Anonymous Device Fingerprinting via Cryptographic Proof
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Solution Overview
Problem
Existing device registration approaches are vulnerable to spoofing attacks, as metadata such as IP addresses, MAC addresses, and user agent strings can be easily manipulated by attackers, allowing them to bypass authentication mechanisms.
Innovation Solution
The use of a user-agent-based non-extractable keypair to generate a cryptographic proof that uniquely identifies a device, ensuring that the device's fingerprint is generated and verified in an isolated and secured environment, thus eliminating the risk of spoofing.
Engineering Contradictions & Design Principles
Engineering Contradiction Analysis
1Ease of operation
If device registration is performed using metadata such as IP address, MAC address, and user agent string, then device identification can be implemented, but the system becomes vulnerable to spoofing attacks since all these data points can be manipulated by attackers
Solution Approach 1:
The patent replaces traditional metadata-based device identification (mechanical/system-level data collection) with cryptographic proof-based identification. Instead of relying on manipulatable metadata like IP addresses and user agent strings, the system uses cryptographic proofs generated by the device's secure environment to uniquely identify the device. This substitution eliminates the spoofing vulnerability inherent in metadata-based approaches while maintaining ease of device registration.
Solution Approach 2:
The patent introduces cryptographic proofs as an intermediary mechanism between the device and the authentication system. These proofs serve as a trusted mediator that verifies device identity without exposing vulnerable metadata. The cryptographic proof acts as a secure bridge that allows the system to identify devices reliably without directly relying on manipulatable data points like IP addresses or user agent strings.
2Reliability
If synchronous authentication mechanisms are used to eliminate user-known passwords, then the shelf-life of stolen credentials is limited, but users can still be tricked into entering authentication data into illegitimate sites
Solution Approach 1:
The patent implements preliminary device identification and verification before authentication credentials are exchanged. By establishing device identity through cryptographic proofs in advance, the system creates a trusted foundation that prevents phishing attacks. The device is registered and verified before any authentication data is shared, ensuring that even if users are tricked into illegitimate sites, the cryptographic binding prevents credential theft from being useful.
Solution Approach 2:
The patent inverts the traditional authentication model by prioritizing device identification over credential verification. Instead of trusting credentials and verifying devices, the system first establishes device identity through cryptographic proofs and then uses that trusted device identity to secure credential exchange. This inversion ensures that even stolen credentials cannot be used without the corresponding cryptographic proof, effectively neutralizing phishing attacks.
3Reliability
If cryptographic proofs are used for device identification, then spoofing resistance is achieved, but the system complexity increases due to the need for isolated and secured environments for keypair generation
Solution Approach 1:
The patent implements self-service device identification by leveraging the device's own secure environment (such as hardware security modules or trusted execution environments) to generate and store cryptographic keypairs. The device serves itself by using its built-in secure capabilities to create cryptographic proofs without requiring external verification infrastructure. This self-service approach achieves spoofing resistance while minimizing system complexity, as each device independently provides its own security functionality.
Data Source
AI summary
Systems, methods, and computer readable media are described herein that use a user-agent-based non-extractable cryptographic keypair to generate a cryptographic proof containing a device fingerprint that an authentication system can use to subsequently identify and/or register a known device. Specifically, the systems disclosed herein may generate the device's “fingerprint” in an isolated and secured environment. Although the private key cannot be extracted from the isolated and secured environment, the authentication system can verify the truthfulness of the device's identity. This cryptographic “fingerprint,” in concert with a synchronous authentication system, has the ability to essentially eliminate authentication phishing. By ensuring that the cryptographic fingerprint of the device answering the synchronous authentication challenge has the same cryptographic fingerprint as the device that initiated the authentication request, the operation ensures the integrity of the authentication mechanism by verifying the legitimacy of the requesting device.