Decentralized Authentication for Ad Hoc Network Security

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Solution Overview

Problem

Ad hoc networks face security challenges due to the lack of comprehensive authentication mechanisms, particularly in dynamic topologies, where centralized approaches are unsuitable and existing solutions do not effectively prevent internal attacks like link-spoofing.

Innovation Solution

Implementing a decentralized authentication system using public key cryptography and a distributed authentication certificate management system, where each node verifies the authenticity of messages and maintains an ID TABLE for secure data transmission, preventing identity theft and IP address spoofing.

Engineering Contradictions & Design Principles

VSEngineering Contradiction Analysis

1Reliability

If a decentralized authentication system is implemented in ad hoc networks, then network security and integrity are improved, but device complexity and implementation difficulty increase

Engineering Contradiction:
Improvenetwork securityVSAvoidauthentication system complexity
Core Design Contradiction:
ReliabilityVSDevice complexity

Solution Approach 1:

The authentication system is segmented into modular components including ID generation modules, signature verification modules, and certificate management modules. Each node independently implements these segmented functions rather than relying on centralized authentication, reducing individual node complexity while maintaining overall system security through distributed authentication capabilities.

Inventive Principle:
Principle #1Segmentation

Solution Approach 2:

Authentication credentials (IDs, private keys, and self-signed certificates) are generated and stored in advance during node initialization before actual network operations begin. This preliminary setup eliminates the need for complex real-time authentication negotiations, reducing operational complexity while ensuring security from the outset of network interactions.

Inventive Principle:
Principle #10Preliminary action

2Reliability

If authentication mechanisms are added to OLSR protocol, then protection against attacks is improved, but message overhead and transmission efficiency worsen

Engineering Contradiction:
Improveprotection against attacksVSAvoidmessage overhead
Core Design Contradiction:
ReliabilityVSLoss of energy

Solution Approach 1:

Authentication data (node ID, public key, and digital signature) are merged into single structured fields within existing OLSR message formats rather than creating separate authentication message types. This integration approach provides comprehensive attack protection while minimizing additional message overhead by combining multiple authentication elements into compact unified structures.

Inventive Principle:
Principle #5Merging (Combining)

Solution Approach 2:

Full authentication verification with complete certificate chains is performed only at critical message types (HELLO and TC messages) rather than uniformly across all OLSR messages. This selective verification approach maintains strong security protection where needed while reducing overall message overhead and processing energy consumption for routine data transmissions.

Inventive Principle:
Principle #3Local quality

3Reliability

If public key cryptography is implemented for data encryption, then data transmission security is improved, but processing time and energy consumption increase

Engineering Contradiction:
Improvedata transmission securityVSAvoidprocessing time
Core Design Contradiction:
ReliabilityVSLoss of time

Solution Approach 1:

Symmetric session keys are introduced as intermediaries between public key cryptography and data encryption. Public key mechanisms are used only for initial key exchange and authentication, while the resulting symmetric keys handle actual data encryption. This intermediary approach provides strong data transmission security while significantly reducing processing time and energy consumption during bulk data operations.

Inventive Principle:
Principle #24Intermediary (Mediator)

Solution Approach 2:

Public key authentication and session key establishment are performed in advance during the connection setup phase before actual data transmission begins. This preliminary cryptographic handshaking ensures data transmission security is established upfront, allowing subsequent data operations to use faster symmetric encryption rather than repeated public key operations, thus reducing overall processing time.

Inventive Principle:
Principle #10Preliminary action

4Ease of operation

If centralized key distribution is used, then authentication management is simplified, but suitability for dynamic ad hoc networks worsens

Engineering Contradiction:
Improveauthentication managementVSAvoidsuitability for dynamic networks
Core Design Contradiction:
Ease of operationVSAdaptability or versatility

Solution Approach 1:

Instead of nodes receiving authentication credentials from a central authority, the system inverts the approach by having each node autonomously generate its own identity and self-signed certificates. This inversion eliminates the need for centralized key distribution infrastructure while maintaining simplified authentication management through self-contained node identities that work seamlessly in dynamic ad hoc network configurations.

Inventive Principle:
Principle #13The other way round (Inversion)

Data Source

PatentEP2936767B1Methods for protecting data transmissions and for carrying out an authentication check of ad hoc network nodes
Publication Date: 2020.02.12 AIRBUS DEFENCE & SPACE SAS
  • EP2936767B1 patent drawingFigure 1
  • EP2936767B1 patent drawingFigure 2
  • EP2936767B1 patent drawingFigure 3

AI summary

Method for protecting data transmission in an ad hoc network comprising nodes, each node (Ni) comprising a private key (ki), a public key (Ki) and a certificate (Ci) of the public key (Ki) signed by a certification authority (CA). The first node (NA) transmits to the second node (NB) : • a first message (M1) signed (M1/kA) with the private key of the first node (NA); • a third message (M3) containing a first set (ENS1) of initialisation data comprising: - a first certificate including the public key (KA) of the first node (NA), signed by the certification authority (CA), designated KA/kCA; - a second data set (ENS2) comprising: · the IP address (IPA) of the first node (NA); · and the first certificate associated with the IP address (IPA) of the first node (NA), wherein the second data set (ENS2/kA) is signed with the private key (kA) of the first node (NA).