Active Shield Reverse Engineering Detection in Integrated Circuits
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Solution Overview
Problem
Integrated circuits, particularly in smart cards, are vulnerable to reverse engineering attacks, where attackers can manipulate or alter operations using methods like Focused Ion Beam (FIB) to bypass active shields, posing security risks.
Innovation Solution
The integration of an active shield in integrated circuits that receives a test signal, outputs shield signals through multiple paths, and utilizes compare logic to generate comparison signals, which are processed by detection and decision logic to determine if the shield is under attack, thereby initiating a reset or interrupt to prevent unauthorized access.
Engineering Contradictions & Design Principles
Engineering Contradiction Analysis
1Reliability
If an active shield is used to protect the integrated circuit, then security protection is improved, but the circuit becomes vulnerable to FIB, probing, or forcing methods that can cut or manipulate metal lines
Solution Approach 1:
The shield signal path is divided into multiple segments (first shield signal line and second shield signal line) that are spatially separated. The compare logic is divided into multiple comparison units (first and second comparison units) that independently compare different signal pairs. This segmentation ensures that an attacker cannot simultaneously access and manipulate all critical signal paths with a single FIB cut or probe point.
Solution Approach 2:
The patent employs asymmetric signal routing where the test signal is split into different shield signal paths with different characteristics. The first comparison unit compares the test signal with the first shield signal, while the second comparison unit compares the test signal with the second shield signal. This asymmetric arrangement makes it difficult for attackers to apply uniform manipulation techniques across all paths.
2Measurement precision
If multiple comparison units are used to compare signals through different paths, then detection accuracy is improved, but device complexity increases
Solution Approach 1:
Multiple comparison units perform different comparison functions but share common structural elements and signal sources. Each comparison unit compares the test signal with a different shield signal path, but they all use the same basic comparison mechanism. This multi-functional approach improves detection accuracy while reusing design patterns to control complexity.
Solution Approach 2:
The patent uses replicated comparison units (first and second comparison units) that follow the same structural template. Each unit copies the basic comparison logic but applies it to different signal paths. This copying strategy enables enhanced detection capability through multiple independent comparisons while maintaining design simplicity through template reuse.
Data Source
AI summary
An active shield can be configured to receive a test signal, and configured to output a plurality of shield signals, derived from the test signal, via a plurality of signal paths. A compare logic can be configured to compare the test signal with each of the plurality of shield signals to provide at least two comparison signals indicating comparison results and can be configured to output the at least two comparison signals. A detection and decision logic can be configured to determine whether the active shield is subject to attack based on patterns of the at least two comparison signals.