Anonymous Customer References for Privacy Protection
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Solution Overview
Problem
Application developers and non-trusted entities can monitor and track communication device users through unique identifiers, compromising user privacy, as existing solutions fail to effectively protect user identity and prevent profiling across apps and websites.
Innovation Solution
The system generates and utilizes a variable subscriber ID (V-SubId) that masks the user's identity, changing periodically to prevent tracking, and employs domain-specific anonymous customer references (ACRs) to deter unauthorized profiling and tracking.
Engineering Contradictions & Design Principles
Engineering Contradiction Analysis
1Reliability
If unique identifiers are used to identify users across apps and services, then user identification and service continuity are improved, but user privacy and protection from tracking are worsened
Solution Approach 1:
The system segments the identification process into multiple layers: a stable subscriber identifier remains private in the network core, while multiple transient pseudonymous identifiers are presented to different applications and services. This segmentation allows reliable user identification within the network while preventing external tracking.
Solution Approach 2:
The system introduces pseudonymous identifiers as intermediaries between the user's true identity and external applications. These pseudonyms act as mediators that enable service delivery without exposing the subscriber's actual identity, thereby protecting privacy while maintaining service continuity.
2Object-affected harmful factors
If pseudonymous identifiers are changed periodically to prevent tracking, then user privacy protection is improved, but service continuity and user recognition are worsened
Solution Approach 1:
The system implements dynamic pseudonymous identifiers that change over time and across different contexts. Each pseudonym has a specific lifespan and scope, allowing the system to adapt identification mechanisms to different privacy requirements while maintaining service continuity through the underlying stable subscriber identifier.
Solution Approach 2:
Different pseudonymous identifiers are created with different properties for different applications and time periods. Each pseudonym is tailored to specific local requirements, allowing some stability within specific contexts while ensuring overall privacy protection across the system.
3Object-affected harmful factors
If multiple pseudonymous identifiers are generated for different domains, then privacy protection across services is improved, but system complexity and identifier management are worsened
Solution Approach 1:
The system creates a universal identifier management framework that handles multiple pseudonymous identifiers through a single standardized interface. The same core mechanisms manage all pseudonyms across different applications and services, reducing overall system complexity despite the proliferation of individual identifiers.
Solution Approach 2:
The identifier management system automatically generates, tracks, and retires pseudonymous identifiers without requiring manual intervention. The system self-manages the complexity of multiple identifiers through automated processes, reducing the burden on users and operators.
Data Source
AI summary
Facilitation of management and utilization of domain-specific anonymous customer references (ACRs) for protection of subscriber privacy across different domains is disclosed herein. In one aspect, on receiving user authorization, an ACR services (ACRS) component can generate an ACR that is to be inserted in a communication or message transmitted from a user equipment to an untrusted entity. The ACR can be generated based on address data associated with the untrusted entity and/or a unique subscriber identifier associated with the user equipment. As an example, the ACR creation component can generate the ACR based on a cryptographic hash, a static encryption key, and/or a dynamic encryption key. If the ACR is forwarded to a trusted entity, the trusted entity can calculate the unique subscriber identifier based on evaluating the ACR and/or exchange the ACR for the unique subscriber identifier via a secure communication with the ACRS component.


