Message-Level API Encryption Across Unsecure Server Zones
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Solution Overview
Problem
Financial institutions face challenges in securing message transmission within their systems due to the 'onion security model' where messages are decrypted and re-encrypted at each layer, exposing unencrypted messages to operations personnel, and most have not transitioned to secure data centers, leading to potential data exposure.
Innovation Solution
Implementing message-level encryption using dedicated processors to encrypt and decrypt messages through unsecure zones within both the requesting and responding parties' computer systems, employing session keys and public/private key pairs stored in Hardware Security Modules (HSMs) to maintain message integrity and confidentiality.
Engineering Contradictions & Design Principles
Engineering Contradiction Analysis
1Reliability
If the onion security model is used with multiple layers of decryption and re-encryption, then security analysis can be performed at each layer, but messages are exposed in unencrypted form to operations personnel at each layer
Solution Approach 1:
The patent segments the security architecture into distinct functional layers: an unsecure zone for operations personnel to perform security analysis, and secure zones with HSMs for key storage and encryption/decryption operations. This segmentation allows security analysis capability while preventing message exposure by ensuring that sensitive operations occur in isolated secure environments rather than exposing unencrypted messages at intermediate layers.
Solution Approach 2:
The patent introduces secure zones with HSMs as intermediary components between the unsecure zone and the message flow. These intermediaries handle all encryption and decryption operations, allowing security analysis in the unsecure zone without exposing actual message content to personnel. The HSM acts as a mediator that enables security functions while protecting sensitive data.
2Ease of operation
If operations personnel are given physical and login access to servers for operational purposes, then system operations can be performed, but unencrypted messages become visible to personnel
Solution Approach 1:
The patent segments the server environment into unsecure zones where operations personnel can access and analyze messages, and secure zones where HSMs perform encryption/decryption operations. This segmentation allows operational personnel to perform their duties in the unsecure zone while the secure zone isolates sensitive cryptographic operations, preventing personnel from accessing unencrypted messages even though they have server access.
Solution Approach 2:
The HSM acts as an intermediary that operations personnel can interact with through the unsecure zone interface, but the actual sensitive operations occur within the secure zone. Personnel can initiate operations and receive results without ever seeing the unencrypted message content, as the HSM mediates all interactions between the unsecure operational environment and the secure cryptographic functions.
3Adaptability or versatility
If messages are transmitted through unsecure zones within computer systems, then system architecture flexibility is maintained, but message confidentiality is compromised
Solution Approach 1:
The patent segments the transmission path into unsecure zones for flexible routing and secure zones with HSMs for confidentiality protection. Messages are encrypted before entering unsecure zones and decrypted only in secure zones, allowing the system to maintain architectural flexibility with unsecure transmission paths while preserving confidentiality through isolated secure processing zones.
Solution Approach 2:
The HSM serves as an intermediary that enables messages to traverse unsecure zones while maintaining confidentiality. The HSM encrypts messages before they enter unsecure transmission paths and decrypts them only when needed in secure zones, acting as a mediator that allows flexible architecture without compromising message confidentiality during transmission.
Data Source
AI summary
Disclosed are requesting party and responding party computer systems which perform a message level encryption for messages sent through the computer systems. Using the message level encryption, the computer systems may prevent those with access to an unsecured zone in one or more of the computer systems from viewing the messages.