AoA/AoD Phase Attack Detection Using Random Antenna Switching
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Solution Overview
Problem
Existing Angle of Arrival (AoA) and Angle of Departure (AoD) algorithms are vulnerable to phase manipulation attacks, which can disrupt location systems used in access control, security, and tracking applications by falsely determining the location of malicious devices.
Innovation Solution
The system generates random antenna switching patterns to detect phase manipulation by comparing phase differences in Constant Tone Extension (CTE) signals received during different sample slots, and if the differences exceed a threshold, it identifies and responds to malicious attacks by discarding location information, alerting operators, or changing radio parameters.
Engineering Contradictions & Design Principles
Engineering Contradiction Analysis
1Measurement precision
If AoA/AoD algorithms use phase difference measurements to determine signal direction, then location accuracy is improved, but the system becomes vulnerable to phase manipulation attacks
Solution Approach 1:
The system performs preliminary actions by generating random antenna switching patterns before the actual AoA/AoD measurement process. These patterns are used to receive and compare CTE signals in advance, establishing a baseline for detecting phase manipulation attacks before they can compromise location accuracy.
Solution Approach 2:
The system implements feedback by comparing phase differences of CTE signals received during different sample slots and using the same antenna element. When phase differences exceed expected thresholds, the system detects potential attacks and adjusts its operation accordingly, creating a closed-loop security mechanism.
2Difficulty of detecting and measuring
If the system compares phase differences across multiple sample slots to detect attacks, then detection capability is improved, but processing complexity increases
Solution Approach 1:
The system segments the CTE signal reception process into multiple sample slots, each associated with specific antenna elements through random switching patterns. This segmentation allows independent phase comparison for each antenna element across different slots, simplifying the detection logic while improving attack detection capability.
3Reliability
If random antenna switching patterns are generated for each AoA operation, then attack protection is improved, but system overhead increases
Solution Approach 1:
The system employs periodic action by generating random antenna switching patterns at regular intervals for each AoA operation. This periodic generation of random patterns provides consistent attack protection while managing system overhead through structured, repeatable processes.
Data Source
AI summary
Systems and methods for detecting and protecting against phase manipulation during AoA or AoD operations are disclosed. For AoA operations, the network device receiving the constant tone extension (CTE) generates an antenna switching pattern, which may be randomly generated. The network device then receives the CTE using a plurality of antenna elements. In one embodiment, the network device compares the phase of portions of the CTE signal received that utilize the same antenna element. If the phase of these portions differs by more than a threshold, the network device detects a malicious attack and acts accordingly. In another embodiment, if the AoA algorithm cannot determine the angle of arrival, the network device detects a malicious attack and acts accordingly. For angle of departure operations, the network device that transmits the CTE signal generates the antenna switching pattern and transmits it to the position engine, which performs the comparisons described above.