Operational control system for rail traffic with an operating enablement functionality

Abstract

The present invention discloses an operational control system (2) for rail-bound traffic, comprising: a) at least one control system cell (2a) which is provided for a train steering within a predeterminable region of a rail network, wherein the control system cell (2a) comprises the following components: b) a computer infrastructure for executing a cell software, wherein the cell software comprises projected train safety rules for the train steering; c) an operating workstation (AP) for a train traffic controller, wherein the cell software provides an automatic handling of the train traffic according to the timetable within the region with a corresponding output of driving route requirements to a control centre and a display of a detail view and overview (8) about the state of the track elements arranged in the region and the trains travelling in the region on the operator workstation (AP), and wherein the cell software provides a series of manual operations for train steering for the train traffic controller, which the train traffic controller is permitted to carry out within the scope of existing train safety rules available in the cell software according to a special operating situation, such as for example a deviation from the timetable on the basis of delays and / or malfunctions on track elements, and d) a function block (6) for operating enablement with the aim of switching off an automatic signal operation for the control system cell wherein, within the scope of this functionality provided by the functional block (6), a number of operational situations have been defined, upon the occurrence of which a previously defined safety measure is automatically initiated, such as steering commands of the train steering are prevented, and upon the disappearance of which the safety measure is automatically switched off again, e.g. steering commands of the train steering are enabled.

Description

[0001] Dispositive control system for rail traffic with an operator release functionality

[0002] The present invention relates to a dispositive guidance system for rail traffic.

[0003] In rail transport, trains travel the railway network along routes requested by a control system at the level of operational train control (also called train routing). This request can be triggered automatically when trains are operating according to schedule, thus following a sequence of previously planned routes. In case of deviations from the timetable or other interventions, the routes are requested manually by the train dispatcher. Each requested route is set by a control unit, such as a signal box, centrally or decentrally, only when the route elements, such as points, signals, block occupancy detection, and moving blocks in ETCS, are available for that route and can be set accordingly and locked against other use by competing routes. After the route has been traversed, the route is then...Once the roadway elements located within it are closed, this closure will be lifted and the roadway elements will be available again for setting new routes.

[0004] Thus, signal boxes or virtual control instances are currently operated either manually by a train dispatcher at an operator workstation of a dispatching control system, such as Iltis Netz of Siemens Mobility AG, Wallisellen, Switzerland, or, if available (as in the case of Iltis Netz), by the automation of the dispatching control system.

[0005] Many railway companies operate so-called train management systems (Traffic Management Systems, TMS) that further automate operational processes in productive rail traffic and are designed to operate the control system like a virtual train dispatcher. Emergency operations are generally excluded and continue to be carried out manually by the train dispatcher at a workstation.

[0006] As mentioned above, there are still numerous applications today where certain operations of the interlocking system must be carried out manually by the train dispatcher at a workstation of the operational control system. This procedure often carries a certain potential for errors, because, for example, route settings in the shunting and depot areas must be requested by telephone from the shunting and depot personnel to the train dispatcher, and the transmissions can sometimes be inadequate due to ambient noise or other sources of interference, and thus misinterpreted by the train dispatcher.

[0007] Regarding the possibilities and / or obligations of manual intervention by the train dispatcher, the Swiss implementing regulations for train operating procedures (AB FDV) stipulate, for example, that the train dispatcher must deactivate the automatic interlocking system (ASB, AB, etc.) if there is an occupied track section between the train's front and a starting signal for the train route, or if a shunting route is set in the track section between the train's front and the starting signal for the train route. In the current shunting procedure, the train dispatcher ensures, by deactivating the automatic signaling system (ASB) in the operational control system, that train control (ZL) directives are not possible in the aforementioned situation.

[0008] Therefore, in the aforementioned operational situation, the train dispatcher must manually deactivate the automatic signaling system (using controls on the operational control system, for example, at the dispatcher's workstation within an ILTIS® environment). Initiating this safety measure (deactivating automatic signaling) is currently left to the operator (usually the train dispatcher) without any system support. If this manual safety measure is not initiated, or is initiated too late, it can jeopardize railway safety.

[0009] The present invention is therefore based on the objective of providing a control system for rail traffic with which it is possible to make certain operations and / or operating sequences of the control system safer and thereby relieve the train dispatcher at the operating workstation of the control system.

[0010] This problem is solved according to the invention by a dispositive control system for rail traffic, which comprises the following components:

[0011] a) at least one control system cell intended for train control within a predetermined area of ​​a rail network, wherein the control system cell comprises the following components:

[0012] b) a computer infrastructure for executing cell software, wherein the cell software includes projected train control rules for train steering;

[0013] c) an operator workstation for a train dispatcher, wherein the cell software provides timetable-compliant automatic handling of train traffic within the area with corresponding output of route requests to an interlocking system and a display of an overview image of the status of the track elements arranged in the area and the trains traversing the area at the operator workstation, and wherein the cell software provides a series of manual operations for train control for the train dispatcher, which he may execute within the framework of the train protection rules available in the cell software according to a separate operating situation, such as deviation from the timetable due to delays and / or malfunctions of track elements, wherein:

[0014] A function block for enabling operation is provided with the aim of deactivating automatic signal operation for the control system cell, whereby within the scope of this functionality provided by the function block a number of operational situations have been defined, when a previously defined safety measure is automatically initiated, such as . preventing train control commands, and when the situation disappears the safety measure is automatically deactivated again, e.g. enabling train control commands.

[0015] In this way, the present invention ensures that, for example, in the automated shunting setup process, the safety measure is no longer achieved by manually switching off the automatic signal operation. The present invention thus enables continuous automation for a number of predefined / configurable operating processes because the operator release functionality now ensures that, in the predefined situations, the train control system's steering outputs (the route requests) are prevented and subsequently re-enabled as soon as the situation in question no longer exists. This operator release functionality is therefore an important component for ensuring compliance with applicable train operating regulations, even in the automated shunting setup process.

[0016] In a suitable embodiment of the present invention, the dispositive control system can be designed such that the functional block can be configured to receive location and path occupancy data from a motion tracking system and thus detect the operational situation in the predetermined area of ​​the rail network.

[0017] Accordingly, as part of a meaningful further development of this approach, it may be provided that the functional block is configured to decide, based on a comparison of the current operational situation with correspondingly predefined operational situations, whether the operation in the form of one or more steering commands issued by the control system for the train steering is prevented or enabled.

[0018] To assist the train dispatcher, for whom an intuitive understanding of the current operational situation is of great help, it may be provided that the fact that a steering output has been prevented is revealed in the magnifying glass and overview image 8 displayed at the operator workstation (AP) at the relevant signal, if a steering output has been prevented by the function block ( 6 .

[0019] In a safety-relevant further development of the present invention, it may be provided that the functional block is only activated if the tracking of train movements and the manager of train identifiers have been classified as fully functional.

[0020] To implement an operational situation that is easily recognizable for the train dispatcher, it may be provided that a two-stage operation for switching from the automatic process to the manual process is implemented in the cell software, whereby a first operation at the control system-side operator workstation (AP) deactivates the shunting control and starts an intermediate phase, whereby in this intermediate phase steering outputs of the train control continue to be prevented or enabled by the function block ( 6), and whereby a second operation ends the intermediate phase and thus completes the deactivation of the shunting control.Accordingly, the first operation in the magnified view can mark all main signals where the steering output would currently be prevented, while the second operation in the magnified view removes the disclosure of the intermediate state and the marking of the main signals, and subsequently releases the steering outputs again without restriction.

[0021] Within the framework of safety-related track and trace considerations, it may be stipulated that the second operation to end the intermediate phase is designed as an operation requiring confirmation. This provides the train dispatcher with an additional level of security through the confirmation requirement and also ensures traceability of when and by whom a second operation was triggered.

[0022] Further advantageous embodiments of the present invention can be found in the remaining dependent claims.

[0023] Advantageous embodiments of the present invention are explained in more detail with reference to the drawing. The figure shows a schematic view of a solution concept for operating a control system 2 and, optionally, a signal box 4 with a control system-side function block 6 for controlling the operating authorization during train control within the framework of the control system 2.

[0024] In a manner not shown here, the signal box 4 with the control units for track elements, such as points, signals, block occupancy detection, axle counting systems, is located in a section of a railway network for which the operational control system 2 controls / steers the train movements carried out in this section. Thus, in the embodiment presented here, the operational control system 2 for rail-bound traffic comprises at least one control system cell 2a, which is provided for train steering within a predetermined area of ​​a railway network, wherein the control system cell 2a comprises the following components:

[0025] a) a computer infrastructure for executing cell software, wherein the cell software includes projected train control rules for train steering;

[0026] b) an operator workstation AP for a train dispatcher, wherein the cell software provides a timetable-compliant automatic handling of train traffic within the area with a corresponding output of route requests to the signal box 4 and a display of a magnified and overview image 8 of the status of the track elements arranged in the area and the trains passing through the area at the operator workstation AP, and wherein the cell software provides a series of manual operations for train control for the train dispatcher, which he is authorized to perform within the framework of the train protection rules available in the cell software according to a separate operating situation, such as a deviation from the timetable due to delays and / or malfunctions of track elements.

[0027] The functionality specifically discussed here, and provided by Function Block 6, concerns the train control commands issued by Control System 2. These commands are no longer issued directly, but are first fed to Function Block 6 – hereinafter also referred to as the Operation Release Controller. The Operation Release Controller uses the location and path occupancy data from the motion tracking implemented by Control System 2 to detect the operational situation in the track area. Based on this, the Operation Release Controller decides, by comparing the current operational situation with predefined operational situations, whether to prevent or enable the operation of one or more train control commands issued by the Control System.

[0028] As shown in the figure, the message flow within the scope of the present invention proceeds essentially as described below. Elements subsequently mentioned in italics and bold in the text refer to the corresponding functionalities in the figure.

[0029] The train control system, implemented within the operational control system, wishes to steer based on the current operational situation (e.g., regular scheduled operation) and therefore sends a steering command to the automatic control unit. This unit then sends the resulting control signal to the control release controller. If shunting control is activated, the control release controller evaluates whether one of the predefined operating situations exists in which the control signal must be prevented. If such an operational situation exists, the control release controller sends a negative acknowledgment back to the automatic control unit. This acknowledges to the train control system that the steering command was not issued. The status that a steering signal was prevented is revealed by the automatic control system's process image via the process image and safe display and operation in the magnified and overview view at the relevant signal.

[0030] If the operational situation no longer warrants preventing steering commands, the control release controller sends a trigger message to the automatic control processing unit. This unit, in turn, sends a trigger message to the train control system. The train control system then evaluates whether steering commands should be issued based on the operational situation. If so, the train control system sends the relevant steering command to the automatic control processing unit. The resulting control command is then sent back to the control release controller. Since the operational situation that would normally prevent steering commands is no longer present, the control release controller acknowledges the control command positively to the automatic control processing unit. The automatic control processing unit then issues the control commands to the interlocking system via the interlocking connection. A corresponding update is also performed in the zoomed-in and overview displays.

[0031] When the train dispatcher deactivates the shunting control in the zoomed-in view at their workstation, an operation (RALE off) is sent to the control processing unit via the Safe Display and Operation module. There, the shunting control is deactivated and an intermediate phase is initiated. The state of the intermediate phase is revealed in the zoomed-in view via the Safe Display and Operation module. During the intermediate phase, the train control outputs are still prevented or enabled by the control release controller. Additionally, all main signals for which the control output would currently be prevented are highlighted in the zoomed-in view. After the train dispatcher has deactivated automatic signal operation at all highlighted main signals, they end the intermediate phase with an operation requiring confirmation. Upon execution of the operation in the control processing unit, the display of the intermediate state and the highlighting of the main signals are removed from the zoomed-in view.Subsequently, all steering outputs of the train steering system are immediately released by the operator release controller.

[0032] Functioning of the operator release controller in normal operation

[0033] An operator processing unit for the automatic system (operator processing unit "Automatic") implemented in the control system 2 sends every operation resulting from a steering command of the train control system to the operator release controller 6. If shunting control is activated, the operator release controller 6 evaluates whether one of the predefined operating situations within this shunting control system is present or not. An example of a predefined situation is when there is an occupied track section between the train's front and a starting signal for the train route, or when a shunting route is set in the track section between the train's front and the starting signal for the train route.

[0034] If such an operational situation exists, the operation is acknowledged negatively by the operator release controller 6 due to its corresponding implementation, thus preventing the steering output. The fact that a steering output has been prevented can be revealed in the magnified and overview image 8 displayed at the operator workstation AP for the relevant signal. If the aforementioned operational situation does not exist or if the shunting control is switched off (RALE off), the operation is enabled and subsequently commands are issued to the signal box 4.

[0035] As soon as the aforementioned operational situation no longer exists (steering commands should no longer be prevented), the operating release controller 6 notifies the train control system via the "Automatic" operating process so that the train control system can reissue any previously unreleased steering commands. The operational situation displayed in the magnified and overview image 8 is also adjusted accordingly.

[0036] Functioning of the operator release controller when switching to manual operation

[0037] When switching from the automatic process (shunting control activated) to the manual process (shunting control deactivated), it must be ensured that the safety measures comply with railway safety regulations at all times. This requires a structured procedure so that the train dispatcher can take over the manual process. This is achieved through a two-stage operation.

[0038] With the first operation, the shunting steering is deactivated at the control system-side operator workstation AP, and an intermediate phase is started. In this intermediate phase, the steering outputs of the train steering continue to be prevented or enabled by the operator release controller 6.

[0039] Additionally, in magnified view 8, all main signals where steering output would currently be prevented are marked. This marking in magnified view 8 assists the operator in identifying where manual safety measures (deactivating automatic signal operation) are required. The markings for the main signals remain visible even after the operator has initiated this safety measure.

[0040] A second operation ends the intermediate phase and thus completes the deactivation of the shunting control system. Upon execution of this operation, the display of the intermediate state and the marking of the main signals are removed in magnified view 8, and the control outputs are subsequently fully reactivated. The operation to end the intermediate phase can be implemented as an operation requiring confirmation (e.g., a query to verify that all necessary ASB [automatic shunting control] systems have been deactivated).

[0041] Functioning of the 'Operator Release Controller' in case of a malfunction

[0042] The operating release controller 6 can only function correctly if the train movement tracking and the train identifier manager (which may be connected to the control system via an interface) are operational. Therefore, the functionality of the movement tracking and the train identifier manager is included in the assessment of the operating release controller's functionality. This means that if the movement tracking or the train identifier manager is not (or no longer) operational, the functionality of the operating release controller is also considered to be not (or no longer) operational. In such a case, all control outputs of the train control system within the spatial and / or temporal area of ​​responsibility of the operating release controller are prevented, and all new shunting requests are rejected.

[0043] Additionally, this situation is displayed to the operator. If the malfunction persists for an extended period, the operator can choose to deactivate the shunting steering and thus switch to manual operation.

[0044] The particular advantage of the operator release controller 6 lies, among other things, in the fact that the safety measures required by regulations are initiated during the automatic shunting setup process, eliminating the need for operator interaction. The exemplary two-stage procedure described above also ensures that safety in accordance with railway safety regulations is guaranteed at all times, even during the transition from the automatic to the manual process. To enable the shunting setup process to be fully automated, the required safety measures have also been reliably and securely implemented in an automated manner.

Claims

Patent claims 1. Dispositive guidance system (2 ) for rail-bound traffic, comprehensive: a) at least one control system cell (2a) which is intended for train control within a predetermined area of ​​a railway network, wherein the control system cell (2a) comprises the following components: b) a computer infrastructure for executing cell software, wherein the cell software includes projected train control rules for train steering; c) an operator workstation for a train dispatcher, wherein the cell software provides timetable-compliant automatic handling of train traffic within the area with corresponding output of route requests to an interlocking system and a display of a magnified and overview image ( 8 ) of the status of the track elements arranged in the area and the trains traversing the area at the operator workstation (AP), and wherein the cell software provides a series of manual operations for train control for the train dispatcher, which he may execute within the framework of the train protection rules available in the cell software according to a separate operating situation, such as deviation from the timetable due to delays and / or malfunctions of track elements, characterized in that A functional block (6) for enabling operation is provided with the aim of disabling automatic signal operation for the control system cell, wherein, within the scope of this functionality provided by the functional block (6), a number of operational situations have been defined, upon the occurrence of which a previously defined safety measure is automatically initiated, such as preventing train control commands, and upon the disappearance of which the safety measure is automatically deactivated again, such as releasing train control commands.

2. Dispositive control system according to claim 1, characterized by the fact that the function block ( 6) is configured to receive location and path occupancy data from a motion tracking system and thus to detect the operational situation in the predetermined area of ​​the rail network.

3. Dispositive guidance system according to claim 1 or 2, characterized by the fact that the function block ( 6) is configured to decide, by comparing the current operational situation with a corresponding predefined operational situation, whether the operation in the form of one or more steering commands issued by the control system for the train steering is prevented or enabled.

4. Dispositive guidance system according to one of the preceding claims, characterized in that The fact that a steering output has been prevented can be revealed in the magnifying glass and overview image 8 displayed at the operator workstation (AP) at the relevant signal if a steering output has been prevented by the function block ( 6 .

5. Dispositive guidance system according to one of the preceding claims, characterized in that The function block ( 6) is only activated if the tracking of train movements and the train identifier manager have been classified as fully functional.

6. Dispositive guidance system according to one of the preceding claims, characterized in that The cell software implements a two-stage operation, whereby a first operation at the control system-side operator workstation (AP) switches off the shunting steering and starts an intermediate phase, whereby in this intermediate phase steering outputs of the train steering are still prevented or enabled by the function block ( 6), and whereby a second operation ends the intermediate phase and thus completes the switching off of the shunting steering.

7. Dispositive guidance system according to claim 6, characterized in that With the first operation in the magnified view ( 8 ) all main signals are marked where the steering output would currently be prevented and with the second operation in the magnified view ( 8 ) the disclosure of the intermediate state and the marking of the main signals are removed and the steering outputs are subsequently released again without restriction.

8. Dispositive guidance system according to claim 6 or 7, characterized in that The second operation, used to end the intermediate phase, is designed as an operation requiring a receipt.

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