An automated quality control and goods acceptance system and method for sensitive and military equipment shipments to main defense industry contractors, which does not require long-range wireless communication and is protected against cryptographic tampering.

Abstract

This invention relates to a telemetry, data masking, and decision system and method that objectively and automatically detects whether a predetermined vibration / shock threshold (in a preferred arrangement, a product-specific threshold derived from road / terrain reference shock amplitudes as defined in Table 516.8-VII of Procedure II (Transportation Shock) of Method 516.8 of MIL-STD-810H) of defense industry products has actually been exceeded during actual transport / shipment – ​​this is the most important technical criterion of the invention – and generates an automated quality control decision at the point of receipt based on this detection.

Description

Invention Title: Precision and Military Equipment Manufactured for Main Contractors in the Defense Industry Cryptographically designed, it does not require long-distance wireless communication for its shipments. Tamper-Protected, Automated Quality Control and Goods Receiving System and Method TECHNICAL FIELD This invention enables defense industry products to have a predetermined vibration / shock threshold (a In the preferred arrangement, MIL-STD-810H Method 516.8, Procedure II (Transportation Shock) Derived from road / terrain reference pulse amplitudes defined in Table 516.8-VII, whether a product-specific threshold was actually exceeded during actual shipping / delivery — This is the most important technical criterion of the invention — it detects objectively and automatically; this Based on the findings, it generates an automated quality control decision at the point of receipt of goods. Telemetry is related to data masking and decision systems and methods. More generally... invention, defense industry, military equipment logistics, precision avionics and optical systems vibration / shock as defined by MIL-STD-810H standard during transportation Measurement of parameters via telemetry and quality control in the Goods Receiving area It is related. For clarity, it should be noted: here, compliance with MIL-STD-810H (qualification) is indicated. The actual product subject to shipment must be shown (via testing); telemetry The fact that the device itself has been qualified / tested according to this standard constitutes an invention. IT IS NOT REQUIRED — the role of the device in relation to this standard is not what the standard envisages. The purpose is to measure and record vibration / shock values ​​(G-force, vibration) of various types (other functions of the device). Its functions — hash-chain, encryption, activation record, GPS correlation — are also detailed below. (described). More specifically, the invention improves transportation quality in the defense industry and precision equipment logistics. security, impact / vibration monitoring during shipment, cryptographic tamper-proof protection. 1 Robust local data logging, military equipment / shipment identification only to the recipient. A data masking mechanism that conceals data through asymmetric encryption, short-range reading and basing this data on whether the product's qualification threshold has been exceeded or not. It relates to the field of automated examination / quarantine referral decisions. The invention is independent. Claims 1 and 13 are not limited to any particular mode of transport (land, sea or air); However, in a preferred arrangement, the reference used by the verification / decision unit Vibration / shock profile, whether the shipment is by land (wheeled / tracked / train), sea or air. Depending on which mode of transport (jet / propeller / helicopter) is used, MIL- From the relevant category or method of STD-810H (see "Detailed Invention" below) (As detailed in the "Description" section) it is selected automatically. Terminology note — the relationship between "data masking" and "recipient-specific encryption": This The term "data masking" used in the document is detailed in the specifications and claims. the defined "recipient-specific asymmetric encryption" mechanism (Claims 11, 17, 19, 20 — (See the section "Receiver-specific end-to-end encryption") is a general / descriptive meta-expression; two The terms refer to the same technical element; they are not two different or additional mechanisms. Military equipment / shipment identification and contents (project code, vehicle license plate, driver identification information, (including G-force / GPS data), only with the recipient's (main contractor's) private key. It is "masked" because it is encrypted in a way that can be deciphered; no one, including the sender, can decipher it. Unauthorized parties may not view this content. The rest of the specification and claims are technical. The term "encryption" / "decryption" has been preferred for accuracy; "data masking" is only used. At the summary level, it is used as a signal expression that points to the same mechanism. IPC Classes: G01P 15 / 00 (acceleration measurement), G06Q 10 / 08 (logistics, supply chain management and inventory control), H04L 9 / 32 (cryptographic message authentication / hash-chain), H04L 9 / 30 (asymmetric / public-key cryptographic techniques), G06F 21 / 60 (data Tools for protecting confidentiality / integrity — auxiliary class), G01C 21 / 00 (Route / navigation calculation and display — auxiliary class), G01N 29 / 00 (non-destructive material testing — auxiliary class), G06K 7 / 10 (optical code reading — (auxiliary class), G06K 19 / 07 (short-range data carrier / tag — auxiliary class). 2 STATE OF THE ART In conventional technology, impacts, vibrations, or temperatures that occur during shipment / transportation, etc. There are various systems for monitoring environmental impacts. These systems, It differs from the existing invention in the following respects: US9,501,920 B2 (KL Harring Transportation LLC) reports a malfunction in its cellular communications equipment. detects and automatically activates a satellite device and provides high-priority reporting. It requires a hybrid cellular-satellite communication architecture that transitions to this mode. The current The invention differs fundamentally from the one described in this document: the telemetry device of the present invention, shipping time no cellular or satellite communication modules capable of sending data / signals outwards throughout does not include (except for the optional passive GPS / GNSS positioner — see Claim 1(d)) and therefore the technical possibility of a "cellular failure → automatic transition to satellite" scenario The prerequisite required for this (long-distance communication capability) is present in the invention from the outset. It is not found from then on. The difference lies in the different design of a failover mechanism. No, it's about completely eliminating the communication layer that necessitates failover. US10,521,806 B2 (Walmart Apollo LLC) is developing a smart tag from a blockchain to a temperature-controlled device. It reads the required range, receives data from the temperature sensor, compares it, and sets the threshold. It requires the blockchain to write the temperature and timestamp when the device is moved outside of the blockchain. This requires a networked, distributed ledger / consensus infrastructure during operation. The present invention addresses the issue where the measured physical quantity (G-force instead of temperature) is different. Furthermore, it is also structurally different: a centralized or distributed blockchain in the current invention. There is no network; instead, on-device recording is available for each new measurement. sequentially including the cryptographic hash value of the previous record A local hash chain is maintained to which the data is linked. This local chain does not contain any data during the shipment process. It is not written to or synchronized with the network; its integrity is only ensured upon arrival, a one-time process. It is checked during the scanning / verification process. Therefore, the present invention is valid for Walmart. from the "live, network-connected, distributed ledger real-time writing" architecture required by the patent They are structurally distinct. 3 The on-device hash-chain mechanism itself processes data via cryptographic hash-chaining. It is a known application of the integrity verification technique (trusted timestamping) and Hash-chain is a much older, established cryptographic practice than blockchain. Therefore, it's a more established cryptographic method. the element, as an isolated element, alone constitutes the basis for novelty or inventive step It does not create; the novelty of the present invention lies in the fact that this known technique, during long-distance shipment, does not create a novelty; In the context of an IoT telemetry device without communication, an activation-dependent a specific process that begins with the shipment record and closes with a one-time scan / verification upon arrival. It is based on using them in combination. US7,427,918 B2 (Accenture Global Services) describes sensors (vibration sensors) in smart containers. (including) detecting incidents and transmitting them to a central database, a threat level calculation and a general quarantine / inspection of containers exceeding the threshold It requests that the communication be routed; via cellular and / or satellite. is being done. The present invention differs from this document in three respects: (i) Accenture's patent The system uses live cellular / satellite communication to transmit event data to a central database. It requires; there is no such communication in the present invention — data is only transmitted short-range upon arrival. (ii) The direction decision of the Accenture patent is general. The term "quarantine / inspection" is limited to this; the present invention relates to the acceptance of goods by the main contractor. Gate-specific, QR / NFC / BLE triggered, direct non-destructive testing (NDT) / X-Ray (iii) In the Accenture patent, it defines a specific decision flow that directs it to the laboratory. any cryptographic tamper-detection mechanism (hash-chain or similar) It is not available. Additionally, there are commercial products that provide real-time shock notifications via GSM. (SpotSee / ShockLog Cellular), MIL-STD-810H compliance declaration and IoT- the sensor+blockchain supply chain transparency concept (IBM, Deloitte, Chainlink, former It should be noted that TradeLens is widely used and well-known in the industry; none of these elements are unique. The claims of the present invention are not made in the initial invention — the present invention does not make these, the specific combination described above (long-range communication not included + on-device hash-) 4 (request for chain + short-range arrival scanning + automated routing specific to NDT / X-Ray) is doing. For shipment activation / chain-of-custody linking element, US2015 / 0262123 A1 family. and follow-on patents (US10,438,162 B2, US11,042,828 B2, US11,681,974 B2, US12,051,035 B2; registered under Roambee Corporation), a wireless tracking device It receives and verifies a code at the start and arrival of the shipment and establishes a chain-of-custody They are requesting that the system generate a verified / violated notification. These are the requests of this family. a structured field bundle (project code + vehicle license plate + driver identification information + (date / time) or the concept of a cryptographic hash-chain does not exist in this family The requests include whether the received code is generic (alphanumeric / QR / biometric) and It is limited to a Boolean check to determine whether it was received within the time / distance window. The present invention both utilizes the aforementioned structured field bundle and records this data. It differs from this family in that it makes the first cryptographic record of the hash chain. Also... US10,949,938 B2 ("Tracking products with chain of custody using IOT devices"), Since the connection is made via automatic sensor-to-sensor handshake / token exchange, the existing the invention's activation mechanism relies on manual data entry by the operator They are structurally distinct. For the receiver-specific asymmetric encryption element, the core technique of asymmetric encryption is — a the message can be encrypted with the recipient's public key and decrypted only with the recipient's private key — US4,405,829 A (RSA) is a publicly available, textbook-level technique; The Diffie-Hellman key change patent (US4,200,770) refers to this as a secondary source. This supports the existence of asymmetric encryption, therefore, as a single, isolated element. It cannot be used as a basis for its own invention; the difference of the current invention is that this known technique applies to IoT shipments. In the context of telemetry hash-chain, it refers to a situation where the sender cannot decrypt its own record. It is implemented through architecture. It uses asymmetric encryption in the supply-chain field. US9,306,750 B2 / US2011 / 0016318 A1 ("Techniques for securing supply chain electronics The patent's architecture is designed for signing / authentication purposes. (Parties sign with their private keys, the other party verifies with their public key) — existing The invention is confidential, reverse-directional (encrypt with the recipient's public key, only with the recipient's private key). It differs from the ("solve with a key") architecture. For GPS-shock correlation and route / violation-point representation, use Samsara's US11,365,980 B1 / US12,140,445 B2 family ("Vehicle gateway device and interactive map graphical user interfaces"), "harsh event" and location data to geographic cells They request that it be transformed and displayed on an interactive map; however, this is related to the fleet- It is based on multi-vehicle density / heat map aggregation across the board. The present invention is a single In terms of plotting the shipment route and marking the point of breach — the fleet — Because it generally does not contain aggregation — it is conceptually distinct. WO2009025789A1 ("System and method for detecting and reporting vehicle damage"), GPS, accelerometer, threshold-overshoot detection, and location display on a fleet management portal. It includes, but largely relies on, a real-time / live transmission architecture. At the commercial product level, Newsteo TRP55, MSR175plus, SpotSee ShockLog 298 / Satellite and LogTag LT5GEO products have a "download on arrival, show route and event map" feature. It should be noted that it offers... US20180096175 A1 ("Blockchain Enabled Packaging"; Schmeling, Divine, Thompson, Colson) and related family members (US20180094953 "DISTRIBUTED MANUFACTURING", US20190180291 "3D-PRINTED PACKAGING WITH BLOCKCHAIN ​​INTEGRATION"), Claim In step 1, information about a packaging element can be obtained, along with information about the package itself. It requests that this information be placed in a packet and written to a blockchain; Request 10 refers to an entry in a blockchain that is located on / within the packet. It requests a verification credential that includes a verification code. Both requests explicitly state that... It requires writing / referencing to the blockchain; this is inherently network-dependent, It is a shared ledger architecture. The current invention, however, does not allow any network writing during shipment. a non-device-based, one-way hash-chain (one-time hash only upon arrival) (read / verify) with recipient-specific asymmetric encryption and activation-linked shipment It is based on a combination of records; this is the "blockchain" requested by the family in question. It differs structurally from the "writing" architecture. 6 The nearest neighbor-area document is used for the vehicle type-dependent reference vibration profile selection element. US11,010,991 ("System for automatically detecting an operational event for a bulk "Material hauler vehicle" family; related publication US2020 / 0211300A1; rights holder Command Alkon Incorporated) is the owner of the dependent Claim 2, which states that the vehicle is one of several different vehicle types. and that the loading / unloading signature definitions are different for each different vehicle type. It requests that the following be noted. The points of divergence are: (i) the distinction between vehicle types in this patent. body / chassis configuration (end dump / side dump / belly dump truck, (tanker type truck) relies on — the propulsion / motion system of the present invention (wheeled / tracked), structurally different from the distinction based on the military MIL-STD-810 category. (ii) this patent detects loading / unloading events, The present invention provides a standard-based reference for a goods acceptance / quality control decision. (iii) makes comparison with the threshold; no reference to a military standard such as MIL-STD-810. There is none. Also, VibrationVIEW / Vibration Research software does not comply with MIL-STD-810H (Method (including 514.8) Keep predefined test profiles in a library and allow the user to test It is known to select its profile and drive a shaker accordingly; this is the current It differs conceptually from the invention — VibrationVIEW is designed to produce a laboratory test. The present invention applies a profile manually selected by the operator to a shaking table. it automatically processes real data recorded in the field, based on a shipment record field. It compares the application to a selected reference profile (for acceptance / rejection decisions). For sea and air transport modes, US8,990,033 B2 (IBM, "Monitoring operational conditions of a cargo ship through use of sensor grid on intermodal containers"), It simply sets a baseline compound vibration pattern based on location — It is not a choice based on the mode of transport; it is limited to a single mode of transport (sea) and is an external choice. The distinction is clear as it does not refer to the standard (MIL-STD-810). US10,611,545 B2 (Copeland Transportation Solutions ApS, formerly Emerson Climate Technologies, "Container Shock The Detection System uses "bias value", "shock intensity", and "shock severity" to measure shock intensity. Evaluated by a multi-step internal calculation chain that includes an "absolute value indicator". The applicant requests a container shock detection system; the present invention conforms to MIL-STD-810H. Direct threshold comparison based on the reference value, this multi-step calculation chain 7 not including and relying on a reference profile selection depending on the mode of transport / vehicle type differs in terms of US12,056,654 B2 (UPS, "Method and system for customized configuration of a shipper for transporting temperature-sensitive materials") Irrelevant: election forecast based on air temperature three fixed shipper configurations (gel- This is done between the packaging / pre-cooling, and has nothing to do with vibration / shock. There is no reference to MIL-STD-810. At the commercial product level, Newsteo TRP55 is a product. The specification allows for device configuration with only a single fixed shock threshold (identical on three axes) This indicates that it offers a "mode of transport" field or a reference to MIL-STD-810. It is not available. Furthermore, there is the ASTM D4169 standard and the "ASTM" standard based on this standard. The "D4169 Test Plan Generator" software tool determines the transport mode for shipping packages. Automatically categorized among "Distribution Cycles" (by air / train / truck / sea). It presents a proposal; however, this is based on a civilian standard (not the military MIL-STD-810H). It is based on and produces a pre-shipment laboratory test plan (shipment (not during / after field telemetry and automated acceptance / rejection decision) — therefore They are structurally different. For rail (tire) transport mode, Lansmont offers rail / intermodal cargo solutions. The product / service offer does not refer to MIL-STD-810, only ASTM / ISTA / ISO. It is based on standards. MSR's railway applications focus on passenger comfort and driving. This is for safety (EN 12299 / UIC 513, EN 14363 / UIC 518) — cargo shock / goods-acceptance decision. No; the distinction between the two products is clear. ASTM D4169 / PackCalc's train-specific cycle codes (DC-7, DC-8, DC-9, DC-10, DC-11) pre-shipment laboratory test plan It produces [production] and differs from the existing invention for the same reason explained above. For the deactivated cellular / satellite communication module element, WO2013044399A1 ("Automatic flight mode") is a communication module setting in a cargo / shipment tracking device. It shows that it should be automatically disabled; however, the trigger in this document... The mechanism relies on flight detection / regulation compliance, the shipment in the present invention- its activation is different from its trigger, and this document is with other elements of the present invention. (cryptographic integrity mechanism, activation-dependent shipment record, MIL-STD-810H threshold, 8 NDT / X-Ray decision flow) are not combined. A communication module's software or The technique of disabling it at the hardware level itself, as an isolated element, portable computer Wi-Fi kill-switch patents (US10,915,484, US10,930,452) is also generic; therefore, this element is just like the hash-chain element. For example, in isolation, it does not constitute a basis for novelty or an inventive step — existing The potential difference of the invention is that this known technique has a trigger dependent on shipment-activation. and should be based on a combination of the other elements described above. For the independent digital signature + sequence number integrity mechanism element, US7,877,607 B2 ("Tamper-evident data management" — in the context of software license / usage data, (not in the context of telemetry), each record must be signed independently and in a sequence. This includes the technique of deletion / skipping detection using a number; this is part of the present invention. with the core technique of this alternative arrangement of the integrity mechanism They overlap. TCG / ISO-IEC 11889 (TPM attestation standard — independently signed) (quote) + a separate monotonic counter) this technique is an industry standard, an established practice. This is confirmed by a second source. Therefore, independent-signature+sequence-number The element, as an isolated element, operates on the same logic as the hash-chain element, representing innovation or invention. The step does not constitute a basis; the potential difference of the present invention is that this known technique, an IoT telemetry device without long-distance communication during shipment in this context, with activation-linked shipment record and MIL-STD-810H threshold comparison. It must be based on combining the elements of the aforementioned integrity mechanism. The independent authentication tag is a symmetric message identifier instead of a digital signature. The extended scope of the subtype where the validation code (MAC — e.g., HMAC-SHA256) is It should also be noted that the symmetric key independent record authentication technique (for example, in the literature on forward-secure audit log schemes) It is an established and widespread practice; a separate, targeted screening specific to this subspecies has not yet been carried out. It has not been done. Annex C of MIL-STD-810H Method 514.8, Transportation life cycle, Composite wheeled vehicles define the vibration profile as Category 4; with a tracked vehicle. 9 However, it does not offer a separate, ready-made composite profile for cargo / material transport. Category defined in Annex D of the Operational life cycle of the standard. Article 20(b), the exposure of equipment installed inside a tracked vehicle while the vehicle is in motion. characterizes the vibration; the reference used in the present invention for tracked vehicle transport. The profile is derived from adapting this category to the shipping / cargo context. MIL-STD- The 810H itself is a composite profile under Method 514.8 for sea transport mode. It does not offer this, instead it uses a separate method, Method 528 (ship / shipboard vibration). It refers to the Transportation life cycle of Method 514.8 for the road-rail transport mode. In Annex C, Category 11 (railway / rail cargo) is defined with the same official status as Category 4. (vibration exposure) is used; it is also a shock component for train transport. If it is to be evaluated, this would be according to Method 526 ("Rail"), which is a separate method of MIL-STD-810H. It is based on "impact". None of the documents discussed above incorporate all of the following elements into a single system. does not combine: (i) any data / signals that can be sent out during shipment does not include a cellular or satellite communication module OR the module in question physically Even if included, it is deactivated during transit (optional passive) (ii) a telemetry device with deep sleep / hardware-wake architecture (excluding GPS / GNSS receiver); The measurement records are secured by a cryptographic integrity mechanism on the device — sequential cryptographic hash-chain or independent authentication tag (digital signature or message) (iii) tamper protection with authentication code / MAC) + sequence number; The registration is only done upon arrival, via a short-range interface (wireless or wired; (BLE / NFC / QR / dock connector) one-time scanning and verification of integrity; (iv) According to the verified record, an automated NDT / X- specific to the main contractor's goods acceptance process. Rail routing decision generation; (v) recording with a structured shipment record (project The code (vehicle license plate + driver's ID + date / time) is activated and the aforementioned cryptographic code is used. (vi) cryptographically linking the integrity mechanism to the first record; recorded The content is asymmetric, unique to the recipient and not even decipherable by the sender. (vii) GPS / GNSS position data added to the record and protected by encryption; the route of the shipment and the points of breach being shown on a map upon arrival; and (viii) vehicle type (wheeled / tracked) or — in a preferred extended arrangement — mode of transport (land-wheeled / land-tracked / land-train, sea, air-jet / air- Depending on whether it is a propeller-driven / air-helicopter, the verification / decision unit must comply with MIL-STD-810H. Method 514.8 Category 4 / Category 20(b) / Category 11 or Method 528 / Category 7 / 8 / 9 Automatic selection of a reference vibration / shock profile or threshold between them. This gap, the invention This constitutes a technical problem; each of the elements mentioned above, in isolation... although it may correspond to known patterns in its field — disabled communication Including alternatives for the module and independent-signature+sequence-number integrity mechanism — The technical contribution of the present invention lies in the complete combination of these elements together. It is based on. The key criterion of the invention is whether the shipping shock data actually exceeds a predetermined limit. It should not exceed the limit specified in Procedure II (Transportation Shock) of MIL-STD-810H Method 516.8. Terminal peak sawtooth, published in Table 516.8-VII. Ready-made reference amplitudes for the pulse type — for road transport (5000 km) Approximately 5.1G-6.4G-7.6G peak amplitudes (11 ms pulse duration), off-road transportation (1000 km) Approximately 10.2G-12.8G-15.2G peak amplitudes (5 ms pulse duration) are derived for this. This choice, Procedure III (Fragility) within Method 516.8 refers to the actual damage to the product. A destructive test, specific to each product, to determine the level at which it begins to be seen. This is because it requires and does not offer a published, readily available reference value; In response, Procedure II provides published table values, thus enabling the automated decision-making unit. It provides a more practical and repeatable reference basis for threshold calibration. It is not a replacement for Procedure III, but an alternative, supplementary reference source. MIL- STD-810H, Method 516.8 Procedure II (transport shock) Method 514.8 Category 4 and / or It mandates implementation in conjunction with a Category 20 vibration test; see "The Invention" below. Vehicle-type-specific as described in the "Detailed Description" and "REQUIREMENTS" sections. The selection of the (wheeled / tracked) vibration profile reflects this common application relationship. 11 THE PURPOSE AND SOLUTION OF THE INVENTION The technical problem solved by the invention: The detection gap described in the ABSTRACT section above. — proven in the MIL-STD-810H qualification test of defense industry products Whether the durability threshold was actually exceeded during transport can today be determined objectively and The inability to detect it automatically, and the associated risk of invisible internal structural damage / loosening. and the dependence of the current goods receiving process on manual evaluation — this invention It is a technical problem that it aims to solve. The purpose of the invention is to provide precision equipment to main contractors in the defense industry. the quality of their shipments; any continuous wireless communication during the shipment communication infrastructure (cellular subscription, satellite service provider) or a central Without relying on a distributed ledger network, with low engineering risk and tamper-proof. a system and method that provides security in a cryptographically verifiable manner to provide. This objective is essentially achieved through a combination of the following elements: (a) shipment fixed to the equipment, in deep sleep mode, and from a high-G accelerometer (b) a telemetry device containing a microcontroller that is awakened by an incoming hardware interrupt; separate (c) a vibration sensor; measurement samples on the device, each new record being a previous one a local memory / hash in which the record is stored chained to include its cryptographic hash chain module or — in an alternative arrangement — each record having its own independent with a verifiable cryptographic authentication tag (digital signature or message) (d) an integrity mechanism in which the authentication code / MAC is protected; (d) the shipment of the device no cellular or satellite communication capable of sending data / signals externally during this period not including the module, or — in an alternative arrangement — physically not including such a module. Even if it includes this module, it must be disabled during transit (optional). (e) upon arrival, the main contractor shall accept the goods; excluding the connected passive GPS / GNSS positioning receiver. the terminal connects the device via a short-range interface (wireless — BLE, NFC or optical) (f) scanning the QR code — or a wired dock connector; hash at the time of scanning registered momentum that verifies the integrity of the chain or authentication tag 12 their values ​​within a predetermined threshold (in a preferred configuration, MIL-STD-810H) Method 516.8, Procedure II (Transportation Shock), Table 516.8-VII, road / terrain (compared to a threshold derived from reference pulse amplitudes) — this comparison, The invention is the most important determination step leading to the decision to accept the goods — and accordingly, it is automatic. as "Green Approval — direct installation" or "Red Alert — NDT / X-Ray" A verification / decision-making unit that produces a "refer to the laboratory" decision. A preferred option. In the arrangement, this basic combination is further expanded with the following elements: chain-of- Custody, privacy and route-visualization functions are added: (g) at the start of the shipment Project code, vehicle license plate, driver identification information entered by an operator, and The device is activated with a shipment record consisting of the activation date / time, and the record... From this point onwards, it must be linked to the relevant shipment context (no prior data before activation). (h) not to be associated with the shipment; (h) the recorded content only to the main destination of the shipment with a public key that can be unlocked with a private key held by the contractor encryption — so that even the sender cannot decrypt the data he / she has recorded; and (i) By adding GPS / GNSS location data to the record, the route followed by the shipment upon arrival and Showing threshold-crossing events on a map. (g) and the element related to (g), specifying by whom, by what means and when the shipment will be made. By enabling the record to be cryptographically linked to the fact that it has been moved, it creates a chain-of- It serves a custody / traceability function. Element (h) refers to personal data such as driver identification information. Access to the record, which may contain such information, is determined mathematically (asymmetrically) rather than by an administrative permission rule. data minimization and purpose limitation principles by restricting data (through encryption) It provides an overlapping technical privacy-by-design; this assessment is solely for... This relates to the technical nature of the architecture and is governed by the Law No. 6698 on the Protection of Personal Data. This does not replace separate legal compliance consultancy under the Turkish Personal Data Protection Law (KVKK). This architectural choice is also based on uninterrupted long-distance communication throughout the shipment process. It also eliminates the additional engineering / operational uncertainties inherent in architectures. 13 BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF THE FIGURES  Figure 1: Overview of the system (200) — fixed to the shipping equipment (220) telemetry device (201), any wireless communication along the shipping route a dashed / blank road segment indicating no connection, and at the destination main contractor’s goods receiving terminal (230) device with short range interface (214 / 215) the moment he taught.  Figure 2: Hardware block diagram / cross-section of the telemetry device (201) — high-G accelerometer (202), vibration sensor (203), microcontroller (204), local memory unit (206), cryptographic encryption module (216), main contractor's public key (218) and its Downloading from a key distribution / validation server (219), short range interface (wireless or wired, 214), passive GPS / GNSS receiver (213, optional), battery (210), ATEX / IECEx housing (209), Gore-Vent valve (211), N52 magnetic fastening the arrangement (212) and — in an alternative arrangement — physically included but with a deactivated cellular / satellite module (250) during transit time disable mechanism (251).  Figure 3: Deep sleep and hardware wake-up flowchart — microcontroller (204) Deep sleep mode is a hardware-generated pulse signal from the accelerometer (202). interruption (205), waking up in about 1 millisecond, taking measurements and returning to deep sleep. rotation cycle.  Figure 4: Hash-chain data structure schema — consecutive records (207-1, 207-2, ..., 207-n) each of them contains the summary value of the previous record (208), the measurement data of that record (G- force, vibration, GPS location, timestamp) and the data in question with a public key (218) compiled the next hash value by summarizing the encrypted content together. chain structure; representation that the first record contains the shipment record (217); a retrospective A schematic representation of how a record change creates inconsistencies in the chain.  Figure 5: Goods Receipt scanning and decision flowchart — device (201) terminal (230) read by, decryption with a private key (243), hash-chain (232) or — one in the alternative arrangement — via authentication tag (signature or MAC, 232b) integrity verification, MIL-STD-810H threshold comparison (233), route / map 14 visualization and violation point marking (241 / 242), and accordingly "Green Approval" (235) or generating the decision "Red Alert — NDT / X-Ray redirection" (236).  Figure 6: Software / implementation block diagram of the verification / decision unit (231) — data retrieval module, decryption module (243), hash-chain verification module (232) or — one in alternative arrangement — authentication tag validation module (232b), threshold Comparison module (233), G-force / time graph and path / map visualization module (234 / 241), violation point marking module (242) and Decision / Report Output Module (235 / 236).  Figure 7: Shipment activation flowchart — the operator opens the mobile application, Reading the device (201) with the short range interface (214 / 215), the shipment record (217 — Project code, number of devices / items, vehicle license plate, driver identification information, activation. (date / time) entry, loading of the main contractor’s public key (218), shipment The registration and public key are written to the device, and the device switches to active registration mode. EXPLANATION OF REFERENCES IN THE FIGURES 200: System 201: Telemetry device 202: High-G accelerometer 203: Vibration sensor 204: Microcontroller 205: Hardware interrupt signal 206: Local memory unit 207: Hash-chain record 208: Hash value of the previous record. 209: Mechanical enclosure 210: Battery 211: Pressure relief valve 212: Magnetic fastening mechanism 213: Passive GPS / GNSS receiver 214: Short-range interface (wireless or wired) 215: Optical QR code 216: Cryptographic encryption module 217: Shipment record 218: Main contractor's public key 219: Key distribution / verification server 220: Shipping equipment 230: Goods receiving terminal 231: Verification / Decision Unit 232: Hash-chain integrity verification module 232b: Authentication tag validation module (signature or MAC alternative) 233: Threshold comparison module 234: Visual output of G-force / time graph 235: "Green Approval" decision 236: "Red Alert — NDT / X-Ray redirection" decision 240: Non-Destructive Testing (NDT) / X-Ray laboratory 16 241: Route / map visualization module 242: Violation point marker 243: Decryption module 244: Symmetric session key 245: Vehicle type information 246: Selection of reference vibration profile / threshold depending on vehicle type. 247: Transportation mode information 248: Selection of reference vibration / shock profile or data set depending on transport mode. 249: Reference vibration profile for rail transport mode 250: Optional, cellular / satellite communication disabled during transit. module 251: Mechanism that disables module (250) DETAILED DESCRIPTION OF THE INVENTION General system architecture (Figure 1) The system (200) consists of a telemetry device (201) fixed to a shipping equipment (220) and Includes a main contractor goods receiving terminal (230) located at the destination of the shipment. Telemetry device (201) during transit time from activation to arrival any cellular (GSM / NB-IoT / CAT-M1) capable of sending data or signals outwards or It does not include a satellite communications module and during this time no long-distance wireless data is transmitted. It is not found in the transmission or transmitter; in Figure 1, this situation is along the shipment route. an empty path showing no communication links coming from the device This is represented by the segment. This limitation prevents any data from being transmitted out of the device or This relates to signal transmission (see Claim 1(d) and equivalent method claim Claim 13(c)); 17 As described below in the "Device hardware and mechanical housing" section, the device It may optionally include a passive, receive-only GPS / GNSS position receiver. Since it does not transmit any data or signals, the device is outside the scope of this limitation. During shipment, it only keeps a measurement record in its own local memory (206). Shipment equipment (220), directly of the device via a magnetic fixing device (212) It allows it to be attached to the equipment body or transport case. In an alternative arrangement, the telemetry device (201) is the cellular or It may physically include a satellite communications module; however, this arrangement refers to module (250), during the transit time from the activation of the shipment to the arrival a disabled device that cannot transmit any data or signals to the outside It is kept in this state. Disabling it, for example, means cutting off the power supply to the module in question. physically cutting off the module's antenna or power line with a switch or relay (251). physical separation, or the module being rendered ineffective before activation or during transit. This can be accomplished through a software or hardware locking mechanism. In the alternative arrangement, the purpose of the limitation described in Claim 1(d) and Claim 13(c) is... — the actual capacity of the device to transmit data or signals to the outside during transit time its absence — is ensured in the same way; the difference is that this result is physically present in the module. is it obtained through its absence or by physically finding it and rendering it ineffective? It is that the module in question (250) has been deactivated and the deactivation. mechanism (251), in a preferred arrangement, with other components of the device (202-219) They are housed together inside the device casing. It should be noted that a physical interruption of the power supply or the antenna / power line... Disabling it by physically separating it effectively reduces the module's transmission capacity. a disease that eliminates and can only be reversed through physical intervention It provides security; in contrast, a purely software-based locking mechanism prevents the module's transmission. It only suppresses activation while preserving capacity and prevents unauthorized firmware. This can be bypassed via the update or debugging interface; therefore, the software lock. In a preferred arrangement, a signed / verified firmware update (secure boot) 18 and additional measures such as physically disabling the hardware debugging port. It is implemented along with other measures. Shipment initiation and activation (Figure 7) Telemetry device (201), after it is manufactured or unloaded from a previous shipment It is in a pre-activation state; in this state, the device does not record any measurements. It does not hold any data, or any data it holds is not associated with a shipment. A shipment Initially, an operator at the supplier's facility opens a mobile application and by scanning the device’s short-range interface (214) or optical QR code (215) It matches. The operator, via the mobile application, provides at least one project code within the scope of the shipment. Number of devices / pens, a vehicle license plate, and driver's identification information (name, surname, and Turkish Republic ID number). (number) and enter an activation date / time; this information is recorded as a shipment record (217), The text is written to the telemetry device (201) via the short range interface (214) and for the device A unique shipment ID is generated. Telemetry is then processed upon completion of this write operation. The device enters an active recording mode; cryptographic integrity as described below. The first record of the mechanism (Figure 4) includes the shipment record in question (217). Any data that may have been retained by the device prior to activation (e.g. (relating to a previous shipment or storage / pre-shipping testing), with a new shipment record. It is not associated and will not become part of the new hash chain. In one preferred arrangement, the operator can activate the mobile application in the same activation session. (245) also selects the type of vehicle carrying the shipment — wheeled or tracked — or enters; this information is written to the telemetry device (201) as a field of the shipment record (217). and therefore it is included in the initial record of the cryptographic integrity mechanism. Tool type Information (245), below "Goods Receipt scanning, verification and automatic inspection guidance As described in the section "decision", the verification / decision unit on arrival (231) It allows it to select the reference vibration profile or threshold (246) which it will use for comparison. It recognizes this because the vibration profiles produced by wheeled and tracked vehicles during transport are MIL- STD-810H is structurally different under Method 514.8 (detailed below). (explained). This element is optional; in an alternative arrangement, the shipment record tool 19 It may not include type information, and the verification / decision unit is independent of vehicle type, a single constant. It performs a comparison with a reference profile or threshold. In one preferred arrangement, the operator's mobile application performs the same activation. During the session, the telemetry also included a public key (218) of the main contractor to whom the shipment would be sent. It loads into the device or a cryptographic encryption module associated with the device (216) (see below "Receiver-specific end-to-end encryption"). The operator's mobile application, supplier WiFi or cellular connection at the facility — for example, the open switch in question It is possible to use telemetry to download from the server; however, this connection requires telemetry. It is not a communication capability inherent to the device itself, and the device does not establish this connection in any way. It doesn't use time directly. The activation process itself is a short-range interface. Because it takes place over (BLE / NFC) and is not long-distance communication, The activation described in the "General system architecture" section above and in Claim 1(d) "Cellular / Satellite" valid during the transit period from arrival until arrival. This does not contradict the limitation "there is no communication module"; this limitation applies to transit time. It is related to the moment of activation or the operator's own mobile device's ambient connection. It is not related. Device hardware and mechanical housing (Figure 2) Telemetry device (201), a high-G accelerometer (202) — for example, measurement of approximately ±200G a MEMS accelerometer with a range — and a separate, lower range (e.g., ±16G) Includes vibration sensor (203); vibration sensor, 3-axis acceleration and 3-axis angular velocity. (gyroscope) may be a MEMS sensor that measures. A microcontroller (204) can measure these two sensors. It processes the incoming data and writes it to the local memory unit (206). The device also has a short range interface (214 — BLE or NFC) and / or an optical QR code printed on the device body (215) includes; this interface remains passive during shipment and only a read upon arrival. It is activated for data transfer when paired with the terminal (230). In an alternative arrangement, The short-range interface in question (214), instead of or in addition to wireless (BLE / NFC), a physical connector on the device body (for example, a USB-C or pogo-pin type connector) (interface) can be implemented as; in this arrangement the goods receiving terminal (230), the device this It performs data transfer by physically connecting to the connector. Both sub-arrangements (wireless and wired), direct physical contact or short-range wireless pairing a long-distance communication system that is not used during the shipment due to the need for it It differs fundamentally from its capacity and does not conflict with the limitation in Claim 1(d) / 13(c). The mechanical housing of the device (209) is an ATEX / IECEx approved, explosion-proof casing. The enclosure can be made of PA12-CF (carbon-fiber-reinforced nylon) material, IP67. It may have a leak-proof rating and a Gore-Vent pressure valve that equalizes internal / external pressure. The device may include a relief valve (211). The device may contain a battery (210) in non-explosive chemistry — for example LiFePO4 (lithium iron phosphate) or LiSOCl2 (lithium thionyl chloride) is used to nourish the cell. The device consists of N52 neodymium magnets that are fixed to the carrying surface. It may include a fixing device (212). In a preferred arrangement, the external dimensions of the device It measures approximately 110×70×35 millimeters; this measurement is a preferred sample and represents the basis of the invention. It does not limit its scope. In one preferred configuration, the device can also specify location and timestamp. It may include a passive GPS / GNSS receiver (213). This receiver only receives satellite navigation signals. It calculates its own position and time by receiving data; it does not transmit any signals or data and It is not connected to any long-range communication network. Therefore, the GPS / GNSS receiver... (213) the presence of any device that can send data or signals outwards during the shipment period "it does not include a cellular or satellite communication module" and "long-range wireless data Claim 1(d) (and method requests) which states "it does not have a transmitter or transmitter" This does not conflict with the equivalent Claim 13(c) limitation; since GNSS reception is by nature unidirectional. (Satellite-to-device only), it is passive and does not transmit any data or signals from the device. This does not include transmission. Claims 1(d) and 13(c) state that this limitation applies to passive, receive-only transactions. It also explicitly states that it excludes the location-determining function. The position information calculated by the GPS / GNSS receiver (213) is shown below as "GPS-shock correlation and as described in the "route / violation-point indication" section, to the measurement records by adding, the shipment's route and threshold-crossing events are displayed on a map upon arrival. It can be used in display. This element is optional; in an alternative arrangement, the device 21 It may not include a GPS / GNSS receiver and location information may only be obtained from the shipment log (departure / arrival). (point information) can be derived; in this alternative, the route / violation-point mapping function is enabled. It remains outside. Deep sleep and hardware-based wake-up mechanism (Figure 3) The microcontroller (204) minimizes energy consumption and reduces shipping time significantly. The high-G accelerometer (202), waits in a deep-sleep mode in this part. When the microcontroller detects that a predetermined acceleration threshold has been exceeded, it triggers a signal. It generates a hardware interrupt signal (205) directly to the interrupt input. This A hardware interrupt wakes the microcontroller from deep sleep mode, a preferred option. The system wakes up to full operating mode in approximately 1 millisecond. Wake-up then the microcontroller receives pulses from the accelerometer (202) and the vibration sensor (203). It reads the measurement data related to the event and processes this data locally using the hash-chain structure described in Figure 4. It writes to memory (206) and then returns to deep sleep mode. This hardware- The cut-based wake-up architecture connects the device to a cellular or satellite communication module. Even without being connected, with low power consumption even at delivery times on the order of months. It enables it to work. Hash-chain data structure and tampering detection (Figure 4) The local memory unit (206) stores the measurement samples as a sequential record chain. In the chain Each record (207-n) contains the measurement data for that record (timestamp, maximum G-force, raw acceleration / vibration samples) and the cryptographic hash value of the previous record (207-(n-1)) (208) includes together; the hash value of the nth record, in a preferred arrangement H_n = In the form of summary(H_(n-1) ‖ data_n), the previous summary value and the current measurement data. by combining them and passing them through a cryptographic hash function (e.g., SHA-256) is calculated. The first record of the chain (207-1) is a fixed or device-specific starting value (seed). uses. Thanks to this structure, if the data of any record in the chain is subsequently modified, that record will be affected. From that point on, all subsequent hash values ​​in the chain become inconsistent; this inconsistency causes the chain to... This can be detected during verification (as described below). In this mechanism... 22 a centralized or distributed network, node cluster, or consensus mechanism It is not found; the chain is created entirely on-device, without being connected to a network, and It is only exported and verified upon arrival, during a single read / verification event. In an alternative arrangement, instead of the sequential hash-chain described above, a cryptographic system could be used. The integrity mechanism ensures that each record has its own independently verifiable identity. as an arrangement marked with a cryptographic authentication label It can be implemented: in this arrangement, the microcontroller (204) registers each register (207-n), one without referencing the summary value of the previous record, on the telemetry device (production or Signals independently with a cryptographic key (generated during activation). the subject of the authentication tag (a) is an asymmetric signature scheme (e.g. ECDSA or A digital signature calculated using a private key held on the device (Ed25519). as may be, (b) shared between the telemetry device and the verification / decision unit a message authentication code (MAC) calculated with a symmetric key — for example It could also be HMAC-SHA256; both sub-compilations allow for the processing of data from any record. If the record's authentication tag is subsequently modified They are functionally equivalent in terms of becoming invalid. Deleting the records or To detect reordering, each record is also assigned a monotonically ascending sequence. It may include a number; this number is part of the data protected by the authentication tag, and Therefore, it is also protected by the label itself. In this alternative arrangement, upon arrival... Verification involves recalculating the hash values ​​of each record instead of recalculating the hash values ​​of the hash chain. the authentication tag, the associated cryptographic key (public key in the signature sub-type, through verification using a shared symmetric key in the MAC subtype This is done; if the data of any record is subsequently modified, that record will be... Since the authentication tag will no longer be valid, this change will be processed during verification. This is detected. These two arrangements (sequential hash-chain and standalone authentication tag — signature or MAC), the cryptographic integrity mechanism element of this application (see Claims 1(c) / 13(b) are alternative forms of implementation; both arrangements involve the records The device is kept connected to the network and its integrity is ensured only during shipment. 23 Its key feature is that it is checked upon arrival with a one-time read / verify process. shares. In one preferred arrangement, the verification / decision unit is cryptographic integrity. In the case where the mechanism is in (ii) regulation, each record must be authenticated. In addition to verifying the tag, all records are numbered starting from 1. It also checks that it has created a continuous, uninterrupted increasing sequence; in this sequence there is a The detection of a gap indicates that one or more records in between have been deleted. It is marked as evidence of tampering. Also, with each authentication tag. The marked record is a shipment ID belonging to the shipment record (217) or a copy of that ID. It includes the hash value as part of the preserved data; thus, a record contains the hash value of the data it was generated with. It is not considered valid outside the context of the shipment. The system will process the shipment after its final registration. an external party to independently verify that the recording stream was intentionally terminated Since no reference is found, the records that occurred at the end of transit are deleted en masse. It is stated that this mechanism provides limited protection against this risk. In a preferred arrangement, the telemetry device uses the arrangement in (ii) in (c). cryptographic key — a private key of the signature subtype, message authentication code. In the (MAC) sub-type, a symmetric switch — either on the microcontroller or on a separate device within a hardware security element or trusted execution environment (TEE) It is generated and stored. In the signature sub-type, that specific key is never released from the device. It is not extracted and is only transmitted to the corresponding public key verification / decision unit. In the MAC sub-type, for verification to be possible, the same symmetric key must be present. a copy of it is also securely stored in the verification / decision unit (e.g., key) It must be delivered via the distribution / verification server (219) during activation; In this case, the confidentiality of the key, its storage on the device and in the verification / decision unit... It depends on its security. The key (private or symmetrical) is renewed with each shipment activation. It can be manufactured or remain constant throughout the device's lifespan — in the latter case, the device's physical a cancellation / blacklist in case it is seized and its key is removed It is preferable that the main contractor's role in the mechanism be kept within the verification / decision-making unit. 24 Receiver-specific end-to-end encryption (Figure 2, Figure 4) In a preferred configuration, during activation (see "Initiate shipment and activation") operator mobile application, the main contractor to whom the shipment will be sent (that project (218) a public key of the point of receipt (or the point of receipt) — for example an asymmetric encryption a public key of the (public-key cryptography) scheme — to the telemetry device (201) or It loads a cryptographic encryption module (216) associated with the device. The telemetry device, shipment every measurement sample it recorded during the period (G-force, vibration, GPS position, time) (stamp) encrypts the content data with the public key (218) and stores it in local memory. (206) The author writes that the hash values, which are the basis for the integrity verification of the hash-chain, are encrypted. It can be calculated based on the content or maintained as a separate / plain-text integrity field; In both cases, the integrity verification function of the hash chain ensures that the content is encrypted. It operates independently. Critically, the public key in question (218) can only be used for the encryption process; The private key that will decrypt the code is only held by the main contractor to whom the shipment will be delivered. and is located in the operator's mobile application or any system on the supplier's side It is not transmitted or stored in these systems. Therefore, the supplier (sender) must keep it in their own system. The device cannot decode and read the data it has recorded itself; that data is only available upon arrival, at the main port. A password is created by the contractor’s goods receiving terminal (230) using a private key. It can be resolved via the decoding module (243). This arrangement requires administrative permission for access to the data. It is a "only" one that is enforced mathematically (through asymmetric encryption) and not by rule. It provides a "recipient-only decryption" architecture; this allows personal data (driver ID) to be decrypted. (including information) the record must comply with purpose limitation and data minimization principles, This is a technical privacy-by-design measure. Law No. 6698 on Personal Data Protection This patent is subject to compliance assessment under the Personal Data Protection Law (KVKK). This is outside the scope of the application and is a separate legal matter; the above The expression merely describes the aspect of technical architecture that aligns with these principles. In a preferred arrangement, the main contractor’s public key (218) is given to the operator’s mobile via the application, through WiFi or cellular connection at the supplier's facility from the key distribution / validation server (219) — e.g. operated by the main contractor or from a certificate / key directory service operated by a trusted third party — It is downloaded over a secure (TLS protected) connection; the downloaded public key Its authenticity is determined by a digital certificate chain (X.509 type) or a pre-distributed key. verified by fingerprint comparison, a man-in-the-middle Measures can be taken against the risk of a middle (middle) attack. A preferred arrangement may be open. The key is an RSA key or equivalent security key approximately 2048 bits long. An elliptic curve with a level (ECC, e.g., P-256) can be a key; these values ​​are examples of and does not limit the scope of the invention to a specific algorithm or key length. In one preferred arrangement, direct asymmetric encryption is embedded in a low-power system. In order to reduce the computational load for the microcontroller (204), a hybrid encryption The following scheme can be used: telemetry device, random symmetric session during activation. produces the key (244) — for example an AES-256 key — recorded during shipment The content of each measurement sample is encrypted with this symmetric session key (244); symmetric The session key (244) itself is only one with the main contractor’s public key (218). It is encrypted once and added to the first record of the records in question, together with the shipment record (217). In the arrangement, decryption is only possible if the main contractor, who possesses the private key, first uses a symmetrical system. by decoding the session key (244) and then decoding the measurement content with that key It is possible because the sender does not have access to the symmetric session key (244). It still cannot decode the data it has recorded — therefore, hybrid regulation, as described above, is necessary. "Receiver-only" architecture reduces computational load while maintaining its security feature. It reduces. Goods Receipt scanning, verification and automated inspection routing decision (Figure 5) The shipment will be delivered upon receipt of goods by the main contractor (e.g., ASELSAN, TUSAŞ, or ROKETSAN). When it reaches the point, an authorized goods receiving terminal (230) reports the short telemetry device (201) range interface (214 — via BLE or NFC pairing in the wireless sub-type, or (by physically connecting to a dock connector in the wired sub-type) by pairing / connecting or by scanning the optical QR code (215) on the device 26 establishes a connection. At the moment of this readout, the hash-chained and encrypted (206) in local memory are read. The entire record is transferred to the terminal (230). The terminal uses a private key held by the main contractor to whom the shipment is headed, creating a password. It decrypts the encrypted content via the decryption module (243) (see "Receiver-specific end-to-end" above). encryption"). A verification / decision unit (231) on the terminal, the decrypted chain It checks its integrity through a hash-chain verification module (232); The module recalculates the hash value for each record and stores it in a value stored in the record. It then compares it with the next summary value and any discrepancies are recorded after the setup. It indicates that it may have been tampered with. After the integrity of the chain is verified, a threshold is reached. Comparison module (233) records the maximum G-force values ​​as predetermined, Calibrated according to MIL-STD-810H Method 516.8, Procedure II (Transportation Shock). threshold (in a preferred arrangement, the highway as defined in Table 516.8-VII) approximately 5.1G-7.6G for transportation or approximately 10.2G-15.2G for land transportation It compares it with a value derived from reference pulse amplitudes. The verification / decision unit, It generates and displays a visual graph (234) from the recorded G-force / time data; threshold If the obstacle is not overcome, a "Green Approval" decision (235) is produced and the shipment is sent directly to assembly. It is reported that it can be obtained; if the threshold is exceeded, a "Red Alert - Non-Destructive Testing" is issued. The decision to "refer to (NDT) / X-Ray laboratory" (236) is made and the shipment is automatically processed. They are referred to an NDT / X-Ray laboratory (240). When the cryptographic integrity mechanism is in (ii) regulation, verification / decision the unit, an authentication tag instead of a hash-chain verification module (232) via the verification module (232b), the authentication tag of each record is assigned to the relevant cryptographic key (public key in the signature subtype, shared key in the MAC subtype) (symmetric key) lines and the sequence-number adjacency check described above applies. In a preferred arrangement, the threshold comparison module (233) is as above Before making the comparison, check the vehicle type field (245) in the resolved shipment record (217). by reading, a reference vibration profile to be compared with the recorded acceleration / vibration data. 27 or selects the predetermined threshold (246). When the vehicle type is wheeled, MIL-STD-810H Category as defined in Annex C of the Transportation life stage of Method 514.8. 4.e (composite wheeled vehicle — measured data of numerous wheeled military vehicles) (a multi-peak power spectral density [PSD] curve formed by enveloping) A corresponding profile is used. However, the situation is different when the vehicle type is tracked: MIL-STD-810H Method Annex C of Section 514.8, relating to the transport life cycle, for the carriage of cargo / material by pallet vehicle. It does not offer a separate, ready-made composite vibration profile — Appendix C shipping categories (Category 4 — wheeled truck / trailer with secured cargo; Category 5 — wheeled Truck / trailer unsecured cargo; Category 6 — bulk assembly transport; Category 7 / 8 / 9 — cargo for jet / propeller / helicopter aircraft, respectively; Category 10 — marine vessels. cargo; Category 11 — rail / train cargo) cargo transport by a palletized vehicle. There is no separate category corresponding to vibration. Category 20 of the standard — broadband. Narrow-band peaking based on random vibration base, dependent on track link length and vehicle speed. the spectral shape over which the points (track-pitch-derived narrowband spikes) overlap — of the standard It is defined in Annex D of the operational life phase and was originally a Equipment installed / mounted inside a tracked vehicle is exposed while the vehicle is in motion. It characterizes the vibration it experiences — not defined for the cargo / transportation context. This Therefore, in a preferred arrangement, the reference used when the vehicle type is tracked. profile (246), due to this gap in Annex C, Method 514.8 Operational life phase. broad-band+narrow-band spectral characterization of Category 20(b) in Annex D It is derived by adapting it to the shipping / cargo context; this is because the standard itself has a ready-made shipping system. not a direct acquisition of the profile, but an engineering of an operational characterization. It is transported in an arrangement preferred in the context of transportation by reasoning. In the alternative arrangement, instead of adapting from Category 20(b) for tracked vehicles, the application an empirical reference profile derived from the owner's own measurement campaign This is a viable approach that closes the gap in Appendix C of the standard with empirical data. 28 The applicable transportation shock procedure (Procedure II) of MIL-STD-810H, Method 516.8. To the extent that Method 514.8 Category 4 and / or (adapted as described above) Category 20(b) requires application together with vibration testing; therefore, a In the preferred arrangement, the verification / decision unit (231) is the G-force described above. In addition to threshold comparison, a vibration profile specific to the vehicle type is also selected. You can make comparisons. This vehicle-type-specific profile selection is optional; an alternative In the regulation, the verification / decision unit is a single fixed reference, independent of vehicle type. It compares to a profile or threshold. Expanded transport mode selection — land (wheeled / tracked / train), sea and air. Reference profiles (247 / 248 / 249) In a preferred arrangement, the vehicle type field of the shipment record (217) is only land. not limited to transportation (wheeled / tracked), but encompassing a wider range of shipping methods. It can also be coded as a "mode of transport" information (247); this field is land-wheeled, land- from tracked, road-train, sea, air-jet, air-propeller or air-helicopter values It can be configured to receive one. Verification / decision unit (231), this transport mode depending on the information (247), structurally different MIL-STD-810H reference data It automatically selects the appropriate source to create a reference vibration / shock profile. or determines the dataset (248 / 249):  For land-wheeled vehicles, Transportation Life of Method 514.8 as described above. Category 4 in Annex C of the phase.  For tracked vehicles, Operational life of Method 514.8 as described above. Category 20(b) in Annex D of the relevant phase, adapted to the transport context.  For rail transport: MIL-STD-810H Method 514.8 Transportation In Annex C of the life cycle, it has the same official status as Category 4 (wheeled vehicle). Category 11 — Rail / Train Cargo Vibration Exposure (as defined by the standard itself) It is listed as "11. Train" in Table 514.8-I; the ASD envelope curve is shown in Figure 514.8C- of Appendix C. It is given on the 17th; this is not a life-stage adaptation as in Category 20(b), (This is a ready-made category directly related to the transportation phase.) This category is approximately 3-80 Hz. 29 peak acceleration spectral density (ASD) value of 0.0030 g² / Hz in the range of 80-350 Hz decreasing in the range to 0.000045 g² / Hz and the low-frequency value at 1 Hz It is defined by an envelope curve of 0.000105 g² / Hz; the default test time is per axis. That's 12 hours, and that time represents a 4,800 km (3,000 mile) rail transport. As stated in the standard's own text, the typical vibration amplitude of a wheeled vehicle is... This is higher than railway vibration, and this situation is reflected in railway transportation testing. This can eliminate the need for — that is, rail transport is generally replaced by road transport. It is considered to be of lesser severity than transportation; this reference is therefore particularly important. for fragile or bulky equipment or items primarily transported by train It is recommended that this ASD represents high-speed magnetic suspension (maglev) systems. It does not; moreover, it exhibits low-frequency transient localization typical of the transverse and longitudinal axes. It also does not represent displacement or shock — that is, shock (not vibration) for rail transport, Category 11 is a separate issue that is not covered; in a preferred arrangement, the train If a shock component is also to be evaluated for transport, this is outside of Category 11. MIL-STD-810H must be based on a separate reference source. That separate source... The reference source is Method 526 ("Rail Impact") of MIL-STD-810H — railcars Exposure during coupling / maneuvering (typically tested at speeds of 4, 6 and 8 mph) the impact / shock conditions it is subjected to, the durability of the tie-down system It characterizes for the purpose of evaluation; this is Method 528 for the maritime transport mode. It is a reference relationship parallel to the role played.  For marine applications: MIL-STD-810H Method 514.8 itself, Table 514.8-I, item 5. in the footnote it states that in the case of cargo transportation by sea vessels (naval ships) their own it did not present the composite profile and instead used a separate method of the standard. It explicitly states that Method 528 (ship / shipboard vibration) should be examined. This Therefore, in a preferred arrangement, when the mode of transport is sea, The validation / decision unit reference dataset (248) is in Method 514.8’s own Table Not from 514.8-I, but the reference defined in Method 528 of MIL-STD-810H. It selects from the data; this distinction is, in itself, Method 514.8 for the maritime transport mode. This is due to the lack of a sufficient data source.  For air-jet: Method 514.8 Category 7 (jet aircraft cargo); this category includes broadband. The random vibration reaches its highest levels at takeoff and then rapidly drops, resulting in a "general" The general exposure envelope curve shows an RMS of approximately 4.02 g (C-5, KC-10, KC- Table 135 is derived from measured data of military cargo aircraft such as C-17 and T-43A. (514.8C-IX); exposure time is typically about 1 minute per takeoff. It defines that it was received as such.  For air-propeller aircraft: Method 514.8 Category 8 (cargo of propeller-driven aircraft); this category, high amplitude, approximately at the propeller transition frequency and harmonics of the vibration sinusoidal narrow-band peaks superimposed on a broad-band background vibration with a spectral shape it is based on (measurements of the 4-wing and 6-wing versions of the C-130) (based on) it is defined.  For air-to-helicopter: Method 514.8 Category 9 (helicopter cargo); standard For this category, the vibration depends on the location within the cargo compartment and the cargo itself. It is highly dependent on the dynamic interaction of its mass / stiffness with the helicopter's structure. They suggest direct measurement, stating that (cargo carried with a sling / handle) (their levels are relatively low). Therefore, in a preferred arrangement, the verification / decision unit produces when the mode of transport is air-to-helicopter. The comparison result is unique due to the high uncertainty indicated by the standard. Not considering it sufficient on its own for a definitive acceptance / rejection decision, but rather requiring an additional direct measurement. a campaign or manual engineering assessment indicating that it is needed It presents a flag / warning; in this arrangement, the system uses the standard's own specifications. It is designed to clearly reflect, rather than conceal, measurement uncertainty. This extended transport mode selection is optional; shipment in an alternative arrangement Registration is only for the limited type of land-wheeled / land-tracked vehicle described above. It includes the distinction (245 / 246) and sea / air modes are not supported. Land-train, sea and air. Shipment records relating to modes of transport include information specific to road vehicles, such as vehicle license plates. Instead of areas, in a preferred arrangement, the means of transport is uniquely an equivalent field that defines (e.g., for rail-train, a train composition / wagon number; (IMO number for sea; flight / tail number for air) may be used; this change 31 It is an adaptation of the data schema and the basic combination of the invention (activation-dependent) (Registration, hash-chain, recipient-specific encryption, threshold comparison) does not affect it. GPS-shock correlation and route / violation-point representation (Figure 5) In one preferred configuration, the position calculated by the GPS / GNSS receiver (213) This information is relevant with each measurement sample or at least with each threshold-overshoot event. It is added to the relevant record of the records (Figure 4); this location information is also as described above. The public key (218) may be part of the encrypted content. The goods receiving terminal (230), shipment When it reads and decrypts the record with the decryption module (243), the verification / decision unit (231) through a route / map visualization module (241) the shipment from departure It plots the complete route it followed until arrival on a map; threshold comparison. Each threshold-breaking event detected by the module (233) is a breach point on this map. as a signal (242), together with the relevant location, timestamp and measured G-force intensity. This shows the goods receiving inspector at which geographical point or route the shipment is located. shock / vibration in the segment (e.g., a specific road section, intersection, or transfer point) It enables the visual detection of the incident. GPS / GNSS receiver (213) It only receives satellite signals and does not transmit any data or signals (see above). "Device hardware and mechanical housing"); therefore this function is also in Claim 1(d) (and in the method requirements, "long-range wireless data transmission or transmitter" in Claim 13(c) This does not contradict the limitation — since this limitation clearly applies to those who do not send data or signals outwards. This excludes a passive position receiver. Software / application architecture (Figure 6) Verification / decision unit (231), a goods receipt mobile application or desktop panel It can be implemented as software and includes the following functional components: (i) from the telemetry device (201) a data receiving module that receives data via a short-range interface; (ii) with a private key (243) a decryption module that decrypts the encrypted content; (iii) the hash-chain described above verification module (232) or — independent identity of the cryptographic integrity mechanism In the case where it is included in the authentication tag edit — an authentication tag (232b) verification module; (iv) MIL-STD-810H threshold comparison module (233); (v) registered 32 A G-force / time graph that visualizes the change in acceleration data over time. module (234) and a map visualization module (241) showing the route of the shipment; (vi) a violation point marking module that marks threshold-crossing events on the map (242); and (vii) "Green Approval" or "Red Approval" according to the verification and comparison results. The alarm is triggered by a receipt record (e.g., inspector ID, shipment ID, a decision / report output module that stores the shipment record (217), decision timestamp) (235 / 236). In a preferred arrangement, the generated decision and supporting data are hashed. The hash value of the chain can be written to an audit log along with the chain itself; Thus, the decision to accept the goods itself becomes traceable later. Potentially expanded scope of application — transport insurance (coverage of existing claims) outside) In a possible extended implementation, the cryptographically verified version described above, Tamper-proof G-force / vibration log and threshold-breaking history (hash-chain) (206 / 207) and records produced by the verification / decision unit (231), only Goods Receipt not only the decision regarding NDT / X-Ray dispatch at the point, but also the transport insurance policy. pricing, claims assessment, or objectivity for an insurer / reinsurer and can also be used as an untampered-with source of evidence; because the same verified record, the actual G-force / vibration history to which a shipment was subjected and predetermined Whether a threshold has been exceeded can also be determined independently by a third party (insurer / reinsurer). This constitutes reliable, objective evidence. This expanded scope of application, therefore... This application is outside the scope of all the current claims; this application does not include any insurance policy issuance, risk analysis / scoring, premium calculation, or reinsurance elements It does not request this, and this paragraph does not create a new request or modify existing requests. It neither expands nor narrows its scope. This expanded application will be separate and independent in the future. It can be the subject of a continuation or a divisional reference. HOW THE INVENTION WAS APPLIED TO INDUSTRY The invention is intended for industrial use as part of the defense industry supply chain, as described above. The telemetry device is mass-produced and fixed to the equipment subject to shipment (220) and 33 a terminal at the main contractor’s receiving point of goods verification / decision unit (231) (230) can be implemented by operating it on the telemetry device, defense industry reusable equipment that suppliers (subcontractors) attach to shipping equipment before shipment a usable hardware component; the verification / decision unit is the main contractor's goods acceptance unit. software installed in the unit as a mobile application or desktop panel software It can be applied to industry in the form of components. The invention benefits key contractors in the defense industry (e.g., ASELSAN, TUSAŞ, ROKETSAN, and other sensitive companies). equipment, military equipment, avionics and optical systems buyers), their approved suppliers / subcontractors contractor networks and transportation / logistics companies that actually transport the shipments in question, Objectively and automatically detects G-force / vibration overshoots occurring during transportation. by standardizing quality control of goods receipt and non-destructive testing. in order to make the referral decision independent of manual evaluation It can benefit from; the invention provides a continuous wireless communication infrastructure throughout the shipment. because it is not required, remote areas or routes where communication infrastructure is limited It is applicable to all types of transportation, including land, sea and air. 34

Claims

Request 1 (system request): It is a system for ensuring the quality of transportation of a shipment, and includes the following: Includes: (a) a telemetry device configured to be fixed to a shipping rig, It includes a high-G accelerometer and a separate vibration sensor; (b) a microcontroller that will wait in a deep sleep mode and the high- The deep sleep mode is interrupted by a hardware interrupt signal from the accelerometer. It is configured to wake up; (c) a local memory unit which stores the measurement data taken after waking up, numerous records In short, through a cryptographic integrity mechanism, the data of any record is verified. It is configured to store data in a way that allows subsequent alterations to be detected; The cryptographic integrity mechanism in question here is (i) that each record is superior to the previous record. will contain a cryptographic hash value, thus providing a sequential hash of the records in question. an arrangement structured to form a chain, and in this arrangement any If the data in a record is subsequently modified, the summary of subsequent records (ii) an inconsistency occurs in the values ​​of each record, which is kept in the telemetry device. a cryptographic key is an independently verifiable cryptographic identity associated with that record. by generating an authentication tag (a digital signature or a message authentication code) This is an arrangement whereby the data of any record will be marked, and in this arrangement, the data of any record will be marked. The authentication tag for that record becomes invalid if it is subsequently modified. becomes; (d) the telemetry device in question during transit from the activation of the shipment to arrival during its duration, it can send any data or signal outwards (contains a transmitter) any cellular communication module or any satellite communication module (i) it does not physically include it; OR (ii) even if it physically includes the module in question, The module in question does not transmit any data or signals externally during transit. 35 that it was in a disabled state, unable to transmit; and in both cases However, any long-distance transit time of the telemetry device in question it does not have wireless data transmission or a transmitter; the limitation in question here is that, The device does not send any data or signals outwards; it only provides satellite navigation. a passive positioning (GPS / GNSS) receiver that receives signals in a one-way direction its existence does not include; (e) a short-range interface (wireless or wired) or an optical code, which is a shipment when scanned by a goods receiving terminal upon arrival at its destination or when connected, all records stored in that local memory unit It is configured to ensure that the goods are transferred to the aforementioned receiving terminal; and (f) a verification / decision unit, located on or near the goods receiving terminal in question. depending on the integrity of the transmitted records — that is, the cryptographic integrity In the mechanism (c) in arrangement (i), the hash value of each record is recalculated. by calculating, in the regulation (ii) of (c) of the mechanism in question, the identity of each record verifying the verification tag by validating it with the corresponding cryptographic key; the one in question to compare the acceleration values ​​recorded in the logs with a predetermined threshold; and the word If the threshold is exceeded, the shipment will undergo a non-destructive testing (NDT) or X-ray examination. to make a decision regarding referring it to the laboratory, and if this is not overcome, then... It is structured to generate approval decisions. Claim 2: The system is as described in Claim 1, and the microcontroller must respond to the aforementioned hardware interrupt. After the signal is received, it takes approximately 1 millisecond for the system to fully operate from deep sleep mode. A system configured to adapt to its current mode. Claim 3: The system is as described in Claim 1, and its vibration sensor includes 3-axis acceleration and 3-axis angular deflection sensors. It is a MEMS sensor that measures speed and is more advanced than a vibration sensor of a high-G accelerometer. A system that includes a separate MEMS accelerometer with a wide measurement range. Claim 4: The system is as per Claim 1, and the said cryptographic integrity mechanism... In the arrangement (i) in (c), the summary value of the nth record is the same as that of the previous record. 36 A cryptographic hash is created by combining the hash value with the measurement data of the nth record. by passing it through the function (SHA-256 or an equivalent cryptographic hash algorithm) a system by which it is calculated. Requirement 5: The system must be compliant with Requirement 1, and the telemetry device must be ATEX or IECEx certified. It is housed in an explosion-proof enclosure and is made of LiFePO4 or LiSOCl2 a system powered by an explosion-proof battery with a specific chemistry. Claim 6: The system is as per Claim 5, and the enclosure has a pressure equalizing the internal and external pressure. relief valve, body material of PA12-CF or equivalent carbon-fiber-reinforced, minimum IP67 watertightness rating and telemetry device mounted on a surface of shipping equipment. It contains a fixing device with an N52 neodymium magnet configured for securing. a system. Claim 7: The system is as per Claim 1, and the predetermined threshold is met according to the MIL-STD-810H Method. 516.8, Procedure II (Transportation Shock) terminal-peak defined in Table 516.8-VII. sawtooth pulses are derived from reference amplitudes, and those reference amplitudes are... For road transport, approximately 5.1G to 7.6G range (11 millisecond pulse duration) or approximately 10.2G to 15.2G range (5 millisecond pulse duration) for land transportation a system that exists. Claim 8: The system is based on Claim 1 and the short-range wireless interface is Bluetooth Low Energy (BLE) or near field communication (NFC) interface and / or telemetry device that it has an optical QR code on its outer surface; and the verification / decision unit, also to generate and display a G-force / time graph from verified acceleration data a system that is structured. Claim 9: The system is as per Claim 1, and the telemetry device is also a passive GPS or GNSS. the receiver contains; that receiver can only receive satellite navigation signals to determine location and it derived timestamp information and did not transmit any signal or any remote- a system that is not connected to a long-distance communication network. 37 Claim 10: The system is as per Claim 1 and also includes a shipment activation function; The subject function is that the telemetry device is shorted by an operator mobile application in (e). until a shipment record is received written via the range interface, a pre-activation to remain in this state and not associate any measurement data with a shipment; the promise The subject of the shipment record is at least one project code, device, or item included in the shipment. The number must include a vehicle license plate, a driver's identification document, and an activation date / time; and When the shipment record is received, the telemetry device switches to an active recording mode. The first record of the cryptographic integrity mechanism in (c) is from the shipment record in question. a system that enables its creation. Request 11: The system, in accordance with Request 1, writes to the local memory unit of the telemetry device. The content data of each measurement sample is enclosed in a public key belonging to a recipient to whom the shipment will be sent. It is configured to encrypt using; a corresponding public key the private key is held only by the recipient in question and is not accessible to a telemetry device or a that it was never transferred to the supplier's system; and therefore the encrypted content, Only upon arrival, a private key is provided by the recipient's goods receiving terminal. a system that can be solved by using Claim 12: The system is in accordance with Claim 11, and the telemetry device is also a passive GPS or GNSS. the receiver contains; that receiver can only receive satellite navigation signals to determine location and it derived timestamp information and did not transmit any signal or any remote- The telemetry device was not connected to the long-distance communication network; the GPS or GNSS device in question... position information received from the receiver with each measurement sample or at least with each threshold exceedance It was configured to add the relevant records to the record in question along with the event; and The verification / decision unit creates a map showing the route the shipment followed from the decrypted record. to display and every threshold overshoot detected by the threshold comparison module. The event is shown on the map with its location, timestamp, and measured acceleration. a structured to mark a point of violation, along with its violence system. 38 Request 13 (method request): It is a method for ensuring the transportation quality of a shipment, and includes the following: Includes: (a) a telemetry device mounted on a shipping rig, a high-G A hardware interrupt is generated by a pulse signal from the accelerometer, initiating a deep sleep cycle. Waking up a microcontroller that is in wake-up mode; (b) after waking up, from the aforementioned high-G accelerometer and a separate vibration Measurement data is obtained from the sensor and this data is transmitted to a telemetry device. storage in local memory via a cryptographic integrity mechanism; The cryptographic integrity mechanism in question here is (i) that each new record is consistent with the previous one. storing the record by chaining it to include a cryptographic hash value. (ii) each new record may include a cryptographic key held in the telemetry device, an independently verifiable cryptographic authentication tag (a) associated with that record by generating and marking a message (either a digital signature or a message authentication code) This may include storage; (c) the telemetry device in question during transit from the activation of the shipment to arrival during its duration, it can send any data or signal outwards (contains a transmitter) any cellular communication module or any satellite communication module (i) not physically including it; OR (ii) even if it physically includes the module in question, The module in question does not transmit any data or signals externally during transit. being in a disabled state in a way that prevents transmission; and in both cases also, during the transit time of the telemetry device, any cellular or satellite not having any data transmission or transmitter over the communication network; here This limitation applies to devices that do not send any data or signals outwards. A passive positioning system that receives satellite navigation signals in only one direction. (This does not include the presence of a GPS / GNSS receiver;) 39 (d) a goods receiving terminal after the shipment arrives at a destination by a telemetry device via a short-range interface (wireless or wired) or a read or connected via optical code reading and in the local memory in question All stored records must be transferred to the goods receiving terminal; (e) the integrity of the transmitted records — the cryptographic integrity mechanism in question In the arrangement (i) in (b), the summary value of each record is recalculated and compared to the previous one. By checking the consistency with the record, the mechanism in question is in (ii) (b). In this arrangement, each record's authentication tag is linked to its respective cryptographic key. through verification — verification; (f) Comparison of acceleration values ​​in the verified record with a predetermined threshold; And (g) If the threshold in question is exceeded, the shipment will automatically be cancelled without damage. Decision to refer to a non-toxic, toxicologically tested (NDT) or X-ray laboratory; not exceeding the limit. In this case, a decision is made to approve the shipment for direct assembly. Claim 14: The method in accordance with Claim 13, regarding the cryptographic integrity in question. the mechanism is in the arrangement of (i) in (b) and the hash-chain in step (b) The process involves creating a hash value for each record by comparing that record's hash value with the hash value of the previous record. The existing measurement data is combined and a cryptographic hash function (SHA-256 or a method that involves calculating by passing an equivalent algorithm through it. Claim 15: Method according to Claim 13, step (d) of which is an optical on the telemetry device. Reading a QR code, scanning an NFC tag, or a BLE pairing that it is achieved through the establishment of a predetermined threshold, MIL-STD-810H Method 516.8, Procedure II (Transportation Shock) terminal-peak defined in Table 516.8-VII. sawtooth pulses are derived from reference amplitudes, and those reference amplitudes are... For road transport, approximately 5.1G to 7.6G range (11 millisecond pulse duration) or approximately 10.2G to 15.2G range (5 millisecond pulse duration) for land transportation It is a method that is used. 40 Claim 16: The method is as per Claim 13, and additionally, at the start of the shipment, an operator via a short-range interface through a mobile application, to a telemetry device This includes writing a shipment record; that shipment record must contain at least one project code. the number of devices or items included in the shipment, a vehicle license plate, a driver's identification information and includes an activation date / time; and the telemetry device records the shipment in question. It does not associate any measurement data with a shipment until it is written down. Claim 17: Method according to Claim 13, content of each measurement sample stored in step (b). that the data involves being encrypted with a public key belonging to a recipient to whom the shipment will be sent; and Step (e) requires that the content in question be accessed using a private key held only by the recipient in question. a method that involves solving it using Claim 18: The method according to Claim 13, and also, each GPS or GNSS position data that the measurement sample, or at least each threshold-overshoot event, be recorded; and After verification, the shipment's route is shown on a map. the display of threshold-breaking events and their location and time on the map. A method that involves marking with information. Request 19: The system is as described in Request 11, and the public key is approximately 2048 bits long. An RSA switch or an elliptic curve (ECC) switch with an equivalent level of security. that; and the telemetry device directly transmits the contents of each measurement sample via a public key. Instead of encrypting, it uses a symmetric session key generated during activation (for example (AES-256) encryption and the symmetric session key in question are only revealed once. a configuration that encrypts the records with a key and adds them to the first record of those records system. Claim 20: Method according to Claim 17, step (b) activation on the telemetry device. the content of each measurement sample with a symmetrical session key generated during the process encryption and the symmetric session key being used only once with the public key A method that involves encrypting and appending the records in question to the first record. 41 Claim 21: According to Claim 10, the system and the shipment record in question are also the shipment itself. It includes a field specifying the type of vehicle carrying the goods, whether wheeled or tracked; and The verification / decision unit's recorded acceleration / vibration, depending on the vehicle type field in question. a reference vibration profile or a predetermined threshold to be compared with the data It is structured to be selected; here, if the vehicle type is wheeled, the word The subject is the reference profile of MIL-STD-810H Method 514.8 Transportation Lifecycles. Category 4 (composite wheeled vehicle, multi-peaked vehicle) as defined in Annex C of the relevant phase. (defined by the power spectral density curve) corresponds to; and the vehicle type is tracked. In that case, the reference profile in question — Method 514.8, belonging to the Transportation life cycle — Annex C does not offer a separate, ready-made composite profile for cargo transport by tracked vehicle. Therefore — in a preferred arrangement, Method 514.8 Operational Category 20(b) (equipment mounted on a tracked vehicle) as defined in Annex D of the life stage, Narrow-band peak welded to track-link on wide-band random vibration base. (defined by the spectral shape where the points overlap) adaptation to the transportation / cargo context It is a separate reference profile, structurally different from the derived wheeled vehicle profile. a system. Claim 22: The method is in accordance with Claim 16, and the shipment record in question is also the shipment itself. It must include a field specifying the type of vehicle carrying the vehicle, whether wheeled or tracked; and the step. The comparison in (f) is a reference chosen depending on the vehicle type field in question. This involves performing the vibration according to the vibration profile or a predetermined threshold; where the vehicle If the type is wheeled, the reference profile in question is MIL-STD-810H Method. It corresponds to Category 4 as defined in Annex C of 514.8 relating to the transport life cycle; and the vehicle If the vehicle type is tracked, the reference profile in question — Annex C for tracked vehicles — should be used. Because it does not offer a separate ready-made profile for cargo transportation — it is a preferred choice. in the regulation, as defined in Appendix D of Method 514.8 relating to the Operational life phase. Wheeled vehicles, derived from the adaptation of Category 20(b) to the transport context. structurally different from its profile, containing a separate, pallet-link-derived narrow-band component. It's a method that involves profiling. 42 Claim 23: According to Claim 10, the system is and the shipment record in question is also the shipment itself. The vehicle carrying the goods includes a field specifying a mode of transport; that mode of transport is... the field, land-wheeled, land-tracked, land-train, sea, air-jet, air-propeller or It is configured to receive one of the air-helicopter values; and verification / decision the unit, depending on the transportation mode area in question, with recorded acceleration / vibration data Automatically select a reference vibration / shock profile or data set for comparison. It is configured to select; here: (i) when the mode of transport is land-wheeled, the reference in question is MIL-STD-810H Method It corresponds to Category 4 as defined in Annex C of 514.8 relating to the transportation life cycle; (ii) when the mode of transport is land-tracked, the reference in question — Method 514.8 Annex C of the transportation life cycle contains a separate, ready-made form for cargo transport by pallet vehicle. due to the absence of a composite profile — belonging to the Operational life phase of Method 514.8 Category 20(b) (tracked vehicle mounted equipment, broadband random) as defined in Annex D. Spectral projection where narrow-band peaks are superimposed on a vibrating base using track-link welded profiles. that it is derived from its adaptation to the transportation context (defined by the shape); (iii) when the mode of transport is land-train, the reference in question is MIL-STD-810H Method In Annex C of Section 514.8 relating to the transportation life cycle, it is defined with the same official status as Category 4. Category 11 (train / railway cargo vibration exposure; peak range approximately 3-80 Hz) acceleration spectral density is 0.0030 g² / Hz and decreases to 0.000045 g² / Hz in the 80-350 Hz range. defined by a falling envelope curve; in the standard's own text, wheeled vehicle vibration It typically has a higher amplitude than railway vibration, and this is why ASD is high. fast magnetic suspension systems or low-frequency transient displacement / shock (it is stated that it does not represent) corresponds to; (iv) when the mode of transport is sea, the reference in question is — MIL-STD-810H Method Table 514.8-I of 514.8 itself does not provide a composite profile for this mode of transport. because — not from Method 514.8, but from Method 810H, which is a separate method of MIL-STD-810H. Selected from the reference data defined in 528 (ship / shipboard vibration); 43 (v) When the mode of transport is air-jet, the reference in question is MIL-STD-810H Method 514.8 Category 7 (jet aircraft cargo, broadband reaching its highest level during takeoff) (random vibration) corresponds to; (vi) When the mode of transport is air-propeller, the reference in question is MIL-STD-810H Method 514.8 Category 8 (propeller aircraft cargo, propeller transition frequency and harmonics) (defined by approximately sinusoidal narrow-band peaks superimposed on a broad-band base) that corresponds to; and (vii) When the mode of transport is air-to-helicopter, the reference in question is MIL-STD-810H Method 514.8 corresponds to Category 9 (helicopter cargo) and verification / decision the unit, within the cargo compartment, as defined by the standard itself for that category. High degree of interaction between location and cargo mass / stiffness with the helicopter structure Because it is defined based on dependence, the comparison result it produces for this mode is unique. not being considered sufficient on its own, and requiring additional direct measurement or manual verification. A system structured to present a warning along with a flag indicating the issue. Claim 24: The method is in accordance with Claim 16, and the shipment record in question is also the shipment itself. The vehicle carrying the goods must include a field specifying the mode of transport; the mode of transport in question the field of land-wheeled, land-tracked, land-train, sea, air-jet, air-propeller or to obtain one of the air-helicopter values; and the comparison in step (f), word The subject is a reference vibration / shock automatically selected depending on the transport mode area. This involves doing it according to the profile or dataset; where: (i) when the mode of transport is land-wheeled, the reference in question is MIL-STD-810H Method It corresponds to Category 4 as defined in Annex C of 514.8 relating to the transportation life cycle; (ii) when the mode of transport is land-tracked, the reference in question — Method 514.8 Annex C of the transportation life cycle contains a separate, ready-made form for cargo transport by pallet vehicle. due to the absence of a composite profile — belonging to the Operational life phase of Method 514.8 It is derived from the adaptation of Category 20(b) as defined in Annex D to the transport context; 44 (iii) when the mode of transport is land-train, the reference in question is MIL-STD-810H Method In Annex C of Section 514.8 relating to the transportation life cycle, Category 4 is defined with the same official status. It corresponds to Category 11 (railway cargo vibration exposure); (iv) When the mode of transport is sea, the reference in question is — Method 514.8’s own Table Because 514.8-I does not offer a composite profile for this mode of transport — Method Not from 514.8, but from Method 528 (ship / shipboard), which is a separate method of MIL-STD-810H. (vibration) was selected from the defined reference data; (v) When the mode of transport is air-jet, the reference in question is MIL-STD-810H Method 514.8 It corresponds to Category 7; (vi) When the mode of transport is air-propeller, the reference in question is MIL-STD-810H Method 514.8 corresponds to Category 8; and (vii) When the mode of transport is air-to-helicopter, the reference in question is MIL-STD-810H Method 514.8 corresponds to Category 9, and the method also corresponds to that category. the standard itself determines the location within the cargo compartment and the mass / stiffness of the cargo. Because it is defined as highly dependent on its interaction with the helicopter structure, The comparison result produced for this mode does not require an additional direct measurement or manual A method that involves generating a flag / warning indicating that verification is needed. Claim 25: A system in accordance with Claim 1, which is cellular or satellite communication. If it is physically included in accordance with the arrangement in (ii) of module (d), the word The module in question is disabled by at least one of the following means: a system in which the power supply to the module in question is implemented via a switch or relay physically cutting off the module's antenna or power line; separation; or rendering the module in question ineffective prior to activation or during transit. Implementing a software or hardware locking mechanism. Claim 26: Method according to Claim 13, concerning cellular or satellite communication. If physically included in accordance with the arrangement in (ii) of module (c), the word Disabling the module in question means cutting off the power supply to that module. 45 physically cutting off the module's antenna or power supply with a switch or relay. the physical separation of the line, or prior to activation of the module in question or a software or hardware interception mechanism that renders the system ineffective during transit a method that involves its implementation. Claim 27: The system is as per Claim 1, and the said cryptographic integrity mechanism As stated in the regulation (ii) in (c); the telemetry device must sign each record. It uses an asymmetric digital signature scheme (e.g., ECDSA or Ed25519); and each record, In order to detect the deletion or reordering of records, a separate A system containing monotonically increasing sequence numbers. Claim 28: The method in accordance with Claim 13, regarding the cryptographic integrity in question. the mechanism is in the arrangement of (ii) in (b); each record is an asymmetric digital signing with a signature scheme (e.g., ECDSA or Ed25519); and ensuring that each record, of the records In order to detect deletion or reordering, a monotonically increasing a method that involves including a sequence number. Claim 29: The system is as per Claim 1, and the predetermined threshold is a fixed value. as it may be, according to a predetermined rule or statistical model — for example from shipment-specific historical measurement data or an anomaly detection algorithm — A system where the value calculated at the time of comparison can also be a variable value. Claim 30: Method according to Claim 13, where the predetermined threshold in step (f) is fixed It can be a single value, or it can be based on a predetermined rule or statistical model. — for example, from historical measurement data specific to a shipment or from the detection of an anomaly from the algorithm — it could also be a variable value calculated at the time of comparison. It is a method that it involves. 46