Aircraft Brake Control Architecture Antiskid Redundancy
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Solution Overview
Problem
Existing electromechanical aircraft braking systems face reduced antiskid control capabilities during system failures, such as power loss or component failures, which can compromise braking performance during critical operations like emergency landings.
Innovation Solution
The implementation of a redundant electromechanical braking system architecture with two independent electromechanical actuator controllers (EMACs) that generate primary and backup drive control signals using antiskid algorithms, ensuring continued effective braking even in the event of system failures, with each EMAC controlling a subset of actuators and sharing health information for optimal performance.
Engineering Contradictions & Design Principles
Engineering Contradiction Analysis
1Reliability
If redundant power sources and controllers are introduced to ensure braking availability during failures, then system reliability is improved, but device complexity increases
Solution Approach 1:
The braking system is divided into multiple independent EMAC units, each capable of autonomous antiskid control. Each EMAC can independently control a subset of EMAs, allowing the system to segment functionality while maintaining overall reliability through distribution rather than centralization.
Solution Approach 2:
The system changes the operational state of EMACs dynamically - normally both operate in parallel for full redundancy, but upon failure detection, the system transitions to single-EMAC operation with adjusted control parameters, allowing the same hardware to provide different levels of redundancy based on system state.
2Device complexity
If traditional centralized antiskid control is used in the BSCU, then device complexity is reduced, but braking performance deteriorates during system failures
Solution Approach 1:
Antiskid control functionality is segmented from the centralized BSCU and distributed to individual EMACs. Each EMAC contains its own antiskid controller that can independently execute antiskid algorithms, ensuring that antiskid control capability is preserved even when other system components fail.
Solution Approach 2:
Each EMAC is designed to be self-sufficient with complete antiskid control capability embedded within it. The EMACs can autonomously generate drive control signals and execute antiskid algorithms without requiring continuous input from the BSCU, allowing them to maintain braking performance independently during system failures.
3Device complexity
If one EMAC controls all EMAs normally, then device complexity is minimized, but braking capability is lost if that EMAC fails
Solution Approach 1:
The control architecture segments the EMAC-EMA control relationships into multiple independent pathways. Each EMAC is assigned to control specific EMAs, creating redundant control pathways that can be activated upon failure of any single EMAC or EMA subset.
Solution Approach 2:
Multiple EMACs are merged in a parallel configuration where both can simultaneously generate drive control signals for the same EMAs. This merging provides redundancy while maintaining simplicity, as the EMAs receive coordinated control signals from multiple sources that can be seamlessly switched between.
Data Source
AI summary
An electromechanical braking system includes first and second electromechanical actuator controllers (EMACs) that each independently generate a complete set of drive control signals for an associated set of electromechanical actuators (EMAs). The drive control signals are generated in accordance with an antiskid algorithm to impart antiskid control to the braking of wheels associated with the EMAs. Drive signals for some of the EMAs from the set of EMAs are output by drivers of the first EMAC and drive signals for the other EMAs from the set of EMAs are output by drivers of the second EMAC. Drive control signals from one of the EMACs are used to control output the drive signals for all the EMAs from the set of EMAs, regardless of the EMAC in which the associated drivers are present. The drive control signals from the other of the EMACs are used as a backup set of drive control signals.