Homomorphic computation device, homomorphic computation method, homomorphic computation program, and confidential information processing system
The homomorphic encryption system achieves secure cloud computations by performing operations on encrypted data with proof generation, addressing the challenge of simultaneous vCCA security and circuit confidentiality.
Patent Information
- Application Number
- PCT/JP2025/025026
- Authority / Receiving Office
- WO · WO
- Patent Type
- Applications
- Current Assignee / Owner
- Priority Date
- 2025-05-14
- Filing Date
- 2025-07-11
- Publication Date
- 2026-11-19
AI Technical Summary
Existing homomorphic encryption schemes fail to achieve both vCCA security and circuit confidentiality simultaneously due to the existence of an algorithm that can extract information about the pre-operation ciphertext and the operation from the post-operation ciphertext.
A homomorphic encryption system that performs operations on encrypted data while generating proof data for verification, ensuring compatibility with circuit confidentiality, using a configuration of input, homomorphic operation, and proof generation units to maintain security.
Enables secure homomorphic operations on encrypted data without compromising circuit confidentiality, allowing for secure cloud computations without decryption.
Smart Images

Figure JP2025025026_19112026_PF_FP_ABST
Abstract
Description
Homomorphic arithmetic unit, homomorphic arithmetic method, homomorphic arithmetic program, and confidential information processing system
[0001] This disclosure relates to a method for implementing homomorphic operations.
[0002] Homomorphic encryption is an encryption technique that allows data to be analyzed and processed while it remains encrypted. With the increasing use of cloud services, concerns about hacking and the reliability of cloud services have led to the consideration of storing data encrypted on the cloud. Homomorphic encryption allows calculations to be performed on encrypted data without decryption, thus enabling the use of cloud services without compromising security.
[0003] The homomorphic encryption scheme described in Non-Patent Document 1 is known to achieve the highest level of security. This encryption scheme achieves a security level called vCCA security. vCCA stands for verified Choice-Ciphertext Attack.
[0004] Mark Manulis and Jerome Nguyen. Fully Homomorphic Encryption beyond IND-CCA1 Security: Integrity through Verifiability. In EUROCRYPT, 2024.
[0005] The field of homomorphic arithmetic has a property called circuit confidentiality. Circuit confidentiality is a property of homomorphic encryption in which information about the arithmetic process is not leaked from the result of the arithmetic operation while it remains encrypted. The homomorphic encryption scheme described in Non-Patent Document 1 has the problem that it cannot achieve both vCCA security and circuit confidentiality at the same time.
[0006] In the vCCA achieved by the homomorphic encryption described in Non-Patent Document 1, an algorithm is defined to extract information about the pre-operation ciphertext and the operation from the post-operation ciphertext. This algorithm is used to check whether the ciphertext obtained from the decryption result was generated from the target ciphertext by homomorphic operation. The existence of this algorithm makes it impossible to achieve both vCCA security and circuit confidentiality at the same time.
[0007] The present disclosure enables realization of a homomorphic encryption that achieves security that is somewhat weaker than vCCA security but can be compatible with circuit confidentiality.
[0008] A homomorphic operation device according to the present disclosure includes an input unit that inputs encrypted data C including an element C obtained by encrypting plaintext data m with random number data r HE and an element C obtained by encrypting combined data that is a combination of the plaintext data m and the random number data r, PKE the encrypted data C including the two elements C PK (m; r); a homomorphic operation unit that performs a homomorphic operation applying an operation f to the plaintext data m on the encrypted data C input by the input unit to generate post-operation data C PK (m; r), and the homomorphic operation applies the operation f to the plaintext data m to generate post-operation data C PK (M); and a proof generation unit that generates proof data π for verification that the post-operation data C generated by the homomorphic operation unit PK (M) is generated from the encrypted data C PK (m; r).
[0009] In the present disclosure, homomorphic operation is performed on encrypted data C including an element C HE and an element C PKE to generate post-operation data C PK (M), and proof data π for verification of the post-operation data C PK (M) is generated. This makes it possible to realize homomorphic encryption that achieves security compatible with circuit confidentiality.
[0010] A configuration diagram of a confidential information processing system 100 according to Embodiment 1. A configuration diagram of a key generation device 200 according to Embodiment 1. A configuration diagram of an encryption device 300 according to Embodiment 1. A configuration diagram of a homomorphic operation device 400 according to Embodiment 1. A configuration diagram of a decryption device 500 according to Embodiment 1. A flowchart of key generation processing according to Embodiment 1. A flowchart of operation processing according to Embodiment 1.
[0011] Embodiment 1. ***Description of Configuration*** Referring to Figure 1, the configuration of the confidential information processing system 100 according to Embodiment 1 will be described. The confidential information processing system 100 comprises a key generation device 200, an encryption device 300, a homomorphic arithmetic unit 400, and a decryption device 500. The key generation device 200, the encryption device 300, the homomorphic arithmetic unit 400, and the decryption device 500 are connected via the Internet 900. The Internet 900 is an example of a transmission path. Other types of transmission paths may be used instead of the Internet 900.
[0012] Referring to Figure 2, the configuration of the key generation device 200 according to Embodiment 1 will be described. The key generation device 200 is a computer such as a PC. PC stands for Personal Computer. The key generation device 200 generates keys for decryption SK, encryption PK, and proof σ. The key generation device 200 includes hardware consisting of a processor 201, memory 202, storage 203, and communication interface 204. The processor 201 is connected to other hardware via signal lines and controls this other hardware.
[0013] The key generation device 200 comprises, as functional components, an input unit 211, a decryption key generation unit 212, an encryption key generation unit 213, a proof key generation unit 214, and a transmission unit 215. The functions of each functional component of the key generation device 200 are realized by software. The storage 203 stores programs that realize the functions of each functional component of the key generation device 200. These programs are read into the memory 202 by the processor 201 and executed by the processor 201. This realizes the functions of each functional component of the key generation device 200.
[0014] Referring to Figure 3, the configuration of the encryption device 300 according to Embodiment 1 will be described. The encryption device 300 is a computer such as a PC. The encryption device 300 encrypts plaintext data m using an encryption key PK. The encryption device 300 includes hardware consisting of a processor 301, memory 302, storage 303, and a communication interface 304. The processor 301 is connected to other hardware via signal lines and controls this other hardware.
[0015] The encryption device 300 comprises, as functional components, an input unit 311, an encryption key storage unit 312, a random number generation unit 313, an encryption unit 314, and a transmission unit 315. The functions of each functional component of the encryption device 300 are realized by software. The storage 303 stores programs that realize the functions of each functional component of the encryption device 300. These programs are read into the memory 302 by the processor 301 and executed by the processor 301. This realizes the functions of each functional component of the encryption device 300.
[0016] Referring to Figure 4, the configuration of the homomorphic arithmetic unit 400 according to Embodiment 1 will be described. The homomorphic arithmetic unit 400 is a computer such as a server having a large-capacity storage 403. The homomorphic arithmetic unit 400 performs homomorphic operations on ciphertext. The homomorphic arithmetic unit 400 also functions as a data storage device for storing ciphertext. The homomorphic arithmetic unit 400 comprises hardware including a processor 401, memory 402, storage 403, and a communication interface 404. The processor 401 is connected to other hardware via signal lines and controls this other hardware.
[0017] The homomorphic arithmetic unit 400 comprises, as functional components, an input unit 411, an encryption key storage unit 412, an authentication key storage unit 413, a ciphertext storage unit 414, a homomorphic arithmetic unit 415, a certificate generation unit 416, and a transmission unit 417. The functions of each functional component of the homomorphic arithmetic unit 400 are realized by software. The storage unit 403 stores programs that realize the functions of each functional component of the homomorphic arithmetic unit 400. These programs are read into the memory 402 by the processor 401 and executed by the processor 401. This realizes the functions of each functional component of the homomorphic arithmetic unit 400.
[0018] Referring to Figure 5, the configuration of the decryption device 500 according to Embodiment 1 will be described. The decryption device 500 is a computer such as a PC. The decryption device 500 decrypts the ciphertext using the decryption key SK. The decryption device 500 also functions as a decryption key storage device that stores the decryption key SK. The decryption device 500 includes hardware consisting of a processor 501, memory 502, storage 503, and a communication interface 504. The processor 501 is connected to the other hardware via signal lines and controls this other hardware.
[0019] The decryption device 500 comprises, as functional components, an input unit 511, a decryption key storage unit 512, a proof key storage unit 513, a decryption processing unit 514, and a decryption result storage unit 515. The functions of each functional component of the decryption device 500 are realized by software. The storage 503 stores programs that realize the functions of each functional component of the decryption device 500. These programs are read into the memory 502 by the processor 501 and executed by the processor 501. This realizes the functions of each functional component of the decryption device 500.
[0020] Furthermore, a single computer may simultaneously include the functions of at least two or more devices, such as a key generation device 200, an encryption device 300, a homomorphic arithmetic unit 400, and a decryption device 500.
[0021] Processors 201, 301, 401, and 501 are integrated circuits (ICs) that perform processing. IC stands for Integrated Circuit. Specific examples of processors 201, 301, 401, and 501 include CPUs, DSPs, and GPUs. CPU stands for Central Processing Unit. DSP stands for Digital Signal Processor. GPU stands for Graphics Processing Unit.
[0022] Memory modules 202, 302, 402, and 502 are storage devices that temporarily store data. Specific examples of memory modules 202, 302, 402, and 502 are SRAM and DRAM. SRAM stands for Static Random Access Memory. DRAM stands for Dynamic Random Access Memory.
[0023] Storage devices 203, 303, 403, and 503 are storage devices for storing data. Specific examples of storage devices 203, 303, 403, and 503 are HDDs or SSDs. HDD stands for Hard Disk Drive. SSD stands for Solid State Drive. Alternatively, storage devices 203, 303, 403, and 503 may be portable recording media such as SD® memory cards, CompactFlash®, NAND flash, flexible disks, optical disks, compact disks, Blu-ray® discs, and DVDs. SD stands for Secure Digital. DVD stands for Digital Versatile Disk.
[0024] Communication interfaces 204, 304, 404, and 504 are interfaces for communicating with external devices. Specific examples of communication interfaces 204, 304, 404, and 504 include Ethernet®, USB, and HDMI® ports. USB stands for Universal Serial Bus. HDMI stands for High-Definition Multimedia Interface.
[0025] There may be multiple processors 201, 301, 401, and 501, and multiple processors 201, 301, 401, and 501 may work together to execute programs that implement each function.
[0026] ***Explanation of Operation*** The operation of the confidential information processing system 100 according to Embodiment 1 will be explained with reference to Figures 6 and 7. The operation procedure of the confidential information processing system 100 according to Embodiment 1 corresponds to the confidential information processing method according to Embodiment 1. The program that implements the operation of the confidential information processing system 100 according to Embodiment 1 corresponds to the confidential information processing program according to Embodiment 1. The operation procedure of the homomorphic arithmetic unit 400 within the confidential information processing system 100 according to Embodiment 1 corresponds to the homomorphic arithmetic method according to Embodiment 1. The program that implements the operation of the homomorphic arithmetic unit 400 within the confidential information processing system 100 according to Embodiment 1 corresponds to the homomorphic arithmetic program according to Embodiment 1.
[0027] The operation of the confidential information processing system 100 includes key generation processing and arithmetic processing.
[0028] Referring to Figure 6, the key generation process according to Embodiment 1 will be described. (Step S101: Security parameter reception process) The input unit 211 of the key generation device 200 receives the input of security parameter λ. The input unit 211 transmits the security parameter λ to the decryption key generation unit 212.
[0029] (Step S102: Decryption Key Generation Process) The decryption key generation unit 212 of the key generation device 200 generates a decryption key SK using the security parameter λ received in step S101 as input. The decryption key generation unit 212 transmits the decryption key SK to the encryption key generation unit 213 and the transmission unit 215. Here, the decryption key generation unit 212 generates the decryption key SK in a manner corresponding to the encryption method described later. Specifically, the encryption method Enc HE (m;r) is the encryption method described in Non-Patent Document 2, which will be discussed later, and the encryption method Enc PKELet (m||r) be the encryption method described in Non-Patent Document 3, which will be discussed later. In this case, the decryption key generation unit 212 generates the decryption key SK corresponding to the encryption method in Non-Patent Document 2. HE And the decryption key SK corresponding to the encryption method of Non-Patent Document 3 PKE The decryption key SK is generated.
[0030] (Step S103: Encryption key generation process) The encryption key generation unit 213 of the key generation device 200 generates an encryption key PK using the decryption key SK generated in step S102 as input. The encryption key generation unit 213 transmits the encryption key PK to the transmission unit 215. Here, the encryption key generation unit 213 generates the encryption key PK in a manner corresponding to the encryption method described later. Specifically, the encryption method Enc HE (m;r) is the encryption method described in Non-Patent Document 2, which will be discussed later, and the encryption method Enc PKE Let (m||r) be the encryption method described in Non-Patent Document 3, which will be discussed later. In this case, the encryption key generation unit 213 generates the encryption key PK corresponding to the encryption method described in Non-Patent Document 2. HE And, the encryption key PK corresponding to the encryption method of Non-Patent Document 3 PKE The decryption key SK is generated.
[0031] (Step S104: Proof Key Generation Process) The proof key generation unit 214 of the key generation device 200 generates a proof key σ using the security parameter λ received in step S101 as input. Here, the proof key generation unit 214 generates the proof key σ in a manner corresponding to the proof generation algorithm described later. Specifically, it is assumed that the proof generation algorithm described in Non-Patent Document 4, described later, is used. In this case, the proof key generation unit 214 generates a proof key σ corresponding to the proof generation algorithm described in Non-Patent Document 4.
[0032] (Step S105: Key transmission process) The transmission unit 215 of the key generation device 200 transmits the decryption key SK generated in step S102 to the decryption device 500 via the internet 900. The transmission unit 215 also transmits the encryption key PK generated in step S103 to the encryption device 300 and the homomorphic arithmetic unit 400 via the internet 900. The transmission unit 215 also transmits the proof key σ generated in step S104 to the homomorphic arithmetic unit 400 and the decryption device 500 via the internet 900. Since the decryption key SK is confidential information, it is transmitted in a manner that prevents leakage. The encryption key PK, decryption key SK, and proof key σ may be transmitted by mail or other means.
[0033] (Step S106: First key reception process) The input unit 311 of the encryption device 300 receives the encryption key PK transmitted in step S105. The input unit 311 transmits the encryption key PK to the encryption key storage unit 312.
[0034] (Step S107: First key storage process) The encryption key storage unit 312 of the encryption device 300 stores the encryption key PK received in step S106 in the storage 303.
[0035] (Step S108: Second key reception process) The input unit 411 of the homomorphic arithmetic unit 400 receives the encryption key PK and the certification key σ transmitted in step S105. The input unit 411 transmits the encryption key PK to the encryption key storage unit 412 and the certification key σ to the certification key storage unit 413.
[0036] (Step S109: Second key storage process) The encryption key storage unit 412 of the homomorphic arithmetic unit 400 stores the encryption key PK received in step S108 in the storage unit 403. The proof key storage unit 413 of the homomorphic arithmetic unit 400 also stores the proof key σ received in step S108 in the storage unit 403.
[0037] (Step S110: Third key reception process) The input unit 511 of the decryption device 500 receives the decryption key SK and the certification key σ transmitted in step S105. The input unit 511 transmits the decryption key SK to the decryption key storage unit 512 and the certification key σ to the certification key storage unit 513.
[0038] (Step S111: Third key storage process) The decryption key storage unit 512 of the decryption device 500 stores the decryption key SK received in step S110 in the storage 503. Since the decryption key SK is confidential information, it is stored in a way that prevents leakage. The certification key storage unit 513 of the decryption device 500 stores the certification key σ received in step S110 in the storage 503.
[0039] Referring to Figure 7, the calculation process according to Embodiment 1 will be described. (Step S201: Plaintext reception processing) The input unit 311 of the encryption device 300 receives plaintext data m as input. Plaintext data m is, for example, data collected from a sensor or the like. The input unit 311 transmits the plaintext data m to the encryption unit 314.
[0040] (Step S202: Random number generation process) The random number generation unit 313 of the encryption device 300 generates random number data r. The random number generation unit 313 transmits the random number data r to the encryption unit 314.
[0041] (Step S203: Encryption process) The encryption unit 314 of the encryption device 300 encrypts the plaintext data m received in step S201 with the random number data r generated in step S202 and the encryption key PK stored in the storage 303 to obtain ciphertext C PK (m;r) is generated. The encryption unit 314 generates the ciphertext C. PK (m;r) is transmitted to the transmission unit 315.
[0042] Specifically, the encryption unit 314 receives the ciphertext C shown in Equation 1. PK (m; r) = (C HE , C PKE ) generates. Element C HE The encryption method is Enc HE (m;r) is generated by encrypting plaintext data m with random number data r. Encryption method: Enc HE (m;r) is an encryption method in which random number data r can be recovered by decryption. For example, the encryption method Enc HE(m;r) is an encryption scheme described in Non-Patent Document 2: Urmila Mahadev. Classical Homomorphic Encryption for Quantum Circuits. In FOCS, 2018. Element C PKE The encryption method is Enc PKE The combined data, which is a combination of plaintext data m and random number data r, is generated by encrypting it using the (m||r) method. Encryption method: Enc PKE (m| |r) is an encryption method that can identify its relationship with the target ciphertext. An encryption method that can identify its relationship with the target ciphertext is an encryption method that can determine its relationship with the target ciphertext, known as detectable-CCA security. detectable-CCA is an abbreviation for detectable-chosen-ciphertext attack. For example, the encryption method Enc PKE (m||r) is an encryption method described in Non-Patent Literature 3: Susan Hohenberger, Allison Lewko, and Brent Waters. Detecting Dangerous Queries: A New Approach for Chosen Ciphertext Security. In EUROCRYPT, 2012.
[0043] (Step S204: Ciphertext transmission process) The transmission unit 315 of the encryption device 300 transmits the ciphertext C generated in step S203 via the Internet 900. PK (m;r) is transmitted to the homomorphic arithmetic unit 400.
[0044] (Step S205: Encrypted text reception processing) The input unit 411 of the homomorphic arithmetic unit 400 receives the ciphertext C transmitted in step S204. PK (m;r) is received. Input unit 411 receives the ciphertext C PK (m;r) is sent to the ciphertext storage unit 414.
[0045] (Step S206: Ciphertext storage process) The ciphertext storage unit 414 of the homomorphic arithmetic unit 400 stores the ciphertext C received in step S205. PK (m;r) is stored in storage 403.
[0046] (Step S207: Calculation Acceptance Processing) The input unit 411 of the homomorphic arithmetic unit 400 accepts input of the arithmetic circuit f. The input unit 411 accepts input of the arithmetic circuit f that is input from an input device such as a keyboard or mouse, or that is stored in a storage device such as the storage 403. The input unit 411 transmits the arithmetic circuit f to the homomorphic arithmetic unit 415.
[0047] (Step S208: Homomorphic arithmetic processing) The homomorphic arithmetic unit 415 of the homomorphic arithmetic unit 400 processes the ciphertext C stored in the ciphertext storage unit 414. PK For (m; r), a homomorphic operation is performed by applying the arithmetic circuit f received in step S207 to the plaintext data m, and the resulting data C is obtained. PK (M) is generated. The homomorphic operation unit 415 generates the post-operation data C. PK (M) is sent to the certificate generation unit 416 and the transmission unit 417. Specifically, the homomorphic arithmetic unit 415 receives the arithmetic circuit f received in step S207, the encryption key PK stored in the encryption key storage unit 412, and the ciphertext C stored in the ciphertext storage unit 414. PK Element C of (m;r) PKE With and as input, the homomorphic operation Eval HE Execute the calculation and the resulting element C HE Generates '. Homomorphism Eval HE is element C HE The encryption method used when generating it was Enc HE This is a homomorphic operation scheme corresponding to (m;r). For example, the encryption scheme Enc HE If (m;r) is the encryption scheme described in Non-Patent Document 2, then the homomorphic operation scheme Eval HE This is a homomorphic arithmetic scheme described in Non-Patent Document 2. The homomorphic arithmetic unit 415 has the post-arithmetic element C as shown in Equation 2. HE 'and ciphertext C PK Data C after calculation including (m;r) PK Generate (M).
[0048] (Step S209: Certificate generation process) The certificate generation unit 416 of the homomorphic arithmetic unit 400 generates the post-calculation data C generated in step S208. PK (M) is encrypted data C PK The certificate generation unit 416 generates proof data π for verification that it was generated by a specific analysis process from (m;r). Specifically, the certificate generation unit 416 generates the post-calculation data C generated in step S208. PK (M) and the proof key σ stored in the proof key storage unit 413 are used as inputs to execute a proof generation algorithm to generate proof data π. For example, the proof generation algorithm is the one described in Non-Patent Literature 4: Chaya Ganesh, Yashvanth, Claudio Orlandi, Mahak Pancholi, Akira Takahashi, and Deniel Tschudi. Witness-Success Universally Composable SNARKS. In EUROCRYPT, 2023.
[0049] (Step S210: Transmission process) The transmission unit 417 of the homomorphic arithmetic unit 400 transmits the post-calculation data C generated in step S208. PK (M) and the proof data π generated in step S209 are transmitted to the decoding device 500.
[0050] (Step S211: Processing of post-calculation data) The input unit 511 of the decoding device 500 receives the post-calculation data C transmitted in step S210. PK (M) and proof data π are received. Input unit 511 receives the calculated data C PK (M) and the proof data π are sent to the decoding processing unit 514.
[0051] (Step S212: Decryption process) The decoding processing unit 514 of the decoding device 500 processes the calculated data C received in step S211. PK The verification of (M) is performed. Specifically, the decoding processing unit 514 performs the calculation data C received in step S211. PKVerification is performed by executing a verification algorithm using (M) and the proof data π and the proof key σ stored in the proof key storage unit 513 as inputs. The verification algorithm is the verification algorithm corresponding to the proof generation algorithm used in step S209. For example, if the proof generation algorithm is the algorithm described in Non-Patent Literature 4, then the verification algorithm is the algorithm described in Non-Patent Literature 4.
[0052] If the verification is successful, the decryption processing unit 514 uses the decryption key SK stored in the decryption key storage unit 512 to calculate the post-calculation data C. PK The decoding process is performed on (M) to generate the decoded result D. Specifically, the decoding processing unit 514 processes the calculated data C PK (M)'s resulting element C HE ' is used as input, and the decoding method is Dec HE Execute the following to generate the decryption result D. Decryption method Dec HE is the element C after the operation. HE The homomorphic operation Eval used when generating ' HE This is the corresponding decoding method. For example, the processed element C HE The homomorphic operation Eval used when generating ' HE If this is the homomorphic operation scheme described in Non-Patent Document 2, then the decoding scheme Dec HE This is the decoding method described in Non-Patent Document 2.
[0053] The decoding processing unit 514 transmits the decoding result D to the decoding result storage unit 515.
[0054] (Step S213: Result storage process) The decoding result storage unit 515 of the decoding device 500 stores the decoding result D transmitted in step S212.
[0055] ***Effects of Embodiment 1*** As described above, the confidential information processing system 100 according to Embodiment 1 has element C HE and element C PKE For encrypted data C containing and , perform a homomorphic operation and obtain the resulting data C PK (M) is generated, and the calculated data C is generated. PKA verification proof data π is generated for (M). This makes it possible to implement homomorphic encryption that achieves security compatible with circuit secrecy.
[0056] In cryptographic security, a target ciphertext is defined, and the attacker attempts to decrypt it. The attacker can obtain the decryption result of a ciphertext of their choice (one that is "unrelated" to the target ciphertext). In vCCA security, an algorithm exists to extract information about the analysis process and the pre-analysis ciphertext from the post-analysis ciphertext in order to explicitly show the relationship with the target ciphertext. As a result, it is not possible to achieve both circuit confidentiality and vCCA security. In the confidential information processing system 100 according to Embodiment 1, the post-calculation data C is the ciphertext after analysis. PK (M) The ciphertext C before analysis processing PK (m;r) is included. This makes it possible to reveal the relationship between the ciphertext chosen by the attacker and the ciphertext being attacked. In particular, a portion of the ciphertext before analysis is generated using an encryption scheme that has an algorithm capable of determining its relationship with the ciphertext being attacked, known as detectable-CCA security. This makes it possible to detect the relationship with the ciphertext being attacked without having to extract information about the analysis process, as is the case with vCCA security.
[0057] ***Other Configurations*** <Modification 1> In Embodiment 1, each functional component was implemented in software. However, in Modification 1, each functional component may be implemented in hardware. The differences between this Modification 1 and Embodiment 1 will be explained below.
[0058] When each functional component is implemented in hardware, the key generation device 200 includes electronic circuits instead of the processor 201, memory 202, and storage 203. The electronic circuits are dedicated circuits that implement the functions of each functional component, as well as the functions of the memory 202 and storage 203.
[0059] When each functional component is implemented in hardware, the encryption device 300 includes electronic circuits instead of the processor 301, memory 302, and storage 303. The electronic circuits are dedicated circuits that implement the functions of each functional component, as well as the functions of the memory 302 and storage 303.
[0060] When each functional component is implemented in hardware, the homomorphic arithmetic unit 400 includes electronic circuits instead of the processor 401, memory 402, and storage 403. The electronic circuits are dedicated circuits that implement the functions of each functional component, as well as the functions of the memory 402 and storage 403.
[0061] When each functional component is implemented in hardware, the decoding device 500 includes electronic circuits instead of the processor 501, memory 502, and storage 503. The electronic circuits are dedicated circuits that implement the functions of each functional component, as well as the functions of the memory 502 and storage 503.
[0062] The electronic circuits envisioned include single circuits, complex circuits, programmed processors, parallel programmed processors, logic ICs, GAs, ASICs, and FPGAs. GA stands for Gate Array. ASIC stands for Application Specific IC Integrated Circuit. FPGA stands for Field-Programmable Gate Array. Each functional component may be implemented in a single electronic circuit, or each functional component may be implemented by distributing them across multiple electronic circuits.
[0063] <Modification 2> As modification 2, some of the functional components may be implemented in hardware, while other functional components may be implemented in software.
[0064] The processor 11, memory 12, storage 13, and electronic circuitry are collectively referred to as the processing circuit. In other words, the function of each functional component is realized by the processing circuit.
[0065] Furthermore, the term "part" in the above explanation may be replaced with "circuit," "process," "procedure," "processing," or "processing circuit."
[0066] The embodiments and variations of this disclosure have been described above. Some of these embodiments and variations may be implemented in combination. Alternatively, some or all of them may be implemented in part. However, this disclosure is not limited to the embodiments and variations described above, and various modifications are possible as needed.
[0067] 100 Confidential Information Processing System, 200 Key Generator, 300 Encryption Device, 400 Homomorphic Arithmetic Unit, 500 Decryption Device, 900 Internet, 201 Processor, 202 Memory, 203 Storage, 204 Communication Interface, 211 Input Unit, 212 Decryption Key Generation Unit, 213 Encryption Key Generation Unit, 214 Proof Key Generation Unit, 215 Transmission Unit, 301 Processor, 302 Memory, 303 Storage, 304 Communication Interface, 311 Input Unit, 312 Encryption Key Storage Unit, 313 Random Number Generation Unit, 314 Encryption Unit, 315 Transmission Unit, 401 Processor, 402 Memory, 403 Storage, 404 Communication Interface, 411 Input Unit, 412 Encryption Key Storage Unit, 413 Proof Key Storage Unit, 414 Ciphertext Storage Unit, 415 Homomorphic arithmetic unit, 416 Certificate generation unit, 417 Transmission unit, 501 Processor, 502 Memory, 503 Storage, 504 Communication interface, 511 Input unit, 512 Decryption key storage unit, 513 Proof key storage unit, 514 Decryption processing unit, 515 Decryption result storage unit.
Claims
1. Element C obtained by encrypting plaintext data m with random number data r. HE The element C is an encrypted combined data obtained by combining the plaintext data m and the random number data r. PKE Encrypted data C including PK An input unit for inputting (m;r), and the encrypted data C input by the input unit. PK For (m; r), a homomorphic operation is performed by applying the arithmetic circuit f to the plaintext data m, and the resulting data C is obtained. PK A homomorphic arithmetic unit that generates (M), and the post-calculation data C generated by the homomorphic arithmetic unit. PK (M) is the encrypted data C PK A homomorphic arithmetic unit comprising a proof generation unit that generates proof data π for verification that it was generated from (m;r).
2. The homomorphic operation unit is configured to perform the homomorphic operation on the element C included in the encrypted data C PK (m; r) HE to generate a post-operation element C by performing the homomorphic operation thereon HE ', and generate post-operation data C including the post-operation element C HE ' and the encrypted data C PK (m; r) PK (M), the homomorphic operation apparatus according to claim 1.
3. Element C HE The homomorphic arithmetic device according to claim 1 or 2, wherein the random number data r is encrypted using an encryption method that allows the random number data r to be recovered by decryption.
4. Element C PKE The homomorphic arithmetic unit according to any one of claims 1 to 3, which is encrypted using an encryption method that can identify the relationship with the target ciphertext.
5. The computer encrypts the plaintext data m with random number data r to form element C. HE The element C is an encrypted combined data obtained by combining the plaintext data m and the random number data r. PKE Encrypted data C including PK Enter (m;r) and the computer will process the encrypted data C PK For (m; r), a homomorphic operation is performed by applying the arithmetic circuit f to the plaintext data m, and the resulting data C is obtained. PK (M) is generated, and the computer calculates the post-calculation data C. PK (M) is the encrypted data C PK A homomorphic operation method for generating proof data π for verification that it was generated from (m;r).
6. Element C obtained by encrypting plaintext data m with random number data r. HE The element C is an encrypted combined data obtained by combining the plaintext data m and the random number data r. PKE Encrypted data C including PK An input process that inputs (m;r), and the encrypted data C input by the input process. PK For (m; r), a homomorphic operation is performed by applying the arithmetic circuit f to the plaintext data m, and the resulting data C is obtained. PK A homomorphic operation that generates (M), and the post-operation data C generated by the homomorphic operation. PK (M) is the encrypted data C PK A homomorphic arithmetic program that makes a computer function as a homomorphic arithmetic unit that performs a proof generation process to generate proof data π for verification that it was generated from (m;r).
7. Encrypt plaintext data m to obtain encrypted data C. PK An encryption device that generates (m; r), wherein the plaintext data m is encrypted with random number data r to form element C HE The element C is an encrypted combined data obtained by combining the plaintext data m and the random number data r. PKE Encrypted data C including PK An encryption device that generates (m;r), and the encrypted data C generated by the encryption device. PK A homomorphic operation is performed by applying the arithmetic circuit f to the plaintext data m, taking (m; r) as input, and the resulting data C is obtained. PK (M) is generated, and the calculated data C is generated. PK (M) is the encrypted data C PK A confidential information processing system comprising a homomorphic arithmetic unit that generates proof data π for verification that it was generated from (m;r).
8. The confidential information processing system further determines whether the post-calculation data C is obtained if it passes verification using the proof data π generated by the homomorphic arithmetic unit. PK The confidential information processing system according to claim 7, comprising a decryption device for decrypting (M).
