Method of controlling data integrity in robotic systems

Abstract

FIELD: robotic systems.SUBSTANCE: invention relates to a method for monitoring the integrity of data in robotic systems. In the method, a data block Mi,j (i=0,1,… , n-1; j=0.1,… , k-1) with signs of integrity violation is detected and localized by calculating a system of hash codes formed from hash codes calculated from a set of n⋅k data blocks Mi,j, characterized in that the reference hash codes Xi,j and Yi,j are calculated by means of transformations over the elements of the corresponding rows and columns of the data array M[n,k], performed with alternation of different hash functions ƒx,ƒy, which allows localizing a data block with signs of integrity violation under conditions of simulating the impact of an intruder by subsequently calculating from the reference hash codes Xi,j, and Yi,j the common hash code Hn,k and comparing its value with the value of the reference hash code H'n,k calculated when a request to use the data is made.EFFEECT: reliable control of data integrity.1 cl, 10 dwg, 1 tbl

Description

[0001] Field of technology to which the invention relates

[0002] The proposed invention relates to information technology and can be used to control the integrity of data in robotic systems based on the application of cryptographic hash functions to protected data blocks under conditions of simulating the effects of an intruder.

[0003] Technology Level

[0004] The current stage of development of robotic systems used in industry, research, and military affairs in all physical environments—on land, in the air, on and under water, and in outer space—is characterized by a steady trend toward increasing the volume of data accumulated during their operation. When analyzing the development of special-purpose robotic systems, in particular those designed for aerial and underwater reconnaissance and other tasks characterized by the rapidity of decision-making on their use, the transfer of data processing and storage processes from ground control posts to onboard the robotic systems themselves is also evident. This information, depending on the intended purpose of the robotic systems, is presented and stored as multidimensional structured data arrays, and may be of various natures (telemetry, special, navigation, etc.).) and, as a consequence, different value for the consumer (ground control center, on-board systems, etc.).

[0005] One of the essential requirements for information is to ensure its integrity, in particular, its reliability and completeness, which inevitably suffer from the distortion and / or destruction of data during its storage on board robotic systems due to the impact of various destabilizing factors, which are understood as impacts on robotic systems, the source of which is a physical or technological process of an internal or external nature in relation to them, leading to the failure of its elements.

[0006] In this case, the implementation of threats to information security can be carried out as a result of both destructive actions by an attacker and disturbances in the operating environment.

[0007] The results of the analysis of the current state of affairs in this subject area allowed us to conclude that recently the greatest relevance has been acquired by solving the problem associated with monitoring the integrity of data in robotic complexes, in particular, in conditions of simulating the effects of an intruder, which are aimed at changing the qualitative characteristics of information that determine its suitability in performing the target functions of the complexes in question.

[0008] a) Description of analogues

[0009] There are known methods for monitoring the integrity of data through the use of cryptographic methods: key and keyless hashing, electronic signature tools (Patent for invention RU No. 26207030 07.12.2015; Patent for invention RU No. 2669144 28.11.2017; Patent for invention RU No. 2680033 22.05.2017; Patent for invention RU No. 2680350 02.05.2017; Patent for invention RU No. 2680739 28.11.2017; Patent for invention RU No. 2686024 25.04.2018; Patent for invention RU No. 2696425 22.05.2018; Knuth, D.E. The Art of Computer Programming. Volume 3. Sorting and Searching / D.E.Knut. - M.: "Mir", 1978. - 824 p.; Dichenko, S. Two-dimensional control and assurance of data integrity in information systems based on residue number system codes and cryptographic hash functions / S. Dichenko, O. Finko / / Integrating Research Agendas and Devising Joint Challenges International Multidisciplinary Symposium ICT Research in Russian Federation and Europe. 2018. P. 139-146; Dichenko, S.A.Hybrid crypto-code method of monitoring and restoring data integrity for secure information and analytical systems / S. Dichenko, O. Finko / / Cybersecurity Issues. - 2019. - No. 6 (34). - Pp. 17-36), which are characterized by three generalized schemes for applying the hash function:.

[0010] - with the calculation of one common hash code from k data blocks (Fig. 1);

[0011] - with the calculation of one hash code from each of the data blocks (Fig. 2);

[0012] - with the construction of a fully connected hashing network (Fig. 3).

[0013] The disadvantages of these methods are:

[0014] - for the scheme of using a hash function with the calculation of one common hash code from k data blocks:

[0015] - low probability of detecting a violation of data integrity (detecting an error) when an error is missed (false error signal) by control means;

[0016] - lack of ability to control the integrity of reference hash codes;

[0017] - the impossibility of localizing a data block with signs of integrity violation under conditions simulating the effects of an intruder;

[0018] - for a scheme for using a hash function with the calculation of one hash code from each of the data blocks:

[0019] - high redundancy of control information when monitoring the integrity of data blocks represented by small-dimensional binary vectors;

[0020] - low probability of detecting a violation of data integrity (detecting an error) when an error is missed (false error signal) by control means;

[0021] - lack of ability to control the integrity of reference hash codes;

[0022] - the impossibility of localizing a data block with signs of integrity violation under conditions simulating the effects of an intruder;

[0023] - for the scheme of applying the hash function with the construction of a fully connected hashing network:

[0024] - high redundancy of control information when monitoring the integrity of data blocks represented by small-dimensional binary vectors;

[0025] - lack of ability to control the integrity of reference hash codes;

[0026] - in general, this model does not allow localization of a data block with signs of integrity violation under conditions of simulating the effects of an intruder.

[0027] A known method of data integrity control is based on a hash code system, the construction rules of which are similar to the rules for constructing linear redundant codes (Fig. 4), obtained by applying a hash function to data in the order determined by a special procedure for selecting a data block based on the mathematical apparatus of linear algebra (Dichenko S.A. Control and Ensuring the Integrity of Information in Data Storage Systems / / Science-Intensive Technologies in Space Research of the Earth. 2019. Vol. 11. No. 1. Pp. 49-57), where data integrity control (error detection), by analogy with linear codes, is carried out by calculating a syndrome, when checking which it is possible to draw a conclusion about a violation of data integrity (the presence of an error).

[0028] The disadvantages of this method are:

[0029] - lack of ability to control the integrity of reference hash codes under conditions of restrictions on permissible resource costs;

[0030] - the impossibility of localizing a data block with signs of integrity violation under conditions simulating the effects of an intruder.

[0031] b) Description of the closest analogue (prototype)

[0032] The closest in technical essence to the claimed invention (prototype) is a method for monitoring the integrity of multidimensional data arrays based on the rules for constructing rectangular codes (Patent for Invention RU No. 2771273 04 / 29 / 2022), in which data blocks represented by a 2-dimensional array are located in a rectangle, to each row and column of which reference hash codes are added, calculated from a set of data blocks located in the corresponding rows and columns of the rectangle, while from the obtained reference hash codes for monitoring the integrity of the data, a common reference hash code is calculated, the value of which is compared with the value of the hash code calculated upon a request to use the data to be protected (Fig. 5).

[0033] The disadvantage of the known method is the lack of the ability to localize a data block with signs of integrity violation under conditions of simulating the effects of an intruder.

[0034] Disclosure of invention

[0035] a) The technical result that the invention is aimed at achieving

[0036] The purpose of the present invention is to develop a method for monitoring the integrity of data in robotic systems based on the use of cryptographic hash functions with the ability to localize a data block with signs of integrity violation under conditions of simulating the effects of an intruder.

[0037] b) Set of essential features

[0038] The stated goal is achieved by the fact that in the known method of data integrity control, which consists in the fact that the detection and localization of the data block M i,j(i=0,1,…, n-1; j=0,1,…, k-1) with signs of integrity violation is carried out by calculating a system of hash codes formed from hash codes calculated from a set of n⋅k data blocks M i,j , in the presented method the reference hash codes X i,j and Y i,j are calculated by means of transformations over the elements of the corresponding rows and columns of the data array M[n,k], performed with alternation of different hash functions ƒ x , ƒ y , which allows localizing a data block with signs of integrity violation under conditions of simulating the influence of an intruder by subsequent calculation from the reference hash codes X i,j and Y i,j common hash code H n,k and comparing its value with the value of the reference hash code calculated when a request to use data is made.

[0039] A comparative analysis of the claimed solution and the prototype shows that the proposed method differs from the known one in that the stated goal is achieved by introducing blocks of alternating different hash functions ƒ x , ƒ y , applied to the corresponding rows and columns of the data array M[n,k] to be protected, which allows for the localization of data blocks with signs of integrity violation under conditions of simulating the effects of an intruder, from the resulting hash codes X i,j , Y i,j the general hash code H is calculated n,k .

[0040] Localization of data blocks with signs of integrity violation will be carried out by calculating reference hash codes X i,j , Y i,j by means of transformations over the elements of the corresponding rows and columns of the data array M[n,k], performed with alternation of different hash functions ƒ x , ƒ y, which will allow, at time t, under conditions of simulating the influence of an attacker, to compare the value of the common hash code H n,k , calculated from the reference hash codes X i,j and Y i,j , with the value of the common reference hash code calculated when a data request is made, thereby detecting signs of integrity violation. What's new is the introduction of blocks of alternating different hash functions. х , ƒ y , applied to the corresponding rows and columns of the data array M[n,k] to be protected, which allows for the localization of data blocks with signs of integrity violation under conditions of simulated intruder actions.

[0041] c) Cause-and-effect relationship between features and technical result Thanks to the new set of essential features, the method realizes the possibility of:

[0042] - localization of a data block with signs of integrity violation under conditions simulating the effects of an intruder.

[0043] Evidence of compliance of the claimed invention with the patentability conditions of “novelty” and “inventive step”

[0044] The conducted analysis of the state of the art allowed us to establish that there are no analogues characterized by a set of features identical to all the features of the claimed technical solution, which indicates that the claimed method complies with the patentability condition of “novelty”.

[0045] A search of prior art in this and related fields of technology to identify features that match the distinctive features of the claimed object revealed that they are not clearly evident from the prior art. The prior art also failed to reveal any known distinctive essential features that would lead to the same technical result achieved by the claimed method. Consequently, the claimed invention meets the patentability requirement of "inventive step."

[0046] Brief description of drawings

[0047] The claimed method is explained by drawings, which show:

[0048] Fig. 1 - diagram of the application of a hash function with the calculation of one common hash code from k data blocks;

[0049] Fig. 2 - diagram of the application of a hash function with the calculation of one hash code from each of the data blocks;

[0050] Fig. 3 - diagram of the application of a hash function with the construction of a fully connected hashing network;

[0051] Fig. 4 - a hash code system based on the rules for constructing linear redundant codes;

[0052] Fig. 5 - rectangular hash code system with integrity control of reference hash codes;

[0053] Fig. 6 - diagram illustrating the order of alternation of different hash functions applied to the rows and columns of a data array;

[0054] Fig. 7 - data hashing scheme based on the rules for constructing rectangular codes with alternating different hash functions applied to the rows and columns of the data array;

[0055] Fig. 8 - hashing network for a rectangular hash code system with alternating different hash functions applied to rows and columns of a data array;

[0056] Fig. 9 - hashing network for a rectangular hash code system with alternating different hash functions applied to the rows and columns of a data array, where n=2, k=3;

[0057] Fig. 10 - a rectangular system of hash codes with alternating different hash functions applied to the rows and columns of a data array, with integrity control of the reference hash codes.

[0058] Implementation of the invention

[0059] Data Blocks M i,j (i=0,1,…, n-1; j=0,1,…, k-1) are located in a rectangle of size n by k, forming a 2-dimensional data array M[n,k].

[0060] Under conditions of simulating the influence of an intruder, in order to ensure the ability to control the integrity of n⋅k data blocks to be protected, hash codes calculated from a set of data blocks M are added to each row and column of the rectangle (data array M[n,k]). i,j , located in the corresponding rows and columns of the rectangle.

[0061] To combat the imitation effects of an intruder, the present invention introduces a procedure for distinguishing between possible intruder effects on data arrays obtained during the operation of a robotic complex.

[0062] The implementation of this procedure is carried out by means of transformations over the elements of the rows and columns of the data array, which are performed with alternating different hash functions applied to the rows and columns of the data array in question (Fig. 6).

[0063] The elements of the even rows of the data array are transformed according to the rules identical to the rules by which the transformations are performed on the elements of the odd columns of the array, or in reverse order:

[0064]

[0065] Example 1. Let the operation of the robotic complex result in the acquisition of a data array M[n,k] (special case: n=k=2).

[0066] Possible expressions in which, as a result of transformations by applying different hash functions, one hash code X is calculated i,j and Y i,j from each row and column of the array are:

[0067]

[0068]

[0069] In general, a possible expression in which, as a result of transformations by applying different hash functions, one hash code X is calculated i,j and Y i,j from each row and column of the array are:

[0070]

[0071] The original rectangle containing n⋅k data blocks, transformed into an array of size (n+1)⋅(k+1) - 1, will be called a rectangular hash code system, based on alternating different hash functions applied to the data array. To verify the integrity of n⋅k data blocks in a rectangular hash code system, it is necessary to calculate n+k hash codes.

[0072] Data integrity control, as well as localization of a data block with integrity violations, is performed using a hashing network. The hashing network for the data hashing scheme (Fig. 7), based on the rules for constructing rectangular codes with alternating different hash functions applied to the rows and columns of the data array under consideration (expression (1)), is shown in Fig. 8.

[0073] Based on the hashing network, for each data block to be protected, we obtain unique groups of reference hash codes used to detect and localize a data block with integrity violations.

[0074] Detection of a data block with integrity violation is performed by comparing the values ​​of pre-computed reference hash codes and the hash codes calculated during the request for its use. A discrepancy between the compared hash code values ​​allows us to conclude that an error has occurred and determine its syndrome. The error syndrome is understood as the binary number obtained by writing the symbol "O" for each performed check for compliance between the calculated and reference hash code values ​​and the symbol "1" if the compared values ​​do not match. For this purpose, a table of error syndromes is compiled based on the hashing network (Fig. 8), in which

[0075] - the presence of one “1” in the corresponding line will indicate a violation of the integrity of the reference hash code;

[0076] - the presence of two "1" in the corresponding row of the table will indicate a violation of the integrity of one data block M i,j , subject to protection;

[0077] - the presence of three or more "1" in the corresponding line will indicate a violation of the integrity of two or more data blocks M i,j , subject to protection, as well as other (occurrence of an undetectable error).

[0078] Example 2. A hashing network for a rectangular hash code system with alternating different hash functions applied to the rows and columns of a data array, with a rectangle size of n=2, k=3, is shown in Fig.9.

[0079] Based on the hashing network (Fig. 9), Table 1 is compiled, where “[⋅]” denotes the localized data block M i,j or a reference hash code with integrity violation.

[0080] To verify the integrity of the reference hash codes, it is necessary to calculate the hash code:

[0081]

[0082] and arrange it in a rectangular hash code system with alternating different hash functions applied to the rows and columns of the data array, as shown in Fig.10; the symbol “||” denotes the concatenation operation.

[0083]

[0084] In this case, the array (1) will look like:

[0085]

[0086] To check the integrity of the reference hash codes, a comparison of the hash code value H is performed n,k with a hash code value calculated upon request to use data subject to protection. Based on the comparison results, we conclude:

[0087] - about the absence of violation of the integrity of the reference hash codes, when

[0088] - about the violation of the integrity of the reference hash codes, when

Claims

A method for monitoring data integrity in robotic systems, which consists in the detection and localization of a data block M i,j (i=0,1,…, n-1; j=0,1,…, k-1) with signs of integrity violation is carried out by calculating a system of hash codes formed from hash codes calculated from a set of n⋅k data blocks M i,j , characterized in that the reference hash codes X i,j and Y i,j are calculated by means of transformations over the elements of the corresponding rows and columns of the data array M[n,k], performed with alternation of different hash functions ƒ x , ƒ y , which allows localizing a data block with signs of integrity violation under conditions of simulating the impact of an intruder by subsequent calculation from the reference hash codes X i,j , and Y i,j common hash code H n,k and comparing its value with the value of the reference hash code calculated when a request to use data is made.

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