entity. In some aspects, the message may comprise a reliability value associated with a type of threat entity. The message may comprise an average of an RSSI measured over at least the bandwidth of the first wireless device. Jamming is typically wideband, and an average of an RSSI measured over the entire bandwidth of the first wireless device may indicate the threat entity as being a jamming device. In some aspects, the message may comprise an average of an RSSI measured for each subchannel that exceeds an RSSI threshold. The average of the RSSI for each subchannel may be measured over a time window. The average of the RSSI measured for each subchannel may indicate the threat entity as an OOB entity or a narrowband jammer. The message may comprise a duty cycle of a data signal received from the threat entity. Information of the duty cycle of the data signal from the threat entity may enable the wireless device to ignore data received during the duty cycle. In some aspects, the message may comprise a Layer 2 (L2) address of the threat entity. In some cases, e.g., a DoS attack or an abnormally operating wireless device (e.g., an abnormally operating vehicle), the RSSI report may not be important. Thus, the message may include an L2 address of the threat entity to enable the at least one second wireless device to pre-filter DoS packets received at the modem layer. The message may further indicate at least one information element (IE) corresponding to the threat entity. The at least one IE may comprise a detected characteristic of the threat entity. In some aspects, the detected characteristic of the threat entity may comprise at least one of a location, a speed, or an orientation, or a combination thereof. For example, the location, speed, and / or orientation of the threat entity may be included in the case of a DoS attack. In some aspects, the detected characteristic of the threat entity may comprise a radius around the location of the threat entity. For example, in the case of a jammer or interferer, information related to a radius around the location may be provided.In some aspects, the first wireless device may combine information from its other sensors (e.g., camera, radar, lidar) and / or messages (e.g., SDSM or maps) received from other wireless devices detecting the same threat entity to determine a characteristic of the threat entity. In some aspects, the detected characteristic of the threat entity may comprise information related to the measured RSSI of the threat entity. In some aspects, the detected characteristic of the threat entity may comprise information related to one or more layers, cert digests, cell identifiers, or public land mobile networks (PLMNs) associated with the threat entity. The message may identify the threat entity as an object transmitting the data signal of the threat entity. In some aspects, the object may comprise one of a vulnerable road user (VRU), a detected vehicle, or a wireless obstacle.

[0111]

[0138] In a case where the detected threat type is a C-V2X jammer, the IE (e.g., DetectedJammerData) may include information related to an average of RSSI over the entire bandwidth of the first wireless device and an RSSI averaging window size. In some aspects, the IE (e.g., DetectedObjectCommonData) may include information related to a radius of a threat zone of the threat entity as well as combined information of other sensors (e.g., camera, radar, lidar) of the first wireless device. In a case where the detected threat type is an OOB interferer, the IE (e.g., DetectedInterfererData) may include a measured RSSI of each subchannel or band, an RSSI reporting threshold, an RSSI averaging window size, or a duty cycle of the threat entity. In a case where the detected threat type is an abnormally behaving vehicle, the IE (e.g., MisbehavingVehicleData) may include an L2 address or a certificate digest. In cases where the detected threat type is a WAN jammer, the IE (e.g., DetectedJammerData) may include information related to an E-UTRA Absolute Radio Frequency Channel Number (EARFCN), a cell identifier, or a PLMN. In cases where the detected threat type is a GNSS jammer, the IE (e.g., DetectedJammerData) may include information related to a GNSS band, Layer 1 (L1), L2, or Layer 5 (L5).

[0112]

[0139] As shown at 2118, the second wireless device 2104 may initiate mitigation actions in response to receiving the message (e.g., SDSM). In response to receiving the message, the second wireless device 2104 may initiate mitigation actions to avoid or mitigate contact with a threat entity. The threat entity may disrupt a wireless spectrum or resource utilized in collaborative or autonomous driving decisions. In some aspects, the mitigation actions may comprise selecting an alternative path to avoid the threat entity utilizing a more robust MCS or virtual sensing of the threat entity. The threat entity may significantly degrade the wireless spectrum or resource utilized in collaborative or autonomous driving decisions. Collaborative or autonomous driving decisions may require high reliability for safety. In some aspects, the second wireless device may decide to change its scheduled travel route or path to one that is least affected by the detected threat entity or any threat entity. In the case where the second wireless device receives a message indicating a threat entity from a network entity (e.g., an RSU), the second wireless device may be able to avoid or mitigate contact with the threat entity. The second wireless device moving away from the first wireless device may not be within range to directly receive the message from the first wireless device via PC5, and therefore the second wireless device receives the message relayed from the network entity (e.g., a base station) via the Uu link. The second wireless device moving away from the first wireless device may provide the second wireless device with enough time to prepare a mitigation action, such as taking an alternative path to avoid the threat entity, utilizing a more robust MCS, or virtually sensing the threat entity.In some aspects, the network entity may comprise an RSU or a multiple access edge computing (MEC) system that may be configured to provide detailed RF fingerprints of known threats (e.g., fixed), such as access points at street intersections, and transmit them over Uu to a cloud endpoint, which may then transmit them to the second wireless device. Due in part to the RSU or MEC having higher computational resources and / or sensory inputs, the RSU or MEC may obtain improved localization of the threat entity than the first wireless device. In addition, the RSU or MEC may transmit a message reporting the threat entity to the second wireless device over the PC5 and / or Uu interfaces.

[0113]

[0140] In some aspects, e.g., at 2112, the first wireless device may determine an estimated measure of the location of the threat entity based on a data signal received from the threat entity in combination with other data acquired by the first wireless device. In some aspects, the data signal received from the threat entity may be combined with data received from one or more sensors of the first wireless device. For example, the first wireless device may combine RSSI measurements of the threat entity with readings from sensors (e.g., cameras, radar, lidar) and / or V2I messages (e.g., maps) of the first wireless device to determine an estimated location of the threat entity. The messages may comprise the estimated location of the threat entity and a reliability value associated with the estimated location of the threat entity.

[0114]

[0141] In some aspects, for example at 2110, the first wireless device 2102 may receive a report from the third wireless device 2106 indicating a threat entity. The first wireless device may determine an estimated location of the threat entity in response to receiving the report. In some aspects, the first wireless device 2102 may be triggered to determine an estimated location of the threat entity in response to receiving the report. In some aspects, the first wireless device 2102 may utilize information provided in the report from the third wireless 2106 device along with a data signal received by the first wireless device from the threat entity to determine an estimated location of the threat entity. In some aspects, the report from the third wireless device may comprise an estimated location of the threat entity determined by the third wireless device, signal strength measurements of the threat entity measured by the third wireless device, or other characteristics of the threat entity. In some aspects, the report from the third wireless device may comprise characteristics of the third wireless device such as, but not limited to, location, speed, orientation, and timestamp. The first wireless device may receive reports related to a detected threat entity from two or more third wireless devices and combine such information to determine a probable location of the threat entity.

[0115]

[0142] In some aspects, for example at 2116, the second wireless device 2104 may adjust transmission parameters in response to receiving the message. In response to receiving the message, the second wireless device may adjust transmission parameters to transmit a BSM. In some aspects, the adjusted transmission parameters may comprise at least one of increasing transmit power or using a more robust MCS, or a combination thereof. Using a more robust MCS may comprise switching to a lower MCS. In some aspects, adjusting the transmission parameters may mitigate the impact of the threat entity, but the extended range and / or increased over-the-air transmission time may increase packet collision probability with other wireless devices. In such instances, the MCS index and transmit power may be adjusted based on wireless device density and threat signal strength.

[0116]

[0143] 22 is a flowchart 2200 of a method of wireless communication. The method may be performed by a UE or a component of a UE (e.g., the UE 104, the apparatus 2402, and the cellular baseband processor 2404, which may include the memory 360 and may be the UE 350 in its entirety or a component of the UE 350, such as the TX processor 368, the RX processor 356, and / or the controller / processor 359). One or more of the illustrated operations may be optional, omitted, transposed, or coexistent. The method may enable a first wireless device to share information related to a detected threat entity with other wireless devices, such that other wireless devices beyond the threat entity's threat zone may proactively take preventative measures.

[0117]

[0144] At 2202, the first wireless device may detect a threat entity within a threat zone. For example, 2202 may be implemented by the detection component 2440 of the apparatus 2402. The first wireless device may detect the threat entity based on a data signal received from the threat entity within the threat zone. The threat entity may disrupt a wireless spectrum or resources utilized in collaborative or autonomous driving decisions. In some aspects, the data signal received from the threat entity may comprise data that is inconsistent with expected data of the wireless device. For example, the data signal may include data that is not realistic or expected for the wireless device. The data signal may indicate speed values ​​much higher than expected, location information that is meaningless or not within the vicinity of the first wireless device, or may include a high amount of data that overloads the first wireless device. The data signal may include other types of inconsistent or inaccurate data, such that the disclosure is not limited to the examples provided herein. In some aspects, the data signal may comprise data of an abnormally operating wireless device. The data of the abnormally operating wireless device comprises erroneous or unlikely data related to at least one characteristic of the abnormally operating wireless device. In some aspects, the type of threat entity may be determined by the first wireless device based on the data signal received from the threat entity. The type of threat entity may comprise a DoS attacker, a jammer, an abnormally operating vehicle, an OOB interferer, a WAN jammer, or a GNSS jammer.

[0118]

[0145] At 2204, the first wireless device may transmit a message indicating a threat entity in the threat zone. For example, 2204 may be implemented by the message component 2446 of the apparatus 2402. The first wireless device may transmit a message indicating a threat entity in the threat zone to at least one second wireless device. The detected threat entity may be considered a new class of detected object such that the message indicating the threat entity may be encoded as an SDSM or CPM due to the threat entity being a spectrum or security issue as opposed to a physical obstacle. The message may be broadcast to at least one second wireless device outside the threat zone, as well as any other wireless devices within the vicinity of the first wireless device. The message may be broadcast to the at least one second wireless device via sidelink communication (e.g., PC5). In some aspects, the message may be transmitted to a network entity (e.g., a base station) via a Uu interface. In such instances, the network entity (e.g., a base station) may relay the message to other wireless devices outside the threat zone so that the other wireless devices may proactively take preventative measures. The message may be transmitted based on at least one of a number of reports of the threat entity received from the at least one third wireless device, a severity of the threat entity, a distance separating the threat entity and the first wireless device, or a time for the at least one second wireless device to approach a threat zone, or a combination thereof. The message (e.g., SDSM) may trigger a mitigation action in the at least one second wireless device to avoid or mitigate contact with the threat entity. The message enables the at least one second wireless device to virtually sense the threat entity even though the at least one second wireless device may not be within the threat zone of the threat entity to physically sense the threat entity.

[0119]

[0146] The message may comprise information relating to a characteristic of the threat entity. In some aspects, the message may comprise a reliability value associated with a type of threat entity. The message may comprise an average of RSSI measured over at least the bandwidth of the first wireless device. Jamming is typically wideband, and an average of RSSI measured over the entire bandwidth of the first wireless device may indicate the threat entity as being a jamming device. In some aspects, the message may comprise an average of RSSI measured for each subchannel that exceeds an RSSI threshold. The average of RSSI for each subchannel may be measured over a time window. The average of RSSI measured for each subchannel may indicate the threat entity as an OOB entity or a narrowband jammer. The message may comprise a duty cycle of a data signal received from the threat entity. Information of the duty cycle of the data signal from the threat entity may enable the wireless device to ignore data received during the duty cycle. In some aspects, the message may comprise an L2 address of the threat entity. In some cases, e.g., a DoS attack or an abnormally operating wireless device (e.g., an abnormally operating vehicle), the RSSI report may not be important. Thus, the message may include an L2 address of the threat entity to enable the at least one second wireless device to pre-filter DoS packets received at the modem layer. The message may further indicate at least one IE corresponding to the threat entity. The at least one IE may comprise a detected characteristic of the threat entity. In some aspects, the detected characteristic of the threat entity may comprise at least one of a location, a speed, or an orientation, or a combination thereof. For example, the location, speed, and / or orientation of the threat entity may be included in the case of a DoS attack. In some aspects, the detected characteristic of the threat entity may comprise a radius around the location of the threat entity. For example, in the case of a jammer or interferer, information related to a radius around the location may be provided.In some aspects, the first wireless device may combine information from its other sensors (e.g., camera, radar, lidar) and / or messages (e.g., SDSM or maps) received from other wireless devices detecting the same threat entity to determine a characteristic of the threat entity. In some aspects, the detected characteristic of the threat entity may comprise information related to the measured RSSI of the threat entity. In some aspects, the detected characteristic of the threat entity may comprise information related to one or more layers, cert digests, cell identifiers, or PLMNs associated with the threat entity. The message may identify the threat entity as the object transmitting the data signal of the threat entity. In some aspects, the object may comprise one of a VRU, a detected vehicle, or a wireless obstacle.

[0120]

[0147] In a case where the detected threat type is a C-V2X jammer, the IE (e.g., DetectedJammerData) may include information related to an average of RSSI over the entire bandwidth of the first wireless device and an RSSI averaging window size. In some aspects, the IE (e.g., DetectedObjectCommonData) may include information related to a radius of a threat zone of the threat entity as well as combined information of other sensors (e.g., camera, radar, lidar) of the first wireless device. In a case where the detected threat type is an OOB interferer, the IE (e.g., DetectedInterfererData) may include a measured RSSI of each sub-channel or band, an RSSI reporting threshold, an RSSI averaging window size, or a duty cycle of the threat entity. In a case where the detected threat type is an abnormally behaving vehicle, the IE (e.g., MisbehavingVehicleData) may include an L2 address or a cert digest. In cases where the detected threat type is a WAN jammer, the IE (e.g., DetectedJammerData) may include information related to the (EARFCN, cell identifier, or PLMN. In cases where the detected threat type is a GNSS jammer, the IE (e.g., DetectedJammerData) may include information related to the GNSS band, L1, L2, or L5.

[0121]

[0148] 23 is a flowchart 2300 of a method of wireless communication. The method may be performed by a UE or a component of a UE (e.g., the UE 104, the apparatus 2402, and the cellular baseband processor 2404, which may include the memory 360 and may be the UE 350 in its entirety or a component of the UE 350, such as the TX processor 368, the RX processor 356, and / or the controller / processor 359). One or more of the illustrated operations may be optional, omitted, transposed, or coexistent. The method may enable a first wireless device to share information related to a detected threat entity with other wireless devices, so that other wireless devices beyond the threat entity's threat zone may proactively take preventative measures.

[0122]

[0149] At 2302, the first wireless device may detect a threat entity within a threat zone. For example, 2302 may be implemented by a detection component 2440 of the apparatus 2402. The first wireless device may detect the threat entity based on a data signal received from the threat entity within the threat zone. The threat entity may disrupt a wireless spectrum or resources utilized in collaborative or autonomous driving decisions. In some aspects, the data signal received from the threat entity may comprise data that is inconsistent with expected data of the wireless device. For example, the data signal may include data that is not realistic or expected for the wireless device. The data signal may indicate speed values ​​much higher than expected, location information that is meaningless or not within the vicinity of the first wireless device, or may include a high amount of data that overloads the first wireless device. The data signal may include other types of inconsistent or inaccurate data, such that the disclosure is not limited to the examples provided herein. In some aspects, the data signal may comprise data of an abnormally operating wireless device. The data of the abnormally operating wireless device comprises erroneous or unlikely data related to at least one characteristic of the abnormally operating wireless device. In some aspects, the type of threat entity may be determined by the first wireless device based on the data signal received from the threat entity. The type of threat entity may comprise a DoS attacker, a jammer, an abnormally operating vehicle, an OOB interferer, a WAN jammer, or a GNSS jammer.

[0123]

[0150] At 2304, the first wireless device may determine an estimated location of the threat entity based on the data signal received from the threat entity in combination with other data acquired by the first wireless device. For example, 2304 may be implemented by the determining component 2442 of the apparatus 2402. In some aspects, the data signal received from the threat entity may be combined with data received from one or more sensors of the first wireless device. For example, the first wireless device may combine RSSI measurements of the threat entity with readings from sensors (e.g., cameras, radar, lidar) and / or V2I messages (e.g., maps) of the first wireless device to determine the location of the threat entity. The messages may comprise the estimated location of the threat entity and a reliability value associated with the estimated location of the threat entity.

[0124]

[0151] At 2306, the first wireless device may receive a report from the third wireless device indicating the threat entity. For example, 2306 may be implemented by the reporting component 2444 of the apparatus 2402. The first wireless device may determine an estimated location of the threat entity in response to receiving the report. In some aspects, the first wireless device may be triggered to determine an estimated location of the threat entity in response to receiving the report. In some aspects, the first wireless device may utilize information provided in the report from the third wireless device along with a data signal received by the first wireless device from the threat entity to determine the estimated location of the threat entity. In some aspects, the report from the third wireless device may comprise the estimated location of the threat entity determined by the third wireless device, signal strength measurements of the threat entity measured by the third wireless device, or other characteristics of the threat entity. In some aspects, the report from the third wireless device may comprise characteristics of the third wireless device such as, but not limited to, location, speed, orientation, and timestamp. The first wireless device may receive reports related to a detected threat entity from two or more third wireless devices and combine such information to determine a probable location of the threat entity.

[0125]

[0152] As shown at 2308, the first wireless device may transmit a message indicating a threat entity in the threat zone. For example, 2308 may be implemented by the message component 2446 of the apparatus 2402. The first wireless device may transmit a message indicating a threat entity in the threat zone to at least one second wireless device. The detected threat entity may be considered a new class of detected object such that the message indicating the threat entity may be encoded as an SDSM or CPM due to the threat entity being a spectrum or security issue as opposed to a physical obstacle. The message may be broadcast to at least one second wireless device outside the threat zone as well as any other wireless devices within the vicinity of the first wireless device. The message may be broadcast to at least one second wireless device via sidelink communication (e.g., PC5). In some aspects, the message may be transmitted to a network entity (e.g., a base station) via a Uu interface. In such instances, the network entity (e.g., a base station) may relay the message to other wireless devices outside the threat zone so that the other wireless devices may proactively take preventative measures. The message may be transmitted based on at least one of a number of reports of the threat entity received from the at least one third wireless device, a severity of the threat entity, a distance separating the threat entity and the first wireless device, or a time for the at least one second wireless device to approach a threat zone, or a combination thereof. The message (e.g., SDSM) may trigger a mitigation action in the at least one second wireless device to avoid or mitigate contact with the threat entity. The message enables the at least one second wireless device to virtually sense the threat entity even though the at least one second wireless device may not be within the threat zone of the threat entity to physically sense the threat entity.

[0126]

[0153] The message may comprise information relating to a characteristic of the threat entity. In some aspects, the message may comprise a reliability value associated with a type of threat entity. The message may comprise an average of RSSI measured over at least the bandwidth of the first wireless device. Jamming is typically wideband, and an average of RSSI measured over the entire bandwidth of the first wireless device may indicate the threat entity as being a jamming device. In some aspects, the message may comprise an average of RSSI measured for each subchannel that exceeds an RSSI threshold. The average of RSSI for each subchannel may be measured over a time window. The average of RSSI measured for each subchannel may indicate the threat entity as an OOB entity or a narrowband jammer. The message may comprise a duty cycle of a data signal received from the threat entity. Information of the duty cycle of the data signal from the threat entity may enable the wireless device to ignore data received during the duty cycle. In some aspects, the message may comprise an L2 address of the threat entity. In some cases, e.g., a DoS attack or an abnormally operating wireless device (e.g., an abnormally operating vehicle), the RSSI report may not be important. Thus, the message may include an L2 address of the threat entity to enable the at least one second wireless device to pre-filter DoS packets received at the modem layer. The message may further indicate at least one IE corresponding to the threat entity. The at least one IE may comprise a detected characteristic of the threat entity. In some aspects, the detected characteristic of the threat entity may comprise at least one of a location, a speed, or an orientation, or a combination thereof. For example, the location, speed, and / or orientation of the threat entity may be included in the case of a DoS attack. In some aspects, the detected characteristic of the threat entity may comprise a radius around the location of the threat entity. For example, in the case of a jammer or interferer, information related to a radius around the location may be provided.In some aspects, the first wireless device may combine information from its other sensors (e.g., camera, radar, lidar) and / or messages (e.g., SDSM or maps) received from other wireless devices detecting the same threat entity to determine a characteristic of the threat entity. In some aspects, the detected characteristic of the threat entity may comprise information related to the measured RSSI of the threat entity. In some aspects, the detected characteristic of the threat entity may comprise information related to one or more layers, cert digests, cell identifiers, or PLMNs associated with the threat entity. The message may identify the threat entity as the object transmitting the data signal of the threat entity. In some aspects, the object may comprise one of a VRU, a detected vehicle, or a wireless obstacle.

[0127]

[0154] In a case where the detected threat type is a C-V2X jammer, the IE (e.g., DetectedJammerData) may include information related to an average of RSSI over the entire bandwidth of the first wireless device and an RSSI averaging window size. In some aspects, the IE (e.g., DetectedObjectCommonData) may include information related to a radius of a threat zone of the threat entity as well as combined information of other sensors (e.g., camera, radar, lidar) of the first wireless device. In a case where the detected threat type is an OOB interferer, the IE (e.g., DetectedInterfererData) may include a measured RSSI of each sub-channel or band, an RSSI reporting threshold, an RSSI averaging window size, or a duty cycle of the threat entity. In a case where the detected threat type is an abnormally behaving vehicle, the IE (e.g., MisbehavingVehicleData) may include an L2 address or a cert digest. In cases where the detected threat type is a WAN jammer, the IE (e.g., DetectedJammerData) may include information related to the (EARFCN, cell identifier, or PLMN. In cases where the detected threat type is a GNSS jammer, the IE (e.g., DetectedJammerData) may include information related to the GNSS band, L1, L2, or L5.

[0128]

[0155] 24 is a diagram 2400 illustrating an example of a hardware implementation for an apparatus 2402. The apparatus 2402 is a UE and includes a cellular baseband processor 2404 (also referred to as a modem) coupled to a cellular RF transceiver 2422 and one or more subscriber identity module (SIM) cards 2420, an application processor 2406 coupled to a secure digital (SD) card 2408 and a screen 2410, a Bluetooth module 2412, a wireless local area network (WLAN) module 2414, a GNSS module 2416, and a power source 2418. The GNSS module 2416 may comprise a variety of satellite positioning systems. For example, the GNSS module may correspond to Global Positioning System (GPS), Global Navigation Satellite System (GLONASS), Galileo, BeiDou Navigation Satellite System (BDS), Wide Area Augmentation System (WAAS), European Geostationary Navigation Overlay Service (EGNOS), GPS Aided Geo-Augmented Navigation (GAGAN), Multi-purpose Transport Satellite (MTSAT) Satellite Augmentation System (MSAS), Quasi-Zenith Satellite System (QZSS), or Navigation with Indian Constellations (NavIC). The cellular baseband processor 2404 communicates with the UE 104 and / or the BS 102 / 180 through the cellular RF transceiver 2422. The cellular baseband processor 2404 may include computer readable media / memory. The computer readable media / memory may be non-transitory. The cellular baseband processor 2404 is responsible for general processing, including the execution of software stored in the computer readable media / memory. The software, when executed by the cellular baseband processor 2404, causes the cellular baseband processor 2404 to perform the various functions described above. The computer-readable medium / memory may also be used to store data that is manipulated by the cellular baseband processor 2404 when executing the software.The cellular baseband processor 2404 further includes a receiving component 2430, a communications manager 2432, and a transmitting component 2434. The communications manager 2432 includes one or more of the illustrated components. The components in the communications manager 2432 may be stored in a computer readable medium / memory and / or configured as hardware in the cellular baseband processor 2404. The cellular baseband processor 2404 may be a component of the UE 350 and may include the memory 360 and / or at least one of the TX processor 368, the RX processor 356, and the controller / processor 359. In one configuration, the apparatus 2402 is a modem chip and may include just the baseband processor 2404, and in another configuration, the apparatus 2402 is an entire UE (e.g., see 350 in FIG. 3) and may include the additional modules discussed previously of the apparatus 2402.

[0129]

[0156] The communications manager 2432 includes a detection component 2440 configured to detect a threat entity within the threat zone, e.g., as described with respect to 2202 of FIG. 22 or 2302 of FIG. 23. The communications manager 2432 further includes a determination component 2442 configured to determine an estimated location of the threat entity based on a data signal received from the threat entity in combination with other data acquired by the first wireless device, e.g., as described with respect to 2304 of FIG. 23. The communications manager 2432 further includes a reporting component 2444 configured to receive a report indicative of the threat entity from the third wireless device, e.g., as described with respect to 2306 of FIG. 23. The communications manager 2432 further includes a message component 2446 configured to send a message indicative of the threat entity within the threat zone, e.g., as described with respect to 2204 of FIG. 22 or 2308 of FIG. 23.

[0130]

[0157] The apparatus may include additional components that implement each of the blocks of the algorithms in the above-mentioned flowcharts of Figure 22 or Figure 23. Thus, each block in the above-mentioned flowcharts of Figure 22 or Figure 23 may be implemented by one component, and the apparatus may include one or more of those components. The components may be one or more hardware components specifically configured to perform the described process / algorithm, implemented by a processor configured to perform the described process / algorithm, stored in a computer-readable medium for implementation by a processor, or some combination thereof.

[0131]

[0158] In one configuration, the apparatus 2402, and in particular the cellular baseband processor 2404, includes means for detecting a threat entity based on a data signal received from a threat entity within a threat zone. The threat entity disrupts a wireless spectrum or resource utilized in collaborative or autonomous driving decisions. The apparatus includes means for transmitting a message indicative of a threat entity within the threat zone to at least one second wireless device. The apparatus further includes means for determining an estimated location of the threat entity based on a data signal received from the threat entity in combination with data received from one or more sensors of the first wireless device. The apparatus further includes means for receiving a report indicative of the threat entity from a third wireless device. The estimated location of the threat entity is determined in response to receiving the report. The aforementioned means may be one or more of the aforementioned components of the apparatus 2402 configured to perform the functions recited by the aforementioned means. As described above, the apparatus 2402 may include a TX processor 368, a RX processor 356, and a controller / processor 359. Thus, in one configuration, the aforementioned means may be the TX processor 368, the RX processor 356, and the controller / processor 359 configured to perform the functions recited by the aforementioned means.

[0132]

[0159] 25 is a flowchart 2500 of a method of wireless communication. The method may be performed by a UE or a component of a UE (e.g., the UE 104, the apparatus 2702, and the cellular baseband processor 2704, which may include the memory 360 and may be the UE 350 in its entirety or a component of the UE 350, such as the TX processor 368, the RX processor 356, and / or the controller / processor 359). One or more of the illustrated operations may be optional, omitted, transposed, or coexistent. The method may enable a second wireless device to initiate mitigation actions based on a virtual sensing of a threat entity detected by the first wireless device.

[0133]

[0160] At 2502, the second wireless device may receive a message indicating a threat entity within a threat zone. For example, 2502 may be implemented by a message component 2740 of the apparatus 2702. The threat entity may disrupt a wireless spectrum or resources utilized in collaborative or autonomous driving decisions. The second wireless device may receive the message from the first wireless device or from a network entity. For example, the first wireless device may be within the threat zone of the threat entity and physically detects the threat entity. The message received from the first wireless device may comprise an SDSM or a CPM. The second wireless device receiving a message from the first wireless device indicating a threat entity allows the second wireless device to virtually sense a threat entity that the second wireless device cannot detect due to the second wireless device being beyond the threat zone of the threat entity. In some aspects, for example in semi-persistent scheduling (SPS), the second wireless device may measure RSRP and / or RSSI of a subchannel carrying data during a sensing window to make a reservation. If the measured RSRP / RSSI exceeds a threshold, the second wireless device may remove the subchannel from the list of candidate subchannels. In addition, the second wireless device using the message indicating a threat entity from the first wireless device may remove the jammed or interfered subchannel based on the RSSI measurements reported in the message indicating a threat entity from the first wireless device. This virtual sensing may improve the reception probability of the message transmitted by the second wireless device, especially if the second wireless device may stick to the SPS reservation for an extended period of time. In some aspects, the second wireless device may receive the message indicating a threat entity from a network entity (e.g., a base station).In such instances, a wireless device (e.g., a first wireless device) physically detects a threat entity while within the threat entity's threat zone. The wireless device transmitted a message reporting the detected threat entity to the network entity to enable the network entity to relay the message to a wireless device that is outside the threat zone and beyond the transmission range of the wireless device that detected the threat entity. The message may comprise a duty cycle of the threat entity's data signal. Information of the duty cycle of the threat entity's data signal may enable the second wireless device to take the threat entity's duty cycle into account when scheduling / configuring its transmissions. In some aspects, the message may include a peak RSSI detection between antenna elements of the first wireless device that detected the threat entity. The first wireless device configured with directional reception may improve the determination of the threat entity's location and may assist in suppressing the threat zone included in the message.

[0134]

[0161] At 2504, the second wireless device may initiate a mitigation action in response to receiving the message (e.g., SDSM). For example, 2504 may be implemented by the mitigation component 2744 of the apparatus 2702. In response to receiving the message, the second wireless device may initiate a mitigation action to avoid or mitigate contact with the threat entity. In some aspects, the mitigation action may comprise utilizing a more robust MCS or virtual sensing of the threat entity to select an alternative path to avoid the threat entity. The threat entity may significantly degrade the wireless spectrum or resources utilized in collaborative or autonomous driving decisions. Collaborative or autonomous driving decisions may require high reliability for safety. In some aspects, the second wireless device may determine to change its scheduled travel route or path to one that is least affected by the detected threat entity or any threat entity. In instances where the second wireless device receives a message from a network entity (e.g., a base station) indicating a threat entity, the second wireless device may be able to avoid or mitigate contact with the threat entity. A second wireless device moving away from the first wireless device may not be within range to directly receive a message from the first wireless device via PC5, and thus the second wireless device receives a message relayed from a network entity (e.g., a base station) via a Uu link. The second wireless device moving away from the first wireless device may provide the second wireless device with sufficient time to prepare a mitigation action, such as taking an alternate route to avoid the threat entity, utilizing a more robust MCS, or virtually sensing the threat entity.In some aspects, the network entity may comprise a base station or MEC system that may be configured to provide detailed RF fingerprints of known threats (e.g., stationary), such as access points at street intersections, and transmit them over Uu to a cloud endpoint, which may then transmit them to the second wireless device. Due in part to the MEC having higher computational resources and / or sensory inputs, the MEC may obtain improved localization of the threat entity than the first wireless device. In addition, the base station or MEC may transmit messages reporting the threat entity to the second wireless device over the PC5 and / or Uu interfaces.

[0135]

[0162] 26 is a flowchart 2600 of a method of wireless communication. The method may be performed by a UE or a component of a UE (e.g., the UE 104, the apparatus 2702, and the cellular baseband processor 2704, which may include the memory 360 and may be the UE 350 in its entirety or a component of the UE 350 such as the TX processor 368, the RX processor 356, and / or the controller / processor 359). One or more of the illustrated operations may be optional, omitted, transposed, or coexistent. The method may enable a second wireless device to initiate mitigation actions based on a virtual sensing of a threat entity detected by the first wireless device.

[0136]

[0163] At 2602, the second wireless device may receive a message indicating a threat entity within a threat zone. For example, 2602 may be implemented by a message component 2740 of the apparatus 2702. The threat entity may disrupt a wireless spectrum or resources utilized in collaborative or autonomous driving decisions. The second wireless device may receive the message from the first wireless device or from a network entity. For example, the first wireless device may be within the threat zone of the threat entity and physically detects the threat entity. The message received from the first wireless device may comprise an SDSM or a CPM. The second wireless device receiving a message from the first wireless device indicating a threat entity allows the second wireless device to virtually sense a threat entity that the second wireless device cannot detect due to the second wireless device being beyond the threat zone of the threat entity. In some aspects, for example in semi-persistent scheduling (SPS), the second wireless device may measure RSRP and / or RSSI of a subchannel carrying data during a sensing window to make a reservation. If the measured RSRP / RSSI exceeds a threshold, the second wireless device may remove the subchannel from the list of candidate subchannels. In addition, the second wireless device using the message indicating a threat entity from the first wireless device may remove the jammed or interfered subchannel based on the RSSI measurements reported in the message indicating a threat entity from the first wireless device. This virtual sensing may improve the reception probability of the message transmitted by the second wireless device, especially if the second wireless device may stick to the SPS reservation for an extended period of time. In some aspects, the second wireless device may receive the message indicating a threat entity from a network entity (e.g., a base station).In such instances, a wireless device (e.g., a first wireless device) physically detects a threat entity while within the threat entity's threat zone. The wireless device transmitted a message reporting the detected threat entity to the network entity to enable the network entity to relay the message to a wireless device that is outside the threat zone and beyond the transmission range of the wireless device that detected the threat entity. The message may comprise a duty cycle of the threat entity's data signal. Information of the duty cycle of the threat entity's data signal may enable the second wireless device to take the threat entity's duty cycle into account when scheduling / configuring its transmissions. In some aspects, the message may include a peak RSSI detection between antenna elements of the first wireless device that detected the threat entity. The first wireless device configured with directional reception may improve the determination of the threat entity's location and may assist in suppressing the threat zone included in the message.

[0137]

[0164] At 2604, the second wireless device may adjust transmission parameters in response to receiving the message. For example, 2602 may be implemented by adjustment component 2742 of apparatus 2702. The second wireless device may adjust transmission parameters to transmit the BSM in response to receiving the message. In some aspects, the adjusted transmission parameters may comprise at least one of increasing transmit power or using a more robust MCS, or a combination thereof. Using a more robust MCS may comprise switching to a lower MCS. In some aspects, adjusting the transmission parameters may mitigate the impact of the threat entity, but the extended range and / or increased over-the-air transmission time may increase packet collision probability with other wireless devices. In such instances, the MCS index and transmit power may be adjusted based on wireless device density and threat signal strength.

[0138]

[0165] At 2606, the second wireless device may initiate a mitigation action in response to receiving the message (e.g., SDSM). For example, 2606 may be implemented by the mitigation component 2744 of the apparatus 2702. In response to receiving the message, the second wireless device may initiate a mitigation action to avoid or mitigate contact with the threat entity. In some aspects, the mitigation action may comprise selecting an alternative path to avoid the threat entity utilizing a more robust MCS or virtual sensing of the threat entity. The threat entity may significantly degrade wireless spectrum or resources utilized in collaborative or autonomous driving decisions. Collaborative or autonomous driving decisions may require high reliability for safety. In some aspects, the second wireless device may determine to change its scheduled travel route or path to one that is least affected by the detected threat entity or any threat entity. In instances where the second wireless device receives a message from a network entity (e.g., a base station) indicating a threat entity, the second wireless device may be able to avoid or mitigate contact with the threat entity. A second wireless device moving away from the first wireless device may not be within range to directly receive a message from the first wireless device via PC5, and thus the second wireless device receives a message relayed from a network entity (e.g., a base station) via a Uu link. The second wireless device moving away from the first wireless device may provide the second wireless device with sufficient time to prepare a mitigation action, such as taking an alternate route to avoid the threat entity, utilizing a more robust MCS, or virtually sensing the threat entity.In some aspects, the network entity may comprise an RSU or MEC system that may be configured to provide detailed RF fingerprints of known threats (e.g., stationary), such as access points at street intersections, and transmit them over Uu to a cloud endpoint, which may then transmit them to the second wireless device. Due in part to the RSU or MEC having higher computational resources and / or sensory inputs, the RSU or MEC may obtain improved localization of the threat entity than the first wireless device. In addition, the RSU or MEC may transmit messages reporting the threat entity to the second wireless device over the PC5 and / or Uu interfaces.

[0139]

[0166] 27 is a diagram 2700 illustrating an example of a hardware implementation for a device 2702. The device 2702 is a UE and includes a cellular baseband processor 2704 (also referred to as a modem) coupled to a cellular RF transceiver 2722 and one or more subscriber identity module (SIM) cards 2720, an application processor 2706 coupled to a secure digital (SD) card 2708 and a screen 2710, a Bluetooth module 2712, a wireless local area network (WLAN) module 2714, a GNSS module 2716, and a power source 2718. The GNSS module 2716 may comprise a variety of satellite positioning systems. For example, the GNSS module may correspond to Global Positioning System (GPS), Global Navigation Satellite System (GLONASS), Galileo, BeiDou Navigation Satellite System (BDS), Wide Area Augmentation System (WAAS), European Geostationary Navigation Overlay Service (EGNOS), GPS Aided Geo-Augmented Navigation (GAGAN), Multi-purpose Transport Satellite (MTSAT) Satellite Augmentation System (MSAS), Quasi-Zenith Satellite System (QZSS), or Navigation with Indian Constellations (NavIC). The cellular baseband processor 2704 communicates with the UE 104 and / or the BS 102 / 180 through the cellular RF transceiver 2722. The cellular baseband processor 2704 may include computer readable media / memory. The computer readable media / memory may be non-transitory. The cellular baseband processor 2704 is responsible for general processing, including the execution of software stored in the computer readable media / memory. The software, when executed by the cellular baseband processor 2704, causes the cellular baseband processor 2704 to perform the various functions described above. The computer-readable medium / memory may also be used to store data that is manipulated by the cellular baseband processor 2704 when executing the software.The cellular baseband processor 2704 further includes a receiving component 2730, a communications manager 2732, and a transmitting component 2734. The communications manager 2732 includes one or more of the illustrated components. The components in the communications manager 2732 may be stored in a computer-readable medium / memory and / or configured as hardware in the cellular baseband processor 2704. The cellular baseband processor 2704 may be a component of the UE 350 and may include the memory 360 and / or at least one of the TX processor 368, the RX processor 356, and the controller / processor 359. In one configuration, the apparatus 2702 is a modem chip and may include just the baseband processor 2704, and in another configuration, the apparatus 2702 is an entire UE (e.g., see 350 in FIG. 3) and may include the additional modules discussed previously of the apparatus 2702.

[0140]

[0167] The communications manager 2732 includes a message component 2740 configured to receive a message indicating a threat entity within a threat zone, e.g., as described with respect to 2502 of Figure 25 or 2602 of Figure 26. The communications manager 2732 further includes an adjustment component 2742 configured to adjust transmission parameters in response to receiving the message, e.g., as described with respect to 2604 of Figure 26. The communications manager 2732 further includes a mitigation component 2744 configured to initiate a mitigation action in response to receiving the message, e.g., as described with respect to 2504 of Figure 25 or 2606 of Figure 26.

[0141]

[0168] The apparatus may include additional components that implement each of the blocks of the algorithms in the above-mentioned flowcharts of Figure 25 or Figure 26. Thus, each block in the above-mentioned flowcharts of Figure 25 or Figure 26 may be implemented by one component, and the apparatus may include one or more of those components. The components may be one or more hardware components specifically configured to perform the described process / algorithm, implemented by a processor configured to perform the described process / algorithm, stored in a computer-readable medium for implementation by a processor, or some combination thereof.

[0142]

[0169] In one configuration, the apparatus 2702, and in particular the cellular baseband processor 2704, includes means for receiving a message indicating a threat entity within a threat zone. The threat entity disrupts wireless spectrum or resources utilized in collaborative or autonomous driving decisions. The apparatus includes means for initiating mitigation actions to avoid or mitigate contact with the threat entity in response to receiving the message. The apparatus further includes means for adjusting transmission parameters in response to receiving the message. The aforementioned means may be one or more of the aforementioned components of the apparatus 2702 configured to perform the functions recited by the aforementioned means. As described above, the apparatus 2702 may include the TX processor 368, the RX processor 356, and the controller / processor 359. Thus, in one configuration, the aforementioned means may be the TX processor 368, the RX processor 356, and the controller / processor 359 configured to perform the functions recited by the aforementioned means.

[0143]

[0170] FIG. 28 illustrates an example communication flow 2800 between a first wireless device 2802 and a second wireless device 2804. The communication may be based on V2X, V2V, or D2D based communication from the transmitting device directly to the receiving device. The communication transmitted from the devices 2802, 2804 may be broadcast and received by multiple receiving devices within range of the particular transmitting device, as described with respect to FIG. 4. The first wireless device 2802 may correspond to a first UE, and the second wireless device 2804 may correspond to a second UE. For example, in the context of FIG. 1, the first wireless device 2802 may correspond to at least a UE 104, and the second wireless device 2804 may correspond to at least a UE 104′. In another example, in the context of FIG. 3, the first wireless device 2802 may correspond to device 350, and the second wireless device 2804 may correspond to device 310.

[0144]

[0171] As shown at 2806, the first wireless device 2802 may detect one or more object data signals having data interfering with wireless resources utilized in the autonomous driving decision. In some aspects, the one or more object data signals may correspond to an abnormally operating wireless device. The data of the abnormally operating wireless device may comprise erroneous or improbable data related to at least one characteristic of the abnormally operating wireless device. In some aspects, the abnormally operating wireless device may comprise an abnormally operating vehicle. The erroneous or improbable data related to at least one characteristic of the abnormally operating wireless device may include at least one of a location, a speed, or a heading, or a combination thereof. For example, the one or more object data signals may include data that is not realistic or expected for the wireless device. The one or more object data signals may indicate a speed value that is well beyond the actual speed, location information that is meaningless or not within the vicinity of the first wireless device, or may include a high amount of data that overloads the first wireless device. The one or more object data signals may include other types of inconsistent or inaccurate data, such that the disclosure is not limited to the examples provided herein. The one or more object data signals may correspond to an obstacle that interferes with or disrupts a wireless spectrum or resource utilized in collaborative or autonomous driving decisions. In some aspects, the one or more object data signals of an obstacle or threat entity that interferes with or disrupts a wireless spectrum or resource may be transmitted with an RSSI greater than an RSSI threshold. In some aspects, the one or more object data signals may correspond to a DoS attacker, a jammer, an abnormally operating vehicle, an OOB interferer, a WAN jammer, or a GNSS jammer. The one or more object data signals that interfere with a wireless resource utilized in autonomous driving decisions may present a threat to a safety use case.For example, collaborative or autonomous driving decisions may require high reliability for safety. Obstacles or threat entities may significantly degrade wireless spectrum or resources utilized in collaborative or autonomous driving decisions. Accurate knowledge of road conditions and / or road users may assist an automated vehicle (e.g., the first or second wireless device) in arriving at safe and efficient driving decisions, which may include decisions made individually or as part of vehicle-to-vehicle negotiated collaborative maneuvers.

[0145]

[0172] As shown at 2808, the first wireless device 2802 may transmit a message indicating one or more object data signals having data interfering with wireless resources utilized in the autonomous driving decision-making. The first wireless device 2802 may transmit a message to at least the second wireless device 2804 indicating one or more object data signals having data interfering with wireless resources utilized in the autonomous driving decision-making. The second wireless device 2804 may receive the message from the first wireless device 2802. The message may be encoded as SDSM or CPM, with the obstacle or threat entity being a spectrum or security issue as opposed to a physical obstacle. The message may be broadcast to at least one second wireless device outside the threat zone, as well as any other wireless devices within the vicinity of the first wireless device. The message may be broadcast to at least one second wireless device via sidelink communication (e.g., PC5). In some aspects, the message may be transmitted to a network entity (e.g., RSU) via a PC5 interface. In such a case, a network entity (e.g., an RSU) may relay the message to the other wireless devices, such that the other wireless devices that are outside the transmission range of the first wireless device and cannot receive the message via sidelink communication may proactively take preventative measures. In some aspects, the message further indicates at least one IE corresponding to the detected one or more object data signals. The at least one IE may comprise detected characteristics of the detected misbehaving wireless device, DoS attacker, detected jammer, or at least one of the detected OOB interferer, WAN jammer, GNSS jammer, or combinations thereof. The at least one IE may comprise classes of detected objects.Each class of detected object may comprise a detected characteristic of a respective one of a detected misbehaving wireless device, a DoS attacker, a detected jammer, and a detected interferer. In a case where the detected object type is a misbehaving vehicle, the detected object IE (e.g., MisbehavingVehicleData) may include an L2 address or a certificate digest. In a case where the detected object type is an OOB interferer, the detected obstacle IE (e.g., InterfererData) may include a measured RSSI, an RSSI reporting threshold, an RSSI averaging window size, or a threat duty cycle for each subchannel or band. In a case where the detected object type is a C-V2X jammer, the detected obstacle IE (e.g., JammerData) may include information related to an average of RSSI over the bandwidth of the first wireless device and an RSSI averaging window size. In a case where the detected object type is a GNSS jammer, the detected obstacle IE (e.g., JammerData) may include information related to a GNSS band, L1, L2, or L5. In the case where the detected object type is a WAN jammer, the detected obstruction IE (eg, JammerData) may include information related to the EARFCN, a cell identifier, or a PLMN.

[0146]

[0173] In some aspects, the message may identify an object that may be transmitting one or more object data signals having data interfering with wireless resources utilized in the autonomous driving decision. For example, an object or obstacle interfering with wireless resources utilized in the autonomous driving decision may be identified based on existing detected objects. In some aspects, the object may comprise one of a VRU, a detected vehicle, or a wireless obstacle. For example, a VRU may comprise attributes corresponding to a jammer, an interferer, or an abnormally operating vehicle. In some aspects, a detected vehicle may comprise attributes corresponding to a jammer, an interferer, or an abnormally operating vehicle. In some aspects, an obstacle may comprise attributes corresponding to a jammer, an interferer, or an abnormally operating vehicle. In some aspects, the second wireless device comprises at least one of a wireless vehicle, an RSU, or a VRU.

[0147]

[0174] As shown at 2810, the second wireless device 2804 may initiate a mitigation action in response to receiving the message (e.g., SDSM). The second wireless device 2804 may initiate a mitigation action in response to receiving the message to avoid or mitigate contact with one or more object data signals that interfere with wireless resources utilized in the autonomous driving decision. In some aspects, the message may trigger a mitigation action in at least the second wireless device to avoid or mitigate contact with one or more object data signals that interfere with the collaborative or autonomous driving decision. The obstacle may interfere with the wireless spectrum or resources utilized in the collaborative or autonomous driving decision. In some aspects, the mitigation action may comprise selecting an alternative path to avoid the threat entity utilizing a more robust MCS or virtual sensing of the threat entity. The obstacle may significantly degrade the wireless spectrum or resources utilized in the collaborative or autonomous driving decision. The collaborative or autonomous driving decision may require high reliability for safety. In some aspects, the second wireless device may decide to change its scheduled travel route or path to one that is least affected by the detected obstacle or obstacles.

[0148]

[0175] 29 is a flowchart 2900 of a method of wireless communication. The method may be performed by a UE or a component of a UE (e.g., the UE 104, the apparatus 3002, and the cellular baseband processor 3004, which may include the memory 360 and may be the UE 350 in its entirety or a component of the UE 350, such as the TX processor 368, the RX processor 356, and / or the controller / processor 359). One or more of the illustrated operations may be optional, omitted, transposed, or coexistent. The method may enable the first wireless device to share information related to a detected threat entity with other wireless devices.

[0149]

[0176] At 2902, the first wireless device may detect one or more object data signals having data interfering with wireless resources utilized in the autonomous driving decision. For example, 2902 may be implemented by the detection component 3040 of the apparatus 3002. In some aspects, the one or more object data signals may correspond to an abnormally operating wireless device. The data of the abnormally operating wireless device may comprise erroneous or improbable data related to at least one characteristic of the abnormally operating wireless device. In some aspects, the abnormally operating wireless device may comprise an abnormally operating vehicle. The erroneous or improbable data related to at least one characteristic of the abnormally operating wireless device may include at least one of a location, a speed, or a heading, or a combination thereof. For example, the one or more object data signals may include data that is not realistic or expected for the wireless device. The one or more object data signals may indicate a speed value that is well beyond the actual speed, location information that is meaningless or not within the vicinity of the first wireless device, or may include a high amount of data that overloads the first wireless device. The one or more object data signals may include other types of inconsistent or inaccurate data such that the disclosure is not limited to the examples provided herein. The one or more object data signals may correspond to an obstacle that interferes with or disrupts a wireless spectrum or resource utilized in a collaborative or autonomous driving decision. In some aspects, the one or more object data signals of an obstacle or threat entity that interferes with or disrupts a wireless spectrum or resource may be transmitted with an RSSI greater than an RSSI threshold. In some aspects, the one or more object data signals may correspond to a DoS attacker, a jammer, an abnormally operating vehicle, an OOB interferer, a WAN jammer, or a GNSS jammer.One or more object data signals interfering with wireless resources utilized in autonomous driving decisions may present a threat to safety use cases. For example, collaborative or autonomous driving decisions may require high reliability for safety. An obstacle or threat entity may significantly degrade the wireless spectrum or resources utilized in collaborative or autonomous driving decisions. Accurate knowledge of road conditions and / or road users may assist an autonomous vehicle (e.g., the first or second wireless device) in arriving at safe and efficient driving decisions, which may include decisions made individually or as part of vehicle-to-vehicle negotiated collaborative maneuvers.

[0150]

[0177] As shown at 2904, the first wireless device may transmit a message indicating one or more object data signals having data interfering with wireless resources utilized in the autonomous driving decision. For example, 2904 may be implemented by a message component 3042 of the apparatus 3002. The first wireless device may transmit a message indicating one or more object data signals having data interfering with wireless resources utilized in the autonomous driving decision to at least a second wireless device. The message may be encoded as SDSM or CPM, with the obstacle or threat entity being a spectrum or security issue as opposed to a physical obstacle. The message may be broadcast to at least one second wireless device outside the threat zone, as well as any other wireless devices within the vicinity of the first wireless device. The message may be broadcast to at least one second wireless device via sidelink communication (e.g., PC5). In some aspects, the message may be transmitted to a network entity (e.g., RSU) via a PC5 interface. In such a case, a network entity (e.g., an RSU) may relay the message to the other wireless devices, such that the other wireless devices that are outside the transmission range of the first wireless device and cannot receive the message via sidelink communication may proactively take preventative measures. In some aspects, the message further indicates at least one IE corresponding to the detected one or more object data signals. The at least one IE may comprise a detected characteristic of at least one of the detected misbehaving wireless device, the DoS attacker, the detected jammer, the detected OOB interferer, the WAN jammer, the GNSS jammer, or a combination thereof. The at least one IE may comprise a class of the detected object. Each class of the detected object may comprise a detected characteristic of a respective one of the detected misbehaving wireless device, the DoS attacker, the detected jammer, and the detected interferer.In a case where the detected object type is an abnormally behaving vehicle, the detected object IE (e.g., MisbehavingVehicleData) may include an L2 address or a cert digest. In a case where the detected object type is an OOB interferer, the detected obstacle IE (e.g., InterfererData) may include a measured RSSI for each sub-channel or band, an RSSI reporting threshold, an RSSI averaging window size, or a threat duty cycle. In a case where the detected object type is a C-V2X jammer, the detected obstacle IE (e.g., JammerData) may include information related to an average of RSSI over the bandwidth of the first wireless device and an RSSI averaging window size. In a case where the detected object type is a GNSS jammer, the detected obstacle IE (e.g., JammerData) may include information related to a GNSS band, L1, L2, or L5. In a case where the detected object type is a WAN jammer, the detected obstacle IE (e.g., JammerData) may include information related to an EARFCN, a cell identifier, or a PLMN.

[0151]

[0178] In some aspects, the message (e.g., SDSM) may trigger a mitigation action in the second wireless device to avoid or mitigate contact with one or more object data signals that interfere with the collaborative or autonomous driving decision. The transmission of the message to the second wireless device may provide the second wireless device with early detection of an obstacle or threat entity such that the second wireless device may be triggered to initiate an avoidance or mitigation action based on the message. In some aspects, the message may identify an object to which one or more object data signals having data that interfere with wireless resources utilized in the autonomous driving decision may be transmitted. For example, an object or obstacle that interferes with wireless resources utilized in the autonomous driving decision may be identified based on an existing detected object. In some aspects, the object may comprise one of a VRU, a detected vehicle, or a wireless obstacle. For example, the VRU may comprise attributes corresponding to a jammer, an interferer, or an erratic operating vehicle. In some aspects, the detected vehicle may comprise attributes corresponding to a jammer, an interferer, or an erratic operating vehicle. In some aspects, the obstacle may comprise attributes corresponding to a jammer, an interferer, or an erratic operating vehicle. In some aspects, the second wireless device comprises at least one of a wireless vehicle, an RSU, or a VRU.

[0152]

[0179] 30 is a diagram 3000 illustrating an example of a hardware implementation for an apparatus 3002. The apparatus 3002 is a UE and includes a cellular baseband processor 3004 (also called a modem) coupled to a cellular RF transceiver 3022 and one or more subscriber identity module (SIM) cards 3020, an application processor 3006 coupled to a secure digital (SD) card 3008 and a screen 3010, a Bluetooth module 3012, a wireless local area network (WLAN) module 3014, a GNSS module 3016, and a power source 3018. The GNSS module 3016 may comprise a variety of satellite positioning systems. For example, the GNSS module may correspond to Global Positioning System (GPS), Global Navigation Satellite System (GLONASS), Galileo, BeiDou Navigation Satellite System (BDS), Wide Area Augmentation System (WAAS), European Geostationary Navigation Overlay Service (EGNOS), GPS Aided Geo-Augmented Navigation (GAGAN), Multi-purpose Transport Satellite (MTSAT) Satellite Augmentation System (MSAS), Quasi-Zenith Satellite System (QZSS), or Navigation with Indian Constellations (NavIC). The cellular baseband processor 3004 communicates with the UE 104 and / or the BS 102 / 180 through the cellular RF transceiver 3022. The cellular baseband processor 3004 may include computer readable media / memory. The computer readable media / memory may be non-transitory. The cellular baseband processor 3004 is responsible for general processing, including the execution of software stored in the computer readable media / memory. The software, when executed by the cellular baseband processor 3004, causes the cellular baseband processor 3004 to perform the various functions described above. The computer-readable medium / memory may also be used to store data that is manipulated by the cellular baseband processor 3004 when executing the software.The cellular baseband processor 3004 further includes a receiving component 3030, a communications manager 3032, and a transmitting component 3034. The communications manager 3032 includes one or more of the illustrated components. The components in the communications manager 3032 may be stored in a computer readable medium / memory and / or configured as hardware in the cellular baseband processor 3004. The cellular baseband processor 3004 may be a component of the UE 350 and may include the memory 360 and / or at least one of the TX processor 368, the RX processor 356, and the controller / processor 359. In one configuration, the apparatus 3002 may be a modem chip and may only include the baseband processor 3004, and in another configuration, the apparatus 3002 may be an entire UE (e.g., see 350 in FIG. 3) and may include the additional modules previously discussed for the apparatus 3002.

[0153]

[0180] The communications manager 3032 includes a detection component 3040 configured to detect one or more object data signals having data interfering with wireless resources utilized in the automated driving decisions, e.g., as described with respect to 2902 of FIGURE 29. The communications manager 3032 further includes a message component 3042 configured to transmit a message indicating the one or more object data signals having data interfering with wireless resources utilized in the automated driving decisions, e.g., as described with respect to 2904 of FIGURE 29.

[0154]

[0181] The apparatus may include additional components that implement each of the blocks of the algorithm in the above-mentioned flowchart of Figure 29. Thus, each block in the above-mentioned flowchart of Figure 29 may be implemented by one component, and the apparatus may include one or more of those components. The components may be one or more hardware components specifically configured to perform the described process / algorithm, implemented by a processor configured to perform the described process / algorithm, stored in a computer-readable medium for implementation by a processor, or some combination thereof.

[0155]

[0182] In one configuration, the apparatus 3002, and in particular the cellular baseband processor 3004, includes means for detecting one or more object data signals having data interfering with wireless resources utilized in the autonomous driving decision. The apparatus includes means for transmitting, to at least a second wireless device, a message indicating one or more object data signals having data interfering with wireless resources utilized in the autonomous driving decision. The aforementioned means may be one or more of the aforementioned components of the apparatus 3002 configured to perform the functions recited by the aforementioned means. As described above, the apparatus 3002 may include a TX processor 368, an RX processor 356, and a controller / processor 359. Thus, in one configuration, the aforementioned means may be the TX processor 368, the RX processor 356, and the controller / processor 359 configured to perform the functions recited by the aforementioned means.

[0156]

[0183] FIG. 31 is a flowchart 3100 of a method of wireless communication. The method may be performed by a UE or a component of a UE (e.g., the UE 104, the apparatus 3202, and the cellular baseband processor 3204, which may include the memory 360 and may be the UE 350 in its entirety or a component of the UE 350, such as the TX processor 368, the RX processor 356, and / or the controller / processor 359). One or more of the illustrated operations may be optional, omitted, transposed, or coexistent. The method may enable a second wireless device to initiate mitigation actions in response to receiving notification of a threat obstacle detected by the first wireless device while beyond the threat zone of the threat obstacle.

[0157]

[0184] At 3102, the second wireless device may receive a message indicating one or more object data signals having data interfering with wireless resources utilized in the autonomous driving decision. For example, 3102 may be implemented by a message component 3240 of the apparatus 3202. The second wireless device may receive a message from the first wireless device indicating one or more object data signals having data interfering with wireless resources utilized in the autonomous driving decision. In some aspects, the one or more object data signals may correspond to an abnormally operating wireless device. The data of the abnormally operating wireless device may comprise erroneous or unlikely data related to at least one characteristic of the abnormally operating wireless device. In some aspects, the abnormally operating wireless device may comprise an abnormally operating vehicle. The erroneous or unlikely data related to at least one characteristic of the abnormally operating wireless device may include at least one of a location, a speed, or a heading, or a combination thereof. For example, the one or more object data signals may include data that is not realistic or expected for the wireless device. The one or more object data signals may indicate speed values ​​well beyond the actual speed, location information that is meaningless or not within the vicinity of the first wireless device, or may contain a high amount of data that overloads the first wireless device. The one or more object data signals may contain other types of inconsistent or inaccurate data, such that the disclosure is not limited to the examples provided herein. The one or more object data signals may correspond to obstacles that interfere with or disrupt wireless spectrum or resources utilized in collaborative or autonomous driving decisions. In some aspects, one or more object data signals of obstacles or threat entities that interfere with or disrupt wireless spectrum or resources may be transmitted with an RSSI greater than an RSSI threshold.In some aspects, the one or more object data signals may correspond to a DoS attacker, a jammer, an abnormally operating vehicle, an OOB interferer, a WAN jammer, or a GNSS jammer. The one or more object data signals interfering with wireless resources utilized in the autonomous driving decision may present a threat to safety use cases. For example, the collaborative or autonomous driving decision may require high reliability for safety. An obstacle or threat entity may significantly degrade the wireless spectrum or resources utilized in the collaborative or autonomous driving decision. Accurate knowledge of road conditions and / or road users may assist the autonomous vehicle (e.g., the first or second wireless device) to arrive at safe and efficient driving decisions, which may include decisions made individually or as part of vehicle-to-vehicle negotiated collaborative maneuvers.

[0158]

[0185] In some aspects, the message further indicates at least one IE corresponding to the detected one or more object data signals. The at least one IE may comprise a detected characteristic of at least one of a detected misbehaving wireless device, a DoS attacker, a detected jammer, a detected OOB interferer, a WAN jammer, a GNSS jammer, or a combination thereof. The at least one IE may comprise a class of the detected object. Each class of the detected object may comprise a detected characteristic of a respective one of a detected misbehaving wireless device, a DoS attacker, a detected jammer, and a detected interferer. In cases where the detected object type is a misbehaving vehicle, the detected object IE (e.g., MisbehavingVehicleData) may include an L2 address or a cert digest. In cases where the detected object type is an OOB interferer, the detected obstacle IE (e.g., InterfererData) may include a measured RSSI of each subchannel or band, an RSSI reporting threshold, an RSSI averaging window size, or a threat duty cycle. In cases where the detected object type is a C-V2X jammer, the detected obstacle IE (e.g., JammerData) may include information related to an average of RSSI over the entire bandwidth of the first wireless device and an RSSI averaging window size. In cases where the detected object type is a GNSS jammer, the detected obstacle IE (e.g., JammerData) may include information related to the GNSS band, L1, L2, or L5. In cases where the detected object type is a WAN jammer, the detected obstacle IE (e.g., JammerData) may include information related to an EARFCN, a cell identifier, or a PLMN.

[0159]

[0186] In some aspects, the message may identify an object that may be transmitted one or more object data signals having data interfering with wireless resources utilized in the autonomous driving decision. For example, an object or obstacle interfering with wireless resources utilized in the autonomous driving decision may be identified based on existing detected objects. In some aspects, the object may comprise one of a VRU, a detected vehicle, or a wireless obstacle. For example, a VRU may comprise attributes corresponding to a jammer, an interferer, or an abnormally operating vehicle. In some aspects, a detected vehicle may comprise attributes corresponding to a jammer, an interferer, or an abnormally operating vehicle. In some aspects, an obstacle may comprise attributes corresponding to a jammer, an interferer, or an abnormally operating vehicle. In some aspects, the second wireless device comprises at least one of a wireless vehicle, an RSU, or a VRU.

[0160]

[0187] At 3104, the second wireless device may initiate a mitigation action in response to receiving the message (e.g., SDSM). For example, 3104 may be implemented by the mitigation component 3242 of the apparatus 3202. In response to receiving the message, the second wireless device may initiate a mitigation action to avoid or mitigate contact with one or more object data signals that interfere with wireless resources utilized in the autonomous driving decision. In some aspects, the message may trigger a mitigation action in at least the second wireless device to avoid or mitigate contact with one or more object data signals that interfere with the collaborative or autonomous driving decision. The obstacle may interfere with the wireless spectrum or resources utilized in the collaborative or autonomous driving decision. In some aspects, the mitigation action may comprise selecting an alternative path to avoid the threat entity utilizing a more robust MCS or virtual sensing of the threat entity. The obstacle may significantly degrade the wireless spectrum or resources utilized in the collaborative or autonomous driving decision. The collaborative or autonomous driving decision may require high reliability for safety. In some aspects, the second wireless device may decide to change its scheduled travel route or path to one that is least affected by the detected obstacle or obstacles.

[0161]

[0188] 32 is a diagram 3200 illustrating an example of a hardware implementation for a device 3202. The device 3202 is a UE and includes a cellular baseband processor 3204 (also referred to as a modem) coupled to a cellular RF transceiver 3222 and one or more subscriber identity module (SIM) cards 3220, an application processor 3206 coupled to a secure digital (SD) card 3208 and a screen 3210, a Bluetooth module 3212, a wireless local area network (WLAN) module 3214, a GNSS module 3216, and a power source 3218. The GNSS module 3216 may comprise a variety of satellite positioning systems. For example, the GNSS module may correspond to Global Positioning System (GPS), Global Navigation Satellite System (GLONASS), Galileo, BeiDou Navigation Satellite System (BDS), Wide Area Augmentation System (WAAS), European Geostationary Navigation Overlay Service (EGNOS), GPS Aided Geo-Augmented Navigation (GAGAN), Multi-purpose Transport Satellite (MTSAT) Satellite Augmentation System (MSAS), Quasi-Zenith Satellite System (QZSS), or Navigation with Indian Constellations (NavIC). The cellular baseband processor 3204 communicates with the UE 104 and / or the BS 102 / 180 through the cellular RF transceiver 3222. The cellular baseband processor 3204 may include computer readable media / memory. The computer readable media / memory may be non-transitory. The cellular baseband processor 3204 is responsible for general processing, including the execution of software stored in the computer readable media / memory. The software, when executed by the cellular baseband processor 3204, causes the cellular baseband processor 3204 to perform the various functions described above. The computer-readable medium / memory may also be used to store data that is manipulated by the cellular baseband processor 3204 when executing the software.The cellular baseband processor 3204 further includes a receiving component 3230, a communications manager 3232, and a transmitting component 3234. The communications manager 3232 includes one or more of the illustrated components. The components in the communications manager 3232 may be stored in a computer readable medium / memory and / or configured as hardware in the cellular baseband processor 3204. The cellular baseband processor 3204 may be a component of the UE 350 and may include the memory 360 and / or at least one of the TX processor 368, the RX processor 356, and the controller / processor 359. In one configuration, the apparatus 3202 is a modem chip and may include just the baseband processor 3204, and in another configuration, the apparatus 3202 is an entire UE (e.g., see 350 in FIG. 3) and may include the additional modules discussed previously of the apparatus 3202.

[0162]

[0189] The communications manager 3232 includes a message component 3240 configured to receive a message indicating one or more object data signals having data interfering with wireless resources utilized in the autonomous driving decision, e.g., as described with respect to 3102 of FIGURE 31. The communications manager 3232 further includes a mitigation component 3242 configured to initiate a mitigation action in response to receiving the message, e.g., as described with respect to 3104 of FIGURE 31.

[0163]

[0190] The apparatus may include additional components that implement each of the blocks of the algorithm in the above-mentioned flowchart of Figure 31. Thus, each block in the above-mentioned flowchart of Figure 31 may be implemented by one component, and the apparatus may include one or more of those components. The components may be one or more hardware components specifically configured to perform the described process / algorithm, implemented by a processor configured to perform the described process / algorithm, stored in a computer-readable medium for implementation by a processor, or some combination thereof.

[0164]

[0191] In one configuration, the apparatus 3202, and in particular the cellular baseband processor 3204, includes means for receiving a message from a first wireless device indicating one or more object data signals having data interfering with wireless resources utilized in the autonomous driving decision. The apparatus includes means for initiating a mitigation action to avoid or mitigate contact with one or more object data signals interfering with wireless resources utilized in the autonomous driving decision in response to receiving the message (e.g., SDSM). The aforementioned means may be one or more of the aforementioned components of the apparatus 3202 configured to perform the functions recited by the aforementioned means. As described above, the apparatus 3202 may include a TX processor 368, an RX processor 356, and a controller / processor 359. Thus, in one configuration, the aforementioned means may be the TX processor 368, the RX processor 356, and the controller / processor 359 configured to perform the functions recited by the aforementioned means.

[0165]

[0192] It should be understood that the particular order or hierarchy of the blocks in the disclosed processes / flowcharts is an example of an example approach. Based on design preferences, it should be understood that the particular order or hierarchy of the blocks in the processes / flowcharts may be rearranged. Additionally, some blocks may be combined or omitted. The accompanying method claims present elements of the various blocks in an example order, and are not limited to the particular order or hierarchy presented.

[0166]

[0193] The following examples are illustrative only and may be combined with, but not limited to, other embodiments or aspects of the teachings described herein.

[0167]

[0194] Aspect 1 is a method of wireless communication in a first wireless device, the method comprising detecting a threat entity transmitting data that interferes with a transmission of a BSM, and transmitting a message to a second wireless device indicating information related to a type of the threat entity.

[0168]

[0195] In aspect 2, the method of aspect 1 further includes the information in the message comprising a subset of subchannels having an RSSI greater than an RSSI threshold based on an average of the RSSI of the subset of subchannels, or of each subchannel in the subset of subchannels, being greater than the RSSI threshold over at least an RSSI window time length.

[0169]

[0196] In aspect 3, the method of aspect 1 or 2 further includes the information in the message further indicating at least one of an average RSSI over the subset of sub-channels, an average RSSI of each sub-channel in the subset of sub-channels, an RSSI threshold, an RSSI window length, locations of threat entities affecting the RSSI in at least one of the subset of sub-channels, or a location confidence radius associated with a threat entity affecting the RSSI in at least one of the subset of sub-channels, or a combination thereof.

[0170]

[0197] In an embodiment 4, the method of any of the embodiments 1 to 3 further includes that the transmitted message is an SDSM, an I2V message, or a CPM.

[0171]

[0198] In example 5, the method of any of examples 1-4 further includes the threat entity comprising a jammer, an OOB interferer, a WAN jammer, or a GNSS jammer.

[0172]

[0199] Aspect 6 is a device that includes one or more transceivers, one or more processors, and one or more memories in electronic communication with the one or more transceivers and the one or more processors, the memories storing instructions executable by the one or more processors to cause the device to implement any of the methods of aspects 1-5.

[0173]

[0200] A seventh aspect is a system or device including means for implementing the method or realizing the device of any of the first to fifth aspects.

[0174]

[0201] Aspect 8 is a non-transitory computer-readable storage medium storing instructions executable by one or more processors to cause the one or more processors to implement the method of any of aspects 1-5.

[0175]

[0202] Aspect 9 is a method of wireless communication in a second wireless device, the method comprising receiving a message from a first wireless device indicating a threat entity within a threat zone, where the threat entity transmits data that interferes with transmission of the BSM, determining candidate resources among a set of candidate resources on which to transmit a BSM based at least in part on the message indicating information related to the threat entity from the first wireless device, and transmitting the BSM on the determined candidate resources to at least a third wireless device.

[0176]

[0203] In aspect 10, the method of aspect 9 further includes the information in the message comprising a subset of subchannels having an RSSI greater than an RSSI threshold based on an average of the RSSI of the subset of subchannels, or of each subchannel in the subset of subchannels, being greater than the RSSI threshold over at least the RSSI window time length.

[0177]

[0204] In aspect 11, the method of aspect 9 or 10 further includes the information in the message further indicating at least one of an average RSSI over the subset of sub-channels, an average RSSI of each sub-channel in the subset of sub-channels, an RSSI threshold, an RSSI window length, a location of a threat entity affecting the RSSI in at least one of the subset of sub-channels, or a location confidence radius associated with a threat entity affecting the RSSI in at least one of the subset of sub-channels, or a combination thereof.

[0178]

[0205] In an embodiment 12, the method of any of embodiments 9 to 11 further includes that the received message is an SDSM, an I2V message, or a CPM.

[0179]

[0206] In example 13, the method of any of examples 9-12 further includes the threat entity comprising a jammer, an OOB interferer, a WAN jammer, or a GNSS jammer.

[0180]

[0207] In an embodiment 14, the method of any of embodiments 9-13 further includes the candidate resources comprising CSRs, and the set of candidate resources comprising the set of CSRs.

[0181]

[0208] In aspect 15, the method of any of aspects 9 to 14 further includes: determining candidate resources from the set of candidate resources further includes: eliminating one or more candidate resources in the set of candidate resources based on a predicted RSRP of each candidate resource in the set of candidate resources exceeding an RSRP threshold to determine a first subset of candidate resources; ranking the first subset of candidate resources based on a weighted RSSI ranking to obtain a second subset of candidate resources having the lowest weighted RSSI; and selecting candidate resources from the second subset of candidate resources, where the second subset of candidate resources is a portion of the first subset of candidate resources.

[0182]

[0209] In example 16, the method of any of examples 9-15 further includes, the weighted RSSI comprising the physically sensed candidate resource and one or more virtually sensed candidate resources.

[0183]

[0210] In example 17, the method of any of examples 9-16 further includes the physically sensed candidate resources comprising candidate resources measured by the second wireless device within a sensing window.

[0184]

[0211] In aspect 18, the method of any of aspects 9-17 further includes, the one or more virtually sensed candidate resources comprising candidate resources measured by the first wireless device and indicated in a message received by the second wireless device from the first wireless device.

[0185]

[0212] In example 19, the method of any of examples 9-18 further includes basing the one or more virtually sensed candidate resources on at least one of, or a combination of, a location of a threat entity affecting an RSSI of the candidate resource, a location reliability radius associated with the threat entity, a timestamp associated with a message received from the first wireless device, a speed of the second wireless device, an acceleration of the second wireless device, a heading of the second wireless device relative to the location of the threat entity, information related to road geometry, or a transmission requirement associated with the BSM.

[0186]

[0213] In aspect 20, the method of any of aspects 9 to 19 further includes: determining candidate resources from the set of candidate resources further includes: filtering out one or more virtually sensed candidate resources in the set of candidate resources having RSSI that exceeds the pre-filter threshold to obtain a filtered subset of candidate resources that do not exceed the pre-filter threshold; filtering out candidate resources in the filtered subset of candidate resources that do not exceed the pre-filter threshold that exceed the RSRP threshold to obtain a second subset of candidate resources that do not exceed the RSRP threshold; and selecting a candidate resource from the second subset of candidate resources.

[0187]

[0214] In example 21, the method of any of examples 9-20 further includes the one or more virtually sensed candidate resources being measured by the first wireless device and indicated in a message received by the second wireless device from the first wireless device.

[0188]

[0215] In example 22, the method of any of examples 9-21 further includes, the second subset of candidate resources comprising a preconfigured proportion of the total candidate resources in the selection pool that does not exceed a prefilter threshold.

[0189]

[0216] In aspect 23, the method of any of aspects 9 to 22 further includes, where the pre-filter threshold is adjusted if the second subset of candidate resources comprises an amount of candidate resources that is less than a pre-configured proportion of the total candidate resources in the selection pool.

[0190]

[0217] In aspect 24, the method of any of aspects 9-23 further includes that the pre-filter threshold is further adjusted until the second subset of candidate resources comprises a pre-configured proportion of the total candidate resources in the selection pool.

[0191]

[0218] In aspect 25, the method of any of aspects 9 to 24 further includes basing the virtually sensed candidate resource on at least one of, or a combination of, a location of a threat entity affecting an RSSI of the candidate resource, a location reliability radius associated with the threat entity, a timestamp associated with a message received from the first wireless device, a speed of the second wireless device, an acceleration of the second wireless device, a heading of the second wireless device relative to the location of the threat entity, information related to road geometry, or a transmission requirement associated with the BSM.

[0192]

[0219] In aspect 26, the method of any of aspects 9 to 25 further includes, wherein the determination of a candidate resource from the set of candidate resources is further based on whether additional messages are received from other wireless devices indicating a threat entity within the threat zone.

[0193]

[0220] Example 27 is a device that includes one or more transceivers, one or more processors, and one or more memories in electronic communication with the one or more processors and storing instructions executable by the one or more processors to cause the device to implement any of the methods of Examples 9-26.

[0194]

[0221] Embodiment 28 is a system or device including means for implementing the method or realizing the device of any of embodiments 9 to 26.

[0195]

[0222] Aspect 29 is a non-transitory computer-readable storage medium storing instructions executable by one or more processors to cause the one or more processors to implement the method of any of aspects 9-26.

[0196]

[0223] Aspect 30 is a method of wireless communication in a first wireless device, the method comprising detecting a threat entity based on a data signal received from a threat entity within a threat zone, and transmitting a message to at least one second wireless device indicating the threat entity within the threat zone, where the threat entity disrupts wireless spectrum or resources utilized in collaborative or autonomous driving decisions.

[0197]

[0224] In aspect 31, the method of aspect 30 further includes the data signal received from the threat entity comprising data inconsistent with expected data of the wireless device.

[0198]

[0225] In example 32, the method of example 30 or 31 further includes the data signal comprising data of the abnormally operating wireless device, wherein the data of the abnormally operating wireless device comprises unlikely data related to at least one characteristic of the abnormally operating wireless device.

[0199]

[0226] In example 33, the method of any of examples 30-32 further includes determining a type of threat entity based on the data signal received from the threat entity, and wherein the type of threat entity includes a DoS attacker, a jammer, an abnormally operating vehicle, an OOB interferer, or a GNSS jammer.

[0200]

[0227] In example 34, the method of any of examples 30-33 further includes the message comprising a credibility value associated with the type of threat entity.

[0201]

[0228] In example 35, the method of any of examples 30-34 further includes the message comprising an average RSSI measured across a bandwidth of at least the first wireless device.

[0202]

[0229] In embodiment 36, the method of any of embodiments 30-35 further includes the message comprising an average RSSI measured for each subchannel that exceeds an RSSI threshold, where the average RSSI for each subchannel is measured over a time window.

[0203]

[0230] In example 37, the method of any of examples 30-36 further includes the message comprising an L2 address of the threat entity.

[0204]

[0231] In aspect 38, the method of any of aspects 30-37 further includes determining an estimated location of the threat entity based on the data signal received from the threat entity in combination with data received from the one or more sensors of the first wireless device.

[0205]

[0232] In aspect 39, the method of any of aspects 30-38 further includes receiving a report from the third wireless device indicating the threat entity, wherein an estimated location of the threat entity is determined in response to receiving the report.

[0206]

[0233] In example 40, the method of any of examples 30-39 further includes the message comprising the estimated location of the threat entity and a credibility value associated with the estimated location of the threat entity.

[0207]

[0234] In example 41, the method of any of examples 30-40 further includes the message further indicating at least one IE corresponding to the threat entity, where the at least one IE comprises a detected characteristic of the threat entity.

[0208]

[0235] In example 42, the method of any of examples 30-41 further includes, wherein the detected characteristic of the threat entity comprises at least one of a location, a speed, or an orientation, or a combination thereof.

[0209]

[0236] In example 43, the method of any of examples 30-42 further includes, the detected characteristic of the threat entity comprising a radius around a location of the threat entity.

[0210]

[0237] In example 44, the method of any of examples 30-43 further includes, wherein the detected characteristic of the threat entity comprises information related to a measured RSSI of the threat entity.

[0211]

[0238] In example 45, the method of any of examples 30-44 further includes, wherein the detected characteristics of the threat entity comprise information related to one or more layers, certificate digests, cell identifiers, or PLMNs associated with the threat entity.

[0212]

[0239] In example 46, the method of any of examples 30-45 further includes the message identifying the threat entity as the object transmitting the threat entity's data signal.

[0213]

[0240] In example 47, the method of any of examples 30-46 further includes, where the object may comprise one of a VRU, a detected vehicle, or a wireless obstacle.

[0214]

[0241] In aspect 48, the method of any of aspects 30-47 further includes, the message being sent based on at least one of, or a combination of, a number of reports of the threat entity received from the at least one third wireless device, a severity of the threat entity, a distance separating the threat entity and the first wireless device, or a time for the at least one second wireless device to approach the threat zone.

[0215]

[0242] In example 49, the method of any of examples 30-48 further includes the message triggering a mitigation action in at least one second wireless device to avoid or mitigate contact with the threat entity.

[0216]

[0243] In embodiment 50, the method of any of embodiments 30-49 further includes the message comprising a duty cycle of the data signal received from the threat entity.

[0217]

[0244] Embodiment 51 is a device that includes one or more transceivers, one or more processors, and one or more memories in electronic communication with the one or more processors and storing instructions executable by the one or more processors to cause the device to implement any of the methods of embodiments 30-50.

[0218]

[0245] Embodiment 52 is a system or device including means for implementing the method or realizing the device of any of embodiments 30 to 50.

[0219]

[0246] Aspect 53 is a non-transitory computer-readable storage medium storing instructions executable by one or more processors to cause the one or more processors to implement the method of any of aspects 30-50.

[0220]

[0247] Example 54 is a method of wireless communication in a second wireless device, the method comprising receiving a message indicating a threat entity within a threat zone, and in response to receiving the message, where the threat entity disrupts wireless spectrum or resources utilized in collaborative or autonomous driving decisions, initiating mitigation actions to avoid or mitigate contact with the threat entity.

[0221]

[0248] In embodiment 55, the method of embodiment 54 further includes adjusting transmission parameters in response to receiving the message.

[0222]

[0249] In aspect 56, the method of aspects 54 or 55 further includes, wherein the adjusted transmission parameters comprise at least one of increasing a transmission power or using a more robust MCS, or a combination thereof.

[0223]

[0250] In example 57, the method of any of examples 54-56 further includes, the mitigation action comprising selecting an alternate path to avoid the threat entity.

[0224]

[0251] In example 58, the method of any of examples 54-57 further includes the message being received from the first wireless device or from a network entity.

[0225]

[0252] Example 59 is a device that includes one or more transceivers, one or more processors, and one or more memories in electronic communication with the one or more processors and storing instructions executable by the one or more processors to cause the device to implement any of the methods of examples 54-58.

[0226]

[0253] Embodiment 60 is a system or device including means for implementing the method or realizing the device of any of embodiments 54-58.

[0227]

[0254] Embodiment 61 is a non-transitory computer-readable storage medium storing instructions executable by one or more processors to cause the one or more processors to implement the method of any of embodiments 54-58.

[0228]

[0255] Example 62 is a method of wireless communication in a first wireless device, the method comprising detecting one or more object data signals having data interfering with wireless resources utilized in autonomous driving decisions, and transmitting a message to at least a second wireless device indicating the one or more object data signals having data interfering with wireless resources utilized in autonomous driving decisions.

[0229]

[0256] In aspect 63, the method of aspect 62 further includes the one or more object data signals corresponding to an abnormally operating wireless device, wherein the data of the abnormally operating wireless device comprises unlikely data relating to at least one characteristic of the abnormally operating wireless device.

[0230]

[0257] In aspect 64, the method of aspect 62 or 63 further includes that the unlikely data relating to at least one characteristic of the abnormally operating wireless device includes at least one of location, speed, or orientation, or a combination thereof.

[0231]

[0258] In embodiment 65, the method of any of embodiments 62-64 further includes the wireless device that is malfunctioning comprising a vehicle that is malfunctioning.

[0232]

[0259] In example 66, the method of any of examples 62-65 further includes, wherein the one or more object data signals correspond to an obstacle interfering with or disrupting wireless spectrum or resources utilized in collaborative or autonomous driving decisions.

[0233]

[0260] In aspect 67, the method of any of aspects 62-66 further includes transmitting one or more object data signals of an obstacle interfering with or obstructing the wireless spectrum or resources with an RSSI greater than an RSSI threshold.

[0234]

[0261] In example 68, the method of any of examples 62-67 further includes the one or more object data signals comprising a DoS attacker, a jammer, or an OOB interferer.

[0235]

[0262] In example 69, the method of any of examples 62-68 further includes the message further indicating at least one IE corresponding to the detected one or more object data signals, wherein the at least one IE comprises detected characteristics of at least one of a detected abnormally behaving wireless device, a DoS attacker, a detected jammer, or a detected OOB interferer, or a combination thereof.

[0236]

[0263] In example 70, the method of any of examples 62-69 further includes at least one IE comprising a class of detected objects, wherein each class of detected objects comprises a detected characteristic of a respective one of a detected abnormally behaving wireless device, a DoS attacker, a detected jammer, and a detected interferer.

[0237]

[0264] In aspect 71, the method of any of aspects 62-70 further includes the message triggering a mitigation action in at least a second wireless device to avoid or mitigate contact with one or more object data signals that interfere with collaborative or autonomous driving decisions.

[0238]

[0265] In aspect 72, any of the methods of aspects 62-71 further includes identifying an object in which the message is transmitting one or more object data signals having data that interferes with wireless resources utilized in the autonomous driving decision.

[0239]

[0266] In example 73, the method of any of examples 62-72 further includes, the object comprising one of a VRU, a detected vehicle, or a wireless obstacle.

[0240]

[0267] In example 74, the method of any of examples 62-73 further includes the second wireless device comprising at least one of a wireless vehicle, an RSU, or a VRU.

[0241]

[0268] Example 75 is a device that includes one or more transceivers, one or more processors, and one or more memories in electronic communication with the one or more processors and storing instructions executable by the one or more processors to cause the device to implement any of the methods of examples 62-74.

[0242]

[0269] Embodiment 76 is a system or device including means for implementing the method or realizing the device of any of embodiments 62 to 74.

[0243]

[0270] Embodiment 77 is a non-transitory computer-readable storage medium storing instructions executable by one or more processors to cause the one or more processors to implement the method of any of embodiments 62-74.

[0244]

[0271] Example 78 is a method of wireless communication in a second wireless device, the method comprising receiving a message indicating one or more object data signals having data interfering with wireless resources utilized in the automated driving decision-making, and in response to receiving the message, initiating mitigation actions to avoid or mitigate contact with the one or more object data signals interfering with the wireless resources utilized in the automated driving decision-making.

[0245]

[0272] In aspect 79, the method of aspect 78 further includes the one or more object data signals corresponding to an abnormally operating wireless device, wherein the data of the abnormally operating wireless device comprises unlikely data relating to at least one characteristic of the abnormally operating wireless device.

[0246]

[0273] In aspect 80, the method of aspect 78 or 79 further includes, wherein the unlikely data relating to at least one characteristic of the abnormally operating wireless device includes at least one of location, speed, or heading, or a combination thereof.

[0247]

[0274] In embodiment 81, the method of any of embodiments 78-80 further includes the wireless device that is malfunctioning comprising a vehicle that is malfunctioning.

[0248]

[0275] In example 82, the method of any of examples 78-81 further includes, wherein the one or more object data signals correspond to an obstacle interfering with or disrupting wireless spectrum or resources utilized in collaborative or autonomous driving decisions.

[0249]

[0276] In aspect 83, the method of any of aspects 78-82 further includes transmitting one or more object data signals of an obstacle interfering with or obstructing the wireless spectrum or resources with an RSSI greater than an RSSI threshold.

[0250]

[0277] In example 84, the method of any of examples 78-83 further includes the one or more object data signals comprising a DoS attacker, a jammer, or an OOB interferer.

[0251]

[0278] In example 85, the method of any of examples 78-84 further includes the message further indicating at least one IE corresponding to the detected one or more object data signals, wherein the at least one IE comprises detected characteristics of at least one of a detected abnormally behaving wireless device, a DoS attacker, a detected jammer, or a detected OOB interferer, or a combination thereof.

[0252]

[0279] In example 86, the method of any of examples 78-85 further includes at least one IE comprising a class of detected objects, wherein each class of detected objects comprises a detected characteristic of a respective one of a detected abnormally behaving wireless device, a DoS attacker, a detected jammer, and a detected interferer.

[0253]

[0280] In aspect 87, the method of any of aspects 78-86 further includes the message triggering a mitigation action in at least a second wireless device to avoid or mitigate contact with one or more object data signals that interfere with the collaborative or autonomous driving decision.

[0254]

[0281] In aspect 88, the method of any of aspects 78-87 further includes identifying an object in which the message is transmitting one or more object data signals having data that interferes with wireless resources utilized in the autonomous driving decision.

[0255]

[0282] In example 89, the method of any of examples 78-88 further includes, the object comprising one of a VRU, a detected vehicle, or a wireless obstacle.

[0256]

[0283] In aspect 90, the method of any of aspects 78-89 further includes the second wireless device comprising at least one of a wireless vehicle, an RSU, or a VRU.

[0257]

[0284] In aspect 91, the method of any of aspects 78-90 further includes the message being received from the first wireless device or from the RSU.

[0258]

[0285] Example 92 is a device that includes one or more transceivers, one or more processors, and one or more memories in electronic communication with the one or more processors and storing instructions executable by the one or more processors to cause the device to implement any of the methods of examples 78-91.

[0259]

[0286] Embodiment 93 is a system or device including means for implementing the method or realizing the device of any of embodiments 78 to 91.

[0260]

[0287] Embodiment 94 is a non-transitory computer-readable storage medium storing instructions executable by one or more processors to cause the one or more processors to implement the method of any of embodiments 78-91.

[0261]

[0288] The foregoing description is provided to enable those skilled in the art to practice the various aspects described herein. Various modifications to these aspects will be readily apparent to those skilled in the art, and the general principles defined herein may be applied to other aspects. Thus, the claims are not limited to the aspects set forth herein but are to be accorded the full scope consistent with the claim language, in which reference to an element in the singular does not mean "the only one" unless so expressly stated, but rather means "one or more." The word "exemplary" is used herein to mean "serving as an example, instance, or illustration." Any aspect described herein as "exemplary" should not necessarily be construed as preferred or advantageous over other aspects. Unless otherwise expressly stated, the term "some" refers to one or more. Combinations such as "at least one of A, B, or C," "one or more of A, B, or C," "at least one of A, B, and C," "one or more of A, B, and C," and "A, B, C, or any combination thereof" include any combination of A, B, and / or C and may include multiple As, multiple Bs, or multiple Cs. Specifically, combinations such as "at least one of A, B, or C," "one or more of A, B, or C," "at least one of A, B, and C," "one or more of A, B, and C," and "A, B, C, or any combination thereof" may be A only, B only, C only, A and B, A and C, B and C, or A and B and C, where any such combination may include one or more members of A, B, or C. All structural and functional equivalents to the elements of the various embodiments described throughout this disclosure that are known or later become known to those skilled in the art are expressly incorporated herein by reference and are encompassed by the claims. Moreover, nothing disclosed herein is offered to the public, regardless of whether such disclosure is expressly recited in the claims.The words "module," "mechanism," "element," "device," etc. may not be substitutes for the word "means." Thus, no claim element should be construed as a means-plus-function unless the element is expressly recited using the phrase "means for."

Claims

1. 1. An apparatus for wireless communication in a first wireless device, the apparatus comprising: Memory, At least one transceiver; and at least one processor communicatively coupled to the memory and to the at least one transceiver, the at least one processor comprising: Detecting one or more object data signals having data interfering with a wireless resource utilized in autonomous driving decisions; transmitting, to at least a second wireless device, a message indicative of the one or more object data signals having the data interfering with a wireless resource utilized in autonomous driving decisions; configured to: Device.

2. 2. The apparatus of claim 1, wherein the one or more object data signals correspond to an abnormally operating wireless device, and wherein the data of the abnormally operating wireless device comprises unlikely data relating to at least one characteristic of the abnormally operating wireless device.

3. 3. The apparatus of claim 2, wherein the unlikely data relating to the at least one characteristic of the abnormally behaving wireless device includes at least one of location, speed, or heading, or a combination thereof, and / or the abnormally behaving wireless device comprises an abnormally behaving vehicle.

4. 2. The apparatus of claim 1, wherein the one or more object data signals correspond to an obstacle that interferes with or disrupts wireless spectrum or resources utilized in collaborative or autonomous driving decisions.

5. 5. The apparatus of claim 4, wherein the one or more object data signals of the obstacle interfering with or disrupting the wireless spectrum or resources are transmitted with an RSSI greater than a reference signal strength indicator (RSSI) threshold and / or the one or more object data signals comprise a denial of service (DoS) attacker, a jammer, or an out-of-band (OOB) interferer.

6. 2. The apparatus of claim 1, wherein the message further indicates at least one information element (IE) corresponding to the one or more detected object data signals, wherein the at least one IE comprises a detected characteristic of at least one of a detected misbehaving wireless device, a Denial of Service (DoS) attacker, a detected jammer, or a detected OOB interferer, or a combination thereof, and optionally the at least one IE comprises a class of detected object, wherein each class of detected object comprises the detected characteristic of a respective one of the detected misbehaving wireless device, the Denial of Service (DoS) attacker, the detected jammer, and the detected OOB interferer.

7. 2. The apparatus of claim 1, wherein the message is for triggering a mitigation action in the at least the second wireless device to avoid or mitigate contact with the one or more object data signals that interfere with collaborative or automated driving decisions, and / or the message identifies an object transmitting the one or more object data signals having the data that interferes with wireless resources utilized in automated driving decisions, and optionally the object comprises one of a vulnerable road user (VRU), a detected vehicle, or a wireless obstacle.

8. The apparatus of claim 1 , wherein the second wireless device comprises at least one of a wireless vehicle, a roadside unit (RSU), or a vulnerable road user (VRU).

9. 1. A method of wireless communication for a first wireless device, comprising: Detecting one or more object data signals having data interfering with a wireless resource utilized in autonomous driving decisions; transmitting, to at least a second wireless device, a message indicative of the one or more object data signals having the data interfering with a wireless resource utilized in autonomous driving decisions; A method comprising:

10. 10. The method of claim 9, wherein the one or more object data signals correspond to an abnormally operating wireless device, and wherein the data of the abnormally operating wireless device comprises unlikely data relating to at least one characteristic of the abnormally operating wireless device.

11. 10. The method of claim 9, wherein the one or more object data signals correspond to an obstacle that interferes with or disrupts a wireless spectrum or resources utilized in collaborative or autonomous driving decisions, and optionally the one or more object data signals of the obstacle that interferes with or disrupts the wireless spectrum or resources are transmitted with a signal strength indicator (RSSI) greater than a reference RSSI threshold.

12. The message, and further indicating at least one information element (IE) corresponding to the one or more detected object data signals, wherein the at least one IE comprises a detected characteristic of at least one of a detected misbehaving wireless device, a Denial of Service (DoS) attacker, a detected jammer, or a detected interferer, or a combination thereof. and / or for triggering a mitigation action in the at least the second wireless device to avoid or mitigate contact with the one or more object data signals that interfere with collaborative or automated driving decisions.

10. The method of claim 9, further comprising identifying an object transmitting the one or more object data signals having the data interfering with wireless resources utilized in automated driving decisions.

13. 1. An apparatus for wireless communication in a second wireless device, the apparatus comprising: Memory, At least one transceiver; and at least one processor communicatively coupled to the memory and to the at least one transceiver, the at least one processor comprising: receiving a message indicative of one or more object data signals having data interfering with a wireless resource utilized in the autonomous driving decision; In response to receiving the message, initiate a mitigation action to avoid or mitigate contact with the one or more object data signals that interfere with wireless resources utilized in autonomous driving decisions. configured to: Device.

14. 1. A method of wireless communication for a second wireless device, comprising: receiving a message indicative of one or more object data signals having data interfering with a wireless resource utilized in the autonomous driving decision; In response to receiving the message, initiate a mitigation action to avoid or mitigate contact with the one or more object data signals that interfere with wireless resources utilized in autonomous driving decisions. A method comprising:

15. A non-transitory computer-readable storage medium storing instructions executable by one or more processors to cause the one or more processors to implement a method according to any one of claims 9 to 12 or 14.

Images