Control Plane Trust via Anonymous Cryptographic Tokens
Find Innovative SolutionsGenerate Solutions
Solution Overview
Problem
Existing systems face challenges in establishing and revoking trust with anonymous software artifacts or devices while preserving their anonymity, particularly in control planes where unique identities are typically required for trust establishment.
Innovation Solution
A control plane system that uses cryptographically verifiable anonymized tokens to establish and revoke trust with software artifacts or devices, employing methods like blind decryption and anonymized identity management to maintain anonymity.
Engineering Contradictions & Design Principles
Engineering Contradiction Analysis
1Reliability
If traditional identity-based trust establishment is used in control planes, then trust verification is straightforward, but anonymity of software artifacts or devices is lost
Solution Approach 1:
The system segments the trust establishment process into two independent phases: (1) anonymous token issuance where devices receive cryptographic tokens without revealing identities, and (2) trust verification where control planes validate tokens without learning device identities. This segmentation allows trust verification to proceed reliably while preserving anonymity throughout the process.
Solution Approach 2:
Anonymous tokens serve as cryptographic intermediaries that mediate between devices and control planes. These tokens contain verified identity information and authorization data, allowing control planes to trust devices without directly knowing their identities. The tokens act as a trusted intermediary layer that decouples trust verification from identity disclosure.
2Loss of information
If anonymous tokens are used to preserve device anonymity, then privacy is maintained, but trust establishment complexity increases
Solution Approach 1:
The system performs preliminary actions by pre-issuing anonymous tokens to devices during manufacturing or initial provisioning. These tokens are generated in advance using secure cryptographic key pairs and signed by trusted authorities. This preliminary setup eliminates the need for complex real-time identity verification, as devices present pre-validated tokens for trust establishment.
Solution Approach 2:
The system uses cryptographic copies of device identities embedded in anonymous tokens. Instead of transmitting actual device identities, the system creates and verifies cryptographic representations (signed token claims) that prove device authenticity without exposing real identities. This copying approach simplifies the trust mechanism by working with verified token data rather than raw identity information.
3Object-affected harmful factors
If control planes verify device identities for security, then system security improves, but device anonymity is compromised
Solution Approach 1:
The system applies local quality by differentiating between what information is needed for security verification versus what information should remain anonymous. Control planes verify local properties of tokens (cryptographic signatures, expiration dates, authorization claims) without accessing or storing global device identity information. This selective verification maintains security while preserving anonymity.
Solution Approach 2:
The system transitions from a single-dimensional trust model (identity-based) to a multi-dimensional model where trust is established through cryptographic token properties rather than direct identity knowledge. Control planes operate in the dimension of token verification (cryptographic validation) rather than identity dimension, allowing security to be enforced without compromising anonymity.
Data Source
AI summary
Systems and methods for a control plane to cryptographically trust and revoke the trust of anonymous software artifacts or devices are described. In an illustrative, non-limiting embodiment, an Information Handling System (IHS) may include: a processor; and a memory coupled to the processor, where the memory includes program instructions stored thereon that, upon execution by the processor, cause a control plane of the IHS to: receive an anonymous token of a distributed anonymous token set package from a requestor; verify the anonymous token; and subsequent to verifying the anonymous token, establish a trust relationship with the requestor.