Drone control device and control method thereof

TWI938770BActive Publication Date: 2026-09-11QISDA CORP
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Patent Information

Application Number
TW114101462
Authority / Receiving Office
TW · TW
Patent Type
Patents
Current Assignee / Owner
Filing Date
2025-01-14
Publication Date
2026-09-11
Estimated Expiration
2045-01-13

AI Technical Summary

Technical Problem

Drones face challenges in maintaining flight safety and data confidentiality due to interference and attacks on Global Navigation Satellite System (GNSS) signals, which are difficult to identify and respond to effectively.

Method used

A drone control device and method that includes an inertial navigation system for continuous position determination, encryption of sensitive data, and emergency protocols to ensure flight safety and data security, such as entering an emergency mode and transmitting data to a swarm of drones or entering a disassembly mode upon GNSS attacks.

Benefits of technology

Enhances flight safety and data confidentiality by enabling drones to detect and respond to GNSS interference, ensuring secure data transmission and retrieval, and preventing malicious data acquisition.

✦ Generated by Eureka AI based on patent content.

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Abstract

A method for controlling an unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) includes the following steps: The UAV performs a flight mission to acquire sensitive data. When the UAV's satellite navigation system is attacked, the UAV enters an emergency mode and sends a signal to other UAVs performing the same flight mission.
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Description

Technical Field

[0001] This invention relates to a drone, and more particularly to a drone control device and control method thereof. Prior Technology

[0002] To enable drones to fly autonomously and perform specific tasks, Global Navigation Satellite System (GNSS) signals are typically used to provide drones with precise positioning information and navigation capabilities. However, during signal transmission, GNSS signals are susceptible to various interferences and attacks, which may originate from natural environmental factors (such as electromagnetic interference) or malicious attacks (such as signal spoofing, electronic warfare jamming, etc.).

[0003] Furthermore, the solutions provided by related technologies are also difficult to quickly identify and distinguish the type of interference when GNSS signals are interfered with (e.g., signal masking, signal spoofing, etc.). This will result in the inability of UAVs to take effective anti-interference measures quickly when they encounter GNSS signal interference, and the risk of flight mission failure or flight accident is high. Summary of the Invention

[0004] This invention relates to a drone control device and control method, which addresses the issues of drone flight safety and data confidentiality.

[0005] According to one aspect of the present invention, a method for controlling an unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) is provided, comprising the following steps: The UAV performs a flight mission to acquire sensitive data. When the UAV's satellite navigation system is attacked, the UAV enters an emergency mode and sends a signal to other UAVs performing the flight mission.

[0006] According to one aspect of the present invention, a method for controlling an unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) is provided, comprising the following steps: Confirming that the UAV's canopy is open; Confirming that the UAV is in a normal power-on state; When the UAV is normally powered on, activating the UAV's satellite navigation system to confirm whether the UAV has entered a designated area; When the UAV enters the designated area, the UAV enters a disassembly mode to retrieve sensitive data stored in the UAV.

[0007] According to one aspect of the present invention, a drone control device is provided, comprising a control unit and a storage unit. The control unit is used to execute a flight mission. The storage unit is used to store sensitive data. When the drone's satellite navigation system is attacked, the drone enters an emergency mode and sends a signal to other drones executing the flight mission.

[0008] To provide a better understanding of the above and other aspects of the present invention, specific embodiments are described below in conjunction with the accompanying drawings: Simple Explanation of the Diagram

[0009] Figure 1 illustrates a flowchart of a drone control method according to an embodiment of the present invention. Figure 2 illustrates a flowchart of a drone control method according to another embodiment of the present invention. Figure 3 illustrates a schematic diagram of a drone control device according to an embodiment of the present invention. Implementation

[0010] Please refer to Figures 1 and 3, wherein Figure 1 illustrates a flowchart of a drone 10 control method according to an embodiment of the present invention, and Figure 3 illustrates a schematic diagram of a drone 10 control device according to an embodiment of the present invention. In one embodiment, the drone 10 control device of Figure 3 is used to execute the various steps of the drone 10 control method described in Figure 1.

[0011] In one embodiment, the control device for the unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) 10 includes a control unit 12, an inertial navigator 14, an inertial sensing unit 16, and a storage unit 18. The control unit 12 is used to execute a flight mission 13. The inertial navigator 14 is used to calculate the heading angle 15 of the UAV 10. The inertial sensing unit 16 is used to determine the gravitational acceleration 17, angular velocity, and / or geomagnetic field information of the UAV 10. The storage unit 18 is used to store sensitive data 19.

[0012] The control unit 12 includes, for example, a flight analyzer and a flight controller. The flight analyzer calculates the target flight speed and target flight altitude of the UAV 10 using GNSS signals, and the flight controller controls the flight of the UAV 10 based on the target flight speed and target flight altitude. Therefore, the UAV 10 can plan a predetermined flight path through the GNSS signals received by the control unit 12 to perform a flight mission 13. The UAV 10 is equipped with a basic GNSS chip for positioning, requiring no additional transmission technology, and the flight controller can automatically execute pre-arranged tasks based on the latitude and longitude of the destination.

[0013] In one embodiment, flight mission 13 may be a terrain reconnaissance mission or intelligence gathering mission. For example, the drone 10 may be used to take aerial photos of the terrain of the destination, enemy camp information, aircraft landing points or equipment, warehouses, etc. These photos can be stored in the storage unit 18 of the drone 10 as sensitive data 19. The drone 10 can then fly back to its own camp to archive or decode these sensitive data 19 for analysis, such as analyzing enemy situations.

[0014] The inertial sensing unit 16 includes an accelerometer, a gyroscope, and a magnetometer. The accelerometer measures the acceleration information of the UAV 10 in multiple spatial directions, the gyroscope measures the rotational angular velocity of the UAV 10 during flight, and the magnetometer measures the geomagnetic field information of the UAV 10's location in real time. The geomagnetic field information is used to determine the current orientation of the UAV 10 in GNSS signals. A typical configuration uses one accelerometer, one gyroscope, and one magnetometer on each directional axis to measure the attitude on the three directional axes: yaw angle, pitch angle, and roll angle.

[0015] The inertial navigator 14 receives initial position and velocity information from a global satellite system. Subsequently, it integrates and calculates information measured by inertial sensing units 16, such as accelerometers, gyroscopes, and magnetometers, to continuously update the current position and velocity. Therefore, given initial conditions, the inertial navigator 14 can determine the current position, direction, and velocity of the UAV 10 without external GNSS signals. However, small errors in the inertial sensing units 16 accumulate into large errors over time, with the error generally proportional to time. Therefore, the inertial navigator 14 needs continuous correction to ensure its accuracy and reliability.

[0016] Referring to Figure 1, in step S110, the UAV 10 establishes the correspondence between the information of the inertial sensing unit 16 and the GNSS signal. In step S111, the UAV 10 ascends to a location with good GNSS signal to perform parameter calibration of the inertial sensing unit 16 and the GNSS signal. In step S112, the UAV 10 receives the mission activity status and the encryption key for this mission from the ground control station. In step S113, the UAV 10 begins executing flight mission 13.

[0017] In other words, before executing flight mission 13, the UAV 10 needs to correctly set the numerical relationship between GNSS and the inertial sensing unit 16, and then ascend into the air to perform numerical comparison and correction. In addition, to ensure the security of the sensitive data 19 of the UAV 10, asymmetric key cryptography is used to encrypt the collected sensitive information, and only those who possess the asymmetric key can decrypt the sensitive data 19.

[0018] During flight mission 13, UAV 10 can obtain its current velocity and acceleration in various dimensions. Through inference, for example through algorithmic inference, it can derive the expected next GNSS position. If the difference between the expected and actual GNSS positions exceeds the GNSS accuracy range, it indicates that UAV 10 has been subjected to a GNSS spoofing attack. The aforementioned algorithm, for example, performs a signal quality assessment of the GNSS signal to obtain a signal assessment index, which describes the degree of interference experienced by UAV 10. Furthermore, when the signal assessment index meets target conditions, interference intensity analysis is performed on the GNSS signal to obtain an interference intensity index, where the target conditions describe the degree to which abnormal interference signals or spoofed GNSS signals exist in the navigation signal.

[0019] Referring to Figure 1, in step S114, it is confirmed whether the UAV 10 is under GNSS signal camouflage attack. If it is confirmed that the UAV 10 is under GNSS camouflage attack, in step S115, the UAV 10 enters an emergency mode and sends a signal to the swarm of UAVs 10 performing flight mission 13. For example, the UAV 10 under GNSS camouflage attack sends an emergency signal (e.g., a distress signal) to other UAVs 10 that are not under GNSS camouflage attack. If the UAV 10 is not under GNSS camouflage attack, it continues to perform the mission, and in step S118, it is confirmed whether the mission has ended. If it is confirmed that the mission has ended, then proceed to step S123.

[0020] In step S115, once an emergency mode is entered, for example, if the satellite navigation system of UAV 10 is attacked and causes UAV 10 to deviate from its original navigation path, in step S119, if UAV 10 discovers other UAVs 10 with the same mission, in step S120, it can transmit the acquired sensitive data 19 to the UAVs 10 normally performing flight mission 13. In step S121, if UAV 10 does not discover other UAVs with the same mission, UAV 10 waits for rescue. If the waiting time exceeds a predetermined duration, UAV 10 can delete the sensitive data 19 or encrypt the sensitive data 19 to prevent it from being maliciously obtained. In step S122, after the UAV 10 finishes transmitting the file (e.g., sensitive data 19), it proceeds to step S123, and the mission ends.

[0021] On the other hand, after step S113, step S116 can be entered to confirm whether the satellite navigation system of UAV 10 has been attacked, causing UAV 10 to fall rapidly towards the ground. If it is confirmed that UAV 10 is falling rapidly towards the ground, in step S117, UAV 10 enters an emergency mode and sends a signal to the swarm of UAVs that are normally performing flight mission 13. For example, UAV 10, which has been subjected to a GNSS camouflage attack, sends an emergency signal (such as a distress signal) to other swarm of UAVs that have not been subjected to a GNSS camouflage attack.

[0022] In step S117, once an emergency mode is entered, for example, when drone 10 is attacked and falls rapidly towards the ground, in step S119, if drone 10 discovers a swarm of drones with the same mission, in step S120, it can transmit the acquired sensitive data 19 to the swarm of drones 10 normally performing flight mission 13. In step S121, if drone 10 does not discover a swarm of drones with the same mission, drone 10 waits for rescue. If the waiting time exceeds a predetermined duration, drone 10 can delete the sensitive data 19 or encrypt the sensitive data 19 to prevent it from being maliciously obtained. In step S122, after drone 10 finishes transmitting the file (e.g., sensitive data 19), it proceeds to step S123, and the mission ends.

[0023] In step S114, the UAV 10 can determine whether it has deviated from its original navigation path based on whether the angle between the forward axis of an inertial navigator 14 and the true north direction of the navigation coordinate system is greater than a preset heading angle 15. In another embodiment, the UAV 10 can obtain the correspondence between the current GNSS time and the system time during flight. When there is an abnormal offset between the system time and the latest obtained GNSS time, it indicates that the UAV 10 has been subjected to a GNSS camouflage attack.

[0024] In step S116, the drone 10 can determine whether it is rapidly falling towards the ground by detecting whether the gravitational acceleration 17 of the drone 10 is greater than a preset value using an inertial sensing unit 16. Therefore, the drone 10 can use the inertial sensing unit 16 and mission information to detect whether it has been maliciously attacked, causing the drone 10 to crash. For example, when the control unit 12 is performing a mission, it can know the current altitude, the expected altitude, and various flight attitudes of the drone 10. When the altitude value rapidly or unexpectedly drops, and the downward acceleration value cannot be improved, it means that the drone 10 has entered a crash state.

[0025] In steps S119 and S120, when the swarm of drones is in flight, it will enter a listening mode to monitor whether any drone 10 in the airspace is sending an alarm signal indicating that it is under attack. The swarm of drones can identify whether the drone 10 that sent the alarm signal is legitimate by using the encryption key of the same flight mission 13. After the verification is completed, it will enter the data transmission mode. After the transmission is completed, the drone 10 can bring the sensitive data 19 back to the ground station, and the ground station can then know which drone 10 sent the mission data.

[0026] On the other hand, when the drone 10 is captured without warning, the following process can be used to confirm that the sensitive data 19 obtained by the drone 10 will not be maliciously obtained. Please refer to Figure 2, which illustrates a flowchart of a drone 10 control method according to another embodiment of the present invention. The drone 10 control method includes the following steps: In step S210, it is confirmed that the canopy of the drone 10 has been removed. In step S211, it is confirmed whether the drone 10 is in a normal powered-on state. In step S212, when the drone 10 is normally powered on, the satellite navigation system of the drone 10 is activated to confirm whether the drone 10 has entered a designated area. In step S214, when the drone 10 enters the designated area, the drone 10 enters a disassembly mode to obtain sensitive data 19 stored in the drone 10. The above steps can be executed by the control unit 12.

[0027] In steps S211 and S212, when the canopy of the drone 10 is removed, it needs to enter a specific area, which is a specific GNSS positioning location and a specific time range. After the canopy of the drone 10 is removed, the drone 10 will quickly confirm that the current environment is safe before entering the disassembly mode. Only in disassembly mode will the backup power supply not delete sensitive data 19. Finally, in step S216, the drone 10 shuts down normally to turn off the power.

[0028] However, in step S213, when the drone 10 is not in a normal power-on state, the drone 10 uses a backup power supply to enter a fast power-on mode to start the drone 10's satellite navigation system. In step S215, when the drone 10 does not enter the designated area, the drone 10 deletes sensitive data 19 or encrypts sensitive data 19. Therefore, in this embodiment, the drone 10 can use sensors to detect whether the drone 10's canopy has been removed, and can use a backup battery to enter a fast power-on mode to confirm that sensitive data 19 will not be maliciously obtained.

[0029] Furthermore, when the satellite navigation system of UAV 10 is attacked, causing UAV 10 to deviate from its original navigation path to an undesignated area, UAV 10 performs the aforementioned judgment steps S210-S215, deleting sensitive data 19 or encrypting sensitive data 19 to prevent malicious acquisition of sensitive data 19. When UAV 10 is lured into an undesignated area, UAV 10 cannot enter a dismantling mode to ensure confidentiality and security.

[0030] Furthermore, when the satellite navigation system of the drone 10 is attacked, causing the drone 10 to fall rapidly towards the ground to an undesignated area, and when the drone 10 is retrieved and its canopy is removed, the drone 10 can perform the aforementioned judgment steps S210-S215 to delete sensitive data 19 or encrypt sensitive data 19 to prevent sensitive data 19 from being maliciously obtained.

[0031] In summary, although the present invention has been disclosed above with reference to embodiments, it is not intended to limit the invention. Those skilled in the art can make various modifications and refinements without departing from the spirit and scope of the invention. Therefore, the scope of protection of the present invention shall be determined by the appended claims.

[0032] 10: Drones 12: Control Unit 13: Flight Mission 14: Inertial Navigation Device 15: Heading Angle 16: Inertial Sensing Unit 17: Gravitational acceleration 18: Storage Unit 19: Sensitive Information S110~S123, S210~S216: Steps

Claims

1. A method for controlling an unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV), comprising: Confirm that the drone's canopy has been opened; Confirm that the drone is in a normal powered-on state; When the drone is powered on normally, its satellite navigation system is activated to confirm whether the drone has entered a designated area; and when the drone enters the designated area, it enters a disassembly mode to obtain sensitive data stored on the drone.

2. The drone control method as described in claim 1, wherein the drone performs a flight mission to acquire sensitive data, and the swarm of drones performing the flight mission encrypts or decrypts the sensitive data using an encryption key, wherein the swarm of drones uses the encryption key of the same flight mission to identify whether the drone emitting the signal is legitimate, and after verification, it enters the data transmission mode.

3. A drone control device, comprising: A control unit used to perform a flight mission; The system also includes a storage unit for storing sensitive data. When the drone's satellite navigation system is attacked, the drone enters an emergency mode and sends a signal to other drones performing the flight mission. The control unit performs the following judgment steps: confirming that the drone's canopy has been opened; confirming that the drone is in a normal power-on state; when the drone is normally powered on, activating the drone's satellite navigation system to confirm whether the drone has entered a designated area; and when the drone enters the designated area, the drone enters a dismantling mode to retrieve the sensitive data stored in the drone.

4. The unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) control device as described in claim 3, wherein the control unit determines that when the UAV's satellite navigation system is attacked, causing the UAV to deviate from its original navigation path, the UAV sends the signal and transmits the acquired sensitive data to other UAVs performing the flight mission.

5. The UAV control device as described in claim 3, wherein the control unit includes an inertial navigator, and the control unit determines whether the UAV has deviated from the original navigation path based on whether the angle between the forward axis of the inertial navigator and the due north direction of the navigation coordinate system is greater than a preset heading angle.

6. The unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) control device as described in claim 3, wherein the control unit determines that when the UAV's satellite navigation system is attacked, causing the UAV to rapidly fall towards the ground, the UAV sends an emergency signal and transmits the acquired sensitive data to other UAVs performing the flight mission; wherein the control unit includes an inertial sensing unit, and the control unit determines whether the UAV is rapidly falling towards the ground based on whether the gravitational acceleration of the UAV detected by the inertial sensing unit is greater than a preset value.

7. The unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) control device as described in claim 3, wherein when the UAV is not in the normal power-on state, the UAV activates a backup power supply to start the UAV's satellite navigation system.

8. The drone control device as described in claim 3, wherein when the drone does not enter the designated area, the drone deletes the sensitive data or encrypts the sensitive data; wherein when the drone's satellite navigation system is attacked, causing the drone to deviate from its original navigation path to a non-designated area, the drone performs the above-mentioned judgment step, deleting the sensitive data or encrypting the sensitive data; or when the drone's satellite navigation system is attacked, causing the drone to rapidly descend towards the ground to a non-designated area, the drone performs the above-mentioned judgment step, deleting the sensitive data or encrypting the sensitive data.

9. The drone control device as described in claim 3, wherein the swarm of drones performing the flight mission encrypts or decrypts the sensitive data with an encryption key, and the swarm of drones identifies whether the drone sending the signal is legitimate by using the encryption key that performs the same flight mission, and enters the data transmission mode after verification.

Citation Information

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