Factoreal method and multi-layer system

Abstract

FactoReal Method and Multi-Layer System includes a software section for implementing FactoReal Method and a hardware section for recording and storing private keys. Some private keys are so valuable that they require a secure, long-term, and even intergenerationally transferable method for recording and storing. For such keys, writing down is always recommended. However, this approach may face unresolved and significant challenges, such as vulnerabilities to theft and environmental factors. The growing number of users in the tech world fear the exposure of their crucial private keys and thus avoid recording and storing them, as they have never had access to a comprehensive method. Paradoxically, they avoid recording and storing their private keys to protect them because, for them, the word "protection" has never been synonymous with "recording and storing." FactoReal Method and Multi-Layer System has been designed based on the principle of "the user's best defensive response against theft." This principle defines "changing the private key" as the best defensive response against theft, which forms the basis of its Multi-Layer design. Multi-Layers extend the time needed for unauthorized access through a defense in depth strategy. In case of a prolonged theft attempt, the user has the opportunity to change their private key, thereby neutralizing the theft. Therefore, the comprehensive solution of FactoReal Method and Multi-Layer System for recording and storing private keys in a secure, lifelong, and even intergenerationally transferable manner is to benefit from a Multi-Layer protection and design.

Description

FactoReal Method and Multi-Layer System

[0001] Cybersecurity

[0002] Cryptography has become so essential in the digital world that the continuation of technology without it is inconceivable. Therefore, various companies have invested in it. However, to date, most of their advancements have been directed towards infrastructure and servers, and no significant steps have been taken to ensure user-side security. Every year, social engineering tops all reports on hacking and security vulnerabilities [1], which shows that tech giants have been less focused on enhancing user-side security. Essentially, these tech giants prefer to focus security issues on their end as much as possible. This means that users lack effective options when recording and storing their private keys. While it is smart to make security independent of user behavior and knowledge, it should not be overlooked that critical and unavoidable tasks, such as protecting private keys, always rest on the user side.

[0003] A thorough evaluation of user-side security products and tools confirms this claim. Here are products and services that claim to offer private key recording and storing solutions:Password Manager of Antivirus Programs: Expensive and outdated antivirus programs from past decades, such as ESET’s “NOD32”, are considered basic and unadvanced tools for securing premium users’ private keys.Password Manager of Browsers: This feature is utilized by Alphabet Inc. in the popular “Google Chrome” browser. Companies like Microsoft and the Mozilla Foundation have also integrated similar features into their browsers that work in the same way.BIP39 Protocol: A proposal put forward in 2013 by open-source software developers to improve the security and ease of use in Bitcoin. This protocol converts complex, unreadable private key strings into memorable recovery phrases.Recovery Phrase Protector: This product has been developed in recent years by blockchain-related companies such as Ledger, Ellipal, SafePal, and Swiss Hodler Company.Hardware wallets: Expensive products from blockchain companies, whose only significant advantage is their lack of constant internet connectivity. These cold wallets are entirely unable to protect the recorded private key. In other words, in these products, the user’s recorded private key is entirely insecure and vulnerable. Technically speaking, the recorded private key represents the user’s assets. Therefore, the lack of a proper protection system can render even the world’s most expensive hardware wallet useless and ineffective.

[0004] For further clarification, as the functionality of password managers, they assist users in creating strong and complex passwords and provide a section for their storage. By accepting the associated risks, users can save passwords in its vault, freeing them from having to remember them. In this way, tech giants help users protect their private keys. Although these tools are highly useful, they are not technically perfect, as they do not cover a crucial part of the private key record and storage process.

[0005] Obviously, accessing the browser password manager requires logging in via email. If the user loses all their devices, they will not be able to log in, as the email password is stored in the password manager itself. Tech giants offer the “Forgot Password” option as a solution, which can be utilized through a secondary email or previously linked devices. However, in this exaggerated example, the user does not have access to those either. This serves as a good illustration of why some passwords shouldn’t be relied upon to be stored in a password manager. In such a situation, the primary email password acts as the master key to access the browser’s password manager vault. Private keys with a critical role, like this, need to be recorded and stored in a different way.

[0006] The example is a bit exaggerated to highlight that there are always private keys that need to be stored in a non-digital way. These keys either need to be memorized or recorded somewhere.

[0007] In blockchain technology, the protection of private keys involves more sensitive and complex considerations. Each account is equivalent to a bank account. This platform is completely decentralized. Therefore, if access to the key is lost, no company can intervene to recover the account. Thus, the lack of a comprehensive and effective system for recording and storing private keys equates to the potential theft and loss of the user’s and heirs’ assets. In the long run, this issue could be considered a weakness of blockchain technology, deterring people from this progressive platform, as they may still witness the loss of their assets and those of their ancestors in a decentralized world.

[0008] To address these issues, protocols like BIP39 were proposed in the emerging and modern blockchain community. This protocol equates a long, complex string to a set of specific phrases, allowing the use of meaningful phrases to record private keys. The protocol’s dictionary consists of 2048 phrases, known as “recovery phrases.” Despite its success, the protocol was never more effective at memorizing private keys than recording them or providing any kind of protection. Instead, it became an exceptional optimizer for recording blockchain private keys, reducing recording errors to the point that most wallets in this trillion-dollar industry now support it. The ability to recover an account and prevent its loss by heirs is a major advantage of written notes over memorizing private keys. Thus, security experts recommend writing down private keys for recording and storing, as this method is more durable and less error-prone.

[0009] It can be said that innovations related to the protection of private keys in blockchain technology are more advanced and practical, given the critical importance of these keys in blockchain. Examples of the latest innovations in this area include recovery phrase protectors developed by well-known companies like Ledger, SafePal, Ellipal, and the Swiss Hodler Company. These products, following the BIP39 protocol and utilizing durable alloys, allow users to securely record and store recovery phrases. They protect the key from impact, water ingress, and fire. Therefore, recovery phrase protectors can be used for long-term storage and transfer of private keys to future generations. However, these products still have a significant drawback: if a thief gains access to the protector, the associated account can be immediately compromised. So, recent developments still need further improvement and cannot yet be relied upon as a comprehensive protection solution. At best, they can form part of a broader security process.

[0010] Users lack a comprehensive process for protecting their written private keys. Although significant progress has been made in this area, none of them have fully addressed the primary requirements. The process of protecting private keys involves both recording and storing aspects. In addition, the process must ensure that the private key is secure against theft as well as environmental factors—a requirement that recent achievements have not fully covered. FactoReal Multi-Layer System has been designed based on the principle of “the user’s best defensive response against theft.” This principle defines “private key change” as the user’s best defensive response against theft, which forms the basis of its Multi-Layer design. The Multi-Layers extend the time required for unauthorized access through a defense in depth strategy. In the event of a prolonged theft attempt, the user has the opportunity to change their private key, thereby thwarting theft. Therefore, the comprehensive solution of FactoReal Method and Multi-Layer System for recording and storing private keys in a secure, lifelong, and even intergenerationally transferable manner is to benefit from a Multi-Layer protection and design.

[0011] The invention aims to delay theft processes and protect private keys from theft and environmental factors by artistically integrating powerful software and hardware layers.Software: The software’s main sections include protection and recovery. It is entirely powered by an innovative method called FactoReal. By selecting the “Protection” button, the user can start the process of securing their private key. FactoReal software helps the user to record their private key with a small and intentional margin of error. Through this creative layer, an added layer of security is attached to the vulnerable private key. By creating and then recording this key, the user complicates unauthorized access to the private key. Two new strings, “Fact” and “Real,” are generated from the new key and stored in the system and are used during the private key recovery process.Hardware: Recording and storing the new key are carried out using FactoReal hardware. As the protection process continues, the user must add additional security layers to their key. In the first step, the new key is recorded on a metal plate, then sealed, locked, equipped with a vibration sensor, integrated with subsequent layers, and finally, hidden.

[0012] Passwords and recovery phrases in the digital world are essentially the equivalent of keys in our physical world. This is why, in computer science, they are referred to by similar names. In the physical world, losing a key to a critical lock can be fixed with the help of a skilled locksmith or, at most, by laser technology. However, the story is completely different from that of digital keys. In the digital world, finding the key to a crucial digital lock is almost impossible. In most cases, losing a digital key could cost the equivalent of, say, 4.2 billion years of electricity and processing resources. This is estimated to cost much more than the entire monetary wealth of the Earth.

[0013] This is exactly what happens every day in the digital space. Thousands of users every day have to abandon their computers, memory cards, and online accounts because they lack a secure and comprehensive way of recording and storing their private keys. Furthermore, with the proliferation of the internet and blockchain technology, people are building virtual identities, creating value, and transferring wealth on these platforms. Therefore, failure to protect private keys could lead to the loss or theft of identities and vast amounts of wealth on a global scale.

[0014] Some private keys are so valuable that they require a secure, lifelong, and even intergenerationally transferable way to record and store. Therefore, despite unresolved challenges such as vulnerability to theft and environmental factors, writing down is always recommended. Many users in the tech world fear the exposure of their private keys and avoid recording and storing them because they have never had a comprehensive method for secure storage. Paradoxically, they avoid recording and storing their private keys to protect them because, for them, the word “protection” has never been synonymous with “recording and storing.”

[0015] Despite numerous risks, recording private keys seems inevitable, especially since private keys are now technically considered the user’s property. If a user intends to pass their private key to the next generation, writing it down becomes the only option, albeit with anxiety, given the lack of a comprehensive and effective process for doing so. Thus, it could be argued that users have a goal beyond personal account recovery when writing down private keys. They want to keep these keys safe from public access yet ensure that both they and future heirs have easy access. These two aims are contradictory, making it challenging to find a comprehensive, secure solution for writing down over the years.

[0016] In fact, this is the first time that humanity has seriously faced the issue of inheriting digital accounts and assets. Digital migrants, those born before the advent of digital technologies and later adapted to the digital world [2], are now grappling with this issue. Given the technological timeline, PCs are over 40 years old [3], and the public internet is almost 30 years old [4]. Therefore, the lack of a comprehensive process for protecting private keys might be attributed to the youth of the tech community and digital migrants. However, this situation cannot persist indefinitely. The lack of an effective and comprehensive process for recording and storing private keys could lead to the loss of a huge amount of data and assets in the digital world, which in the long run may be perceived as a technological inefficiency and turn users away from advanced platforms like blockchain. Because people would witness the loss of their own data and assets and those of their predecessors on digital platforms every day.

[0017] Effective and comprehensive protection of private keys must address both recording and storing aspects. Hence, it is important that the desired system sections meet the diverse needs of these aspects.Recording: The initial requirement for a secure record of private keys is that the process should be simple, clear, and durable. This means that the process should avoid unnecessary complexity, ensuring the user—or even their heirs—can reliably restore accounts years later. A guaranteed record requires at least one organic and independent approach. This implies that account recovery should not be exclusively dependent on a specific software. Furthermore, while heirs should be able to read the private key, strict measures should be in place to prevent misuse by unauthorized individuals. Moreover, a system that helps users create passwords should assess password strength based on standards and warn the user if weaknesses are detected.Storing: A prerequisite for storing recorded private keys is to avoid excessive complexity that could render the keys inaccessible. Moreover, users must be assured that the medium holding their private keys is resistant to theft and environmental factors such as heat, water ingress, pressure, and corrosion. It is also essential that users are promptly notified of any movement of their private keys.

[0018] Given the diverse capabilities required and the complexity of private key protection, FactoReal system has been designed with a Multi-Layer approach.

[0019] FactoRealMulti-LayerSystem

[0020] FactoReal Multi-Layer System comprises both software and hardware sections. The name of this system is derived from the innovative method used in its software section. Using FactoReal Method, private keys can be securely recorded in the system.

[0021] FactoReal Method

[0022] The output of this method is a new key, which is derived from the private key through a precise and specialized technique to fulfill the requirements of secure recording. The aim of creating the new key is for the user to record the private key with some deliberate error. This means that the recorded key cannot be used directly. The key created through FactoReal Method is completely reversible, i.e., it is possible to retrieve the private key from the recorded key. FactoReal Method allows private key recovery through two innovative approaches, referred to as “organic” and “inorganic.” By introducing two strings, Fact and Real, this method has achieved groundbreaking results. Using Fact and Real strings, the private key can be recovered from the recorded key.

[0023] The technique behind this method is based on rearranging the private key characters. Through this method, a new key is created by rearranging the characters of the private key. As mentioned, the aim of creating this new key is to record the private key with some deliberate error. This method effectively rewrites the private key with a new structure.

[0024] The private key, as processed by this method, consists of two sections: fixed and variable. The fixed section consists of the characters of the private key that must remain in their original positions, while the variable section consists of characters that need to be rearranged. This process results in a new key comprising two parts: a larger part where the characters match the original private key and are in a correct permutation and a smaller part where the characters have been rearranged and are in an incorrect permutation. In this way, the user only needs to record the new key (the secured private key). The user must identify which characters belong to the fixed section and write a note on the record stating: “Only those marked, have the correct permutation.” Therefore, the user records their private key in a manner that is functional but inaccessible. The degree of difference between the private key and the new key is the amount of entropy that the method has used to create the new key. The higher the entropy, the more challenging it becomes to recover the private key, thus enhancing security.

[0025] Fact:The Fact string containing the fixed section of the new key is defined within FactoReal Method. Fact is a string that facilitates the recovery of the private key. In the output key structure of FactoReal Method, the private key can be recovered by keeping the fixed section and extensively rearranging the remaining characters. In computer science, this extensive trial-and-error process is called “brute force”. Using brute force represents the organic approach to recovery the private key. Additionally, the Fact string, along with the Real string, can be employed for inorganic recovery of the private key.

[0026] Real:The Real string containing the correct arrangement of the variable section is defined within FactoReal Method. Real is a string that enables the rapid identification of the correct arrangement of the variable section, facilitating the recovery of the private key. The method proposes a specific arrangement for constructing Real. For instance, a part of the Real string for a key where the correct permutation of the 9th and 6th characters are in the 1st and 3rd permutations, respectively, might look like this:

[0027] 1. 9 – 3. 6

[0028] As mentioned earlier, with the Fact string and the variable section, the user can recover the private key through the organic approach, albeit with spending time and effort. Also, by possessing the Fact string, the variable section, and the Real string, the user can immediately recover the private key through the inorganic approach.

[0029] FactoReal Method is implemented through the software section.

[0030] 1.Software:

[0031] This section assists the user in creating a new key using FactoReal Method. With the help of the software, the user first modifies their private key with deliberate errors to prepare it for secure recording and storing in the hardware section. In fact, the software adds a robust and reliable security layer to the vulnerable characters of the private key.

[0032] To add a security layer to their private key, the user must select the Protection button in the software and, following the provided instructions, enter parts of the private key. For instance, when entering recovery phrases, only the first two characters of each word are used. To verify the input and ensure the correctness of the characters, the software asks the user to perform this task twice. It should be noted that if the private key is a password, the software also displays its strength based on its algorithms.

[0033] At this stage, the process of creating the new key begins using FactoReal Method. The software section implements the method, guiding the user to create the new key consisting of fixed and variable sections. Depending on the length of the entered string and its internal algorithms, the software determines the length of the fixed section, which corresponds to the length of the Fact string. This length is calculated based on a predefined entropy value within the algorithm. Afterward, based on the length of the Fact string, the software randomly selects parts of the private key that should remain fixed and repeats them verbatim in the new key structure. The remaining smaller parts of the private key that must be rearranged are then automatically determined. To construct the variable section of the new key, the software randomly shuffles the segments of the smaller part. The output is a string displayed to the user, enabling them to construct the new key.

[0034] At this stage, the user can create the new key by comparing their private key with the output string created by the software. The new key represents the private key, written in the order specified by the software. According to the instructions, it is mandatory to mark the correct permutations, as this is integral to the new key structure. Without these markings, the new key would be meaningless. Finally, the user is asked to input specific parts of the created key (including certain characters and marked permutations) into the software for verification. Once it is confirmed that the user has correctly created the new key based on the output string, the message “The end of the software process” is displayed.

[0035] This security layer ensures that the private key is always recorded with deliberate errors. Therefore, any thief gaining access to it would face significant delays in deciphering the correct private key. The only way for the thief to solve this puzzle is to perform exhaustive trial-and-error to find the key’s correct arrangement. This extensive trial-and-error process involves altering the arrangements of the variable section and is referred to in computer science as “brute force,” a time-consuming and resource-intensive process.

[0036] The difficulty of this puzzle is controlled by the amount of entropy. Assuming the thief uses state-of-the-art technology to perform brute force, the software determines the number of variable arrangements such that the time required to find the correct private key is balanced. The aim is for the process of finding the correct arrangement not to be so lengthy as to hinder the user or their heirs from recovering the key, nor so short that a thief with minimal resources could quickly access the private key. By maintaining this subtle balance, the software artistically ensures that the difficulty of solving this puzzle is optimized.

[0037] Recovering through the organic method (brute force) is not the only way to bypass the software layer in FactoReal Multi-Layer System. Clearly, the owner of the private key does not want to wait as long as heirs or thieves to recover their key. So, the system, equipped with an innovative technique, provides a quicker option for recovery. At the outset, when the software creates the fixed section of the new key, it also creates the Fact string for the user. This Fact string is based on the fixed section of the new key. When the user records the new key and marks the correct permutations, they are simultaneously recording their Fact string. Subsequently, the software creates a string based on the variable section of the new key and assigns it to the user’s Fact string as the Real string.

[0038] By selecting the “Recovery” button in the software and entering the Fact string, the user gains quicker access to the correct arrangement of the new key (Real string). At this stage, the software does not immediately provide the Real string to prevent bypassing the security layer through the inorganic approach without delay. Therefore, the user must input an email address, and the software will send the Real string to them at a designated time.

[0039] The hardware section is responsible for recording and storing private keys. The hardware systematically manages the final stages of FactoReal Method, ensuring the private key’s security process is complete. The hardware consists of the following layers:

[0040] 2.Metal Plate and Accessories (metal letters, marker, automatic center punchtool):

[0041] Once the user creates the new key, the recording process begins. Writing the new key on paper without a protective layer cannot protect it against environmental factors. The current system employs a metal alloy plate along with a set of metal letters. This ensures that one of the world’s hardest alloys provides a robust layer of protection against heat, water ingress, pressure, and corrosion for each word.

[0042] The outer surface of the plate is engraved with a statement in the current world language: “Only those marked, have the correct permutation.” A marker and a punching tool are also included to enable the user to mark and permanently engrave the Fact string (fixed permutations).

[0043] This system uses a product made from stainless steel 304. This alloy makes the plate waterproof and resistant to corrosion and fire, withstanding temperatures up to 1,400 °C. Additionally, the protector complies with the BIP39 standard, allowing for the recording of recovery phrases.

[0044] The user records the new key by detaching letters from the metal plate and placing them in the plate’s designated permutations. Following the software’s instructions, the user must mark the fixed permutations with the marker and punch them with the automatic center punch tool after completing the software phase. By doing so, the user ensures the key can be recovered through brute force (organic approach) or using the Real string (inorganic approach).

[0045] 3.Anti-faking sticker:

[0046] Anti-faking stickers are primarily used to seal and secure sensitive items. In this system, anti-faking stickers are used to seal the metal plate. These stickers are designed in such a way that any attempt to remove the seal leaves visible traces on the plate surface. By attaching the sticker to the movable section of the plate, the owner can detect if the seal has been tampered with. This adds a layer of security against data theft from the plate. If a skilled thief attempts to extract data from the plate without removing it, the owner can detect the breach and take the appropriate defensive action.

[0047] 4.Combination Lock:

[0048] This device secures the plate with a metal combination lock featuring a 4-digit code. In the absence of the correct code, it is estimated to take approximately two hours to unlock using a trial-and-error process. Both the combination lock and the anti-faking sticker serve as layers to secure the plate and prevent quick access to its contents.

[0049] 5.Vibration Sensor:

[0050] Any movement or displacement can threaten the security of the plate. This is an essential factor that is often overlooked in the development of private key storage solutions. It is as if the physical movement of these plates is a completely irrelevant issue to security or that the owner is always present to monitor even the slightest displacements concerning their private key. Nevertheless, in reality, any attempt to unlock the plate is likely to involve displacement. The lack of vibration detection capabilities has led users to remove their private keys from secure locations and carry them even for short trips, exposing them to serious risks. It is obvious that employing a vibration sensor can significantly help users constantly monitor their private keys.

[0051] This system uses a highly smart vibration sensor with a length, width, and thickness of 7.2, 2.5, and 2 cm, respectively, and is powered by two 1.5 V batteries. The communication path of this device is WiFi 2.4 G and is easily managed through its dedicated application. The sensitivity of this small sensor can be customized across three levels, allowing it to distinguish between vibration, movement, and falling. It provides real-time notifications through the application and maintains a detailed log of all detected events, which is accessible to the user. The sensor is affixed to the plate using double-sided adhesive.

[0052] The aim of equipping the plate with this security layer is to notify the user of any positional changes to their private key. If the slightest displacement is deemed a threat by the user, it can be easily mitigated. For example, the user can change their password or transfer their assets to another wallet, thereby securing their private key and effectively defending it from thieves.

[0053] 6.Safe Box:

[0054] To further integrate and protect all the aforementioned sections, they are placed in a compact safe box. For enhanced security, the safe box is designed to resemble a book, making it easily concealable on a bookshelf and hidden from thieves. The small dimensions and lightweight construction of the safe box make it more likely to be moved by thieves. However, this is deliberately aligned with the system’s security strategy, which leverages a vibration detection layer to confirm theft attempts. This allows the user to implement the best defensive response against theft, namely changing the private key.

[0055] This system utilizes a 1.13 kg safe box, which looks like an English dictionary. Opening this sturdy safe box using physical force is almost unreasonable, especially considering the simplicity of its locking mechanism. The lock has three permutations, each capable of displaying numbers 0 to 9, resulting in a 3-digit combination between 000 and 999. Assuming 1 code is tried per second, it would take less than 17 minutes to unlock the safe box. This design, along with its manageable size and weight, is intended to tempt the thief into moving the safe box to another place, which aligns with the Multi-Layer Invention’s goal.

[0056] Private keys are naturally vulnerable to both theft and environmental factors. As demonstrated, this system employs a combination of innovative software and hardware sections to add Multi-Layer security to private keys, ensuring users can protect them effectively and comprehensively. The system’s layers against theft are designed with a focus on both time and location-based (displacement) security, making unauthorized access to the user account not impossible but time-consuming.

[0057] This Invention, leveraging the concept of “defense in depth”, provides an effective solution for protecting private keys not by making theft impossible but by creating Multi-Layer security and making access to the private key time-consuming. The system has been designed on the firm belief that the recovery process should be significantly time-consuming for anyone other than the key owner. Otherwise, creating inorganic, complex, and obfuscated security layers may not only prevent heirs from accessing their rights but also cause the owner to forget how to recover their account. In such a case, the private key becomes so securely locked away against external threats that it has to be considered lost and unusable. The use of inefficient systems can lead to such irreparable losses. Therefore, protecting private keys requires meticulous and sophisticated measures, which FactoReal Method and Multi-Layer System has diligently adhered to in all aspects, thus providing a comprehensive solution to the problem.

[0058] FactoReal Method and Multi-Layer System protects private keys in a way that ensures both the owner and heirs have guaranteed and perpetual access while, at the same time, the keys are significantly protected against theft and environmental factors. This invention artistically classifies and balances access to the private key. By leveraging its innovative design, the system has made private keys accessible to their owner while being effectively inaccessible to abusers. With its independent and needs-based design, this system has made it possible for the private key to be recovered and used even after many years, and the software section is no longer available. The perpetual recoverability and anti-theft properties of this system are advantages that have never been combined in previous innovations in this field.

[0059] It is worth mentioning that creating and implementing the Fact string for user identification significantly enhance the system’s security and efficiency. With this innovative string, there is no longer a need to use an email address as the username. This string is directly derived from the private key itself, ensuring it is always accessible to both the user and their heirs. The advantages provided by Fact and Real strings minimize the system’s security risks and significantly enhance privacy.

[0060] Users of FactoReal System possess unique Fact and Real strings. This enables the software section to create a user account based on these two strings. The user can log in to their FactoReal account by entering their Fact and Real strings. The system’s use of these two strings and the creation of FactoReal account cause advantageous effects that are uniquely achievable through FactoReal Method and Multi-Layer System. These advantages are as follows:

[0061] FactoRealAccount as a Private Key Manager:

[0062] The user can save important account information in their FactoReal account. This allows them to securely record and keep it for personal use and, secondly, pass it on to heirs to prevent loss. A key feature is that users can further enhance security by recording the relevant private keys in their accounts using FactoReal Method. To do this, the user must attach the new key location to the related account information. In this way, heirs can use the new key to restore private keys and take control of inherited accounts.

[0063] FactoRealAccount as a Platform for Writing Digital Wills:

[0064] The concept of wills has been a cornerstone of human civilization, with historical records dating back to 1800 BCE in ancient Egypt, illustrating humanity's early recognition of the importance of planning for the transfer of assets and responsibilities after death [5]. In recent decades, there have been attempts to develop services for recording digital wills; unsuccessful attempts tried to fill this human need relying on the email address as the digital identity of the heir but never became a permanent solution.

[0065] The location of digital wills must closely resemble that of traditional wills in the physical world, often stored alongside valuable objects and documents. That is why heirs find them. The Fact string addresses this challenge by becoming a crucial part of a valuable and significant string. Even in the physical world, FactoReal system, as an essential asset, can be securely stored in a safe place, just like other valuable documents and objects of the decedent. So, for the first time, we have a suitable solution to meet this human need.

[0066] As mentioned, the decedent can take notes in their FactoReal account and log in using their Fact and Real and write their will there. The will is non-editable and any updates must be appended as addenda that modify the original content. Upon finding the Real String, the heirs can access the decedent’s FactoReal account and read the stored will. The system records the will status and all addenda with the exact date and time, ensuring their authenticity. Therefore, any modifications made by heirs for personal motives are fully identifiable.

[0067] FactoRealSystem for Managing Collaborative Wallets:

[0068] The software section is capable of creating blockchain private keys. This means that wallets can be created within the software section. In FactoReal wallets, the created private keys cannot be displayed in full. The software creates Fact and Real strings depending on the number of partners and separately distributes parts of the new key to each of them. To complete a transaction, all partners must enter their respective Fact and Real strings. In this way, no partner can independently recover the private key or record a transaction without the approval of other partners. This convenient feature also makes non-fungible tokens (NFTs) efficiently shareable.

[0069] The advantages mentioned have never been found effectively in any other private key protection systems. Meanwhile, all of these innovative advantages work comprehensively, independently, cohesively, efficiently, and permanently in FactoReal Method and Multi-Layer System.Fig.1

[0070] This figure shows the system layers for protecting private keys in the form of a block diagram.Fig.2

[0071] [Fig.2] This figure shows the pathways the software follows to protect and recover private keys in a block diagram format. By selecting the Protection button, the user can add a security layer to their private key using FactoReal Method, and by selecting the Recovery button, they can remove this security layer from their private key. The process of creating a new key based on FactoReal Method is the system’s first layer for protecting private keys. This software layer handles tasks related to recording private keys.Fig.3

[0072] This figure shows the dimensions of the metal plate in length, width, and thickness. When closed, the plate resembles a thick metal card with a thickness of 6 mm. This durable alloy piece is the system’s second layer for protecting private keys. This hardware layer handles tasks related to recording and storing private keys.Fig.4

[0073] This figure shows one of the metal plate’s accessories. A sample of metal plates, containing the letters ‘a’ to ‘f’ is shown.Fig.5

[0074] This figure shows two accessories of the metal plate. On the left side, the marker and on the right side, the automatic center punch are visible. The user first marks specific permutations on the plate using the marker based on the output string displayed by the software. After verifying the plate and the marked permutations, the user permanently records the arrangements with the punching tool.Fig.6

[0075] This figure shows the metal plate in an open state. It is worth mentioning that for a better understanding of the invention’s nature, this diagram is drawn exactly according to the example provided in the Description of Embodiments section.Fig.7

[0076] This figure shows how the anti-faking sticker works. This sticker leaves a trace if tampered with, indicating that the plate has been unsealed. This security label is the system’s third layer for protecting private keys. This hardware layer handles tasks related to storing private keys.Fig.8

[0077] This figure shows the combination lock. This sturdy lock is the system’s fourth layer of protecting private keys. This hardware layer handles tasks related to storing private keys.Fig.9

[0078] This figure shows the dimensions of the vibration sensor in length, width, and thickness. This small electronic section is the system’s fifth layer for protecting private keys. This hardware layer handles tasks related to storing private keys.Fig.10

[0079] This figure shows the dimensions of the book-shaped safe box in length, width, and thickness. This metal box, which looks like a book but functions as a safe, is the system’s sixth layer for protecting private keys. This hardware layer handles tasks related to storing private keys.Fig.11

[0080] This figure shows the safe box’s lock mechanism featuring a 3-digit combination and a lever. When the correct combination is entered, the lever rotates, unlocking the safe box.

[0081] In this embodiment, the user intends to protect the private key associated with their blockchain wallet. The wallet app provides the user with words as a private key and note-taking is suggested as the best way of recording and storing it. The private key recorded and stored in this way is entirely defenseless against external threats (e.g., theft, fire, and tearing). On the other hand, using a computer or cloud space for note-taking is a non-independent method that always requires the user to rely on other private keys to access this highly critical key. Additionally, recording the private key on computer memory does not protect it from hacker attacks and poses serious challenges for heirs and survivors to access the words and, consequently, the assets.

[0082] In this case, the user decides to use the “FactoReal Method and Multi-Layer System” and, through the security layers of this system (), adds multiple layers to their private key. To use this method and system, the user must perform the following steps:

[0083] Step 1:The user first accesses the software section ([Fig.2]) and selects the Protection button. Only the first two letters of each word are sufficient to enter blockchain private keys. The user, observing the recovery words in their wallet app, follows the software instructions and inputs the words sequentially and partially as inputs into the software. The following is an example of letters the user might enter into the software based on the wallet words:

[0084] 1. sy 2. ta 3. ge 4. me 5. sh 6. ea 7. sh 8. gr 9. er 10. lo 11. ze 12. ha 13. tr 14. da 15. ca 16. sk 17. va 18. fl 19. up 20. ac 21. be 22. mi 23. el 24. de

[0085] Given that words 5 and 7 are entered identically, the user is asked to make them distinct by adding a letter. So, for example, the user adds another letter to word 5:

[0086] 1. sy 2. ta 3. ge 4. me 5. sha 6. ea 7. sh 8. gr 9. er 10. lo 11. ze 12. ha 13. tr 14. da 15. ca 16. sk 17. va 18. fl 19. up 20. ac 21. be 22. mi 23. el 24. de

[0087] The software saves the user’s data and, on a new screen, asks the user to re-enter the private key to ensure that the input matches the private key. The user repeats the previous operation by observing the wallet words:

[0088] 1. sy 2. ta 3. ge 4. me 5. sh 6. ea 7. sh 8. gr 9. er 10. lo 11. ze 12. ha 13. tr 14. da 15. ca 16. sk 17. va 18. fl 19. up 20. ac 21. be 22. mi 23. el 24. de

[0089] Step 2:At this stage, the process of creating a new key based on the FactoReal Method begins. The software determines the number of permutations that should remain constant based on the total number of permutations and the entropy level. In this case, the software can use 14 input permutations as the fixed section and another 10 permutations as the variable section to create a new key. The number of variable sections seems appropriate, as the probability of obtaining a correct outcome from 10 permutations equals 1 / 10!. Assuming that one state is tested per second, the correct state can be brute forced within a maximum of 42 days. To achieve this, the software selects 14 permutations from the 24 permutations randomly and uses them unchanged in creating the new key. Then, to apply entropy, it randomly modifies the remaining 10 permutations and merges them into the output. This means the user’s Fact and Real consist of 14 and 10 permutations, respectively. This entire process is completely random. So, a string with a random order is created and displayed for the user. The output string for creating the new key could be as follows:

[0090] 1. fl 2. er3. ge4. me5. tr 6. mi7. sh8. sk 9. sh10. lo11. ze12.ha13. ea14. da15. ca16. gr17. va18. sy19. up20. ac21.be22. ta23. el24. de

[0091] The software identifies 14 permutations in the output string. The above output precisely means that the software has created the Fact by concatenating these 14 permutations and their letters:

[0092] 3ge4me7sh10lo11ze12ha14da15ca17va19up20ac21be23el24de

[0093] The software encrypts the Fact using a cryptographic hash function and saves it in the database. The hash of the above string, created using the well-known and secure SHA256 function, is as follows:

[0094] 29ac9b8bc81db6f8ea4904c048167836da7f8a5c413667909a685925ae96a537

[0095] By comparing the output string and the private key, it can be concluded that the user’s Real has been created through the following string and assigned to the user’s Fact:

[0096] 1. 18 2. 22 5. 9 6. 13 8. 16 9. 2 13. 5 16. 8 18. 1 22. 6

[0097] To save the above string, the software, for example, uses a zero as a point and two zeros to separate the permutations. So, the user’s Real is saved in the database as follows:

[0098] 10180020220050900601300801600902001305001608001801002206

[0099] As can be seen, despite databases using advanced encryption algorithms, the FactoReal system is designed in such a way that nothing is stored about the user in the database except a hash number and a long integer.

[0100] Step 3:In this step, the user must use the output string to create and record the new key by placing the metal letters () into the metal plate (). By comparing the software output string with the wallet words, the user determines that the word “flash” should be placed in the first slot of the metal plate. According to the BIP39 standard, the first four letters of each word are sufficient for recording the key. Thus, for the word “flash”, only the first four letters, i.e., “flas” need to be placed in the first slot. According to the software instructions, to create the new key, the user must mark the designated word permutations from the software output string using the marker (). Therefore, by referencing the software output and the wallet app data, the process of creating and recording the new key on the metal plate begins:

[0101] 1. flas 2. eras3. gest4. memo5. try 6. mixe7. shiv8. sket 9. shal10. loya11. Zero12. harv13. earn14. dang15. cake16. grea17. vali18. Syru19. upda20. act21. beli22. talk23. elit24. dela

[0102] Now, it can be said that the user has added a robust security layer to their private key against theft and, by recording it in the metal plate, has also provided a robust layer of protection against environmental factors.

[0103] Step 4:Finally, the software section clears the output and asks the user to enter the output string into the software based on the data recorded on the plate. The user enters the first two letters of each word into the software sequentially, referencing the plate’s data, and confirms the correct permutations. This ensures that the new key has been created correctly by the user. If the user enters the string incorrectly, they are returned to the previous step to correct any potential errors in the plate’s data. To proceed successfully, the user must input the following string into the software:

[0104] 1. fl 2. er3. ge4. me5. tr 6. mi7. sh8. sk 9. sh10. lo11. ze12.ha13. ea14. da15. ca16. gr17. va18. sy19. up20. ac21.be22. ta23. el24. de

[0105] When the confirmation message is displayed and the task of the software section is finished, the user must punch the marked permutations using the automatic center punch tool (). This process ensures that the new key is perfectly created and permanently recorded ().

[0106] When closing the protection window, the user can optionally check the “Send Real to Email” option. If selected, the software asks for an email address to perform this action. The user must provide their email to receive the Real:

[0107] user@email.com

[0108] The software section task is finished by instantly sending the Real to the user’s email address.

[0109] Step 5:Now that the private key has been equipped with two powerful and robust layers, the sealing process begins. At this stage, the user can use the anti-faking sticker () available in the system’s hardware tools to seal the plate easily. If the metal plate is ever unsealed, the user can immediately detect this security layer’s breach and transfer their assets to another wallet, thereby changing their private key. It is strongly recommended that the new private key also be rigorously protected using the tools of the invention.

[0110] In the following, the user must set a 4-digit code for the combination lock () and lock the plate by inserting the combination lock’s shackle through the related hole. The user then activates the vibration sensor () through the dedicated mobile app and attaches it to the plate using double-sided adhesive tape.

[0111] Step 6:Finally, the user enhances the protection of the private key to its maximum level by adding further security layers. At this step, the user must place everything they have, along with all the accessory tools, inside the safe box (). This action integrates the system and prevents the leakage of additional information. This means that unauthorized people will never suspect the presence of a private key by merely seeing the punching tool or letter plate.

[0112] This small safe box accepts a 3-digit code (). The safe box’s code is 3-digit, while the combination lock’s code consists of 4 digits. The user can set these codes differently to make them easier to remember. The safe box is designed to resemble a book, allowing the system to remain hidden from a thief's glance during a quick burglary. While, it can attract significant attention from heirs who would not have the same perspective. So, as the last step in protecting the private key, the user must place the entire system in a secure location surrounded by numerous books (e.g., their personal bookshelf).

[0113] The safe box integrates the entire system, makes it more robust against environmental factors, and delays potential theft attempts. Its lightweight yet robustness may encourage the thief to relocate it and attempt to unlock it later. Additionally, like the combination lock, the hardware layer is deliberately designed in such a way that it is possible to find the code, but takes time. This deliberate delay aims to buy time and confirm theft, enabling the user to implement the best defensive response. The system, based on a defense-in-depth strategy, assures the user that by leveraging the FactoReal Multi-layer System, they will always be capable of responding flawlessly in necessary situations.

[0114] Optional Step:By requesting from the software section in Step 4, the user can always access their FactoReal account data by having the Real in their email inbox. They can also optionally take advantage of the special benefits of having a FactoReal account.

[0115] The user can log in to their FactoReal account by entering their Fact and Real into the software. This account can act as a private key manager. As a result, the user can store important wallet data or critical account credentials there. The user can store their important private keys using the FactoReal Method. The following example shows data that can be stored by the user in the Private Key Manager section of the FactoReal account:

[0116] Website:

[0117] http: / www.email.com

[0118] Username:

[0119] user@email.com

[0120] New Key:

[0121] 1. 72. t3. 84. 75. 06. 6 7. 78. 79. 210. 611. 112. 613. 414. f 15. s 16. 6 17. i18. 619. 920. 1 21. 322. 623. d

[0122] In this example, it is evident that the user has used the FactoReal Method to create their email password. They have added a security layer to their private key through this method. This password cannot be used directly and must be obtained in the correct order.

[0123] Also, the FactoReal account serves as a platform for writing digital wills. The user can access the relevant features in their account. The following example illustrates a digital will stored by the user in the FactoReal account’s digital will section:

[0124] “I, User, declare that my physical assets shall be inherited by my sons, and my digital assets by my daughter. Access to my important accounts can be obtained via my email, and my social media accounts should be deleted. Remember, love is the most important. Love you all” [This will was created on April 20th, 2024, and securely stored in the FactoReal account].

[0125] Collaborative Wallet:The process of protecting a collaborative private key is similar, except the software works as follows:

[0126] First, the software creates the new wallet’s private key. Then, the software creates a Fact and a Real depending on the number of partners. For example, it sends words 1 to 8 of the new key to partner A’s email, words 9 to 16 to partner B’s email, and words 17 to 24 to partner C’s email. So, each user has their unique Fact and Real. The only difference is that the software combines their Fact strings to create a collaborative Fact and their Real strings to create a collaborative Real. As a result, the private key is not fully available to any partner. Even the software itself, unlike traditional wallet applications, does not have access to the private key.

[0127] To use the wallet, partners must first input their specific key words into the software. During transaction signing, each partner must enter their unique Real into the software. The software then combines these inputs to derive the private key, enabling the transaction signing process. After recording their key on the plate, each partner can continue the protection process by adding storage-related layers (Steps 5 and 6). They may also take advantage of having a shared FactoReal account by entering their Facts and Reals sequentially and separately, for example, to record a draft of the company’s charter.Examples

[0128] The User’s Defensive Response:

[0129] If multiple layers of the system are activated, the principle of “the user’s best defensive response against theft” must be followed. According to this principle, the user’s best defensive response against theft is to change their private key as soon as possible. In this example, the user can transfer their assets to another wallet, change their private key, and protect it indefinitely. To do this, the user must re-protect the new private key using the system’s multi-layer protection tools in the software section. The following Fact and Real should be input into the protection section:

[0130] Fact: 3. ge 4. me 7. sh 10. lo 11. ze 12. ha 14. da 15. ca 17. va 19. up 20. ac 21. be 23. el 24. de

[0131] Real: 1. 18 2. 22 5. 9 6. 13 8. 16 9. 2 13. 5 16. 8 18. 1 22. 6

[0132] The software hashes this string. If the Fact and related Real exist in the database, the user is allowed to reuse the previous permutations to protect the new private key. In this case, the software uses the following fourteen permutations to protect and create the user's new Fact:

[0133] 3471011121415171920212324

[0134] This extraordinary advantage aligns with the system’s values and mission, enabling the user to change and protect their private key at no cost. This causes quick, decisive, and permanent defensive reactions to protect the private keys. Otherwise, the punched plate in the system’s hardware section becomes a single-use tool, leading to hesitation in the user’s defensive response.

[0135] Private Key Recovery:

[0136] This critical example may occur years later. In the instructions, the user is always advised to maintain access to their account as a security requirement. This has two significant benefits: (1) it prevents unnecessary account activity; (2) the user can immediately change their private key upon detecting any theft attempts. In the recovery process, individuals are divided into owners and non-owners (heirs or thieves).

[0137] a.Owner:

[0138] The owner naturally leads the recovery process. They know the system’s location, So they can easily access the safe box and open it using the 3-digit code. Then, they detach the vibration sensor and open the combination lock using the 4-digit code. Finally, the owner removes the anti-facking sticker to access the plate and its data. If the owner knows their Real, the recovery process is nearly complete, and the private key can be accessed shortly. Otherwise, the owner quickly begins the “Recovery” process in the software section. To do this, the software requests the Fact string from the owner, and they must input the fourteen words whose permutations were punched on the plate:

[0139] 3. ge 4. me 7. sh 10. lo 11. ze 12. ha 14. da 15. ca 17. va 19. up 20. ac 21. be 23. el 24. de

[0140] The software concatenates the input and calculates its hash:

[0141] f(3ge4me7sh10lo11ze12ha14da15ca17va19up20ac21be23el24de)= 29ac9b8bc81db6f8ea4904c048167836da7f8a5c413667909a685925ae96a537

[0142] If this hash exists in the database, the software requests an email address from the owner to send the Real. The owner must input their email address twice:

[0143] user@email.com

[0144] user@email.com

[0145] A message is immediately sent to the owner’s email. With this action, the software achieves two aims: (1) to send the user the exact date of sending Real based on UTC; (2) the user could be sure that their recovery request has been submitted. If the owner does not find this email, even in their spam folder, they must reinitiate the recovery request in the software. After a specified time (e.g., 4.2 days), the owner receives the following Real in their email:

[0146] 1. 18 2. 22 5. 9 6. 13 8. 16 9. 2 13. 5 16. 8 18. 1 22. 6

[0147] Real is exactly the correct sequence of unpunched words. The owner uses this string to access their private key immediately. For this, the true positions of the 10 unpunched words must be derived from the Real. For example, the user must consider word 18 on the plate as the first permutation and word 22 as the second word in the private key.

[0148] Thus, the owner unlocks the additional security layer applied to the private key by deriving the correct sequence embedded in the Real:

[0149] 1. syru 2. talk 3. gest 4. memo 5. shal 6. earn 7. shiv 8. grea 9. eras 10. loya 11. zero 12. harv 13. try 14. dang 15. cake 16. sket 17. vali 18. flas 19. upda 20. act 21. beli 22. mixe 23. elit 24. dela

[0150] The private key has now been fully recovered using the software features. The owner, with this part of the private key, can completely restore their blockchain account. By entering these letters into the wallet application, the remaining non-essential letters will appear according to the BIP39 standard. Now, the owner observes the full version of the private key on their wallet, identical to what they observed before the protection process and which was never revealed even to the software and system:

[0151] 1.syrup 2.talk 3.gesture 4.memory 5.shallow 6.earn 7.shiver 8.great 9.erase 10.loyal 11.zero 12.harvest 13.try 14.danger 15.cake 16.sketch 17.valid 18.flash 19.update 20.act 21.believe 22.mixed 23.elite 24.delay

[0152] In this way, the owner regains control of their blockchain account without expending energy. However, the system also provides an organic method for recovery. The owner can work with an expert and use open-source apps or software to brute force the correct sequence of their private key within 42 days. This organic method guarantees the ability to recover the private key forever.

[0153] b.Non-owners(Heirs and Thieves):

[0154] In this system, recovery by other people is not impossible but time-consuming. This advantage is due to the system’s unique multi-layer design. Heirs and thieves must go through extensive trial and error to bypass the software and hardware security layers. Finding the code for the lock of the book-shaped safe box takes about 15 minutes, and the combination lock takes 2 hours through trial and error. After bypassing all hardware layers, they can access data inside the metal plate. With some analysis and numerous failed attempts to recover the wallet, they will realize that instead of an accessible and defenseless private key, they face a solvable but time-consuming puzzle. In this case, brute forcing the private key would take less than 42 days, allowing them to brute force the private key and recover the wallet. In this case, although various layers of the system are activated, there is no owner present to change the private key; therefore, the heirs can easily access their rights.

[0155] On the other hand, if brute forcing is performed by thieves, the owner will have enough time to identify the threat and implement the best defensive response. Although thieves may eventually access the private key, they will find nothing to steal.

[0156] Heirs can enter into a contract with a security expert for brute forcing. The expert can use open-source software and Linux distributions like Kali Linux to brute force the private key. Also, they can use the Fact string in the FactoReal software for a quicker and more energy-efficient recovery.

[0157] After gaining access to Fact and Real, heirs can access the FactoReal account and retrieve the following data stored in the Private Key Manager section:

[0158] Website:

[0159] http: / www.email.com

[0160] Username:

[0161] user@email.com

[0162] New Key:

[0163] 1. 72. t3. 84. 75. 06. 6 7. 78. 79. 210. 611. 112. 613. 414. f 15. s 16. 6 17. i18. 619. 920. 1 21. 322. 623. d

[0164] They can also find the following data in the Digital Will:

[0165] “I, User, declare that my physical assets shall be inherited by my sons, and my digital assets by my daughter. Access to my important accounts can be obtained via my email, and my social media accounts should be deleted. Remember, love is the most important. Love you all” [This will was created on April 20th, 2024, and securely stored in the FactoReal account].

[0166] In this case, the decedent can legally transfer the physical assets to their sons and transfer all the digital assets to their daughters by giving them access to the wallet. Also, the heirs can recover the decedent’s email by retrieving the password stored in the Private Key Manager. To do this, they must enter the corresponding Fact in the software:

[0167] 2. t 4. 7 5. 0 8. 7 9. 2 10. 6 11. 1 12. 6 13. 4 18. 6 19. 9 22. 6 23. d

[0168] The software concatenates the input, hashes it, and locates the user’s Fact in the database. It then requests an email address to send the Real. Heirs must enter the email address twice:

[0169] heirs@email.com

[0170] heirs@email.com

[0171] After a specific time, the following Real is sent to their email:

[0172] 1. 17 3. 15 6. 16 7. 20 14. 6 15. 14 16. 1 17. 3 20. 7 21. 21

[0173] Using this Real, heirs can immediately access the password. They can arrange the stored password using the following string:

[0174] 1.I 2.t 3.s 4. 7 5. 0 6. 6 7. 1 8. 7 9. 2 10. 6 11. 1 12. 6 13. 4 14. 6 15. f 16. 7 17. 8 18. 6 19. 9 20. 7 21. 3 22. 6 23. d

[0175] Thus, heirs can access the decedent’s email account using the following username and password and manage the connected accounts, fulfilling the decedent’s will by deleting their social media accounts:

[0176] user@email.com

[0177] its70617261646f7869736d

[0178] FactoReal Method and Multi-Layer System can play a significant role in any industry involving cryptography. Private keys are fundamental to cryptography, as well as technology-driven and computer industries. Protecting private keys in cryptocurrencies and blockchain is particularly critical since these keys represent the user’s assets. Wherever assets exist, inheritance becomes relevant, so protecting private keys securely and ensuring they are transferable to heirs is a global necessity in the blockchain. Moreover, the ability to record digital wills and transfer user accounts to heirs further enhances the utility of digital industries.

[0179] FactoReal Multi-layer System’s applications extend beyond the lifetime secure and permanent protection of private keys against theft and environmental factors. One notable application is managing collaborative private keys. This system allows industries to efficiently and cost-effectively manage shared accounts, creating a unified digital identity without the overhead of multi-signature account management.

[0180] This figure shows the metal plate in an open state. The hinge of this metal plate is labeled as No. 1. The metal plate opens and closes by rotating around this hinge. This hinge serves as an axis around which the sheets of the metal plate rotate with 360 degrees of freedom. By rotating the sheets so that they overlap, the plate can be placed in a closed state to conceal its contents. When the plate is in the closed state, the holes labeled as No. 2 on each sheet align with each other. In this position, the plate can be fully closed and locked by passing the shackle through the aligned holes No. 2. On the metal plate, a sentence in an international and widely spoken language is engraved, labeled as No. 3, stating: “Only those marked, have the correct permutation.” In this figure, only 12 slots are visible. Slots 13 to 24 are located on the reverse side of the other sheet. As shown, the word, memo, is located in the fourth position of the new key. The user has created this word by removing the letters m, e, m, and o from the metal sheet and placing them in the fourth arrangement. As indicated by No. 4, the user has punched this permutation using the related tool. Moreover, permutations 3, 7, 10, 11, and 12 of the new key have also been punched.

[0181] This figure shows the vibration sensor. The indicator marked as No. 1 displays the connection status to a mobile device during initialization and briefly lights up when vibrations are detected.

[0182]

[0183]

[0184] [1]: IBM Security. (2023). IBM X-Force Threat Intelligence Index 2023.

[0185] [2]: Prensky, M. (2001). Digital Natives, Digital Immigrants. On the Horizon, 9(5), 1-6.

[0186] [3]: Computer History Museum. 2024. Timeline of Computer History.

[0187] [4]: Internet Society. 2024. A Brief History of the Internet.

[0188] [5]: Smith, M. (2010). The World's Oldest Wills: Insights from Ancient Civilizations. The Telegraph.

[0189] PTL1:

[0190] NPL1:

Claims

FactoReal Method is a technique that allows creating a new key from a private key in such a way that securely noting the private key requires only writing down the new key, and the method ensures the private key can be independently and permanently derived from the new key.According to Claim 1, the new key differs in order from the private key and includes a fixed and a variable section, the fixed section must be written completely distinguishable from the other section and so the recovery of the private key is achieved through extensive trial and error on the variable section of the new key.FactoReal Multi-Layer System comprises a software and a hardware section; initially, the private key is secured by the software layer followed by the ability to record and store it using hardware layers; the system consists of the following components:SoftwareMetal plate and accessories (metal letters, marker, automatic center punch tool) (Hardware)Anti-faking sticker (Hardware)Vibration sensor (Hardware)Combination lock (Hardware)Safe box (Hardware)According to Claims 1 and 3, the software is responsible for implementing the FactoReal Method, and the software's output string is created by randomly altering some permutations of the input characters, enabling the user to create the new key from it.According to Claims 2 and 3, the outer surface of the metal plate is engraved with the phrase “Only those marked, have the correct permutation” in a live and widely spoken language; the plate consists of two sturdy alloy sheets, each containing 12 slots for recording words that rotate around an axis with 360 degrees of freedom; the new key is recorded and stored by placing metal letters in these slots, and Fact permutations are marked using a marker.According to Claim 3, the software compares segments of the key and the marked permutations on the plate with the output string to verify the new key’s accuracy; as a result, the fixed permutations are permanently punched by the user using the automatic center punch tool.According to Claim 3, for sealing the metal plate, it must be in a closed state and be affixed with the anti-faking sticker.According to Claim 3, the metal plate is fully locked by passing the combination lock’s shackle through its designated hole.According to Claim 3, the vibration sensor, when connected to WiFi and affixedto the plate, detects displacements of the system and notifies the user through a dedicated application.According to Claim 3, the safe box resembles a book that opens by entering a code and turning a lever and also, the metal plate and its accessories are stored inside, integrating the system and allowing it to be concealed in an environment such as a bookshelf.According to Claim 3, the system’s multiple layers have been placed together in such a way that through defense-in-depth, the unauthorized access process is delayed, and an appropriate opportunity is provided for the user's best defensive response against theft, which is to neutralize the theft by changing the private key.According to Claims 2 and 4, the software section creates a string called Fact based on the fixed section of the output string and a string called Real based on the correct order of the variable section of the output string, and assigns the Real to the user’s Fact.According to Claims 2 and 12, the private key can be recovered by organic approach through extensive trial and error or by inorganic approach by entering the Fact as input into the software and receiving the Real as output.According to Claim 11, securing the new private key continues using the hardware facilities of the previous private key, and the software upon receiving the user’s Fact and Real as input, reuses the same prior permutations to create a new Fact as output.According to Claim 12, using the user’s Fact and Real, the software creates a FactoReal account through which, the user can store their private keys and also record their digital will.According to Claims 3, 12, and 13, the software uses multiple Facts and Reals in creating new keys of shared private keys and then, each partner records and stores their unique Fact and Real using separate hardware tools; signing transactions is done by receiving the Facts and Reals of all partners by the software, and private key recovery process is performed using the combined data from all plates.Due to the multiple and uncomplicated layers of the system, private key recovery by the heirs involves extensive trial and error to decipher the system locks and find the correct private key sequence, which will be met with no defensive reaction from the decedent.According to Claims 13, 15, and 17, heirs can access other private keys and the digital will of the decedent by obtaining the Real through organic or inorganic methods, thereby accessing the decedent’s FactoReal account.

Images