Communication methods and related devices

Abstract

This application provides a communication method and related devices. The method includes a first responder receiving a first frame from an initiator to start a ranging process; the first responder generating a first private address based on the first frame and information relating to the identity of the first responder; and the first responder transmitting a second frame carrying the first private address to the initiator. The method may be applied to an ultra-wideband multi-millisecond ranging system. According to this application, an initiator can verify whether a frame in an ultra-wideband multi-millisecond ranging session is indeed from an authorized responder.

Description

Technical Field

[0001] Embodiments of the present application relate to the field of communication technologies, and more particularly, to communication methods and related devices.

Background Art

[0002] Ultra-wideband (UWB) technology is increasingly being used for indoor positioning and other location services such as access control and item location discovery. To address use cases for long-range ranging, UWB multi-millisecond (MMS) ranging has been introduced. An important concept underlying MMS ranging is to spread the UWB ranging frame over multiple fragments, with the fragments being transmitted over multiple milliseconds (ms), thereby overcoming the radiated energy limit of 37 nanojoules (nJ) per ms. By spreading the ranging frame over several fragments and transmitting each fragment in 1 ms, the total energy of the ranging frame becomes several times higher, thereby enabling a significant expansion of the ranging range. This means that when the block-based mode is used for MMS ranging, the control frame transmission time is limited to 1 ms, which also results in a very limited space available for the actual control information within the control frame. To overcome this limitation, a compressed physical layer service data unit (PSDU) format using private addresses has been introduced for the control frame.

[0003] In an MMS ranging session, when the first compressed PSDU, such as an AdV-POLL (ADV-POLL) frame or POLL frame, is to be sent, the initiator generates a pseudo-random number RPA_prand, and uses this random RPA_prand to generate a private address RPA_hash. The responder verifies the initiator's identity based on the RPA_prand and RPA_hash received from the initiator. If the responder intends to join the ranging session with the initiator, the responder sends a response frame carrying the same RPA_hash.

[0004] Generally, only ADV-POLL frames and POLL frames carry the RPA_hash and RPA_prand, while the remaining frames carry only the RPA_hash from the preceding frame. That is, it is obvious that any device receiving an ADV-POLL frame or POLL frame will copy the RPA_hash and send a response frame carrying the RPA_hash as its private address. In other words, the initiator cannot determine whether the response frame is truly from an authorized responder. [Overview of the project] [Means for solving the problem]

[0005] Embodiments of this application provide a communication method and related devices that enable an initiator in an MMS ranging session to verify that a frame is indeed from an authorized responder.

[0006] According to a first aspect, the present application provides a communication method. The method is applied to a first responder, and the method is The process includes the steps of receiving a first frame from an initiator to start a ranging process, generating a first private address based on the first frame and information relating to the identity of a first responder, and sending a second frame carrying the first private address to the initiator.

[0007] For example, information relating to the identity of the first responder can uniquely identify the identity of the first responder. The frame for initiating the ranging process includes a frame for initiating the initialization and setup phase, or a frame for initiating the measurement cycle phase.

[0008] The second frame may be a response frame to the first frame, or it may be a frame sent after the response frame to the first frame. For example, the first frame may be an ADV-POLL frame and the second frame may be an ad response (ADV-RESP) frame. Alternatively, the first frame may be a POLL frame and the second frame may be a response (RESP) frame. Alternatively, the first frame may be a POLL frame and the second frame may be a report (RPRT) frame.

[0009] For example, the step of generating a first private address based on a first frame and information relating to the identity of a first responder includes the step of verifying the identity of an initiator based on the first frame, and, if the initiator's identity verification is successful, generating a first private address based on information relating to the identity of a first responder.

[0010] Please note that information related to the identity of the first responder is known to the initiator.

[0011] According to the technical solution described above, the responder's private address is generated based on the responder's identity, allowing the initiator to identify whether the sender of the compressed frame is an authorized responder while maintaining the sender's privacy. Furthermore, since there is no need to add new fields within the compressed frame, the size of the compressed frame can be minimized.

[0012] In possible implementations, information relating to the identity of the first responder includes one of the following: the first responder's public address, the MMS ranging configuration requested by the first responder, the first random number generated by the first responder, or an identity resolving key (IRK) specific to both the initiator and the first responder.

[0013] The public address of the first responder may include either an in-band extended address or an out-of-band (OOB) public address.

[0014] To obtain ranging results, it is essential that the responder provides its public address during the session setup phase and / or carries the MMS ranging configuration in the compressed frame sent to the initiator. Therefore, in the technical solution described above, the first responder uses its public address or MMS ranging configuration as identity-related information to generate a private address, eliminating the need for additional signaling exchanges to inform the initiator of its identity information, which helps reduce signaling overhead in ranging sessions. Also, random numbers can be updated more frequently than static identity-related information, and therefore, considering the first random number as identity-related information for the first responder can help improve communication security. Considering the IRK, which is unique between the initiator and the first responder, as identity-related information for the first responder can reduce the complexity of generating a private address.

[0015] In possible implementations, the first frame carries a second random number, the second random number is associated with the initiator's second private address, and the step of generating a first private address based on the first frame and information relating to the identity of the first responder includes the step of generating a first private address based on the second random number and information relating to the identity of the first responder.

[0016] The step of generating a first private address based on a second random number and information relating to the identity of the first responder includes the step of generating a first private address based on information relating to the identity of the first responder after verifying the identity of the initiator by using the second random number and the second private address, and / or the step of generating a first private address by using the first random number and information relating to the identity of the first responder as input to a suitable hash function in combination with an IRK pre-negotiated between the initiator and the first responder, the suitable hash function being pre-negotiated between the initiator and the first responder. In the former case, the first frame also carries the second private address.

[0017] For example, when the information relating to the identity of the first responder includes one of the first responder's public address, an MMS ranging configuration requested by the first responder, and a first random number generated by the first responder, the step of generating a first private address based on a second random number and the information relating to the identity of the first responder includes the step of generating a first private address based on a second random number, the information relating to the identity of the first responder, and a first IRK, the first IRK being pre-negotiated between the initiator and the first responder.

[0018] For example, the first IRK may include a common IRK shared between the initiator and multiple responders (the multiple responders include the first responder), or an IRK specific to the initiator and the first responder.

[0019] According to the technical solution described above, the first responder generates a private address based on a random number carried in the compressed frame received from the initiator, which helps to increase the difficulty of attacking the session between the initiator and the authorized responder, because only a responder that knows the random number can generate a private address that can be successfully verified by the initiator.

[0020] In possible implementations, the second private address is generated based on information relating to the identity of the second responder, and the step of generating the first private address based on the first frame and information relating to the identity of the first responder includes the step of generating the first private address when it is determined that the second responder and the first responder are the same responder.

[0021] According to the technical solution described above, it is possible for the initiator to select specific responders to participate in MMS ranging.

[0022] In a possible implementation, the step of sending a second frame carrying a first private address to the initiator includes the step of sending a second frame carrying the first private address and a first random number to the initiator.

[0023] Alternatively, the first responder generates a new first random number when sending the second frame.

[0024] According to the technical solution described above, carrying the first random number in the second frame allows the initiator to know the identity of the first responder, which can avoid the risk of static identity information being stolen and improve communication security.

[0025] In a possible implementation form, the first frame is a ranging initialization message (RIM) frame that carries a list associated with responders scheduled to participate in MMS ranging, the responder includes a first responder, and the step of generating a first private address based on information related to the identity of the first responder includes generating the first private address when it is determined based on the list that the first responder is scheduled in a first access slot among a plurality of access slots.

[0026] According to the above technical solution, when a responder receives a RIM, only the responder scheduled in the first access slot generates and transmits its private address, and other responders wait until they receive a POLL frame.

[0027] In a possible implementation form, the second frame includes any one of an ADV-RESP frame, a RESP frame, or a RPRT frame.

[0028] The first frame includes an ADV-POLL frame or a POLL frame.

[0029] According to the above technical solution, carrying a private address related to the identity of a responder in a frame transmitted by the responder to the initiator helps the initiator authenticate the identity of the responder.

[0030] In a possible implementation form, the first frame or the second frame is a secured frame that carries encrypted information, the encrypted information is obtained based on a first nonce, and the first nonce is associated with any one of a private address carried by the secured frame, a random number used to generate the private address, or a time period for transmitting the secured frame.

[0031] For example, a time period can be an inner block structure or an outer block structure. More specifically, if a time period is an inner block structure, it may represent slots, rounds, and blocks through which secure frames are transmitted.

[0032] According to the technical solution described above, encrypting a portion of the content within the second frame based on a nonce can help improve the security of the information being carried in the second frame.

[0033] In possible implementations, the first nonce includes frame counter information, which indicates the time period for securely transmitting the frame.

[0034] According to the technical solution described above, it is possible to generate a frame counter for a nonce used to secure or not secure a frame, based on the time period for sending a secure frame.

[0035] In possible implementations, the first nonce also includes block structure indicator information, which indicates whether the second frame is transmitted inside or outside the block structure.

[0036] For example, block structure instruction information includes a 1-bit field, which is set to 0 in compressed frames transmitted outside the block structure and to 1 in secure compressed frames transmitted inside the block structure.

[0037] According to the technical solution described above, block structure instruction information can ensure that nonce used for secure frames transmitted inside and outside the block structure is never reused.

[0038] In possible implementations, the second frame further carries the initiator's private address.

[0039] For example, the initiator's private address includes a second private address.

[0040] According to the technical solution described above, including both the initiator's private address and the responder's private address in the second frame simplifies responder identity verification. For example, if the initiator's private address carried in the second frame does not match the initiator's private address carried in the first frame, the initiator determines that responder identity verification has failed; otherwise, the initiator further verifies the responder's identity based on the responder's private address. Also, carrying the initiator's private address in the second frame makes it easier for the initiator to identify the IRK that will be used to verify the responder's private address.

[0041] In possible implementations, the method further includes the step of receiving a third frame from the initiator that carries time offset information, which indicates the time offset of the transmitted ranging start (SOR) frame.

[0042] According to the technical solution described above, when UWB channel coordination is active, the responder can be made aware of the time offset of the SOR frame.

[0043] According to a second aspect, the present application provides a communication method. The method is applied to an initiator, and the method is A step of receiving a second frame from a first responder carrying a first private address, wherein the first private address is associated with information relating to the identity of the first responder; a step of generating a third private address based on the information relating to the identity of the first responder; and a step of verifying the identity of the first responder by comparing the third private address with the first private address.

[0044] More specifically, whether the second frame truly originates from the authorized first responder is determined when the third private address is the same as the first private address.

[0045] In possible implementations, information relating to the identity of the first responder includes the first responder's public address, the MMS ranging configuration requested by the first responder, the first random number generated by the first responder, and one of the IRKs specific to the initiator and the first responder.

[0046] In a possible implementation, the method further includes the step of sending a first frame to initiate a ranging process, wherein the first frame carries a second random number, the second random number is associated with a second private address of an initiator, and the step of generating a third private address based on information relating to the identity of a first responder includes the step of generating a third private address based on the second random number and information relating to the identity of a first responder.

[0047] For example, a third private address is generated by using a first random number and information related to the identity of the first responder as inputs to a suitable hash function, combined with an IRK pre-negotiated between the initiator and the first responder. The suitable hash function is pre-negotiated between the initiator and the first responder.

[0048] In a possible implementation, the method further includes the steps of generating a fourth private address based on information relating to the identity of a second responder, and sending a frame carrying the fourth private address to the second responder.

[0049] In some embodiments, the first responder and the second responder are the same responder.

[0050] Optionally, the method further includes the step of sending a frame carrying a fourth private address to the first responder. Note that since the fourth private address is generated based on the identity of the second responder, only the second responder can successfully verify the fourth private address.

[0051] In possible implementations, the second frame further carries the first random number, and the step of generating a third private address based on information relating to the identity of the first responder includes the step of generating a third private address based on the first random number.

[0052] In a possible implementation, the method further includes the step of sending a first frame to a first responder to initiate a ranging process, the first frame being a RIM frame carrying a list associated with responders scheduled to participate in MMS ranging, the responders including the first responder.

[0053] In possible implementations, the second frame includes one of the following: an ADV-RESP frame, a RESP frame, or an RPRT frame.

[0054] In possible implementations, the first or second frame is a secure frame carrying encrypted information, which is retrieved based on a first nonce, the first nonce being associated with one of the following: a private address carried by the secure frame, a random number used to generate the private address, or a time period for transmitting the secure frame.

[0055] In possible implementations, the first nonce includes frame counter information, which indicates the time period for securely transmitting the frame.

[0056] In possible implementations, the first nonce further includes block structure indicator information, which indicates whether the second frame is transmitted inside or outside the block structure.

[0057] In possible implementations, the second frame further carries the initiator's private address, and the method further includes the step of verifying the identity of the first responder based on the initiator's private address.

[0058] In a possible implementation, the method further includes the step of sending a third frame carrying time offset information to a first responder, the time offset information indicating the time offset of the transmitted SOR frame.

[0059] For the beneficial effects of the second embodiment, refer to the first embodiment. Further details are not provided here.

[0060] In a third aspect, the present application provides a communication device comprising: a receiving unit configured to receive a first frame from an initiator for starting a ranging process; a generating unit configured to generate a first private address based on the first frame and information relating to the identity of a first responder, wherein the information relating to the identity of a first responder is known to the initiator; and a transmitting unit configured to transmit a second frame carrying the first private address to the initiator.

[0061] In possible implementations, information relating to the identity of the first responder includes one of the following: the first responder's public address, the MMS ranging configuration requested by the first responder, the first random number generated by the first responder, or an IRK specific to the initiator and the first responder.

[0062] In a possible implementation, the first frame carries a second random number, which is associated with the initiator's second private address, and the generation unit is configured to generate the first private address based on the second random number and information relating to the identity of the first responder.

[0063] In possible implementations, the second private address is generated based on information relating to the identity of the second responder, and the generation unit is configured to generate the first private address when it is determined that the second responder and the first responder are the same responder.

[0064] In a possible implementation, the transmitting unit is configured to send a second frame to the initiator that carries a first private address and a first random number.

[0065] In a possible implementation, the first frame is a RIM frame carrying a list associated with responders scheduled to participate in MMS ranging, the responders include the first responder, and the generating unit is configured to generate the first private address when it is determined from the list that the first responder is scheduled for the first access slot among multiple access slots.

[0066] In possible implementations, the second frame includes one of the following: an ADV-RESP frame, a RESP frame, or an RPRT frame.

[0067] In possible implementations, the first or second frame is a secure frame carrying encrypted information, which is retrieved based on a first nonce, the first nonce being associated with one of the following: a private address carried by the secure frame, a random number used to generate the private address, or a time period for transmitting the secure frame.

[0068] In possible implementations, the first nonce includes frame counter information, which indicates the time period for securely transmitting the frame.

[0069] In possible implementations, the first nonce further includes block structure indicator information, which indicates whether the second frame is transmitted inside or outside the block structure.

[0070] In possible implementations, the second frame further carries the initiator's private address.

[0071] In a possible implementation, the receiving unit is further configured to receive a third frame from the initiator that carries time offset information, which indicates the time offset of the transmitted SOR frame.

[0072] In a fourth aspect, the present application provides a communication device comprising: a receiving unit configured to receive a second frame carrying a first private address from a first responder, wherein the first private address is associated with information relating to the identity of the first responder; a generating unit configured to generate a third private address based on the information relating to the identity of the first responder; and a verifying unit configured to verify the identity of the first responder by comparing the third private address with the first private address.

[0073] In possible implementations, information relating to the identity of the first responder includes one of the following: the first responder's public address, the MMS ranging configuration requested by the first responder, the first random number generated by the first responder, or an IRK specific to the initiator and the first responder.

[0074] In a possible implementation, the communication device further includes a transmitting unit configured to send a first frame to initiate a ranging process, the first frame carrying a second random number, the second random number associated with a second private address of the initiator, and a generating unit configured to generate a third private address based on the second random number and information relating to the identity of the first responder.

[0075] In possible implementations, the generating unit is further configured to generate a fourth private address based on information relating to the identity of the second responder, and the transmitting unit is further configured to send a frame carrying the fourth private address to the second responder.

[0076] In possible implementations, a second frame further carries the first random number, and the generation unit is configured to generate a third private address based on the first random number.

[0077] In a possible implementation, the transmitting unit is further configured to send a first frame to a first responder to initiate the ranging process, the first frame being a RIM frame carrying a list associated with responders scheduled to participate in MMS ranging, the responders including the first responder.

[0078] In possible implementations, the second frame includes one of the following: an ADV-RESP frame, a RESP frame, or an RPRT frame.

[0079] In possible implementations, the first or second frame is a secure frame carrying encrypted information, which is retrieved based on a first nonce, the first nonce being associated with one of the following: a private address carried by the secure frame, a random number used to generate the private address, or a time period for transmitting the secure frame.

[0080] In possible implementations, the first nonce includes frame counter information, which indicates the time period for securely transmitting the frame.

[0081] In possible implementations, the first nonce further includes block structure indicator information, which indicates whether the second frame is transmitted inside or outside the block structure.

[0082] In possible implementations, the second frame further carries the initiator's private address, and the verification unit is further configured to verify the identity of the first responder based on the initiator's private address.

[0083] In a possible implementation, the transmitting unit is further configured to transmit a third frame to the first responder carrying time offset information, which indicates the time offset of the transmitted SOR frame.

[0084] According to a fifth aspect, a communication device is provided which includes a processor and memory. The processor is connected to the memory. The memory is configured to store instructions, and the processor is configured to execute instructions. When the processor executes instructions stored in the memory, the processor is enabled to perform a method in any possible implementation of the first or second aspect.

[0085] According to the sixth aspect, the present application provides a communication device in any possible implementation of the third aspect, and a communication system including a communication device in any possible implementation of the fourth aspect.

[0086] According to the seventh aspect, the present application provides a computer-readable storage medium containing instructions. When the instructions are executed in a processor, the processor is enabled to perform a method in any possible implementation of the first or second aspect.

[0087] According to the eighth aspect, the present application provides a computer program product including computer program code. When the computer program code is run on a computer, the computer is enabled to perform the method in any possible implementation of the first or second aspect.

[0088] It should be noted that all or part of the above computer program code may be stored in a first storage medium. The first storage medium may be packaged together with the processor or separately from the processor.

[0089] According to the ninth aspect, the present application provides a chip system including memory and a processor. The memory is configured to store a computer program, and the processor is configured to call a computer program from the memory and execute the computer program, so that an electronic device on which the chip system is installed performs the method in any possible implementation of the first or second aspect. [Brief explanation of the drawing]

[0090] [Figure 1] This figure shows the transmission of compressed frames in an MMS ranging session. [Figure 2] This is a schematic flowchart of a communication method according to one embodiment of this application. [Figure 3] This is a schematic flowchart of another communication method according to one embodiment of this application. [Figure 4] This is a schematic diagram of the ADV-POLL frame or POLL frame. [Figure 5] This is a schematic diagram of an ADV-RESP frame or RESP frame according to one embodiment of the present application. [Figure 6] This is a schematic diagram of another ADV-RESP frame or another RESP frame according to one embodiment of the present application. [Figure 7] This is a schematic diagram of yet another ADV-RESP frame or yet another RESP frame according to one embodiment of the present application. [Figure 8] This is a schematic diagram of the SOR frame. [Figure 9] This is a schematic diagram of a secure compression frame according to one embodiment of the present application. [Figure 10] This is a schematic diagram of a nonce according to one embodiment of the present application. [Figure 11] This is a schematic diagram of a method for constructing a nonce according to one embodiment of the present application. [Figure 12] This is a schematic flowchart of yet another communication method according to one embodiment of this application. [Figure 13] This is a schematic flowchart of yet another communication method according to one embodiment of this application. [Figure 14] This is a schematic flowchart of yet another communication method according to one embodiment of this application. [Figure 15] This is a schematic flowchart of yet another communication method according to one embodiment of this application. [Figure 16] This is a schematic diagram of a RIM frame according to one embodiment of the present application. [Figure 17] This is a schematic flowchart of another communication method involving selective MMS ranging according to one embodiment of the present application. [Figure 18] This is a schematic block diagram of a communication device according to one embodiment of the present application. [Figure 19] This is a schematic block diagram of another communication device according to one embodiment of the present application. [Figure 20] This is a schematic block diagram of yet another communication device according to one embodiment of the present application. [Modes for carrying out the invention]

[0091] To make it easier to understand, an MMS ranging session will be used as an example below.

[0092] As shown in Figure 1, an MMS ranging session may include an initialization and setup phase, followed by one or more range measurement cycles. During the initialization and setup phase, frames are transmitted on the initialization channel, but during the measurement cycle, frames are transmitted on the ranging channel. The same channel can be used as both the initialization and ranging channel, but one or more well-known channels are more likely to be used as the initialization channel.

[0093] During the initialization and setup phase, the initiator and responder may negotiate a ranging configuration. The initiator opportunistically transmits ADV-POLL frames at its sole discretion for time and intervals, while the responder opportunistically listens for incoming ADV-POLL frames and may respond with ADV-RESP frames if the responder intends to participate in a ranging session with the initiator. Upon receiving an ADV-RESP frame, the initiator transmits a SOR frame that provides a time offset for when the first ranging measurement cycle begins.

[0094] The measurement cycle includes a ranging control phase, a ranging phase, and an optional measurement reporting phase. The ranging control phase begins at the start of the ranging measurement cycle. The initiator starts the ranging control phase by sending a POLL frame to the responder at the start of the first ranging slot of the ranging ground. The responder, having successfully received the POLL frame, sends a RESP frame back to the initiator. The POLL frame and RESP frame enable the initiator and responder to achieve time and frequency synchronization. The initiator may also include other control information in the POLL frame for the responder. During the ranging phase, the initiator and responder may exchange zero or more UWB ranging sequence fragments (RSFs) and optionally one or more UWB ranging integrity fragments (RIFs). RSFs are used to perform the ranging measurement, while RIFs are used to check the integrity of the ranging measurement. After the initiator or responder has finished receiving all UWB fragments from the ranging phase, the reporting phase begins when the initiator and / or responder generate a ranging measurement report and send an RPRT frame to deliver the measurement report to the other device.

[0095] There are two types of MMS ranging: 1) UWB-only MMS ranging, in which control frames and ranging fragments are transmitted using UWB, and 2) Narrowband-assisted UWB (NBA-UWB) MMS ranging, in which ranging fragments are transmitted using UWB, but control signals are transmitted using narrowband.

[0096] Frame transmission in an MMS ranging session is based on a block-based time structure. As shown in Figure 1, frames are transmitted outside the block structure during the initialization and setup phases, and inside the block structure during the measurement cycle. In the block-based time structure, each ranging block consists of an integer number of ranging grounds, each ranging ground being a period of sufficient duration to complete an entire range measurement cycle involving a set of enhanced ranging-capable devices (ERDEVs) participating in the ranging exchange. Here, when we say that a frame is transmitted or received inside the block structure, this means that both the initiator and responder are aware of and synchronized with the block-based time structure. However, if either or both are not aware of the block-based time, the frame is said to be transmitted or received outside the block structure. Each ranging ground is further subdivided into an integer number of ranging slots, each ranging slot being a period of sufficient duration for the transmission of at least one ranging frame (RFRAME). The block-based mode uses a structured timeline in which the ranging block structure is periodic by default.

[0097] The technical solutions in this application will be described below with reference to the attached drawings.

[0098] Figure 2 shows a flowchart of one embodiment of the communication method. The method can be applied to the MMS ranging process. The initiator may be a device that starts UWB exchange by sending an exchange message. The responder may be a device that responds to a message received from the initiator and participates in UWB exchange.

[0099] S110: The initiator sends the first frame to the first responder.

[0100] The first frame carries a second random number and the initiator's second private address, the second private address being associated with the second random number. For example, the second private address is generated by using a hash function on the second random number in combination with a second IRK, the second IRK being pre-negotiated between the initiator and the first responder.

[0101] In some possible implementations, the first frame is used to initiate the ranging process. For example, the first frame may be one of the following: an ADV-POLL frame, a POLL frame, or a RIM frame. The RIM frame can be considered a variation of the POLL frame.

[0102] S120: The first responder generates a first private address based on the first frame and information relating to the identity of the first responder.

[0103] Information relating to the identity of the first responder is known to the initiator. For example, information relating to the identity of the first responder is either negotiated in advance between the initiator and the first responder, or the first responder notifies the initiator of information relating to the identity of the first responder. In the former case, information relating to the identity of the first responder includes the first responder's public address and one of the IRKs (e.g., IRK-RI) specific to the initiator and the first responder. In the latter case, information relating to the identity of the first responder includes one of the MMS ranging configuration requested by the first responder and a first random number generated by the first responder.

[0104] For example, the public address of the first responder may include an in-band extended address or an out-of-band public address.

[0105] For example, the in-band extended address may include an 8-octet extended medium access control (MAC) address. The OOB public address may include a 6-octet Bluetooth MAC address. In some embodiments, the public address of the first responder may also include another communication address that uniquely identifies the first responder.

[0106] For example, the requested MMS ranging configuration of the first responder may include at least one of the following: a UWB physical layer (PHY) configuration, a UWB MAC configuration, a narrowband (NB) PHY configuration, and an NB MAC configuration.

[0107] Optionally, the first responder generating a first private address based on a first frame and information relating to the first responder's identity includes the first responder generating a first private address based on a second random number and information relating to the first responder's identity.

[0108] In some embodiments, the generation of a first private address by a first responder based on a second random number and information relating to the identity of the first responder includes the first responder generating the first private address by using the first random number and information relating to the identity of the first responder as input to a suitable hash function in combination with a first IRK pre-negotiated between the initiator and the first responder, or the first responder generating the first private address by using the first random number and information relating to the identity of the first responder as input to a suitable hash function, the suitable hash function pre-negotiated between the initiator and the first responder.

[0109] For example, the first private address may be generated by using the following formula, namely Hash = AH(IRK, random number), where Hash represents the first private address, AH() represents the hash function, IRK can be the first IRK or an IRK specific to the initiator and the first responder, and random number can be the second random number or the first random number.

[0110] For example, the first IRK may include a common IRK shared between the initiator and multiple responders (multiple responders including the first responder), or an IRK specific to the initiator and the first responder.

[0111] Optionally, the second IRK and the first IRK are the same, or the second IRK and the first IRK are paired.

[0112] In other embodiments, the generation of a first private address by the first responder based on a second random number and information relating to the first responder's identity includes the first responder verifying the initiator's identity by using the second random number and the second private address, and then generating a first private address based on information relating to the first responder's identity.

[0113] For example, the first responder verifying the initiator's identity by using a second random number and a second private address includes the first responder verifying the initiator's identity by using a second IRK, a second random number, and a second private address. In detail, the first responder uses the first IRK to generate a local private address for the second random number. If the local private address matches the second private address carried in the first frame, the first responder determines that the initiator's identity verification was successful; otherwise, the first responder discards the first frame.

[0114] S130: The first responder sends a second frame to the initiator carrying the first private address.

[0115] For example, the second frame may be one of the ADV-RESP frame, RESP frame, and RPRT frame.

[0116] In some possible implementations, if the first private address is generated based on a first random number, the second frame carries the first private address and the first random number.

[0117] In some possible implementations, the second frame also carries the second private address.

[0118] S140: The initiator verifies the identity of the first responder based on the first private address.

[0119] For example, the initiator verifies the identity of the first responder by using information related to the first responder's identity and a first IRK that is pre-negotiated between the initiator and the first responder. More specifically, the initiator generates a specific random local private address (for example, a third private address) using the first IRK and information related to the first responder's identity. If the local private address matches the first private address carried in the second frame, the initiator determines that the verification of the first responder's identity was successful; otherwise, the initiator discards the second frame.

[0120] For example, a specific random number may include a first random number or a second random number. When the first private address is generated based on the first random number, the specific random number includes the first random number. When the first private address is generated based on the second random number, the specific random number includes the second random number.

[0121] In some possible implementations, the initiator generates a second private address based on information relating to the identity of the second responder. The first responder generates a local private address based on information relating to the identity of the second responder. If the first responder can successfully verify the second private address, the first responder determines that the second responder is the same as the first responder and generates a first private address.

[0122] In some possible implementations, the initiator generates a fourth private address based on information related to the identity of the second responder and sends a frame carrying the fourth private address to both the second and first responders. Note that since the fourth private address is generated based on the identity of the second responder, only the second responder can successfully verify the fourth private address.

[0123] Optionally, the first or second frame is a secure frame carrying encrypted information, which is retrieved based on a first nonce, the first nonce being associated with one of the following: a private address carried by the secure frame, a random number used to generate the private address, or a time period for transmitting the secure frame.

[0124] For example, the first responder generates a first nonce based on the ID field and private address field of the second frame, as well as the slot, round, and block in which the second frame is sent.

[0125] Optionally, the first nonce includes frame counter information, which indicates the slot, round, and block in which the second frame is sent.

[0126] Optionally, the first nonce may also include block structure indication information, which indicates whether the second frame is transmitted inside or outside the block structure.

[0127] Please note that in this application, the first and second frames are compressed frames. A compressed frame is either a compressed PSDU or an IEEE 802.15.4 frame using the Compressed Header Information Element (Header IE) format.

[0128] In some possible implementations, the control device acts as the initiator and the controlled device is assigned the role of the first responder; however, the controlled device may be assigned the role of the initiator and the control device may also act as the first responder. Note that the control device is a device used to control the UWB session and define session parameters, while the controlled device is a device that utilizes the session parameters received from the control device to participate in the UWB session.

[0129] A communication method provided in the embodiments of this application in a one-to-one MMS ranging session will be described in detail below with reference to Figures 3 to 12. The embodiments shown in Figures 3 to 12 are shown, for example, using a control device as an initiator and a controlled device as a responder.

[0130] Figure 3 shows a schematic flowchart of a communication method in one-to-one MMS ranging according to one embodiment of the present application. The method shown in Figure 3 includes a session setup phase and steps S210 to S270.

[0131] An MMS ranging session begins with the control unit and controlled device performing session setup, during which long-term session parameters such as the number of UWB channels, preamble code, and block structure are negotiated. Specifically, at least one IRK is also provided by the control unit to the controlled device during session setup to resolve or create a private address. In the case of NBA-UWB MMS ranging, narrowband-related parameters such as the number of NB channels and the number of MMS fragments may also be negotiated during session setup. In addition, initiator and responder roles may also be assigned during session setup.

[0132] For example, at least one IRK may include at least one of the first IRK and the second IRK in the above embodiment.

[0133] To make it clear, long-term parameters are not expected to change during an MMS ranging session.

[0134] In contrast, parameters related to the measurement cycle, such as round / slot duration, number of MMS fragments, and reporting mode, may be considered short-term parameters and may be changed during an MMS ranging session.

[0135] Session setup may be performed out of band using, for example, Bluetooth or Wi-Fi radio, or in band using, for example, NB or UWB radio.

[0136] Once the session is set up, step S210 is performed.

[0137] S210: The initiator sends an ADV-POLL frame.

[0138] For example, an initiator opportunistically transmits ADV-POLL frames at its own discretion in terms of time and intervals, while a responder may opportunistically listen for incoming ADV-POLL frames. The ADV-POLL frame may carry a pseudo-random number RPA_prand-I-1 and its private address RPA_hash-I-1, where RPA_hash-I-1 can be considered an example of a second private address in the above embodiment.

[0139] For example, RPA_hash-I-1 can be calculated using Equation 1 and may be truncated to 24 bits.

[0140] RPA_hash-I-1 = AES-128-ECB(key=IRK, data=(0x000…

[13] || RPA_prand-I-1[3])) % 2^24 Formula 1

[0141] AES-128-ECB is a hash function that can be replaced by other hash functions. [n] indicates that its preceding parameter is n octets.

[0142] The IRK may be a common IRK pre-negotiated between the initiator and the responder, such as IRK-B.

[0143] A schematic diagram of the ADV-POLL frame is shown in Figure 4. As shown in Figure 4, the ADV-POLL frame consists of a one-octet message ID field, a three-octet private address field that carries the Initiator RPA_hash (e.g., RPA_hash-I-1), a three-octet field that carries the Initiator RPA_prand (e.g., RPA_prand-I-1), a one-octet MessageControl field that determines the format of the MessageContent field, a variable-length MessageContent field whose format depends on the content of the MessageContent field, and a two-octet cyclic redundancy check (CRC) field. The Initiator RPA_hash is sometimes referred to as the initiator's RPA_hash or the initiator's private address. The Initiator RPA_prand is sometimes referred to as the initiator's RPA_prand or the initiator's random number.

[0144] Upon receiving an ADV-POLL frame, the responder generates a local hash of RPA_prand-I-1 by using a pre-negotiated IRK, such as IRK-B as described above. For example, the responder generates a local hash of RPA_prand-I-1 by using IRK-B as input to Equation 1. Furthermore, if the local hash does not match RPA_hash-I-1 carried in the ADV-POLL frame, the responder discards the ADV-POLL frame; otherwise, the responder determines that the initiator's identity verification was successful and then, if the responder intends to participate in a ranging session with the initiator, sends an ADV-RESP frame to the initiator, as shown in step S220.

[0145] S220: The responder sends an ADV-RESP frame to the initiator.

[0146] In detail, the ADV-RESP frame carries an RPA_hash-R-1, which is generated by using a private address that can identify the responder, i.e., information relating to the responder's identity. RPA_hash-R-1 can be considered an example of the first private address in the above embodiment.

[0147] When the initiator receives an ADV-RESP frame, the initiator verifies the responder's identity based on RPA_hash-R-1.

[0148] In one embodiment, information relating to the responder's identity may include the responder's public address, the Responder MAC Address, such as an 8-octet extended 802.15 MAC address, which is then calculated by using Equation 2 and truncated to 24 bits, and RPA_hash-R-1 may be calculated using Equation 2.

[0149] RPA_hash-R-1 = AES-128-ECB(key=IRK, data=(0x000…[5] || Responder MAC Address [8] || RPA_prand-I-1]) % 2^24 Formula 2

[0150] Furthermore, when the initiator receives an ADV-RESP frame, the initiator generates a local hash for the responder using the responder's public address (for example, an 8-octet extended 802.15 MAC address) in combination with the RPA_prand-I-1 carried in ADV-POLL, and using IRK as input to Equation 2.

[0151] In another embodiment, information relating to the responder's identity may include MMS ranging configurations requested by the responder, such as various NB and UWB configurations requested by the responder in the ADV-RESP frame, and RPA_hash-R-1 may then be calculated using the following Equation 3 and truncated to 24 bits.

[0152] RPA_hash-R-1 = AES-128-ECB(key=IRK, data=(0x00[1] || UWB PHY Config || UWB MAC Config || NB PHY Config || NB MAC Config || RPA_prand-I-1]) % 2^24 Formula 3

[0153] Here, UWB PHY Config, UWB MAC Config, NB PHY Config, and NB MAC Config refer to the various configuration parameters carried in the MessageContent field of the ADV-RESP frame.

[0154] Note that a responder's private address is unique as long as there is at least one bit difference in the configuration required by different responders, and can be used to identify the responder in subsequent frames.

[0155] Furthermore, when the initiator receives an ADV-RESP frame, the initiator generates a local hash for the responder using the configuration parameters carried in the MessageContent field of the ADV-RESP frame in combination with RPA_prand-I-1, and using IRK as input to Equation 3 above.

[0156] In yet another embodiment, information relating to the responder's identity may include the responder's public address, such as a 6-octet Bluetooth MAC address, the Responder OOB MAC Address, which is then calculated by using Equation 4 and truncated to 24 bits, and RPA_hash-R-1 may be calculated.

[0157] RPA_hash-R-1 = AES-128-ECB(key=IRK, data=(0x000…[7] ||, 6 octets Bluetooth MAC address [6] || RPA_prand-I-1]) % 2^24 Formula 4

[0158] Furthermore, when the initiator receives an ADV-RESP frame, the initiator generates a local hash for the responder using the responder's public address (for example, a 6-octet Bluetooth MAC address) in combination with RPA_prand-I-1, and using IRK as input to Equation 4.

[0159] In some possible implementations, the initiator maintains a record of the responder's public address during session setup.

[0160] In another embodiment, the information relating to the responder's identity may be specific to the initiator and the first responder and may include one IRK (e.g., IRK-RI) of a pair of IRKs (e.g., IRK-RI & IRK-IR) used for frames sent by the responder to the initiator, and then RPA_hash-R-1 may be calculated by using Equation 5 and truncated to 24 bits.

[0161] RPA_hash-R-1 = AES-128-ECB(key=IRK-RI, data=(0x000…

[13] || Initiator RPA_prand-I-1]) % 2^24 Formula 5

[0162] Furthermore, when the initiator receives an ADV-RESP frame, the initiator uses IRK-RI in combination with RPA_prand-I-1 as input to Equation 5 to generate a local hash for the responder.

[0163] Figure 5 shows a schematic diagram of an ADV-RESP frame that carries the responder's private address (e.g., RPA_hash-R-1) generated by any one of the above equations 2 through 5. As shown in Figure 5, the ADV-RESP frame consists of a one-octet message ID field, a three-octet field that carries the responder's private address (e.g., RPA_hash-R-1), a one-octet MessageControl field that determines the format of the MessageContent field, a variable-length MessageContent field whose format depends on the content of the MessageContent field, and a two-octet CRC field.

[0164] In some embodiments, the ADV-RESP frame also carries the private address obtained from the ADV-POLL, which is the Initiator RPA_hash. A schematic diagram of the ADV-RESP frame carrying the responder's private address and the initiator's private address is shown in Figure 6.

[0165] Including both the Initiator RPA_hash and Responder RPA_hash in the ADV-RESP frame facilitates the identification of the relevant IRK and simplifies the initiator's identity verification of the responder. Specifically, if the Initiator RPA_hash carried in the ADV-RESP frame does not match the Initiator RPA_hash carried in the ADV-POLL frame, the initiator determines that the responder's identity verification has failed; otherwise, the initiator further verifies the responder's identity based on the Responder RPA_hash. The Responder RPA_hash is sometimes referred to as the responder's RPA_hash or the responder's private address.

[0166] In some embodiments, information relating to the responder's identity may include a random number generated by the responder (e.g., RPA_prand-R-1), which is then calculated using Equation 6 and truncated to 24 bits.

[0167] RPA_hash-R-1 = AES-128-ECB(key=IRK, data=(0x000…

[13] || RPA_prand-R-1])) % 2^24 Formula 6

[0168] For example, the responder generates its own pseudorandom number RPA_prand-R-1 using any suitable pseudorandom generation function.

[0169] In one embodiment, the responder generates RPA_prand-R-1 when the responder successfully verifies the initiator's identity.

[0170] In another embodiment, the responder generates RPA_prand-R-1 each time an ADV-RESR frame and a RESP frame are sent.

[0171] Furthermore, if RPA_hash-R-1 is generated using Equation 6, the ADV-RESP frame must also carry a responder's random number, which in turn allows the initiator to verify the responder's identity. A schematic diagram of the ADV-RESP frame carrying the responder's private address and the responder's random number is shown in Figure 7. Optionally, the frame shown in Figure 7 may or may not carry the initiator's private address obtained from ADV-POLL.

[0172] It should be noted that different formats of ADV-RESP frames or RESP frames can be distinguished by using different IDs in the frame, for example, 0x02 for the format shown in Figure 5, 0x32 for the format shown in Figure 6, and 0x42 for the format shown in Figure 7.

[0173] It should be noted that the IRK used in Equations 2 to 4 and Equation 6 may be the first IRK in the embodiments described above. For example, the IRK used in Equations 2 to 4 and Equation 6 may be a common IRK (e.g., IRK-B), or the IRK used in Equations 2 to 4 and Equation 6 may be one of a pair of IRKs (e.g., IRK-RI). Furthermore, Equations 2 to 6 can be considered as several specific examples of Hash = AH (IRK, random number).

[0174] Furthermore, if the local hash for the responder does not match RPA_hash-R-1 carried in the ADV-RESP frame, the initiator discards the ADV-RESP frame; otherwise, the initiator determines that the responder's identity verification was successful and then sends a SOR frame to the responder, as shown in step S230.

[0175] S230: The initiator sends a SOR frame to the responder.

[0176] In detail, the SOR frame provides a time offset for when the first range measurement cycle begins. The SOR frame carries the same RPA_hash-I-1 that is included in the ADV-POLL frame.

[0177] A schematic diagram of the SOR frame is shown in Figure 8. As shown in Figure 8, the SOR frame consists of a one-octet message ID field, a three-octet private address field that carries the Initiator RPA_hash (e.g., RPA_hash-I-1), a one-octet MessageControl field that determines the format of the MessageContent field, a variable-length MessageContent field whose format depends on the content of the MessageContent field, and a two-octet CRC field. The SOR frame carries a time offset that indicates the time when the measurement phase of MMS ranging begins.

[0178] S240: The initiator sends a POLL frame to the responder.

[0179] At the time indicated by the time offset within the SOR frame, the initiator sends a POLL frame to the responder at the beginning of the first ranging slot in the ranging ground.

[0180] For example, a POLL frame shares the same format as shown in Figure 4, carrying a pseudo-random number RPA_prand-I-2 and its private address RPA_hash-I-2, which is generated using RPA_prand-I-2 and IRK as input to Equation 1.

[0181] Upon receiving a POLL frame, the responder verifies the initiator's identity based on the private address carried in the POLL frame. For specific verification methods, refer to the verification method based on ADV-POLL frames in S210. Further details are not provided here.

[0182] When the initiator's identity verification is successful, the responder sends a RESP frame to the initiator, as shown in step S250.

[0183] S250: The responder sends a RESP frame to the initiator.

[0184] In detail, the RESP frame carries the responder's private address, such as RPA_hash-R-2. For details on how to generate the responder's private address, the format of the RESP frame, and how the initiator verifies the responder's identity based on the RESP frame, see the detailed explanation in S220. The method is the same, except that a pseudo-random number (e.g., RPA_prand-I-2) carried in the POLL frame is used to generate the Responder RPA_hash. In short, when generating RPA_hash-R-2 using the above formula, RPA_prand-I-1 in the relevant formula is replaced with RPA_prand-I-2. Further details are not provided here.

[0185] When the responder's identity verification is successful, the initiator initiates a ranging phase in which the initiator and responder exchange zero or more RSFs and, optionally, one or more RIFs.

[0186] After the initiator or responder has finished receiving all UWB fragments in the ranging phase, the initiator and / or responder generate a ranging measurement report and send an RPRT frame to carry the measurement report to the other device, as shown in steps S260 and S270.

[0187] S260: The responder sends an RPPT frame to the initiator.

[0188] For example, the RPRT frame in this step shares the same format as shown in Figure 8 and carries the private address RPA_hash-R-2 generated in step S250.

[0189] S270: The initiator sends an RPPT frame to the responder.

[0190] For example, the RPRT frame in this step shares the same format as shown in Figure 8 and carries the private address RPA_hash-I-2 generated in step S240.

[0191] In consideration of the confidentiality of some of the information conveyed in the above-mentioned frame, a secure compressed frame is provided in the embodiments of this application to improve information security.

[0192] Please note that the secure compressed frame in this application is a compressed frame that has been secured using cryptographic operations such as authentication or encryption.

[0193] Figure 9 shows a schematic diagram of a safe compressed frame. As shown in Figure 9, the fields of the safe compressed frame are as follows:

[0194] 1. The ID field indicates the identity of the secure compressed frame. For example, ID spaces 0x60 through 0x6F may be reserved for secure compressed frames, where 0x60 represents a secure ADV-RESP frame, 0x61 represents a secure SOR frame, and 0x65 and 0x66 represent secure RPRT frames sent by the initiator and responder, respectively. RPRT frames are sometimes referred to as REPORT frames.

[0195] 2. A 3-octet private address field that carries the RPA_hash.

[0196] 3. An optional 3-octet field that carries RPA_prand. This field may only be present in certain frames (e.g., ADV-POLL or POLL) and may not be present in other compressed PSDUs (e.g., ADV-RESP, RESP, SOR, REPORT).

[0197] 4. A one-octet MessageControl field that determines the format of the MessageContent field.

[0198] 5. A variable-length MessageContent field whose format depends on the content of the MessageContent field. If an encryption security level is selected, all or part of the MessageContent field will be encrypted. If only a portion of the MessageContent field is encrypted, the subfields to be encrypted (also known as private payload fields) will be placed at the end of the MessageContent field, while the subfields that will not be encrypted (also known as open payload fields) will be placed at the beginning of the MessageContent field.

[0199] 6. A variable-length Message Integrity Check (MIC) field replaces the CRC field. The length of the MIC depends on the security level. For example, the length of the MIC can be one of 0 octets, 4 octets, or 8 octets. When the length of the MIC is 0 octets, the frame is not secure, and the field is used for a 2-octet CRC.

[0200] In some possible implementations, all or part of the content within the MessageContent field may be encrypted by an authenticated encryption with associated data (AEAD) operation based on a nonce.

[0201] Note that when security is enabled, one or more secret keys, different from the IRK, may be exchanged between the initiator and responder used in the AEAD operation.

[0202] The nonce used for AEAD conversion or inverse conversion of securely compressed frames is shown in Figure 10. This nonce format is used for compressed frames transmitted outside or inside a block structure. As shown in Figure 10, the fields of the nonce are as follows:

[0203] 1. The RPA_hash field is set in the RPA_hash field of the compressed frame to either be secure or not secure.

[0204] 2. The RPA_prand field is set to the RPA_prand field of the compressed frame to be secure if such a field exists, otherwise it is set as the RPA_prand used to generate the RPA_hash field of the compressed frame to be secure or not secure.

[0205] 3. The ID field is set to the ID field of the compressed frame to either be secure or not secure.

[0206] 4. If a block structure exists and is known to both the transmitting and receiving devices (for example, the internal block structure in Figure 1), the Frame Counter field includes the Slot Index field, the Round Index field, and the Block Index field, which are set as the indexes of the slot, round, and block in which the frame is transmitted or received, respectively. If a block structure does not exist and / or is unknown to at least one of the transmitting or receiving devices (for example, the external block structure in Figure 1), the Frame Counter field is reserved and set to 0. The information carried in the Frame Counter field can be considered an example of frame counter information.

[0207] 5. A one-bit field called the Block Structure Indicator indicates whether the secure frame is transmitted within or outside the block structure. For example, the Block Structure Indicator field is set to 0 for secure compressed frames transmitted outside the block structure and to 1 for secure compressed frames transmitted within the block structure. The information carried in the Block Structure Indicator field can be considered an example of block structure indication information.

[0208] 6. The Security Level field is an unsigned integer that will be set to the security level value negotiated during session setup.

[0209] Furthermore, Figure 11 illustrates how a nonce is constructed for security operations related to securely compressed frames transmitted within a block structure according to one embodiment of the present application.

[0210] When the device synchronizes with the block structure, it knows the slot / round / block index in which the compressed frame is sent or received, and the device can construct the Frame Counter field of the nonce; otherwise, the Frame Counter field is set to 0. In the example shown in Figure 11, for an RPRT frame sent by the responder in slot m of round 1 of block 1, the Slot Index, Round Index, and Block Index fields of the nonce's Frame Counter field are set separately as m, 1, and 1, corresponding to slot m, round 1, and block 1, but the Block Structure Indicator is set to 1. The RPA_hash and ID fields of the nonce are copied from the RPA_hash and ID fields of the REPORT frame. However, since the RPA_prand field does not exist in the REPORT frame, the RPA_prand field of the nonce is set as the RPA_prand used to generate the RPA_hash field, for example, the RPA_prand carried in the preceding POLL frame sent by the initiator. Nance's Security Level is set to an appropriate security level, such as the security level negotiated during session setup.

[0211] Similarly, for frames sent outside the block structure, such as SOR frames, the Frame Counter field of the nonce is set to 0 for all frames, but the Block Structure Indicator is set to 0. The RPA_hash and Message ID fields of the nonce are copied from the RPA_hash and ID fields of the SOR frame. Since the RPA_prand field does not exist in the SOR frame, the RPA_prand field of the nonce is set to the RPA_prand used to generate the RPA_hash field, i.e., the RPA_prand carried in the preceding ADV-POLL frame sent by the initiator. The Security Level of the nonce is set to the appropriate security level, for example, the security level negotiated during session setup.

[0212] For example, to make a compressed frame secure or insecure, the procedures outlined in 9.3.5 (AEAD converted data representation) or 9.3.6 (AEAD inverse converted data representation) of the 802.15.4-2020 specification are reused, except that the MAC header (MHR) is replaced with the ID field, RPA_hash field, RPA_prand field (if present), and MessageControl field for the compressed frame.

[0213] In the most secure compressed frame, the entire MessageControl field is considered a Private Payload field and is encrypted if any security level with encryption is negotiated. However, in a secure RPRT compressed frame (SECURE-RPRT), only selected fields of the MessageControl field may be considered a Private Payload field and is encrypted if any security level with encryption is negotiated. This is summarized in Table 1.

[0214] [Table 1]

[0215] In the above embodiment, the security of communication during MMS ranging can be further improved by encrypting the compressed frame.

[0216] In some possible implementations, UWB channel coordination may be active, and before sending the SOR frame, the initiator scans the initialization channel in the NB and the default UWB channel for acquisition packets (APs) from other initiators. To perform the acquisition scan, upon receiving an ADV-RESP frame from the responder, the initiator does not immediately send the SOR frame, but instead sends an Advertisement Confirmation (ADV-CONF) frame to the responder carrying a time offset indicating the transmission time of the SOR, as shown in step S230' in Figure 12, and the initiator performs the acquisition scan for APs. Based on the information gathered from the APs, the initiator can adapt configuration parameters for MMS ranging in the SOR frame.

[0217] The communication method provided in the embodiments of this application may also be applied in a one-to-many MMS ranging session. Figures 13 to 15 show a schematic flowchart of a communication method in one-to-many MMS ranging according to one embodiment of this application.

[0218] As shown in Figure 13, similar to one-to-one MMS ranging, a one-to-many MMS ranging session begins with the control unit and two controlled devices performing session setup, during which long-term session parameters such as the number of UWB channels, preamble code, and block structure are negotiated. When privacy is enabled, at least one IRK is also provided by the control unit to each controlled device to resolve the private address carried in the frame sent by the initiator and to generate the private address that will be included in the frame sent by the responder, thereby protecting the privacy of the devices.

[0219] Once the session is set up, step S310 is performed.

[0220] S310: The initiator sends an ADV-POLL frame.

[0221] For example, an initiator may opportunistically send ADV-POLL frames at its own discretion in terms of time and intervals, while a responder may opportunistically listen for incoming ADV-POLL frames.

[0222] For details regarding the method for generating the private address of the initiator carried in the ADV-POLL frame and the format of the ADV-POLL frame, refer to the embodiments described above. Further details are not described here.

[0223] When an initiator anticipates that two or more responders will participate in MMS ranging, the initiator allocates a fixed duration for the responders to compete for the medium and transmit their respective ADV-RESP frames.

[0224] Upon receiving an ADV-POLL frame, responder 1 or responder 2 verifies the initiator's identity. The method for verifying the initiator's identity is described in the embodiments above; further details are not provided here.

[0225] When the initiator's identity verification is successful, responder 1 and responder 2, if they intend to participate in a ranging session with the initiator, send ADV-RESP frames to the initiator as shown in step S320. In detail, S320 includes S321 and S322.

[0226] S321: Responder 1 sends an AVD-RESP to the initiator carrying its private address RPA_hash-R1-1.

[0227] S322: Responder 2 sends an AVD-RESP to the initiator carrying its private address RPA_hash-R2-1.

[0228] For information on how to generate private addresses, please refer to the embodiments described above. Further details will not be provided here.

[0229] S330: The initiator sends SOR frames to responder 1 and responder 2.

[0230] The initiator generates local hashes by the method in the embodiment described above. If at least one of the local hashes matches either RPA_hash-R1-1 or RPA_hash-R2-1, the initiator sends a SOR frame that provides a time offset for when the first range measurement cycle begins. The SOR frame carries the same RPA_hash-I-1 contained in the ADV-POLL frame.

[0231] S340: The initiator sends RIM frames to responder 1 and responder 2.

[0232] At the time indicated by the time offset in the SOR frame, the initiator sends a RIM frame to the responder at the beginning of the first ranging slot in the ranging ground.

[0233] A schematic diagram of the RIM frame is shown in Figure 16. Apart from providing time and frequency synchronization to responders, another important purpose of the RIM frame is to provide responders with a schedule of access slots for MMS ranging. As shown in Figure 16, the MessageControl field of the RIM frame carries a list of responders scheduled to participate in MMS ranging. The Responder RPA_hash used in the ADV-RESP frame from responder n, e.g., RPA_hash-Rn-1 (n = 1, 2, etc.), is used as the responder's private address, and the sequence in which the Responder RPA_hash appears in the MessageContent field of the RIM frame determines the sequence of the responder's access slots for MMS ranging. Furthermore, the RIM frame can also carry the initiator's second pseudo-random number RPA_prand-I-2 in the Initiator RPA_prand field and its private address RPA_hash-I-2 in the Initiator RPA_hash field, enabling the responder to verify the initiator's identity.

[0234] For example, responder 1 is scheduled for the first access slot (access slot 0), and responder 2 is scheduled for the second access slot (access slot 1). Then steps S350 to S380 and S350' to S380' are performed.

[0235] S350: Responder 1 sends a RESP to the initiator carrying its private address RPA_hash-R1-2.

[0236] Upon receiving a RIM frame, each responder receiving the RIM frame generates a local hash of the Initiator RPA_prand (e.g., RPA_prand-I-2) based on the IRK, and if the local hash matches the RPA_hash-I-2 carried in the Initiator RPA_hash field of the RIM frame, the responder has verified the initiator's identity.

[0237] A responder that successfully receives a RIM frame and is scheduled for the first access slot (access slot 0) will, as described above, generate its own private address using the RPA_prand-I-2 carried in the RIM frame and send back a RESP frame carrying its private address to the initiator. As described above, the responder may be responder 1.

[0238] It should be noted that the RIM and RESP frames enable the initiator and responder to achieve time and frequency synchronization. The initiator may also include other control information in the RIM frame for the responder.

[0239] When Responder 1's identity verification based on RESP is successful, the initiator initiates a ranging phase in which the initiator and responder exchange zero or more RSFs and, optionally, one or more RIFs.

[0240] After the initiator or responder has finished receiving all UWB fragments in the ranging phase, as shown in steps S370 and S380, the initiator and / or responder generate a ranging measurement report and send an RPRT frame that carries the measurement report to the other device, with each RPRT frame carrying the appropriate private address.

[0241] Subsequently, as shown in step S340', the initiator sends a POLL frame to the responder 2 at the beginning of the first ranging slot of the second access slot (access slot 1).

[0242] The remaining steps in Figure 13 are the same as those described above and in the embodiments described above. Further details are not described here.

[0243] In some possible implementations, the format of the ADV-RESP (or RESP) frame in Figure 13 may be as shown in one of Figures 5 through 7, and the specific format of the ADV-RESP (or RESP) frame may be determined by the parameters used to generate the ADV-RESP (or RESP) frame. For example, the format of the ADV-RESP (or RESP) frame in Figure 13 may be as shown in Figure 5 or Figure 6, if the private address carried in the ADV-RESP (or RESP) frame is generated using one of Equations 2 through 5. Alternatively, the format of the ADV-RESP (or RESP) frame in Figure 13 may be as shown in Figure 7, if the private address carried in the ADV-RESP (or RESP) frame is generated using Equation 6.

[0244] The one-to-many MMS ranging session shown in Figure 14 is similar to that in Figure 13. The difference is that UWB channel coordination may be active, and before sending the SOR frame, the initiator scans the initialization channel in the NB and the default UWB channel for captured packets (APs) from other initiators. To perform the capture scan, upon receiving an ADV-RESP frame from the responder, the initiator does not immediately send the SOR frame, but instead sends an ADV-CONF frame to the responder carrying a time offset indicating the transmission time of the SOR, as shown in step S330' in Figure 14, and the initiator performs the AP capture scan. Based on the information gathered from the APs, the initiator can adapt the configuration parameters for MMS ranging in the SOR frame.

[0245] In some possible implementations, the format of the ADV-RESP (or RESP) frame in Figure 14 may be as shown in Figures 5 to 7, and the specific format of the ADV-RESP (or RESP) frame may be determined by the parameters used to generate the ADV-RESP (or RESP) frame. For example, the format of the ADV-RESP (or RESP) frame in Figure 14 may be as shown in Figure 5 or Figure 6, if the private address carried in the ADV-RESP (or RESP) frame is generated using any one of Equations 2 to 5. Alternatively, the format of the ADV-RESP (or RESP) frame in Figure 14 may be as shown in Figure 7, if the private address carried in the ADV-RESP (or RESP) frame is generated using Equation 6.

[0246] The one-to-many MMS ranging session shown in Figure 15 is similar to that in Figure 13. The difference is that the responders generate their own private addresses based on their paired IRKs. In some of the embodiments described above, it was assumed that the IRKs exchanged between the initiator and all responders were common to all responders, that is, only a single IRK was maintained in the network for the purpose of identifying the resolution. However, for broadcast frames (e.g., RIMs), a common IRK (IRK-B) is shared among all initiators and responders within the same network, and for unicast frames in each direction, a pair of IRKs (IRK-IRn & IRK-RIn, n = responder index) are exchanged between the initiator and each responder (i.e., one IRK (IRK-IRn, n = responder index) for frames from initiator to responder and one IRK (IRK-RIn, n = responder index) for frames from responder to initiator). The IRK is used in subsequent frames as an indirect means of identifying the sender of the frame.

[0247] For example, in the case of a unicast frame to be sent to responder n (i.e., a frame for a single responder, e.g., an ADV-POLL frame, a POLL frame, or a REPORT frame), the initiator generates a unique pseudorandom number for the responder (RPA_prand-In) and, using the initiator-paired IRK for the responder (IRK-IRn, n = responder index), generates an Initiator RPA_hash (RPA_hash-In) by using Equation 1, and includes RPA_hash-In and RPA_prand-In in the first unicast frame for responder n. When responder n receives the first unicast frame sent by the initiator's ADV-POLL (or POLL) frame, responder n generates the local hash of the Initiator RPA_prand and IRK-IRn carried in the ADV-POLL (or POLL) frame as input to Equation 1. If the local hash matches the Initiator RPA_hash carried in the ADV-POLL (or POLL) frame, the responder has verified the initiator's identity.

[0248] Similarly, for broadcast frames (i.e., frames for multiple responders, e.g., POLL for one-to-many ranging, i.e., RIM frames), the initiator generates a unique pseudorandom number (RPA_prand-BI) and, using a common broadcast IRK (IRK-B), generates an Initiator RPA_hash (RPA_hash-BI) by using Equation 1, and includes RPA_hash-BI and RPA_prand-BI in the broadcast frame. When a responder receives the first broadcast frame sent by the initiator (e.g., a RIM frame), the responder generates the local hash of the Initiator RPA_prand carried in the frame and IRK-B as input to Equation 1. If the local hash matches the Initiator RPA_hash carried in the frame, the responder has verified the initiator's identity.

[0249] Similarly, responder n includes in its response frame its RPA_hash, generated by using Equation 5 as the only address field in that frame (e.g., ADV-RESP or RESP), and responder n generates its RPA_hash (RPA_hash-Rn) using its unique paired IRK (IRK-RIn) and Initiator RPA_prand (e.g., RPA_prand-In) in the preceding first frame. For example, using Equation 5, responder 1 generates its own private address based on IRK-RI1, and responder 2 generates its own private address based on IRK-RI2. Correspondingly, the initiator verifies the identity of responder 1 based on IRK-RI1 and the identity of responder 2 based on IRK-RI2. Based on the IRK used, the initiator can implicitly identify the responder (e.g., by mapping the IRK to the initiator's record of the responder's public address). Another difference is that in ADV-POLL and POLL frames, paired IRKs are used to generate a private address (e.g., Initiator RPA_hash), so only the target responder (the one with the correct IRK) can accurately verify the private address, and therefore only the targeted responder will respond to the ADV-POLL or POLL frame with an ADV-RESP or RESP frame, respectively. Correspondingly, SOR frames also target only one responder at a time. This allows the initiator to selectively choose which responders to participate in MMS ranging.

[0250] For example, the format of the ADV-RESP (or RESP) frame in Figure 15 may be as shown in Figures 5 to 7, and the specific format of the ADV-RESP (or RESP) frame may be determined by the parameters used to generate the ADV-RESP (or RESP) frame. For example, the format of the ADV-RESP (or RESP) frame in Figure 15 may be as shown in Figure 5 or Figure 6, if the private address carried in the ADV-RESP (or RESP) frame is generated using any one of Equations 2 to 5. Alternatively, the format of the ADV-RESP (or RESP) frame in Figure 15 may be as shown in Figure 7, if the private address carried in the ADV-RESP (or RESP) frame is generated using Equation 6.

[0251] In the above example using a common IRK as shown in Figures 3 and 12 through 14, the initiator's ADV-POLL and POLL frames are not directed to any particular responder, and any responder possessing the common IRK can verify the initiator's private address and respond to the ADV-POLL and POLL frames. However, sometimes an initiator may want to select a particular responder to participate in MMS ranging. Such an example is shown in Figure 17. The initiator can achieve this by including the target responder's identity (e.g., an 8-octet extended 802.15 MAC address) and the ID of the compressed PSDU (e.g., ADV-POLL) in the calculation of the Initiator RPA_hash for responder n (e.g., RPA_hash_I-Rn, n = 1, 2, …) and truncating it to 24 bits by using Equation 7.

[0252] RPA_hash = AES-128-ECB(key=IRK, data=(0x000…[4] || ID || 8-octets extended 802.15 MAC address of responder n [8] || RPA_prand-I]) % 2^24 Formula 7

[0253] For example, in the first ADV-POLL, the initiator includes the extended 802.15 MAC address of responder 1 in the calculation of the Initiator RPA_hash (RPA_hash-I-R1-1) included in the ADV-POLL frame. Even if both responder 1 and responder 2 receive the ADV-POLL frame, only responder 1 can verify the initiator's private address (RPA_hash-I-R1-1), and thus only responder 1 will respond with an ADV-RESP frame.

[0254] Similarly, responder n can also use the same formula 7 to generate its private address (RPA_hash-Rn), which will be used in ADV-RESP and RESP frames. The same formula is used, but including an ID field (e.g., ADV-RESP) ensures that the private addresses generated by the initiator and responders are different, and the initiator can verify that the responder has a valid IRK. For example, responder 1 generates its private address using formula 7 and sends an ADV-RESP frame to the initiator, which then responds with a SOR frame to invite responder 1 to join a one-to-one MMS ranging. The initiator then sends another ADV-POLL targeting responder 2, and if the initiator receives an ADV-RESP from responder 2, it sends a SOR frame to responder 2 to invite responder 2 to join responder 1 to a one-to-many MMS ranging. Here, it is assumed that responder 1 will continue the MMS ranging session in subsequent rounds / blocks. The RIM frame from the initiator assigns responder 1 and responder 2 to the first and second access slots of the one-to-many MMS ranging, respectively, by including their private addresses in the RIM frame, as previously described in Figure 16.

[0255] It should be noted that the RPRT frame in the above embodiment may also carry the private address of the initiator and the private address of the responder.

[0256] It should also be noted that the above embodiments refer to methods for generating responder private addresses, verifying responder identity, and other relevant aspects of one-to-many MMS ranging sessions. Further details are not provided here.

[0257] This application provides a communication method that enables an initiator to determine whether a response frame is truly from an authorized responder. In particular, in one-to-many MMS ranging, the communication method enables an initiator to distinguish between different responders without revealing the responder's identity. In addition, security of compressed frames is considered.

[0258] In combination with embodiments of the above-described method, this application further provides a related device which may be placed in a control unit or a controlled device. The related device may perform the steps of the above-described embodiment.

[0259] Figure 18 is a schematic block diagram of a communication device 2000 according to one embodiment of the present application. The communication device 2000 can perform steps performed by the responder in the above embodiment. As shown in Figure 18, the communication device 2000 includes a receiving unit 2010 configured to receive a first frame from an initiator to start a ranging process; a generating unit 2020 configured to generate a first private address based on the first frame and information relating to the identity of a first responder, wherein the information relating to the identity of a first responder is known to the initiator; and a transmitting unit 2030 configured to transmit a second frame carrying the first private address to the initiator.

[0260] In possible implementations, information relating to the identity of the first responder includes one of the following: the first responder's public address, the MMS ranging configuration requested by the first responder, the first random number generated by the first responder, or an IRK specific to the initiator and the first responder.

[0261] In a possible implementation, the first frame carries a second random number, which is associated with the initiator's second private address, and the generation unit 2020 is configured to generate the first private address based on the second random number and information relating to the identity of the first responder.

[0262] In possible implementations, the second private address is generated based on information relating to the identity of the second responder, and the generation unit 2020 is configured to generate the first private address when it is determined that the second responder and the first responder are the same responder.

[0263] In a possible implementation, the transmitting unit 2030 is configured to send a second frame to the initiator that carries a first private address and a first random number.

[0264] In a possible implementation, the first frame is a RIM frame carrying a list associated with responders scheduled to participate in MMS ranging, which includes the first responder, and the generation unit 2020 is configured to generate the first private address when it is determined, based on the list, that the first responder is scheduled for the first access slot among multiple access slots.

[0265] In possible implementations, the second frame includes one of the following: an ADV-RESP frame, a RESP frame, or an RPRT frame.

[0266] In possible implementations, the first or second frame is a secure frame carrying encrypted information, which is retrieved based on a first nonce, the first nonce being associated with one of the following: a private address carried by the secure frame, a random number used to generate the private address, or a time period for transmitting the secure frame.

[0267] In possible implementations, the first nonce includes frame counter information, which indicates the time period for securely transmitting the frame.

[0268] In possible implementations, the first nonce further includes block structure indicator information, which indicates whether the second frame is transmitted inside or outside the block structure.

[0269] In possible implementations, the second frame further carries the initiator's private address.

[0270] In a possible implementation, the receiving unit 2010 is further configured to receive a third frame from the initiator that carries time offset information, which indicates the time offset of the transmitted SOR frame.

[0271] Figure 19 is a schematic block diagram of a communication device 2100 according to one embodiment of the present application. The communication device 2100 can perform steps performed by the initiator in the above embodiment. As shown in Figure 19, the communication device 2100 includes a receiving unit 2110 configured to receive a second frame from a first responder carrying a first private address, wherein the first private address is associated with information relating to the identity of the first responder; a generating unit 2120 configured to generate a third private address based on the information relating to the identity of the first responder; and a verification unit 2130 configured to verify the identity of the first responder by comparing the third private address with the first private address.

[0272] In possible implementations, information relating to the identity of the first responder includes one of the following: the first responder's public address, the MMS ranging configuration requested by the first responder, the first random number generated by the first responder, or an IRK specific to the initiator and the first responder.

[0273] In a possible implementation, the communication device further includes a transmitting unit configured to send a first frame to initiate a ranging process, the first frame carrying a second random number, the second random number associated with a second private address of the initiator, and a generating unit 2120 configured to generate a third private address based on the second random number and information relating to the identity of the first responder.

[0274] In possible implementations, the generation unit 2120 is further configured to generate a fourth private address based on information relating to the identity of the second responder, and the transmission unit is further configured to send a frame carrying the fourth private address to the second responder.

[0275] In a possible implementation form, the second frame further carries the first random number, and the generation unit 2120 is configured to generate a third private address based on the first random number.

[0276] In a possible implementation form, the sending unit is further configured to send a first frame for starting a ranging process to a first responder, and the first frame is a RIM frame carrying a list associated with responders scheduled to participate in MMS ranging, and the responders include the first responder.

[0277] In a possible implementation form, the second frame includes any one of an ADV-RESP frame, a RESP frame, or a RPRT frame.

[0278] In a possible implementation form, the first frame or the second frame is a secured frame carrying encrypted information, and the encrypted information is obtained based on a first nonce, and the first nonce is associated with any one of a private address carried by the secured frame, a random number used to generate the private address, or a time period for sending the secured frame.

[0279] In a possible implementation form, the first nonce includes frame counter information, and the frame counter information indicates a time period for sending the secured frame.

[0280] In a possible implementation form, the first nonce further includes block structure indication information, and the block structure indication information indicates whether the second frame is sent inside or outside the block structure.

[0281] In a possible implementation form, the second frame further carries the private address of the initiator, and the verification unit 2130 is further configured to verify the identity of the first responder based on the private address of the initiator.

[0282] In a possible implementation form, the sending unit is further configured to send a third frame carrying time offset information to the first responder, and the time offset information indicates the time offset of the sent SOR frame.

[0283] As shown in FIG. 20, the communication device 2200 may include a processor 2210, a transceiver 2220, and a memory 2230. The transceiver 2220 may be configured to receive a query. The memory 2230 may be configured to store codes, instructions, etc. executed by the processor 2210.

[0284] Also, the memory 2230 may be further configured to store data corresponding to generating and / or verifying a private address, such as an IRK pre-negotiated between the initiator and the responder.

[0285] The memory 2230 may include a random memory, a flash memory, a read-only memory, a programmable read-only memory, a non-volatile memory, a register, etc. The processor 2210 may be a central processing unit (CPU).

[0286] Regarding other functions and operations of the communication device 2200, reference is made to the processes of the method embodiments in FIGS. 2, FIGS. 3, FIGS. 12 to FIGS. 15, and FIGS. 17. To avoid repetition, these are not described again here.

[0287] One embodiment of the present application further provides a communication system. The communication system includes the communication device 2000 and the communication device 2100, or the communication system includes the communication device 2200.

[0288] One embodiment of this application further provides a computer storage medium which may store program instructions for performing the steps in the above method.

[0289] Optionally, the storage medium may be specifically memory 2230.

[0290] One embodiment of this application further provides a computer program product. The computer program product includes computer program code. When the computer program code is run on a computer, the computer is enabled to perform the steps in the above method.

[0291] Optionally, all or part of the computer program code may be stored in a first storage medium. The first storage medium may be packaged together with the processor or separately from the processor.

[0292] One embodiment of the present application further provides a chip system comprising an input / output interface, at least one processor, at least one memory, and a bus. The at least one memory is configured to store instructions, and the at least one processor is configured to call instructions from the at least one memory to perform the operation of the method in the above embodiment.

[0293] In embodiments of this application, “at least one” means one or more, and “a plurality of” means two or more. The words “and / or” describe the relationship between related subjects and indicate that there may be three possible relationships. For example, A and / or B can represent the following three cases: only A exists, both A and B exist, or only B exists, where A and B may be singular or plural. The letter “ / ” generally indicates an “or” relationship between related subjects. “At least one of the following” and similar expressions refer to any combination of these items, including any combination of one or more items. For example, at least one of a, b, and c can represent a, b, c, a and b, a and c, b and c, or a, b, and c, where a, b, and c may be singular or plural.

[0294] Those skilled in the art will understand that all or some of the processes of the method in the embodiment may be implemented by a computer program that instructs the relevant hardware. The program may be stored in a computer-readable storage medium. When the program is executed, the processes of the method in the embodiment are carried out. The storage medium may include a magnetic disk, an optical disk, read-only memory (ROM), or random access memory (RAM).

[0295] In some embodiments provided in this application, it should be understood that the disclosed systems, apparatus, and methods may be implemented in other ways. For example, the embodiments of the described apparatus are illustrative only. For example, the unit division is merely a logical functional division, and other divisions may be used in actual implementations. For example, multiple units or components may be combined or integrated into another system, or some features may be ignored or not implemented. In addition, the mutual coupling, direct coupling, or communication connection shown or discussed may be implemented by using some interfaces. Indirect coupling or communication connection between apparatus or units may be implemented in electronic, mechanical, or other forms.

[0296] Units described as separate components may or may not be physically separated, and components shown as units may or may not be physical units, may be located in one place, or may be distributed across multiple network units. Some or all of the units may be selected according to the actual needs in order to achieve the objectives of the solution of the embodiment.

[0297] In addition, the functional units in the embodiments of the present invention may be integrated into a single processing unit, or each unit may exist physically independently, or two or more units may be integrated into a single unit.

[0298] The above are merely exemplary embodiments of the present invention. Those skilled in the art may make various modifications and variations to the present invention without departing from its scope. [Explanation of symbols]

[0299] 2000 Communication equipment 2010 Receiving Unit 2020 Generation Unit 2030 Transmitter Unit 2100 Communication equipment 2110 Receiving Unit 2120 generation units 2130 Verification Unit 2200 Communication equipment 2210 Processor 2220 Transceiver 2230 memory

Claims

1. A communication method applicable to the first responder, The steps include receiving a first frame from the initiator to start the ranging process, A step of generating a first private address based on the first frame and information relating to the identity of the first responder, The steps include sending a second frame carrying the first private address to the initiator, and A communication method that includes this.

2. The communication method according to claim 1, wherein the information relating to the identity of the first responder includes one of the following: the public address of the first responder, a multi-millisecond (MMS) ranging configuration requested by the first responder, a first random number generated by the first responder, or an identity resolution key (IRK) specific to the initiator and the first responder.

3. The first frame carries a second random number, and the second random number is associated with the second private address of the initiator. The step of generating a first private address based on the first frame and information relating to the identity of the first responder is: The communication method according to claim 2, comprising the step of generating a first private address based on the second random number and the information relating to the identity of the first responder.

4. The step of generating a first private address based on the first frame and the information relating to the identity of the first responder is as follows: The communication method according to claim 3, further comprising the step of generating the first private address when it is determined that the second responder and the first responder are the same responder.

5. The step of transmitting a second frame carrying the first private address to the initiator is: A communication method according to any one of claims 2 to 4, comprising the step of transmitting to the initiator the second frame carrying the first private address and the first random number.

6. The first frame is a ranging initialization message (RIM) frame that carries a list of responders scheduled to participate in MMS ranging, and the responders include the first responder. The step of generating a first private address by using information relating to the identity of the first responder is, A communication method according to any one of claims 1 to 5, comprising the step of generating a first private address when it is determined based on the list that the first responder is scheduled for a first access slot among a plurality of access slots.

7. The communication method according to any one of claims 1 to 6, wherein the second frame includes one of an ad response (ADV-RESP) frame, a response (RESP) frame, or a report (RPRT) frame.

8. A communication method according to any one of claims 1 to 7, wherein the first frame or the second frame is a secure frame carrying encrypted information, the encrypted information is obtained based on a first nonce, the first nonce being associated with one of the following: a private address carried by the secure frame, a random number used to generate the private address, or a period of time for transmitting the secure frame.

9. The communication method according to claim 8, wherein the first nonce includes frame counter information, the frame counter information indicating the time period for the transmission of the secured frame.

10. The communication method according to claim 8 or 9, wherein the first nonce further includes block structure instruction information, the block structure instruction information indicating whether the second frame is transmitted inside or outside the block structure.

11. The communication method according to any one of claims 1 to 10, wherein the second frame further carries the private address of the initiator.

12. The method described above is A communication method according to any one of claims 1 to 11, further comprising the step of receiving a third frame carrying time offset information from the initiator, wherein the time offset information indicates a time offset of a transmitted ranging start (SOR) frame.

13. A communication method applicable to the initiator, A step of receiving a second frame from a first responder that carries a first private address, wherein the first private address is associated with information relating to the identity of the first responder, A step of generating a third private address based on the information relating to the identity of the first responder, The steps include verifying the identity of the first responder by comparing the third private address with the first private address, and A communication method that includes this.

14. The communication method according to claim 13, wherein the information relating to the identity of the first responder includes one of the following: the public address of the first responder, a multi-millisecond (MMS) ranging configuration requested by the first responder, a first random number generated by the first responder, or an identity resolution key (IRK) specific to the initiator and the first responder.

15. The method described above is A step of transmitting a first frame for initiating a ranging process, the first frame carrying a second random number, the second random number associated with a second private address of the initiator, further comprising: The step of generating a third private address based on the information relating to the identity of the first responder is: The communication method according to claim 14, comprising the step of generating the third private address based on the second random number and the information relating to the identity of the first responder.

16. The method described above is A step of generating a fourth private address based on information related to the identity of the second responder, The steps include sending a frame carrying the fourth private address to the second responder and The communication method according to claim 15, further comprising:

17. The second frame further carries the first random number, and the step of generating a third private address based on the information relating to the identity of the first responder is: A communication method according to any one of claims 14 to 16, comprising the step of generating the third private address based on the first random number.

18. The method described above is A communication method according to any one of claims 13 to 17, further comprising the step of sending a first frame to a first responder for initiating a ranging process, wherein the first frame is a ranging initialization message (RIM) frame carrying a list associated with responders scheduled to participate in MMS ranging, and the responder includes the first responder.

19. The communication method according to any one of claims 13 to 18, wherein the second frame includes one of an ad response (ADV-RESP) frame, a response (RESP) frame, or a report (RPRT) frame.

20. A communication method according to any one of claims 13 to 19, wherein the first frame or the second frame is a secure frame carrying encrypted information, the encrypted information is obtained based on a first nonce, the first nonce being associated with one of the following: a private address carried by the secure frame, a random number used to generate the private address, or a period of time for transmitting the secure frame.

21. The communication method according to claim 20, wherein the first nonce includes frame counter information, and the frame counter information indicates the time period for the transmission of the secured frame.

22. The communication method according to claim 20 or 21, wherein the first nonce further includes block structure instruction information, the block structure instruction information indicating whether the second frame is transmitted inside or outside the block structure.

23. The second frame further carries the private address of the initiator, and the method A communication method according to any one of claims 13 to 22, further comprising the step of verifying the identity of the first responder based on the private address of the initiator.

24. The method described above is A communication method according to any one of claims 13 to 23, further comprising the step of transmitting a third frame carrying time offset information to the first responder, wherein the time offset information indicates a time offset of a transmitted ranging start (SOR) frame.

25. A receiving unit configured to receive a first frame from the initiator to start the ranging process, A generation unit configured to generate a first private address based on the first frame and information relating to the identity of the first responder, A transmitting unit configured to transmit a second frame carrying the first private address to the initiator, Communication devices, including

26. The communication device according to claim 25, wherein the information relating to the identity of the first responder includes one of the following: the public address of the first responder, a multi-millisecond (MMS) ranging configuration requested by the first responder, a first random number generated by the first responder, or an identity resolution key (IRK) specific to the initiator and the first responder.

27. The first frame carries a second random number, the second random number is associated with the second private address of the initiator, and the generation unit, The communication device according to claim 26, configured to generate the first private address based on the second random number and the information relating to the identity of the first responder.

28. The second private address is generated based on information relating to the identity of the second responder, and the generation unit, The communication device according to claim 27, configured to generate the first private address when the second responder and the first responder are determined to be the same responder.

29. The aforementioned transmission unit A communication device according to any one of claims 26 to 28, configured to transmit to the initiator a second frame carrying the first private address and the first random number.

30. The first frame is a ranging initialization message (RIM) frame that carries a list associated with responders scheduled to participate in MMS ranging, and the responders include the first responder, and the generating unit, A communication device according to any one of claims 25 to 29, configured to generate the first private address when it is determined, based on the list, that the first responder is scheduled for a first access slot among a plurality of access slots.

31. The communication device according to any one of claims 25 to 30, wherein the second frame includes one of an ad response (ADV-RESP) frame, a response (RESP) frame, or a report (RPRT) frame.

32. A communication device according to any one of claims 25 to 31, wherein the first frame or the second frame is a secure frame carrying encrypted information, the encrypted information is obtained based on a first nonce, the first nonce being associated with one of the following: a private address carried by the secure frame, a random number used to generate the private address, or a period of time for transmitting the secure frame.

33. The communication device according to claim 32, wherein the first nonce includes frame counter information, and the frame counter information indicates the time period for the transmission of the secured frame.

34. The communication device according to claim 32 or 33, wherein the first nonce further includes block structure instruction information, the block structure instruction information indicating whether the second frame is transmitted inside or outside the block structure.

35. The communication device according to any one of claims 25 to 34, wherein the second frame further carries the private address of the initiator.

36. The receiving unit, The communication device according to any one of claims 25 to 35, further configured to receive a third frame from the initiator carrying time offset information, wherein the time offset information indicates a time offset of a transmitted ranging start (SOR) frame.

37. A receiving unit configured to receive a second frame carrying a first private address from a first responder, wherein the first private address is associated with information relating to the identity of the first responder, A generation unit configured to generate a third private address based on the information relating to the identity of the first responder, A verification unit configured to verify the identity of the first responder by comparing the third private address with the first private address, Communication devices, including

38. The communication device according to claim 37, wherein the information relating to the identity of the first responder includes one of the following: the public address of the first responder, a multi-millisecond (MMS) ranging configuration requested by the first responder, a first random number generated by the first responder, or an identity resolution key (IRK) specific to the initiator and the first responder.

39. The aforementioned communication device The system further includes a transmitting unit configured to transmit a first frame for initiating a ranging process, wherein the first frame carries a second random number, and the second random number is associated with a second private address of the initiator. The aforementioned generation unit The communication device according to claim 38, configured to generate the third private address based on the second random number and the information relating to the identity of the first responder.

40. The aforementioned generation unit It is further configured to generate a fourth private address based on information related to the identity of the second responder, The aforementioned transmission unit The communication device according to claim 39, further configured to transmit a frame carrying the fourth private address to the second responder.

41. The second frame further transports the first random number, and the generation unit, A communication device according to any one of claims 38 to 40, configured to generate the third private address based on the first random number.

42. The aforementioned transmission unit The communication device according to any one of claims 37 to 41, further configured to send a first frame to the first responder for initiating a ranging process, wherein the first frame is a ranging initialization message (RIM) frame carrying a list associated with responders scheduled to participate in MMS ranging, and the responders include the first responder.

43. The communication device according to any one of claims 37 to 42, wherein the second frame includes one of an ad response (ADV-RESP) frame, a response (RESP) frame, and a report (RPRT) frame.

44. A communication device according to any one of claims 37 to 43, wherein the first frame or the second frame is a secure frame carrying encrypted information, the encrypted information is obtained based on a first nonce, the first nonce being associated with one of the following: a private address carried by the secure frame, a random number used to generate the private address, or a period of time for transmitting the secure frame.

45. The communication device according to claim 44, wherein the first nonce includes frame counter information, the frame counter information indicating the time period for the transmission of the secured frame.

46. The communication device according to claim 44 or 45, wherein the first nonce further includes block structure instruction information, the block structure instruction information indicating whether the second frame is transmitted inside or outside the block structure.

47. The second frame further carries the private address of the initiator, and the verification unit, A communication device according to any one of claims 37 to 46, further configured to verify the identity of the first responder based on the private address of the initiator.

48. The aforementioned transmission unit The communication device according to any one of claims 37 to 47, further configured to transmit a third frame carrying time offset information to the first responder, wherein the time offset information indicates a time offset of a transmitted ranging start (SOR) frame.

49. A communication device comprising a processor and memory, wherein the processor is connected to the memory, the memory is configured to store instructions, the processor is configured to execute the instructions, and when the processor executes the instructions stored in the memory, the processor is enabled to perform the method according to any one of claims 1 to 12 or any one of claims 13 to 24.

50. A communication system comprising a communication device according to any one of claims 25 to 36 and a communication device according to any one of claims 37 to 48.

51. A computer-readable storage medium, wherein the computer-readable storage medium stores instructions, and when the instructions are executed in a processor, the processor is enabled to perform the method according to any one of claims 1 to 12 or any one of claims 13 to 24.

52. A computer program product comprising computer program code, wherein when the computer program code is operated on a computer, the computer is enabled to perform the method according to any one of claims 1 to 12 or any one of claims 13 to 24.

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