Hardware security apparatus, in-vehicle device, certificate service device and verification device

By establishing a secure encrypted link between the vehicle and the verification device, using post-quantum key pairs for signature verification, and combining the consortium blockchain and root certificate management of the certificate service device, the security problem of the vehicle identification system in a quantum computing environment is solved, achieving both security and convenience in vehicle identity verification.

WO2026238169A1PCT designated stage Publication Date: 2026-11-19ANHUI KAIYANG TECHNOLOGY CO LTD +1
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Patent Information

Application Number
PCT/CN2026/112606
Authority / Receiving Office
WO · WO
Patent Type
Applications
Current Assignee / Owner
Priority Date
2026-01-16
Filing Date
2026-07-22
Publication Date
2026-11-19

AI Technical Summary

Technical Problem

Existing vehicle identification systems are not secure enough in the face of quantum computing threats, making vehicle identities easy to forge and communication data easy to intercept.

Method used

A secure encrypted link is used between the hardware security device and the verification device, and post-quantum key pairs are used for signing and verification. Combined with the consortium blockchain of the certificate service device and root certificate management, the security of vehicle authentication is ensured.

Benefits of technology

It achieves security and convenience for vehicle authentication in a quantum computing environment, ensures data transmission security, simplifies cross-regional passage procedures, and reduces management costs.

✦ Generated by Eureka AI based on patent content.

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Abstract

Provided in the embodiments of the present disclosure are a hardware security apparatus, an in-vehicle device, a certificate service device and a verification device. The hardware security apparatus comprises: a first communication component, which is configured to establish a secure encrypted link between the hardware security apparatus and a verification device, and to receive, by means of the secure encrypted link, a challenge request sent by the verification device; and a signature component, which is connected to the first communication component, and is configured to sign the challenge request on the basis of a private key in a pre-generated post-quantum key pair, so as to generate a digital signature, wherein the first communication component is further configured to send, to the verification device by means of the secure encrypted link, the digital signature, a digital certificate signed and issued for a vehicle by a certificate service device, and a target declaration file corresponding to the verification device.
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Description

Hardware security devices, in-vehicle equipment, certificate service equipment and verification equipment Technical Field

[0001] This disclosure relates to the fields of automotive electronic information technology, network security technology, and intelligent traffic management. Specifically, it relates to a hardware security device, an in-vehicle device, a certificate service device, and a verification device. Background Technology

[0002] In the fields of vehicle identification, vehicle-to-everything (V2X) security, and cross-regional traffic management, ensuring accurate vehicle identification and establishing secure communication links is crucial. However, existing vehicle identification systems often rely on traditional Public Key Infrastructure (PKI) and use encryption algorithms such as RSA (Rivest-Shamir-Adleman) or Elliptic Curve Cryptography (ECC). These algorithms provide sufficient security in traditional computing environments. However, with the rapid development of quantum computing technology, the security of these algorithms will be seriously threatened. Quantum computers can quickly crack traditional encryption methods, making vehicle identities easily forged and communication data vulnerable to interception and decryption.

[0003] There is currently no good solution to the above problems. Summary of the Invention

[0004] This disclosure provides a hardware security device, an in-vehicle device, a certificate service device, and a verification device to at least address the technical problem of low security in vehicle identity verification.

[0005] According to one aspect of the present disclosure, a hardware security device is provided, deployed on a vehicle, comprising: a first communication component configured to establish a secure encrypted link between the hardware security device and a verification device, and to receive a challenge request sent by the verification device through the secure encrypted link, wherein the verification device is located in a target area, and the challenge request is sent by the verification device when the vehicle enters the target area; a signature component connected to the first communication component, configured to sign the challenge request based on a private key in a pre-generated post-quantum key pair to generate a digital signature; the first communication component is further configured to send the digital signature, a digital certificate issued by a certificate service device for the vehicle, and a target declaration file corresponding to the verification device to the verification device through the secure encrypted link, wherein the vehicle leaves the target area after the verification device has verified the vehicle based on the digital signature, the digital certificate, and the target declaration file.

[0006] Furthermore, the first key generation component is configured to generate a root key based on the physical characteristics of the hardware security component; the second key generation component is configured to generate a quantum key pair; and the storage component is encrypted and protected by the root key and configured to store digital certificates, declaration files corresponding to multiple testing institutions, and private keys, wherein the declaration files corresponding to multiple testing institutions contain target declaration files.

[0007] Furthermore, the second key generation component includes: a random number generator configured to generate a first random number; and a processor configured to generate the post-quantum key pair based on the random number.

[0008] According to another aspect of the present disclosure, an in-vehicle device is also provided, deployed on a vehicle, including: the hardware security device described in the above embodiments.

[0009] According to another aspect of the embodiments of this disclosure, a certificate service device is also provided, comprising: a consortium blockchain containing multiple registration authorities located in different regions, wherein a target registration authority among the multiple registration authorities is configured to issue digital certificates to vehicles, wherein the target registration authority is located in the registration area corresponding to the vehicle; a contract component deployed on the consortium blockchain and configured to synchronize digital certificates to other registration authorities among the multiple registration authorities; and a root certificate management component configured to generate and manage root certificates based on the security protocols corresponding to the multiple registration authorities, wherein the root certificates are used to verify the digital certificates sent by the vehicle.

[0010] According to another aspect of the embodiments of this disclosure, a vehicle verification system is also provided, deployed in a target area, comprising: a second communication component configured to establish a secure encrypted link between a verification device and a hardware security device deployed on a vehicle; when the vehicle enters the target area, sending a challenge request to the hardware security device through the secure encrypted link, and receiving a digital signature sent by the hardware security device, a digital certificate issued by a certificate service device for the vehicle, and a target declaration file corresponding to the verification device; a verification component, having a built-in root certificate synchronized with the certificate service device, configured to verify the digital signature and the digital certificate to obtain a sub-verification result, wherein the digital certificate is verified using the root certificate synchronized with the certificate service device; and a decision component configured to obtain a vehicle verification result based on the sub-verification result and the target declaration file, wherein if the verification result indicates that the vehicle verification is successful, the vehicle leaves the target area, and the digital certificate is verified using the root certificate synchronized with the certificate service device.

[0011] According to another aspect of the embodiments of this disclosure, a vehicle verification system is also provided, comprising: a vehicle, on which the hardware security device or the vehicle-mounted device of the above embodiments is deployed; a certificate service device of the above embodiments; and a verification device of the above embodiments.

[0012] According to another aspect of the embodiments of this disclosure, a vehicle verification method is also provided, applied to the hardware security device in the above embodiments, comprising: establishing a secure encrypted link with a verification device in the target area when the vehicle enters the target area; receiving a challenge request sent by the verification device through the secure encrypted link; signing the challenge request using the private key in the post-quantum key pair generated by the hardware security device to obtain a digital signature; sending the digital signature, a digital certificate issued by a certificate service device for the vehicle, and a target declaration file corresponding to the verification device to the verification device through the secure encrypted link; and leaving the target area when the verification device verifies the vehicle based on the digital signature, digital certificate, and target declaration file.

[0013] Furthermore, the method also includes: activating the hardware security device when the vehicle leaves the factory; generating a root key using a first key generation component in the hardware security device, and generating a post-quantum key pair using a second key generation component; receiving a digital certificate issued by a certificate service device for the vehicle, and declaration files corresponding to multiple testing institutions, wherein the digital certificate is obtained by signing the vehicle information using the private key corresponding to the target registration institution, and the target registration institution is located in the registration area corresponding to the vehicle; and storing the private key, digital certificate, and declaration files corresponding to multiple testing institutions in a storage component inside the vehicle security device, wherein the storage component is encrypted and protected by the root key.

[0014] Furthermore, the method also includes: digitally signing at least one event generated during vehicle operation using a private key to obtain an event record; and storing the event record on a consortium blockchain in a hardware security device or certificate service device.

[0015] According to another aspect of the embodiments of this disclosure, a vehicle verification method is also provided, applied to the certificate service device in the above embodiments, comprising: receiving vehicle information through a target registration authority in the certificate service device, wherein the target registration authority is located in the registration area corresponding to the vehicle; synchronizing the vehicle information to other registration authorities in the certificate service device through a contract component in the certificate service device; signing the vehicle information using the private key corresponding to the target registration authority to obtain a digital certificate issued for the vehicle, wherein the digital certificate is written into the vehicle's hardware security device.

[0016] According to another aspect of the embodiments of this disclosure, a vehicle verification method is also provided, applied to the verification device in the above embodiments, located in a target area. The method includes: when a vehicle enters the target area, establishing a secure encrypted link with a hardware security device deployed on the vehicle; sending a challenge request to the hardware security device through the secure encrypted link, and receiving a digital signature returned by the hardware security device, a digital certificate issued by a certificate service device for the vehicle, and a target declaration file corresponding to the verification device, wherein the digital signature is obtained by signing the challenge request using the private key in the post-quantum key pair generated by the hardware security device; verifying the digital signature, the digital certificate, and the target declaration file to obtain a verification result for the vehicle, wherein if the verification result shows that the vehicle verification is successful, the vehicle leaves the target area, and the digital certificate is verified using a root certificate synchronized by the certificate service device.

[0017] According to another aspect of the embodiments of the present disclosure, a computer-readable storage medium is also provided, the computer-readable storage medium including a stored executable program, wherein, when the executable program is executed, it controls the device where the computer-readable storage medium is located to perform the methods of the various embodiments of the present disclosure.

[0018] According to another aspect of the embodiments of this disclosure, a computer program product is also provided, including a computer program that, when executed by a processor, implements the methods of various embodiments of this disclosure.

[0019] According to another aspect of the embodiments of this disclosure, a computer program product is also provided, including a non-volatile computer-readable storage medium storing a computer program that, when executed by a processor, implements the methods of various embodiments of this disclosure.

[0020] According to another aspect of the embodiments of this disclosure, a computer program is also provided, which, when executed by a processor, implements the methods of the various embodiments of this disclosure.

[0021] In this embodiment, a secure encrypted link is established between the first communication component of the hardware security device and the verification device, ensuring secure exchange between the vehicle and the verification device and guaranteeing secure data transmission. When the vehicle enters the target area, the verification device sends a challenge request. The hardware security device signs the challenge request based on the private key in a pre-generated post-quantum key pair, generating a digital signature. Using the post-quantum private key for signing ensures the signature is tamper-proof in a quantum computing environment. Furthermore, the hardware security device sends the digital signature, digital certificate, and target declaration file to the verification device via the encrypted link. The digital certificate and declaration file provide proof of the vehicle's identity and compliance with preset conditions. Finally, the verification device performs a comprehensive verification based on the received digital signature, digital certificate, and target declaration file. If the verification passes, the vehicle is considered to meet the preset conditions and is allowed to leave the target area. In this way, the convenience and security of cross-regional vehicle passage are achieved, thereby solving the technical problem of insufficient security in vehicle identity verification systems. Attached Figure Description

[0022] The accompanying drawings, which are included to provide a further understanding of this disclosure and form part of this disclosure, illustrate exemplary embodiments of the present disclosure and are used to explain the disclosure, but do not constitute an undue limitation of the disclosure. In the drawings:

[0023] Figure 1 is a schematic diagram of a hardware security device according to an embodiment of the present disclosure;

[0024] Figure 2 is a schematic diagram of a vehicle-mounted device according to an embodiment of the present disclosure;

[0025] Figure 3 is a schematic diagram of a certificate service device according to an embodiment of the present disclosure;

[0026] Figure 4 is a schematic diagram of a verification device according to an embodiment of the present disclosure;

[0027] Figure 5 is a schematic diagram of a vehicle verification system according to an embodiment of the present disclosure;

[0028] Figure 6 is a flowchart of a vehicle verification method according to an embodiment of the present disclosure;

[0029] Figure 7 is a flowchart of a vehicle verification method according to an embodiment of the present disclosure;

[0030] Figure 8 is a flowchart of another vehicle verification method according to an embodiment of the present disclosure;

[0031] Figure 9 is a flowchart of a preferred vehicle verification system according to an embodiment of the present disclosure;

[0032] Figure 10 is a flowchart of a preferred vehicle verification method according to an embodiment of the present disclosure. Detailed Implementation

[0033] To enable those skilled in the art to better understand the present disclosure, the technical solutions of the present disclosure will be clearly and completely described below with reference to the accompanying drawings of the embodiments. Obviously, the described embodiments are only some embodiments of the present disclosure, and not all embodiments. Based on the embodiments of the present disclosure, all other embodiments obtained by those skilled in the art without creative effort should fall within the scope of protection of the present disclosure.

[0034] It should be noted that the terms "first," "second," etc., in the specification, claims, and accompanying drawings of this disclosure are used to distinguish similar objects and are not necessarily used to describe a specific order or sequence. It should be understood that such data can be interchanged where appropriate so that the embodiments of this disclosure described herein can be implemented in orders other than those illustrated or described herein. Furthermore, the terms "comprising" and "having," and any variations thereof, are intended to cover non-exclusive inclusion; for example, a process, method, system, product, or device that comprises a series of steps or components is not necessarily limited to those steps or components explicitly listed, but may include other steps or components not explicitly listed or inherent to such processes, methods, products, or devices.

[0035] According to an embodiment of this disclosure, a hardware security device is provided. FIG1 is a schematic diagram of a hardware security device according to an embodiment of this disclosure. As shown in FIG1, the hardware security device 100 is deployed on a vehicle and includes:

[0036] The first communication component 102 is configured to establish a secure encrypted link between the hardware security device and the verification device, and to receive a challenge request sent by the verification device through the secure encrypted link, wherein the verification device is located in the target area, and the challenge request is sent by the verification device when the vehicle enters the target area.

[0037] The aforementioned hardware safety device is an enhanced hardware safety component that meets automotive-grade safety standards. For example, the hardware safety component is selected using a safety chip that conforms to the automotive-grade AEC-Q100 Grade 2 standard, such as Infineon's SLI97 or NXP's SXF3600. Furthermore, the hardware safety component integrates a first communication component, providing the vehicle with a quantum-secure environment. This first communication component utilizes the hardware safety component's encrypted communication capabilities to securely exchange data with external devices.

[0038] The aforementioned first communication component refers to the communication component integrated within the hardware security device. This first communication component is configured to establish a secure encrypted link between the hardware security device and the verification device. The first communication component ensures the quantum security of the link by executing a post-quantum key communication protocol.

[0039] The establishment of a secure encrypted link mentioned above refers to achieving a secure connection between the hardware security device and the verification device by executing a post-quantum key protocol. The establishment of a secure encrypted link ensures the security of data transmission.

[0040] The aforementioned challenge request refers to a random number sent by the verification device to the hardware security device to initiate a quantum-secure authentication process. The verification device sends the challenge request when the vehicle enters the target area. To ensure the security of the random number, a large number of bytes is set, for example, greater than 32 bytes; in a preferred embodiment, a 64-byte random number is set.

[0041] The target area mentioned above refers to the specific geographical area where vehicle identity verification is performed, including but not limited to at least one of the following: cross-border ports, highway toll stations, and areas with special access permissions. When a vehicle enters the target area, the verification device will trigger the identity verification process.

[0042] In one alternative embodiment, when a vehicle enters a specific geographical area of ​​the verification device, the first communication component of the hardware security device will receive an initial handshake signal from the verification device to establish a link. Subsequently, the first communication component and the verification device will establish a secure encrypted link between the hardware security device and the verification device. After the secure encrypted link is successfully established, the verification device will send a challenge request through the link.

[0043] Optionally, to prevent replay and prediction attacks, the challenge request will include a random number that changes each time a vehicle enters the target area. A replay attack is a common security threat in network communication where attackers intercept valid data packets (such as authentication requests, session keys, or transaction information) and then resend them later, attempting to trick the system into performing the same action or transaction again. A prediction attack occurs when attackers can predict messages or random values ​​in future communications based on known patterns or historical data.

[0044] In the aforementioned hardware security device, the establishment of a secure encrypted link protects all data transmission. Only crucial verification information (i.e., challenge requests and digital signatures) is transmitted along the link, without exposing more sensitive vehicle information, such as passenger information or travel routes. The secure encrypted link enhances user privacy protection while reducing unnecessary data transmission and improving link efficiency. Furthermore, the dynamic nature of the challenge requests increases the difficulty of identity forgery. Each time a vehicle enters the target area, it receives a different challenge, enhancing the security and timeliness of authentication.

[0045] The signature component 104, connected to the first communication component, is configured to sign challenge requests based on the private key in a pre-generated post-quantum key pair, thereby generating a digital signature.

[0046] The aforementioned signature component is a component in a hardware security device that signs challenge requests. For example, the signature component is a processor configured to perform various algorithms and data processing tasks.

[0047] The aforementioned pre-generation refers to a series of key pairs, consisting of a public key and a private key, created before the vehicle requires authentication. Pre-generation allows the vehicle to respond to challenge requests from the authentication device at any time, eliminating the need for time-consuming key generation operations at critical moments, thereby improving the efficiency of authentication.

[0048] The aforementioned post-quantum key pair refers to a public and private key pair generated based on a post-quantum key algorithm. Optionally, the post-quantum key pair is generated by a post-quantum key coprocessor within a hardware security device, or by a post-quantum key coprocessor located outside the hardware security device. The design of the post-quantum key pair ensures the security of vehicle authentication and data protection in the era of quantum computing.

[0049] The aforementioned private key refers to a key in a post-quantum key pair that is known only to the user. It is stored internally within the hardware security device. The private key is used to encrypt or sign data, while the public key is used to decrypt or verify digital signatures. In this embodiment, the private key is used to sign challenge requests to prove the identity and integrity of the hardware security device.

[0050] The aforementioned signature refers to encrypting specific data using a private key to generate a message that proves the data's origin and integrity. Using quantum mathematical signatures reduces the forgery potential of signatures; even if the data is intercepted, attackers will find it difficult to forge a correct signature, and it is also difficult for quantum computing to crack.

[0051] In one optional embodiment, the hardware security device stores a series of pre-generated post-quantum key pairs. Upon receiving a challenge request containing a random number from the verification device, the hardware security device will call the private key corresponding to the hardware security device to encrypt the random number in the challenge request, generate a unique encrypted signature, and generate a digital signature.

[0052] In another alternative embodiment, a hardware security device can generate a random number and use a private key to encrypt and sign the random number and the random number contained in the challenge request. Optionally, the random number and the random number contained in the challenge request can be weighted, subjected to logical operations (such as OR, AND, NOT, etc.) to obtain a new random number, and the new random number can be encrypted and signed using the private key.

[0053] In the aforementioned hardware security device, the pre-generated post-quantum key pair enables the device to sign immediately upon receiving a challenge request, eliminating the need for time-consuming key generation at critical moments and ensuring instant response and efficient verification. Digital signatures generated based on the private key reduce forgery potential and ensure the randomness and uniqueness of the key. Digital signatures not only ensure that the transmitted information has not been tampered with but also prove the source of the information—the identity of the hardware security device—enhancing the overall trust and reliability of the system.

[0054] The first communication component 102 is also configured to send a digital signature, a digital certificate issued by a certificate service device for the vehicle, and a target declaration file corresponding to the verification device to the verification device via a secure encrypted link. The vehicle leaves the target area after the verification device verifies the vehicle based on the digital signature, digital certificate, and target declaration file.

[0055] The aforementioned certificate service equipment refers to a decentralized trust infrastructure jointly constructed by authoritative agencies from multiple regions (such as Guangdong, Hong Kong, and Macau), including those responsible for traffic management, customs, and border inspection. This equipment is configured to generate and manage digital certificates for vehicles, providing cross-regional authentication services. Furthermore, it is configured to ensure the adherence to security protocols and rules during certificate generation, renewal, and revocation, thereby providing a trusted management mechanism for the vehicle's digital identity.

[0056] The aforementioned issuance refers to the process whereby, after completing vehicle identity verification, the certificate service device uses its private key to digitally sign the vehicle information, generating a digital certificate. Through issuance, the vehicle obtains a valid, signed identity document, which can be displayed to verification devices in the target area to prove its identity.

[0057] The aforementioned target declaration document refers to a specific type of declaration issued by a relevant verification agency to prove that the vehicle meets specific requirements or standards within the target area. Target declaration documents include, but are not limited to, at least one of the following: vehicle insurance status, environmental testing results, and permits. These documents typically contain a digital signature to ensure their authenticity. When a vehicle enters the target area, the hardware security device must send the target declaration document, along with the digital signature and digital certificate, to the verification equipment for verification to ensure that the vehicle meets the passage requirements.

[0058] In one optional embodiment, upon receiving a challenge request containing a random number, the hardware security device uses its private key to sign and encrypt the random number. Subsequently, the hardware security device sends the target declaration file, digital certificate, and digital signature to a verification device via a secure encrypted link for verification. The verification device verifies whether the digital certificate has passed endorsement verification (based on the root certificate synchronized by the certificate service device), whether the random number in the digital signature is valid, and whether the target declaration file has an organization signature. The aforementioned endorsement verification refers to a process in which multiple authoritative organizations in various regions act as endorsement nodes, jointly participating in and conducting multiple reviews and confirmations of new vehicle registration information or certificate status updates. After successful verification, the vehicle will leave the target area.

[0059] Optionally, the hardware security device uses the private key in the post-quantum key pair to sign the challenge request sent by the verification device to generate a digital signature. The certificate service device issues a digital certificate containing the vehicle's identification information for the vehicle. The target declaration document is issued by the verification authority in the target area to prove that the vehicle meets specific conditions for entering or passing through the area, such as insurance status, environmental standards, and passage permits.

[0060] In the aforementioned hardware security device, key data, including digital signatures, digital certificates, and target declaration files, are transmitted to the verification device via a secure encrypted link through the first communication component. This allows the verification device to instantly receive the vehicle's authentication information, enabling it to complete vehicle identity verification and compliance with preset conditions in a very short time, thus achieving rapid passage. Furthermore, the use of digital certificates and target declaration files, along with the verification device's validation of the digital signature, establishes a cross-regional mutual trust and recognition mechanism. Vehicles no longer need to repeatedly prove their identity and compliance with preset conditions, reducing management costs and simplifying procedures for cross-regional passage.

[0061] In this embodiment, a secure encrypted link based on post-quantum keyology is established between the first communication component of the hardware security device and the verification device, ensuring the security of exchanges between the vehicle and the verification device and guaranteeing the security of data transmission. When the vehicle enters the target area, the verification device sends a challenge request. The hardware security device signs the challenge request based on the private key in a pre-generated post-quantum key pair, generating a digital signature. Using the post-quantum private key for signing ensures the signature is tamper-proof in a quantum computing environment. Furthermore, the hardware security device sends the digital signature, digital certificate, and target declaration file to the verification device via the encrypted link. The digital certificate and declaration file provide proof of the vehicle's identity and compliance with preset conditions. Finally, the verification device performs a comprehensive verification based on the received digital signature, digital certificate, and target declaration file. If the verification passes, the vehicle is considered to meet the preset conditions and is allowed to leave the target area. In this way, the convenience and security of cross-regional vehicle passage are achieved, thereby solving the technical problem of low security in vehicle identity verification.

[0062] In this embodiment of the disclosure, the hardware security device further includes: a first key generation component configured to generate a root key based on the physical characteristics of the hardware security device; a second key generation component configured to generate a quantum key pair; and a storage component encrypted and protected by the root key, configured to store a digital certificate, declaration files corresponding to multiple testing institutions, and a private key, wherein the declaration files corresponding to the multiple testing institutions contain a target declaration file.

[0063] In this embodiment of the disclosure, the second key generation component includes: a random number generator configured to generate a first random number; and a processor configured to generate a subsequent quantum key pair based on the random number.

[0064] The aforementioned first key generation component is a key part of the hardware security device. This component is configured to utilize the physical characteristics of the hardware security device to generate a random and tamper-proof root key. This root key does not leave the hardware security device and is used to protect all subsequently generated keys. The key generation process relies on a Physically Unclonable Function (PUF) to ensure the uniqueness and security of the keys.

[0065] The aforementioned physical characteristics refer to the properties formed within the hardware security device due to minute changes during the manufacturing process. In this embodiment, these physical characteristics are captured by the first key generation component and transformed into initial input or basic knowledge for root key generation. This ensures that even with the same hardware security device design, different hardware security devices will generate different root keys, thereby enhancing the key's anti-cloning properties and the overall system security. For example, a physical characteristic could be a minute resistance difference in the metal circuitry within the hardware security device.

[0066] The aforementioned root key is generated by the first key generation component based on physical characteristics. The root key is used to encrypt and store key information such as quantum key pairs and digital certificates. For example, the root key is used to encrypt the private key with AES-256 before storage.

[0067] The aforementioned storage component refers to a part of the hardware security device, within which a non-volatile storage area protected by root key encryption is designated. The storage component is configured to securely store the vehicle's digital certificate, declaration files corresponding to multiple testing agencies, and the private key from the post-quantum key pair. The design of the storage component ensures secure data storage; even if the hardware security device is physically attacked, the information stored within is not easily read or tampered with.

[0068] The aforementioned encryption protection refers to encrypting the data within the storage component using a root key to prevent unauthorized access or data leakage. In this embodiment of the disclosure, all critical information stored within the storage component, including digital certificates, claim files, and private keys, is encrypted and stored under the protection of the root key, and can only be decrypted and used in an authenticated environment.

[0069] The aforementioned testing organizations refer to entities responsible for testing and certifying vehicles to meet preset conditions, such as insurance companies, environmental testing agencies, or traffic management departments. Based on the vehicle's actual condition, the testing organization provides a declaration document proving that the vehicle meets specific preset conditions or standards.

[0070] The aforementioned declaration document refers to a document issued by the testing agency. This document contains a declaration regarding a specific attribute or state of the vehicle that meets preset conditions. It typically includes a digital signature created by the testing agency using its subsequent quantum private key to verify the document's authenticity. The preset conditions here are conditions predetermined by the testing agency.

[0071] The aforementioned random number generator is one of the key components within a hardware security device. It is configured to generate a series of random numbers. The random number generator is configured as an initial value or parameter in the encryption algorithm and key generation process.

[0072] The aforementioned first random number refers to the first or initial random number specifically designated from a series of random numbers generated by a random number generator. This first random number is used as the initial input in the key generation process, or as the initial random input required for subsequent encryption algorithms or key exchange processes.

[0073] The aforementioned processor refers to the core computing component of the hardware security device, configured to execute various algorithms and data processing tasks. In embodiments of this disclosure, the processor is configured to execute a post-quantum key algorithm and work in conjunction with a random number generator to generate secure post-quantum key pairs; for example, the processor is a post-quantum key coprocessor.

[0074] In one alternative embodiment, the first key generation component generates a root key based on the physical characteristics of the hardware security device. In another alternative embodiment, the first key generation component generates a unique binary sequence by monitoring minute physical changes within the hardware security device. This binary sequence is then processed by a series of algorithms, such as fuzz extractor techniques, to convert the physical characteristics into a stable, high-quality root key.

[0075] In the second key generation component, a random number generator produces a random number as the initial point for key generation. The processor then uses algorithms from post-quantum keyology, taking the root key and the random number as input, to generate a post-quantum key pair. The storage component, built into the hardware security component and encrypted with the key root, securely stores the post-quantum key pair, vehicle digital certificate, and a series of declaration documents issued by testing agencies, ensuring encrypted data storage. Specifically, when a vehicle leaves the factory, the manufacturer submits the vehicle's VIN (Vehicle Identification Number), terminal serial number, and public key to a local registration authority through secure channels. The registration authority initiates a joint endorsement process on the consortium blockchain and conducts a review. Upon approval, the registration authority signs the vehicle information using its post-quantum private key, generating a digital certificate. When the vehicle owner performs actions such as insurance renewal or environmental testing, the relevant testing agency, after confirming the vehicle's status, digitally signs the declaration content using its own post-quantum private key, generating a signed declaration document.

[0076] The aforementioned hardware security device, with its first and second key generation components, ensures the security of the key generation process and the uniqueness of the keys themselves, preventing key cloning and prediction. The encryption protection mechanism of the storage component further safeguards the security of the stored data, preventing the leakage of sensitive information even in the event of a hardware attack.

[0077] According to an embodiment of the present disclosure, an in-vehicle device is provided. FIG2 is a schematic diagram of an in-vehicle device according to an embodiment of the present disclosure. As shown in FIG2, the in-vehicle device 200 is deployed on a vehicle and includes: the hardware security device 100 in the above embodiment.

[0078] The aforementioned vehicle-mounted device is an in-vehicle terminal installed in the vehicle, which can serve as the vehicle's digital identity carrier. This terminal has a built-in hardware security device, which is the same as the hardware security device in the above embodiments and will not be described again here.

[0079] According to an embodiment of this disclosure, a certificate service device is provided. Figure 3 is a schematic diagram of a certificate service device according to an embodiment of this disclosure. As shown in Figure 3, the device includes:

[0080] Consortium blockchain 302 contains multiple registration authorities 3022, which are located in different regions. The target registration authority among these multiple registration authorities is configured to issue digital certificates to vehicles, and the target registration authority is located in the registration area corresponding to the vehicle.

[0081] The aforementioned consortium blockchain refers to a blockchain where each participating institution acts as a node to jointly maintain a shared, tamper-proof distributed ledger. In the embodiments of this disclosure, the consortium blockchain is jointly constructed by multiple registration institutions distributed in different regions, configured to record vehicle registration information, certificate status (valid / revoked / expired), and crucial passage audit logs.

[0082] The aforementioned registration authorities refer to authoritative agencies such as traffic management, customs, and border inspection. These registration authorities also have the authority to write data and issue certificates within the consortium blockchain. Each registration authority is located in a specific registration area and is responsible for managing vehicle information and certificate issuance within its designated area.

[0083] The aforementioned target registration authority refers to the registration authority responsible for issuing digital certificates for vehicles during the vehicle registration process. The target registration authority is located within the registration area corresponding to the vehicle.

[0084] In one optional embodiment, the consortium blockchain is jointly maintained by multiple pre-selected registries located in different geographical locations. These registries are responsible for issuing digital certificates for different vehicles. When a vehicle leaves the factory and is initially registered in a specific region, the target registry in that region is responsible for issuing a quantum-secure digital certificate for the vehicle. The vehicle manufacturer submits information such as the vehicle identification number, hardware serial number, and the public key of the generated post-quantum key to the authoritative institution in the registration location through a secure channel. After preliminary review, the institution uploads the information to the consortium blockchain.

[0085] In another alternative embodiment, the target registration authority receives the vehicle's physical characteristics, encryption key, and ownership information. After verification, it combines this information with the authority's issuing permissions. The information is then signed using the registration authority's own post-quantum private key to generate a digital certificate. The digital certificate contains the vehicle's unique identifier, validity period, and the target registration authority's public key, ensuring the certificate content's tamper-proof nature and the reliability of the signature. The issued digital certificate is recorded on the consortium blockchain's distributed ledger.

[0086] The aforementioned equipment utilizes a multi-node certificate issuance and management system based on a consortium blockchain to achieve cross-regional mutual recognition and efficient management of vehicle digital certificates. The issuance role of the target registration authority in the registration region ensures the regional compliance and institutional authority of the certificate, while the existence of the distributed ledger increases the transparency and tamper resistance of the certificate.

[0087] Contract component 3024, deployed on a consortium blockchain, is configured to synchronize digital certificates with other registries among multiple registries.

[0088] The aforementioned contract components can refer to those deployed on a consortium blockchain and configured to automatically execute certificate lifecycle management rules. For example, multiple endorsement records from various institutions are required for a new car registration to take effect; certificate revocation applications can be instantly synchronized to all nodes.

[0089] In one optional embodiment, when the target registration authority successfully issues a digital certificate and records it on the distributed ledger of the consortium blockchain, a preset contract component is triggered. The contract component notifies other relevant institutions on the consortium blockchain to endorse the certificate and begin the certificate synchronization and mutual recognition process. It traverses all nodes on the consortium blockchain to find other registration authorities besides the target registration authority and synchronizes the newly issued digital certificate information to the nodes of these institutions, ensuring that the certificate information can be correctly and timely obtained by all participating registration authorities.

[0090] In the aforementioned equipment, the deployment of the contract component enables the automatic creation and execution of a cross-regional vehicle digital certificate mutual recognition mechanism, avoiding errors and delays caused by manual operation and improving the efficiency and accuracy of certificate mutual recognition.

[0091] The root certificate management component 304 is configured to generate and manage root certificates based on the security protocols corresponding to multiple registration authorities. The root certificates are used to verify the digital certificates sent by vehicles.

[0092] The aforementioned security protocol refers to a set of encrypted communication and authentication rules jointly adopted by multiple registration structures, designed to ensure the security and integrity of information during data transmission and certificate verification on the consortium blockchain.

[0093] The root certificate mentioned above is generated and managed by the root certificate management component, serving as an authoritative certification commonly recognized by all registration authorities. The root certificate also contains the public key information of each registration authority, as well as its associated authentication information. Any digital certificate issued by any registration authority must be verified by the root certificate before it can be accepted by other parties.

[0094] In one optional embodiment, the root certificate management component generates and issues root certificates based on the security protocols corresponding to multiple registries. Once generated, the root certificates are stored on the consortium blockchain, ensuring that each registry can access and verify them. Furthermore, the root certificate management component continuously monitors the status and integrity of the root certificates to prevent potential security threats. When a vehicle needs to travel in different regions, its digital certificate will be submitted to the verification device in the target region. The verification device uses the root certificate generated by the root certificate management component to verify the validity of the vehicle's digital certificate.

[0095] In the aforementioned devices, the root certificate enables verification in other regions based on the same root certificate, regardless of where the vehicle obtains its digital certificate, thus eliminating cross-regional trust barriers. The root certificate management component operates independently of any single registry authority, achieving automated management through a consortium blockchain. This enhances the system's adaptability and robustness to complex multi-regional environments, avoiding the single point of failure risk associated with centralized management.

[0096] According to an embodiment of this disclosure, a verification device is provided, deployed in a target area. Figure 4 is a schematic diagram of a verification device according to an embodiment of this disclosure. As shown in Figure 4, the verification device includes:

[0097] The second communication component 402 is configured to establish a secure encrypted link between the verification device and the hardware security device deployed on the vehicle. When the vehicle enters the target area, it sends a challenge request to the hardware security device through the secure encrypted link and receives a digital signature, a digital certificate issued by the certificate service device for the vehicle, and a target declaration file corresponding to the verification device sent by the hardware security device.

[0098] The aforementioned second communication component refers to establishing low-latency, high-security wireless communication with the vehicle, configured to request and verify relevant vehicle information.

[0099] In one optional embodiment, when the verification device detects a vehicle entering the target area, the second communication component establishes a secure encrypted link between the verification device and the hardware security device. Further, through the secure encrypted link, the second communication component sends a challenge request to the hardware security device and waits for its response, receiving a verification data packet including a digital signature, digital certificate, and related declaration documents.

[0100] In the aforementioned device, the second communication component effectively verifies the identity of the hardware security device holder by sending a challenge request and receiving a digitally signed response from the hardware security device. Simultaneously, the hardware security device verifies the root certificate of the verification device, ensuring that the verification device meets preset conditions. Furthermore, the digital signature verifies the integrity of the data packet, the digital certificate confirms the identity of the hardware security device, and the relevant declaration documents provide evidence that the vehicle meets the preset conditions. The second communication component ensures that all data required for verification is transmitted securely and completely.

[0101] Verification component 404 has a built-in root certificate synchronized with the certificate service device and is configured to verify digital signatures and digital certificates to obtain sub-verification results. The digital certificate is verified using the root certificate synchronized with the certificate service device.

[0102] The aforementioned verification component has a built-in root certificate synchronized with the certificate service device, enabling it to verify quantum security certificates and digital signatures sent by hardware security devices at high speed and with high accuracy.

[0103] The aforementioned sub-verification results refer to the independent and detailed verification feedback generated by the verification component for each verification action after completing the verification of digital signatures and digital certificates.

[0104] In one optional embodiment, firstly, the verification component verifies the authority of the received digital certificate using the built-in root certificate, ensuring it was issued by a certificate service device that meets preset conditions and has not been forged or tampered with. This verification process involves checking the structure of the digital certificate, including but not limited to its version number, serial number, issuing authority name, validity period, etc., and verifying the signature on the digital certificate using the public key within the root certificate to ensure the integrity and validity of the certificate. Next, the verification component verifies the digital signature using the post-quantum key public key provided in the digital certificate. Finally, the verification component generates sub-verification results. These results respectively reflect the verification status of the digital signature, the confirmation of the digital certificate's authority, and the validity status of the certificate itself.

[0105] In the aforementioned equipment, the verification component not only verifies the authority of the digital signature and certificate, but also checks the declaration documents submitted with the vehicle that meet the preset conditions, ensuring the integrity and reliability of the vehicle's passage information.

[0106] The decision component 406 is configured to obtain the vehicle's verification result based on the sub-verification result and the target declaration file. If the verification result shows that the vehicle has passed verification, the vehicle leaves the target area. The digital certificate is verified using the root certificate synchronized by the certificate service device.

[0107] The aforementioned decision-making component is configured to issue instructions to actuators such as gates and display screens based on the verification results and preset rules. For example, the preset rule is that if the sub-verification result is that the verification is passed and the target declaration file meets the preset conditions, then the passage will be automatically allowed.

[0108] In one optional embodiment, the decision component first receives all sub-verification results from the verification component. These results include verification of the validity of the digital signature, confirmation of the authority and validity of the digital certificate, and review results of the target declaration file. The decision component integrates the sub-verification results with the target declaration file, checking whether the sub-verification results are verified as passed and whether the target declaration file meets preset conditions. Based on the above information, the decision component generates the final verification result according to preset rules. If all conditions are met, the decision component outputs a verification result indicating that the vehicle has passed the safety and meets the preset conditions verification; otherwise, if any condition is not met, a verification failure result is generated.

[0109] In the above setup, by combining and analyzing multiple independent sub-verification results with the target declaration file, the decision component can make more accurate verification decisions, effectively distinguish different types of verification failures, and facilitate subsequent processing and problem localization. The parallel generation of sub-verification results and subsequent centralized processing make the verification decision-making process of the decision component efficient and fast, improving the processing speed of vehicle verification.

[0110] It should be noted that the user information (including but not limited to user device information, user personal information, etc.) and data (including but not limited to data used for analysis, data stored, data displayed, etc.) involved in this disclosure are all information and data authorized by the user or fully authorized by all parties. Furthermore, the collection, use and processing of the relevant data must comply with the relevant laws, regulations and standards of the relevant countries and regions, and corresponding operation portals are provided for users to choose to authorize or refuse.

[0111] According to an embodiment of this disclosure, a vehicle verification system is provided. Figure 5 is a schematic diagram of a vehicle verification system according to an embodiment of this disclosure. As shown in Figure 5, the system includes:

[0112] Vehicle 52 is equipped with the hardware security device or the vehicle-mounted device in the above embodiments; certificate service device 504 in the above embodiments; and verification device 506 in the above embodiments.

[0113] The hardware security device protects the vehicle's post-quantum key pair, using a post-quantum key algorithm to sign challenge requests and generate a digital signature, thereby proving the vehicle's unique identity and the authenticity of the response. The hardware security device also stores a digital certificate issued by a certificate service device and a series of pre-defined condition declarations. This information is securely transmitted during communication with the verification device for remote authentication and pre-defined condition checks. The certificate service device generates a quantum-secure digital certificate for the vehicle, which, through a smart contract endorsement process, ensures consensus and trust transfer across multiple regions. The certificate service device also manages the root certificate, ensuring that all participating institutions can perform verification. The verification device establishes a secure encrypted link with the hardware security device, sends challenge requests, and receives and verifies the digital signature, digital certificate, and declaration documents provided by the hardware security device. With its built-in post-quantum key verification capability, the verification device can quickly determine the authenticity of the vehicle's identity and its current compliance with pre-defined conditions.

[0114] The specific implementation processes of the aforementioned hardware security devices, vehicle-mounted equipment, certificate service equipment, and verification equipment are similar to those described above and will not be limited here.

[0115] According to an embodiment of this disclosure, a vehicle verification method is provided, applied to a hardware security device. Figure 6 is a flowchart of a vehicle verification method according to an embodiment of this disclosure. As shown in Figure 6, the method includes:

[0116] Step S602: When the vehicle enters the target area, establish a secure encrypted link with the verification device in the target area.

[0117] Step S604: Receive a challenge request sent by the verification device via a secure encrypted link.

[0118] Step S606: Use the private key in the post-quantum key pair generated by the hardware security device to sign the challenge request and obtain a digital signature.

[0119] Step S608: Send the digital signature, the digital certificate issued by the certificate service device for the vehicle, and the target declaration file corresponding to the verification device to the verification device through a secure encrypted link.

[0120] Step S609: If the verification device successfully verifies the vehicle based on the digital signature, digital certificate, and target declaration file, the vehicle leaves the target area.

[0121] In one optional embodiment, when a vehicle enters the boundary of the target area, the hardware security device detects the communication beacon of the verification device within the area via its embedded first communication component. Upon receiving the beacon, the hardware security device establishes a secure encrypted link with the verification device using its post-quantum key pair. The verification device sends a randomly generated challenge request containing a random number to the hardware security device through this secure encrypted link. Upon receiving the challenge request, the hardware security device signs the challenge request using its private key, generating a quantum-safe digital signature. Then, the hardware security device sends the digital signature, digital certificate, and target declaration file to the verification device through the secure encrypted link. Upon receiving the above information, the verification device first verifies the digital certificate using a federated root certificate synchronized with the certificate service device, and then verifies the digital signature using its private key. Finally, the verification device checks the validity of all submitted compliance declaration files, i.e., whether the organization signatures on them are correct. If all verifications pass, the verification device generates a verification pass signal, allowing the vehicle to leave the target area and achieve rapid passage.

[0122] The above method, by establishing a secure encrypted link for transmitting challenges and responses, ensures that the communication content is not eavesdropped on or tampered with by third parties, thus enhancing the confidentiality of the entire authentication process. By instantly sending declaration documents that meet preset conditions, the verification device can confirm the vehicle's compliance status, such as insurance and environmental testing, without the need for additional offline audits or inquiries. This achieves online, real-time verification of vehicles that meet preset conditions, simplifying vehicle registration procedures and improving regulatory efficiency.

[0123] In this embodiment of the disclosure, the method further includes: activating a hardware security device when the vehicle leaves the factory; generating a root key using a first key generation component in the hardware security device, and generating a post-quantum key pair using a second key generation component; receiving a digital certificate issued by a certificate service device for the vehicle, and declaration files corresponding to multiple testing agencies, wherein the digital certificate is obtained by signing the vehicle information using the private key corresponding to the target registration agency, and the target registration agency is located in the registration area corresponding to the vehicle; and storing the private key, digital certificate, and declaration files corresponding to multiple testing agencies in a storage component inside the hardware security device, wherein the storage component is encrypted and protected by the root key.

[0124] In this embodiment of the disclosure, the method further includes: digitally signing at least one event generated during vehicle operation using a private key to obtain an event record; and storing the event record on a consortium blockchain in a hardware security device or certificate service device.

[0125] The aforementioned event logs can refer to digital records generated by relevant parties and signed with the private key of a hardware security device for important events (such as maintenance, repair, software updates, etc.) during vehicle operation.

[0126] In one optional embodiment, once the vehicle has completed final assembly and is ready to leave the factory, the hardware security device is activated via a dedicated activation process. Using a first key generation component built into the hardware security device, a root key is generated based on the hardware's physically unclonable function. Subsequently, a second key generation component uses the aforementioned root key as input to generate a quantum-secure key pair, i.e., a post-quantum key pair. Vehicle information, along with the public key from the generated post-quantum key pair, is submitted by the manufacturer to a target registration authority. This registration authority issues a digital certificate using its own private key and, along with declarations from multiple testing agencies meeting preset conditions, sends them to the vehicle's hardware security device. The hardware security device stores the received digital certificate, declarations, and the private key from the previously generated post-quantum key pair in its internal encrypted storage component.

[0127] Preferably, the hardware security device also uses the stored private key to digitally sign various important events that occur during vehicle operation (such as accidents, maintenance, and software upgrades), generating event records. These records are then stored in the storage component of the hardware security device or uploaded to the consortium blockchain of the certificate service device.

[0128] In the above method, the hardware security device utilizes a root key generated by a physically unclonable function and post-quantum key technology to ensure the uniqueness and anti-counterfeiting of the vehicle's digital identity. The encrypted storage of digital certificates and declaration files, along with post-quantum key-based protection, prevents data leakage and tampering during storage and transmission, enhancing the confidentiality and integrity of vehicle data that meets preset conditions.

[0129] According to an embodiment of this disclosure, a vehicle verification method is provided, which should be configured as a certificate service device. Figure 7 is a flowchart of a vehicle verification method according to an embodiment of this disclosure. As shown in Figure 7, the method includes:

[0130] S702 receives vehicle information from a target registration authority located within the registration area corresponding to the vehicle through a certificate service device.

[0131] S704 synchronizes vehicle information to other registration authorities in the certificate service device through the contract component in the certificate service device.

[0132] S706 uses the private key corresponding to the target registration authority to sign the vehicle information and obtain a digital certificate issued for the vehicle. The digital certificate is written into the vehicle's hardware security device.

[0133] In one optional embodiment, upon initial vehicle registration or information update, the target registration authority in the certificate service device receives detailed information from the vehicle. This information includes the vehicle identification number (VIN), vehicle model, ownership information, and a public key from the hardware security device. The target registration authority is located within the registration region corresponding to the vehicle. After receiving the vehicle information, the certificate service device, through its internal contract component, encrypts and synchronizes the vehicle information to all other registration authorities on the consortium blockchain. Finally, the target registration authority signs the collected vehicle information using its post-quantum private key. This signing process generates a digital certificate containing the encrypted vehicle information and the authority's signature, serving as the vehicle's quantum-secure electronic passport. Subsequently, the digital certificate is securely written into the vehicle's hardware security device, becoming a digital identity credential for cross-regional travel.

[0134] The above method ensures the authority and consistency of vehicle digital identities by synchronizing vehicle information to all registration authorities and having the target registration authority issue digital certificates, thus enabling rapid mutual recognition of vehicle identities across different regions. The generation and writing process of digital certificates employs strict quantum-secure encryption measures to prevent forgery and tampering during transmission and storage, ensuring the confidentiality and integrity of vehicle identity information. The use of contract components not only guarantees information synchronization but also promotes the effective operation of the consortium blockchain through intelligent execution, ensuring that all institutions can collaborate within a unified framework to jointly maintain the authority of digital certificates.

[0135] According to an embodiment of this disclosure, a vehicle verification method is provided, which should be configured as a verification device. Figure 8 is a flowchart of another vehicle verification method according to an embodiment of this disclosure. As shown in Figure 8, the process includes:

[0136] S802 establishes a secure encrypted link with the hardware security devices deployed on the vehicle when the vehicle enters the target area.

[0137] S804 sends a challenge request to the hardware security device via a secure encrypted link and receives a digital signature returned by the hardware security device, a digital certificate issued by the certificate service device for the vehicle, and a target declaration file corresponding to the verification device. The digital signature is obtained by signing the challenge request using the private key in the post-quantum key pair generated by the hardware security device.

[0138] S806 verifies the digital signature, digital certificate, and target declaration file to obtain the vehicle verification result. If the verification result shows that the vehicle has passed verification, the vehicle leaves the target area. The digital certificate is verified using the root certificate synchronized by the certificate service device.

[0139] In one optional embodiment, when a vehicle enters the target area, the verification device proactively establishes a secure encrypted communication link with the hardware security device deployed on the vehicle via communication technology. Through this established secure encrypted link, the verification device sends a randomly generated challenge request string to the hardware security device. The on-board terminal then uses the private key from its internally stored post-quantum key pair to sign the challenge request, generating a digital signature. This signature, along with the vehicle's digital certificate and the target declaration file associated with the current verification device, is returned to the verification device via the encrypted link. Upon receiving the response from the on-board terminal, the verification device first verifies the validity of the vehicle's digital certificate using the federated root certificate synchronized by the certificate service device. Then, it verifies the digital signature returned by the on-board terminal, confirming that the signature matches the challenge request, thereby ensuring the authenticity of the on-board terminal's identity and the integrity of the response. Finally, the verification device checks the target declaration file to ensure that the vehicle meets the preset requirements for entering the target area.

[0140] In the above method, the confidentiality of communication data during the verification process is ensured by employing a quantum-secure encrypted link. The verification device can quickly respond to and verify the digital signature and digital certificate of the vehicle terminal, as well as the target declaration file, shortening the waiting time for vehicle passage and improving the efficiency of cross-regional passage. Verification using a federated root certificate synchronized by the certificate service device ensures the mutual recognition of vehicle digital identities and promotes mutual trust and cooperation between different jurisdictions.

[0141] The preferred vehicle verification system of this disclosure will be described below with reference to Figure 9. As shown in Figure 9, the vehicle verification system includes: an on-board quantum secure electronic passport terminal (i.e., the on-board device mentioned above), a Cross-regional consortium Ledger Certificate Authority center (CL-CA, i.e., the certificate service device mentioned above), a Roadside Unit (RSU), and a border inspection system (i.e., the verification device mentioned above).

[0142] The in-vehicle quantum-safe electronic passport terminal serves as the vehicle's digital identity carrier. Its core is an enhanced hardware security module (HSM+) that meets automotive-grade safety standards, including:

[0143] The Physically Unclonable Function (PUF) unit (i.e., the first key generation component mentioned above) is used to extract the chip's unique physical characteristics and generate an unpredictable and unique root key. This root key never leaves the chip and is used to protect all subsequently generated keys.

[0144] Post-Quantum Cryptography (PQC) coprocessor (i.e., the processor mentioned above): Dedicated to executing quantum-resistant cryptographic algorithms (such as the lattice-based ML-KEM (Module Learning with Errors Key Encapsulation Mechanism) algorithm for key exchange, and the ML-DSA algorithm for digital signatures). Responsible for generating and securely storing the vehicle's post-quantum key pair (i.e., public and private keys).

[0145] Quantum Random Number Generator (QRNG, i.e. the random number generator mentioned above): provides a true random number source based on quantum physics phenomena, ensures sufficient entropy value for key generation, and eliminates security vulnerabilities caused by poor random number quality.

[0146] Secure storage area (i.e., the storage component mentioned above): used to store quantum-secure digital certificates (i.e., the electronic passport itself) issued by an authoritative institution, as well as a series of verifiable declarations that meet preset conditions (such as insurance status, environmental standard certification, etc.).

[0147] Secure communication module (i.e., the first communication component mentioned above): supports V2X (Vehicle-to-Everything) communication and can establish secure encrypted links with external entities (such as other vehicles and roadside units) based on post-quantum key algorithms.

[0148] The Cross-Regional Consortium Blockchain Certificate Service Center is a decentralized trust infrastructure jointly built by authoritative agencies from multiple regions (such as Guangdong, Hong Kong, and Macau), including those responsible for transportation management, customs, and border inspection. Its core features include:

[0149] Consortium blockchain network (i.e., the consortium blockchain mentioned above): Each participating institution acts as a node, jointly maintaining a shared, tamper-proof distributed ledger to record vehicle registration information, certificate status (valid / revoked / expired), and critical access audit logs.

[0150] Root Certificate Management Component: A post-quantum joint root certificate is jointly generated and managed by participating institutions through a secure multi-party computation protocol, serving as a trust anchor for cross-regional mutual recognition.

[0151] Contract component: Deployed on the consortium blockchain, configured to automatically execute certificate lifecycle management rules, such as: multiple institution endorsement records are required for a new car registration to take effect; certificate revocation applications can be instantly synchronized to all nodes.

[0152] RSU and border inspection systems are verification devices deployed in key areas such as border crossings and highway toll booths. RSU and border inspection systems include:

[0153] Verification component: Built-in post-quantum root certificate synchronized with certificate service device, capable of high-speed and accurate verification of quantum security certificates and digital signatures sent from vehicle electronic passport terminal.

[0154] Secure communication interface (i.e., the second communication component mentioned above): Establishes low-latency, high-security wireless communication with the vehicle, and requests and verifies relevant vehicle information.

[0155] Decision component: Based on the verification results and preset rules (such as "automatic release if all verifications are passed and all conditions are met"), it issues instructions to the gate, display screen and other actuators.

[0156] A preferred vehicle verification method of this disclosure is described below with reference to Figure 10. As shown in Figure 9, the method includes:

[0157] Step S1: Initialization and joint registration of electronic passports.

[0158] S1.1: Vehicle factory initialization.

[0159] When a vehicle leaves the factory, the onboard terminal is activated. The terminal uses a physically non-cloning function to generate a unique root key, and under its protection, the post-quantum key coprocessor generates the vehicle's post-quantum key pair.

[0160] S1.2: Secure transmission of information.

[0161] Vehicle manufacturers submit information such as vehicle identification numbers, hardware serial numbers, and generated post-quantum public keys to an authoritative institution in the place of registration (such as Guangdong Province) through a secure channel.

[0162] S1.3: Contract component triggered.

[0163] After conducting a preliminary review, the agency uploads the information to the certificate service device and triggers the contract component.

[0164] S1.4: Endorsement confirmation and certificate issuance.

[0165] The smart contract notifies other relevant institutions on the consortium blockchain (such as those in Hong Kong and Macau) to endorse the certificate. After confirmation by all parties, the registration authority uses its private key to issue the final quantum-secure digital certificate for the vehicle and writes it to the in-vehicle terminal. This certificate is then registered on the consortium blockchain and marked as valid.

[0166] Step S2: Online update and issuance of declarations that meet preset conditions.

[0167] S2.1 Online application for proof of compliance with preset conditions.

[0168] Vehicle owners can apply for proof of compliance with preset conditions from insurance companies, environmental testing agencies, and other relevant entities through the official application platform.

[0169] S2.2 Signature and secure delivery meet preset conditions declaration.

[0170] After the relevant authorities approve the online verification, they use their own post-quantum private key to digitally sign the declaration that meets the preset conditions (such as "the compulsory traffic accident liability insurance is valid until YYYY-MM-DD"), and send it to the vehicle terminal through a secure channel and store it in a secure storage area.

[0171] Step S3: Cross-regional secure passage verification (taking cross-border ports as an example).

[0172] S3.1: Establish roadside verification unit connection.

[0173] When a vehicle enters the port's pre-inspection area, the onboard terminal automatically establishes a connection with the roadside verification unit.

[0174] S3.2: Send a random challenge.

[0175] The roadside verification unit sends a random challenge to the vehicle.

[0176] S3.3: Send the signature certificate and proof that the preset conditions are met.

[0177] The vehicle terminal signs the challenge using its quantum-secure private key and sends its digital certificate, along with the pre-defined conditions required for passage (such as insurance and environmental declarations), to the roadside verification unit.

[0178] S3.4: Multi-level verification of roadside verification units.

[0179] The roadside verification unit first verifies the authenticity and validity of the vehicle certificate using the federated root certificate of the certificate service device (including checking whether the on-chain certificate status is valid). Then, it verifies the challenge signature. Finally, it verifies the signatures of each issuing authority that meet the preset conditions.

[0180] S3.5: Verification result processing.

[0181] All verifications are completed instantly. If all verifications pass, the system automatically triggers a green light signal, the barrier lifts, and seamless passage is achieved. If any verification fails, the system will issue an alarm and switch to manual processing.

[0182] Step S4: Full lifecycle data storage.

[0183] During daily operation, for critical events (such as major accidents, major component repairs, and software upgrades), relevant parties (such as repair shops and regulatory agencies) can generate records with post-quantum key digital signatures, which are then securely stored on the vehicle terminal or uploaded to the consortium blockchain for evidence preservation, forming a tamper-proof digital vehicle history.

[0184] Embodiments of this disclosure also provide a vehicle, including: a memory storing an executable program; and a processor configured to run the program, wherein the program executes the methods of various embodiments of this disclosure when it runs.

[0185] Embodiments of this disclosure also provide a computer-readable storage medium including a stored executable program, wherein, when the executable program is executed, it controls the device on which the computer-readable storage medium resides to perform the methods of the various embodiments of this disclosure.

[0186] Embodiments of this disclosure also provide a computer program product, including a computer program that, when executed by a processor, implements the methods of various embodiments of this disclosure.

[0187] Embodiments of this disclosure also provide a computer program product including a non-volatile computer-readable storage medium configured to store a computer program that, when executed by a processor, implements the methods described in various embodiments of this disclosure.

[0188] Embodiments of this disclosure also provide a computer program that, when executed by a processor, implements the methods described in the various embodiments of this disclosure.

[0189] In the above embodiments of this disclosure, the descriptions of each embodiment have different focuses. For parts not described in detail in a certain embodiment, please refer to the relevant descriptions of other embodiments.

[0190] In the several embodiments provided in this disclosure, it should be understood that the disclosed technical content can be implemented in other ways. The device embodiments described above are merely illustrative; for example, the division of components can be a logical functional division, and in actual implementation, there may be other division methods. For instance, multiple components or components may be combined or integrated into another system, or some features may be ignored or not executed. Furthermore, the displayed or discussed mutual coupling, direct coupling, or communication connection may be through some interface, and the indirect coupling or communication connection of components or components may be electrical or other forms.

[0191] The components described as separate parts may or may not be physically separate. The components shown as components may or may not be physical components; that is, they may be located in one place or distributed across multiple components. Some or all of the components can be selected to achieve the purpose of this embodiment according to actual needs.

[0192] Furthermore, the functional components in the various embodiments of this disclosure can be integrated into a single processing component, or each component can exist physically separately, or two or more components can be integrated into a single component. The integrated components described above can be implemented in hardware or as software functional components.

[0193] If the integrated components are implemented as software functional components and sold or used as independent products, they can be stored in a computer-readable storage medium. Based on this understanding, the technical solution of this disclosure, in essence, or the part that contributes to the prior art, or all or part of the technical solution, can be embodied in the form of a software product. This computer software product is stored in a storage medium and includes several instructions to cause a computer device (which may be a personal computer, server, or network device, etc.) to execute all or part of the steps of the methods described in the various embodiments of this disclosure. The aforementioned storage medium includes various media capable of storing program code, such as USB flash drives, read-only memory (ROM), random access memory (RAM), portable hard drives, magnetic disks, or optical disks.

[0194] The above description is only a preferred embodiment of this disclosure. It should be noted that for those skilled in the art, several improvements and modifications can be made without departing from the principles of this disclosure, and these improvements and modifications should also be considered within the scope of protection of this disclosure.

Claims

1. A hardware security device, characterized by Deployed on vehicles, including: The first communication component is configured to establish a secure encrypted link between the hardware security device and the verification device, and to receive a challenge request sent by the verification device through the secure encrypted link, wherein the verification device is located in the target area, and the challenge request is sent by the verification device when the vehicle enters the target area; A signature component, connected to the first communication component, is configured to sign the challenge request based on the private key in a pre-generated post-quantum key pair, generating a digital signature; The first communication component is further configured to send the digital signature, the digital certificate issued by the certificate service device for the vehicle, and the target declaration file corresponding to the verification device to the verification device via the secure encrypted link, wherein the vehicle leaves the target area when the verification device verifies the vehicle based on the digital signature, the digital certificate, and the target declaration file.

2. The hardware security device of claim 1, wherein, Also includes: The first key generation component is configured to generate a root key based on the physical characteristics of the hardware security device; A second key generation component is configured to generate the post-quantum key pair; The storage component, encrypted and protected by the root key, is configured to store the digital certificate, declaration files corresponding to multiple testing institutions, and the private key, wherein the declaration files corresponding to the multiple testing institutions contain the target declaration file.

3. The hardware security device of claim 2, wherein, The second key generation component includes: Random number generator, configured to generate the first random number; A processor configured to generate the post-quantum key pair based on the random number.

4. The hardware security device of claim 3, wherein, The number of bytes in the first random number is greater than a preset value.

5. The hardware security device of claim 2, wherein, Different declaration files contain digital signatures obtained by encrypting the declaration that the vehicle meets preset conditions using the private key in the quantum key pair after different detection structures.

6. The hardware security device of claim 1, wherein, The first communication component is configured to establish the secure encrypted link by executing a post-quantum key communication protocol.

7. The hardware security device of claim 1, wherein, The signature component is configured to encrypt the second random number in the challenge request using the private key to obtain the digital signature.

8. The hardware security device of claim 1, wherein, The signature component is configured to weight the second random number in the challenge request and the third random number generated by the hardware security device to obtain a fourth random number, and then encrypt the fourth random number using the private key to obtain the digital signature.

9. An in-vehicle device characterized by comprising: Deployed on vehicles, including: The hardware security device according to any one of claims 1 to 8.

10. A certificate service apparatus characterized by comprising: include: A consortium blockchain includes multiple registration authorities located in different regions. A target registration authority among the multiple registration authorities is configured to issue digital certificates to vehicles. The target registration authority is located in the registration area corresponding to the vehicle. The digital certificate is written into the hardware security device according to any one of claims 1 to 8. A contract component, deployed on the consortium blockchain, is configured to synchronize the digital certificate with other registries among the multiple registries. The root certificate management component is configured to generate and manage root certificates based on the security protocols corresponding to the multiple registration authorities, wherein the root certificates are used to verify the digital certificates sent by the vehicle.

11. The certificate service device according to claim 10, characterized by The target registration authority is configured to sign the vehicle information of the vehicle using the private key corresponding to the target registration authority, thereby obtaining the digital certificate.

12. A verification device, characterized by Deployed in the target area, including: The second communication component is configured to establish a secure encrypted link between the verification device and the hardware security device deployed on the vehicle. When the vehicle enters the target area, it sends a challenge request to the hardware security device through the secure encrypted link and receives a digital signature, a digital certificate issued by a certificate service device for the vehicle, and a target declaration file corresponding to the verification device sent by the hardware security device. The verification component has a built-in root certificate synchronized with the certificate service device and is configured to verify the digital signature and the digital certificate to obtain a sub-verification result, wherein the digital certificate is verified using the root certificate synchronized with the certificate service device. The decision component is configured to obtain the verification result of the vehicle based on the sub-verification result and the target declaration file. If the verification result indicates that the vehicle has passed verification, the vehicle leaves the target area. The digital certificate is verified using the root certificate synchronized by the certificate service device.

13. A vehicle verification system, characterized by, include: A vehicle equipped with the hardware security device as described in any one of claims 1 to 8, or the vehicle-mounted device as described in claim 9; The certificate service device as described in claim 10 or 11; The verification device as described in claim 12.

14. A vehicle authentication method characterized by, The hardware security device applied to any one of claims 1 to 8 comprises: When a vehicle enters the target area, a secure encrypted link is established with the verification equipment within the target area; The challenge request sent by the verification device is received through the secure encrypted link; The challenge request is signed using the private key in the post-quantum key pair generated by the hardware security device to obtain a digital signature; Through the secure encrypted link, the digital signature, the digital certificate issued by the certificate service device for the vehicle, and the target declaration file corresponding to the verification device are sent to the verification device. Once the verification device successfully verifies the vehicle based on the digital signature, the digital certificate, and the target declaration file, the vehicle leaves the target area.

15. The method of claim 14, wherein, Using the private key from the post-quantum key pair generated by the hardware security device, the challenge request is signed to obtain a digital signature, including: The digital signature is obtained by encrypting the second random number contained in the challenge request using the private key.

16. The method of claim 14, wherein, The method further includes: The hardware security device is used to generate a third random number; The third random number and the second random number contained in the challenge request are weighted to obtain the fourth random number; The fourth random number is encrypted using the private key to obtain the digital signature.

17. The method of claim 14, wherein, The method further includes: The hardware security device is activated when the vehicle leaves the factory. The root key is generated using the first key generation component in the hardware security device, and the post-quantum key pair is generated using the second key generation component. The system receives a digital certificate issued by a certificate service device for the vehicle, as well as declaration documents corresponding to multiple testing institutions. The digital certificate is obtained by signing the vehicle information using the private key of the target registration institution, which is located in the registration area corresponding to the vehicle. The private key, the digital certificate, and the declaration files corresponding to the multiple testing agencies are stored in a storage component inside the hardware security device, wherein the storage component is encrypted and protected by the root key.

18. The method of claim 17, wherein, The method further includes: The private key is used to digitally sign at least one event generated during the operation of the vehicle to obtain an event record; The event records are stored on the consortium blockchain within the hardware security device or certificate service device.

19. A vehicle authentication method characterized by, The certificate service device described in claim 10 or 11 includes: Vehicle information is received through a target registration authority in the certificate service device, wherein the target registration authority is located within the registration area corresponding to the vehicle; The vehicle information is synchronized to other registration authorities within the certificate service device via the contract component in the certificate service device. The vehicle information is signed using the private key corresponding to the target registration authority to obtain a digital certificate issued for the vehicle, wherein the digital certificate is written into the vehicle's hardware security device.

20. A vehicle authentication method characterized by, Applied to the verification device of claim 12, wherein the verification device is located within a target area, the method includes: When a vehicle enters the target area, a secure encrypted link is established with the hardware security device deployed on the vehicle. Through the secure encrypted link, a challenge request is sent to the hardware security device, and the device receives a digital signature, a digital certificate issued by the certificate service device for the vehicle, and a target declaration file corresponding to the verification device. The digital signature is obtained by signing the challenge request using the private key in the post-quantum key pair generated by the hardware security device. The digital signature, the digital certificate, and the target declaration file are verified to obtain the verification result of the vehicle. If the verification result shows that the vehicle has passed verification, the vehicle leaves the target area. The digital certificate is verified using the root certificate synchronized by the certificate service device.