Anonymous Attestation Token Redemption Without User Tracking
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Solution Overview
Problem
Existing authentication techniques for client devices over public networks expose user privacy by requiring stable device identifiers, which can be used for tracking, and are vulnerable to privacy concerns and potential fraud.
Innovation Solution
A method using anonymous attestation tokens, digitally signed by an attestation token issuing system, verifies client device integrity without revealing user identity, ensuring privacy by using blind signatures and group signatures to protect user anonymity and prevent tracking.
Engineering Contradictions & Design Principles
Engineering Contradiction Analysis
1Reliability
If stable device identifiers are used for authentication, then authentication reliability is improved, but user privacy is compromised due to tracking capabilities
Solution Approach 1:
The authentication system is segmented into multiple independent components: attestation tokens that verify device integrity without exposing identifiers, redemption results that confirm authentication status anonymously, and cryptographic signatures that provide verification without revealing user identity. This segmentation allows authentication reliability to be maintained through multiple verification layers while preventing any single point from exposing user privacy.
Solution Approach 2:
An intermediary authentication mechanism is introduced between the client device and the service provider. Instead of directly sharing device identifiers with the service provider, the system uses attestation tokens signed by a trusted attestation service as an intermediary credential. This intermediary layer verifies device integrity and provides anonymous authentication, ensuring reliability while protecting user privacy from direct exposure.
2Reliability
If device identifiers are collected for verification, then fraud detection capability is improved, but data leakage risk increases
Solution Approach 1:
The harmful element of device identifiers is extracted and removed from the authentication flow. Instead of transmitting or storing actual device identifiers, the system uses attestation tokens that contain only the necessary authentication information signed by a trusted service. The identifiers are taken out of the data exchange process entirely, eliminating data leakage risk while maintaining fraud detection capability through cryptographic verification.
Solution Approach 2:
The system uses disposable, short-lived attestation tokens instead of persistent device identifiers. Each token is valid for a specific authentication event and can be redeemed only once. These temporary credentials provide fraud detection capability for each transaction without creating long-term data storage requirements, thereby reducing data leakage risk associated with collecting and storing persistent identifiers.
3Object-affected harmful factors
If anonymous authentication is implemented, then user privacy is protected, but authentication verification complexity increases
Solution Approach 1:
The complex mechanical process of verifying anonymous credentials is replaced with cryptographic operations. Instead of complex procedural verification steps, the system uses digital signatures and cryptographic proof mechanisms that can be verified through standardized algorithms. The attestation tokens contain cryptographic proofs of device integrity that can be verified automatically, reducing verification complexity despite maintaining strong anonymous authentication and privacy protection.
Data Source
AI summary
This disclosure relates to a method for anonymous attestation that includes receiving, by an application running on a client device and from a first content provider, an authentication request to authenticate a user to receive content from a second domain of a second content provider, redeeming, with an attestation token issuing system that issued an anonymous attestation token attesting to the user's authentication to the second content provider, the anonymous attestation token by transmitting the anonymous attestation token with a second request, receiving a redemption result representing whether the attestation token was successfully redeemed, signed by the attestation token issuing system using a digital signature and is operable to verify, to the second content provider, that the user is authenticated to the second content provider without identifying the user to the second content provider, and transmitting, to the first content provider, the redemption result.