Adaptive Connection Management for Trickle DoS Mitigation

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Solution Overview

Problem

Conventional methods are ineffective in mitigating trickle denial-of-service (DoS) attacks, which exhaust available connections by sending numerous, low-traffic requests, causing resource overload and impacting legitimate user experiences, especially for users with slow connections.

Innovation Solution

Dynamic adjustment of connection parameters, such as increasing the maximum number of concurrent connections and decreasing timeout values, based on observed system state to differentiate and terminate suspicious activity, thereby mitigating the effects of trickle DoS attacks while minimizing impact on legitimate users.

Engineering Contradictions & Design Principles

VSEngineering Contradiction Analysis

1Reliability

If shorter timeout periods are used to mitigate trickle DoS attacks, then the cost of the attack increases and connections are freed faster, but legitimate users with slow connections experience frustration and business loss

Engineering Contradiction:
Improveattack mitigation effectivenessVSAvoiduser experience for slow connections
Core Design Contradiction:
ReliabilityVSEase of operation

Solution Approach 1:

The system dynamically adjusts the timeout period based on real-time analysis of connection patterns and system state. During normal operation, longer timeout periods accommodate slow connections. When trickle DoS attacks are detected through analysis of connection establishment rates, packet intervals, and header patterns, the timeout period is automatically reduced to mitigate the attack, and adjusted back when the attack subsides.

Inventive Principle:
Principle #15Dynamics

2Productivity

If the maximum number of concurrent connections is increased to handle legitimate traffic, then more legitimate users can be served, but the system becomes more vulnerable to connection exhaustion from trickle attacks

Engineering Contradiction:
Improvecapacity to serve legitimate usersVSAvoidvulnerability to connection exhaustion
Core Design Contradiction:
ProductivityVSObject-affected harmful factors

Solution Approach 1:

The system changes the maximum concurrent connections parameter dynamically based on detected attack conditions. During normal operation, the system maintains a higher maximum connection count to serve legitimate users. When trickle DoS attacks are detected through monitoring of connection establishment rates and system resource utilization, the maximum concurrent connections parameter is automatically reduced to prevent resource exhaustion, and restored when the attack ceases.

Inventive Principle:
Principle #35Parameter changes

3Reliability

If conventional DoS attack methods are used to overwhelm server capacity, then the attack is more effective at preventing service, but the cost to the attacker increases significantly with network capacity

Engineering Contradiction:
Improveservice availability protectionVSAvoidattacker resource cost
Core Design Contradiction:
ReliabilityVSLoss of energy

Solution Approach 1:

The system implements feedback mechanisms that monitor connection patterns, packet intervals, and system resource utilization to detect trickle DoS attacks. When attacks are detected through this feedback, the system automatically adjusts timeout periods and maximum connection parameters to counteract the attack. This feedback loop enables the system to respond adaptively to the subtle, resource-efficient trickle attack methods that conventional DoS detection fails to identify.

Inventive Principle:
Principle #23Feedback

Data Source

PatentUS9195805B1Adaptive responses to trickle-type denial of service attacks
Publication Date: 2015.11.24 AMAZON TECH INC
  • US9195805B1 patent drawing
  • US9195805B1 patent drawing
  • US9195805B1 patent drawing

AI summary

Various approaches are provided that are able to mitigate the effects of potential trickle-type denial of service (DoS) attacks or similar occurrences. Connection values such as the maximum number of concurrent connections and the timeout values for new connections can be adjusted dynamically in response to changes in operational state and/or an amount of suspicious activity. The suspicious activity can include, for example, a low rate of packets or bytes per unit time, repetitive small headers, unrecognized headers, and other such information. In some embodiments the changes are made iteratively to minimize the effect of the changes on legitimate requests. After the level of suspicious activity decreases, the connection values can iteratively be readjusted hack to normal operational values, in order to minimize any remaining portion of the potential attack.