Active Directory Deception Sensors for Unauthorized Access Detection

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Solution Overview

Problem

Attackers compromise endpoint systems to harvest data and move laterally within networks, posing a risk of unauthorized access to application and directory data.

Innovation Solution

Implementing a sensor module on endpoints that intercepts commands, verifies the source against a sanctioned list of applications, and either executes or modifies commands to refer to deception data, or ignores them, while simulating successful execution, to prevent unauthorized access and lure attackers into decoy systems.

Engineering Contradictions & Design Principles

VSEngineering Contradiction Analysis

1Reliability

If traditional access control methods are used to protect Active Directory data, then security measures are in place, but attackers can still compromise endpoint systems and harvest data to move laterally within the network

Engineering Contradiction:
Improvesecurity protectionVSAvoidunauthorized access
Core Design Contradiction:
ReliabilityVSObject-affected harmful factors

Solution Approach 1:

The patent creates a copy of the Active Directory database and stores it locally on endpoint systems. This local copy allows the system to simulate Active Directory responses without exposing the actual directory data, thereby maintaining security while enabling detection of unauthorized access attempts.

Inventive Principle:
Principle #26Copying

Solution Approach 2:

The patent introduces an intermediary component that sits between attackers and the actual Active Directory data. This intermediary intercepts commands, verifies them against a sanctioned list, and either executes them against the local copy or modifies them to refer to deception data, preventing direct access to real directory data.

Inventive Principle:
Principle #24Intermediary (Mediator)

2Difficulty of detecting and measuring

If deception data is used to lure attackers, then early detection is enabled, but additional system complexity is introduced through sensor modules and command interception mechanisms

Engineering Contradiction:
Improveattacker detectionVSAvoidsystem structure
Core Design Contradiction:
Difficulty of detecting and measuringVSDevice complexity

Solution Approach 1:

The patent implements a self-service mechanism where the local Active Directory copy automatically responds to commands without requiring constant verification against the sanctioned list. The system serves itself by maintaining an up-to-date local copy that can independently handle requests, reducing the complexity of continuous monitoring.

Inventive Principle:
Principle #25Self-service

3Reliability

If all commands are verified against a sanctioned list, then unauthorized access is prevented, but system performance decreases due to extensive verification requirements

Engineering Contradiction:
Improveaccess controlVSAvoidsystem performance
Core Design Contradiction:
ReliabilityVSProductivity

Solution Approach 1:

The patent applies partial verification by only checking commands against the sanctioned list when necessary. The sensor module intercepts commands and verifies them, but allows legitimate commands to proceed without extensive verification, balancing security with performance by applying verification selectively rather than to all commands uniformly.

Inventive Principle:
Principle #16Partial or excessive action

Data Source

PatentUS20250260721A1Deceiving attackers accessing active directory data
Publication Date: 2025.08.14 SENTINELONE INC
  • US20250260721A1 patent drawing
  • US20250260721A1 patent drawing
  • US20250260721A1 patent drawing

AI summary

Endpoints in a network execute a sensor module that intercepts commands. The sensor module compares a source of commands to a sanctioned list of applications received from a management server. If the source does not match a sanctioned application and the command is a write or delete command, the command is ignored and a simulated acknowledgment is sent. If the command is a read command, deception data is returned instead. In some embodiments, certain data is protected such that commands will be ignored or modified to refer to deception data where the source is not a sanctioned application. The source may be verified to be a sanctioned application by evaluating a certificate, hash, or path of the source. Responses from an active directory server may be intercepted and modified to reference a decoy server when not addressed to a sanctioned application.