Secure key replacement system, secure key replacement device, and secure key replacement method
The secure key replacement system addresses the issue of public key replacement by using a replacement command generated from the original private key to update the public key, ensuring continued data authentication and signature generation capabilities.
Patent Information
- Authority / Receiving Office
- JP · JP
- Patent Type
- Patents
- Current Assignee / Owner
- WINBOND ELECTRONICS CORP
- Filing Date
- 2025-01-21
- Publication Date
- 2026-07-23
AI Technical Summary
Existing systems fail to effectively replace a public key when the corresponding private key is lost, corrupted, or unavailable, leading to the inability to generate signatures and authenticate data, as the public key cannot be overwritten, and the signing server's ability to provide signatures is lost.
A secure key replacement system and method that involves generating a replacement command using the original private key to replace the old public key with a new one, ensuring that each device can authenticate data using the new public key by accepting commands signed by the active signing server and rejecting unsigned commands.
Ensures that devices can protect their public keys by accepting valid replacement commands, allowing the signing server to regain the ability to generate signatures, thus maintaining data authentication capabilities even when the private key becomes unavailable.
Smart Images
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Abstract
Description
Technical Field
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[0001] The present invention relates to a computer system, and more particularly, to, but not limited to, the replacement of a secure key.
Background Art
[0002] A signature server or other centrally managed entity can provide data to a device (such as a secure flash device) signed with the secret key of the signature server and generate a signature. Since each device holds a corresponding public key, the public key can be used to authenticate the data against the signature. It is important to prevent the public key from being overwritten by an attacker attempting to spoof the signature server.
[0003] On the signature server side, since the secret key may be lost, damaged, or become unavailable, it becomes impossible to generate a signature using the secret key and perform authentication by the device using the corresponding public key.
Summary of the Invention
Problems to be Solved by the Invention
[0004] One solution is to create a backup copy of the secret key and store the secret key in one or more secure locations as needed.
Means for Solving the Problems
[0005] According to one embodiment of the present invention, a secure key replacement system is provided, the secure key replacement system comprising a secure storage and processing unit configured to store a first private key, generate a signature using the first private key and authenticate by a device storing a first public key that forms a key pair with the first private key, and sign a replacement command using the first private key, wherein the replacement command is used to instruct a device to replace the first public key with a second public key that forms a key pair with the second private key; and an active signature server configured to provide the signature to the device and provide the replacement command to at least one entity, wherein the at least one entity stores an active signature server and devices remotely, and the at least one entity includes an interface that includes an orchestration server and / or at least one other signature server.
[0006] Furthermore, according to another embodiment of the present invention, a secure key replacement device is provided, the secure key replacement device includes: secure storage configured to securely store a first public key that forms a key pair with a first private key stored by an active signing server; and a secure processor configured to reject an instruction to replace the first public key, that the instruction is not authorized by a signature formed by an active signing server using the first private key; receive a replacement command signed by the first private key, and the replacement command is used to instruct the device to replace the first public key with a second public key that forms a key pair with a second private key stored by a new active signing server; authenticate the replacement command using the first public key; and, upon authentication of the replacement command using the first public key, replace the first public key with the second public key in response.
[0007] Furthermore, according to yet another embodiment of the present invention, a secure key replacement method is provided, the secure key replacement method comprising: storing a first private key; generating a signature by an active signing server using the first private key and authenticating by a device storing a first public key that forms a key pair with the first private key; signing a replacement command by an active signing server using the first private key, the replacement command being used to instruct the device to replace the first public key with a second public key that forms a key pair with the second private key; providing the signature to the device and providing the replacement command to at least one entity, the at least one entity storing the active signing server and the device remotely, the at least one entity including an orchestration server and / or at least one other signing server.
[0008] Furthermore, according to yet another embodiment of the present invention, a secure key replacement method is provided, which includes securely storing a first public key that forms a key pair with a first private key stored by an active signing server; receiving a replacement command signed by the first private key, configured to be used to instruct a device to replace the first public key with a second public key that forms a key pair with a second private key stored by a new active signing server; authenticating the replacement command using the first public key; and, upon authenticating the replacement command using the first public key, replacing the first public key with the second public key in response. [Effects of the Invention]
[0009] As described above, each device can protect its currently stored public key by accepting substitution commands signed by a live signing server and rejecting substitution commands that are not signed by a signing server. Then, the signing server corresponding to the substitution command becomes the new active signing server and can generate a signature using its private key, so each device can authenticate the data using the new public key. [Brief explanation of the drawing]
[0010] This invention can be understood from the detailed description below, when read in conjunction with the drawings.
[0011] [Figure 1] This is a block diagram of a secure key replacement system configured and operating according to one embodiment of the present invention. [Figure 2] Figure 1 is a flowchart showing the steps involved in the operation of the system. [Figure 3] Figure 1 is a flowchart showing the steps in the device method for the system. [Figure 4] This is a block diagram of the system in Figure 1 when the active signing server or active private key becomes inactive or unavailable. [Figure 5] This flowchart shows the steps in the operation of the system shown in Figure 1 that are performed in response when an active signing server or active private key becomes inactive or unavailable. [Figure 6] Figure 1 is a block diagram of the system when a new active signing server is assigned. [Figure 7] This is a flowchart showing the steps in the device method in the system shown in Figure 1 after assigning a new active signing server. [Modes for carrying out the invention]
[0012] As mentioned earlier, a signature server can back up its private key to one or more secure locations if the private key in use is lost, corrupted, or unavailable. However, backing up the private key may not always solve the problem, as illustrated below.
[0013] The National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) recommends the use of hash-based signatures (i.e., stateful signatures). These are one-time signatures that use an index that is incremented each time a signature is generated, and have the advantage of being unbreakable by quantum computers. However, it is crucial that the same index is never used twice, otherwise the signature will be broken. Therefore, backing up only the private key is insufficient; the index must also be backed up, but there is no practical solution for this. For this reason, NIST recommends always storing the index and key together in a hardware module (e.g., a hardware security module, HSM), but because the index is incremented each time the key is used, it becomes impossible to back up the key as if you had deleted the key yourself, the connection to the index is lost, and the security of the signature scheme cannot be ensured. A signature server is an entity that contains an HSM for securely storing the private key and performing the cryptographic process (e.g., signature generation) with the private key.
[0014] If a private key cannot be backed up, and if the private key is lost, corrupted, or unavailable, it has been proposed that a new key pair be generated by the signing server or another signing server to sign the data and authenticate it using the device. However, each device has a public key installed in a protected manner that corresponds to the "lost" private key, and the public key cannot be replaced, so simply generating a new key pair yourself does not solve the problem. Therefore, the device becomes unusable in this respect because it cannot overwrite the old public key with the new public key, and the signing server's ability to provide signatures to all devices is permanently lost.
[0015] Embodiments of the present invention solve the above-mentioned problems by providing a system that can use a replacement command generated from the original private key when the original private key becomes unavailable (for example, lost, corrupted, or for other reasons). The original public key is then sent to the device to replace it with a new public key, thereby recovering from the situation in which the private key was unavailable.
[0016] System Description
[0017] Referring now to Figure 1, which is a block diagram of a secure key replacement system (hereinafter referred to as the System) 10 built and operating according to one embodiment of the present invention. The System 10 includes N signature servers SS, including an active signature server SS and N-1 inactive signature servers SS. N may be any suitable number greater than or equal to 2. As shown in Figure 1, signature server 0 functions as the active signature server 14 at this time, and signature servers 1 to N-1 function as backup signature servers. The System 10 also includes an orchestration server 18 and a device 20, where device 20 is, for example, a secure flash storage device.
[0018] Each signature server SS includes a secure storage and processing unit 16 (e.g., a hardware security module (HSM)) and an interface 26 for sharing data with another of the signature server SS, orchestration server 18, and device 20 (e.g., via orchestration server 18). In the example in Figure 1, signature server 0 includes a secure storage and processing unit 16 (HSM 0), signature server 1 includes a secure storage and processing unit 16 (HSM 1), and signature server N-1 includes HSM N-1. The secure storage and processing unit 16 (HSM) is a physical computing device that protects and manages secrets and performs encryption and decryption functions used for digital signatures, strong authentication, and other cryptographic functions. Each secure storage and processing unit 16 is configured to store one or more private keys 30 (PRVKs) and selectively store indexes associated with the private keys 30. In the example shown in Figure 1, the secure storage and processing unit 16 (HSM 0) stores the secret key 30 (PRVK_0), the secure storage and processing unit 16 (HSM 1) stores the secret key 30 (PRVK_1), and the secure storage and processing unit 16 (HSM N-1) stores the secret key 30 (PRVK_N-1). Further details will be explained with reference to Figure 2.
[0019] Each device 20 includes an interface 28 for sharing data with the orchestration server 18 and each signing server SS. Each device 20 also includes a secure processor 22 and secure storage 24. The secure storage 24 of each device 20 is configured to store public keys (PUBK) 32 (for example, the public key 32 (PUBK_0) that forms a key pair with the private key 30 (PRVK_0) of the active signing server 14 (signing server 0)).
[0020] FIG. 2 is a flowchart 200 including steps in the method of operating the system 10 of FIG. 1. Please refer to FIGS. 1 and 2.
[0021] The orchestration server 18 is configured to assign the signature server 0 as the active signature server 14 (step 202). The secure storage and processing unit 16 of the signature server 14 (signature server 0) is configured to generate a key pair, store the generated private key 30 (PRVK_0), and selectively store an index associated with the private key 30 (not shown). The secure storage and processing unit 16 of the active signature server 14 (signature server 0) is configured to distribute the generated public key 32 (PUBK_0) to each device 20. The public key 32 (PUBK_0) of the active signature server 14 (signature server 0) is then stored in the secure storage 24 of each device 20 (step 204). In one embodiment, the secure storage and processing unit 16 of the active signature server 14 (signature server 0) is also configured to distribute the generated public key 32 (PUBK_0) to all signature servers SS and / or the orchestration server 18 (not shown).
[0022] Each secure storage and processing unit 16 (HSM 1 to HSM N-1) of the backup signature servers (signature servers 1 to signature server N-1) is configured to generate a key pair (public key 32 (PUBK_1 to PUBK_N-1) and private key 30 (PRVK_1 to PRVK_N-1)), store the generated private key 30, and selectively store an index related to the private key 30 (not shown) (step 206). That is, the secure storage and processing unit 16 of the N-1 signature servers is configured to generate N-1 corresponding key pairs, and each key pair includes its respective public key and its respective private key. As shown in the example of FIG. 1, HSM 1 generates a key pair including public key PUBK_1 and private key PRVK_1, and stores the generated private key PRVK_1. HSM N-1 generates a key pair including public key PUBK_N-1 and private key PRVK_N-1, and stores the generated private key PRVK_N-1. The same applies hereinafter. In one embodiment, optionally, the secure storage and processing unit 16 of the backup signature server SS is configured to distribute the generated public key 32 to all signature servers SS and / or the orchestration server 18 (step 210).
[0023] The secure storage and processing unit 16 of the active signature server 14 (signature server 0) is configured to sign the replacement command corresponding to each backup signature server SS using its private key 30 (PRVK_0) (step 212). When N is equal to 2, there will be one replacement command. Here, each replacement command can include the public key of each backup signature server and a signature of data including the public key signed using the private key 30 of the active signature server 14. For example, "replacement command 0>1" can include a signature signed by the active signature server 14 (signature server 0) using the public key 32 (PUBK_1) of the backup signature server 1 and the private key 30 (PRVK_0) of the active signature server 14 (signature server 0).
[0024] The substitution command is configured to instruct device 20 to replace the public key 32 (PUBK_0) of the active signing server 14 (signing server 0) with the public key 32 corresponding to the substitution command. For example, the secure storage and processing unit 16 of the active signing server 14 (signing server 0) can use its private key 30 (PRVK_0) to sign "substitution command 0>1" corresponding to backup signing server 1 (block 34 in Figure 1), and "substitution command 0>1" is configured to instruct device 20 to replace the stored public key PUBK_0 with the public key PUBK_1. The secure storage and processing unit 16 of the active signing server 14 (signing server 0) can use its private key PRVK_0 to sign "substitution command 0>N-1" corresponding to signing server N-1 (block 36 in Figure 1), and "substitution command 0>N-1" is configured to instruct device 20 to replace the stored public key PUBK_0 with the public key PUBK_N-1.
[0025] The interface 26 of the active signing server 14 (signing server 0) is configured to provide (e.g., send) substitution commands to one or more entities (e.g., orchestration server 18 and / or backup signing servers (e.g., signing server 1 to signing server N-1)), and one or more entities store the substitution commands away from the active signing server 14 and device 20 (step 214). In one embodiment of the present invention, orchestration server 18 may store all substitution commands, and / or each substitution command may be stored by the associated signing server 12. For example, "command 0>1" (block 34) may be stored by signing server 1, and "command 0>N-1" (block 36) may be stored by signing server N-1.
[0026] The secure storage and processing unit 16 of the active signature server 12 is configured to generate a signature 38 using its private key 30 (PRVK_0) and to be authenticated by device 20 (step 216). In one embodiment, the secure storage and processing unit 16 of the active signature server 14 (signature server 0) is configured to generate a hash-based signature using the private key PRVK_0 and a stored index (stored in the secure storage and processing unit 16 of the active signature server 14) and to be authenticated by device 20. In embodiments where hash-based signatures are generated, the secure storage and processing unit 16 of the active signature server 14 is configured to update (e.g., increment) the index in response to each hash-based signature generated (optionally, step 218). The interface 26 of the active signing server 14 is configured to provide the signature 38 to the device 20 (for example, via the orchestration server 18), so that the device 20 can authenticate using the stored public key 32 (PUBK_0) corresponding to the active signing server 14 (signing server 0) (step 220). Steps 216-220 may be repeated (arrow 222).
[0027] Figure 3 is a flowchart 300 showing the steps in one method of device 20 in system 10 of Figure 1. Referring to Figures 1 and 3, secure storage 24 is configured to securely store the public key 32 (PUBK_0) corresponding to the private key 30 (PRVK_0) stored by the active signing server 14 (signing server 0) (step 302). Secure processor 22 is configured to authenticate incoming substitution commands using the stored public key 32 (PUBK_0), and if authentication is successful, in response to it, approve substitution commands that have a signature signed by the active signing server 14 (signing server 0); but if authentication fails, in response to it, reject substitution commands that do not have a signature signed by the active signing server 14 (signing server 0) (step 304). Secure processor 22 is configured to receive one or more signatures 38 (step 306). The secure processor 22 is configured to use the stored public key 32 (PUBK_0) to authenticate whether the received signature 38 is a signature signed by the active signing server 14 (signing server 0) (step 308). Steps 306-308 may be repeated (arrow 310).
[0028] Figure 4 is a block diagram of system 10 in Figure 1 when the original active signing server (signing server 0) and / or its active private key 30 (PRVK_0) become unavailable (block 40). Figure 5 is a flowchart 500 showing the steps in how system 10 in Figure 1 operates in response when the original active signing server (signing server 0) and / or the original active private key 30 (PRVK_0) become unavailable. Figure 6 is a block diagram of system 10 showing the situation when system 10 assigns a new active signing server 14' (block 42).
[0029] Referring to Figures 4 to 6, the orchestration server 18 can be configured to detect when the active signing server 14 (signing server 0) and / or its private key 30 (PRVK_0) become unavailable (e.g., destroyed) (step 502).
[0030] The orchestration server 18 is configured to assign a backup signing server (e.g., signing server 1) as the new active signing server 14' (step 504). The orchestration server 18 is configured to provide device 20 with a substitution command (e.g., "substitution command 0>1" (block 34 in Figure 6)) corresponding to the new active signing server 14' (e.g., signing server 1) (in response to the original active signing server 14 (signing server 0) going down and / or its private key 30 (PRVK_0) becoming unavailable), and device 20 replaces the public key 32 (PUBK_0) that was originally stored with the public key 32 (PUBK_1) corresponding to the substitution command (step 506). The step by which device 20 replaces PUBK_0 with PUBK_1 is described in detail with reference to Figure 7.
[0031] The orchestration server 18 can be configured to add a new signing server SS (block 48 in Figure 6) having a secure storage and processing unit 16 to the system as a backup signing server (step 508). The secure storage and processing unit 16 (e.g., HSM N) of the added signing server SS (signing server N) is configured to generate a key pair containing a public key 32 (PUBK_N) and a private key 30 (PRVK_N), store the generated private key 30 (PRVK_N), and selectively store the index (not shown) associated with the private key 30, as shown in Figure 6 (step 510). In one embodiment, selectively, the secure storage and processing unit 16 of the added signing server SS is configured to distribute the public key 32 (PUBK_N) it generates to all signing servers SS and / or orchestration servers 18 (step 514).
[0032] The secure storage and processing unit 16 of the new active signing server 14' (signing server 1) is configured to sign substitution commands corresponding to each backup signing server SS using its private key 30 (PRVK_1) (block 516). Here, each substitution command may include the public key of each backup signing server and a signature signed using the private key 30 of the active signing server 14' to the data containing the public key. For example, "substitution command 1>N" may include a signature signed by the active signing server 14 (signing server 1) using the public key 32 (PUBK_N) of backup signing server N and the private key 30 (PRVK_1) of the active signing server 14' (signing server 1).
[0033] The substitution command is configured to instruct device 20 to replace the public key 32 (PUBK_1) of the active signing server with the public key 32 corresponding to the substitution command. For example, the secure storage and processing unit 16 of the active signing server 14' (signing server 1) can use its private key 30 (PRVK_1) to sign "substitution command 1>N-1" (block 46 in Figure 6) corresponding to backup signing server N-1. "Substitution command 1>N-1" is configured to instruct device 20 to replace the stored public key PUBK_1 with the public key PUBK_N-1. The secure storage and processing unit 16 of the active signing server 14' (signing server 1) can use its private key PRVK_1 to sign "substitution command 1>N" (block 44 in Figure 6) corresponding to signing server N. "Substitution command 1>N" is configured to instruct device 20 to replace the stored public key PUBK_1 with the public key PUBK_N.
[0034] The interface 26 of the active signing server 14' (signing server 1) is configured to provide (e.g., send) substitution commands to one or more entities (e.g., orchestration server 18 and / or backup signing servers (e.g., signing server 2 to signing server N)), and one or more entities store the substitution commands away from the active signing server 14' and device 20 (step 518). In one embodiment, orchestration server 18 may store all substitution commands, and / or each substitution command may be stored by the associated signing server SS. For example, "substitution command 1>N-1" (block 46 in Figure 6) may be stored by signing server N-1, and "substitution command 1>N" (block 44 in Figure 6) may be stored by signing server N.
[0035] The secure storage and processing unit 16 of the active signature server 14' (signature server 1) is configured to generate a signature 38 using the private key 30 (PRVK_1) and to be authenticated by the device 20 (step 520). In one embodiment of the present invention, the secure storage and processing unit 16 of the active signature server 14' (signature server 1) is configured to generate a hash-based signature 38 using its private key PRVK_1 and a stored index (stored in the secure storage and processing unit 16 of the active signature server 14') and to be authenticated by the device 20. In embodiments in which hash-based signatures are generated, the secure storage and processing unit 16 of the active signature server 14' is configured to update (e.g., increment) the index in response to each hash-based signature generated (optionally, step 522). The interface 26 of the active signing server 14' is configured to provide the signature 38 to the device 20 (for example, via the orchestration server 18), so that the device 20 can authenticate using the stored public key 32 (PUBK_1) corresponding to the active signing server 14' (signing server 1) (step 524). Steps 520-524 may be repeated (arrow 526).
[0036] Figure 7 is a flowchart 700 showing the steps in one method of device 20 in system 10 of Figure 1 after a new active signing server 14' (signing server 1) has been assigned (block 42 in Figure 6). Referring to Figures 6 and 7, the secure processor 22 is configured to receive substitution commands from a remote entity (e.g., "substitution command 0>1" (block 34 in Figure 6)) (step 702). The secure processor 22 is configured to authenticate the received substitution command using the originally stored public key 32 (PUBK_0) (private key 30 (PRVK_0) corresponding to the original active signing server 14 (signing server 0)) (block 704). The secure processor 22 is configured to respond to successful authentication of an incoming substitution command (substitution command 0>1) by replacing the originally stored public key 32 (PRVK_0) with the public key 32 (PUBK_1) corresponding to the private key 30 (PRVK_1) of the new active signing server 14' (signing server 1) (step 706). The secure processor 22 is configured to receive one or more signatures 38 (step 708). The secure processor 22 is configured to authenticate whether the received signature 38 is a signature signed by the active signing server 14' (signing server 1) by using the new public key 32 (PUBK_1) (step 710). Steps 708-710 may be repeated (arrow 712).
[0037] As described above, based on several embodiments of the present invention, the active signing server includes a secure storage and processing unit that generates a key pair containing a public key and a private key, and stores the generated private key. The public key generated by the active signing server is sent to a device (e.g., via an orchestration server), stored in the device's secure storage, and used for authentication. Each backup signing server includes a secure storage and processing unit that generates a key pair containing a public key and a private key, and stores the generated private key. The secure storage and processing unit of the active signing server uses its private key to pre-sign a substitution command corresponding to each backup signing server. Each substitution command may include a public key generated by the corresponding backup signing server and a signature signed by the active signing server. Each substitution command is used to instruct the device to replace the public key originally stored in the device with the public key corresponding to the substitution command, if necessary. Each substitution command is sent to and stored by a remote entity (e.g., an orchestration server or a signing server corresponding to the substitution command). If the active signing server or its private key becomes unavailable, the remote entity can provide this substitution command to the device. Each device authenticates the authenticity of the substitution command using its original public key, and upon successful authentication, replaces the original public key with the public key corresponding to the substitution command in response. In this way, each device can protect its currently stored public keys by accepting substitution commands signed by the live signing server and rejecting substitution commands not signed by the signing server. The signing server corresponding to the substitution command then becomes the new active signing server and can generate signatures using its private key, so each device can authenticate data using the new public key.
[0038] Furthermore, the new signing server can then use its private key to sign new replacement commands corresponding to each backup signing server, which can be used, if necessary, to instruct a device to replace the stored public key again with a public key generated by another backup signing server. Each new replacement command is sent to and stored by a remote entity (e.g., an orchestration server or a signing server corresponding to the replacement command).
[0039] In practice, some or all of these functions may be combined into a single physical component, or they may be implemented using multiple physical components. These physical components may include hard-wired devices, programmable devices, or a combination thereof. In some embodiments, at least some of the functions of the processing circuit may be performed by a programmable processor under the control of appropriate software. This software may be downloaded to the device in electronic form, for example, over a network. Alternatively, the software may be stored in a tangible, non-temporary, computer-readable storage medium such as optical, magnetic, or electronic memory.
[0040] The embodiments described above are cited for illustrative purposes only, and the present invention is not limited to those specifically shown and described above. Rather, the scope of the present invention includes not disclosed in the prior art, as well as both combinations and partial combinations of the various features described above, and which those skilled in the art will conceive of by reading the above description. [Industrial applicability]
[0041] The secure key replacement system, secure key replacement device, and secure key replacement method of the present invention can be used to protect currently stored public keys by approving replacement commands signed by a live signing server and rejecting replacement commands not signed by a signing server. [Explanation of symbols]
[0042] 10 Systems SS Signature Server 14, 14' Active Signature Servers 16 Secure Storage and Processing Units 18 Orchestration Server 20 devices Steps 202-220, 302-308, 502-524, 702-710 22 Secure Processors 24 Secure Storage 26, 28 Interfaces 30 private key 32 Public Keys Blocks 34, 36, 40, 42, 44, 46, and 48 38 signatures Flowcharts for 200, 300, 500, and 700 222, 310, 526, 712 Arrows
Claims
1. Includes an active signature server, and the active signature server is The first private key is to be stored, A signature is generated using the first private key, and authentication is performed by a device that stores the first public key that forms a key pair with the first private key. The first private key is used to sign a substitution command, and the substitution command is used to instruct the device to replace the first public key with a second public key that forms a key pair with the second private key, A secure storage and processing unit configured to perform the following: The system is configured to provide the signature to the device and the substitution command to at least one entity, the at least one entity storing the substitution command away from the active signature server and the device, and the at least one entity having an interface including an orchestration server and / or at least one other signature server, A secure key replacement system including this.
2. The system further comprises the active signature server and N-1 signature servers, The N-1 signature servers are configured to generate N-1 corresponding key pairs, each key pair containing its own new public key and its own new private key. The secure storage and processing unit of the active signing server are configured to sign N-1 substitution commands using the first private key, and the N-1 substitution commands are configured to instruct the device to replace the first public key with the respective new public key. The secure key replacement system according to claim 1, wherein the interface is configured to provide the N-1 replacement commands to the orchestration server and / or the N-1 signature servers.
3. The secure storage and processing unit, Saving the index, A hash-based signature is generated using the first private key and the stored index, and authentication is performed by the device. When each of the hash-based signatures is generated, the index is updated in response, A secure key replacement system according to claim 1, configured to perform the following:
4. The secure key replacement system according to claim 1, wherein the orchestration server is configured to provide the replacement command to the device, and the device replaces the first public key with the second public key.
5. The secure key replacement system according to claim 4, wherein the orchestration server is configured to provide the replacement command to the device in response to the active signing server being shut down or the first private key being destroyed or unavailable for use by the active signing server.
6. Furthermore, the new active signature server has been added, and the said new active signature server To store the second private key, A signature is generated using the second private key, and authentication is performed by the device that stores the second public key. The second private key is used to sign a new substitution command, and the new substitution command is used to instruct the device to replace the second public key with a third public key that forms a key pair with the third private key, A new secure storage and processing unit configured to perform the following: A new interface configured to provide the new substitution command to the at least one entity, The secure key replacement system according to claim 4, including the following:
7. The device further comprises a predetermined device among the aforementioned devices, and the predetermined device is A secure storage configured to securely store the first public key, The instruction to replace the first public key is rejected, and the instruction is not authorized by the signature formed using the first private key. Receiving the substitution command signed by the first private key, Authenticating the substitution command using the first public key, When the substitution command is authenticated using the first public key, in response, the first public key is replaced with the second public key, A secure processor configured to perform the following actions: A secure key replacement system according to claim 1, including the following:
8. The secure processor of the predetermined device Authenticating a signature signed by the active signing server using the first public key, After the first public key is replaced with the second public key, the signature signed by the new active signing server using the second public key is authenticated, A secure key replacement system according to claim 7, configured to perform the following:
9. The first private key is to be stored, A signature is generated by an active signing server using the first private key, and authentication is performed by a device that stores the first public key that forms a key pair with the first private key. The first private key is used to sign the substitution command by the active signing server, and the substitution command is configured to be used to instruct the device to replace the first public key with a second public key that forms a key pair with the second private key, The signature is provided to the device, the substitution command is provided to at least one entity, the at least one entity stores the substitution command away from the active signature server and the device, and the at least one entity includes an orchestration server and / or at least one other signature server. A secure key replacement method that includes this.
10. N-1 signing servers generate N-1 corresponding key pairs, each key pair containing its own new public key and its own new private key. The secure storage and processing unit of the active signing server is configured to sign N-1 substitution commands using the first private key, and the N-1 substitution commands instruct the device to replace the first public key with the respective new public key. Providing the N-1 substitution commands to the orchestration server and / or the N-1 signature servers, The secure key replacement method according to claim 9, further comprising:
11. Saving the index, A hash-based signature is generated using the first private key and the stored index, and authentication is performed by the device. When a signature for each hash base is generated, the index is updated in response, The secure key replacement method according to claim 9, further comprising:
12. The secure key replacement method according to claim 9, further comprising providing the replacement command to the device, and the device replacing the first public key with the second public key.
13. The secure key replacement method according to claim 12, wherein providing the replacement command to the device is performed in response to the active signing server being shut down or the first private key being destroyed or unavailable for use by the active signing server.
14. The second private key is stored by a new active signing server, A signature is generated using the second private key, and authentication is performed by the device that stores the second public key. The second private key is used to sign a new substitution command, and the new substitution command is used to instruct the device to replace the second public key with a third public key that forms a key pair with the third private key, Providing the aforementioned new substitution command to the at least one entity, The secure key replacement method according to claim 12, further comprising:
15. Receiving the substitution command signed by the first private key, Authenticating the substitution command using the first public key, When the substitution command is authenticated using the first public key, in response, the first public key is replaced with the second public key, The secure key replacement method according to claim 9, further comprising:
16. Authenticating a signature signed by the active signing server using the first public key, After the first public key is replaced with the second public key, the signature signed by the new active signing server using the second public key is authenticated, The secure key replacement method according to claim 15, further comprising: