User-centric authorization in a communication network environment
A user-centric authorization framework in communication networks allows users to define permissions for sharing sensitive information, addressing the lack of control in existing systems and enhancing security and privacy management.
Patent Information
- Application Number
- PCT/EP2026/063232
- Authority / Receiving Office
- WO · WO
- Patent Type
- Applications
- Current Assignee / Owner
- Priority Date
- 2025-05-13
- Filing Date
- 2026-05-07
- Publication Date
- 2026-11-19
AI Technical Summary
Existing security management systems in communication networks lack user-centric authorization mechanisms, particularly in 5G and 6G environments, leading to inadequate control over privacy and identity exposure, and there is no direct mechanism for users to authorize the sharing of sensitive information with third-party applications.
A user-centric authorization framework is introduced, allowing users to define permission parameters for sharing sensitive information, such as GPSI, through digitally signed data objects, enabling fine-grained authorization and alignment with privacy regulations.
Enhances user control over privacy and identity exposure, improves security by enabling flexible and explicit user permissions, and empowers network operators to enforce privacy policies while respecting user preferences.
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Abstract
Description
[0001] USER-CENTRIC AUTHORIZATION IN A COMMUNICATION NETWORK ENVIRONMENT
[0002] Field
[0003] The field relates generally to communication networks, and more particularly, but not exclusively, to security management in such communication networks.
[0004] Background
[0005] This section introduces aspects that may be helpful in facilitating a better understanding of the inventions. Accordingly, the statements of this section are to be read in this light and are not to be understood as admissions about what is in the prior art or what is not in the prior art.
[0006] Advancements in communication network technologies have rapidly progressed over recent years.
[0007] Fourth generation (4G) wireless mobile telecommunications technology, also known as Long Term Evolution (LTE) technology, provided high-capacity mobile multimedia with high data rates particularly for human interaction, as compared with previous generations of communication networks.
[0008] Fifth generation (5G) technology currently provides not only for human interaction use cases, but also for machine type communications in so-called Internet of Things (loT) networks. While 5G networks enable massive loT services (e.g., very large numbers of limited capacity devices) and mission-critical loT services (e.g., requiring high reliability), improvements over 4G communication services are supported in the form of enhanced mobile broadband (eMBB) services providing improved wireless Internet access for mobile devices.
[0009] Sixth generation (6G) technology is now being developed for communication networks that differs from 5G technology by offering, inter aha, significant improvements in speed and latency (e.g., the Ultra-Reliable Low-Latency Communication (URLLC) service that began with 5G is being refined and improved in 6G to address more stringent connectivity requirements), as well as the capability to sense a physical environment through expanded spectrum band usage. Such sensing capability enables creation of a digital twin of the physical environment which leads to new applications such as, but not limited to, highly accurate localization and immersive experiences. Furthermore, in 6G technology, artificial intelligence (Al) applications, which may include machine learning (ML) applications, are intended to be more readily utilized to facilitate various communication network functionalities.However, security management is an important consideration in any communication network environment - and now especially ones that provide for applications such as localization, immersion, Al, and the like. Moreover, security management is an ongoing consideration due to continuing attempts to improve the architectures and protocols associated with communication networks in order to increase network efficiency and / or subscriber convenience. Accordingly, security management can present significant technical challenges.
[0010] Summary
[0011] Illustrative embodiments provide techniques for user-centric authorization in a communication network environment. While the techniques are particularly well suited for authorization in accordance with user equipment interacting with one or more third party applications or services, the techniques are more generally applicable to other use cases.
[0012] In one illustrative embodiment, a method includes sending, from a user equipment, an application session establishment request, including a data object digitally signed by the user equipment, towards an application entity, the data object including at least one user equipment-defined permission parameter to authorize a communication network to provide data associated with the user equipment to the application entity. The method further includes receiving, by the user equipment, an application session establishment response from the application entity.
[0013] In another illustrative embodiment, a method includes receiving from a user equipment, at an application entity, an application session establishment request including a data object digitally signed by the user equipment, the data object including at least one user equipment-defined permission parameter to authorize a communication network to provide data associated with the user equipment to the application entity. The method further includes sending to the communication network, from the application entity, an application key request, the application key request including the data object.
[0014] In a further illustrative embodiment, a method includes receiving, at an application key management entity, an application key request from an application entity, the application key request including a data object digitally signed by a user equipment, the data object including at least one user equipment-defined permission parameter to authorize the application key management entity to provide data associated with the user equipment to the application entity. The method further includes sending, from the application key management entity, a permission validation request to an authentication entity in the communication network, the permission validation request including the data object and a subscription identifier for the user equipment.Further illustrative embodiments are provided in the form of a non-transitory computer readable medium having embodied therein executable program code that when executed by a processor causes the processor to perform the above and / or other steps, operations, and the like. Still further illustrative embodiments comprise an apparatus with a processor and a memory configured to perform the above and / or other steps, operations, and the like. Some illustrative embodiments comprise a system configured to perform the above and / or other steps, operations, and the like. Further, some illustrative embodiments comprise an apparatus or a system comprising means for performing the above and / or other steps, operations, and the like.
[0015] Advantageously, illustrative embodiments provide, inter alia, enhanced user control over their privacy and identity exposure; improved security by enabling fine-grained authorization mechanisms, alignment with privacy regulations by introducing explicit user permissions, flexibility for different applications, services, and access conditions, and empowerment of network operators with a structured mechanism to enforce privacy policies while respecting user preferences.
[0016] These and other features and advantages of embodiments described herein will become more apparent from the accompanying drawings and the following detailed description.
[0017] Brief Description of the Drawings
[0018] FIG. 1 illustrates a communication network environment with which one or more illustrative embodiments may be implemented.
[0019] FIG. 2 illustrates user equipment and entities with which one or more illustrative embodiments may be implemented.
[0020] FIG. 3 illustrates a user-centric authorization procedure in a communication network environment according to an illustrative embodiment.
[0021] Detailed Description
[0022] Embodiments will be illustrated herein in conjunction with example communication systems and associated techniques for security management in communication systems. It should be understood, however, that the scope of the claims is not limited to particular types of communication systems and / or processes disclosed. Embodiments can be implemented in a wide variety of other types of communication systems, using alternative processes and operations. For example, although illustrated in the context of wireless cellular systems utilizing the 3rd Generation Partnership Project (3GPP) system elements such as a 3GPP next generation system(5G), the disclosed embodiments can be adapted in a straightforward manner to a variety of other types of communication systems such as 6G communication systems.
[0023] In accordance with illustrative embodiments implemented in 5G / 6G communication system environments, one or more 3GPP technical specifications (TS) and technical reports (TR) may provide further explanation of network elements / functions and / or operations that may interact with parts of the inventive solutions. By way of example only, Technical Specification (TS) 33.501, entitled “Technical Specification Group Services and System Aspects; Security Architecture and Procedures for the 5G System,” the disclosure of which is incorporated by reference herein in its entirety, describes security management details applicable to 5G and other networks. Other 3 GPP TS / TR documents may provide other details that one of ordinary skill in the art will realize, for example, 3GPP TS 23.273, entitled “Technical Specification Group Services and System Aspects; 5G System (5GS) Location Services (LCS),” 3GPP TS 29.515, entitled “Technical Specification Group Core Network and Terminals; 5G System; Gateway Mobile Location Services,” 3GPP TS 33.220, entitled “Technical Specification Group Services and System Aspects; Generic Authentication Architecture (GAA); Generic Bootstrapping Architecture (GBA),” and 3GPP TS 33.535, entitled “Technical Specification Group Services and System Aspects; Authentication and Key Management for Applications (AKMA) based on 3GPP credentials in the 5G System (5GS),” the disclosures of which are incorporated by reference herein in their entireties. Note that 3GPP TS / TR documents are non-limiting examples of communication network standards (e.g., specifications, procedures, reports, requirements, recommendations, and the like). However, while well-suited for 5G-related and other 3GPP standards, embodiments are not necessarily intended to be limited to any particular standards.
[0024] It is to be understood that the term 5G network, and the like (e.g., 5G system, 5G communication system, 5G environment, 5G communication environment etc.), in some illustrative embodiments, may comprise all or part of an access network and all or part of a core network. However, the term 5G network, and the like, may also occasionally be used interchangeably herein with the term 5GC network, and the like, without any loss of generality, since one of ordinary skill in the art understands any distinctions. Also, it is to be understood that terms and descriptions used for 5G networks can apply to 6G and other networks.
[0025] Prior to describing illustrative embodiments, a general description of certain main components of a communication network environment will be described below in the context of FIGS. 1 and 2.
[0026] FIG. 1 shows a communication system 100 within which illustrative embodiments are implemented. It is to be understood that the elements shown in communication system 100 areintended to represent some main functions provided within the system, e.g., control plane functions, user plane functions, etc. As such, the blocks shown in FIG. 1 reference specific elements in 5G networks that provide some of these main functions. However, other network elements may be used to implement some or all of the main functions represented. Also, it is to be understood that not all functions of a 5G network are depicted in FIG. 1. Rather, at least some functions that facilitate an explanation of illustrative embodiments are represented. Subsequent figures may depict some additional elements / functions (i.e. , network entities).
[0027] Accordingly, as shown, communication system 100 comprises user equipment (UE) 102 that communicates via an air interface 103 with an access point 104. It is to be understood that UE 102 may use one or more other types of access points (e.g., access functions, networks, etc.) to communicate with the 5GC network other than a gNB. By way of example only, the access point 104 may be any 5G access network (gNB), an untrusted non-3GPP access network that uses an Non-3GPP Interworking Function (N3IWF), a trusted non-3GPP network that uses a Trusted Non-3GPP Gateway Function (TNGF) or wireline access that uses a Wireline Access Gateway Function (W-AGF) or may correspond to a legacy access point (e.g., eNB). Furthermore, access point 104 may be a wireless local area network (WLAN) access point as may be applicable to illustrative embodiments described herein.
[0028] The UE 102 may be a mobile station, and such a mobile station may comprise, by way of example, a mobile telephone, a computer, an loT device, or any other type of communication device. The term “user equipment” as used herein is therefore intended to be construed broadly, so as to encompass a variety of different types of mobile stations, subscriber stations or, more generally, communication devices, including examples such as a combination of a data card inserted in a laptop or other equipment such as a smart phone. Such communication devices are also intended to encompass devices commonly referred to as access terminals.
[0029] In one illustrative embodiment, UE 102 is comprised of a Universal Integrated Circuit Card (UICC) part and a Mobile Equipment (ME) part. The UICC is the user-dependent part of the UE and contains at least one Universal Subscriber Identity Module (USIM) and appropriate application software. The USIM securely stores a permanent subscription identifier and its related key, which are used to uniquely identify and authenticate subscribers to access networks. The ME is the user-independent part of the UE and contains terminal equipment (TE) functions and various mobile termination (MT) functions. Alternative illustrative embodiments may not use UICC-based authentication, e.g., aNon-Public (Private) Network (NPN).
[0030] Note that, in one example, the permanent subscription identifier is an International Mobile Subscriber Identity (IMSI) unique to the UE. In one embodiment, the IMSI is a fixed 15-digitlength and consists of a 3-digit Mobile Country Code (MCC), a 3-digit Mobile Network Code (MNC), and a 9-digit Mobile Station Identification Number (MSIN). In a 5G communication system, an IMSI is referred to as a Subscription Permanent Identifier (SUPI). In the case of an IMS I as a SUPI, the MSIN provides the subscriber identity. Thus, only the MSIN portion of the IMSI typically needs to be encrypted. The MNC and MCC portions of the IMSI provide routing information, used by the serving network to route to the correct home network. When the MSIN of a SUPI is encrypted, it is referred to as Subscription Concealed Identifier (SUCI). Another example of a SUPI uses a Network Access Identifier (NAI). NAI is typically used for loT communication.
[0031] The access point 104 is illustratively part of a radio access network or RAN of the communication system 100. Such a radio access network may comprise, for example, a 5G System having a plurality of base stations. Components of a radio access network may, more generally, be considered “radio access entities.”
[0032] Further, the access point 104 in this illustrative embodiment is operatively coupled to an Access and Mobility Management Function (AMF) 106. In a 5G network, the AMF supports, inter alia, mobility management (MM) and security anchor (SEAF) functions.
[0033] AMF 106 in this illustrative embodiment is operatively coupled to (e.g., uses the services of) other network functions 108. As shown, some of these other network functions 108 include, but are not limited to, an Authentication and Key Management for Applications (AKMA) Anchor Function (AAnF), an Application Function(s) (AF(s)), an Authentication Server Function (AUSF), and a Unified Data Management (UDM) function.
[0034] AKMA is a protocol that enables authentication between a UE and one or more AFs and respective establishment of secure connections to enable the user (UE) to utilize applications (services enabled by the AFs). An AAnF is the anchor function associated with AKMA in the UE’s (subscriber’s) home network that generates key material to be used between the UE and the AF and maintains UE AKMA contexts. AKMA and AAnF will be further described below.
[0035] An AUSF verifies a UE’s identity when the UE attempts to connect to a 5G network, e.g., by communicating with the UDM function which stores UE subscriber data and profiles. These listed network function examples are typically implemented in the home network of the UE subscriber, and further explained below.
[0036] Other network functions 108 may include network functions that can act as service producers (NFp) and / or service consumers (NFc). Note that any network function can be a service producer for one service and a service consumer for another service. Further, when the service being provided includes data, the data-providing NFp is referred to as a data producer, while thedata-requesting NFc is referred to as a data consumer. A data producer may also be an NF that generates data by modifying or otherwise processing data produced by another NF. Note that NFs may, more generally, be considered “network entities.”
[0037] Note that a UE, such as UE 102, is typically subscribed to what is referred to as a Home Public Land Mobile Network (HPLMN) in which some or all of the functions 106 and 108 reside. Alternatively the UE, such as UE 102, may receive services from aNon-Public Network (NPN) where these functions may reside. The HPLMN is also referred to as the Home Environment (HE). If the UE is roaming (not in the HPLMN), it is typically connected with a Visited Public Land Mobile Network (VPLMN) also referred to as a visited network, while the network that is currently serving the UE is also referred to as a serving network. In the roaming case, some of the functions 106 and 108 can reside in the VPLMN, in which case, functions in the VPLMN communicate with functions in the HPLMN as needed. However, in a non-roaming scenario, access and mobility management functions 106 and the other network functions 108 reside in the same communication network, i.e., HPLMN. Embodiments described herein, unless otherwise specified, are not necessarily limited by which functions reside in which PLMN (i.e., HPLMN or VPLMN).
[0038] The access point 104 is also operatively coupled (via one or more of functions 106 and / or 108) to a Session Management Function (SMF) 110, which is operatively coupled to a User Plane Function (UPF) 112. UPF 112 is operatively coupled to a Packet Data Network, e.g., Internet 114. Note that the thicker solid lines in this figure denote a user plane (UP) of the communication network, as compared to the thinner solid lines that denote a control plane (CP) of the communication network. It is to be appreciated that network (e.g., Internet) 114 in FIG. 1 may additionally or alternatively represent other network infrastructures including, but not limited to, cloud computing infrastructure and / or edge computing infrastructure. Further typical operations and functions of such network elements are not described here since they are not the focus of the illustrative embodiments and may be found in appropriate 3GPP 5G documentation. Note that functions shown in 106, 108, 110 and 112 are examples of network functions (NFs).
[0039] It is to be appreciated that this particular arrangement of system elements is an example only, and other types and arrangements of additional or alternative elements can be used to implement a communication system in other embodiments. For example, in other embodiments, the communication system 100 may comprise other elements / functions not expressly shown herein.
[0040] Accordingly, the FIG. 1 arrangement is just one example configuration of a wireless cellular system, and numerous alternative configurations of system elements may be used. For example, although only single elements / functions are shown in the FIG. 1 embodiment, this is forsimplicity and clarity of description only. A given alternative embodiment may of course include larger numbers of such system elements, as well as additional or alternative elements of a type commonly associated with conventional system implementations.
[0041] It is also to be noted that while FIG. 1 illustrates system elements as singular functional blocks, the various subnetworks that make up the network may be partitioned into so-called network slices. Network slices (network partitions) are logical networks that provide specific network capabilities and network characteristics that can support a corresponding service type, optionally using network function virtualization (NFV) on a common physical infrastructure. With NFV, network slices are instantiated as needed for a given service, e.g., eMBB service, massive loT service, and mission-critical loT service. A network slice or function is thus instantiated when an instance of that network slice or function is created. In some embodiments, this involves installing or otherwise running the network slice or function on one or more host devices of the underlying physical infrastructure. UE 102 is configured to access one or more of these services via access point 104.
[0042] FIG. 2 is a block diagram illustrating computing architectures for various participants in methodologies according to illustrative embodiments. More particularly, system 200 is shown comprising user equipment (UE) 202 and a plurality of entities 204-1, . . . . , 204-N. For example, in illustrative embodiments and with reference back to FIG. 1, UE 202 can represent UE 102, while entities 204-1, . . . , 204-N can represent functions 106 and 108 (i.e., network entities such as, but not limited to, AAnf, AF, AUSF, UDM, etc.), and as will be described in illustrative embodiments herein, a Gateway Mobile Location Center (GMLC), as well as access point 104 (i.e., radio access entity such as, but not limited to, a RAN node or gNB). It is to be appreciated that the UE 202 and entities 204-1, . . . . , 204-N are configured to interact to provide security management and other techniques described herein.
[0043] The user equipment 202 comprises a processor 212 coupled to a memory 216 and interface circuitry 210. The processor 212 of the user equipment 202 includes a security management processing module 214 that may be implemented at least in part in the form of software executed by the processor. The security management processing module 214 performs security management described in conjunction with subsequent figures and otherwise herein. The memory 216 of the user equipment 202 includes a security management storage module 218 that stores data generated or otherwise used during security management operations.
[0044] Each of the entities (individually or collectively referred to herein as 204) comprises a processor 222 (222-1, . . . , 222 -N) coupled to a memory 226 (226-1, . . . , 226-N) and interface circuitry 220 (220-1, . . . , 220-N). Each processor 222 of each entity 204 includes a securitymanagement processing module 224 (224-1, . . . , 224-N) that may be implemented at least in part in the form of software executed by the processor 222. The security management processing module 224 performs security management operations described in conjunction with subsequent figures and otherwise herein. Each memory 226 of each entity 204 includes a security management storage module 228 (228-1, . . . , 228-N) that stores data generated or otherwise used during security management operations.
[0045] The processors 212 and 222 may comprise, for example, microprocessors such as central processing units (CPUs), application-specific integrated circuits (ASICs), digital signal processors (DSPs) or other types of processing devices, as well as portions or combinations of such elements.
[0046] The memories 216 and 226 may be used to store one or more software programs that are executed by the respective processors 212 and 222 to implement at least a portion of the functionality described herein. For example, security management operations and other functionality as described in conjunction with subsequent figures and otherwise herein may be implemented in a straightforward manner using software code executed by processors 212 and 222.
[0047] A given one of the memories 216 and 226 may therefore be viewed as an example of what is more generally referred to herein as a computer program product or still more generally as a computer or processor readable (non-transitory or storage) medium that has executable program code embodied therein. Other examples of computer or processor readable media may include disks or other types of magnetic or optical media, in any combination. Illustrative embodiments can include articles of manufacture comprising such computer program products or other computer or processor readable media.
[0048] Further, the memories 216 and 226 may more particularly comprise, for example, electronic random-access memory (RAM) such as static RAM (SRAM), dynamic RAM (DRAM) or other types of volatile or non-volatile electronic memory. The latter may include, for example, non-volatile memories such as flash memory, magnetic RAM (MRAM), phase-change RAM (PC-RAM) or ferroelectric RAM (FRAM). The term “memory” as used herein is intended to be broadly construed, and may additionally or alternatively encompass, for example, a read-only memory (ROM), a disk-based memory, or other type of storage device, as well as portions or combinations of such devices.
[0049] The interface circuitries 210 and 220 illustratively comprise transceivers or other communication hardware or firmware that allows the associated system elements to communicate with one another in the manner described herein.It is apparent from FIG. 2 that user equipment 202 and plurality of entities 204 are configured for communication with each other as security management participants via their respective interface circuitries 210 and 220. This communication involves each participant sending data to and / or receiving data from one or more of the other participants. The term “data” as used herein is intended to be construed broadly, so as to encompass any type of information that may be sent between participants including, but not limited to, identity data, key pairs, key indicators, tokens and other data objects, secrets, security management messages, registration request / response messages and data, request / response messages, authentication request / response messages and data, metadata, control data, audio, video, multimedia, consent data, analytics results, other messages, etc.
[0050] It is to be appreciated that the particular arrangement of components shown in FIG. 2 is an example only, and numerous alternative configurations may be used in other embodiments. For example, any given network element / function and / or access point can be configured to incorporate additional or alternative components and to support other communication protocols.
[0051] Other system elements such as access point 104, SMF 110, and UPF 112 may each be configured to include components such as a processor, memory and network interface. Also, entities such as third-party applications and network operators can participate in methodologies described herein via computing devices configured to include components such as a processor, memory and network interface. These elements and devices need not be implemented on separate stand-alone processing platforms, but could instead, for example, represent different functional portions of a single common processing platform.
[0052] More generally, FIG. 2 can be considered to represent processing devices configured to provide respective security management functionalities and operatively coupled to one another in a communication system. By way of example only, all or parts of each of UE 202 and the plurality of entities 204 (e.g., processor and memory) can be considered examples of means for performing one or more operations, one or more steps, one or more functions, one or more processes, etc. as described herein.
[0053] Given the above general description of some features of a communication network environment, problems with existing security approaches in the context of application authorization and solutions proposed in accordance with illustrative embodiments, will now be described herein below.
[0054] Further to the description above, AKMA is a mechanism that allows applications to leverage the UE authentication performed by the PLMN for further authentication and authorization. AKMA also enables the secure distribution of application-specific security keys tothe UE. Further details on the AKMA procedure can be found in the above-referenced TS 33.535. AKMA details relevant to illustrative embodiments include, by way of example, the following:
[0055] (i) AAnF is responsible for managing AKMA authentication and key provisioning. (ii) AKMA Application Key (KAF) is a key specific to the AF Identifier (AF_ID), derived from the primary authentication between the UE and the 5G network. (iii) A-KID is an identifier used for authentication, derived from A-TID (itself derived from KAUSF generated by AUSF and the SUPI of the UE) and follows the NAI (Network Access Identifier) format: usemame@realm (constructed using A-TID, Routing-Identifier, and PLMN).
[0056] (iv) AF is the application entity that requests authentication and security keys from the 5G network to enable secure communication with the UE.
[0057] The application in the UE gets access to the AKMA Application Key (KAF) pertaining to only the AF Identifier (AF ID). KAF in the UE is derived and leveraged from primary authentication which the UE performs with the 5G network. In one or more illustrative embodiments, a process involves an AF authenticating a UE with A-KID (e.g., derived from A-TID and KAUSF) and KAF (e.g., derived from KAKMA and AF ID). A-KID is typically in the format of NAI, e.g., usemame@realm, which is composed from A-TID (e.g., derived from KAUSF and SUPI), Routing-Identifier, and PLMN.
[0058] When an AF retrieves KAF, the AF may optionally request UE identity information such as a Generic Public Subscription Identifier (GPSI). In existing approaches, the decision to provide this information rests with the AAnF, which follows operator-defined local policies. More particularly, the decision to disclose GPSI or other sensitive information to an AF is controlled by operator policies at the AAnF. As such, there is currently no direct mechanism to enable user authorization (e.g., permissions and control) over the sharing of its sensitive information in the context of applications / services associated with AFs.
[0059] To address the above and other technical drawbacks with existing security management, illustrative embodiments introduce a user-centric authorization framework. In some illustrative embodiments, the user-centric authorization framework allows, inter aha, the UE owner (user) to:
[0060] (i) Authorize whether an AF should receive GPSI or other UE-sensitive information from the operator network.
[0061] (ii) Control and influence the operator network’ s decision to provide GPSI or other UE- sensitive information to the AF.
[0062] (iii) Specify authorization conditions (e.g., permission parameters), such as, e.g.:
[0063] - Time-based constraints (e.g., valid for the next 24 hours).Geographic restrictions (e.g., only within a specific region).
[0064] - Application-specific permissions (e.g., allow AF1 but deny AF2).
[0065] It is to be understood that while illustrative embodiments describe GPSI as the UE-sensitive information associated with the user, alternative embodiments can be used to get permissions from the user by the operator or other entity for any network services, applications, or information such as, but not limited to, UE location, K-ID expiry, regional access, contact information, etc.
[0066] Moreover, in some illustrative embodiments, the user-centric authorization described herein may be performed after authentication between the AF and the home network of the UE -such AF-home network authentication using, for example, a framework such as, e.g., Common Application Programming Interface (API) Framework (CAPIF) CAPIF allows secure exposure of 5G core APIs to third-party domains and enables third parties to define and expose their own APIs. However, one or more illustrative embodiments propose a minimal authorization mechanism (such as for location sharing, regional access, contact information, etc., which also involves user permissions) to be integrated within existing authentication procedures defined by 3GPP.
[0067] Still further, in one or more illustrative embodiments, the user-centric (e.g., user-controlled) authorization enables the user (via UE) to proactively authorize or restrict access to specific information and services during the AKMA-based authentication procedure. The proposed framework is flexible and extensible, allowing users to authorize not only GPSI access but also other network-based services. Some non-limiting use cases include:
[0068] (i) Authorizing the use of A-KID under specific geographic (spatial) or time (temporal) constraints, e.g.:
[0069] - Restricting AFs from using A-KID outside certain geographic regions or beyond a defined duration.
[0070] - Enhancing security by preventing misuse of A-KID outside approved contexts. (ii) Authorizing AF access to telecommunication services (e.g., location, dedicated network slice, quality-of-service (QoS), guaranteed bit rate (GBR)) or use data stored in core network.
[0071] (ii) Authorizing and authenticating the use of temporary identifiers (e.g., A-KID) for specific purposes, e.g., for gaming, social -media, emergency-applications, etc. The following description describes a user-centric authorization mechanism, according to one or more illustrative embodiments, with an example of how the UE may proactively provide permissions to enable an AF to access its location / avatar / other personal information from the network operator for the AF to provide the intended services.
[0072] Assume UE and AF are connected via AKMA:(i) User provides permissions for AFs (example: location access allowed= true, validity = 5 min) to UE, e.g., via an application accessible by the UE. For example, the UE generates an AKMA-based permission token (more generally, a data object). The UE provides the AKMA-based permission token to the AF having a different claim (e.g., one of them is location access= true, expiry= 2 min) and the AF caches the permission token. The permission token is signed by a UE key. (ii) Assume the AF wants to retrieve the location / avatar / other personal information of the UE, so it requests the operator (e.g., GMLC or other NF such as Network Exposure Function (NEF)) and provides the permission token.
[0073] (iii) GMLC or other NF (e.g., NEF) can request the AAnF / AUSF to validate the permission token and, if it is successful, then GMLC can provide the location without requesting dynamic permissions collection from the user as defined in existing CAPIF framework.
[0074] In one or more illustrative embodiments, the permission token can be in the form of a JavaScript Object Notation (JSON) web token (JWT). More particularly, the user permissions for various claims is embedded in the permission token which follows standard JWT formatting structure, see, e.g., Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF) Request for Comments 7519 (RFC 7519), entitled “JSON Web Token (JWT),” the disclosure of which is incorporated by reference herein in its entirety.
[0075] In one non-limiting example, a JWT structure for a permission token may include:
[0076] Header:
[0077] “alg” would refer to a symmetric algorithm such as, e.g., HMAC-SHA256 with a secret derived using existing AKMA mechanisms.
[0078] Payload:
[0079] Refer to RFC 7519 for generic claims and their significance such as “iss,” “iat,” “sub,” “aud,” etc. In addition, illustrative embodiments further define “aaf,” “ans,” and “grs” as follows:
[0080] 1. allowedApplicationFunctions (aal)
[0081] - Specifies which application functions are authorized for the user.
[0082] - Example values: “social-service,” “games,” “emergency.”
[0083] 2. allowedNetworkServices (ans)
[0084] - Defines which network services are allowed:
[0085] - “location” - permission for the application to access the user’s location. - “contact” - permission to retrieve the user’s contact information (e.g., GPSI).- “preferential-qos” - defines QoS settings, e.g., gold class with 100Mbps bandwidth.
[0086] 3. geoRestrictions (grs)
[0087] - Adds an extra security layer to restrict access based on geography and time validity.
[0088] - Example: allowing access only in India (IN) and the United States (US) until December 31, 2025.
[0089] An example of JWT with example values could be:
[0090] Header:
[0091] "alg": "HS256",
[0092] "typ": "JWT"
[0093] Payload:
[0094] "sub": "A-KID".
[0095] "iss": "GPSI or EXT-ID", (optional)
[0096] "aud": "AF",
[0097] "exp": 1704057600,
[0098] "iat": 1704054000,
[0099] "allowedApplicationFunctions": [
[0100] "social-service",
[0101] "games",
[0102] "emergency”
[0103] ],
[0104] "allowedNetworkServices": {
[0105] "location": true, / / This is needed in our case for Network to allow location retrieval to the AF
[0106] "contact": true,
[0107] "preferential-qos": {
[0108] "qos-class": "gold",
[0109] "max-bandwidth": "100Mbps""geoRestrictions": {
[0110] "allowedRegions": ["IN", "US"],
[0111] "validUntil": "2025-12-31T23:59:59Z"
[0112] In one or more illustrative embodiments, a JWT permission token generated in the above manner can be referred to as A-KID-ACCESS which can be digitally signed using a symmetric HS256 algorithm as specified in Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF) Request for Comments 7515 (RFC 7515), entitled “JSON Web Signature (JWS),” the disclosure of which is incorporated by reference herein in its entirety.
[0113] In one or more illustrative embodiments, the symmetric algorithm key, KJWT could be derived independently both by the UE and network providers as described in one of the two illustrative methods below:
[0114] Method 1 :
[0115] When deriving a KJWT from KAUSF, the following parameters can be used to form the input S to the key derivation function (KDF):
[0116] FC = OxXY ; (some agreed number)
[0117] P0 = "JWT";
[0118] L0 = length of "JWT"; (i.e., 0x000x03)
[0119] Pl = SUPI;
[0120] LI = length of SUPI.
[0121] The input key is KAUSF.
[0122] In this non-limiting use case, it is assumed:
[0123] (i) The key derivation function (KDF) is specified in the above-referenced TS 33.220. (ii) KJWT is derived from KAUSF to provide a service at AUSF to perform permissionvalidation.
[0124] (iii) Also, the parameters such as P0, Pl are not limited to “JWT” and SUPI. They can be extended such as, e.g., P3=<The USER EXT-ID>, P4=<User-Secret-known-to-Operator>, and so on.
[0125] Method 2:
[0126] When deriving a KJWT from KAUSF, the following parameters can be used to form the input S to the KDF:
[0127] FC = OxXY ; (an agreed number)
[0128] P0 = AF ID;L0 = length of AF ID
[0129] Pl = SUPI;
[0130] LI = length of SUPI.
[0131] 4. In one or more illustrative embodiments, the input key can be the KAUSF.
[0132] KJWT, derived from KAUSF, is then used to sign the JWT as per the above-referenced RFC 7515 to generate permission token, e.g., A-KID-ACCESS.
[0133] Moreover, regarding the JWT structure example above, the following should be understood:
[0134] (i) The “sub” (subject) claim is not limited to just the A-KID. It could also represent the UE’s AF Client ID, depending on the context of the JWT usage.
[0135] (ii) The “iss” (issuer) claim can be a GPSI, an EXT-ID, or even another A-KID - for example, in scenarios where a public UE is being accessed by individual users, this could be the individual’s A-KID.
[0136] (iii) The “aud” (audience) claim represents the target AF that is intended to consume the JWT - typically specified as the AF ID. Validation of the JWT is done by the 5GC network.
[0137] Referring now to FIG. 3, a user-centric authorization procedure (a procedure 300) is depicted in a communication network environment according to an illustrative embodiment. As shown, procedure 300 involves a UE 302, an AAnF 304, a GMLC 306, an AUSF 308, a UDM 310, and an AF 312. Procedure 300 includes steps 0-13 described as follows:
[0138] Step 0 and pre-requisite: UE 302 latches to the operator network, which implies that AUSF 308 would register the UE’s SUPI, A-KID and KAKMA with AAnF 304.
[0139] UE 302 generates a permission token, e.g., A-KID-ACCESS (JWT) with the necessary claims and user permissions, ensuring authorization control, as illustratively described above.
[0140] A-KID-TOKEN generation logic is as follows. The user at UE 302 generates the necessary claims (an example is provided below). The token generation could be done using the network operator’s trusted application client that resides in the user’s device, i.e., UE 302. The signature is performed using the HS256 (HMAC-SHA256) algorithm with symmetric key / secret A-KID-ACCESS - being the key derived from the AKMA procedures.
[0141] Step 1: Application Session Establishment Request
[0142] UE 302 AF 312: Sends A-KID and A-KID-ACCESS, which acts as an access token for authorization. In this case, the claim consists of location=true and contact=true.
[0143] Step 2: AF 312 requests application key
[0144] AF 312 AAnF 304: Sends Naanf_AKMA_ApplicationKey_Get Request with (A-KID, AF ID and A-KID-TOKEN).AAnF 304 processes the request as specified in the above-referenced 3GPP TS 33.535. In the existing version of the TS 33.535 process, the retrieval of GPSI (and expTime, etc.) and its provision to the AF is subject to the local operator’s policy. With the introduction of A-KID-ACCESS, in accordance with illustrative embodiments, AAnF 304 now validates A-KID-ACCESS before proceeding to provide the GPSI and other claims that the user has requested or explicitly provided permissions for.
[0145] The A-KID- ACCESS validation can be performed if the AF 312 has the capability to verify the signature. Therefore, the validation and claims verification depend on who is responsible for deriving or accessing the KJWT.
[0146] In the use case here, AUSF 308 is capable to validate A-KID-ACCESS as it can derive KJWT out of KAUSF.
[0147] AAnF 304 uses AUSF new service API to perform validation checks, i.e., check contact=true.
[0148] Step 3: AUSF Permission Validation Request
[0149] Once AUSF 308 receives the Nausf_PermissionValidation request with TokenValidationRequest, it can retrieve token-data from TokenValidationRequest. The tokendata here is A-KID-ACCESS.
[0150] Step 4: AUSF A-KID-ACCESS Validation
[0151] A-KID-ACCESS has the issuer (iss), subject (sub), the audience (aud) and various claims. In the use case here, iss=GPSI / EXT-ID, sub=A-KID and aud=AF-ID and claims are allowing location=true and allowing contact-sharing=true.
[0152] AUSF 308 checks the signature part of A-KID-ACCESS using the KJWT.
[0153] Step 5: AUSF Permission Validation Response
[0154] AUSF 308 sends a success or failure response back to AAnF 304 depending on the validation of A-KID-ACCESS using the KJWT in step 4. A specific permission validation service / API may be defined.
[0155] Step 6: UE Identifier Retrieval Request
[0156] AAnF 304 —> UDM 310: Sends Nudm_SDM_Get Request (Identifier Translation, SUPI, A-KID-ACCESS). Since A-KID-ACCESS is validated, i.e., contact=true, AAnF 304 calls the Subscriber Data Management (SDM) service of UDM 310 to retrieve the GPSI.
[0157] Step 7: AF Key and GPSI Response
[0158] AAnF 304 —> AF 312: Returns Naanf_AKMA_ApplicationKey_Get Response with (KAF, expTime, SUPI / GPSI). AAnF 304 also informs that permission token is valid.
[0159] Step 8: Session Establishment ResponseAAnF 304 UE 302: Completes the session by sending the Application Session Establishment Response.
[0160] Step 9: Cache A-KID-ACCESS
[0161] AF 312 caches the A-KID-ACCESS token for future usage and session continuity.
[0162] Step 10: Further Authorization: Access Location Service
[0163] AF 312 uses A-KID-ACCESS to request location services from GMLC 306.
[0164] In one example, obtaining location from GMLC 306 can include:
[0165] 1) AF 312 or NF (e.g., NEF, UDM) sends a location request to GMLC 306 using Na-LCS APIs.
[0166] 2) GMLC 306 authorizes and authenticates the request via OAuth 2.0 or CAPIF.
[0167] 3) GMLC 306 communicates with AMF (Access and Mobility Management Function, not expressly shown in FIG. 3), which fetches location from gNB (RAN, not expressly shown in FIG. 3) to get the user location.
[0168] 4) AMF queries the gNB (RAN) to retrieve the location of the UE 302.
[0169] 5) The final location response (e.g., latitude, longitude, and accuracy) is sent back to the requesting entity.
[0170] The AF 312 can use the stored A-KID-ACCESS and pack them while calling an API towards GMLC 306.
[0171] The permission enhancement to the API definition is specified at the end of the code below: paths:
[0172] / provide-location:
[0173] post:
[0174] summary: Request Location of a UE
[0175] operationld: RequestLocation
[0176] requestBody:
[0177] content:
[0178] application / json:
[0179] schema:
[0180] $ref: '# / components / schemas / InputData'
[0181] required: true
[0182] InputData:
[0183] description: Contains the input parameters in ProvideLocation service operationtype: object
[0184] required:
[0185] - extemalClientType
[0186] properties:
[0187] gpsi:
[0188] $ref: 'TS29571_CommonData.yaml# / components / schemas / Gpsi'
[0189] supi:
[0190] $ref: 'TS29571_CommonData.yaml# / components / schemas / Supi'
[0191] permission:
[0192] description: JWT token string to be validated.
[0193] type: string
[0194] Steps 11 and 12: Validate A-KID-ACCESS
[0195] GMLC 306 validates the A-KID-ACCESS token to ensure the request can be processed as it is coming from authorized AF 312 with user-permissions. This is done by accessing APIs of AUSF 308. This is essentially the same as step 3 to step 5.
[0196] Step 13: Authorization for Location Access
[0197] If validation is successful, GMLC 306 authorizes access to location services for the requested entity, e.g., refer to the above-referenced TS 23.273 (Location Services).
[0198] Advantageously, illustrative embodiments provide many technical advantages including but not limited to: (i) enhance user control over their privacy and identity exposure; (ii) improve security by enabling fine-grained authorization mechanisms; (iii) align with privacy regulations such as, e.g., the European Union’s General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) by introducing explicit user permissions; (iv) provide flexibility for different AFs, services, and access conditions; and (v) empower network operators with a structured mechanism to enforce privacy policies while respecting user preferences.
[0199] As used herein, it is to be understood that the term “communication network” in some embodiments can comprise two or more separate communication networks. Further, the particular processing operations and other system functionality described in conjunction with the diagrams described herein are presented by way of illustrative example only and should not be construed as limiting the scope of the disclosure in any way. Alternative embodiments can use other types of processing operations and messaging protocols. For example, the ordering of the steps may be varied in other embodiments, or certain steps may be performed at least in part concurrently withone another rather than serially. Also, one or more of the steps may be repeated periodically, or multiple instances of the methods can be performed in parallel with one another.
[0200] It should again be emphasized that the various embodiments described herein are presented by way of illustrative example only and should not be construed as limiting the scope of the claims. For example, alternative embodiments can utilize different communication system configurations, user equipment configurations, base station configurations, provisioning and usage processes, messaging protocols and message formats than those described above in the context of the illustrative embodiments. These and numerous other alternative embodiments within the scope of the appended claims will be readily apparent to those skilled in the art.
Claims
I / We Claim:
1. An apparatus comprising:at least one processor; andat least one memory storing instructions that, when executed by the at least one processor, cause the apparatus at least to:receive an application key request from an application entity, the application key request including a data object digitally signed by a user equipment, the data object including at least one user equipment-defined permission parameter to authorize the apparatus to provide data associated with the user equipment to the application entity.
2. The apparatus of claim 1, wherein the apparatus is further caused to:send a permission validation request to an authentication entity in a communication network, the permission validation request including the data object and a subscription identifier for the user equipment.
3. The apparatus of claim 2, wherein the apparatus is further caused to:receive a permission validation response from the authentication entity; andsend an application key response to the application entity, in response to successful validation by the authentication entity, the application key response including an application key and the data associated with the user equipment.
4. The apparatus of claim 1, wherein the apparatus is further cause to:receive from a user equipment location access request from the application entity, the user equipment location access request including the data object.
5. The apparatus of claim 4, wherein the apparatus is further caused to:send a user equipment location access authorization to the application entity, in response to successful validation by an authentication entity.
6. The apparatus of claim 1, wherein the data associated with the user equipment includes user-sensitive data.
7. The apparatus of claim 1, wherein the digitally signed data object is digitally signed by the user equipment using a cryptographic key.
8. The apparatus of claim 7, wherein the cryptographic key is independently derivable by the user equipment and a communication network.
9. The apparatus of claim 7, wherein the cryptographic key is derivable via an authentication and key management of applications (AKMA) key derivation function.
10. The apparatus of claim 7, wherein the cryptographic key is derivable from an authentication key associated with an authentication server function of a communication network.
11. The apparatus of claim 1, wherein the at least one user equipment-defined permission parameter includes one or more of:a time-based parameter to temporally constrain the authorization given to a communication network to provide the data;a geographic-based parameter to spatially constrain the authorization given to the communication network to provide the data; andan application-based parameter to constrain the authorization given to the communication network to provide the data to a specific application entity or a specific application type.
12. The apparatus of claim 1, wherein the data object further includes an identity of the user equipment.
13. The apparatus of claim 1, wherein the apparatus is an AKMA anchor function and the at least one user equipment-defined permission parameter is a user-defined permission parameter.
14. An method comprising:receiving, at an application key management entity, an application key request from an application entity, the application key request including a data object digitally signed by a user equipment, the data object including at least one user equipment-defined permission parameter to authorize the application key management entity to provide data associated with the user equipment to the application entity; andsending, from the application key management entity, a permission validation request to an authentication entity in a communication network, the permission validation request including the data object and a subscription identifier for the user equipment;wherein the receiving and sending are performed by at least one processor and at least one memory, coupled to the at least one processor, of the application key management entity.
15. The method of claim 14, further comprising:receiving, at the application key management entity, a permission validation response from the authentication entity; andsending, from the application key management entity, an application key response to the application entity, in response to successful validation by the authentication entity, the application key response including an application key and the data associated with the user equipment.
16. The method of claim 14, further comprising:receiving, at the application key management entity, a user equipment location access request from the application entity, the user equipment location access request including the data object.
17. The method of claim 16, further comprising:sending, from the application key management entity, a user equipment location access authorization to the application entity, in response to successful validation by the authentication entity.
