A cryptographic method to demonstrate that a vector is binary.
The cryptographic method allows efficient verification of vector binaryity using orthogonal demonstrations, addressing the inefficiencies of existing vector commitment schemes by maintaining proof size independent of vector dimension, enhancing cryptographic systems like homomorphic encryption.
Patent Information
- Application Number
- JP2025545216
- Authority / Receiving Office
- JP · JP
- Patent Type
- Patents
- Current Assignee / Owner
- Priority Date
- 2023-02-06
- Filing Date
- 2024-02-06
- Publication Date
- 2026-11-19
- Estimated Expiration
- 2044-02-06
AI Technical Summary
Existing vector commitment schemes lack an efficient method to generate a short proof that the committed vector is binary, leading to costly proof generation due to large common reference strings and computational overhead.
A cryptographic method where a prover demonstrates a vector's binaryity by showing an auxiliary vector is orthogonal to the principal vector through a Hadamard product, using commitments and proofs that maintain a constant size independent of the vector's dimension.
Enables efficient verification of vector binaryity with concise proofs, reducing computational and storage costs, applicable in cryptographic systems like homomorphic encryption and multiparty computation.
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Abstract
Description
[Technical Field]
[0001] The present invention relates to a cryptographic method for a prover to demonstrate to a verifier that a principal vector is a binary vector, a cryptographic method for a verifier to verify a proof, a system, and a computer storage medium. [Background technology]
[0002] A commitment scheme involves a sender, such as a prover or committer, committing to a secret message, which remains secret until the commitment is opened. In non-interactive commitments, the commitment and opening phases may each involve a single message from the committer to the verifier. A commitment scheme has two characteristics called hiding and binding. The former means that the commitment string C does not disclose any information about the committed message. The latter means that an attacker cannot calculate a commitment that can be opened for two different messages.
[0003] One example of a commitment scheme is the Pedersen commitment.
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[0004] A vector commitment allows a prover to generate a short commitment string for a vector of messages m=(m1,…,m n )∈D nThis allows committing to a vector. Later, the committer can concisely disclose the individual coordinates of m. Here, “concisely” means that the partially opened information, also called proof, has a constant size independent of the dimension of the committed vector, for example, and still convinces the verifier that the opened coordinates are valid. Like standard commitments, the vector commitment scheme preferably satisfies the following two security properties: (i) the binding property asserts that no efficient attacker can produce a commitment that can be opened to two different values at the same location i ∈ [n]; and (ii) the hiding property ensures that disclosing a subset of components does not disclose information about messages at undisclosed locations. Vector commitments enable significant storage savings by storing only constant-size commitments to vectors instead of commitments to individual coordinates, and significant bandwidth savings by enabling the concise opening of individual locations in a provable manner.
[0005] Other concise vector commitments may be based on the RSA assumption, or a Diffie-Hellman analogue for pairing-friendly groups.
[0006] One limitation of all known vector commitments with short proofs is that there is no efficient way to generate a short proof that the committed vector m is small, for example, within a given range, for example, below and / or above a threshold, for example, having binary elements. One solution to this problem is to use a general-purpose concise non-interactive zero-knowledge proof (SNARK) for all NP languages. SNARK can give a constant-size proof, but the statement must be expressed as an arithmetic circuit. In this arithmetic circuit, the unboxing algorithm of the commitment scheme is computed (hence the group
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[0007] [Non-Patent Document 1] Gorbunov et al., “Pointproofs: Aggregating Proofs for Multiple Vector Commitments.” [Non-Patent Document 2] E. Kachisa, E. Schaefer, and M. Scott, "Constructing Brezing-Weng pairing-friendly elliptic curves using elements in the cyclotomic field" [Non-Patent Document 3] D. Aranha, Y. El Housni, and A. Guillevic, “A survey of elliptic curves for proof systems” [Non-Patent Document 4] Y.El Housni and A.Guillevic, “Optimized and secure pairing friendly elliptic curves suitable for one layer proof composition” [Non-Patent Document 5] Steven D. Galbraith et al., “Pairings for cryptographers” [Non-Patent Document 6] B. Libert and M. Yung, “Concise Mercurial Vector Commitments and Independent Zero-Knowledge Sets with Short Proofs” [Non-Patent Document 7] B. Libert, S. Ramanna, and M. Yung, “Functional Commitment Schemes: From Polynomial Commitments to Pairing-Based Accumulators from Simple Assumptions” [Non-Patent Document 8] G. Fuchsbauer, E. Kiltz, and J. Loss, "The Algebraic Group Model and its Applications" [Non-Patent Document 9] Benedikt Buenz et al., "Bulletproofs: Short Proofs for Confidential Transactions and More" (see, for example, section 1.2.1, which describes Confidential Transactions). [Non-Patent Document 10] Vadim Lyubashevsky et al., “On Ideal Lattices and Learning with Errors Over Rings” [Non-Patent Document 11] Sergey Gorbunov et al., “Pointproofs: Aggregating Proofs for Multiple Vector Commitments” [Overview of the Initiative] [Means for solving the problem]
[0008] It is desirable to provide a more advanced method for a prover to a verifier to demonstrate that a principal vector is a binary vector. The attached claims describe a demonstration method, a verification method, a system, and a computer-readable medium. Dependent claims describe specific embodiments of the invention. In one embodiment, a commitment is calculated with respect to the principal vector. The prover can then demonstrate the binaryity by showing that an auxiliary vector is orthogonal to the principal vector, for example, by showing that their dot product is zero. The auxiliary vector includes the Hadamard product of the principal vector and a randomization vector. The proof can be verified against the principal commitment and a first auxiliary commitment. The first auxiliary commitment may be calculated with respect to the auxiliary vector, but in reverse order with respect to the principal vector.
[0009] A second proof may be computed to show that the first auxiliary commitment was actually computed in reverse order with respect to the Hadamard product of the principal vector and the randomized vector. The second proof may be obtained by aggregating the randomized openings with respect to the vector elements in the principal commitment and the first auxiliary commitment.
[0010] The advantage of these embodiments is that the principal commitment, auxiliary commitment, first proof, and second proof each have a size independent of the dimension of the principal vector. In one embodiment, the proof of binaryity fits within 87 bytes with respect to a suitable selection of an elliptic curve, e.g., the KSS18 curve, while the complete proof of the validity of the FHE ciphertext fits within 225 bytes using, for example, the BLS12-446 curve.
[0011] In one embodiment, the principal commitment is calculated by directly evaluating the commitment function of the vector commitment scheme for the principal vector. This is not strictly necessary; for example, using a vector commitment scheme with additive homomorphism properties, the commitment function can be applied to any linear combination of the principal vector and a vector known to the verifier. For example, the principal commitment can alternatively be calculated by evaluating the commitment function for the sum of the principal vector and a vector known to the verifier. From the alternative commitment and the known vector, the verifier can obtain the directly applicable commitment described above. However, it is typical to apply the commitment function to the principal vector itself.
[0012] Similarly, with respect to auxiliary commitments, the commitment function can be applied to any linear combination of the auxiliary vector and the public vector, in particular the randomization vector. Two typical options are to apply the commitment function directly to the auxiliary vector, or to apply it to the auxiliary vector minus the randomization vector; in one embodiment, one of these two options is computed by the prover and shared with the verifier, while the verifier computes the other commitment itself.
[0013] For convenience, most embodiments described in detail herein assume that the principal commitment is obtained by applying the commitment function to the principal vector and the auxiliary commitment is obtained by applying the commitment function to the auxiliary vector, but other choices can be made in this regard.
[0014] Proofs and commitments can be expressed as group elements. A bilinear map can be defined between the first and second groups. The reverse order has the effect that the dot product of two vectors is computed in the exponent when the bilinear map is applied to the corresponding commitments in the first and second groups, respectively. This can be applied to the primary and secondary commitments. This may be a secondary commitment computed by the prover, or a second secondary commitment. The second secondary commitment can be computed from the first secondary commitment, for example, using the additive homomorphism property of the vector commitment scheme.
[0015] In one embodiment, the scheme for proving the bivalence of a vector is zero-knowledge and / or non-interactive.
[0016] Proving the binary nature of a vector can be applied in many situations. For example, it may be used to demonstrate that the number of committed items is less than a threshold, to demonstrate the validity of a ring LWE ciphertext, or to demonstrate that a vector x is ternary.
[0017] In one embodiment, a system, such as a device, is configured for a demonstration and / or verification method.
[0018] One embodiment of the method may be implemented as a computer implementation on a computer, or on dedicated hardware, or a combination of both. Executable code for one embodiment of the method may be stored in a computer program product. Examples of computer program products include memory devices, optical storage devices, integrated circuits, servers, online software, and the like. Preferably, the computer program product includes non-temporary program code stored on a computer-readable medium for performing one embodiment of the method when the program product is executed on a computer.
[0019] In one embodiment, the computer program includes computer program code that performs all or part of the steps of one embodiment of the method when the computer program is executed on a computer. Preferably, the computer program is embodied on a computer-readable medium.
[0020] Another aspect of the subject matter disclosed herein is a method for making computer programs available for download.
[0021] Further details, aspects, and embodiments will be described simply by reference to the drawings. Elements in the drawings are shown for brevity and clarity and are not necessarily drawn to scale. Elements in the drawings that correspond to elements already described may have the same reference numerals. [Brief explanation of the drawing]
[0022] [Figure 1] This diagram schematically shows an example of one embodiment of the demonstration system. [Figure 2] This diagram schematically shows an example of one embodiment of a certification system. [Figure 3] This diagram schematically illustrates one example of an embodiment of the proof method. [Figure 4a] This figure schematically shows a computer-readable medium having a writable portion containing a computer program according to one embodiment. [Figure 4b] This figure schematically illustrates a processor system according to one embodiment. [Modes for carrying out the invention]
[0023] List of reference symbols The following list of reference numerals and abbreviations corresponds to Figures 1, 2, 3, 4a, and 4b and is provided to facilitate the interpretation of the drawings and is not intended to be construed as limiting the scope of the claims.
[0024] 100 Proof Systems 110 Proof Devices 113 Processor Systems 114 storage 115 Communication Interface 120 verification devices 123 Processor System 124 storage 125 Communication Interfaces 200 certification systems 210 Principal Vector Sources 211 Principal Vectors 212 Randomized Vectors 213 Randomized Vectors 219 committed to vector 220 Commitment Units 221 Main Commitment 222 First Auxiliary Commitment 230 certification units 231 Proof of orthogonality 232 Proof of Equivalence 1000, 1001 Computer-readable media 1010 Writable portion 1020 Computer Programs 1110 Integrated Circuit 1120 Processing Units 1122 memory 1124 Dedicated Integrated Circuit 1126 Communication elements 1130 Interconnection 1140 Processor System
[0025] The subject matter disclosed herein can take many different forms, but one or more specific embodiments are shown in the drawings and described in detail herein. It should be understood that this disclosure should be considered an example of the principles of the subject matter disclosed herein and is not intended to limit the subject matter to the specific embodiments shown and described herein.
[0026] In the following, for the sake of clarity, the elements of the embodiment will be described in terms of their operation. However, it will be clear that each element is configured to perform the function that it is said to perform.
[0027] Furthermore, the subject matter disclosed herein is not limited to embodiments, but also includes any other combination of features described herein or features described in any other different dependent claims.
[0028] Figure 1 schematically shows an example of an embodiment of the certification device 110 and an example of an embodiment of the verification device 120. The certification device 110 and the verification device 120 may be part of the certification system 100.
[0029] The proof device 110 is configured to cryptographically prove to the verification device that a vector is a binary vector using a vector commitment scheme. The vector commitment scheme includes at least one commitment function that takes a vector as input and produces a commitment as output. The vector commitment scheme may include multiple commitment functions, for example two, each taking a vector as input and producing a commitment as output, but the commitment values produced are in different groups. For example, the first commitment function can produce a group element of the first group, and the second commitment function can produce a group element of the second group. A bilinear map may be defined between the first and second groups. The vector commitment scheme may have additional properties, such as the additive homomorphism property. According to this property, a new commitment concerning the sum of the first vector and the second vector can be computed from the second vector and the commitment of the first vector, without knowing the first vector. The commitment scheme allows the prover to compute a proof, for example in the form of a group element, of the element (x) at the position (i ∈ [n]) of the committed vector. iThis allows for partial opening of the document. The verifier can verify that the proof proves that the committed vector has a value at that position.
[0030] The verification device 120 is configured to verify the cryptographic proof provided by the prover device. The prover device is also called the prover. The verification device is also called the verifyer.
[0031] One embodiment of the cryptographic method described herein is particularly advantageous because the size of the cryptographic proof does not depend on the dimensions of the vector whose binaryity is being proven. This property is sometimes called conciseness or simplicity, i.e., the proof is concise. Because the size of the proof does not depend on the vector dimensions, the size per dimension decreases as the vector dimensions increase. The vector can have any length, and as an example, one embodiment can be applied to a vector with at least 10, 100, 1000, or 10000 elements, such as bits.
[0032] System 100 can be used standalone, but it has many applications where proving whether a vector is binary can be used as a fundamental means. For example, many mathematical objects can be represented as vectors of bits, for example, as sequences of bits. In this case, the properties of a mathematical object can be verified by demonstrating the properties of a vector, for example by disclosing one or more bits, by calculating an inner product, such as a dot product, on the vector or a part thereof and proving the result, or by performing other linear operations. For good security, the binaryity of a vector should also be proven. Otherwise, a prover could attempt to cheat by committing to a non-binary vector.
[0033] Two specific uses will be discussed in some detail, but many other uses are possible. For example, proving that a vector is binary can be used to prove that a number known to the prover is within a certain range, for example, less than a certain upper limit. To do this, the number may be converted into a binary vector, and then an appropriate linear operation may be performed on it, for example, the most significant bit may be opened; if the verifier is convinced that the committed vector contains an l-bit representation of the integer x, then x is 2 l To know that it is smaller than that.
[0034] If a prover can commit to a non-binary vector, they can cheat by making the verifier believe that the prover's number is smaller than the limit, even though it is not actually the case. Another application is in advanced cryptographic systems such as multiparty computation and homomorphic encryption. In homomorphic encryption, it is possible to perform complex mathematical operations on encrypted data without compromising the encryption. Encryption schemes that allow computations to be performed on encrypted data are known in themselves, but they are subject to some limitations. For example, a homomorphic encryption device can homomorphically encrypt data. A homomorphic computing device can perform algorithms, such as software programs or arithmetic procedures, on data without decrypting the data. Existing methods for verifying whether received data is indeed legitimately encrypted data for a homomorphic computing device have drawbacks; for example, the proof of SNARK is computationally very expensive. Using one embodiment, data may be converted to a binary vector, which can then be used to prove the validity of homomorphically encrypted data. By using a non-interactive proof that the committed vector is binary, we can obtain a short proof that convinces a homomorphic computing device that the ciphertext is properly formed.
[0035] Cryptographically demonstrating that a vector is a binary vector can involve various phases.
[0036] In the initialization phase, common parameters are shared between the prover device and the verifier device. Typically, the cryptographic method performs its computation on various finite groups or rings, rather than on natural numbers. In the initialization phase, shared parameters are established between the prover and the verifier. In non-interactive zero-knowledge proofs, a set of trusted public parameters is often generated by a trusted party and made available to the prover and verifier. Such shared parameters are sometimes called a Common Reference String (CRS) or public parameters. Shared parameters may be obtained, for example, generated by a trusted party and sent to the prover and verifier. Shared parameters may also be jointly generated by the prover and verifier, sometimes with the involvement of a trusted party. It should be noted that most embodiments use a trusted party. Preferably, the trusted party erases all of its private randomness used to generate the CRS after delivery to the prover and verifier.
[0037] Typically, the initialization phase only needs to be performed once. This phase is often implicit. For example, this phase may be performed as part of another cryptographic method executed by the prover and verifier. In this case, the parameters of the other cryptographic method may be used in the proof method according to one embodiment. For example, shared parameters may be implicitly known and may be part of computer software provided to the prover and verifier, for example.
[0038] For example, the shared parameters may include one or more groups, e.g., a first, second, and third group. For example, the shared parameters may include a bilinear map mapping from the first and second groups to the third group. For example, the shared parameters may include a set of generators for the aforementioned groups, particularly the first and second groups.
[0039] In the commitment phase, the prover creates a vector x=(x1,…,x n) commits to. The prover calculates the commitment from the vector and shared parameters according to the commitment scheme. A commitment allows the prover to commit to a value, in this case a vector, while keeping it hidden from others, especially from the verifier. The commitment is sent to the verifier, which allows the prover to later disclose the committed value or any part of it; this is also called opening the commitment. Commitments may be used for this purpose, for example, to prevent the prover from changing its value, e.g., vector x, after committing to it. However, commitments may also be used as part of other demonstrations. For example, in one embodiment, the prover demonstrates to the verifier that the committed vector is binary without necessarily opening any part of the vector.
[0040] The commitment phase may include not only the calculation of one or more commitments but also the calculation of one or more proofs; for example, a proof that a committed vector has a certain property. The commitments and proofs are shared with the verifier and transmitted to the verifier, for example, over a computer network. The calculation of proofs and commitments may be separated into their own phases, for example, the commitment phase and the proof phase.
[0041] In the verification phase, the verifier can, for example, verify that the proof provided with the commitment is valid. Interestingly, this allows the prover to prove facts about a vector without disclosing anything else about the vector. This so-called zero-knowledge property is particularly desirable in cryptography.
[0042] For example, in the commitment phase, the proof device may compute a principal commitment to commit to a specific vector of interest, such as the principal vector. This commitment may allow the prover to later disclose one or more values of the principal vector. The verifier can then verify that the commitment actually corresponds to the disclosed values. Interestingly, the proof device may also compute one or more proofs demonstrating the properties of the principal vector. Such proofs can also be verified using commitments. For example, the proof device might compute a principal vector and (y1(x1-1),…,y n (x n It is sometimes necessary to prove that the vector defined by -1)) is orthogonal to the vector y=(y1,…,y n ) randomizes this sum.
[0043] To aid this proof, the proof device may compute one or more auxiliary commitments committing to other vectors related to the principal vector. For example, the auxiliary commitments may be for the Hadamard product of the principal vector and the randomization vector. It was the inventor's insight that by reversing the order of these vectors, subsequent verifications could use bilinear maps. The proof device may generate further proofs. For example, the proof device may prove that the principal commitment defined above and one or more auxiliary commitments are indeed derived from the same principal vector.
[0044] The primary and secondary commitments are typically obtained by applying the commitment function of a vector commitment scheme to the primary and secondary vectors, respectively. In most embodiments, this typical case is assumed. However, the homomorphic property of commitment schemes makes this unnecessary; that is, given a valid commitment, the verifier can use the homomorphic property to derive additional commitments. This is particularly useful for secondary commitments. Secondary commitments can be obtained not only by applying the commitment function of a vector commitment scheme to the secondary vectors, but also by applying the commitment function to the result of subtracting the randomization vector from the secondary vector. In the former case, the verifier can derive the latter commitment; in the latter case, the verifier can derive the former commitment.
[0045] The ability to demonstrate that a vector is binary without necessarily disclosing the entire vector itself is useful in many situations. Generally, mathematical objects can be encoded as binary vectors, for example, as sequences of bits. In this case, the properties of the mathematical object can be demonstrated, for example, by unpacking specific elements of the vector, by calculating the dot product over the vector or a portion thereof, or by performing other operations on the vector, possibly linear operations. However, for this approach to have good security, the verifier must be certain that the vector is binary. For example, to prove that a number known to the prover falls within a certain range, e.g., less than an upper bound, the prover can encode the number as a binary vector and commit to it. Using a constant-size, for example, concise proof, by unpacking the last (nl) elements of the binary vector, e.g., the (nl) most significant bits, to zero, the prover can prove that the integer is binary. lIt is possible to prove that it is smaller than [a certain value]. However, if the prover can cheat by committing to a non-binary vector, the value will appear to be smaller than the limit even though it is not actually smaller.
[0046] Another application is as a fundamental mechanism in other cryptographic schemes where data is shared in an encrypted form, but operations are still performed on the data, such as homomorphic encryption. For example, data may be homomorphically encrypted by a homomorphic encryption device. The data may then be sent to a homomorphic computing device. The homomorphic computing device performs calculations on the encrypted data without decrypting the data, for example, without gaining knowledge of the plaintext of the data. The calculation results may be sent back to the encryption device, still encrypted. There, the encrypted calculation results may be decrypted. Homomorphic encryption relies on the data being legitimately provided according to specific rules of a particular homomorphic encryption scheme. The computing device typically cannot verify whether the data is legitimately encrypted, for example, because it cannot decrypt the data. Interestingly, this becomes possible using one embodiment. The encryption device converts the randomness of the data and / or encryption into a binary vector, and then proves that the provided encrypted data legitimately reflects the plain data according to the rules. This also relies on the fact that it is possible to efficiently prove that the vector is binary.
[0047] The certification device 110 may include a processor system 113, storage 114, and a communication interface 115. The verification device 120 may include a processor system 123, storage 124, and a communication interface 125. Storage 114 and 124 may be, for example, electronic storage or magnetic storage. Storage may include local storage, such as a local hard drive or electronic memory. Storage 114 and 124 may also include non-local storage, such as cloud storage. In the latter case, storage 114 and 124 may include a storage interface to the non-local storage. Storage may include multiple separate sub-storages, which together constitute storage 114 and 124. Storage may include volatile writable portions such as RAM, non-volatile writable portions such as flash, and non-volatile non-writable portions such as ROM.
[0048] In various embodiments of the communication interface 115 and / or 125, the communication interface may be selected from a variety of alternative forms. For example, the interface may be a network interface to a local or wide area network such as the Internet, a storage interface to internal or external data storage, or an application interface (API).
[0049] Storage devices 114 and 124 may be non-temporary storage. For example, if storage devices 114 and 124 are volatile memory devices, such as random access memory (RAM), they can store data when power is present. For example, if storage devices 114 and 124 are non-volatile memory devices such as flash memory, they can store data whether power is present or absent.
[0050] Devices 110 and 120 can communicate internally, communicate with each other, or communicate with other devices, external storage, input devices, output devices, and / or one or more sensors over a computer network. The computer network may be the Internet, an intranet, a LAN, a WLAN, etc. Devices 110 and 120 have connection interfaces configured to communicate within or outside of system 100 as needed. For example, the connection interfaces may include connectors, such as wired connectors, such as Ethernet connectors, optical connectors, etc., or wireless connectors, such as antennas, such as Wi-Fi, 4G, or 5G antennas.
[0051] Communication interface 115 may be used to send and receive digital data, such as commitments and proofs, or vectors, such as binary vectors. Communication interface 125 may be used to send and receive digital data, such as commitments and proofs.
[0052] The proof device 110 and the verification device 120 may have a user interface, which may include one or more familiar elements such as buttons, a keyboard, a display, or a touchscreen. The user interface may be configured to accommodate user interaction for initiating a cryptographic protocol. The user interface may be configured for higher-level protocols, such as homomorphic computation on encrypted data, for example, initiating a neural network evaluation. As part of a higher-level protocol, a vector may be generated along with a proof that the vector is binary. Other properties of the vector may also be demonstrated by the proof. For example, encrypted data is effectively encrypted according to a homomorphic encryption scheme. The user interface is optional, as the proof and verification devices can operate automatically.
[0053] The execution of devices 110 and 120 may be implemented in a processor system. Devices 110 and 120 may include functional units for implementing aspects of several embodiments. Functional units may be part of a processor system. For example, functional units shown herein may be stored in the device's storage and implemented entirely or partially with computer instructions executable by the processor system.
[0054] A processor system may comprise one or more processor circuits, such as a microprocessor, CPU, or GPU. Devices 110 and 120 may comprise multiple processors. Processor circuits may be implemented in a distributed manner, for example, as multiple subprocessor circuits. For example, devices 110 and 120 may utilize cloud computing.
[0055] Typically, the proof device 110 and the verification device 120 each comprise a microprocessor that runs appropriate software stored in the device; for example, the software may be downloaded and / or stored in corresponding memory, such as volatile memory like RAM or non-volatile memory like Flash.
[0056] Instead of using software to implement functionality, devices 110 and / or 120 may be implemented entirely or partially with programmable logic, for example, as a field-programmable gate array (FPGA). The devices may also be implemented entirely or partially as so-called application-specific integrated circuits (ASICs), such as application-specific integrated circuits (ICs). For example, the circuitry may be implemented in CMOS using a hardware description language such as Verilog or VHDL. In particular, the proof device 110 and verification device 120 may include circuitry for cryptographic and / or arithmetic processing, for example.
[0057] In a hybrid embodiment, the functional unit is partially implemented in hardware as a coprocessor, such as a cryptographic and / or mathematical coprocessor, and partially implemented in software that is stored and executed on the device.
[0058] Figure 2 schematically shows an example of one embodiment of the certification system 200.
[0059] The proof system 200 uses a vector commitment scheme to provide the main vector 211, x=(x1,…,x) to the verifier by the prover. n The system is configured to implement a cryptographic method to demonstrate that ) is a binary vector. For example, system 200 can be implemented on device 110.
[0060] The principal vector 211 may be obtained from a principal vector source 210. Typically, the principal vector source 210 may be part of a further cryptographic method. For example, a cryptographic object may be converted into a binary vector. By proving the properties of the vector, those properties can be efficiently demonstrated to a verifier. One embodiment may be used to efficiently prove that the principal vector is binary. The principal vector may be obtained from storage, for example, or received from a third party.
[0061] In addition to the principal vector, various further vectors may be used, for example, to randomize calculations or to aggregate to a single value. Randomization vectors 212 and 213 are shown. Typically, the randomization vector is not secret and is available to the verifier, or is made available to the verifier by the prover. In principle, an agreement scheme between the prover and the verifier may be adapted to select the randomization vector. Preferably, the randomization vector is selected by the prover system, as this enables a non-interactive scheme. To prevent dishonest provers from unfairly controlling randomization, the randomization vector may be generated from a hash value by applying a cryptographic hash function to data containing one or more previous protocol parts, e.g., previously obtained vectors, commitments, proofs, etc. This has the additional advantage that the verifier can generate the randomization vector itself without needing to receive it, thus reducing transmission costs.
[0062] In one embodiment, the randomization vector is selected by the verifier or derived from the output of a hash function and applied, for example, to a previously computed commitment. Security is enhanced if the prover cannot select the randomization vector before committing to the vector. Generating the randomization vector from a hash function achieves this.
[0063] Randomized vectors, such as hash functions, are sometimes modeled as random oracles. This is not mandatory, but it is useful for proving mathematical properties.
[0064] For example, in one embodiment, the randomized vector (y=(y1,…,y nThe randomization vector may be obtained from a scalar (u) selected by the verifier, or it may be derived from the output of a hash function by the prover, for example. In this case, the randomization vector may be obtained by a series of polynomial functions applied to the scalar. For example, the randomization vector may be obtained by the prover from (f0(u),f2(u),..,f n-1 It may be reconstructed as (u). The polynomial may be selected by the protocol designer or by the verifier. The polynomial may be used repeatedly in multiple iterations of the protocol. This has the advantage of reducing the amount of data sent by the verifier. For example, the verifier may select a random scalar u and send it to the prover, who can then reconstruct the randomized vector. In one embodiment, the polynomial is selected as follows: y=(1,u,u 2 ,…,u n-1 ).
[0065] One or more randomization vectors may be used in the calculation of auxiliary commitments, but some may not be used. This is shown in Figure 2, where the randomization vector y=(y1,…,y n ), 212 is the input to the commitment unit 220, but the randomization vector t=(t1,…,t n ), 213 is not. Both randomization vectors 212 and 213 can be obtained by hashing previous commitments, such as commitments 221 and 222 discussed below.
[0066] The proof system 200 includes a commitment unit 220 configured to compute a vector commitment. A principal commitment 221 is shown in Figure 2. The principal commitment commits to the principal vector x, 211. Later, the prover may choose to open all or part of the vector 211, and the verifier can verify that the opened portion is indeed the same as the principal vector 211 when the commitment 221 is computed.
[0067] Commitment unit 220 may be used to compute further commitments that help construct later proofs. For example, commitment unit 220 is used to compute a first auxiliary commitment 222. The auxiliary commitment does not directly randomize vector 212, since the verifier has access to vector 212 and can generate vector 212 itself, for example. However, the first auxiliary commitment 222 does not randomize element x i y i The result may be the Hadamard product of the principal vector (x) and the randomization vector (y). The insight was that if the order in which the principal commitment 221 and the auxiliary commitment 222 are calculated is reversed, efficient verification using the bilinear map becomes possible. The first auxiliary commitment 222 is in the reverse order of the principal vectors. For example, the principal commitment is the vector x=(x1,...,x n ) may commit to the first auxiliary commitment 222, but in the reverse order, the auxiliary vector, for example (y n x n It can commit to ,…,y1x1). Note that the order in which the main vectors are used is reversed in the main commitment and the auxiliary commitment. In this example, the main commitment uses the natural order of the main vectors, e.g., the order in which they are received or generated, while the auxiliary commitment reverses the order in which the elements of the main vectors are used. However, this can also be reversed, and the main commitment can reverse the natural order, while the auxiliary commitment reverses this, i.e., uses the natural order again.
[0068] In one embodiment, the vector commitment scheme is a homomorphism, for example, an additive homomorphism. This has the consequence that, given a received commitment, e.g., a primary commitment and a first auxiliary commitment, the verifier can construct additional commitments. For example, assuming the verifier has a randomization vector 212, a further vector (y nx n -y n For , ..., y1x1-y1), the second auxiliary commitment can be calculated from the first auxiliary commitment.
[0069] Furthermore, the vector commitment scheme preferably involves elements (x) at the position (i∈[n]) of the vector. i It is configured to allow for partial opening of the proof. This allows for the construction of the proof by computing the product and / or quotient of the proof over a range of indices in the corresponding vectors, e.g., the principal vector and / or auxiliary vector.
[0070] For example, the vector commitment scheme can be the Pedersen commitment scheme.
[0071] The proof system 200 further comprises a proof unit 230, which is configured to generate proofs of statements relating to vectors, which can be verified using commitments relating to the vectors without requiring knowledge of the vectors themselves.
[0072] Proof unit 230 provides orthogonality proof 231, for example, the first proof π y It is sometimes used to construct. Orthogonality proof requires the verifier to provide further vectors (y1x1-y1,…,y n x n -y n We will demonstrate that the sum y1(x1-1)x1+…y is orthogonal to the principal vectors. n (x n -1)x n We can show that = 0, which means y i This sum is randomized, for example y i It is random, for example x i Since it is selected independently of x, each x has an overwhelming probability i This means that x is either 0 or 1. More precisely, x i If one of the elements is not in {0,1}, the probability that the sum is 0 is only 1 / p.
[0073] This proof is the second proof π that links the main commitment 221 and the first auxiliary commitment 222. eq This is complemented by equivalence proof 232. For example, equivalence proof 232 demonstrates that the principal vector in the Hadamard product committed by the first auxiliary commitment is the principal vector committed by the principal commitment. More precisely, equivalence proof 232 can demonstrate that the principal vector in the Hadamard product committed by the first auxiliary commitment is the principal vector committed by the principal commitment. More precisely, the first auxiliary commitment commits to the auxiliary vector in reverse order, i.e., commits to the Hadamard product of the principal vector (x) and the randomization vector (y) in reverse order.
[0074] Interestingly, the principal commitment, auxiliary commitment, first proof, and second proof can each have a size independent of the dimension of the principal vector; that is, they are concise.
[0075] The proof system may be further configured to make commitments and auxiliary commitments available to the verifier, and to make the first proof and / or the second proof or its aggregate available to the verifier. The verifier can verify that the orthogonality proof and / or equivalence proof is consistent with the primary commitment and the first auxiliary commitment.
[0076] In some cases, the proof system may generate additional proofs in later states. For example, the proof system may generate proofs concerning further properties of the principal vector. For example, the principal vector may be opened in whole or in part; for example, a linear operator may be applied to the principal vector and the result may be opened. For example, the dot product of the principal vector and another vector may be calculated, the other vector may be a known vector. The result of the dot product may be disclosed to the verifier, and its validity may be demonstrated using the principal commitment and, if applicable, further auxiliary commitments.
[0077] In one embodiment, commitment and proof are group elements. For example, the first group
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[0078] For example, the verification of proof 221 of orthogonality involves a bilinear map to the generators of the first and second groups.
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[0079] Similarly, proof of equivalence π eq This is a bilinear map to the second proof.
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[0080] If the proof is valid, a bilinear map can be applied to the product of selected group generators, chosen such that the comparison in the third group balances, for example, that they are equal. For example, in the case of an equivalence proof, this is when both the principal commitment and the first auxiliary commitment correspond to the same principal vector.
[0081] The inventors have found that the embodiment is a bilinear map
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[0082] Several embodiments that are special cases of the above formula are also provided, for example, m1=1, m2=0, l1=1, l2=0, and
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[0083] These embodiments have various advantages. The common reference string has a linear size in the dimension of the committed vector.
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[0084] For example, one embodiment involves the prover using a vector commitment scheme to communicate to the verifier the principal vector (x=(x1,…,x n A cryptographic method to demonstrate that )) is a binary vector, where the bilinear map (e( , )) is the first group and the second group
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[0085] The first proof can sometimes be obtained as proof that the dot product of two vectors is zero. The reason for reversing the order of the Hadamard product of the principal vector (x) and the randomization vector (y) is to allow the proof to be verified using a bilinear map. The bilinear map of the principal commitment and the auxiliary commitment computes the product of polynomials in the exponent. In the product, one of the coefficients is the dot product of the two vectors.
[0086] for example,
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[0087] For example, in one embodiment, the principal vector (x=(x1,…,x) is determined by the verifier. nA cryptographic method to verify that )) is a binary vector is sufficient. - Verification of the first proof is a bilinear map to the generators of the first proof and the second group.
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[0088] Some embodiments can be implemented as non-interactive zero-knowledge (NIZK) proof systems. Such proof systems typically include an algorithm (CRS-Gen, Prove, Verify).
[0089] The CRS-Gen algorithm is sometimes used, for example, in the initialization phase. Security parameters
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[0090] Several further optional improvements, details, and embodiments are illustrated below.
[0091] Message space related to prime number modulus p
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[0092] Some embodiments involve a small vector x with an infinite norm or even a binary x ∈ {0,1}. n This allows us to commit to and obtain a constant-size commitment C. Then, it is possible to generate a short proof that x has binary entries. In one embodiment, the proof involves only two group elements. In particular, CRS can be O(n) size and the commitments for individual vector positions can be concisely opened. Also, committed vectors
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[0093] For the purpose of describing some detailed embodiments,
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[0094] Preferably, the group [Mathematical formula] is an asymmetric bilinear group of prime order p. Note that techniques for converting a symmetric bilinear group to an asymmetric bilinear group are known. For integers m and n, the (m,n)-discrete logarithm ((m,n)-DLOG) problem is [Mathematical formula] (where [Mathematical formula] ), when given, is to calculate [Mathematical formula] .
[0095] In actual embodiments, [Mathematical formula] and [Mathematical formula] This can be materialized from a suitable set of elliptic curves.
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[0096] In this technology, three types of pairing are sometimes distinguished. In Type-1 pairing,
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[0097] Vector Commitment In one embodiment, the vector commitment is of a constant size, for example,
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[0098] In the vector commitment scheme, structured common reference strings (SRS) are in the format [Math] and [Math] group elements. In this embodiment, the element [Math] is not publicly available. The sender [Math] selects uniformly, and by computing the commitment function [Math] commits to [Math] . This commitment function can be regarded as the (exponent part) evaluation of a polynomial whose coefficients for the input [Math] are (γ,m1,…,m n ). The commitment scheme has a second similar commitment function that generates group elements in another group of the bilinear map.
[0099] To open the position i∈[n] of m to m i , the committer discloses a proof [Math] , which is verified by checking [Math] .
[0100] A malicious committer can obtain two different m at a certain position i∈[n] i ≠m i’Commitment C and valid proof π satisfying (1) with respect to (1) i , π i’ If you can figure out the missing elements of SRS
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[0101] As shown in the paper "Functional Commitment Schemes: From Polynomial Commitments to Pairing-Based Accumulators from Simple Assumptions" by B. Libert, S. Ramanna, and M. Yung, this vector commitment uses aggregation to commit the vector
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[0102] By assuming a random oracle H, the proof {π} i} i∈S This is the random aggregation coefficient.
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[0103] Proof of the bivalence of committed vectors In one embodiment, the vector commitment common reference string is a bilinear map
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[0104] Using the commitment aggregation property, for each i∈[n] x i ·(x i By showing that (-1)=0 mod p holds, we can determine that for each i∈[n] x i We can demonstrate that ∈{0,1}. Since p is a prime number, this means x i This suggests ∈{0,1}. This can sometimes be shown by aggregating the individual equations using randomized vectors.
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[0105] To prove a statement using a certain number of group elements, first, random
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[0106] C y is in the form (y n ·x n An equivalence proof is computed that demonstrates committing the vector (,…,y1·x1), for example, the inverse of the auxiliary vector. Commitment (3) satisfies the following:
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[0107] Randomized vector with respect to a random exponent [Formula] may be selected and used to raise (5) to the t i ·y i power and (4) to the t i power, respectively. Dividing them for each i∈[n] and taking the product of the ratios over all indices i∈[n] gives [Formula] is found to satisfy [Formula] .
[0108] π eq is a convincing proof that C y is a commitment to (y n ·x n ,..., y₁·x₁) for the following reasons. Assume that C y is a commitment to some vector (z₁,..., z n ) [Formula] . At this point, (4) becomes [Formula] , where [Formula] is a proof that the prover can compute to open the (n+1-i)-th position of C y . Here, raising (7) to the t i power and dividing it by (5) raised to the t i ·y i power gives [Formula] Here,
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[0109] Proof of π eq is, product
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[0110] To reduce the proof size, the linearity of verification formulas (6) and (8) is used to determine random aggregation coefficients.
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[0111] Ultimately, proof
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[0112] In the above embodiment, the first auxiliary commitment is
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[0113] As described above, some embodiments are bilinear maps
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[0114] The above embodiment is a special case of the above formula, where m1=1, m2=0, l1=1, l2=0, and
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[0115] Example 1, Detailed Embodiment Given a security parameter λ and a committed vector of maximum dimension n∈poly(λ), do the following: - A certain function
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[0116] The public parameters are:
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[0117] Main vectors
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[0118] Main commitment
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[0119] Commitment
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[0120] Next, randomization vector
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[0121] Former
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[0122] Final proof
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[0123] Public parameters, final proof, and primary commitment may be shared with the verifier.
[0124] The verifier can proceed as follows: Commitment
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[0125] Regarding the length of the proof, π is,
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[0126] Commitment
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[0127] Interestingly, this construction can be mathematically proven to be completely zero-knowledge to algebraic attackers. Furthermore, knowledge-soundness can also be proven in algebraic group models, such as those formulated by G. Fuchsbauer, E. Kiltz, and J. Loss, "The Algebraic Group Model and its Applications," and in random oracle models. This means that a witness can be extracted from an algebraic attacker who has devised a valid proof, or the (2n,n)-DLOG assumption can be broken. Under the (2n,n)-DLOG assumption, this scheme provides knowledge-soundness in algebraic group models and random oracle models.
[0128] Example 2, Detailed Embodiment In a second exemplary embodiment, where the vector commitment is,
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[0129] Given a security parameter λ and a committed vector of maximum dimension n∈poly(λ), do the following: - A certain function
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[0130] The public parameters are:
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[0131] Main vectors
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[0132]
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[0133] Principal commitment C and principal vector
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[0134] Next, randomization vector
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[0135] Former
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[0136] Final proof
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[0137] Commitment
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[0138] In both the first and second exemplary embodiments, a second auxiliary commitment is calculated for verifying the orthogonality proof, while the equivalence proof directly uses the first auxiliary commitment. However, this can be reversed in either embodiment.
[0139] Exemplary Uses The preferred embodiment can be used for many applications. Illustrative applications are discussed below.
[0140] A short proof that committed vectors are short. The first application is to construct a proof that a committed scalar belongs to a certain interval. This can be useful, for example, in blockchain transactions. The need for such proofs is explained, for example, in Benedikt Buenz et al., "Bulletproofs: Short Proofs for Confidential Transactions and More" (see, for example, section 1.2.1 which describes Confidential Transactions). Let's briefly explain the idea of a committed scalar, for example, a vector of dimension n=1.
[0141]
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[0142] The prover is the second source group of the bilinear map.
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[0143] Using the commitment aggregation properties, the committed vector
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[0144]
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[0145] The configuration outlined above is a vector commitment.
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[0146] It is also possible to deal with the range [0, B] where B+1 is not a power of 2. The standard approach to this problem is 2 l-1 ≤B<2 l integers such that
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[0147] A short proof regarding the ring LWE ciphertext. As a second application, it can be used to prove the validity of a ring LWE ciphertext using only three group elements. This uses a short embodiment of the proof that committed vectors are binary. This example also takes advantage of the fact that the underlying vector commitments allow for the proof of an inner product relation.
[0148] For some d-degree cyclotomic polynomial, the polynomial ring
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[0149]
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[0150] To prove (19), the prover uses the Pedersen commitment to vector
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[0151] In particular, this approach makes it possible to prove that a committed vector is a solution to an instance of the subset sum problem, which is useful in many applications.
[0152] This example proves the validity of a ring LWE ciphertext, but using statement (16), the inference system can be easily extended to handle more general statements of form (16).
[0153] The statement is a public key
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[0154] The certifier, to the verifier,
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[0155] The above statement,
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[0156] To make the proof shorter, we can commit directly to the bits of w.
[0157] any integer
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[0158] Therefore, the prover is witness w∈{0,1} D We can commit to the decomposition of where D = 2d(2 + logB + logd). Relation (22) holds modulo p (therefore, both elements have an infinite norm less than p / 2,
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[0159] By applying the above idea, we can obtain three group elements (i.e.,
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[0160] Furthermore, a structured random string half the length is obtained compared to using a general-purpose SNARK for the arithmetic circuit. In the SNARK-based approach, the number of multiplication gates in the arithmetic circuit is estimated to be approximately 142,000, and therefore the prover,
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[0161] Proof that the committed vector is 3-valued. Using a preferred embodiment, commitment
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[0162] One approach is to define x as two binary vectors x0, x1 ∈ {0, 1} l The difference between them is written as x = x0 - x1. The prover must first prove the following two vector commitments to x0 and x1, respectively.
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[0163] At the cost of doubling the CRS size, the size of the proof can be reduced.
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[0164] As with the previous construction, (i) can be proven. Regarding (ii), the properties of the underlying commitment can be used. That is,
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[0165] Proof of accurate Hamming weights for binary vectors 2-value x ∈ {0, 1} n Commitment to
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[0166] Proof of restricted Hamming weights for any vector Here,
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[0167] To prove this statement, first we have a random vector w=(w1,…,w) with Hamming weights HW(w)=B. n )∈{0,1} n Commitment to C w Generate a function and, with respect to this, w for all i∈[n] i = 1, therefore x i≠0. Here we can prove the following: (i) w is binary and has Hamming weight B; (ii) for each i ∈ [n], x i When ≠0, it's always w i = 1. This suggests that HW(x) ≤ HW(w).
[0168] As explained in the previous paragraph, (i) can be proven. To prove (ii), a random vector
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[0169] More specifically, the prover is a random
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[0170] Figure 3 schematically shows an example of one embodiment of proof method 300. Method 300 may be implemented on a computer. Method 300 uses a vector commitment scheme to prove the principal vector (x=(x1,…,x n We demonstrate that )) is a binary vector. Method 300 is, - by the certifier, primary commitment
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[0171] One embodiment further relates to a cryptographic method for verifying a proof generated by a verifier in accordance with any of the prior claims.
[0172] For example, verification and proof methods may be computer-implemented methods. Vectors, proofs, and commitments may be represented by multiple bits. For example, a vector may have at least 10, 100, or 1000 bits. For example, proofs and commitments may be represented digitally on a bit-by-bit basis, and may contain at least 100 bits and at least 500 bits, respectively.
[0173] As will be apparent to those skilled in the art, many different ways of carrying out this method are possible. For example, the order of the steps may be as shown, but the order of the steps may be changed, or some steps may be carried out in parallel. Furthermore, other method steps may be inserted between steps. The inserted steps may represent improvements to the method as described herein, or they may be unrelated to the method. For example, some steps may be carried out in parallel, at least partially. Furthermore, a given step may not be completely completed before the next step begins.
[0174] Embodiments of the method may be executed using software that includes instructions for a processor system to perform Method 300. The software may include only steps performed by specific sub-entities of the system. The software may be stored on a suitable storage medium such as a hard disk, floppy disk, memory, or optical disk. The software may be transmitted as a signal via wired or wireless or using a data network such as the Internet. The software may be made available for download and / or for remote use on a server. Embodiments of the method may be executed using a bitstream configured to constitute programmable logic such as a field-programmable gate array (FPGA) to perform the method.
[0175] It should be understood that the subject matter disclosed herein also extends to computer programs, in particular to computer programs on or within a carrier adapted to practice the subject matter disclosed herein. The programs may be in the form of object code, such as source code, object code, code intermediate source, and partially compiled forms, or any other form suitable for use in implementing embodiments of the methods. Embodiments relating to a computer program product include computer executable instructions corresponding to each of at least one processing step of the described method. These instructions may be subdivided into subroutines and / or stored in one or more files that can be statically or dynamically linked. Another embodiment relating to a computer program product includes computer executable instructions corresponding to each of at least one device, unit, and / or component of the described system and / or product.
[0176] The following clauses represent preferred embodiments.
[0177] Clause 1. The prover shall use a vector commitment scheme to ensure that the principal vector (x=(x1,…,x n A cryptographic method (300) for demonstrating that )) is a binary vector, wherein the method is - by the certifier, primary commitment
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[0178] Article 2. - Main commitment
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[0179] Article 3. - A second proof (π) demonstrating that the principal vector in the Hadamard product committed by the first auxiliary commitment is the principal vector committed by the principal commitment. eq ) to generate (350) The method described in Clause 1 or 2, including the method described in Clause 1 or 2.
[0180] Clause 4. The commitment scheme is such that the element (x) at the position (i ∈ [n]) of the vectori The method according to Clause 3, configured to allow partial opening with respect to ), wherein the second proof includes the product of the proofs over the range of indices in the principal vector divided by the product of the proofs over the range of indices in the auxiliary vector.
[0181] Clause 5. The method according to any of Clauses 1 to 4, wherein the principal commitment, auxiliary commitment, first proof, and second proof each have a size independent of the dimension of the principal vector.
[0182] Clause 6. The method described in any of Clauses 1 to 5, wherein the vector commitment scheme is an additive homomorphism.
[0183] Clause 7. Verification from the first auxiliary commitment to the second auxiliary commitment
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[0184] Clause 8. The method according to Clause 7, wherein a second auxiliary commitment is obtained from a first auxiliary commitment and a randomization vector using the additive homomorphism property of the commitment scheme.
[0185] Article 9. The first group and the second group
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[0186] Clause 10. Verification of the first proof is a bilinear mapping to the main commitment and the auxiliary commitment.
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[0187] Clause 11. Verification of the first proof is a bilinear mapping to the primary commitment and the second auxiliary commitment.
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[0188] Article 12. Second proof (π eq ) is the first group
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[0189] Clause 13. The method of Clause 12, wherein the application of the bilinear map is by product of selected group generators, and the group generators are selected for comparison and balanced such that both the principal commitment and the first auxiliary commitment correspond to the same principal vector.
[0190] Article 14. - A bilinear map applied to the selected group elements and principal commitment of the first group.
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[0191] Article 15. - To make commitments and auxiliary commitments available to the verifier, and to make the first proof and / or the second proof or its aggregate available to the verifier. The method described in any of the clauses 1 to 14, including the method described in any of the clauses 1 to 14.
[0192] Clause 16. The method described in any of Clauses 1 to 15, wherein the vector commitment scheme includes the Pedersen commitment scheme.
[0193] Clause 17. A method for demonstrating that a numerical value (x) is less than a threshold, - Bit representation of a number (x) ((x1, ..., x l )∈{0,1} l Obtain a bit vector containing ), compute a commitment on the vector, and generate at least one first proof as described in any of clauses 1 to 16. - To generate a proof demonstrating the equivalence of bit vectors to numbers. Methods that include...
[0194] Article 18.
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[0195] Clause 19. A method for demonstrating that a vector x is trivalued, wherein two binary vectors x0, x1 ∈ {0, 1} l A method comprising writing x as the difference between them x = x0 - x1, and for a concatenated vector of two binary vectors, generating at least the first proof described in any of clauses 1 to 16.
[0196] Clause 20. A cryptographic method for verifying a proof generated by a verifier in accordance with any of Clauses 1 through 19.
[0197] Clause 21. A system comprising one or more processors and one or more storage devices for storing instructions, wherein when an instruction is executed by one or more processors, the system causes one or more processors to perform an operation relating to any of the methods described in Clauses 1 to 20.
[0198] Clause 22. A non-temporary computer storage medium encoded with instructions that cause one or more computers to perform any of the operations described in Clauses 1 through 20 when executed by one or more computers.
[0199] Figure 4a shows a computer-readable medium 1000 having a writable portion 1010, and a computer-readable medium 1001 similarly having a writable portion. The computer-readable medium 1000 is illustrated in the form of an optical-readable medium. The computer-readable medium 1001 is illustrated in the form of electronic memory, in this case a memory card. The computer-readable media 1000 and 1001 can store data 1020, which, when executed by a processor system, can indicate instructions causing the processor system to perform an embodiment of a demonstration and / or verification method according to one embodiment. The computer program 1020 may be embodied on the computer-readable medium 1000 as a physical mark or by magnetization of the computer-readable medium 1000. However, any other suitable embodiment is conceivable. Furthermore, although the computer-readable medium 1000 is illustrated here as an optical disc, it may be any suitable computer-readable medium such as a hard disk, solid-state memory, or flash memory, and may be non-recordable or recordable. The computer program 1020 includes instructions for causing the processor system to perform the demonstration and / or verification method described above.
[0200] Figure 4b shows a schematic diagram of a processor system 1140 according to one embodiment of a demonstration and / or verification system. The processor system comprises one or more integrated circuits 1110. The architecture of one or more integrated circuits 1110 is schematically shown in Figure 4b. Circuit 1110 includes a processing unit 1120, e.g., a CPU, for executing computer program components to perform the method according to one embodiment and / or for implementing its module or unit. Circuit 1110 includes a memory 1122 for storing programming code, data, etc. Part of the memory 1122 may be read-only. Circuit 1110 may include communication elements 1126, e.g., an antenna, a connector, or both. Circuit 1110 may include a dedicated integrated circuit 1124 for performing some or all of the processing defined by the method. The processor 1120, memory 1122, dedicated IC 1124, and communication elements 1126 may be interconnected via an interconnect 1130, e.g., a bus. The processor system 1110 may be configured for contact and / or contactless communications using antennas and / or connectors, respectively.
[0201] For example, in one embodiment, a processor system 1140, e.g., a demonstration and / or verification system, may include a processor circuit and a memory circuit, the processor being configured to execute software stored in the memory circuit. For example, the processor circuit may be an Intel Core i7 processor, an ARM Cortex-R8, etc. The memory circuit may be a ROM circuit or non-volatile memory, such as flash memory. The memory circuit may also be volatile memory, such as SRAM memory. In the latter case, the device may include a non-volatile software interface configured to provide software, such as a hard drive or a network interface.
[0202] Although System 1140 is illustrated to include one of the components described herein, various components may overlap in various embodiments. For example, Processing Unit 1120 may include multiple microprocessors configured to independently perform the methods described herein, or to perform steps or subroutines of the methods described herein, with the multiple processors working together to achieve the functions described herein. Furthermore, if System 1140 is implemented in a cloud computing system, various hardware components may belong to separate physical systems. For example, Processor 1120 may include a first processor in a first server and a second processor in a second server.
[0203] It should be noted that the embodiments described above are illustrative and not limiting to the subject matter disclosed herein, and that many alternative embodiments can be designed by those skilled in the art.
[0204] In the claims, reference numerals in parentheses shall not be construed as limiting each claim. The use of the verb “to equip” and its conjugations shall not preclude the existence of elements or steps other than those described in the claims. The articles “a” or “an” preceding an element shall not preclude the existence of multiple such elements. Expressions such as “at least one of” following a list of elements shall indicate a selection of all or any subset of the elements from the list. For example, the expression “at least one of A, B, and C” should be understood to include A only, B only, C only, both A and B, both A and C, both B and C, or all of A, B, and C. The subject matter disclosed herein may be implemented by hardware comprising several different elements and by a appropriately programmed computer. In device claims listing several components, some of these components may be embodied by the same hardware item. The mere fact that certain means are described in mutually different dependent claims shall not imply that combinations of these means cannot be used advantageously.
[0205] In the claims, references in parentheses represent reference numerals or formulas of embodiments in the drawings of the exemplary embodiments, and are therefore intended to facilitate understanding of the claims. These references shall not be construed as limiting any of the claims.
Claims
1. The prover uses a vector commitment scheme to tell the verifier the principal vector (x = (x 1 , ..., x n A computer-implemented cryptographic method (300) for demonstrating that )) is a binary vector, wherein the vector commitment scheme is such that the element (x) at the position (i ∈ [n]) of the committed vector i The method is configured to calculate proof that allows for partial opening of the ) and The primary commitment [Math 1] Calculating (310), the main commitment [Math 2] The commitment function C is calculated for the committed vector (x) and the commitment function is calculated for the proof. [Math 3] Having a pair with (310), The prover has randomized the vector (y = (y 1 , ..., y n (320) obtaining the randomization vector, which is made available to the verifier, which is selected by the verifier, or which is derived from the output of the cryptographic hash function. The first auxiliary commitment by the certifier [Math 4] Calculating (330), the first auxiliary commitment [Math 5] However, the commitment function is calculated for the auxiliary vector, which contains the Hadamard product of the main vector (x) and the randomization vector (y), and is committed in reverse order to the main vector. [Math 6] And the commitment function computed for the proof of auxiliary vectors [Number 7] Having a pair with (330), a further vector (y that for each component includes the product of a randomized vector and the main vector minus 1 i (x i −1)) is orthogonal to the main vector (x i ), generating a first proof (π that demonstrates this orthogonality y ) (340), wherein the first proof is configured for verification by a verifier A second proof (π) demonstrates that the principal vector in the Hadamard product committed by the first auxiliary commitment is the principal vector committed by the main commitment. eq ) to generate (350) Methods that include...
2. Main commitment [Number 8] However, this is calculated by evaluating the commitment function of the vector commitment scheme with respect to the principal vector (x), and First auxiliary commitment [Number 9] However, this is calculated by evaluating the commitment function of the vector commitment scheme for the auxiliary vector, or a linear combination of the auxiliary vector and the randomization vector, or the auxiliary vector minus the randomization vector. The method according to claim 1, comprising at least one of the following.
3. The method according to claim 1, wherein the second proof includes dividing the product of proofs over the elements of the principal vectors by the product of proofs over the elements of the auxiliary vectors.
4. The method according to claim 1, wherein the principal commitment, the first auxiliary commitment, the first proof, and the second proof each have a size independent of the dimension of the principal vector.
5. The method according to claim 1, wherein the vector commitment scheme is an additive homomorphism.
6. The verification process goes from the first auxiliary commitment to the second auxiliary commitment. [Number 10] The method according to claim 1, further comprising obtaining
7. The method according to claim 6, wherein a second auxiliary commitment is obtained from a first auxiliary commitment and a randomized vector using the additive homomorphism property of a vector commitment scheme.
8. Group 1 and Group 2 [Math 11] From the third group [Math 12] A bilinear map (e( , )) is defined to the first and second groups. [Number 13] It is the origin of, The verification of the first proof is a bilinear map to the generators of the first proof and the second group. [Number 14] The method according to claim 1, including a first application of the method.
9. The verification process goes from the first auxiliary commitment to the second auxiliary commitment. [Number 15] This further includes obtaining the first proof, and the verification of the first proof is a bilinear map to the main commitment and the second auxiliary commitment. [Number 16] The method according to claim 8, comprising a second application, wherein the verification includes comparing the results of the first and second applications in a third group.
10. The verification of the first proof is a bilinear map to the main commitment and the second auxiliary commitment. [Number 17] The method according to claim 9, comprising a third application, wherein the verification comprises comparing the results of the first and second applications in the third group.
11. Second proof (π eq ) is the first group [Number 18] The second proof is constructed for verification by the verifier, and the said verification is a bilinear map to the second proof. [Number 19] , bilinear map to the main commitment [Number 20] , and bilinear mapping to the first auxiliary commitment [Math 21] The method according to claim 8, comprising comparing the application of a bilinear map to a second auxiliary commitment derived from a first auxiliary commitment and a randomization vector.
12. The method according to claim 11, wherein the application of the bilinear map is by the product of selected group generators, and the group generators are selected for comparison and balanced when both the principal commitment and the first auxiliary commitment correspond to the same principal vector.
13. A bilinear map applied to the selected group elements and principal commitment of the first group. [Number 22] However, in the third group, the bilinear map applied to the Open proof concerning an element at a certain position and a selected group element of the second group [Number 23] And a bilinear map applied to the selected group elements of the first group and the selected elements of the second group, raised to the power of their original values at position. [Number 24] Equivalent to the product of and / or A bilinear map applied to the first auxiliary commitment and the selected group elements of the second group. [Number 25] However, in the third group, the bilinear map applied to the Open proof concerning an element at a certain position and a selected group element of the second group [Number 26] And a bilinear map applied to the selected group elements of the first group and the selected elements of the second group, raised to the power of their original values at position. [Number 27] The method according to claim 8, which is equal to the product of the following.
14. Second proof (π eq The method according to claim 1, wherein the result is obtained by aggregating randomized openings relating to vector elements.
15. To make the commitment and the first auxiliary commitment available to the verifier, and to make the first proof and / or the second proof or its aggregate available to the verifier. The method according to claim 1, including the method described in claim 1.
16. The method according to claim 1, wherein the vector commitment scheme includes a Pedersen commitment scheme.
17. A method for demonstrating that a numerical value (x) is less than a threshold, Bit representation of a numerical value (x) ((x 1 , ..., x l ) ∈ {0, 1} l Obtain a bit vector containing ), calculate a commitment relating to the bit vector, and generate at least the first proof described in claim 1. To generate a proof that demonstrates the equivalence of bit representations for a given number (x), Demonstrate that a number (x) is less than a threshold by opening one or more of the most significant bits of a bit vector. Methods that include...
18. ring [Number 28] A method for demonstrating the validity of the above ring LWE ciphertext, wherein the ciphertext is a first vector s = (s 1 , ..., s M ) ∈ R M and, [Number 29] and [Number 30] Regarding the formula [Number 31] A second vector a that satisfies the following condition, and for an integer q, R q A method comprising expressing a vector s as a binary vector, generating at least the first proof described in claim 1, and generating a proof that the vector s satisfies the equation, wherein = R / (qR).
19. A method for demonstrating that a vector x is ternary, and two binary vectors x 0 , x 1 ∈{0, 1} l The difference between them x = x 0 -x 1 A method comprising writing x as and generating at least the first proof according to claim 1 for a concatenated vector of two binary vectors.
20. Randomized vector (y = (y 1 , ..., y n The method according to claim 1, wherein the randomization vector is obtained by a series of polynomial functions applied to the scalar, and is obtained from a scalar (u) selected by the verifier or derived from the output of a hash function.
21. The verifier is a verifier device, and the verifier provides a cryptographic method for verifying a proof, wherein the proof is a first proof (π) generated according to claim 1. y ) and / or the second proof (π eq ), or the first proof (π) generated according to claim 1 y ) and the second proof (π eq A cryptographic method is an aggregation of these, and its verification includes proof verification.
22. A system comprising one or more processors and one or more storage devices for storing instructions, wherein when an instruction is executed by one or more processors, the system causes one or more processors to perform an operation according to any one of claims 1 to 21.
23. A verification system comprising one or more processors and one or more storage devices for storing instructions, wherein when an instruction is executed by one or more processors, one or more processors are made to perform an operation for verifying a proof, and the proof is a first proof (π) generated according to claim 1. y ) and / or the second proof (π eq ), or generated according to claim 1 The first proof (π y ) and the second proof (π eq A verification system is an aggregation of and verification of evidence, including the verification of proof.
24. A computer program that, when executed by one or more computers, includes instructions that cause one or more computers to perform the operations described in any one of claims 1 to 21.
25. Verification software including data representing an instruction, wherein when the instruction is executed by one or more computers, the software causes one or more computers to perform an operation to verify a proof, and the proof is a first proof (π) generated according to claim 1. y ) and / or the second proof (π eq ), or the first proof (π) generated according to claim 1 y ) and the second proof (π eq Verification software is an aggregation of and verifies proof, including verification of evidence.
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