Addressable Element Array for Quantum-Resistant Key Exchange
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Solution Overview
Problem
Current public key infrastructures (PKIs) are vulnerable to mathematical cryptanalysis and side-channel attacks, particularly with the emergence of quantum computers, and rely on non-volatile memory storage that can be compromised through side-channel attacks.
Innovation Solution
The implementation of a Public Key Infrastructure that is Addressable (PKA) using physically unclonable functions (PUFs) to generate private keys from public keys, where PUFs are used instead of standard non-volatile memory storage, and an array of addressable elements to securely store cryptographic tables, resistant to mathematical operations and side-channel attacks.
Engineering Contradictions & Design Principles
Engineering Contradiction Analysis
1Ease of operation
If standard non-volatile memory storage is used for key storage, then ease of operation is improved, but security is worsened due to vulnerability to side-channel attacks
Solution Approach 1:
The patent replaces traditional electronic non-volatile memory storage with a biological system using DNA molecules to store cryptographic keys. This substitution fundamentally changes the storage medium from a solid-state electronic system to a molecular biological system, which is inherently resistant to side-channel attacks that target electronic memory through power analysis, electromagnetic radiation, or timing attacks. The DNA-based storage operates on completely different physical principles, making it immune to conventional electronic side-channel exploitation methods.
2Ease of manufacture
If traditional PKI mathematical operations are used, then ease of manufacture is improved, but security is worsened due to vulnerability to mathematical cryptanalysis and quantum computer attacks
Solution Approach 1:
The patent replaces mathematical cryptographic operations with physical-biological processes. Instead of relying on computationally hard mathematical problems (such as factoring large integers or discrete logarithms) that are vulnerable to quantum computer attacks, the system uses DNA molecule manipulation and physical measurements. The cryptographic security is derived from the physical properties of DNA and the complexity of biological processes rather than mathematical complexity, making it resistant to both classical and quantum mathematical cryptanalysis.
Solution Approach 2:
The patent fundamentally changes the parameter space of cryptography from mathematical parameters (numbers, equations, computational complexity) to physical-biological parameters (DNA sequences, molecular structures, biological processes). This parameter transformation moves the security foundation from the mathematical domain to the physical domain, where quantum computers and mathematical cryptanalysis techniques are ineffective.
3Reliability
If quantum resistant security is implemented, then security is improved, but device complexity is worsened
Solution Approach 1:
The patent employs biological self-service mechanisms where DNA molecules naturally perform functions that would otherwise require complex engineered systems. The DNA molecules self-replicate, self-organize, and can be manipulated through well-established biological processes. This self-service capability of biological systems reduces the need for additional complex control mechanisms and infrastructure, making quantum-resistant security more achievable despite the inherent complexity of biological systems.
Data Source
AI summary
A computing device includes an array of addressable elements. Each addressable element is a hardware element that generates a substantially consistent response when interrogated. The device includes a processor coupled to the array of addressable elements and configured to communicate using a communication network. The processor receives a public key, and processes the public key to produce at least a set of addresses. Each address in the set of addresses identifies one or more hardware elements in the array of addressable elements. The processor generates a set of responses by interrogating the one or more hardware elements in the array of addressable elements identified by the set of addresses according to a set of reading instructions, appends the responses in the set of responses to generate a private key, receives an encrypted message and decrypts the encrypted message using the private key to generate an unencrypted message.