Adaptation Layer Header Integrity in Relayed Radio

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Solution Overview

Problem

In relayed radio communications, the header of a data unit lacks security protection, making it vulnerable to misuse, such as identity theft and channel congestion attacks, which can lead to resource wastage and latency issues.

Innovation Solution

A method is introduced to protect the integrity of the header by including a local temporary identifier token at the adaptation layer, ensuring the header's integrity is maintained through encryption and decryption processes, thereby preventing malicious activities.

Engineering Contradictions & Design Principles

VSEngineering Contradiction Analysis

1Reliability

If a relayed radio communication is established without header integrity protection, then device complexity is reduced and ease of operation is improved, but security reliability deteriorates allowing identity theft and channel congestion attacks

Engineering Contradiction:
Improveheader integrityVSAvoidsecurity mechanism complexity
Core Design Contradiction:
ReliabilityVSDevice complexity

Solution Approach 1:

The patent applies preliminary action by including an integrity protection field in the adaptation layer header before transmission. This field contains a cryptographic hash or authentication token that validates the header's integrity beforehand, preventing identity theft and channel congestion attacks without requiring complex real-time verification mechanisms at each relay node.

Inventive Principle:
Principle #10Preliminary action

Solution Approach 2:

The patent introduces an intermediary integrity protection mechanism at the adaptation layer that mediates between the upper-layer security (PDCP) and lower-layer transmission. This intermediary layer provides header integrity protection using a dedicated field that acts as a mediator, validating identities and preventing attacks without burdening the entire security system.

Inventive Principle:
Principle #24Intermediary (Mediator)

2Object-affected harmful factors

If existing PDCP layer end-to-end security is used, then device complexity is minimized, but the header of the adaptation layer remains vulnerable to disclosure of UE ID and RB ID

Engineering Contradiction:
Improveheader vulnerabilityVSAvoidsecurity protection
Core Design Contradiction:
Object-affected harmful factorsVSReliability

Solution Approach 1:

The patent applies segmentation by separating security protection functions into different layers. The PDCP layer maintains end-to-end security for data, while the adaptation layer introduces a separate integrity protection field specifically for header information. This segmentation allows targeted protection of vulnerable header elements (UE ID, RB ID) without disrupting existing PDCP security mechanisms.

Inventive Principle:
Principle #1Segmentation

Solution Approach 2:

The patent applies local quality by providing enhanced security specifically where needed - in the adaptation layer header containing sensitive identification information. The integrity protection field is locally applied to the header portion rather than requiring comprehensive re-encryption of entire data units, thus protecting vulnerable elements with minimal additional complexity.

Inventive Principle:
Principle #3Local quality

3Loss of energy

If no integrity protection is applied to the adaptation layer header, then processing time is reduced, but malicious UEs can successfully initiate fake RRC connection setup causing resource wastage

Engineering Contradiction:
Improveradio resource wastageVSAvoidintegrity verification time
Core Design Contradiction:
Loss of energyVSLoss of time

Solution Approach 1:

The patent applies preliminary action by pre-computing and including the integrity protection field in the header before transmission. This allows receiving nodes to quickly verify header integrity using the pre-included field without requiring time-consuming re-computation or additional communication rounds, thus preventing resource wastage from fake connections with minimal time overhead.

Inventive Principle:
Principle #10Preliminary action

4Reliability

If the adaptation layer includes security protection for the header, then reliability of communication is improved, but device complexity increases due to additional security mechanisms

Engineering Contradiction:
Improvecommunication securityVSAvoidadaptation layer structure
Core Design Contradiction:
ReliabilityVSDevice complexity

Solution Approach 1:

The patent applies local quality by introducing security protection only where specifically needed - in the adaptation layer header containing sensitive identification information. Rather than implementing comprehensive security across all layers and data types, the integrity protection field is locally applied to the vulnerable header portion, achieving enhanced reliability with minimal structural complexity.

Inventive Principle:
Principle #3Local quality

Data Source

PatentUS20230328526A1Technique for Header Integrity in a Relayed Radio Communication
Publication Date: 2023.10.12 TELEFONAKTIEBOLAGET LM ERICSSON (PUBL)
  • US20230328526A1 patent drawing
  • US20230328526A1 patent drawing
  • US20230328526A1 patent drawing

AI summary

A technique for protecting and validating header integrity in a relayed radio communication is described. As to a method aspect of the technique, integrity of a header of a data unit, DU, is protected at an adaptation layer for a relayed radio communication between a remote radio device (100-RM) and a radio access network, RAN (100-NN), or a further radio device (100-RM), through a relay radio device (100- RL). A DU is obtained at a transmitter, TX, from a transparent layer, wherein the relayed radio communication uses a protocol stack comprising the adaptation layer below the transparent layer that is relayed transparently at the relay radio device (100-RL). The integrity of the header of the DU is protected at the adaptation layer of the TX by including a token in the header of the DU at the adaptation layer, the token comprising a local temporary identifier, ID, of the remote radio device (100-RM), wherein the integrity-protected header is attached to the DU obtained from the transparent layer. The DU comprising the integrity-protected header is transmitted from the TX to a receiver, RX.