Nuclear power plant

WO2026163967A1PCT designated stage Publication Date: 2026-08-06HITACHI GE NUCLEAR ENERGY LTD
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Patent Information

Authority / Receiving Office
WO · WO
Patent Type
Applications
Current Assignee / Owner
HITACHI GE NUCLEAR ENERGY LTD
Filing Date
2026-01-23
Publication Date
2026-08-06

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Abstract

A nuclear power plant (101A) that has a building (102) under protection comprises a blowout panel (104) capable of opening in an outer wall (105) of the building (102) under protection, and also comprises a structure (103) not under protection which is positioned in a direction facing the blowout panel (104), wherein the height (H2) of the structure (103) not under protection from a ground surface (106) is greater than or equal to a height that is calculated on the basis of the height (Hb) of the blowout panel (104) from the ground surface (106).
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Description

Nuclear power plant

[0001] This invention relates to a nuclear power plant.

[0002] In recent years, nuclear power plants have implemented measures to protect critical facilities from collisions with flying objects such as aircraft. Generally, collision protection measures often involve increasing the wall thickness to strengthen the outer walls of critical facilities, thereby maintaining their structural integrity against collisions with flying objects and secondary fires.

[0003] Furthermore, there is a prior art document describing a method for mitigating the effects of collisions with external flying objects, which is described in Patent Document 1. Patent Document 1 describes a protective structure in which a protective mound is installed around the entire circumference of the object to be protected, and this protective mound is set higher than the object to be protected and is constructed to withstand collisions with aircraft and other flying objects and vehicles.

[0004] Japanese Patent Publication No. 2010-95884

[0005] Reactor buildings are equipped with blowout panels that open to release pressure to the outside of the building in the event of a rapid pressure increase inside the building due to damage to the main steam pipes or an increase in hydrogen concentration inside the building, in order to prevent damage to the building itself and equipment. They also have access doors for vehicles and equipment to enter and exit the building during construction and periodic inspections. Generally, strengthening the building by increasing the wall thickness is often considered as a protective measure against flying objects impacting the reactor building, but this cannot be applied to openable plate-like structures such as blowout panels and access doors because they are not outer walls. On the other hand, it is conceivable to strengthen them by increasing the thickness of these plates, but in order to maintain both structural integrity against impact and high airtightness, it would be necessary to have extremely thick plates and significantly increase the strength of the connections (e.g., hinges) to prevent deformation at the joints between the plate-like structures and the outer walls even when impact loads are applied, which would drastically increase construction costs and is therefore impractical.

[0006] In Patent Document 1, an aircraft collision against a target object is prevented by a protective mound that is set higher than the target building along the entire perimeter of the building to be protected. However, since the protective mound is a large protective structure installed in the yard used for the maintenance of nuclear power plants, it is necessary to secure a large installation area for the nuclear power plant. In addition, since nuclear power plants, especially reactor buildings, are arranged considering the characteristics of the ground, when a large protective structure is arranged within a nuclear power plant, the impact on the planned layout within the nuclear power plant is significant, and it is expected to be difficult to apply it to existing plants or plants under construction both at home and abroad.

[0007] The present invention solves the above-described conventional problems, and an object thereof is to provide a nuclear power plant that can protect against flying objects while maintaining the opening function of a plate-like structure.

[0008] The present invention is a nuclear power plant having a building to be protected as a protection target, including an openable plate-like structure on an outer wall of the building to be protected, and a structure outside the protection target arranged in a direction facing the plate-like structure, and a height H from the ground surface of the structure outside the protection target 2 is equal to or higher than a height calculated based on the height H from the ground surface of the plate-like structure. b H d

[0009] According to the present invention, it is possible to provide a nuclear power plant that can protect against flying objects while maintaining the opening function of a plate-like structure.

[0010] This is a perspective view of the nuclear power plant according to the first embodiment. This is a cross-sectional view of the blowout panel and its surroundings from the side. This is a cross-sectional view showing the blowout panel removed, with the protected building locally open. This is a partial cross-sectional view of the protected building and a cross-sectional view of the unprotected structure in the nuclear power plant according to the first embodiment. This is a plan view showing the arrangement range of the unprotected structure in the nuclear power plant according to the first embodiment. This is a perspective view of the nuclear power plant according to the second embodiment. This is a perspective view of an example of an entrance door provided in the protected building of the nuclear power plant according to the second embodiment. This is a perspective view of the nuclear power plant according to the third embodiment. This is a perspective view of the nuclear power plant according to the fourth embodiment. This is a plan view of the nuclear power plant according to the fourth embodiment. This is a side view of the nuclear power plant according to the fifth embodiment. This is a side view of the nuclear power plant according to the sixth embodiment. This is a side view of the nuclear power plant according to the seventh embodiment.

[0011] The embodiments of the present invention will be described in detail below with reference to the drawings, but the present invention is not limited to the following embodiments, and various modifications and applications are included within the scope of the technical concept of the present invention. In each embodiment, the same reference numerals are used for the same components. (First Embodiment) Figure 1 is a perspective view of a nuclear power plant according to the first embodiment. As shown in Figure 1, the nuclear power plant 101A is composed of a protected building 102 and an unprotected structure 103. The protected building 102 is a building that houses the main equipment of the reactor, and has blowout panels 104 (plate-like structures) on the outer wall 105 of its upper floors. The shapes of the protected building 102 and the unprotected structure 103 shown in Figure 1 are simplified for the sake of explanation. Furthermore, from here on, buildings of relatively high importance, such as reactor buildings that require protection from flying objects, will be referred to as protected buildings 102, and other buildings, structures, and artificial objects within the nuclear power plant will be referred to as unprotected structures.

[0012] The non-protected structure 103 is arranged in the direction facing the blow-out panel 104 provided in the protected building 102. The blow-out panel 104 is an example of an openable plate-like structure provided on the outer wall 105 of the protected building 102, and other structures may also be used. Also, in FIG. 1, a configuration in which the blow-out panels 104 are provided at two locations is illustrated, but it is not limited to two locations.

[0013] FIG. 2A is a cross-sectional view of the blow-out panel and its surroundings as seen from the side, and FIG. 2B is a cross-sectional view showing a state in which the blow-out panel is removed and the protected building is locally opened. The blow-out panel 104 shown in FIGS. 2A and 2B is an example and is not limited to this embodiment. As shown in FIG. 2A, the blow-out panel 104 has a structure fitted to the outer wall 105 of the protected building 102. Also, the upper end of the blow-out panel 104 is fixed to the protected building 102 by a metal fitting 201, and the lower end is rotatably supported by a hinge 202. Further, a wire 203 for preventing the blow-out panel 104 from falling when the blow-out panel 104 is opened is attached to the surface of the blow-out panel 104 on the inside of the building. This wire 203 is connected to the protected building 102.

[0014] As shown in FIG. 2B, the blow-out panel 104 is opened to release the pressure inside the protected building 102 to the outside in order to prevent damage to the protected building 102 or the equipment inside the protected building 102 when the pressure inside the protected building 102 suddenly rises due to damage to the main steam pipe or the like or when the hydrogen concentration inside the protected building 102 rises. When the pressure inside the protected building 102 rises, pressure acts on the blow-out panel 104. When this pressure exceeds the reference value, the metal fitting 201 of the blow-out panel 104 is damaged, and the blow-out panel 104 rotates about the hinge 202 due to the acting pressure, and the outer wall 105 of the protected building 102 is opened.

[0015] Figure 3 is a partial cross-sectional view of a building to be protected and a cross-sectional view of a structure outside the protection target in the nuclear power plant of the first embodiment. For ease of explanation, Figure 3 shows a part of the building to be protected 102 and the structure outside the protection target 103 as cross-sectional views. As shown in Figure 3, the structure outside the protection target 103 is a building composed of a hollow structure that surrounds the internal space with an outer wall. Also, in the structure outside the protection target 103, a plurality of floors are formed by a plurality of floors 302 inside, and equipment 301 is installed on the floor 302 of each floor. The equipment 301 installed here is not important for safety, and even if it is hit by a flying object 107, the nuclear power plant can be safely stopped.

[0016] Flying objects 107 such as airplanes are known to travel at a certain angle θ (θ≧0) with respect to the building to be protected 102. In order to protect the blowout panel 104 from the collision of the flying object 107, the height H from the ground surface 106 of the structure outside the protection target 103 2 is the height H from the ground surface 106 of the blowout panel 104 b or the height H from the ground surface 106 of the building to be protected 102 1 is calculated based on.

[0017] The height H from the ground surface 106 of the structure outside the protection target 103 2 can be calculated from the following (Equation 1). H 2 =H b +(D b +W 2 )tanθ... (Equation 1) Here, θ is the angle formed by the travel route 303 of the flying object 107 that can be assumed to collide with the building to be protected 102 and the ground surface 106. H b is the height from the ground surface 106 of the blowout panel 104 (the upper end of the blowout panel 104). D b is the distance from the blowout panel 104 to the structure outside the protection target 103. W 2 is the width of the structure outside the protection target 103. Note that the width W 2This is the length of the unprotected structure 103 parallel to the ground surface 106 from the blowout panel 104 side to the opposite side, when a straight line is drawn connecting the blowout panel 104 and the unprotected structure 103 furthest from the blowout panel 104. Also, width W 2 This is the length of the unprotected structure 103 in the left-right direction when the protected building 102 and the unprotected structure 103 are placed side by side.

[0018] Furthermore, the height H from the ground surface 106 of the structure 103 that is not subject to protection. 2 This can also be calculated from (Equation 2) below. H 2 = H 1 + (W 1 +D+W 2 ) tanθ... (Equation 2) Note that H 1 This is the height of the building 102 to be protected from the ground surface 106. 1 D is the width of the building 102 to be protected. D is the distance from the building 102 to be protected to the structure 103 that is not to be protected. Angle θ and width W 2 This is the same as in equation 1.

[0019] Note that the height H from the ground surface 106 of the structure 103 that is not subject to protection. 2 The height may exceed the height calculated by formulas 1 and 2 (it may also be greater than or equal to the height).

[0020] Figure 4 is a plan view showing the arrangement range of the unprotected structure in the nuclear power plant according to the first embodiment. As shown in Figure 4, the unprotected structure 103 is arranged considering the route 303 (see Figure 3) of flying objects 107 toward the protected building 102. The arrangement range is within ±90 degrees in the horizontal plane, starting from the blowout panel 104 and based on the normal 401 that extends outward from the protected building 102. This is the range 403 on the normal 401 side of the extension line 402 of the blowout panel 104.

[0021] Furthermore, the unprotected structure 103 is positioned either partially or entirely within this range 403. Partial placement means, for example, the position indicated by the dashed rectangle S1 in Figure 4. All placement means the position indicated by the dashed rectangle S2 in Figure 4. Although the flight route 303 (see Figure 3) of the flying object 107 is not uniquely determined, the unprotected structure 103 is positioned considering the route on which the flying object 107 is relatively likely to travel, taking into account the natural terrain and cityscape surrounding the protected building 102. In addition, by reducing the distance between the protected building 102 and the unprotected structure 103, the range on which the flying object 107 can travel to the blowout panel 104 can be narrowed.

[0022] The unprotected structure 103 is the height H calculated by the above-mentioned formulas 1 and 2. 2 Furthermore, it lies within the aforementioned arrangement range (a range of ±90 degrees in the horizontal plane with respect to the normal 401). Therefore, the flying object 107 collides with the unprotected structure 103 before it collides with the blowout panel 104. Since the unprotected structure 103 has sufficient strength, the flying object 107 does not penetrate the unprotected structure 103. Therefore, the flying object 107 is prevented from traveling or its direction of travel is deflected by the unprotected structure 103, and the unprotected structure 103 is protected from the flying object 107. The same applies to other embodiments.

[0023] As an example of a structure with sufficient strength, as shown in Figure 3, the thickness T of the wall 304 of the building 102 to be protected is shown. 1 Since it has enough thickness to withstand the impact of the flying object 107, the thickness T of the outer walls 305, 306 of the unprotected structure 103 located on the flight path 303 of the flying object 107 is sufficient. 2 , T 3 The sum of the thickness T of the wall 304 of the building 102 to be protected. 1 One example is that it is thicker. Also, the thickness T of the wall 304 of the building 102 to be protected. 1 The thickness T of the outer walls 305, 306 of the unprotected structure 103 is within the range when projected onto the horizontal plane of the flight path 303 of the flying object 107. 2 , T 3 The sum of the thickness T of the wall 304 of the building 102 to be protected. 1It can be thicker.

[0024] This is because, unlike the protected building 102, even if an object 107 penetrates a wall (any wall) in the unprotected structure 103, it will not collide with the protected building 102 if its progress is stopped by another wall. Other methods include using reinforced concrete for the entire or localized exterior walls 305 and 306 of the unprotected structure 103, or attaching steel plates to the entire or localized exterior walls 305 and 306 to increase their strength.

[0025] In the first embodiment of the nuclear power plant 101A configured in this way, the unprotected structure 103 is positioned facing the blowout panel 104 of the protected building 102, and at a height H that takes into account the trajectory 303 of the flying object 107. 2 The height H of the blowout panel 104 of the building 102 to be protected. b Alternatively, the height H of the building 102 to be protected. 1 It is calculated based on this. Therefore, if the flying object 107 were to travel towards the building to be protected 102, it would hit the unprotected structure 103 before hitting the building to be protected 102. Since this unprotected structure 103 has sufficient strength, the flying object 107 that hits the unprotected structure 103 will not penetrate the unprotected structure 103, and the building to be protected 102 can be protected without adversely affecting the opening function of the blowout panel 104.

[0026] Furthermore, by arranging the unprotected structure 103 considering the most likely routes for flying debris 107 to travel towards the blowout panel 104 of the protected building 102, costs can be reduced compared to arranging the unprotected structure 103 to surround the protected building 102, and there is an advantage in that the layout plan and the usable land area for the nuclear power plant 101A do not need to be wide. In the first embodiment, the unprotected structure 103 may be a structure that is standard within the nuclear power plant 101A, or a standard structure that has been modified or extended.

[0027] (Second Embodiment) Figure 5 is a perspective view of the nuclear power plant according to the second embodiment, and Figure 6 is a perspective view of an example of an access door provided in the protected building of the nuclear power plant according to the second embodiment. As shown in Figure 5, the nuclear power plant 101B according to the second embodiment is provided with an access door 501 (plate structure) for large equipment and vehicles to enter and exit, with the outer wall 105 of the protected building 102 being an openable plate structure. In addition, a road 502 for vehicles and the like is laid between the protected building 102 and the unprotected structure 103.

[0028] As shown in Figure 6, the entrance door 501 consists of a protective door 601 to prevent the entry of tsunamis and the like, and an airtight door 603 at the end of the passage 602 inside it. The protective door 601 is attached to the building to be protected 102 via a hinge 604.

[0029] In nuclear power plant 101B, in order to protect the entrance door 501 from impact by flying objects 107, the height H from the ground surface 106 of the unprotected structure 103 is set. 2 The height H from the ground surface 106 of the building 102 to be protected by the loading door 501 is d It is calculated based on the following.

[0030] Furthermore, at the nuclear power plant 101B, a road 502 is laid between the protected building 102 and the unprotected structure 103 for transporting equipment to the access door 501 and for moving vehicles. Therefore, the protected building 102 and the unprotected structure 103 are separated by at least the width of the road (3m or more). In other words, the distance L between the access door 501 and the unprotected structure 103 at the same elevation (same height) as the access door 501 is 3m or more. By ensuring space for the road 502 that accesses the access door 501 in this way, the transport of equipment and the loading and unloading of vehicles are not hindered.

[0031] In the nuclear power plant 101B of the second embodiment, the non-protected structure 103 is positioned opposite the entrance door 501 of the protected building 102, and at a height H that takes into account the trajectory 303 of the flying object 107. 2 The height H of the entrance door 501 of the building 102 to be protected. d Alternatively, the height H of the building 102 to be protected. 1It is calculated based on this. Therefore, if the flying object 107 were to travel towards the building to be protected 102, it would hit the unprotected structure 103 before hitting the building to be protected 102. Since this unprotected structure 103 has sufficient strength, the flying object 107 that hits the unprotected structure 103 will not penetrate the unprotected structure 103, and the building to be protected 102 can be protected without adversely affecting the opening function of the blowout panel 104.

[0032] To protect the loading door 501 from impact by flying objects 107, the height H of the unprotected structure 103 from the ground surface 106 2 The height H from the ground surface 106 of the loading door 501 is d Alternatively, the height H from the ground surface 106 of the building 102 to be protected. 1 It is calculated based on the height H of the unprotected structure 103 from the ground surface 106. 2 As an example, the height H from the ground surface 106 of the blowout panel 104 in Equation 1, as described in the first embodiment. b The height H from the ground surface 106 of the loading door 501 d It can be calculated by substituting the following: Alternatively, the height H of the unprotected structure 103 from the ground surface 106 can be calculated by applying formula 2 described in the first embodiment. 2 You may calculate this.

[0033] (Third Embodiment) Figure 7 is a perspective view of the nuclear power plant according to the third embodiment. As shown in Figure 7, the nuclear power plant 101C of the third embodiment is provided with a recess 701 in the unprotected structure 103 so that a road 502 necessary for bringing in equipment and vehicles can access the entrance door 501. This recess 701 is configured to surround the road 502 that extends from the side wall of the unprotected structure 103 toward the entrance door 501 of the protected building 102. In other words, the road 502 is configured to pass inside the unprotected structure 103, rather than between the protected building 102 and the unprotected structure 103, as in the second embodiment. Note that the shape of the recess 701 is an example and can be changed as appropriate.

[0034] In the nuclear power plant 101C of the third embodiment, the unprotected structure 103 is positioned opposite the entrance door 501 of the protected building 102, and in a location that takes into account the trajectory 303 of the flying object 107. Furthermore, the height H of the unprotected structure 103 is also included. 2 The height H of the entrance door 501 of the building 102 to be protected. d The height H of the building 102 to be protected 1 It is calculated based on this. Therefore, a flying object 107 that collides with the unprotected structure 103 will not penetrate the unprotected structure 103, and the building to be protected can be protected without adversely affecting the opening function of the entrance door 501 of the protected building 102.

[0035] Furthermore, space is secured for the road 502 accessing the loading door 501, so as not to obstruct the transport of equipment or the loading and unloading of vehicles. In addition, the distance between the loading door 501 and the unprotected structure 103 can be reduced, allowing for protection of a wider area of ​​the protected building 102.

[0036] (Fourth Embodiment) Figure 8 is a perspective view of the nuclear power plant according to the fourth embodiment, and Figure 9 is a plan view of the nuclear power plant according to the fourth embodiment. As shown in Figure 8, the nuclear power plant 101D of the fourth embodiment is equipped with a rod-shaped structure 801 as an unprotected structure. In the fourth embodiment, there is natural terrain such as mountains 802 around the building 102 to be protected, and the route 303 of flying objects 107 can be limited to some extent.

[0037] As shown in Figure 9, the unprotected structures 103 are positioned around the blowout panel 104 of the protected building 102, taking into account the route range 901 where the flying object 107 is likely to travel. One of the unprotected structures 103 is a building, and the other is a rod-shaped structure 801, both positioned at a distance sufficiently smaller than the length of the flying object 107. The reason for the sufficiently small distance is that the assumed objects differ depending on geographical reasons and the country in which the building is located.

[0038] If an incoming object 107 collides with the rod-shaped structure 801, the object 107 will be destroyed and broken down into smaller pieces. The speed of the broken-down object 107 will be greatly reduced due to the energy loss during the collision, and it will either not reach the protected building 102, or if it does, its speed will be sufficiently slowed so that there will be no adverse effects from the collision.

[0039] In the nuclear power plant 101D of the fourth embodiment, the unprotected structures 103 are positioned opposite the blowout panel 104 of the protected building 102, in each of the route ranges 901 where there is a relatively high probability that flying debris 107 will travel toward the protected building 102. This makes it possible to protect the blowout panel 104, which is the unprotected structure 103, without adversely affecting the opening function of the blowout panel 104 of the protected building 102.

[0040] (Fifth Embodiment) Figure 10 is a side view of the nuclear power plant of the fifth embodiment. As shown in Figure 10, the nuclear power plant 101E of the fifth embodiment is equipped with a tank 1001 (hollow structure) containing a liquid 1002 such as water as an unprotected structure 103. When a flying object 107 collides with the tank 1001 and penetrates the outer wall on one side (the side into which the flying object 107 collides), the flying object 107 moves through the liquid 1002. The speed at which the flying object 107 moves is much faster than the speed at which the liquid 1002 flows out through the hole created by penetrating the outer wall of the tank 1001, so a fluid drag force corresponding to its speed acts on the flying object 107, which can reduce its speed.

[0041] In the fifth embodiment of the nuclear power plant 101E, the tank 1001, which is an unprotected structure 103, is positioned facing the blowout panel 104 of the protected building 102, and at a location that takes into account the trajectory 303 of the flying object 107. Height H of the tank 1001 2 The height H of the blowout panel 104 of the building 102 to be protected. b The height H of the building 102 to be protected 1It is calculated based on the above. Furthermore, if an object 107 were to penetrate the outer wall on one side of the tank 1001, it would pass through the liquid 1002, and fluid resistance would act upon it, reducing its speed. As a result, an object 107 that collides with the tank 1001 would not completely penetrate the tank 1001, and the blowout panel 104 of the building to be protected could be protected without adversely affecting its opening function.

[0042] (Sixth Embodiment) Figure 11 is a side view of the nuclear power plant according to the sixth embodiment. As shown in Figure 11, the nuclear power plant 101F of the sixth embodiment is equipped with an artificially constructed hill 1101 as an unprotected structure 103. This hill 1101 can be constructed at a low cost by utilizing soil and other materials excavated when the protected building 102 is buried.

[0043] In the nuclear power plant 101F of the sixth embodiment, a hill 1101, which is an unprotected structure 103, is positioned opposite the blowout panel 104 of the protected building 102, and in a location that takes into account the trajectory 303 of the flying object 107. Height H of the hill 1101 2 The height H of the blowout panel 104 of the building 102 to be protected. b The height H of the building 102 to be protected 1 This is calculated based on the above. As a result, the flying object 107 that collides with the hill 1101 will not penetrate the unprotected structure 103, and the blowout panel 104 of the protected building 102 can be protected without adversely affecting the opening function of the blowout panel 104.

[0044] (Seventh Embodiment) Figure 12 is a side view of the nuclear power plant according to the seventh embodiment. As shown in Figure 12, the nuclear power plant 101G of the seventh embodiment includes a building 1201 (an existing building) as an unprotected structure 103. This building 1201 is at the height H of the blowout panel 104 of the protected building 102. b The height H of the building 102 to be protected 1To achieve a height that takes this into consideration, a protective wall 1202 has been added on top of the existing building 1201. However, when heavy objects are added to the top of building 1201 in this way, the center of gravity rises, raising concerns that the moment acting on the outer walls of building 1201 during an earthquake will increase. For this reason, to reduce the moment, a seismic isolation layer 1205 consisting of springs 1203 such as laminated rubber and dampers 1204 is provided between the protective wall 1202 and building 1201.

[0045] In the nuclear power plant 101G of the seventh embodiment, building 1201 is positioned opposite the blowout panel 104 of the building to be protected 102, and at a location that takes into account the trajectory 303 of the flying object 107, with a protective wall 1202 added as an unprotected structure 103. The height H of building 1201 including the protective wall 1202 2 The height H of the blowout panel 104 of the building 102 to be protected. b The height H of the building 102 to be protected 1 This is calculated based on the following. As a result, when an object 107 collides with the building 1201 to which the protective wall 1202 has been added, it will not penetrate the protective wall 1202 or the building 1201, and the blowout panel 104 of the building 102 to be protected can be protected without adversely affecting the opening function of the blowout panel 104.

[0046] Furthermore, in the seventh embodiment, a seismic isolation layer 1205 consisting of a spring 1203 and a damper 1204 is provided between the protective wall 1202 and the building 1201, thereby suppressing the deterioration of the seismic resistance of the building 1201 due to the addition of the protective wall 1202.

[0047] It should be noted that the present invention is not limited to the embodiments described above, and various modifications are included. Furthermore, it is possible to replace parts of the configuration of one embodiment with the configuration of another embodiment, and it is also possible to add configurations from other embodiments to the configuration of one embodiment. In addition, it is possible to add, delete, or replace parts of the configuration of each embodiment with other configurations.

[0048] 101A, 101B, 101C, 101D, 101E, 101F, 101G Nuclear plant 102 Protected building 103 Unprotected structure 104 Blowout panel (plate structure) 105 Outer wall 106 Ground surface 107 Flying object 303 Route of advance 304 Wall 305, 306 Outer wall 501 Entrance door (plate structure) 502 Road 801 Rod-shaped structure (unprotected structure) 802 Mountain 901 Relatively high probability route area 1001 Tank (hollow structure) 1101 Hill 1201 Building 1202 Protective wall 1205 Seismic isolation layer D Distance from protected building to unprotected structure D b Distance H from blowout panel to unprotected structure 1 Height H of the building to be protected from the ground surface 2 Height H of structures not subject to protection from the ground surface b Height of blowout panel from ground surface H d Height of the transport door from the ground surface W 1 Width of the building to be protected W 2 Width of the unprotected structure θ The angle between the trajectory of an incoming object, which is assumed to be the trajectory of an incoming object that may collide with the protected building, and the ground surface.

Claims

1. A nuclear power plant having a building to be protected, comprising: a plate-like structure that can be opened to the outer wall of the building to be protected; and an unprotected structure arranged in a direction opposite to the plate-like structure, wherein the height H of the unprotected structure from the ground surface. 2 The height H of the plate-like structure from the ground surface is b , H d A nuclear power plant characterized by being at or above the height calculated based on [the relevant criteria].

2. A nuclear power plant according to claim 1, wherein the height H of the structure not subject to protection from the ground surface 2 This involves the angle θ between the trajectory of an object, which is determined considering the trajectory of an object that is expected to collide with the building to be protected, and the ground surface, and the height H from the ground surface of the plate-like structure. b , H d The distance D from the plate-like structure to the structure not to be protected. b And the width W of the structure not to be protected 2 A nuclear power plant characterized by being above a predetermined height calculated from the above.

3. The nuclear power plant according to claim 1, wherein the height H of the structure outside the protection target from the ground surface 2 is equal to or greater than the height calculated based on the height H of the building to be protected from the ground surface 1 of the nuclear power plant.

4. The nuclear power plant according to claim 3, wherein the height H of the structure not subject to protection from the ground surface 2 This involves the angle θ between the trajectory of an object, which is determined considering the trajectory of an object that is expected to collide with the building to be protected, and the ground surface, and the height H from the ground surface of the building to be protected. 1 The distance D from the protected building to the unprotected structure, and the width W of the protected building. 1 And the width W of the structure not to be protected 2 A nuclear power plant characterized by being above a predetermined height calculated from the above.

5. A nuclear power plant according to claim 1 or claim 3, characterized in that the unprotected structure is arranged in a direction facing the blowout panel, which is a plate-shaped structure that releases pressure to the outside, in order to prevent damage to the protected building and the equipment inside the protected building when the pressure inside the protected building rises and when the hydrogen concentration inside the protected building rises.

6. A nuclear power plant according to claim 1 or claim 3, characterized in that the unprotected structure is arranged in a direction facing the loading door, which is a plate-like structure for loading and unloading equipment and vehicles into and out of the protected building.

7. A nuclear power plant according to claim 1 or claim 3, characterized in that part or all of the unprotected structure is located within an angle of ±90 degrees in the horizontal plane with respect to a normal line that extends outward from the plate-like structure as the starting point to the outside of the protected building.

8. A nuclear power plant according to claim 2 or claim 4, wherein the unprotected structure is a hollow structure with an outer wall that surrounds the internal space of a building or tank, and the thickness T of the outer wall of the hollow structure is within the range when projected onto the path of the flying object or onto the horizontal plane of the path of the flying object. 2 , T 3 The sum of the thickness T of the walls of the building to be protected is 1 A nuclear power plant characterized by being thicker than [a certain type of plant].

9. A nuclear power plant according to claim 6, characterized in that the distance between the entrance door and the unprotected structure at the same elevation as the entrance door is 3 meters or more in order to secure the road width necessary for bringing in equipment and vehicles.

10. A nuclear power plant according to claim 6, characterized in that the unprotected structure is provided with a recess so that a road necessary for the transport of equipment and vehicles can access the transport door.

11. A nuclear power plant according to claim 1, characterized by comprising: a protective wall provided on an existing building; and a seismic isolation layer formed by springs and dampers between the existing building and the protective wall.