Method and system for remote redundancy of on-board equipment of aircraft
A remote redundancy system for aircraft systems addresses the lack of backup capabilities by using external computing resources to adaptively manage standby modes and ensure seamless operation, enhancing reliability and reducing weight and cost.
Patent Information
- Authority / Receiving Office
- RU · RU
- Patent Type
- Patents
- Current Assignee / Owner
- МИРОНОВ СЕМЁН АНАТОЛЬЕВИЧ
- Filing Date
- 2025-11-27
- Publication Date
- 2026-07-02
AI Technical Summary
Existing aircraft systems lack remote backup capabilities to ensure continuous operation in case of onboard equipment failure, leading to potential loss of functionality and increased weight, cost, and power consumption, especially in unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs).
Implementing a remote redundancy system where critical aircraft functions are performed by a remote computing resource located outside the aircraft, adapting to hot or cold standby modes based on flight phase and system criticality, with seamless switching and proactive redundancy to maintain operational continuity.
Enhances aircraft reliability and survivability while reducing weight and cost by ensuring adaptive and fault-tolerant operation through remote backup, maintaining critical functions even in the event of onboard system failures.
Smart Images
Figure 00000001_ABST
Abstract
Description
[0001] The invention relates to backup systems and is intended for remote backup of on-board equipment (BE) of an aircraft (AC) based on the use of a remote computing resource located outside the AC and operating via wireless communication channels.
[0002] There are known methods for redundant aircraft systems and components installed on the aircraft itself (for example, triple redundancy of automatic control system channels). The disadvantage of such solutions is a significant increase in the aircraft's weight, size, cost, and power consumption, which is especially critical for unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs). Furthermore, the service life of such redundant systems is also limited and susceptible to the same external influences as the primary equipment.
[0003] Also known are solutions for remote aircraft control, in which some functions (e.g., navigation) are performed by a ground control station. However, such systems do not provide automatic, instantaneous, and transparent backup for other aircraft systems in the event of a failure of a specific unit or module of the control system. They merely provide aircraft control in place of the crew using the aircraft's control system. They do not provide flexible management of backup equipment readiness modes (hot / cold standby) depending on system criticality and flight phase, nor do they address the issues of intelligent data flow redistribution or communication channel delay compensation for time-critical systems.
[0004] The closest in technical essence to the claimed invention is the System and method for automatic control of the trajectory of a vehicle, based on the remote activation of the on-board automatic control system of an aircraft (AC) and (or) an autopilot, as well as the deactivation of the on-board controls of the AC and the controls for engaging / disengaging the automatic control system or autopilot in order to improve flight safety by eliminating unauthorized access to the control of the AC [see, for example, patent US 7142971 B2, IPC G05D 1 / 0061, B64D 45 / 0015, B64D 45 / 0031, published 28.11.2006].
[0005] This method improves flight safety solely by eliminating unauthorized access to aircraft controls by remotely engaging the onboard ACS and disabling all controls. Furthermore, the method involves disabling the controls responsible for engaging and disabling the onboard ACS. Thus, the method enables safe aircraft flight using the onboard ACS in the event of emergency situations related to unauthorized access to aircraft controls, crew error, or inability to continue controlling the aircraft, and other onboard situations that require the cockpit to be excluded from aircraft control.
[0006] The disadvantages of this method include the lack of remote backup control systems, including ground-based ones, that would allow for fully remote control of the aircraft. This method only functions if the onboard control system is operational, does not account for its complete failure, and does not provide for redundancy of onboard equipment or the transfer of all computing equipment functions, including the control system, to remote backup computing resources.
[0007] A modernization of the PFN / TRAC system by the US Federal Aviation Administration is known to ensure responsible remote and robotic control in order to prevent unauthorized use of aircraft, as well as to improve equipment management and ensure public safety in transport, based on the use of the PFN / TRAC system, which allows for remote monitoring of the parameters and flight trajectory of all aircraft connected to the system, and, in the event of emergency situations, including unauthorized access, to carry out remote control (radio control) of the aircraft with the help of a crew located on the ground, or with the help of automatic simulators that take into account the experience of pilots in controlling the aircraft [see, for example, patent US 6965816 B2, IPC G07C5 / 008, B64C 13 / 20, B64D 45 / 0015, B64D 45 / 0031, B64D 45 / 0034, B64D 45 / 0053, B64D 45 / 0059, G08B 13 / 1965, G08B 27 / 008, G08B 31 / 00, Y02T50 / 40, published 15.11.2005].
[0008] A disadvantage of this invention is the use of onboard equipment. When switching to remote radio control, only control commands are transmitted from the ground equipment to the aircraft. These commands are used by the standard onboard equipment, instead of commands from the crew. This certainly improves flight safety in the context of unauthorized access to aircraft control. However, it does not account for onboard equipment failures, which can lead to loss of aircraft functionality, which can only be restored through the use of remote backup. Therefore, in the event of onboard equipment failure, this method is impossible to implement, since it relies on the standard automatic control system and autopilot and does not allow for their computational functions to be performed remotely.This invention does not provide for remote (distant) backup of the aircraft and restoration of its operability by switching to ground-based backup equipment, but is based only on remote control of the aircraft using pilots, simulators and other means.
[0009] A flight control emergency system is known. It is a method and system that prevent control of an aircraft from the cockpit. In one embodiment, the system can be activated externally. For example, an air traffic control (ATC) station may determine that an aircraft has deviated from its planned flight path. If ATC personnel determine that the deviation is not due to the actions of the authorized flight crew, they can transmit a signal to the aircraft that disables all normal cockpit controls. After disabling normal flight controls, the aircraft can execute a preprogrammed emergency flight plan using the autopilot system, with or without the flight management system (FMS).An emergency flight plan may result in the aircraft being diverted to a sparsely populated area and entering a holding pattern, or landing in a sparsely populated area or at an airport using an automatic landing system [see, for example, US Patent 7568662 B1, IPC B64D 45 / 0031, B64D 45 / 0034, B64D 45 / 0059, published 04.08.2009].
[0010] A disadvantage of this invention is the use of standard onboard equipment to control the aircraft, which does not account for its possible failures. Therefore, if the onboard equipment fails, this method cannot be implemented, as it relies on the standard automatic control system and autopilot and does not provide for remote execution of their computing functions, i.e., redundancy.
[0011] A known anti-theft system, which in an emergency disables onboard flight control systems and allows remote control of the aircraft using the autopilot. In the anti-theft system for aircraft equipped with an autopilot, a transceiver communicates with at least one remote control device. In the event of a hijacking, the flight crew activates a panic button. The control device is connected to the transceiver and panic button, as well as to the existing avionics, including the aircraft's main computer and autopilot. Optionally, a relay is connected between the pilot's controls and selected aircraft flight systems. The control device recognizes predefined interlock input signals, such as the activation of the panic button or the receipt of interlock signals from the remote control device.In response to the interlock input, the control unit deactivates the on-board control of selected aircraft flight systems and the autopilot system and commands the autopilot to guide the aircraft to a safe landing. Flight and landing instructions are received from the remote control unit or by independently assessing nearby airports, taking into account the aircraft's position and various preset criteria [see, for example, US Patent 6,641,087 B1, IPC G05D 1 / 0061, B64D 45 / 0031, B64D 45 / 0034, published 04.11.2003].
[0012] A drawback of this system is the use of onboard equipment, namely the autopilot and, consequently, the automatic control system, to control the aircraft. This system allows for the reception of control commands from the ground station and the transmission of them to the autopilot, which presumes the autopilot and other aircraft control systems are in good working order. This drawback can be eliminated by remote redundancy of the onboard aircraft control system, which is not addressed in the above-mentioned inventions.
[0013] Aviation system and ground station for off-route aircraft control and emergency communications is known. An avionics system and ground station for off-route aircraft control and emergency communications, consisting of an on-board electronic device installed on board an aircraft with a memory unit for storing data on the flight path, runways, orography and obstacles; processors for processing stored or received data received from sensors monitoring the situation on board. The processors will calculate commands that will be transmitted to the aircraft's autopilot for temporary control of the aircraft and its return to specified flight levels or positions in space; communication devices designed to transmit information about the situation on board in real time to ground control stations when potentially hazardous events occur [see, for example, patent EP 1527432 B1, IPC G08G5 / 26, G08G5 / 52, G08G5 / 53, G08G5 / 54, G08G5 / 55, G08G5 / 727, H04B7 / 18506, H04B7 / 18508, published 03.05.2006].
[0014] A disadvantage of this invention is the use of the standard onboard control system for the operation of the developed system, which does not account for its failures. Consequently, the developed system is only feasible with properly functioning onboard equipment. This disadvantage can only be resolved by using redundancy, including remote redundancy. This invention does not address onboard equipment redundancy, whereby ground equipment would perform the functions of the onboard equipment and transmit information to the aircraft's actuators. This invention involves an additional unit that generates commands for the onboard automatic control system, specifically the autopilot.
[0015] A method for preventing unauthorized movement of an aircraft is known. The invention relates to the field of ensuring air traffic safety. The method is implemented by activating the automatic flight and landing control system of the aircraft, remotely switched to autonomous mode from onboard an interceptor aircraft. The aircraft is transferred to a flight path to the airfield, followed by landing. Airspace control means are used to detect unauthorized movement of the aircraft. The invention is aimed at improving passenger safety [see, for example, patent RU 2214934 C2, IPC B60R25 / 02, G05G5 / 02, B64D45 / 00, published 27.10.2003].
[0016] The disadvantage of this method is the use of the aircraft's standard onboard equipment, namely the automatic control system and autopilot, to control the aircraft. This does not account for possible onboard equipment failures and makes this method unfeasible. Furthermore, the method does not provide for remote execution of onboard equipment functions or the transmission of control commands directly to the aircraft's actuators, rather than to the autopilot. Thus, remote redundancy of onboard equipment is not considered in principle.
[0017] Thus, the inventions discussed above do not address restoring aircraft operability in the event of onboard equipment failure by activating a remote backup computing resource, replacing the failed onboard equipment elements (systems), to perform the functions of the failed one. All of the above inventions are based on transferring aircraft control from the cockpit (from the crew) to the autopilot, ground crew, ground station, interceptor aircraft, etc., and on the use of the aircraft's standard onboard equipment. Replacing the failed onboard equipment with non-airborne equipment is not considered in the inventions considered. These inventions assume a functioning onboard equipment.
[0018] Solutions in the field of telemetry and remote control of aircraft are known, where data on the status of onboard systems is transmitted to a ground station for monitoring, analysis, and the generation of control commands. However, in such systems, ground-based computing resources perform tasks such as overall control or diagnostics, but do not replace the functions of a specific failed element of onboard equipment. In contrast, the present invention implements the principle of remote redundancy at the module level, in which ground equipment functions in place of the failed unit, processing its input data and returning ready-made output signals. This ensures not just remote control, but also the continuity of critical functions while maintaining the architectural integrity of the onboard systems.
[0019] The technical result of the invention is to increase the reliability and survivability of the aircraft, to reduce the weight and cost of the on-board equipment by ensuring automatic, adaptive and trouble-free operation of the aircraft's BO in the event of failure of its elements through the use of remote computing resources.
[0020] The said technical result is achieved by the fact that in the method for remote redundancy of onboard equipment of an aircraft, according to the invention, a decision is made on the need to perform the functions of at least one element and / or system of the aircraft's onboard equipment by a remote computing resource, information and input data intended for the said element and / or system of the aircraft's onboard equipment are transmitted via a wireless communication channel to a remote control point, the input data are processed on the remote computing resource, the output data are transmitted onboard the aircraft and fed to the corresponding systems of the aircraft's onboard equipment. Moreover, the remote computing resource is located outside the structural boundaries of the aircraft, and its functions are performed in one of at least two readiness modes (e.g., hot or cold standby), differing in the level of operational readiness for data processing.The mode selection is carried out adaptively based on at least one parameter characterizing the criticality of the function being performed and / or the flight stage.
[0021] To ensure seamless switchover in the event of an on-board system failure, in hot standby mode, the internal state of the remote computing resource is continuously or periodically synchronized with the state of the redundant on-board system or its on-board observer model. This ensures that at the time of switchover, the remote resource is already in a state identical to the failed unit, eliminating any "jerky" control.
[0022] Additionally, to implement proactive redundancy, when a high probability of system failure is predicted within a specified time horizon, its remote computing resource is automatically transferred from cold standby mode to hot standby mode or to warm-up mode, in which the resource state is synchronized but data processing is not performed.
[0023] The decision on the need and redirection of input data can be carried out using the on-board control unit (OCU), and the operation of the remote computing resource can be controlled using the remote control unit (RCU).
[0024] The decision on necessity can be made based on the fact or forecast of failure, the fact or forecast of increased load, or an external command.
[0025] At least one of the following may be used as a remote computing resource: physical backup equipment, a universal computer, a virtual environment emulating the operation of a combat element and / or system, or a computing resource operating on a digital twin. Using a digital twin of a specific aircraft allows for the operation of its systems to be emulated with maximum accuracy, taking into account individual characteristics and wear and tear.
[0026] To enhance fault tolerance and load balancing, the system can be implemented using multiple onboard control units (OCUs) and onboard communication units (OCUs). Individual systems or groups of onboard equipment systems can have dedicated pairs of OCUs and OCUs that operate independently. This architecture enables parallel remote redundancy for multiple systems simultaneously via different communication channels and eliminates a single point of failure in the event of a single onboard control or communication unit failure.
[0027] Similarly, on the ground side, multiple remote computing resources can be combined into a single computing cluster, with subtasks for the redundant BO system dynamically distributed among them, which allows for scaling of computing power and improvement of reliability through load balancing.
[0028] The essence of the invention is explained by drawings.
[0029] Fig. 1 shows the general structural diagram of the remote backup system.
[0030] The system comprises an aircraft (1) on which onboard equipment systems (2) are installed. The OB systems (2) are connected to an onboard data bus (3). An onboard control unit (OCU) (4) and an onboard communication unit (OCU) (5) are also connected to the bus (3). The OCU (5) communicates wirelessly (7) with a remote complex (8) via an antenna (6). The remote complex (8) comprises a remote communication unit (RCU) (9) with an antenna (10), a remote control unit (RCU) (11), and a remote computing resource (12), which may include physical OB duplicates (13), universal computing servers (14), and servers with virtual machines (15). The remote OCU (11) is connected to a database (16), which stores, among other things, digital twins of the aircraft systems.
[0031] Fig. 2 shows a block diagram of the operating algorithm of the onboard control system (CUU).
[0032] The algorithm begins (Block 20). In step 21, the control unit continuously monitors the status of the BO systems and the data bus. In step 22, a check is made to see if an event (failure, overload forecast, command) has been detected. If not, monitoring continues. If so, in step 23, the control unit redirects the input data intended for the failed system to the BUS for transmission to the remote complex. Simultaneously, in step 24, the control unit performs switching, preparing the appropriate channel for receiving output data from the ground. In step 25, the control unit receives output data from the BUS from the remote computing resource. In step 26, the received data is verified (e.g., compared with the forecast). If the data is correct (step 27), it is fed to the BO systems (step 28). If the data does not pass verification, it is blocked (step 29), and the emergency response procedure is activated (step 30). The process continues until the end of the redundancy session.
[0033] Fig. 3 shows a block diagram of the adaptive redundancy control method.
[0034] The method begins (Block 30). In step 31, continuous data collection occurs: flight phase parameters (takeoff, cruise, approach) and system reliability metrics (e.g., error rate, temperature, operating time). In step 32, the collected data is analyzed. Based on predefined rules or using the AI module, a decision is made in step 33 to select a backup mode. If the system is critical and the flight phase is critical (step 34), hot standby mode is activated (step 35). If the system is non-critical and can tolerate an interruption (step 36), cold standby mode is activated (step 37). The process is repeated cyclically throughout the flight (step 38).
[0035] Fig. 4 shows the implementation diagram of distributed redundancy with best channel selection.
[0036] The aircraft (1) can simultaneously communicate with several remote complexes: via a satellite communication link (40) with a satellite (41) and a ground complex (42), as well as via an airborne repeater (43) on another aircraft (44) with its own link to a ground complex (45). The onboard CCU (CUU) and the ground CCU continuously evaluate quality metrics (latency, packet loss) for each channel (46) and dynamically select for use the channel and the remote complex that provide the highest communication quality at a given moment.
[0037] The method and system are implemented as follows.
[0038] Before or during a flight, remote backup equipment for critical systems (e.g., the ACS) can be switched to hot standby mode. In this mode, the state synchronization module in the control unit (4) and the control unit (11) ensures constant identity of the internal state (e.g., the values of integrators, filters, state variables) of the ground-based computer and the onboard system. In this mode, the backup equipment (e.g., the virtual machine (15) on the server (14), emulating the operation of the standard ACS computer) continuously receives input data (sensor signals, flight parameters) from the aircraft via channel (7), processes them in real time, and is fully prepared to instantly transmit output data (e.g., control signals to the rudders) to the aircraft.In this case, if the onboard ACS fails, the onboard control system (4) switches the channel almost instantly, and control begins to be carried out from the ground without interrupting the formation of control actions and without transient processes, thanks to preliminary synchronization of states.
[0039] For systems that are not latency-critical (e.g., the onboard diagnostic system), cold standby mode is used. The corresponding remote computing resource (13) is idle or powered off. If the onboard diagnostic system fails, the onboard control unit (4) detects the failure and transmits information and data to the remote control unit (11), which starts, initializes, and configures the computing resource (13). Once ready, data processing begins and the results are transmitted to the onboard computer.
[0040] The selection between the modes can be carried out automatically by the ground control unit (11) based on the method illustrated in Fig. 3. For example, for the power plant control system, the hot reserve mode will be automatically selected and activated during takeoff, and for the same system, the cold reserve mode will be automatically selected and activated during the parking phase.
[0041] Data verification, as shown in Fig. 2 (steps 26-27), is an important safety feature. For example, for a navigation system, the onboard CRM (4) can calculate predicted coordinates based on inertial system data. If the coordinates received from the remote backup differ statistically significantly from the predicted coordinates, the data is blocked, and the system switches to using the backup inertial data.
[0042] The use of virtual environments (15) and digital twins from the database (16) allows for the flexible and rapid reconfiguration of a remote computing resource for a specific aircraft type and even for a specific aircraft, using its individual calibration data and settings.
[0043] Industrial applicability.
[0044] The invention can be used in the aviation industry to equip next-generation manned and unmanned aerial vehicles, as well as to upgrade existing aircraft. The system can be implemented using commercially available components (onboard computers, servers, communications equipment) and standard software (real-time operating systems, virtualization environments, machine learning platforms), confirming its industrial applicability.
[0045] The claimed system and method are novel because they are unknown in the prior art. No known solutions exist in which the redistribution of information flows in the event of a failure of a control system element and / or system between the aircraft and a remote computing resource operating in hot or cold standby modes would be accomplished by deciding on the need for such redistribution and adaptively selecting a backup mode based on an analysis of the flight phase's criticality and system reliability metrics. This would also ensure seamless switching through the synchronization of internal states and proactive control based on failure prediction.
[0046] The invention involves an inventive step, as it is not obvious to a person skilled in the art from the prior art. A combination of essential features, including decision-making regarding the need to perform the functions of a component of the flight control system by a remote computing resource located outside the aircraft, adaptive control of its readiness modes based on the flight situation, ensuring seamless switching, and proactive redundancy, enables the achievement of a new technical result—the creation of a flexible, adaptive, and fault-tolerant redundancy system that radically increases the reliability and survivability of the aircraft while simultaneously reducing the weight and cost of its onboard equipment.
Claims
1. A method for remote reservation of on-board equipment (OE) of an aircraft, which consists in making a decision on the need to perform the functions of at least one element and / or system of the OE of the aircraft by a remote computing resource, redirecting input data intended for the said element and / or OE system from on-board the aircraft to a remote computing resource via a wireless communication channel, processing the said input data on a remote computing resource, thereby performing the functions of the said element and / or OE system, transmitting output data obtained as a result of processing on a remote computing resource via a wireless communication channel on-board the aircraft, feeding the said output data to the corresponding OE systems of the aircraft and / or to actuators, characterized in that: – the remote computing resource is located outside the structural boundaries of the aircraft; – the execution of the functions of the specified element and / or the BO system by the remote computing resource is carried out in one of at least two readiness modes, differing in the level of operational readiness of the computing resource for data processing, while the choice of the mode is carried out adaptively on the basis of at least one parameter characterizing the criticality of the function being performed and / or the flight stage.
2. The method according to paragraph 1, characterized in that the readiness modes are at least a hot standby mode and a cold standby mode.
3. The method according to paragraph 2, characterized in that the hot standby mode is used to reserve time-critical systems, which include the automatic flight control system (AFCS), the navigation system, and the power plant control system.
4. The method according to paragraph 2, characterized in that the cold standby mode is used to back up systems that allow a short-term interruption in operation, which include an on-board diagnostic system, a flight data recording system, or a life support system.
5. The method according to paragraph 1, characterized in that the decision on the need and the redirection of input data are carried out using an on-board control device, and the operation of the remote computing resource is controlled using a remote control device.
6. The method according to paragraph 1, characterized in that the decision on the need is made on the basis of at least one of: the fact or forecast of failure of an element and / or BO system, the fact or forecast of increased load on an element and / or BO system, or an external command.
7. The method according to paragraph 1, characterized in that at least one of the following is used as a remote computing resource: physical equipment that duplicates the failed element and / or BO system; a universal electronic computer; a virtual environment that emulates the operation of the element and / or BO system; a computing resource that functions on the basis of a digital twin of the element and / or BO system.
8. The method according to paragraph 7, characterized in that the virtual environment is designed with the possibility of migration between cluster servers without interrupting the data processing process.
9. The method according to paragraph 1, characterized in that the remote computing resource is located on a stationary ground object, on another aircraft or on a vehicle.
10. The method according to paragraph 1, characterized in that the exchange of information between the aircraft and the remote computing resource is carried out via a satellite communication channel and / or via a repeater located on another aircraft, vehicle or stationary object.
11. The method according to paragraph 1, characterized in that, when the need is detected, several remote computing resources located in different geographic locations are simultaneously connected, and the resource for which the communication quality metric with the aircraft is the highest is selected for use.
12. The method according to paragraph 11, characterized in that when the quality metric of the connection with the current remote computing resource deteriorates, an automatic switch is made to another resource with the transfer of the current data processing context.
13. The method according to paragraph 1, characterized in that before submitting output data to the aircraft’s combat systems, they are verified on the on-board control device by comparing them with predicted values calculated on the basis of models of the aircraft’s current state, and in the event of a discrepancy, the data is blocked.
14. The method according to paragraph 1, characterized in that, in order to back up the automatic flight control system (AFCS) during the landing approach phase, the remote computing resource operates in hot standby mode, while it additionally receives and takes into account in calculations current data on the glide path shift and weather conditions in the airfield area.
15. The method according to paragraph 1, characterized in that in the hot standby mode, continuous or periodic synchronization of the internal state of the remote computing resource with the state of the redundant on-board system or its on-board observer model is carried out, ensuring seamless switching in the event of failure.
16. A method for adaptive control of the redundancy of on-board equipment of an aircraft, which consists in continuously or periodically analyzing during the flight at least one parameter characterizing the criticality of the current stage of the flight and at least one metric of the reliability of the on-board equipment system, and, based on this analysis, automatically selecting and activating for this system a remote redundancy mode from at least two options, including a hot reserve mode and a cold reserve mode.
17. The method according to paragraph 16, characterized in that the selection of the backup mode is additionally carried out on the basis of a failure forecast generated by an artificial intelligence module trained on historical data on flights and failures.
18. The method according to claim 17, characterized in that when a high probability of system failure is predicted within a given time horizon, its remote computing resource is automatically transferred from the cold standby mode to the hot standby mode or to the warm-up mode, in which the state of the resource is synchronized, but data processing is not carried out.
19. A system for implementing the method according to any of paragraphs 1-18, containing on-board equipment of an aircraft, characterized in that it additionally contains: – an on-board communication device (OCD) connected to the aircraft’s on-board data bus and capable of exchanging information in real time with a remote computing resource via a wireless communication channel; – an on-board control unit (OCU) connected to the BC and to the on-board data transmission bus of the aircraft and designed with the ability to: – receiving information on the basis of which a decision is made on the need for remote backup; – redirection of input data of the specified element and / or BO system to the BUS for transmission in real time to a remote computing resource; – receiving output data from a remote computing resource from the BUS and submitting them to the LA BO systems.
20. The system according to paragraph 19, characterized in that the BUS and BUU are structurally and / or functionally combined in one device and / or implemented in the form of a software module operating as part of the standard computing device of the aircraft.
21. The system according to paragraph 19, characterized in that the BUS and BUU are additionally configured with the possibility of interaction with another aircraft functioning as a carrier of a remote computing resource.
22. The system according to claim 19, characterized in that at least one of the devices: the control unit or the bus, contains an artificial intelligence module, configured to predict failures based on the analysis of current telemetry data and historical flight data.
23. The system according to claim 19, characterized in that it contains a device for filtering and / or compensating for signal delays in the communication channel.
24. The system according to paragraph 19, characterized in that the control unit is additionally configured with the possibility of buffering and compressing the data transmitted to the ground.
25. The system according to paragraph 19, characterized in that it additionally contains an on-board data storage device, designed with the ability to record and store critical parameters and algorithms of failed systems.
26. The system according to paragraph 19, characterized in that it contains a plurality of on-board control units (OCU) and on-board communication units (OCU), wherein each OCU and OCU are intended for the backup of individual systems or groups of systems of the on-board equipment (OE) of the aircraft, functioning independently or jointly to implement remote backup.
27. The system according to claim 19, characterized in that the control unit and / or the remote control device (RCD) contain a state synchronization module, configured to ensure the identity of the internal state of the remote computing resource and the state of the redundant on-board system in hot standby mode.
28. A system for implementing the method according to any of paragraphs 1-18, containing a remote computing resource, characterized in that it additionally contains: – a remote communication device (RCD) designed with the ability to exchange information in real time with the aircraft’s BUS via a wireless communication channel; – a remote control device (RCD) connected to the RCD and to a remote computing resource and configured to: – receiving from the UUS information in real time and input data intended for the specified element and / or the aircraft’s BO system; – transfer of input data to the corresponding remote computing resource; – receiving output data from a remote computing resource and transmitting it in real time to the UUS for sending on board the aircraft.
29. The system according to paragraph 28, characterized in that the UUS and UUU are structurally and / or functionally combined in one block.
30. The system according to paragraph 28, characterized in that the remote computing resource contains at least one of the following elements: duplicate equipment, a universal computer, an on-board systems simulator, a virtual machine performing the functions of a digital twin of the BO system.
31. The system according to paragraph 30, characterized in that the UUU is configured to configure a remote computing resource based on data from a digital twin of a specific aircraft stored in a database.
32. The system according to paragraph 28, characterized in that at least one of the devices: the UUU, the UUS, or the remote computing resource, contains an artificial intelligence module, configured with the ability to adaptively optimize data processing based on the current load of computing resources.
33. The system according to paragraph 28, characterized in that the UUU is additionally configured with the ability to unpack data compressed by the BUU.
34. The system according to paragraph 28, characterized in that the UUU is additionally configured with the capability of parallel processing of input data by several remote computing resources with different algorithms and subsequent selection of the best result based on the voting algorithm.
35. The system according to paragraph 28, characterized in that the UUU is designed with the ability to organize the operation of several remote computing resources as a single computing cluster, with dynamic distribution of subtasks for the redundant BO system between them.
36. An aircraft comprising a system according to any one of paragraphs 19-27, characterized in that: – the on-board communication device (OCD) is connected to the aircraft’s on-board data transmission bus and is designed to exchange information in real time with a remote computing resource via a wireless communication channel; – the on-board control unit (OCU) is connected to the BUS and to the on-board data transmission bus of the aircraft and is designed with the ability to: – receiving information on the basis of which a decision is made on the need for remote backup; – redirection of input data of the specified element and / or BO system to the BUS for transmission in real time to a remote computing resource; – receiving output data from a remote computing resource from the BUS and submitting them to the LA BO systems; – wherein the control unit is additionally configured with the capability of adaptively selecting one of at least two readiness modes of the remote computing resource, differing in the level of operational readiness for data processing, based on at least one parameter characterizing the criticality of the function being performed and / or the flight stage, and the remote computing resource is located outside the structural boundaries of the aircraft.
37. An aircraft according to paragraph 36, characterized in that it is an unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV).
38. A remote backup system comprising a system according to any one of paragraphs 28-35, characterized in that: – the remote communication device (RCD) is designed with the ability to exchange information in real time with the aircraft’s BUS via a wireless communication channel; – the remote control device (RCD) is connected to the UUS and to the remote computing resource and is designed with the ability to: – receiving from the UUS information in real time and input data intended for the specified element and / or the aircraft’s BO system; – transfer of input data to the corresponding remote computing resource; – receiving output data from a remote computing resource and transmitting it in real time to the UUS for sending on board the aircraft; wherein the UUU and the remote computing resource are configured to provide at least two readiness modes of the remote computing resource, differing in the level of operational readiness for data processing, and adaptive selection of said mode based on at least one parameter characterizing the criticality of the function being performed and / or the flight stage.